

Bulletin

Base

OF THE WORKERS PARTY

INDEPENDENT SOCIALIST LEAGUE

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STATEMENT ON UNITY WITH THE SOCIALIST WORKERS
PARTY AND THE EXTRAORDINARY PARTY CONVENTION

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The National Committee of the Workers Party, after reviewing all the developments relating to unity with the Socialist Workers Party in the past year, deems it necessary to re-state the position of the Party.

The Workers Party, seconding the initiative taken by the then Minority of the SWP in proposing the merger of the two organizations more than two years ago, promptly declared in favor of re-unification. Our Party considered that the unity would signify a big step forward in the advancement of the revolutionary movement here and abroad, provided the unification were achieved on a solid basis. In the course of the first attempt to reunite the two organizations, our Party demonstrated beyond question that it was prepared to make every conceivable concession to the SWP in the interests of unity, short of the abandonment of our own political line and of the democratic rights that every member and every group within a revolutionary party should freely enjoy, including the right to propagate its political line in an orderly and responsible manner. Our Party stated repeatedly and unequivocally that in spite of the wide breach between the political and theoretical positions of the two organizations, representing two tendencies of the Trotskyist movement, these differences were compatible with common membership in a single, united Party, provided that discipline in action and party democracy were fully and equally assured and that the formal unification were preceded and prepared by a local and increasingly close practical collaboration between the two parties in all possible phases of the class struggle. This position was maintained by our Party with unwavering consistency.

The leadership of the Socialist Workers Party evaded its responsibility for a long time by refusing to take a position in favor of or in opposition to unity or to practical collaboration between the two parties. It met the proposal for unity inside its own party with violent attacks upon the Minority aimed at discrediting and isolating it. At no time in the course of the few discussions with the Workers Party in that period did the SWP accept any of the proposals on unity made by our Party, or put forward any counter-proposals of its own. Finally, at its last national convention, the leadership of the SWP obtained a "unanimous" vote in opposition to unity with our Party, in condemnation of the Minority which first advocated the unity, and in expulsion of the two remaining leaders of the Minority - the first time in the history of the American Trotskyist movement when members were expelled for their dissident political opinions. In addition, the convention just as "unanimously" adopted the notorious document proposed by the leadership in which our Party was condemned as a "petty-bourgeois" tendency and the Fourth International was called upon to declare that those holding our political and theoretical views were, by virtue of that fact alone, excluded from membership in the International. This put a definitive end to the first attempt to achieve unity between the two parties. The responsibility for the conclusion rests exclusively upon the shoulders of the SWP leadership.

Early this year, upon the intervention of a representative of the Secretariat, a second attempt to achieve unity was begun. Once

again our Party declared itself ready to make such a unity possible. It even went further in making concessions to the SWP and adopted a resolution on unity aimed at nothing less than saving the face of the SWP leadership in order to facilitate a 180 degree turn-about-face on its part in the matter of unity. In no respect, however, did our Party find it necessary to make any significant, let alone fundamental, alteration in the position it had taken earlier on the unity question.

The National Committee of the SWP thereupon adopted, again unanimously, a resolution in favor of unity with the Workers Party. This complete reversal of the position against unity adopted a short time earlier at its convention, was accomplished without any reference to the previous position, without any acknowledgment of it or any explanation of the reasons for changing it. The bureaucratic opposition to unity was simply replaced by a bureaucratic support to unity.

The misgivings created in our Party by the SWP's resolution in favor of unity were enhanced by the first proposal made to us by the SWP leadership. Our Party had committed itself to abide by the decisions of the Extraordinary Party Convention on the conditions that it be permitted to participate in the Convention with full rights and that the unification of the two parties be achieved. The first proposal of the SWP to our Party was that we could choose between a unification accomplished after the EPC or an immediate unification; but that in the latter case, discussion of the EPC would terminate on the spot. Since the latter proposal would mean that the united party would be deprived of the opportunity, the right and the obligation to discuss the vital problems to come up for decision at the EPC, the Workers Party promptly declined the second choice and agreed with the first.

