ON April 6, 1917, the date on which the United States entered the World War, I was on duty in the War Department, as Secretary of the General Staff. I was, at that time, Lieutenant Colonel, General Staff, and had been Secretary since August, 1914, and also had previously been Secretary, from January, 191I, to July, 1912.
In common with all officers of the War Department, I hoped to be relieved and given duty in France, but my request was disapproved by the Chief of Staff, Major General Hugh L. Scott. On September 22, 1917, General Scott reached the age where the law is mandatory that an Army officer pass from the active to the retired list of the Army, and General Tasker H. Bliss, who had been the Assistant Chief of Staff, took his place. General Bliss retired December 31, 1917, and Major General Peyton C. March soon thereafter became Chief of Staff. He was in France, when notified of his selection, and assumed his new duties about March 1, 1918.
As soon as General March arrived he told me that he wanted me to remain in my present duties for about four months and then he intended to permit me to go to France; but in May, 1918, he said, " If any one has to go to Russia, you're it." This remark rather stunned me, but as it was spoken of as only a possibility, I made no comment, as I knew General March was aware of my desire for service in Europe, and any opportunity I had to devote to anything other than the duties of my desk, was given to study of the conditions and operations in France. I had not even thought of the possibility of American troops being sent to Siberia, and after General March made this remark, I gave it very little consideration, because I did not believe any one would be selected to go.
The latter part of June, 1918, General March told me I was to be made a Major General, National Army, and that I could have the command of any Division in the United States, that did not have a permanent Commander. This made me feel quite sure that the idea of sending troops to Siberia had been given up, or that I would not be sent, and the next morning I told him I would prefer the 8th Division at Camp Fremont, Palo Alto, California. He assented and soon thereafter my name was sent to the Senate for confirmation as Major General, National Army. I was confirmed on July 9, 1918, immediately told General March I wanted to join the Division to which I had been assigned, and on the 13th of July, I left Washington. I assumed command of the 8th Division on July 18, 1918, began familiarizing myself with my new duties, and felt very happy and contented as I knew the 8th Division was scheduled to leave for France in October.
On the afternoon of August 2, 1918, my Chief of Staff told me that a code message was received from Washington and the first sentence was - " You will not tell any member of your staff or anybody else of the contents of this message." I asked the Chief of Staff who signed it and he said " Marshall." I told the Chief of Staff Marshall had nothing to do with me and for him and the Assistant Chief of Staff to decode the message. The message directed me " to take the first and fastest train out of San Francisco and proceed to Kansas City, go to the Baltimore Hotel, and ask for the Secretary of War, and if he was not there, for me to wait until he arrived." I look upon this telegram as one of the most remarkable communications I ever saw come out of the War Department, and if it had not been for the mistake that the designation for signature stood for Marshall instead of March, I would have been put in the embarrassing position of disobeying the order or leaving my station without telling anyone my authority for absence or my destination.
The telegram gave me no information as to why I had been summoned to Kansas City, the probable time of absence, or whether or not I would return. Some of this information seemed essential for my personal preparation. I did not know what clothing to take, and I was also in doubt as to whether the order meant a permanent change of station. I looked at a schedule, and found the Santa Fe train left San Francisco in two hours, so I put a few things in my travelling bag and a few more in a small trunk locker and started for San Francisco. I made the train, but could get no Pullman accommodations. On the way to Kansas City, I telegraphed Mr. Baker, Secretary of War, at the Baltimore Hotel telling him what train I was on. During the trip, I tried to figure out what this very secret mission could be, and feared it meant Siberia, although I had seen nothing in the press indicating that the United States would possibly send troops to Russia.
When I arrived in Kansas City, about 10 P.M., a red cap man met me and told me Mr. Baker was waiting in a room in the station. As Mr. Baker's train was leaving very soon he at once said he was sorry he had to send me to Siberia. As always, he was very generous and expressed his regrets and said he knew I did not want to go and he might, some day, tell me why I had to go. He also wanted me to know that General March tried to get me out of the Siberian trip and wanted me to go to France. He said: " If in future you want to cuss anybody for sending you to Siberia I am the man." He had, by this time, handed me a sealed envelope, saying: " This contains the policy of the United States in Russia which you are to follow. Watch your step; you will be walking on eggs loaded with dynamite. God bless you and good-bye."
