

# YSA

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## DISCUSSION BULLETIN

Vol. 11 No. 1  
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Political Resolution (NEC  
Draft, submitted December 12, 1967)

25 cents

**YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE**

**YSA, BOX 471, COOPER STATION, N.Y., N.Y. 10003**

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## NEC DRAFT POLITICAL RESOLUTION

Almost a decade ago, the American student movement began a shift to the left, moving away from political quiescence and near total acquiescence to the domestic and foreign policies of the U.S. ruling class. This shift has been qualitatively accelerated by the imperialist plunge into Vietnam. An entire layer of American students have been radicalized, and wave after wave of new recruits have been brought into the antiwar struggle. This shift of the student movement has also had an impact on developments that have taken place in other sections of the American population.

In 1960 a resolution by the National Student Association supporting the struggle of Afro-Americans for freedom by any means necessary would have been inconceivable, yet in 1967 such a resolution was passed. In the early '60s the Student Peace Union wrote into its charter red-baiting, communist-exclusion clauses. Today the antiwar movement has been built on the basis of non-exclusion. In the early sixties, the right wing Young Americans for Freedom had relatively strong chapters on most of the major campuses across the country. Today they have shrunk to a small percentage of their former size. In the early '60s black students on campuses across the country were predominantly oriented toward Gandhism. Today they look to Malcolm X as their hero and are oriented toward black nationalism. Afro-American student organizations have become a norm on the campuses.

The continuing escalation of the war in Vietnam, and the domestic and international repercussions of that war, have produced a political climate in this country marked more and more by uneasiness, disillusionment, and questioning. This is reflected not only in the deepening splits in the ruling class itself, and in the growing debate over perspectives for the war, but also by the increasing numbers of Americans favoring the withdrawal of troops from Vietnam, and the greater militancy of the student activists.

The decreasing confidence in the war policy of the ruling class spills over and affects the views of Americans on other issues as well. The shakiness of public confidence in the "permanence" of the current 81-month economic boom is underscored by the scare over the British devaluation of the pound. This general sense of insecurity is reinforced by frequent international political crises, such as those in Cyprus, the Mideast and Nigeria. The growing inability of the ruling class to satisfy the demands of the black community to control its own institutions and determine its own future has contributed to the realization that Washington's international oppression and exploitation may not be simply isolated aberrations of a mistaken foreign policy. Labor, in its defensive battles to maintain its standard of living, has more and more ignored or openly opposed the authority of government policies, such as wage guidelines. And

students, searching for a meaningful future in American society, have become more sharply conscious of the disparity between the myth of the "American dream" and its reality.

It is within this framework that the antiwar movement and the deepening general radicalization of youth, both black and white, takes on importance. The antiwar movement expresses this growing dissent and dissatisfaction, and in turn helps accelerate it. The antiwar movement helps legitimize dissent, disagreement, and a search for alternatives. It helps create an atmosphere in which there is a greater receptivity to socialist ideas, to our transitional program.

In the coming year, debate over perspectives for the war and the struggles of the black community will center around the contest for the presidency of the U.S. This contest opens up unparalleled opportunities for us to take our program to thousands of youth; it gives us unprecedented opportunities for recruitment.

In this campaign we will focus our attention on the three main political challenges confronting the YSA and all radical youth:

(1) Grasping the politics and tactics of building a movement in opposition to the imperialist war in Vietnam. That is, unifying the greatest number of campus based antiwar committees and broad united front action organizations in a campaign designed to educate and win broader and broader layers of Americans to reject the war in Vietnam as not being their war, and to demand that the GIs be withdrawn;

(2) Unconditionally supporting the Afro-American struggle for black control of the black communities. That is, understanding the national question, grasping the central need for an independent black political party, and fighting the racist offensive against "crime in the streets" that will mark the electoral campaigns of various bourgeois candidates;

(3) Fighting for principled class struggle politics in the electoral arena. That is, understanding the need for labor and the black community to break from capitalist politics, not just the two capitalist parties; supporting the Socialist Workers party ticket which will take to the American people the fight against the war, for black control of the black community, and educate for and symbolize the necessary break from the dead end of capitalist politics.

The political battles around the '68 election campaign can set the stage for a further shift to the left on the part of the student movement, or for greater coalitionist confusion within the framework of capitalist politics and new prospects for rightist regeneration, depending on the outcome of those battles.