Meanwhile, it became clear that the SWP leadership not only did not contemplate any serious and substantial steps toward preparing a solid foundation for the unity, but that it envisaged only such a unity as required the capitulation of the Workers Party. Except for a couple of minor and in no case decisive exceptions, all the proposals made by our representatives for practical collaboration between the leadership and the ranks of the two parties in order to prepare a firm ground and a healthy atmosphere for the actual unity, were rejected by the SWP representatives. The latter acted toward the Workers Party not as toward an independent organization with which it was obligated to work out in common and on the basis of equality the means of consummating a merger, but as toward an organization which was already transformed into a grouping within the SWP, subordinated to it and subject to its discipline. Hence, their refusal to work out a united position with our Party in the election campaigns conducted in recent months. Hence, their refusal to arrange for joint meetings of the party fractions in the mass organizations, or joint meetings of any kind between the two memberships. Hence, the attack upon one of our sympathizers as an "informer" and a "tool of the State Department," made in the press of the SWP and without consultation with our Party. Hence, the antagonism disseminated in the SWP against our Party because it prefaced the publication of the Joint Statement of the two parties on unity with an editorial explanation of its own in LABOR ACTION. Hence, the circular letter of X to the SWP membership, not aimed at preparing the latter for comradely and fruitful collaboration with the Workers Party, prior to the unification and inside a united party, but aimed at misrepresenting and maligning our Party, at mob-

ilizing the SWP ranks for a factional assault upon it instead of for unity with it, and above all at creating and stimulating among the SWP ranks a demand for the capitulation of the Workers Party as the condition for unity.

In order to bring all this duplicity and maneuvering to the surface where it could be scotched, the Workers Party declared bluntly that it had never conceived or agreed to a unity based upon a capitulation or upon the cession of any of its democratic rights within the united party. This declaration produced a highly desirable result in that it finally elicited from the SWP leadership an equally blunt declaration of its position. In the "unofficial" speeches of the two leaders of the SWP, they made it crassly clear that practical collaboration between the two parties was possible only where the Workers Party accepted the policy and decisions of the SWP and that unity between the two parties was possible only if the Workers Party capitulated to the SWP.

The open proclamation of this position, which is not only unacceptable to the Workers Party but which it is not even interested in discussing, means that the second attempt to achieve unity between the two organizations has also been smashed. Once again, the responsibility for the failure rests upon the shoulders of the SWP leadership. It has ruined for a long time the possibility of unifying the ranks of the revolutionary movement and thereby gravely undermined the possibility of unity of the movement abroad.

So far as the Joint Statement of the two parties on unity is concerned, the Workers Party records the fact that the past actions of the SWP leadership have reduced the Statement to the significance of a paper declaration. Now, after the engineering of the Johnsonite split from the Workers Party and the proposal of the SWP to admit this faction into its ranks, it has eliminated even the formal significance of the Joint Statement and rendered it totally inoperative and meaningless - and worse than meaningless because it has made it a hypocritical deception. Our Party has neither the desire nor the need to engage in formalistic hypocrisies or picayune show-window maneuvers by pretending allegiance to a document which has been reduced to a mockery. In view of the actions of the SWP, the Workers Party has no further grounds for being bound by the provisions of the Joint Statement, including the provision which deals with the acceptance of members or former members of the SWP into its ranks.

The Workers Party considers, further, that it has the task of making clear its position on unity, the record on unity, and the responsibility for the failure of the attempt to achieve it, before the membership of the SWP, the radical working class public in general, and the international Movement.

At the same time, it is clear that our Party cannot and need not devote a disproportionate amount of its time and energy to this task. The future of the Workers Party is by no means determined by its attitude toward the SWP nor by its relations with it. To convert the Party into an organization which is primarily concerned with the SWP, or into an organization whose chief claim to political existence is its pro-unity position, would mean to sterilize the Party.

Our Party will triumph or be defeated only insofar as its program and policies are confirmed and sustained in the class struggle. Our

Party favored unification with the SWP not because it suffers from any fetishistic attitude toward unity in general, but because a unity with the SWP, accomplished on a sound basis, would have made it more easily possible to overcome, by our joint comradely efforts, the stultifying bureaucratic regime now prevalent in the SWP and the radically false theories and political line which animate it, thus making the united revolutionary movement not only a numerically stronger but a politically more effective factor in the working class of this country. Unity for any other purpose could not possibly have any importance for our Party. No, although the road of unity has been solidly blocked off by the SWP leadership, the road along which we can propagate our program among the advanced workers remains wide open and available to us to the fullest extent of our capacities.