As soon as I could get to the hotel I opened the envelope and saw it was a paper of seven pages, headed " Aide Memoire " without any signature, but at the end appeared, " Department of State, Washington, July 17, 1918." After carefully reading the document and feeling that I understood the policy, I went to bed, but I could not sleep and I kept wondering what other nations were doing and why I was not given some information about what was going on in Siberia. The following day I read this document several times and tried to analyse and get the meaning of each and every sentence. I felt there could be no misunderstanding the policy of the United States, and I did not feel it was necessary for me to ask for elucidation of any point. The policy as given to me was as follows :
The whole heart of the people of the United States is in the winning of this war. The controlling purpose of the Government of the United States is to do everything that is necessary and effective to win it. It wishes to cooperate in every practicable way with the allied governments, and to cooperate ungrudgingly; for it has no ends of its own to serve and believes that the war can be won only by common council and intimate concert of action. It has sought to study every proposed policy or action in which its cooperation has been asked in this spirit, and states the following conclusions in the confidence, that if it finds itself obliged to decline participation in any undertaking or course of action, it will be understood that it does so only because it deems itself precluded from participating by imperative considerations either of policy or fact.
In full agreement with the allied governments and upon the unanimous advice of the Supreme War Council, the Government of the United States adopted, upon its entrance into the war, a plan for taking part in the fighting on the western front into which all its resources of men and material were to be put, and put as rapidly as possible, and it has carried out this plan with energy and success, pressing its execution more and more rapidly forward and literally putting into it the entire energy and executive force of the nation. This was its response, its very willing and hearty response, to what was the unhesitating judgment alike of its own military advisers and of the advisers of the allied governments. It is now considering, at the suggestion of the Supreme War Council, the possibility of making very considerable additions even to this immense programme which, if they should prove feasible at all, will tax the industrial processes of the United States and the shipping facilities of the whole group of associated nations to the utmost. It has thus concentrated all its plans and all its resources upon this single absolutely necessary object.
In such circumstances it feels it to be its duty to say that it cannot, so long as the military situation on the western front remains critical, consent to break or slacken the force of its present effort by diverting any part of its military force to other points or objectives. The United States is at a great distance from the field of action on the western front; it is at a much greater distance from any other field of action. The instrumentalities by which it is to handle its armies and its stores have at great cost and with great difficulty been created in France. They do not exist elsewhere. It is practicable for her to do a great deal in France; it is not practicable for her to do anything of importance or on a large scale upon any other field. The American Government, therefore, very respectfully requested its Associates to accept its deliberate judgment that it should not dissipate its force by atteming important operations elsewhere.
It regards the Italian front as closely coordinated with the western front, however, and is willing to divert a portion of its military forces from France to Italy if it is the judgment and wish of the Supreme Command that it should do so. It wishes to defer to the decision of the Commander-in-Chief in this matter, as it would wish to defer in all others, particularly because it considers these two fronts so related as to be practically but separate parts of a single line and because it would be necessary that any American troops sent to Italy should be subtracted from the number used in France and be actually transported across French territory from the ports now used by armies of the United States.
It is the clear and fixed judgment of the Government of the United States, arrived at after repeated and very searching reconsiderations of the whole situation in Russia, that military intervention there would add to the present sad confusion in Russia rather than cure it, injure her rather than help her, and that it would be of no advantage in the prosecution of our main design, to win the war against Germany. It cannot, therefore, take part in such intervention or sanction it in principle. Military intervention would, in its judgment, even supposing it to be efficacious in its immediate avowed object of delivering an attack upon Germany from the east, be merely a method of making use of Russia, not a method of serving her. Her people could not profit by it, if they profitted by it at all, in time to save them from their present distresses, and their substance would be used to maintain foreign armies, not to reconstitute their own. Military action is admissible in Russia, as the Government of the United States sees the circumstances, only to help the Czecho-Slovaks consolidate their forces and get into successful co-operation with their Slavic kinsmen and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance. Whether from Vladivostok or from Murmansk and Archangel, the only legitimate object for which American or allied troops can be employed, it submits, is to guard military stores which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceable to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense. For helping the Czecho-Slovaks there is immediate necessity and sufficient justification. Recent developments have made it evident that that is in the interest of what the Russian people themselves desire, and the Government of the United States is glad to contribute the small force at its disposal for that purpose. It yields, also, to the judgment of the Supreme Command in the matter of establishing a small force at Murmansk, to guard the military stores at Kola and to make it safe for Russian forces to come together in organized bodies in the north. But it owes it to frank counsel to say that it can go no further than these modest and experimental plans. It is not in a position, and has no expectation of being in a position, to take part in organized intervention in adequate force from either Vladivostok or Murmansk and Archangel. It feels that it ought to add, also, that it will feel at liberty to use the few troops it can spare only for the purposes here stated and shall feel obliged to withdraw these forces, in order to add them to the forces at the western front, if the plans in whose execution it is now intended that they should develop into others inconsistent with the policy to which the Government of the United States feels constrained to restrict itself.
