



INTERNATIONAL

WORKERS OF THE WORLD — UNITE!

The Workers' Parties and de Gaulle

By PIERRE FRANK

Editorials on: DEFEAT IN FRANCE; CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST; THE NAGY ASSASSINATION; THE DEPRESSION; GOMULKA'S RETREAT; ELECTIONS IN ITALY, BELGIUM, AND GERMANY; CYPRUS

The New Programme of the Yugoslav Communists

By ERNEST GERMAIN

TEXTS ON: HUNGARY; ARAB UNITY

The History of the Fourth International: II

By MICHEL PABLO

DOCUMENTS ON: DE GAULLE
NAGY; THE ARAB REVOLUTION; BOLIVIA

NEWS FROM THE WORLD WORKERS' MOVEMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL

SUMMER 1958

3

2 SHILLINGS
35 CENTS



INTERNATIONAL

WORKERS OF THE WORLD — UNITE!

The Workers' Parties and de Gaulle

By PIERRE FRANK

Editorials on: DEFEAT IN FRANCE; CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST; THE NAGY ASSASSINATION; THE DEPRESSION; GOMULKA'S RETREAT; ELECTIONS IN ITALY, BELGIUM, AND GERMANY; CYPRUS

The New Programme of the Yugoslav Communists

By ERNEST GERMAIN

TEXTS ON: HUNGARY; ARAB UNITY

The History of the Fourth International: II

By MICHEL PABLO

DOCUMENTS ON: DE GAULLE
NAGY; THE ARAB REVOLUTION; BOLIVIA

NEWS FROM THE WORLD WORKERS' MOVEMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL

★

FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

ENGLISH - LANGUAGE EDITION OF THE THEORETICAL ORGAN OF THE INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

Number 3

Summer 1958

Editorial

LESSONS OF A DEFEAT

The spectacular collapse of the Fourth Republic in France will long resound on the European and world political stages, so sudden and unexpected was it to the masses and their traditional parties in France itself, and so deeply rooted internationally was the myth of a democratic citadel in that country. It was furthermore an event whose consequences and teachings will stir to the depths the ideas and structures of the world labor movement.

The fall of the Fourth Republic in France closes a chapter in the post-war period which, especially these last years, amid a dynamic expansion of capitalism, saw the growth of the lure of a vulgar neo-reformism that preached — including from the mouths of the Kremlin's new arch-opportunist masters — “new,” “peaceful,” “parliamentary” “ways” to socialism.

The inglorious end of the parliamentary republic in a nation traditionally among the most democratic ones, amid the clatter of the parachutists' machine-guns, the hysteria of the fascist mobs and settlers, the paralyzing disorientation of the immense metropolitan masses, promptly revived pre-war memories: the chain of reactionary victories following the rise of the Nazis in Germany, Austria, Spain, France.

Granted, the current international context is quite other than in that period, and de Gaulle after all is not and cannot be a new Hitler. It is, however, none the less true that the political regime in France has qualitatively changed, that parliamentary democracy has been destroyed, and that the working class cannot get out of this new frame without breaking it by a revolutionary upsurge carried to the highest pitch. It would furthermore be unpardonably light-minded to underestimate the reactionary effects of this first serious post-war victory of the bourgeoisie on the European and world arenas.

THE REASONS FOR THE CRISIS IN PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY

De Gaulle came to power through the revolt of the army against the powerless and ineffective parliamentary apparatus of the bourgeoisie. This multi-partisan apparatus functioned within the framework of institutions and constitutional procedures that split up the bourgeoisie's political power and kept it in a regime of permanent crisis. Government instability in France had become the laughing-stock of the domestic and foreign critics of “the system.” Yet that instability only expressed within the framework of parliamentary democracy a much more fundamental process through which French post-war society was passing: the real political splitting up of the country into formations reflecting its economic and social restructuration.