It is necessary to understand that the failure of the unity is due only in part to the maneuverings and the bureaucratic intolerance of the SWP leadership, which feared the presence in its ranks of hundreds of trained, able and devoted militants whose political line differs from that of the leadership and threatens its domination. The SWP leadership has done everything it could to extend and to deepen the political differences between the two parties, in order thus to assure the continued division between them. Instead of growing agreement, the lines between the two tendencies grow more clear-cut and politically irreconcilable. The tendency represented by the SWP leadership is that of the right wing of the Fourth International. This characterization is determined not by the purely ceremonial and therefore inconsequential "radical" phrasemongering to which it is addicted on occasion, but by the fundamental theoretical and political line to which it is increasingly committed. The objective aim of this line is the conversion of the working class and revolutionary movements into a "left wing" of counterrevolutionary Stalinism (as the objective aim of social reformism is the conversion of the working class into the left wing support of bourgeois democracy, democratic imperialism). On this score, our Party has no mere tactical difference with the SWP tendency, but a fundamental and politically unbridgeable difference. Our Party is more firmly than ever opposed to any defense of Stalinist Russia and Stalinist imperialism. The SWP not only continues to favor the defense of the Stalinist counterrevolution but even supports the GPU regime in Poland and other occupied countries against the popular national movement of resistance to Stalinist imperialism. Our Party is in general opposed to support of or alliances with the reactionary Stalinist parties in the capitalist countries. The SWP favors support of these totalitarian organizations as against the democratic reformist tendencies in the working class.

In the light of this division, the recent capitulation of the Johnsonites becomes all the clearer and more reprehensible. It only underlines the purely literary character of its own ultra-radical phrasemongering and the farcical nature of its theoretical and political position.

If the tendency represented by our Party would have an independent political role to play even if it were part of a united Party together with the SWP tendency, this holds with multiplied force under conditions when our Party is organizationally independent. The formula, "Neither Washington nor Moscow - for the class independence of the proletariat and world socialism!" not only sums up the revolutionary position of the genuinely Marxian movement of our time but draws

the line clearly between our Party and the SWP tendency and between our Party and all brands of petty bourgeois centrism and reformism.

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Basing itself upon the position it has repeatedly set forth, our Party has the duty to intervene actively and firmly in the life of the Movement as a whole. Early this year, the Party committed itself to participate with full rights in the deliberations of the EPC and to abide by its eventual decisions, but only on the condition that unity would be achieved between the Workers Party and the Socialist Workers Party. This condition went and still goes without saying, for without it there would be created the absurd situation in which two independent parties would exist with the same program and political line. In other words, our commitment was only another way of stating what we had stated for two years, namely, that our tendency was prepared to act as a disciplined minority of a united party provided it was guaranteed its democratic rights within that party. In view of the fact that the SWP leadership, in connivance with the Johnson faction, has now eliminated the possibility of unity, our Party, while still committed to presenting and fighting for its views, including its position on unity, before the assemblies of the EPC, reserves the full right to establish its position toward the decisions adopted at the EPC at a regular convention of our Party to be held after the EPC.

The Workers Party holds that the uninterrupted crisis of the Movement can be resolved in a revolutionary way only by a fundamental change of the position now dominant in it on the key questions of the class nature of the Stalinist state; of the slogan of "unconditional defense" of that state; of the support of Stalinist imperialism in the occupied countries or the support of the popular democratic movements of resistance against Stalinist imperialism; of the position taken by the official Movement on the national resistance movements in general; of the position taken by the official Movement toward the Stalinist and social-democratic parties; of the conception now held of the character and the role of the Fourth International, which is sectarian through and through; and finally of the bureaucratic conception of democratic centralism advocated by the present leadership of the Movement, inspired by the SWP leadership. The main task of the Workers Party before the EPC, during its sessions and afterward, is to mobilize the maximum amount of support for the course which it advocates. Toward this end, our Party openly seeks to establish a bloc of all sections of the Movement which occupy a left-wing position on the main questions in dispute and which aim to prevent the reduction of the Movement to the role of "left wing" of Stalinist reaction, a role which means in the long run the abandonment of the basic positions of socialist internationalism.

This is the fundamental concern of the Workers Party with regard to the EPC, and all other considerations are subordinate to it.

At the same time, the Workers Party makes clear in advance that it rejects in toto the pretensions of the leadership of the Secretariat and those members of the CIC who are aligned with it, to the role of a "third party" in the matter of the unity negotiations between our Party and the SWP. The events of the past period have showed conclusively that the Secretariat leadership has acted consistently as the factional agent of the SWP leadership, not only with regard to

our Party but also with regard to other sections of the Movement. It has thereby not only failed to discharge its elementary obligation to act in accordance with the functions that properly belong to such a body, but it has forfeited the right to be considered a responsible and objective authority in the Movement. It has not only pushed the disastrous theoretical and political positions of the SWP leadership to an extreme throughout the world, and heavily compromised the authority and prospects for growth of the Movement, but it has taken responsibility for the indefensible factional excesses of the SWP leadership and acted as its factional agent in all sections of the Movement, even to the extent - when it considered it factionally necessary - of ignoring its basic political solidarity with such sections. In connection with its political struggle against this leadership, the Workers Party therefore considers it an obligation to join with all those who are actuated by objective and non-factional considerations in the effort to restore a healthy democratic regime and an objective and authoritative leadership to the Movement as a whole, as an indispensable prerequisite to ending the chaos and disintegrative tendencies which now afflict it and to rendering possible its long-postponed reorientation and progress.