At the same time the Government of the United States wishes to say with the utmost cordiality and good will that none of the conclusions here stated is meant to wear the least color of criticism of what the other governments associated against Germany may think it wise to undertake. It wishes in no way to embarrass their choices of policy. All that is intended here is a perfectly frank and definite statement of the policy which the United States feels obliged to adopt for herself and in the use of her own military forces. The Government of the United States does not wish it to be understood that in so restricting its own activities it is seeking, even by implication, to set limits to the action or to define the policies of its Associates.
It hopes to carry out the plans for safeguarding the rear of the Czecho-Slovaks operating from Vladivostok in a way that will place it and keep it in close cooperation with a small military force like its own from Japan, and if necessary from the other Allies, and that will assure it of the cordial accord of all the allied powers; and it proposes to ask all associated in this course of action to unite in assuring the people of Russia in the most public and solemn manner that none of the governments uniting in action either in Siberia or in northern Russia contemplates any interference of any kind with the political sovereignty of Russia, any intervention in her internal affairs, or any impairment of her territorial integrity either now or hereafter, but that each of the associated powers has the single object of affording such aid as shall be acceable, and only such aid as shall be acceable, to the Russian people in their endeavour to regain control of their own affairs, their own territory, and their own destiny.
It is the hope and purpose of the Government of the United States to take advantage of the earliest opportunity to send to Siberia a commission of merchants, agricultural experts, labour advisers, Red Cross Representatives, and agents of the Young Men's Christian Association accustomed to organizing the best methods of spreading useful information and rendering educational help of a modest sort, in order in some systematic manner to relieve the immediate economic necessities of the people there in every way for which opportunity may open. The execution of this plan will follow and will not be permitted to embarrass the military assistance rendered in the rear of the westward-moving forces of the Czecho-Slovaks.
Department of State,
Washington, July 17, 1918.
The following part of the policy will bear repeating as it governed the American troops during our entire nineteen months in Siberia; viz., the solemn assurance to the people of Russia, in the most public and solemn manner, that none of the Governments uniting in action in either Siberia or in Northern Russia contemplates any interference of any kind with the political sovereignty of Russia, any intervention in her internal affairs. . . .
This clearly committed the agents of the United States to a specific line of action as long as this solemn assurance held good and one of these two questions or both came up in the consideration of practically every dealing I had with the different Russian factions. These assurances of our Government were always brought to the forefront in the consideration of all controversial questions with other nations. In fact they entered into the consideration of all controversial questions in Siberia.
In order to give proper consideration to any history of the Siberian Expedition it is necessary briefly to summarize the conditions in Russia which led to the decision for Allied intervention.
With the fall of the Romanoff dynasty in March, 1917, the mass of the people, so long oppressed and suppressed by their Government, showed little interest in the continuation of the War. Russian soldiers under the corrupt leadership of the Czarists had suffered greater hardships and privations than those of any nation, had lost more in killed and wounded, and were weary of the horrors of War which they had experienced in such measure.
Although the revolutionary spirit had long been alive in Russia, the War greatly accelerated the disintegration of the Czarist regime and with the final collapse grave anxiety was felt by the Allies as to the result of this debacle on the outcome of the struggle.
The usual line of propaganda given out by the Allies as to the imminence of autocracy and the loss of " Self Determination of Government " in case the Central Powers were successful, could not be used in Russia before the Revolution as the Czar's Government was the most autocratic in the world.
After March, 1917, this propaganda was partly successful for a short time among intellectuals but the masses could not have been induced to continue the struggle unless the War was regarded by them as a revolutionary conflict which was not the case.
The revolutionary movement in Russia, which started in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, culminated in the revolutions of 1905 and 1917, with the opposition to the Czarist Government widespread, including even a part of the propertied classes.
The peasant had been kept in ignorance and poverty by the landed nobility and the worker mercilessly exploited. Naturally, under these circumstances, the most influential groups with the mass of the people were the various socialist parties, that showed an interest in improving their lot as most of these parties demanded free land for the peasants, and improved conditions for the workers. The advocates of these changes in the Government had been compelled to work in foreign countries, or under cover in Russia, but apparently had had greater success in instilling their socialistic ideas in the minds of the bulk of the Russian people than the world realized.
The Government established after the downfall of the Czar, known as the Kerensky Government, was liberal and democratic and very popular in the beginning, but due to delay in the solution of the land problem, so important to the Russian peasants, and to the announcements that this Government intended to continue in the War, it became less and less in favour until it was easily overthrown by the socialists of the extreme left, the Bolsheviks.
The initial anxiety of the Allied representatives was somewhat ameliorated by the announcement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Kerensky Government, on March 18, which read:
Faithful to the pact which unites her indissolubly to her glorious Allies, Russia is resolved like them to fight against the common enemy until the end without cessation and without faltering. [Current History, Vol. V. Part i, page 13.]