The relatively stable French pre-war society, based on an economic structure made up of a multitude of small and medium firms and easy profits arising from the exploitation of submissive colonies and from capital invested abroad at usurious rates, found itself sucked into the temporary dynamism of post-war world capitalism. The task facing the French bourgeoisie was hastily to modernize its economic structures in the midst of a irresistible movement of European economic leveling, carried out from above, and of the emancipation of colonies, in lack of which it ran the risk of having its own homeland colonized by more dynamic capitalisms while definitely losing, even on the economic level, its own colonies.

By the force of events, post-war France undertook the gigantic task of modernizing itself, of bringing itself “up-to-date with the XXth century.” The process once begun could not fail to shake deeply the conservative structures of the country. While industry as a whole developed strongly in these last years (42 %

between 1953 and 1956), a very concentrated and dynamic industry was created in certain branches, first of all in steel. In agriculture, mechanization of production for the benefit of medium-sized and especially of large properties, also developed greatly: France now numbers 12 times more tractors than before the war.

Even the archaic system of distribution, with its immense network of "little shop-keepers," as burdensome as it is inefficient, has undergone profound changes by the steady spread of the chains of department stores and the concentration of trade.

These processes brought about reclassifications and polarizations which expressed their antagonistic interests and tendencies in the political parties and struggles that marked the life of the Fourth Republic. Various sectors of the metropolitan and colonial bourgeoisie in movement, and various petty-bourgeois sectors of city and country injured by the process of "modernization," clashed, before the revolutionary process through which French society was passing could quiet down and a dominant social stratum, in lieu of a new ruling class, emerge with enough dynamism, authority, and efficiency to direct this society. This whole process, with its roots in the transformations of the homeland itself, was rendered infinitely more spasmodic and explosive by the interference of the colonial revolution, shaking the overseas foundations of capitalist France.

It is under these conditions that the political instrument of parliamentary democracy imperceptibly became inoperative for the bourgeoisie. The need for a "reform of institutions" was felt long before the culminating point of the recent crisis. The war in Algeria is only the direct cause of the crisis of the political regime, but this in reality fed on the whole process of the restructuration of the economic and social foundations of capitalist and imperialist post-war France.

The search for a "strong" state was inherent in this process in order that it might be concluded and capitalized upon to the profit of the most dynamic and powerful strata of the "modernized" French bourgeoisie.

DE GAULLE IS INSTALLING A BONAPARTIST REGIME

This search could take the form only of either a more or less benign **Bonapartist** regime or a **fascist** regime. It is indubitable that these two tendencies are now confronting each other within the French bourgeoisie, and are expressed to a certain extent by the ambiguity that at present still characterizes de Gaulle's regime. We give the term Bonapartist regime to a political regime in which the state apparatus (administrative bureaucracy, police, army) in one way or another raises itself above parliamentary democracy and tries to solve the latter's crisis and instability by the continuity of extraparliamentary authoritarian action. Such a regime is possible only in case of a sort of

mutual neutralization of the divided, antagonistic, and momentarily powerless forces of parliamentary democracy, including the forces of the left integrated into the parliamentary game.

This regime appears under these conditions as a super-arbiter and draws its strength precisely from the mutual neutralization of the forces of parliamentary democracy.

The forms of a Bonapartist regime are naturally varied, running all the way from government with a parliamentary façade to an open military dictatorship that completely suppresses all the attributes of parliamentary democracy. That depends on the concrete dynamics of the class struggle.

The Bonapartist regime, however, is never pure Bonapartism, really suspended above all classes and strata, but in the long run expresses the interests of a given class, and even of a given stratum of a class.

Within the framework of the capitalist social regime, Bonapartism in the long run operates in favor of the most dynamic and conscious concentrated strata of big capital.

A fascist political regime, on the contrary, is characterized above all by a broad popular mass movement, organized and militant, that takes hold of the state apparatus, to place it, in turn, at the service of big capital, in the form of an evolution of **fascism** to **Bonapartism**.