The War, the Black Community and the '68 Elections

Last summer's explosions in the black communities constituted another proof of the combativity of the black masses and a further step toward their total rejection of American capitalist society.

The uprisings were more widespread, penetrated more deeply into the communities, and were more aggressively defensive than previous explosions. They occurred in the midst of an imperialist war. They foreshadowed the anticapitalist thrust of the struggles of the black masses by their direct challenge to the private property rights of white capitalist America and by their resistance to the armed repression of the state apparatus.

In the most highly industrialized, advanced capitalist country in the world, every city contains a time bomb. The ruling class never knows when it will go off, or how devastating the explosion will be. All the illusions about domestic peace and tranquility in an America of "racial equality," illusions with which American youth are indoctrinated from childhood, are shattered by these revolts.

The 400 years of racist oppression, the decades of promised reform, the continuing deterioration of living conditions in relation to white America, and the accelerated revolts of oppressed nations, have contributed to a deepening national consciousness among Afro-Americans. Nations neither develop nor exist abstractly. They are created under definite conditions and often from racial stock. While the black slaves brought to this country were consciously and systematically stripped of all national heritage, the conditions of life in America created a deepening nationalist consciousness in the oppressed black minority. This has been especially accelerated in the last quarter century as larger and larger numbers of Afro-Americans have moved to segregated urban centers. Malcolm X was both a reflection of this, and provided leadership for it.

The Vietnam war has added to the radicalization that has been developing in the last 5 years. Afro-Americans have been forced to bear a disproportionately high percentage of the war burden as members of the armed forces, in combat, in casualties, and at home through taxes and inflation. But the war has also strengthened the radicalization among black youth and has been an impetus to a growing sense of internationalism, especially among black student radicals. To them the resistance of the Vietnamese people is the resistance of brothers.

One of the most significant indications of the deepening national consciousness of Afro-Americans has been the formation of Afro-American organizations on virtually every campus that admits black students.

It is the black youth who have been in the forefront of the battles in the black communities, as well as on the black campuses, and it is from this young generation of black militants that a

sorely needed leadership will eventually develop. The organization and unification of the black masses around a clear program for self-determination, and the development of a leadership for the black struggle, have both lagged far behind the demonstrated willingness of the Afro-American population to fight back against racist oppression.

The fact that the battles being fought by Afro-Americans are primarily battles directed against the government and state apparatus tends to push the attention of the black community more and more to the need for a political struggle. It underscores the objective need for an independent black political party to fight for the needs and aspirations of the black population by any means necessary.

The ruling class has reacted to the new intensity of the demands from the black community by supporting the election or appointment of black Democratic party politicians as mayors of major cities such as Washington, Cleveland, and Gary. This reaction is an indication of the imperative importance they attach to keeping the political power of the black community trapped within the capitalist two party system. At the same time, these election victories for Stokes and Hatcher were made possible only by the solid block support of the black community. They demonstrate the power the black community could exert if it voted with the same solidarity for its own independent candidates.

While the SWP election campaign is still only a few months old, our experiences in supporting the SWP candidates have already proved that the campaign offers us greatly expanded opportunities to make contact with and recruit black militants. The response to the campaign tour of black campuses in the South is an indication of the interest in our ideas and the growing political consciousness of black students. Our support for black control of the black community and for the formation of an independent black political party will be a real source of strength in our campaign. It is on these questions that our opponents are weakest; it is with these questions that the vanguard is most concerned.

As the '68 election campaign develops, bringing us into contact with more and more black youth, the doors to increased recruitment will be open to us. Part of this process will be the establishment of working relations with black organizations with whom we have established contact. Such relations will be central to the recruitment, education and development of a black cadre in the YSA, and the establishment of respect for, and trust in, the YSA as a revolutionary organization.

### Labor and the War

The deepening divisions over the war and the further development of the student radicalization have not passed the labor movement by untouched. The domestic consequences of the war have

forced the American working class to defend the economic gains it made in the late '50s and early '60s.

The fight to prevent a decline in real wages in the face of the war inflation, threatened tax hikes, and other attempts by the ruling class to pass on the costs of the war, have resulted in more frequent rank and file rejection of contracts negotiated by union officials. The mood has been one of increasing willingness to challenge the labor "leaders" who give too much too fast to the bosses. The government has not yet tried to broach the idea of a no-strike pledge for the duration of the war, or any similar "equality of sacrifice" measure. Demands for higher wages and improved working conditions have been pressed the hardest by the young workers who make up a growing percentage of the work force in basic industries and the relatively new and recently combative public workers unions.