August 11, 1947.

Political Committee of the
Workers Party

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*NOTE: The Political Committee is submitting the above statement as a draft for the consideration of the National Committee meeting to be held in connection with the Active Workers Conference. At the same time, the draft statement is being made available to the membership as a whole so that it may be discussed both before and during the Active Workers Conference itself.

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THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL IN DANGER

By Natalia Sedova Trotsky
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At the Plenum held at the end of March, 1947, the IEC adopted regulations relative to the holding of the World Congress of the Fourth International, the bureaucratic character of which, inspired by old Stalinist maneuvers, represent a most alarming symptom. The IEC, indeed, has divided the world into three categories: countries of great, moderate and slight importance. What is the criterion which inspired such an outrageously arbitrary division? No one has deigned to share it with anyone in the International.

We imagine that the IEC is going to tell us that it was guided by the example of the First Congress of the late Communist International. But are we participants in the same situation as in 1919, of a real imitation of the First Congress of the CI? At the time of the First Congress the Russian Revolution had just triumphed, the Bolshevik Party numbered hundreds of thousands of members, though in the rest of the world the Communist Parties were still only little groups, for the most part comparable to ours today; so much so that the Bolsheviks were led to diminish the weight of their party in the young international in order by the free play of an apparent democracy to avoid the latter's automatically becoming a majority against the rest of the world and imposing its uncontested will upon it. It was a question of permitting the entire world to express itself even against the Russian party, that is to say, of assuring the operation of an effective as possible democracy in the International. Is this the same end that the IEC seeks today? We categorically affirm that it is not, and we are going to demonstrate that the IS and the IEC with their division of the world into three categories have in mind completely opposite ends. While the CI aimed at the weakening of the strong parties and the strengthening of the weak parties in order to assure a maximum of democracy, our IEC aims at the strengthening of the strong parties and the weakening of the weak parties in order to maintain itself in power.

The Criterion of the Big Three

Let us ask once again: What criterion was used in making this division of the world? The numerical importance of the sections? No, obviously, since Germany, where the section has just been reconstituted, figures in the first category, though it is of necessity very weak because of its recent formation, while Italy, whose section numbers nearly as many members as France, is placed in the second. We can say as much of the Russian section - which must obviously be insignificant - when it is compared with any other section in countries of "moderate importance." It is, then, not a numerical criterion which governed the division; moreover, we will see further on that the consideration of numbers was taken into account and not for reasons of democracy. Besides, even if it were, this criterion would be fallacious. Let us suppose that the Bolivian section numbers 200 members and that the country has 3,000,000 inhabitants; let us admit, also, that the American section in claiming 1,600 members in a country of 150,000,000 is not exaggerat-

ing and that this figure is the exact expression of the truth. It is clear that the 200 Bolivian comrades have much more importance in the political life of their backward country than the 1,600 American comrades in theirs. For the relation of forces to be apparently the same, the American section would have to have 10,000 members. Further, this relation of forces would only be superficially equal, since 200 comrades in Bolivia, a backward country, play an infinitely greater role - they have demonstrated it - than 10,000 members of the American section would be able to play in the U.S., an advanced country and the principal imperialist country of the entire world.

Nor is it the revolutionary importance of the countries considered on the arena of the world class struggle which has motivated this division, since it seems that neither the United States nor England will be called upon to play a decisive role in the revolutionary wave which is becoming manifest, while Spain, Italy, Austria, Belgium, Holland, Greece, Indo-China, North Africa, Indonesia, Poland, Hungary, etc., all excluded from the first category, are obviously destined to play an important revolutionary role in the immediate future.

These reasons set aside, there remains only the criterion of the Big Three, which has doubtlessly inspired the division of the world. It is, in fact, only the importance on the world capitalist arena which has guided the IEC in its choice.

The Majority as a Measuring Rod

To rest content with this declaration, however, would be to consider only one side of the question, its external aspect; in addition, the adopting of such a criterion shows an unconscious submission to imperialist influence and to the Russian counter-revolution, which must be ceaselessly combatted.