But Bonapartism can also precede fascism and as it were open the way to it, as was the case in Germany with the successive governments of Brüning, von Papen, von Schleicher, before the final arrival of Hitler.

WHAT IS THE SITUATION IN THE CONCRETE CASE OF FRANCE ?

For a whole period the dominant trend of the bourgeoisie, especially the metropolitan bourgeoisie, toward a "strong" state, espoused the form of a Bonapartist regime with a parliamentary façade. Talk was especially about the strengthening of the "executive"; there was even envisaged a presidential regime "à l'américaine." There was no question either of a military Bonapartist dictatorship or, a fortiori, of a fascist regime, which, in the current economic conjuncture, visibly lacked a broad popular base in France itself.

The war in Algeria, however, began to have a different effect. An extreme authoritarian tendency developed among layers of the colonial bourgeoisie, of the army, and layers of the metropolitan bourgeoisie economically tied up with Algeria or with the profits resulting from the war in that country. It is this tendency which especially weighed on the policy of the metropolis during recent years, bending it to the degree that it reached its present point: the Bonapartist power of de Gaulle.

The dynamism of the tendency is explicable by the fact that it includes the army. The army, instrument of post-war France's colonial policy, has passed through a deep crisis in face of the invincible rise of

the colonial revolution. Unable either to understand or to dominate the colonial revolution, it began, as is natural, to want to dominate its own country, whose impotent political regime seemed to it the main cause for its own defeats.

In the peculiar ambience of Algeria, the army, cut off from the homeland, was able to bring about a sort of national reintegration by intermingling with the mass of European settlers, so close to its own mentality and aspirations. But the success of this army-settler tendency cannot be explained merely by the presence of the army, the main organized force of the bourgeoisie. In reality the bourgeoisie as a whole was longing for a "strong" state for the specific reasons we have just explained. And it is still doubtful today whether, faced by the problems raised by its colonies and more especially by Algeria, any fraction of the bourgeoisie can oppose a diametrically different policy to that of the army-settlers.

By a real integration of Algeria to France in one form or another, the French bourgeoisie not only maintains the privileges of a strong sector of its class but also thinks that only thus can it control the wealth of the Sahara and economically "federate" Tunisia and Morocco. The real independence of Algeria is a solution that threatens to ruin all that and is currently not considered by any important sector of the bourgeoisie.

The territories of Africa, the real wealth of the Sahara, the African market, far from losing importance in the process of France's modernization, to the degree that this process means in the long run an accumulation of France's industrial and economic potential, also means, in terms of a capitalist regime, an increased imperialist potential in one form or another. France's economic development involves a growing interest in Africa by all sectors of the bourgeoisie. From this point of view the ambitions for African or Euro-African "grandeur" are shared in different forms as much by a de Gaulle as by a Mendès-France, both aimed at serving the interests of a modernized capitalism, more dynamic hence also more expansionist than ever.

Thus the victory of de Gaulle — borne to power by the almost unanimous complicity of all forces of the bourgeoisie, in order to change the henceforth inoperative political instrument of parliamentary democracy and to set up a "strong" state — reflects the tendencies, views, and interests fundamentally common to all the essential fractions of the bourgeoisie at the present time.

The divergences existent among them bear on the form of the "strong" state: **a Bonapartist regime with a parliamentary façade, or a fascisizing military dictatorship.**

These divergences are naturally real and deep and have an obvious importance for the forms and evolution of the regime. The answer to this last question, however, will be given, especially in the first stage, by the turn taken by the war in Algeria, and, in a

second stage, by the degree of resistance of the masses in France itself. If the war in Algeria ended quickly with a military victory of France or a capitulation of the F L N, the new authoritarian regime that de Gaulle is preparing could for a whole period take on benign forms. Its evolution would then depend on the reactions of the masses in France itself: insufficiently strong, they would have the result of hardening the regime; really strong, they might render its stabilization impossible.