In the last three years, the labor union bureaucracy has also been faced with a challenge from the antiwar movement. Pompous pretensions to progressive-mindedness have been put to the test both by the development of the antiwar movement and by the deepening of antiwar sentiment in the union rank and file. The performance of Meany and Co. in the face of the war has confirmed the tendency among many new radicals to discount the working class as a significant force for social change. But this has become disquieting to the more "liberal minded" union bureaucrats who see their prestige among radical youth at its historic low point. Along with this pressure from the radical antiwar movement is the growing pressure from the ruling class for the labor bureaucrats to prove their usefulness by providing "leadership" for the youthful militants and directing them into "constructive," that is, reformist, activity.

Developments such as the national conference of the Trade Union Division of SANE in Chicago in early November, must be judged in this context. The conference reflected the growing antiwar sentiment in the working population as a whole, indicated the pressure on labor bureaucrats from the general leftward shift of the student movement, and also figured in the internal battles of the AFL-CIO bureaucracy. Reuther's decision to repudiate the more crass aspects of the AFL-CIO subservience to the cold war, anti-communist policies of the State Department figured heavily in the conference proceedings. The harshest criticisms by the main speakers were reserved for Meany, not President Johnson, to whom both Meany and Reuther have already pledged their support in '68.

Some YSAers belonging to various public employee unions have found it possible to participate in and help build antiwar committees within those unions. However, the opportunities for doing even this kind of work within the unions are still extremely limited.

These stirrings within the labor bureaucracy do not yet reflect any radicalization or significant deepening of class consciousness

on the part of the union rank and file. However, the standards we use to judge the significance of developments in the student movement cannot be simply transferred to other sections of the mass movement, which develop according to their own dynamic. In the midst of a war and in the face of a mounting government attack, such events as rank and file rejection of negotiated contracts and the continued fight for wage gains to counteract inflation are potentially of great importance. They can, as the government anti-labor attacks are deepened, lead to struggles against the government which will raise political class consciousness among the workers significantly.

### The Antiwar Movement

The last year has seen a sharp deepening of antiwar sentiment on every campus in the country. For the first time it has significantly affected the smaller, more isolated campuses which have experienced numerous and frequent sit-ins, demonstrations, anti-complicity actions, and free speech fights. It has affected the high schools, bringing about the development of high school student mobilization committees in several cities. It has affected Afro-American students on the black campuses even in the deep South, as well as those at predominantly white colleges.

A year ago our central educational task within the antiwar movement was to convince young antiwar activists that the antiwar struggle was the key political fight to be waged in the U.S. today, to convince them of the efficacy and crucial importance of mass actions against the war, and the necessity of appealing propagandistically to the mass of Americans, including the GIs.

The size and impact, both nationally and internationally, of April 15 and October 21, convinced many of the importance of mass actions. Even the ruling class now finds it impossible to maintain the myth that these mass actions have no effect. The continued brutal escalation of the war, with no end in sight, has been a significant factor in creating the new spirit of militancy and combativity among the antiwar activists, which has been reflected in actions at Oakland, Madison, Washington, and dozens of other places across the country in the last month and a half. The international breadth and depth of the October 21st actions, in addition to the direct contact between some leaders of the American antiwar movement and the Vietnamese themselves, has helped to deepen the internationalist spirit of the antiwar activists, and strengthened their understanding of the importance of the antiwar coalition in building mass actions.

While we have left some problems behind us, others are still with us and new developments in the antiwar movement pose some different problems. Some of the antiwar actions around October 21 reflected a greater understanding of the fact that draftees, like the rest of the American population, are affected by the growing antiwar sentiment. However, one of the most important tasks continues to be the need to educate the antiwar movement on the



crucial importance of constantly appealing to the masses of Americans, especially the GIs, and constantly expanding and broadening the base of the antiwar movement.

Secondly, the young activists have yet to learn how to direct their new spirit of militancy into actions that will unite and build the entire antiwar movement. We must fight the attempts of the conscious ultra-leftists to channel the spirit of confrontation into ill-conceived and adventuristic actions that are guaranteed to evoke a brutal response from the state authorities and divide the youth from the millions of Americans opposed to the war. The importance of using defensive formulations is a lesson that many young militants have yet to learn. Many inexperienced young militants tend to consider tactics first, and political objectives second, often failing to comprehend that tactics must be geared to achieving the general political aims. The blind substitution of tactics --- mobile or otherwise -- for a correct political approach to the fight against the war is one of the greatest immediate dangers facing the antiwar movement.