It is known that the questions which will be discussed at the World Congress, whether the IEC or the IS wishes it or not, concern the politics of our sections during the imperialist war and in relation to the nationalist resistance movements, the problem of the Russian counter-revolution and world Stalinism, the tactic of the Fourth International in regard to Stalinism and reformism (united front, SP-CP-CGT Government) and our pre-war transitional program. But, as if by chance, a good number of sections in "countries of great importance," some of them subjected to a bureaucratic leadership, others badly informed, or not informed at all, on the problems to be discussed, have up to now through their majorities, put themselves on record in favor of the conservative position of the IS and the IEC.

The resolution of the IEC decides in parts 5 and 6 of paragraph 3: "To give three delegates to each organization of from 1 to 150 members if they belong in Category A, two delegates if they belong in Category B, one delegate if they belong in Category C.

"For 150 to 500 members, and with an approximate minimum of 300 members - one additional delegate. For 500 to 1,000 members, and with an approximate minimum of 750 members - another delegate, and so on successively."

Here let us insert a piece of figuring, which, for all of its being of necessity approximate, will be nonetheless edifying.

Let us study the following tables:

Table No. 1

<u>Countries of first importance</u>	<u>Maximum Estimate of Number of Members</u>	<u>Delegates granted by IEC</u>	<u>Majority delegates (approximate est.)</u>	<u>Minority delegates (approximate estimate)</u>
U.S.	1,600	6	5	1
Russia	several members	3	3	0
China	100	3	2	1
India	600	4	3	1
England	400	4	4	0
France	1,000	5	4	1
Germany	<u>50</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>
Totals	3,750	28	22	6

Table No. 2

<u>Countries of moderate importance</u>	<u>Maximum estimate of number of members</u>	<u>Delegates granted by IEC</u>	<u>Majority delegates (approx. estimate)</u>	<u>Minority delegates (approx.)</u>	<u>Delegates from the sections on basis of countries of first importance</u>		
					<u>Total</u>	<u>Major</u>	<u>Minor</u>
Spain	60	2	1	1	3	1	2
Italy	800	4	1	3	5	1	4
Holland	50	2	2	0	3	3	0
Belgium	50	2	2	0	3	2	1
Austria	50	2	0	2	3	0	3
Greece	500	3	2	1	4	2	2
Canada	50	2	2	0	3	2	1
Mexico	60	2	0	2	3	0	3
Brazil	50	2	1	1	3	1	2
Argentina	50	2	2	0	3	2	1
Chile	300	3	2	1	4	2	2
Bolivia	200	2	0	2	3	1	2
Indochina	<u>300</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>
Totals	2,500	31	17	14	44	20	24

Countries of slight importance	Maximum estimate of number of members	Delegates granted by IEC	Table No. 3		Delegates from sections on basis of countries of first importance		
			Majority delegates (approx.)	Minority delegates (approx.)	Total	Major.	Minor.
Norway	50	1	1	0	3	2	1
Denmark	50	1	1	0	3	2	1
Switzerland	50	1	1	0	3	2	1
Bulgaria	50	1	0	1	3	0	3
Ireland	50	1	0	1	3	0	3
Palestine	50	1	1	0	3	2	1
Egypt	50	1	1	0	3	2	1
Cyprus	50	1	1	0	3	2	1
Cuba	100	1	0	1	3	0	3
Peru	50	1	0	1	3	0	3
Uruguay	50	1	1	0	3	2	1
Australia	50	1	1	0	3	2	1
S. Africa	300	2	1	1	4	2	2
Totals	950	14	9	5	40	18	22

From these tables it immediately stands out that seven countries (of the first category) will receive 28 delegates, while 26 countries (of the second and third category) will receive 45 delegates. In other words, seven countries of "first importance" will receive from 35% to 38% of the votes at the Congress. They will then lack only 9 delegates to assure themselves control of the Congress. Of course, our Table No. 1 indicates 6 minority delegates. Even assuming that our estimate of the minority representation from the countries of "first importance" is not exaggerated, the 6 minority delegates that we note will be easily compensated for by the support of the sections from countries of "moderate" and of "slight importance." Further, Tables No. 2 and No. 3 clearly show this. It can be seen, therefore, that the division adopted by the IEC inevitably and bureaucratically assures it the majority in the World Congress, a majority which it will sit tight on while avoiding discussion of the major problems which are posed before our International.