If, on the contrary, the war in Algeria dragged on, the F L N rejecting any solution that compromises independence, this would contribute, through a temporary aggravation of the authoritarian regime in France, to preventing the regime's consolidation and bringing about its crisis and downfall.

In one sense, de Gaulle reached power through the inability of the French left to carry out its militant junction with the Algerian revolution and to open up the perspective of revolution in France itself.

The main weakness of de Gaulle's regime, its principal adversary, remains the power of the Algerian revolution.

It is unlikely that de Gaulle can grant genuine independence to Algeria, including within a federative framework with the other countries of the Maghreb and with France. It remains to be seen whether the Algerian revolution, isolated as it is from the active solidarity of the French masses, and under the pressure of bourgeois conciliatory forces from the outside and inside, will be able to find the strength to continue its glorious combat.

THE METROPOLITAN PROLETARIAT AND THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION

The determined struggle of the colonial peoples for their independence has objectively provided a very serious basis for giving drive and victory to the revolutionary struggle in the homelands. But instead of witnessing an effective junction between the metropolitan proletariat and the colonial revolution, we have in reality seen the inverse process, the metropolitan masses acting in practice as de facto allies of their own bourgeoisie against the colonial revolution. This fact is naturally due above all to the training and leadership given the masses by the long-time chauvinist, opportunist, and class-collaborationist practices of the Socialist and Communist Parties. The European Social-Democracy in particular has shown itself to be in practice as pledged till death to the imperialist bourgeoisie. It has backed it up in all its enterprises aiming at perpetuating in one way or another its domination over the colonial peoples. The example of the French SP is naturally the most scandalous one.

But it must not be forgotten, concerning this party that carried on the struggle for the extermination of the Algerian people, that later opened the way to de Gaulle, and that is still today participating, in the person of its general secretary, in the Bonapartist

government, that the Socialist International not only has taken no sanction against it but has in practice covered its activity.

As for the Communist Parties, their verbal opposition to colonial wars must not cause it to be forgotten that in practice these parties have done everything to sabotage an effective revolutionary struggle against these wars. The example of the French C P in this connection is also overwhelming.

The French C P several times lined up with the S F I O position on Algeria ; it voted unlimited powers to Guy Mollet and Lacoste ; it voted unlimited powers, the state of emergency, and the dictatorial reform of the constitution to the Pflimlin cabinet which hatched the plot for the "cold" restoration of de Gaulle ; and it has never cleared up the ambiguity about its real position on the independence of Algeria. In reality its position has been constantly influenced by the Kremlin's considerations about the United States and France. In order to stir up the "anti-Americanism" of certain strata of the French bourgeoisie, the Kremlin has always favored a solution of the Algerian problem that takes into account the "historic bonds that unite Algeria with France," as the Soviet ambassador at Paris quite recently repeated once more.

But it is not this attitude dictated by the Kremlin that has paralyzed the French C P in a real struggle against the war in Algeria. By its whole parliamentarist doctrine and structure this party has completely lost the possibility of effective revolutionary struggle. Really to struggle against the war in Algeria meant in practice to turn one's back on the "new paths" of eminently parliamentary activity in favor of an eminently extraparliamentary revolutionary activity. Such activity would furthermore require a whole different structure of the party and qualitatively different bonds with the masses. Now the French C P is at present simply a party of reformist practice and structure, unable to mobilize the masses.

This has been amply proved by its whole practice in recent years and especially during the crisis preceding de Gaulle's arrival at power. It is, however, not sufficient to throw the final responsibilities for the non-mobilization of the masses in aid of the colonial revolution on to the traditional opportunist leaderships, in order thus to excuse completely the working class itself. The betrayal of the traditional leaderships has been evident for long years now and is confirmed in a striking manner at every important crisis. Why has the working class shown itself unable to draw the conclusions from this and go beyond these leaderships ? That is a question that deserves, and requires, an answer.