We must be careful to distinguish the tendency to tactical militancy and political short-sightedness on the part of many healthy young activists, from the conscious, political ultra-leftism of organized groups such as Progressive Labor and Youth Against War and Fascism. The ultraleft political approach of many new young activists results from a combination of militant spirit and a lack of leadership, lack of experience, and sense of frustration over the continuing escalation of the war. Most will learn from their experiences in the antiwar movement. However, we must consciously try to educate them on the importance of preventing and eliminating any contradiction between the mass of the American population, which is against the war, and the vanguard that acts in the streets.

There is no likely perspective that the war will be over before the '68 elections. On the contrary, the pressure on Johnson to prove there has been some progress in the war is likely to produce even greater escalation, more casualties and more unrestrained aggression.

Thus we can count on the further growth of antiwar sentiment between now and November of 1968. The war will be the central issue in the '68 elections, and people will be searching for a way to express their antiwar sentiments at the polling booth. The debate over the perspectives for the war will be intensified. This debate will help the antiwar movement and further legitimize it, but it will also intensify the struggle for leadership within the antiwar movement as the class collaborationist forces try to divert the antiwar struggle from its independent course and place it at the service of liberal capitalist "peace politicians."

In this struggle, it is the young militants who can most easily be convinced of our perspective. They are more likely to oppose attempts to take the antiwar movement into capitalist politics. In

addition, it is the students who have been the organizational backbone and political left wing throughout the development of the antiwar movement. Thus, building and strengthening the student antiwar movement, particularly its national coordination and organization through the Student Mobilization Committee (SMC) remains the central task of our antiwar work. Virtually every one of the campus actions in the last months has been organized around the major political demands of the SMC -- bring the GIs home now, end campus complicity, and end the draft. It is important that the SMC draw these new forces together and help organize them for the next big antiwar action.

While we have embarked upon a major campaign around the '68 elections, its success and the gains we will make from it are inseparable from the growth and continued development of the antiwar movement. Although our work in support of the SWP presidential campaign will demand substantial time and energy and resources, we must not see it as a substitute for, but rather interconnected with, our antiwar campaign. Our opponents would like nothing better than for us to withdraw from the antiwar movement, but it is our continued work to build the antiwar movement that will provide us with one of the greatest sources of campaign supporters. At the same time, the election campaign must be seen as an extension and deepening of the antiwar movement, and must be used to help build the antiwar movement.

#### The YSA and Other Radical Youth Organizations

All the radical youth organizations in the country are faced with three main political issues in the coming year -- the war, the black freedom struggle, and the '68 elections. Where do the other major radical youth groups stand on these questions?

For the youth influenced by the Communist party, their response to all three issues is consistent with their general perspective of class collaborationist politics. For them the '68 elections present a problem -- how to oppose Johnson while deepening their involvement in the Democratic party and its fringes. After nearly three decades of Democratic party work, the option of supporting a Republican "peace" candidate, if one is nominated, is not very inviting. Thus, they have essentially three options: to work within the Democratic party to line up convention delegates opposed to Johnson's renomination; to try again to line up some kind of third ticket outside the Democratic party supported by the "peace and freedom movement;" or to run their own candidates.

After the total fiasco of the National Conference for New Politics (NCNP) convention in Chicago on Labor Day weekend, the likelihood is very remote that the CP will be able to draw together significant forces outside of themselves to provide cover for the third ticket attempt. Despite a large mobilization of their forces, and a cynical, racist attempt to use the black caucus to establish an "integrated" reformist third ticket,

they came out of the NCNP convention with empty hands and the well-earned animosity of hundreds of militant youth. Their defeat at that conference was so sharp that hundreds were fully aware of it before the conference was over. By contrast, at the Washington NCC convention two years ago, it took months, until the decline of the NCC itself, for most people to realize that the CP had failed in its attempt to steer the antiwar militants into class collaborationist politics.

Immediately after the NCNP conference, the CP leadership, despite internal differences, tried to exert its influence in various local "new politics" organizations in favor of a third peace ticket. However, with their failure to accomplish this in California and New York, the largest and most promising "new politics" groups, and with the increased activity and support for the "dump Johnson" movements inside the Democratic party, the CP's emphasis has shifted.