This statement of the New Government of Russia was consoling, but the Allied representatives began preparing for eventualities, as the workers and soldiers began to assert themselves.
On March 22, 1917, the United States extended recognition to the Kerensky Government, and a mission composed of prominent Americans, headed by the Honorable Elihu Root, was sent to Russia for the announced purpose of discussing " the best and most practical means of cooperation between the two peoples in carrying the present struggle for the freedom of all the peoples to a successful consummation."
Mr. Root, as head of the American mission, assured the representatives of the New Provisional Government of Russia, that that Government could count on the steadfast friendship of the United States. Other Allied Governments, as well as the United States, were trying to show their friendship for the New Provisional Government of Russia, but subsequent events have shown that these representations were of little avail as they were too conservative for the revolutionary mass of the people.
The more radicalism appearing in the Russian ranks, the greater the anxiety felt by the Allies and the United States.
The most important feature of the situation was the demoralization of the Army and the entire economic life of the Country which was clearly shown by the appeal of Prince G. E. Lvov, Prime Minister of Russia, who stated on April 9, 1917 :
Citizens: The Provisional Government, having considered the military situation of the Russian State, and being conscious of its duty to the Country, has resolved to tell the people directly and openly the whole truth. The overthrown government has left the defense of the Country in an utterly disorganized condition. By its criminal inactivity and inefficient methods, it disorganized our finances, food supply, transportation, and the supply of the Army. It has undermined our economic organization.'
More than six months later on November 1, 1917, when rumours were current that Russia had withdrawn from the War, Kerensky gave a desperate picture of the situation in an interview with the representative of the Associated Press, in part as follows:(1)
" Russia has fought consistently since the beginning. She saved France and England from disaster early in the War. She is worn out by the strain and claims as her right that the Allies now shoulder the burden."
The correspondent called attention to widely contradictory reports on Russian conditions, and asked the Premier for a frank statement of the facts.
" It has been said by travelers returning from England and elsewhere to America that opinion among the people, not officially but generally, is that Russia is virtually out of the War."
" Is Russia out of the War? " Kerensky repeated the words and laughed. " That," he answered, " is a ridiculous question. Russia is taking an enormous part in the War. One has only to remember history. Russia began the War for the Allies. While she was already fighting, England was only preparing and America was only observing.
" Russia at the beginning bore the whole brunt of the fighting thereby saving Great Britain and France. People who say she is out of the War have short memories. We have fought since the beginning and have the right to claim that the Allies now take the heaviest part of the burden on their shoulders...."
The Premier was asked regarding the morale of the Russian People and Army. He answered:
" The masses are worn out economically. The disorganized state of life in general has had a psychological effect on the people. They doubt the possibility of attaining their hopes." (2)
This interview which took place six days before the November (Bolshevik) revolution clearly demonstrated the condition of affairs. Although Kerensky stressed the past and avoided the future, his meaning was clear and the impossibility of continuing the War stood out without question. It was fast becoming only a matter of weeks.
On November 7, 1917, the New Provisional Government was overthrown by the Bolsheviks, under the slogan, " All power to the Soviets," and immediate peace.
On the 9th of November, 1917, the Soviet representatives proposed to all peoples engaged in the War that negotiations be begun for a just and democratic peace.(3) This proposal, coupled with the radical ideas of the Soviet adherents, presented serious problems for the consideration of Allied and associated representatives. The Russian question had already extended beyond the question of the prosecution of the War. The interests of England and Japan, in the Far East, were likely to be jeopardized by the spread of such radical ideas of Government as were held by the Soviets, while France was very antagonistic and much opposed to the proposal for peace.
This appeal for a " just and democratic peace " resulted in charges, by those opposed to peace on the terms obtainable at that time, that the proposal of the Soviets was not made in good faith, although the announced statements as to their ideas, and their questions as to what help the Allies would give them, in case they refused to sign the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, justified the belief that they were sincere in their proposal. The socialistic ideas of Government, held by the Soviets, were so objectionable to the Allies that it was unreasonable to expect them to work in harmony, even upon such an important question as the continuation of the War.
On the 23rd of November, the Allied Military Attaches, at the Russian Staff, sent the following communication to the Russian Military Commander:
The Chiefs of the Military Missions accredited to the Russian Supreme Command, acting on the basis of definite instructions received from their Governments through the plenipotentiary representatives in Petrograd, have the honor to state a most energetic protest to the Russian Supreme Command against the violations of the terms of the treaty of the 5th of September, 1914, made by the Allied powers, by which treaty the Allies, including Russia, solemnly agreed not to make a separate peace, nor to cease military activity.(4)
On November 27, 1917, the Military Attache of the United States, made a similar protest to the Russian Commander.