An observation concerning the reactions of the European proletariat as a whole and that of metropolitan capitalist countries in general is now forced upon us. That is, that the degree of its revolutionary spontaneity, of its class revolutionary reactions, is showing

in this post-war period an enormous lag compared to the revolutionary spontaneity demonstrated by the masses of the colonial and dependent countries. The reformist training received over many years from the Socialist and Communist leaderships has pushed back the revolutionary spontaneity of the metropolitan masses. Skepticism and indeed mistrust toward the traditional leaderships has also had a certain weight in this.

But it is possible that in such a context the passing prosperity that post-war capitalism has experienced has also had influence in the direction of causing a certain de facto collaboration of the metropolitan masses with the bourgeoisie in face of the colonial revolution threatening the regime.

The French experience, however, will demonstrate that the basis of such an estimate is false.

The colonial revolution is an irreversible and invincible process, at whose end there will be the inexorable independence of all colonies. Under these conditions the metropolitan bourgeoisie will try to compensate for the concessions and losses in the colonial field by aggravating the exploitation of the metropolitan masses. The de Gaulle operation is heading in this direction. His colonial policy might prove in the long run more "liberal" than that of the "socialist" Lacoste. But on the other hand it will be translated in France itself by the installation of a de facto dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, in which the means of parliamentary representation and action of the workers' parties will no longer have even the semblance of any efficacy.

Hence the fact the metropolitan masses have shown themselves to be incapable of joining in the revolutionary action of the colonial revolution and helping it by beginning their own revolution, might threaten to bring about their own defeat in the home countries and the inevitable lowering of their standard of living. Once more, in this field as well, reformist policy shows itself to be wholly inoperative and catastrophic.

Naturally this factual attitude of the metropolitan proletariat is not without difficulties for the colonial revolution itself. Not only does it put off its victory, but it influences its social development by strengthening bourgeois-nationalist tendencies to the detriment of proletarian-socialist tendencies.

This is already visible in the development of the Arab revolution in general, and in particular in recent developments within the F L N itself. This organization, which set out as an anti-imperialist united front of all national forces, is becoming internally more and more differentiated along the lines of social forces. For the moment the leadership still belongs to the "military" tendency, with a peasant social base, represented by men like Krim Belkacem and Boussouf. To its right, there is growing stronger the tendency of the frankly pro-bourgeois elements, like Ferhat Abbas, who enjoy the support of the Tunisian and Moroccan bourgeoisies, and who are the most

sensitive, despite their verbal intransigence, to the pressure of imperialism. To its left, there is the tendency of the more plebeian and even proletarian elements of the countryside, the cities, and the emigration in France, a tendency which has up till now occasionally had representatives at all levels, and whose best members were among the first victims of the repression and the war.

In one sense, the resistance of the Algerian revolution to the military, political, and diplomatic offensive of French imperialism under the de Gaulle regime, will depend, in the coming weeks and months, on the definitive orientation adopted by the "military-peasant" tendency: structural alliance with that of Ferhat Abbas, which would absorb it politically, or a lining up with the left. This last eventuality, however, would be possible only in case the F L N left organizes itself in depth by developing the social content of its policy.

THE PROLETARIAT AND BOURGEOIS DEMOCRACY

The shipwreck of the Fourth Republic in France should serve for a fundamental reorientation of the revolutionary elements of the French and even the international workers' movement.

The political system of parliamentary democracy has been abandoned unanimously by the vast majority of the bourgeoisie in favor of a political system of a "strong" power.

Hence, by the initiative of the bourgeoisie, the "new paths" leading to "socialism" by parliamentary democracy are blocked for a whole period. The bourgeois parliament is capable of mutations bringing peacefully to power only the openly dictatorial power of the bourgeoisie and not "socialism." To want now to struggle for a pure and simple return to the Fourth Republic, and this by means of No votes in the coming referendum on the constitution, is obviously to go beyond the limits of parliamentary cretinism to enter flatly into conscious betrayal.