It should be observed also that in the second table the 13 sections of "moderate importance" include Spain, whose revolutionary experience - even if it did not have more members than the Russian section - is particularly valuable for our epoch since it marks a decisive turn in the history of the Russian counter-revolution and of Stalinism, while the Russian experience, with all its enormous value, refers precisely to a period which the Spanish revolution brought to a close. Similarly found in this list, which is as outrageously arbitrary as the first, is Italy, which offers immense revolutionary possibilities, if a clear policy is followed in regard to revolutionary anti-Stalinist organizations (Bordighists, anarchists, left socialists) Greece, whose admirable revolutionary combativity ought to give the IEC cause for reflection, Poland and other countries occupied by Russia, which the IEC totally forgets and which offer immense possibilities for action against the Stalinist reaction on condition that the demand is not made to defend the "degenerated workers' state" which oppresses them. Finally comes Indochina, where support to our section has been forgotten for so long and where even to demand who assassinated Ta-Thu-Thau has been forgotten in

order to support, without serious criticism, the Stalinist government of Ho-Chi-Minh, greetings from whom were so warmly hailed by THE MILITANT and LA VERITE.

It has been seen that the resolution of the IEC creates an important majority in favor of the present leadership which the vote of countries of "slight importance" would not be able to modify even if they were able to send all the delegates the IEC grants them and if they all voted against the present leadership. But that is still based on the most favorable hypothesis, for it is impossible for the poor Latin-American sections to send the 10 or 12 delegates given them by the IEC. Moreover, the prohibition against proxy votes in actuality denies a number of sections in countries of "moderate" or "slight" importance the possibility of making themselves heard and of voting at the Congress, which does not prevent the IEC from demanding in advance the acceptance of the decisions which will be made by the World Congress and of desiring to prohibit all discussion after the Congress. The majority thus cunningly worked out by the IS and the IEC is thereby reinforced. Better yet, with this system, not a single opposition can hope to convince the Congress. What except ideological defeat and organic strangulation can the International expect from a leadership which has taken such decisions?

In fact, according to the system which the IEC means to impose, even if the method were rectified by giving the same basis of representation to all the sections so as to agree with the countries of "first importance" it can be seen (Tables No. 2 and No. 3) that a majority is assured for the present International leadership by the fact that the western European, North American and Canadian sections will be almost the only ones able to send all the delegates accorded them. How can it actually be supposed that Mexico, Poland, Peru, Indo-China and other countries will find the necessary means to send two or three delegates? We have difficulty in believing that this represents ignorance on the part of the International leadership; on the contrary, we believe that a question of deliberate calculation is involved, for it could not have imagined that the International would accept such an arbitrary division without protest. But the tendencies which seized the leadership thanks to the conditions immediately following the war calculated that the sections in countries of "moderate" or "slight" importance would demand in principle to be placed on an equal footing with countries classed as those of "first importance." In most cases they would not be able to send the delegates granted them even if the IEC did justice to their objections - and justice probably would have been rendered in order to preserve the democratic facade.

The preceding tables show that only five sections have a membership equal to or greater than 500 persons, while seven range between 100 and 400 members, and 21 have only 50 members or less. If it is really desired to follow the First Congress of the CI, which diminished the weight of the strong sections and increased the weight of the weak ones, a sole method of representation would be genuinely democratic: one delegate for 1 to 25 members and another delegate for 25 additional members or fraction of 25, up to a maximum of 4 delegates. To this method of representation must be added still another major democratic regulation: the transfer of majority and minority votes from one section or another or to individuals having a common position so that minorities can participate in the World Congress. To forestall the creation of artificial minorities which

might threaten to swamp the Congress, it is important, therefore, to demand that minorities represent at least 20% of the members of their section in order to vote.

It can be seen by the following comparative table that the method of representation which we propose assures a very much greater guarantee of democracy at the projected Congress. We have not included in it, however, the figures on minority representation:

<u>Sections</u>	<u>Total number of members</u>	<u>Delegates according to the IEC</u>	<u>Delegates according to our proposal</u>
American	1,600	6	4
Russia	several members	3	1
China	100	3	4
India	600	4	4
England	400	4	4
France	1,000	5	4
Germany	50	3	2
Spain	60	2	3
Italy	800	4	4
Holland	50	2	2
Belgium	50	2	2
Austria	50	2	2
Greece	500	3	4
Canada	50	2	2
Mexico	60	2	3
Brazil	50	2	2
Argentina	50	2	2
Chile	300	3	4
Bolivia	200	2	4
Indochina	300	3	4
Norway	50	1	2
Denmark	50	1	2
Switzerland	50	1	2
Bulgaria	50	1	2
Ireland	50	1	2
Palestine	50	1	2
Egypt	50	1	2
Cyprus	50	1	2
Cuba	100	1	4
Peru	50	1	2
Uruguay	50	1	2
Australia	50	1	2
S. Africa	300	2	4
Totals	7,220	73	91

It can be seen that our proposal assures a more democratic representation at the Congress, the economic weaknesses of the distant and poor sections being compensated for by a larger representation for the small sections in general and especially the sections which will not be able to send their delegates to the Congress much less vote, while the IEC acts inversely and systematically discriminates against them in order to favor its combinations. This resolution of the IEC constitutes an immediate and mortal danger to the whole International. It must be revoked.