On December 1, 1917, Mr. Trotsky, at that time People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, issued a statement that the Soviet Government would not tolerate any military representatives of other Governments sending communications to the Military Commander of the Russian Forces, who by this time had been removed from his Command.
On January 8, 1916, in an address to Congress, President Wilson said:
" Whether their present leaders believe it or not, it is our heartfelt desire and hope that some way may be opened whereby we may be privileged to assist the people of Russia to attain their utmost hope of liberty and ordered peace." This was the expression of the well known views of President Wilson. He was opposed to autocracy and to oppression of the people by any Government.
The Government representatives of England, France, and Japan did not have the same ideas as President Wilson as to " self-determination " of peoples as to the forms of their own Governments. Their ideas were accentuated when it came to considering the Soviet Government, because of the fear of radicalism in European countries and especially in the Far East. These different views of Government naturally caused radical divergence in the policies proposed by the four powers chiefly interested in the Far East: viz., United States, England, France, and Japan, when it came to formulating plans to repair the damage due to the withdrawal of the Russian troops from the Eastern front. The four powers, above mentioned, had to depend upon their respective representatives on the ground for information as to conditions, and these representatives, as well as the leaders, had their own ideas as to forms of Government.
General Alfred Knox, British Army, undoubtedly had much influence in shaping the British policy in Russia. He had served as Military Attache in Petrograd during the Czarist regime; he spoke Russian, and was personally known to many of the former Czarist officials; he was naturally autocratic and could not, if he had desired to do so, give sympathetic consideration to the aspirations of the peasant class in Russia, whom he characterized as swine.
The Czarist Russian Army and Navy officers were naturally very antagonistic to the Soviets and were favourable to any proposition that gave promise of keeping them in their old positions.
These people had convinced General Knox, and I think he was honest in his views, that if the Allies would arm, equip, pay, clothe, and feed a Russian force, the Eastern front could be formed of Russian volunteers. This Eastern Army was to be commanded by Allied and Russian officers, and General Knox thought only a few Allied officers would be necessary. The French were favourable to any proposition that gave promise of keeping the German troops on the Eastern front and thereby relieve the anticipated pressure of the Central Powers on the Western front.
The Japanese were naturally much interested in the Far East but their enthusiasm did not extend beyond Lake Baikal, while the United States did not consider the proposition to form an Eastern front from Russian volunteers a practical one. The objection was based on the long line of communications from a base on the Pacific or on the Arctic oceans to the Eastern front; and on the fear that the Russians would believe, or that the Germans would convince them, that the Allies would never leave their country. If the Russians should believe that the Allies, or any of them, intended to annex any part of their territory, there would be grave danger that their sympathy for the Allied Cause would be changed to sympathy for the Central Powers. The United States Government expressed great compassion for the Russian people who had suffered so much for the Allied Cause, and seemed desirous of aiding them, but was unwilling to take any drastic action, like the proposal to form an Eastern front, because this step was designed to use the Russian people rather than to aid them. Also, if the formation of an Eastern front involved America in providing men or material, it would have been necessary to change the plans formulated, as soon as practicable after we entered-the War, and divide our efforts which did not appear to be in the interest of the Allied Cause. An Eastern front involved the expenditure of a great deal of money and could not be very well carried out without the approval and assistance of the United States.
As soon as Japan, France, and England were convinced that the United States would not take part in military intervention in Russia, other plans were tried which it was hoped would culminate in the same result.
It is significant that the British advocacy of the use of troops, always carried with it the cooperation of their Allies, the Japanese. In March the British proposed that Japan send troops as far as the Ural Mountains, and Great Britian expressed a willingness for Japan to be compensated for this move at the expense of Russia. There was some fear in Allied Councils, that if Japan went alone into Russia it might cause more harm than good, as the scars left by the Russo-Japanese War had not entirely disappeared.
Japan was willing to occupy Vladivostok, the Chinese Eastern, and the Amur railways and again there was fear that the Russians would construe this action as an effort by Japan to take part of Siberia. There seemed to be always present some fear or mistrust of supposed friends, when any action with reference to Russia was proposed, and it was evident the suspicions extended beyond the period of War.
With reference to japan entering Siberia, Colonel R. H. Bruce Lockhart, on March 5, 1918, cabled the British Foreign Office from Moscow, in part, as follows :
i. " . . . If, however, the allies are to allow japan to enter Siberia, the whole position is hopeless. Every class of Russian will prefer the Germans to the Japanese...."