In fact such a policy, like that currently put forward by the leadership of the French C P, can in practice mean only the sabotage of a revolutionary struggle for a revolutionary perspective. It is equivalent to settling down into the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. It is not at all excluded that such is in fact the hidden desire of the Kremlin and of the nucleus of the French C P leadership informed of this desire. The Kremlin may perfectly well be wishing for the consolidation of de Gaulle's power for a whole period, wagering on the difficulties and disagreements that he might sow within the Atlantic alliance, and giving him in this sense the guarantees expressed in the French C P's attitude of purely verbal opposition to him.

The policy of "defense of the Republic" that the French C P is opposing to the "fascism" of de Gaulle, by means of a still eminently parliamentary action like

that of the "battle" with bits of paper for a No in the referendum on the constitution, naturally leaves the masses largely indifferent and nowise contributes to their militant regroupment.

A large part of the petty-bourgeois and even proletarian masses have been repelled — by the inefficiency, corruption, and impotence of the bourgeois Fourth Republic — toward antiparliamentary positions that aid the authoritarian solution of de Gaulle. To avoid their crystalization around his power, it was necessary to offer these masses another perspective that took into account their negative experience with the bourgeois republic and **qualitatively** altered the content of that republic. It was necessary to open up the perspective of **socialist democracy**, concretized in a specific programme of **transitional** economic, social, and political demands culminating in the slogan of a **workers' and peasants' government, of workers' organizations, based on democratic committees of workers and peasants.**

To the counter-revolutionary extraparliamentary action of the bourgeoisie it was necessary to offer in opposition, **not the stale chimæras of a Fourth-Republic type of parliamentary regime, now historically outdistanced by the concrete class struggle in France, but revolutionary working-class action for a revolutionary programme.**

The petty-bourgeois reformism of the traditional leaderships can only die a natural death if it shows itself to be unable to draw the least lesson from the bourgeoisie's own initiatives.

Henceforth the historic alternative in France is not — as we are asked to believe by the leaders of the French C P, who are enjoying disguising themselves as petty-bourgeois Jacobins some centuries late in history's time-table — **fascism or republic**, abstract political categories without class content (if not precisely two forms of capitalist social regime), but **counter-revolution or revolution.**

The Bonapartist regime of de Gaulle, independently of its evolution and its future forms, **has placed the masses of France in a regime of de facto dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.** To get out of it, it is henceforth necessary to break this vise of iron by a revolutionary mobilization raised to the highest pitch.

THE PROLETARIAT AND THE REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE

The traditional leaderships have contributed to weakening enormously the class, revolutionary reactions of the proletariat in the metropolitan countries. They have cultivated the chauvinist and reformist propensities that the proletariat receives from the ambience of developed capitalist society, they have for a long time practised the policy of a whole-hog class-collaborationist opportunism, and they have systematically discredited the forms and means of revolutionary struggle.

But history has not evolved in the direction of "new

paths" of eminently reformist and parliamentary action by the proletariat. The objective situation of capitalism has not ceased to be characterized by abrupt changes, after longer or shorter periods of euphoria, which roughly raise the dilemma : **counter-revolution or revolution.**

In these crises the proletariat's traditional organizations prove to be completely lacking in adequate ideological orientation and material preparation for facing up to them. Their strength in electoral votes, parliamentary mandates, and legal apparatuses falls apart like a house of cards before the blast of the organized and militant forces of the counter-revolution. The French crisis has fully justified these truths of the class struggle viewed not only in "democratic" interludes but as a whole.