While the CP is holding open the option of running their own presidential candidates, their main efforts at this time are devoted to the "dump Johnson" movement. If such a movement were successful they would in all likelihood return publicly to their support for the "lesser-evil." In the meantime, our candidates will have almost a full year of campaigning around the country for a real alternative to the war policies of both the capitalist parties.

The contradictions facing the CP in the antiwar movement are tied closely to their dilemma over the '68 elections. A year ago, at the Thanksgiving conference in Cleveland, the CP made the decision to help build the April 15<sup>th</sup> demonstration in order to prove the existence of a base for a "peace" ticket in '68. But in order to do this, they were forced to go along with building the antiwar movement on the political line of mass actions in the streets against the imperialist war. While the existence of the antiwar movement helps pressure the Democratic party to put up more "peace" candidates, insofar as a large wing of the antiwar movement maintains a position of anti-class-collaborationist politics, it will be more of a detriment than an aid to the CP. We can be confident the CP will continue its efforts nationally and locally to draw the antiwar movement into some form of class collaborationist politics in '68. The ability of the antiwar movement to avoid such a trap will determine how well the coalition survives the pressures of '68.

The CP's grudging and belated "support" for some aspects of black nationalism and the rise of black power, also stems from their class collaborationist politics. They fear the development of an independent black political force outside of and in direct opposition to the Democratic party, and for this reason have been -- along with LBJ and Humphrey -- the most enthusiastic supporters of Democratic party politicians such as Stokes and Hatcher.

The DuBois Clubs continue to suffer from two major contra-

dictions in addition to those imposed on them by the reformist political line of the Communist party. The first has been their attempt to declare themselves to be the broad American socialist youth group; that is, to pretend to be something they are not. Their refusal to admit that they are in essence the youth group of the CP makes them appear dishonest, and prevents them from taking advantage of the strengths they could have as the CP youth group. Secondly, they have acted under the illusion that they can operate on an equal footing with the single issue antiwar movement, that they can be a competitor with the antiwar movement, rather than a component of the antiwar coalition. This illusion stems from their total failure to understand the radicalizing dynamic bred around the issue of opposition to the war and results in the sectarian attitude they have demonstrated to the united front character of the antiwar organizations.

All these problems combined resulted in the precipitous decline of the DuBois Clubs for a year and a half. This decline was marked by the disintegration of most of their chapters, the loss of several of their key leaders, the actual closing down of their national office, and the failure to publish any of their public organs regularly, if at all. The DuBois Club convention held in New York this fall was attended by approximately 100 DuBoisers, mostly from the New York area itself.

At the same time, the CP has been split internally on the importance of the DuBois Club and the role that CP youth should play within it. Until recently, it was uncertain how this disagreement would be resolved. However, since the DuBois Club convention in September, the national office as well as several chapters have been reorganized and begun to function, at least minimally, indicating that the decision has been made to put maximum effort into building the DuBois Clubs, in an attempt to revive the organization. This is being done in conjunction with the continued functioning of some CP youth as open CPers. How successful the attempt to revitalize the DuBois Club will be depends in part upon the YSA. Most DuBois Club members and many CP youth are unable to answer us politically and we can put maximum pressure on their ranks by building a strong antiwar coalition in which they are obliged to participate and where they are forced to try and confront us politically.

Secondly, the attractiveness of our election campaign to many in their periphery and even some of their members, will be a problem for them, and an opportunity for us to put political pressure on them in another arena. Certainly, every socialist should campaign for the Halstead-Boutelle ticket, should campaign against the war and for black control of the black community, rather than for capitalist war-makers.

#### Students for a Democratic Society

The leaders of SDS have also been caught in the contradictions resulting from the fact that they have attempted to avoid, or been

unable to correctly analyze, the main questions of American politics.

Their failure to understand the imperialist war and the nature of the opposition to it, and especially the importance of the single issue antiwar committees, has led them to adopt a sectarian attitude toward the united front. SDS cannot hope to substitute itself for the antiwar movement. The character and existence of the war will continue to produce organizations of youth around the issue of the war, and outside of the direct control of SDS or any other radical youth organization. In recent weeks, some of the SDS national leaders have been publicly critical of SDS's sectarian attitude toward the antiwar coalition and have raised the possibility of closer collaboration and cooperation, but it is unclear whether or not this view is held by the majority of the SDS leadership. It is also important to remember that many of the SDS chapters around the country do not share the sectarian attitude of the national leadership, and they are often among the best builders of the mass antiwar actions and the antiwar coalition.