" I feel sure that you can have no idea of the feeling which Japanese intervention would arouse. Even the Cadet Press, which can not be accused of Bolshevik sympathies, is loud in its denunciation of this crime against Russia, and is now preaching support of any party that will oppose Germany and save the revolution. . . . And now when Germany's aims have been unmasked to the whole world, the Allies are to nullify the benefits of this by allowing the Japanese to enter Russia. . . ." (5)
The American Ambassador to Russia, Mr. Francis, was also much exercised about the Japanese intervention in Siberia, and on March 9, 1918, he cabled to the State Department at Washington, in part:
2. " . . . Moscow and Petrograd Soviets have both instructed their delegates to the conference of March 12th, to support the ratification of the peace terms. I fear that such action is the result of a threatened Japanese invasion of Siberia. . . . Trotsky told Robins that he had heard such an invasion was countenanced by the Allies and especially by America, and it would not only force the Government to advocate the ratification of the humiliating peace but would so completely estrange all factions in Russia that further resistance to Germany would be absolutely impossible. . . ."
In the Congressional Record, June 29, 1919, p. 2336, appears a copy of a note from the Soviet Government given by Trotsky to Colonel Robins for transmission to the American Government. In this note, dated March 5, 1918, appears, in part:
" In case (a) the all Russian Congress of the Soviets will refuse to ratify the peace treaty with Germany or (b) if the German Government, breaking the peace treaty, will renew the offensive in order to continue its robbers' raid. . . .
" (1) Can the Soviet Government rely on the support of the United States of North America, Great Britain, and France in its Struggle against Germany?
What kind of support could be furnished in the nearest future, and on what conditions - Military equipment, transportation supplies, living necessities?
What kind of support could be furnished particularly and especially by the United States? . . ."
I have no information as to what reply, if any, the United States made to these queries. The flames of hatred and suspicion were so strong at this time, that there was little hope of giving full credence to the sincerity of the question asked by Trotsky, the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
For six months prior to the dispatch of American troops to Siberia, England, France, and Japan applied such pressure, as they could, upon the United States, to consent to some form of military intervention in Siberia. This pressure was applied through the Supreme War Council, through diplomatic channels, and such agencies as were available for propaganda. The Supreme War Council wanted troops for use in Russia, in fighting Bolsheviks. This is shown by the following quotation from one of General Pershing's articles, in which he says:
" The Supreme War Council was prone to listen to suggestions for the use of Allied troops at various places, other than the Western front. One of these, in which the British seemed to be especially insistent, was to send troops to help the so-called White Army in Russia to keep open the communication through Murmansk in the Archangel " (Washington Evening Star, March 7, 1931).
The contention that probably had more to do with sending troops to Siberia than all others was the claim that the Soviets had released all German and Austrian prisoners who had been captured and confined in Siberia, and that these prisoners were being organized into military units with the object of taking the military supplies at Vladivostok, and then the Trans-Siberian Railway. This move, if successful, would not only give the Germans the large quantities of munitions, rubber, cotton, railway materials, and many other articles very valuable as war material, but would give them access to the wheat fields of Siberia.
Evidently the United States questioned the accuracy of these reports, as Mr. Francis, acting through Colonel Robins, his representative in Moscow, asked Trotsky as to the truth of the reports. Colonel Robins told Mr. Francis that Trotsky suggested that the United States send responsible men as far east as Irkutsk, to make their own investigation. He offered to send a Soviet official with them and to insure them every opportunity to make the investigation.
As the result of this interview, Mr. Webster, a representative of the American Red Cross in Moscow, and Captain Hicks, of the British Army, left Moscow March 19, 1918, to make the investigation. At the same time, the United States sent Major Walter Drysdale, United States Military Attache, in Peking, to the eastern part of Siberia, to make an investigation of the prison camps in the East. On March 31, 1918, Webster and Hicks having made their examination, and having conferred with Major Drysdale, as to conditions in the eastern prison camps, made the following telegraphic report from Irkutsk:
" Had a long interview Irkutsk Soviet today including Yanson . . . Sternberg and others all of whom were very friendly. They gave us full facts which confirmed our information and which we believe to be true. There are in all Siberia not over twelve hundred armed prisoners, most of whom are from Omsk. . . . They are being used for guarding other prisoners and especially German officers in whom Soviet places no confidence. . . . The Soviet states that they would not think of placing arms at the disposal of prisoners who would take up cause against them when their cause is so categorically opposite to their own. The Soviet further gave us their official guarantee that no more than a maximum of fifteen hundred prisoners will be armed in the whole of Siberia. . . . They also stated that they would have no objections to the Senior Consuls of the Allies in Siberia having the right of free investigation and, at all times, to check the maintenance and integrity of the limitations." [Russian-American Regulations, March, 1917-March, 1920.]