We are witnessing, as has been seen, an attempted bureaucratic

seizure of the International leadership by elements interested in stifling a loyal discussion which would provoke their overthrow. It cannot be a question of anything else. Let us recall under what conditions the pre-conference of April 1946 was convened and the motives for its convocation.

The IS and the IEC, which had been designated at the emergency conference of 1940 had only a vegetative political existence and led an almost non-existent organic activity during the whole war, the functioning of these bodies having been paralyzed by personal and political struggles in the atmosphere of the American section. As early as 1944 the Spanish Group in Mexico demanded the convening of a World Congress. Its request found not a single echo. The following year the IEC was consulted on the possibility of the convening of a pre-conference with limited objectives. This pre-conference proposal was accepted, for it was the only possible way of resolving the situation of an IS which was incapable, because of its internal divisions, of organizing a real discussion and preparing a genuine World Congress. It was then explicitly understood that this gathering would have as its task the selection of new leading bodies whose principal mission would be to animate and extend the international discussion in view of the World Congress. Then - total silence. After that, no one in the International was informed of the place and the date of meeting of the projected pre-conference, no discussion or even exchange of views preceded it, the agenda was unknown to almost the whole International. Members of the IEC were uninformed while the French police were perfectly informed. Everything was organized in the dark by leaders interested in assuring themselves the hegemony in this gathering. The composition of the pre-conference, in addition, was as little democratic as possible, which was excusable given the conditions under which it was convened. But its non-democratic, not to say, anti-democratic character ought to have encouraged the leading bodies which it had elected to compensate for their origin by measures authentically democratic. It is precisely the opposite which we have witnessed. Hardly had it got together when this pre-conference proclaimed itself a conference under the pretext of throwing dust in the eyes of the outside world and issued a manifesto which claimed to introduce the international discussion which it was charged with opening. Then the IS and the IEC began to threaten expulsion and to legislate as if they were the product of a genuine conference delegated full powers by the International; in a word, they began to prepare the future World Congress majority, totally forgetting their principal mission: the loyal organization of a full discussion of all the problems posed before our International and the working class movement. They have even so completely forgotten their task that in all the discussion bulletins published under their guidance, more than a year after the pre-conference, of all the principal problems which confront our movement, only one, the Russian problem, has been extensively treated, and it still reflects only the official opinion. To our knowledge, only extracts from a thesis of the anti-defensist minority have been published. Can that be called a full and loyal discussion in preparation for a World Congress after seven years of a war which has produced changes of major importance? No, the discussion has, in its entirety, still to be organized.

The Strangulation of Minorities

We affirm that the IS and the IEC are seeking to prepare their majority at the World Congress. In addition to the calculations which we have already unmasked what shows it clearly is the minute care they have taken to secure a maximum limitation of representation for minorities, both in number and in power. The next to the last part of paragraph 3 of the resolution of the IEC says:

"Minorities will be proportionally represented in cases where the number of delegates permits it. In other cases, all minorities constituting approximately a quarter of their sections at least will be represented with a consultative vote."

First of all, proportional representation of minorities, if it is placed alongside of the arbitrary representation of the sections criticized earlier, is only a snare. What minorities could be proportionally represented? Obviously those of countries of first importance and yet not all, since that of the American section would have only the satisfaction of revealing its theses. The resolution clearly suggests: "In cases where the number of delegates permits it." For it is obviously not the Peruvian, Polish or Austrian sections, for example, which will have a sufficient number of delegates so that one of them can represent the minority. These sections in countries "of first importance," in addition to the privilege of importance, find themselves granted an additional privilege by the IEC, the luxury, so to speak, of one or more minorities. Precisely among these sections is numbered that of the most imperialist country in the world, and the PCI of France, where the Craipeau majority and the Frank minority have no serious political differences. Moreover, why is a fourth and not a third or fifth of the members required and why is only a consultative vote given? The resolution does not deign to inform us. What it signifies, we may already know. The reason probably is that there is not a single section at the present moment, thanks to the good offices of the IS, where the minority represents a quarter of the membership, except the French minority led by Frank, who is under the guardianship of the present world leadership.