Many of the original leaders of SDS came out of the civil rights movement after the height of the southern projects organized by SNCC, such as Mississippi Summer. They have remained sympathetic to SNCC and have supported the development of black nationalism and the rise of black power. But their support for the Afro-American struggle is based more on a liberal humanist point of view than on an understanding of the national question and the revolutionary potential of the black struggle. They rarely deal with the Afro-American struggle in their press or at their conventions except as it effects the few social work type projects in the ghettos with which they are associated. They are especially blind to the political significance of the formation of an independent black political party.

SDS has also failed to correctly comprehend the role of electoral politics. While most SDSers do not take an explicit pro-Democratic, class collaborationist position, they refuse to face up to the meaning of the '68 elections, and the role of electoral action. Behind a facade of anti-electoralism, they leave themselves open and susceptible to all sorts of capitalist and pro-capitalist gimmicks of the third ticket type. They go from a healthy rejection of capitalist electoral politics, to the rejection of the use of electoral politics in general. They do not draw the political conclusion that the next crucial steps to be taken by the labor movement and the black community are toward an independent labor party and a black party, not "building local constituencies."

Many SDSers, as well as some black militants like Stokely Carmichael, have advocated a policy of boycotting the '68 presidential contest, saying there is no ticket worthy of support. While for most radical youth, the major pressure in '68 will still be toward support of some independent "peace" candidate, or the "Dump Johnson" movement, the question of boycott is an important

one that we will have to deal with seriously. Some are for boycott of all electoral activity, considering it to be class-collaborationism; some are for boycott of all electoral activity on the grounds that it is tactically ineffective; and others are for boycott of national elections on a tactical basis, while supporting local campaigns of various types.

There are thousands of American voters who simply abstain from casting a ballot as they do not think it is worth the effort. The sentiment for boycott is healthy to the extent that it is a recognition that the Republicans and Democrats represent basically the same politics. Sometimes when there is no alternative for radicals, the decision to abstain is correct. But in the 1968 elections there is an alternative and there is no justification for a policy of boycott.

Insofar as such a policy is a rejection of all electoral politics, it reflects a lack of understanding not only of the need to utilize all forms of struggle against the ruling class, but of the central political problem facing the American revolutionary movement. This shortsightedness is in turn largely due to the historical absence of any independent mass political voice in this country for the working class or the black community. But militancy, nationalism, and radicalism are in themselves no serious threat to the American ruling class, as long as these sentiments remain unorganized and incapable of posing the question of political power. These manifestations of discontent can be contained if the ruling class maintains its present monopoly over the electoral system, in one form or another. Those ultralefts who advocate abstentionism simply invite back door support for the Democratic party, maintenance of the capitalist electoral monopoly, and construct a road block to the development of a force that can challenge the American rulers for political power. Unless the American working class and the Afro-American community are organized into parties independent of the ruling class and fighting for their own needs and aspirations, there will be no American revolution.

SDS is politically the most heterogeneous of the various radical youth groups and the ideas of many SDSers are far from being definitely formed. The default of the SDS leadership on the questions of the war and electoral action leaves their members and periphery open to the influence of the Student Mobilization Committee on the importance of building the antiwar movement, and to the influence of Young Socialists for Halstead and Boutelle in the 1968 election campaign. The campaign has already received a number of endorsements from SDS members in various parts of the country, and SDS chapters have already sponsored many campus meetings for the candidates. We should continue to take advantage of every opening and opportunity we have to talk to the SDS milieu about these issues.

### Progressive Labor

Of the various organizations which veer between opportunism and

ultra leftism, Progressive Labor is the strongest on a national scale.

In the antiwar movement their sectarianism has isolated them from the antiwar committees, the coalition in general, and they have played no meaningful role in the mass mobilizations. They see the single-issue, united front character of the antiwar movement through the sectarian lens of their 3rd period Stalinism.

Their abstentionism has been covered up with ultra-left attacks on the antiwar movement and on the YSA, casting the antiwar movement in the role of the class enemy. Their attack on the united front has been paralleled by the classical call for a united front from below, setting up dual apparatus's for activities such as petition campaigns, and demanding that the rank and file of the organizations in the antiwar coalition join them. As this tactic has proved relatively unsuccessful, their frustration has grown to the point of manifesting itself in open physical attacks on the Parade Committee referendum petitioners in New York and on our comrades in San Francisco. It is the classical picture of 3rd period stalinist tactics as practiced by the CP in the '30s.