Webster and Hicks, on April 1, 1918, telegraphed with reference to the prison camps to the British Mission, Moscow:
" 'We have just visited the large war prisoners' camp outside Irkutsk where we were given every facility to see everything and talk with the prisoners. . . . We saw the senior officer prisoners, and several leading soldiers with whom we held long conversations. We, in all cases, asked the following questions: First, is there any pressure put on you to join the Red Guard or Socialists? Answers -none at all. Second, How do you regard any of your commanders who express Bolshevik sympathies? Answer - With very strong disapproval. . . . Fourth, Are any of your fellow prisoners armed? Answer -About seven, who help to guard the prison supply depot . . ." [Ibid]
After an investigation by Major Drysdale, here-ported that the Soviets did not release their German war prisoners from the prison camps, and that the rumour that the Germans were forming a battle front in Siberia was propaganda designed to influence the United States in the question of military action.
It is difficult to understand why the United States sent representatives to get certain specific information about war prisoners, and then decided to send troops to Siberia to frustrate any action taken by organizations of German and Austrian war prisoners which United States representatives said did not exist. Subsequent events have shown that the information furnished the United States Government by these investigators was absolutely correct. Siberia was a great field for propaganda and even Consular Agents of the various Governments had great trouble to know what credence to give reports they received. In this vast country, with limited means of obtaining information, it was a difficult problem to check the accuracy of information.
France, from the moment the Bolsheviks suggested peace with the Central Powers, became the implacable enemy of the Soviets. The French representatives, after signing the agreement with the representatives of the Russian Government to continue to fight together until there was a successful termination of the war, felt there was a base betrayal of her interests, by Russia in proposing peace without consultation with her Allies, and Mr. Clemenceau went so far as to characterize the action as treason to France.
England's past affiliations with Czarist Russia had not been very agreeable, but the chances for the material advancement of England were better with the old Czarist officials than with the Soviets, and it was evident to the Allied representatives, at this time, that any Government in Russia, established by the people of Russia, would necessarily be socialistic.
Bearing upon the subject of intervention in Russia, Dr. Leonid I. Strakhovsky, in an article appearing in Current History, March, 1931, states:
" In these circumstances The Allied Governments were ready to undertake Military intervention in Russia; this is the reason given to explain and justify the policy of the Allies - But there was another reason for this step, a reason that has existed all through the nineteenth century, Great Britain's fear of the rising power of Russia as manifested in the Russian penetration of Central Asia, and in Russian expansion in the East. France, on the other hand, looked for material economic advantages, where Great Britain mainly pursued a political aim, although the British were not likely to overlook economic possibilities. France and Great Britain came to an understanding and agreed to an actual dismemberment of Russia in L'Accord France-Anglais du 23 December, 1917, definissant les zones d'action francaise et anglaise."
Dr. Strakhovsky cites as his authority for this statement, the writings of General Denikin and Winston Churchill. As he is at present a professor at Georgetown University and fought with the French and Wrangel in 1918-20 against the Bolsheviks, it can not be charged that his article was written in the interest of the Soviet Government.
England's interest in India could not be entirely ignored, and from her point of view, it was desirable to keep the socialistic ideas of Government, advocated by the Soviets, from reaching India.
As soon as it became apparent that Russia could not be depended upon to supply men or materials for the Allies on the Eastern front, England began using every means available to frustrate Germany in an anticipated attem to send troops from the East to the West front, and also to prevent Germany from getting access to the Siberian resources. These two reasons were the ones assigned by England for her advocacy of military intervention in Siberia.
The propaganda, as to the deleterious effects of bolshevism, had not taken such roots at that time in the United States as to warrant England in stressing that phase of her desires for military intervention in Russia, but she could and did stress the necessity for the protection of military stores in Archangel and Vladivostok, and for helping the Czechs.
Japan was willing to help the Czechs, protect any property, and guard the railroads east of Lake Baikal, but was not willing to send her troops west of Lake Baikal and especially if she was to bear the expense of any such movement.
The actions of the representatives of England, France, and Japan in subsequent operations in Siberia showed conclusively that the fear of radicalism, known as bolshevism, was not a minor consideration in their efforts to secure agreements as to military intervention in Siberia.
The records show that President Wilson, about March 15, 1918, sent a cable to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which stated, in part:
" The whole heart of the people of the United States is with the people of Russia in the attem to free themselves forever from autocratic government and become the masters of their own life." (6)This communication indicates that President Wilson cherished a hope that the Soviets would discard their socialistic ideas, join the United States and the Allies, and all work for a liberal and democratic Government for Russia. It is manifest that the Soviets could not have been induced, at this time, to listen to any suggestions as to changes in their plans of Government for Russia.