The attempts of the S P and especially of the C P in France to block the drive toward Bonapartist dictatorship backed by the army, which abruptly rose up no farther away than their own noses, by recourse to the means of parliamentary democracy — support to the Pflimlin government, peaceful demonstrations in "legality" for the "republic," etc. — take on an air of real battles of Don Quixote, hurling himself with an outmoded lance against a wall of modern machine-guns and tanks. In the best of cases it was a question of a disarming naïveté bordering on stupidity. In the more probable case, it was a question of "leftist" camouflages of a passive acceptance of defeat, destined for the use of the "militants," who were alas as devoted as they were politically naïve.

The struggle against the dictatorship of the army, which brought de Gaulle to power, was possible only by means of a revolutionary mobilization of the working class, raised to the highest pitch : **the general strike, not passive but accompanied by the generalized arming of the masses and by the occupation of the factories, the airfields, the railway stations, the squares, and the streets, i e the revolutionary mobilization of the masses determined to confront and to beat the armed and organized forces of the counter-revolution.** In such a case, it would obviously be a question of **the beginning of the Revolution.**

Only a revolutionary party, that had for years on end practised a consistent class policy, could hope to mobilize the masses in such a direction. **Only such a party could effectively seize the opportunity offered by history to transform a counter-revolutionary crisis into a victorious revolutionary crisis.**

Granted, the fact that the counter-revolution had taken the initiative of an offensive was already a handicap, the result of the whole previous evolution of the relationship of forces, which were worsening to the detriment of the proletariat. But on the other hand the adversary's forces must not be overestimated

by forgetting that its army was in reality tied down on the front of the colonial revolution in Algeria.

The historical truth is that the whole powerful apparatus of bourgeois democracy in the metropolis, with its great workers' organizations, with millions of members and voters, with hundreds of parliamentary representatives, collapsed lamentably before the shadow of the threat of a few thousand parachutists, the only military force available to the bourgeoisie for fighting in case of need on the metropolitan front !

The real impotence of the French proletarian left is thus more clearly visible. This impotence was the result of abandoning for years on end revolutionary orientation and organization to the advantage of reformist policy and organization.

Herein must lie the main lesson of the French crisis for the proletariat. It is from this observation that its future reorientation must follow. To get out of the present framework of dictatorship, it will need a revolutionary policy and organization.

The policy must consist of linking up the necessary transitional demands and forms with the perspective of a revolutionary upsurge, a revolutionary mobilization of the armed masses who, at the culminating point of the struggle, would beat down the dictatorship and set up a workers' and peasants' government of the Fifth — democratic socialist — Republic in France. It is necessary immediately to defend, tenaciously, step by step, each democratic conquest, political or economic, in a proletarian antifascist united front, organized in as broad as possible democratic committees in the city districts, villages, and factories.

These committees of the new Resistance will find the means of combining legal and illegal struggle, in all forms, including the highest ones. They will fight at the same time against the war in Algeria and for the independence of that country, which, in the war, serves as the main base of counter-revolution in France itself.

But the ultimate organization, for the victorious prosecution of such a struggle, must consist of a militant regroupment of all the revolutionary Marxist forces, on the basis of a clear complete programme, within the same organization : **the new revolutionary Marxist party of the French proletariat.**

There is only one way for the proletariat to turn a serious class defeat into a victory, at least a partial one : to draw from that defeat all necessary conclusions by a revolutionary criticism which, without any ambiguity, hesitations, or evasions whatever, goes to the root of the causes and confronts face-to-face the real problems with the real solutions.

1 July 1958

Editorial Notes

THE CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

All the modern arms sent by Washington to the tottering Chamoun government in Lebanon did not succeed in halting the rising flood of popular revolution steadily submerging that worm-eaten regime, sanctuary for all the agents of imperialism hunted out of the other countries of the Middle East. Imperialism was helplessly watching the collapse of its Lebanese bastion, and calculating the risks of more direct intervention. It was at that moment that there exploded the thunder-clap of the Iraq revolution, knocking over at one blow the handful of "strong men" of the Baghdad Pact, headed by Noury es Saïd, N° 1 valet of Anglosaxon imperialism in the Middle East.