While their perspective for '68 is unclear at this point, they have in the past vacillated from ultra-left abstentionism from electoral actions, to popular front type adventures such as the Levin and Silberman campaigns in New York in '66. One thing is very clear. They have no principled class line on electoral action. Working within the Democratic party is a tactical question for them, and they now think it was an error not to have supported Scheer in the Democratic primaries in Oakland in early '66.

Progressive Labor's position on black nationalism has also been inconsistent. They vacillate from a position of ultra-black-nationalism, trying to portray themselves as the current leadership of the black masses, to sectarian abstentionism, such as their boycott of the Newark black power conference on the grounds that it was a "bourgeois" conference. In the New York teachers strike this fall they supported the racist bureaucracy of the teachers union as against the demands of the black community for more control over their own schools.

Their vaunted worker-student alliance takes the form of inverted social workerism. While it is correct to project the political alliance of students with the working class, PL's method of attempting to carry out a "worker-student alliance" at this time is ultraleft formalism. To put it into practice they try to organize in some of the lowest paid job categories such as the hospital workers. In reality, such an attempt to go to the "blessed poor" and organize is a cover up for their abstention from fighting the real political battles for leadership in the antiwar movement or the Afro-American struggle. For those students who want to align themselves with the perspective of revolutionary working class struggle, it is those battles which must be fought and won at the present time.

In the past few months PL has begun to mount a sustained campaign against the political line of the Cuban leadership, attacking Castroism for not being Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, criticizing the Cuban leadership for not following the thought of Mao, for being "undemocratic," and for being the "conscious left-flank of the counterrevolutionary revisionists." They have implied that Cuba is beginning to revert toward capitalism. The crudeness of their attacks, as well as the tremendous sympathy that exists among the new radicals for the Cuban revolution and for Che, give us one more political issue to illustrate their ultra-left sectarianism. Just publicizing their position on Cuba will help to isolate them further.

Given the nature of the student radicalization, and the favorable objective base that exists for all the radical youth groups in the country, we can expect the CP and DuBois Clubs, SDS and PL to continue to recruit and grow in the coming period. However, simple recruitment and growth will be no great victory. Assimilation, education, and the development of a revolutionary cadre are the central tasks facing the radical youth groups today, and these are precisely the most difficult tasks for these other organizations. It is not easy to transform revolutionary-minded youth into reformists. All the other radical youth organizations face serious political problems in this regard. For each one of them, their political line has precluded their recognition of the single issue and united front character of the antiwar movement and the central responsibility of socialists to build a broad action movement against the imperialist war in Vietnam. None of them have a clear principled line on the need for class struggle rather than class collaborationist politics, and the need for a break with the capitalist parties. And none of them have an understanding of the national question or a clear perspective on the need for a black political party independent of the ruling class. It is on these three main points that we can continue to build and confront them in the coming year through the antiwar movement and our election campaign.

### The 1968 Elections

In the next year the activities of the YSA will be centered around a campaign in support of the 1968 Socialist Workers party presidential ticket, and it is through this campaign that the greatest opportunities for growth in influence and numbers are open to us.

The pressure to conform to bourgeois politics, and the confusion perpetrated by the conscious class collaborationists, will be great. The mass sentiment against the war, insofar as it is expressed in actual votes, will be registered in one way or another through the two capitalist parties, not through the SWP or any of the "independent" peace candidates. At the same time, during the 1968 campaign, there will be greater interest in our ideas, and more receptivity to class struggle politics than during any previous election campaign run by the SWP.



The politicians of the capitalist class are concerned over the extent of the antiwar opposition as well as the direction in which it is moving. "The Great Debate" over the Vietnam war threatens to go far beyond the bounds of that war itself, challenging the basic premises of American foreign policy. The capitalist politicians are also concerned over the growing disillusionment and alienation of militant youth from both the Republican and Democratic parties.

Senator McCarthy's announcement that he will challenge Johnson's renomination by running in several Democratic party primaries is an indication of this concern. Senator McCarthy himself, as well as influential voices of the ruling class such as the New York Times, have stated frankly that their intent is to channel the growing militancy of the dissent from the Vietnam war back into the political framework of the capitalist parties, and to undercut the development of any third party, fourth party, or other "irregular" political movement.