Nevertheless, the present International leadership is going to be obliged to permit a little discussion to take place, in order to save appearances. The minorities will more or less have the illusion of a discussion, but from now until the end of the year they will not have the time to develop and group themselves, since the IS and the IEC have evaded all discussion of the major questions; these minorities will therefore not have the time to win a quarter of the members of their sections. Moreover, even if they reached that proportion, most of the non-European sections would be incapable, as we have already stated, of sending all the majority delegates to which they were entitled, not to speak of the minority delegates. Thus, the stifling of the discussion organized for more than a year by the International leadership, was designed to prevent the growing of an opposition in our movement. The demand for a quarter now gives the coup de grace to minorities in preventing them from being represented at the World Congress. And in case that were not sufficient, now comes the prohibition against proxy votes, and, in consequence, the forestalling of the growth of new formed oppositions, who are prevented from being heard and from voting. For a long time the IS has declared that the next World Congress must above all be a Congress of serious sections of the International. We now know what it under-

stands by that: the sections which support or accept its opportunism, its ideological conservatism, and its organic bureaucratism.

Finally, to crown its work, the IEC in its resolution refuses to call the Congress legally on the pretext that the legal convening is "totally unrealizable under present conditions" and "would prevent the presence at the Congress of a series of sections and comrades." We cannot accept that statement; in fact, what prevents the convening of a legal Congress which would hold secret sessions in the course of which illegal comrades would be heard? The fear of bourgeois and Stalinist repression? But from how many countries has the authorization to hold a legal Congress been asked? Obviously, from not a single one. First of all, authorization must be asked everywhere for permission to hold a legal congress before taking refuge in conspiratorial methods. Secrecy, added to the restrictive methods already criticized, permit the leadership to combine and maneuver and assures that it will retain the leadership of the International. We confront you - and, with us, the whole International will demand the withdrawal of your resolution, the beginning of a real discussion of major problems, and the preparation of a democratic congress.

For a Genuine World Congress

For the World Congress to represent real progress for the Fourth International, it is first of all necessary for it to be convened under such conditions that not a single comrade will have the slightest reason for thinking of maneuvering by the leadership. The theses of minorities must appear equally with those of majorities and must be distributed under the direction of the International leadership.

For the Congress to adopt resolutions which are necessary for the social revolution all minorities must be represented.

We therefore ask:

1. That the sections be represented on the basis of 1 delegate for every 25 members and additional fractions of 25 up to a maximum of 4 delegates for each section, minorities being represented in the same manner. However, only minorities representing at least 20% of the membership of their section will have the right to vote. Others will have only a consultative vote. It is in this fashion that the democratic example given us by the CI at its birth will be followed.
2. Sections and minorities will have the right to transmit their vote to sections, minorities, or comrades outside their section.
3. Organizations close to the Fourth International with differences on this or that point of our program will be invited to the Congress with the same rights as the official sections, on condition of recognizing the fundamental principles of the International, even if fusion with the official sections has not been realized before the opening of the Congress.

(1) At the emergency conference of 1940 comrade Munis representing Spain was authorized to represent Mexico, Argentina, and Chile on the recommendation of LD.

4. The agenda will comprise:

- A. Examination of the politics of the principal parties during the imperialist war and their position in regard to the national resistance movements during the Nazi occupation;
- B. Character of the war between China and Japan;
- C. Balance sheet of the Spanish civil war;
- D. Support or abandonment of the unconditional defense of Russia and the question of world Stalinism (SP-CP-CGT government, united front with Stalinism, etc.);
- E. Outmoding of, or timeliness of, the transitional program and the manner of application of the parts of the program which remain valid;
- F. Problem of the tactics of the construction of revolutionary parties;
- G. Colonial question;
- H. Nature of the present historic period and immediate revolutionary perspectives.

This agenda is not at all exclusive. All questions of general interest which this or that section or group of comrades would like to present for the examination of the Congress will be discussed there.

We call upon the whole International to express themselves on the preceding proposals.

If the World Congress meets under the conditions decided by the IEC, and even under better conditions, without a thorough preliminary discussion of the problems which confront our movement (see our open letter to the French PCI) the Congress will constitute a mortal blow for the Fourth International. The situation demands the energetic intervention of the sections and of comrades within the sections. The IEC must immediately withdraw its resolutions; otherwise the Fourth International will be bureaucratically asphyxiated.

For the revocation of the decision of the IEC ~~or~~ the resignation of the International leadership!

For a free discussion in the International!

For a genuine Congress of the International organized on democratic bases!

Long live the Fourth International!

Long live the world socialist revolution!

Mexico, D.F.
June 27, 1947

N.B. Sections, groups of comrades, or individuals who share our criticisms and proposals are asked to communicate their complete or partial agreement immediately to the IS and to the following address:
G. Munis, Apartado Postal 8942, Mexico D.F.