This statement was made more than four months after the overthrow of the Kerensky Government by the Soviets, and was in accordance with the well-known views of President Wilson as to representative Government. Subsequent events have shown that these views of the President were not shared by all the representatives of the United States in Siberia. At practically the same time that President Wilson was expressing the views above referred to, and was forcefully resisting the Allies in their efforts to induce the United States to agree to military intervention in Siberia, Mr. Francis, the American Ambassador to Russia, stated that the reports of Mr. MacGowan, American Consul at Irkutsk, indicated Germans preparing to take the Siberian railway.
March 22, 1918, Mr. Francis also stated:
" My advices from MacGowan and other reliable sources charge Sternberg, who is a pro-German-Swede, with aiding and directing organization and arming prisoners. Recently, MacGowan wires, that uniforms of German officers are only partly concealed by Russian overcoats."
On March 25, 1918, Mr. Francis wired Colonel Robins, Red Cross, at Moscow:
" . .. Cable which is in my private code, indicates Department has heard that Soviet leaders acting under direction of German General Staff . . .
Mr. Robins, in reply to this, stated:
" Regard suggestion of German control Soviet Government as absurd and impossible. If Washington credits this contention, why are we wasting time here?"
On April 6, 1918, Mr. Robins wired Mr. Francis, in part:
" Soviet Government believes America can prevent hostile intervention, and if Japan advances, it means that America has consented."
On March 15, 1918, Mr. MacGowan, Irkutsk, wired Mr. Francis, in code :
" Train-load prisoners passed Eastward twelfth, with dozen machine guns, is stated, and two thousand stopped here. There is concurrent testimony that 3- and 6-inch guns are arriving, two of latter already commanding railway bridge and station. In daily machine gun practice cadet school. Informant, hitherto reliable, states German Major Generals, even other officers, (omission) over thirty prisoners arrived and general staff expected from Petrograd to direct destruction of bridges, tunnels, and execute plan defenses. German, Turkish, and Austrian officers at times throng station and streets with insignia of rank visible beneath Russian military overcoats. Every prisoner whether at large or in camp has rifle." [Russian-American Relations.]
Subsequent events have shown that these supposed facts reported to Mr. Francis by Mr. MacGowan were someone's imagination. But the object of these reports is, however, perfectly clear. The representatives of England, France, and Japan had found in Mr. Mac-Gowan a ready and willing listener to reports as to the danger to be expected from the German and Austrian prisoners who were confined in Siberia.
During the Spring of 1918, while the Allied Governments and the United States were considering the question of military intervention in Russia, England and France had shown, by their support of certain factions in South Russia, that they were not averse to taking sides in the internal affairs of the Russian people.
At this time England and Japan were supporting the Cossack bandit leader Semeonoff, who claimed to be fighting bolshevism.
It has always been difficult for me, and I believe it is difficult for American readers, to understand why the United States ever acceded to the desires of England, France, and Japan to send United States troops to Siberia. It should, however, be remembered that President Wilson was bombarded from all sources with in-formation purporting to give facts. All reports emanating from representatives of England, France, and Japan, and from some of the representatives of the United States, notably Consul MacGowan, indicated that some steps were necessary in Siberia, in order to protect the interest of the Allied Cause. In political and financial questions alone, President Wilson would probably have remained steadfast against the appeals of the Allies, but in a military question, such as sending troops to Siberia, it would have been difficult for him to justify insisting upon putting his judgement against that of all the Allies.
In times of stress, such as exist in War, there are always false and exaggerated reports received at all Headquarters, and the difficulty experienced is to properly evaluate these reports. Mr. MacGowan, however, was making reports from Irkutsk, as to what was taking place there, and should have been able to ascertain the truth about prisoners and German General Staff officers who, according to his report, made very little or no effort to conceal their identity. As these prisoners and Germans were not in Irkutsk, as reported by Mr. MacGowan, I am forced to the conclusion that he was desirous of getting information that would justify his reports to the State Department. His consular associates from other countries were all interested in making him believe there was a menace from these war prisoners, so all information given Mr. MacGowan naturally would be calculated to form the impressions the Allied representatives desired.
(1) Documents of Russian History, 1914-1917, by Frank A. Golder, Stanford University, the Century Company. Pages 329-330.
(2) Russian-American Relations, March, 1917-March, 1920. Pages 39-40.
(3) Such a peace the Government considers to be an immediate peace without annexations (i. e. without seize of foreign territory, without the forcible annexation of foreign nationalities) and without indemnities.
(4) Russian-American Relations- March, 1917-March, 1920.
(5) Russian-American Relations- March, I917-March, 1920, p. 82.
(6) New York Times Current History, Vol. VIII, Part 1, page 49.