The two major capitalist parties will also be faced with a racist challenge from the right in the '68 elections, headed by "former" Gov. Wallace of Alabama. The pressure to undercut the votes this racist offensive could muster and keep potential Wallace supporters within the two major parties, will give the ruling class less room to maneuver and weaken their ability to make concessions to the antiwar sentiments on their left flank.

Our response to all the capitalist and pseudo-independent election activities is a campaign in support of the Socialist Workers party ticket. The SWP election campaign will be an uncompromising fight against the imperialist war in Vietnam and will propagandize to bring the troops home now. It will campaign in support of black control of the black communities and for the formation of an independent black political party, fighting for a program of uncompromising and independent struggle by the Afro-American community. It will propagandize for and attempt to popularize a program of unconditional and independent class struggle by the American working class to attain its basic needs. And it will educate around and foreshadow the break that the black community and the working class must make with capitalist politics.

The YSA will be campaigning for and building support for the SWP campaign, and our number one task around the campaign and through the campaign will be recruitment to the YSA. In addition to our participation in the antiwar movement, forums, educationals, contact classes, and other activity, which we must continue to maintain at their present level, the campaign gives us a whole new arena of socialist activity in which we can involve our contacts and periphery. It gives us even greater opportunities for speaking engagements, and participating in rallies and protest meetings. It gives us an opportunity to take our program to thousands of youth who are searching for answers to the problems and evils of American capitalist society. The campaign itself will become a new pole of attraction for youth, and we will be able to intervene with the campaign in all forms of activity.

There are many people in our general periphery, and especially in the antiwar movement, who are interested in supporting socialist candidates in '68 but are not ready to join the YSA at this point. For that reason the election campaign committee has initiated the formation of Young Socialists for Halstead and Boutelle (YSHB) as the main vehicle for involving young supporters in campaigning for the socialist ticket against the Democrats and Republicans. The YSHB will also be a major source of new recruits to the YSA in the next year.

At this point Young Socialists for Halstead and Boutelle is not an organization with officers, a formal structure, regular meetings, or a written program. It is more like a mailing list of those interested in supporting the campaign. Our attitude should be that anyone who signs a mailing list or indicates interest in the campaign is a Young Socialist for Halstead and Boutelle, and our job is to involve that person in campaign activities. It must be clear that supporting the campaign involves absolutely minimal commitment, and is not synonymous with joining the YSA.

In reality the YSHB is already much broader than the YSA, involving hundreds of youth who have either endorsed the campaign or are interested in it and want to keep informed about activities. It is important that this breadth be reflected in the activities of YSHB, and that non-YSAers be encouraged to write leaflets and articles and contribute in many other ways to the campaign. Young people have endorsed the campaign for many different reasons, not always agreeing fully with the program of the SWP, and this breadth of support is one of the strongest features of YSHB.

The development of YSHB will be a process that takes place over the coming year, and it will evolve differently from one area to another. Its character will be different in areas where there is no YSA than in areas where we have strong locals. But the key to the development of YSHB will be a creative and experimental attitude on our part, a willingness to think big about the openings and opportunities available to us around the election campaign.

The recent upswing in recruitment to the YSA is one indication of the deepening radicalization going on in this country. The breadth of support already received by the SWP campaign is another. How far and how deep this radicalization will go in the next year depends on many factors that we cannot predict or control, but it is through the campaign and particularly through the development of YSHB that we will be best able to measure the developments that will take place in the coming year. It is through the YSHB that we will best be able to judge the possibilities of even more significant growth for the revolutionary socialist youth movement in this country.

The possibilities for recruitment to the YSA which this campaign and the formation of YSHB give us are unparalleled in the history of the YSA. There are thousands of youth who consider themselves socialists, and can be drawn around the campaign on the minimal

basis of supporting socialist candidates as opposed to capitalist candidates, on the basis of supporting the demands and needs of the working class and the Afro-American community as opposed to the needs of the capitalist class. It is our job to reach these young people through the SWP campaign and bring them one step closer to becoming revolutionary socialists. We should have a campaigning attitude toward their recruitment.

Given the present cadre strength of the YSA and the solid educational base we have laid and must continue to develop, the YSA stands to make significant gains from the new wave of recruits we are winning and will win in the coming year. The real test for us in the months ahead will be to reach out to the hundreds of potential new members, recruit them and educate them as revolutionaries and take the next step towards building the YSA into the dominant socialist youth group in the country.

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