At that moment it was thought that this whole region, economically and strategically so vital to the capitalist West, would be swept away by the hurricane of the pan-Arab revolution.

Instinctively, in dismay and panic, imperialism reacted by landing marines in Lebanon, parachutists in Jordan. This apparently energetic action could, however, make sense only if it were extended to the occupation of Iraq and the crushing of all the revolutionary hotbeds in the Middle East, including Egypt. That is an undertaking that implies all-out war against the Arab revolution and, beyond it, the USSR and the other workers' states. In fact, limited military occupation of some bastions in the Middle East by imperialism is at the present stage unacceptable either by the Arab revolution in full flood or by the Kremlin. By being continued, it would produce daily clashes with the armed popular forces of the Arab revolution, frictions, incidents, and tensions, steadily increasing and heading toward a graver and more general explosion.

The Kremlin itself would encourage Arab resistance to military occupation in all sorts of ways, both to show its active solidarity with the Arab revolution and to dislodge new imperialist bases from the neighborhood of its own frontiers.

Hence the continuance of a military occupation, even a limited one, is at present inconceivable without its ending up by raising tension to the level of an explosive paroxysm.

The only way out, therefore, is by compromises on the basis of political arrangements involving the withdrawal of the imperialist forces from the Middle East, and the respect of the right to self-determination by the Arab peoples of this region.

That is in theory the goal of the "top" conference now being prepared. Under these conditions, imperialism is in a most difficult position. It runs the risk that, no matter what form is given to this withdrawal in order to "save face," such a move will not fail to be interpreted by the Arab and international masses as a resounding new defeat to imperialism, a striking new demonstration of a relationship of forces very unfavorable to it.

The Arab revolution, and the colonial revolution generally, would most certainly, after that, experience a new and spectacular advance.

It would matter little whether the compromises sought for at the "top" conference would respect during a first period the present status of the oil companies in the Middle East. The trend of events is inexorably toward the expropriation of these firms, through an intermediate stage of modification of the present contracts, which scandalously pillage the wealth of the Middle-Eastern countries for the profit of imperialism. Imperialism will be led to share more equitably with the Arab bourgeoisie arriving at political power.

Naturally, it remains to be seen whether imperialism, now weighing all the consequences of its limited military intervention and its possible withdrawal, will decide on withdrawal or on war.

Munichs have marked its policy for several years now: Korea, Indochina, Suez; and now Iraq. That is to say, compromises to its disadvantage in order to avoid a more general war. But, in another sense, Munichs urge it on to the decisive test, to the extent that they break up the balance, aggravate the disequilibrium, and render a further retreat more catastrophic and therefore more difficult than the preceding ones.

The coming weeks and months will once more be critical.

Imperialism is visibly hesitating before the risks, and feels at a loss, uncertain of its own unity, cohesion, and strength. The European bourgeoisie in particular, except for "hard" nuclei in England, and perhaps in Germany, is gripped by a profound defeatism whenever the hour for a decisive choice seems to be striking.

The colonial masses, on the contrary, are filled with limitless revolutionary ardor. On its side, the Kremlin, well aware of its political and military strong cards, has decided to "neutralize" the Middle East, including Turkey, from imperialism, i e, to impose the disarmament of all the imperialist forces in this region, as against the maintenance of economic advantages, these being rearranged on a basis more equitable toward the countries possessed of oil wealth.

That means that any possible withdrawal by imperialism this time must take on a quite broad form, which gives a measure of both the importance and the gravity of the struggle now going on.

There is no better way for the Western proletariat to fulfil its class duties and simultaneously to fight against the danger of war than to come actively to the aid of the colonial revolution. Only the revolutionary activity of the Western proletariat *to impose the withdrawal of the imperialist troops from the Middle East and the right of the subject peoples to self-determination* is at present a really effective contribution to weakening imperialism further and, should the case arise, to disarming it more promptly and easily.

29 July 1958

[For background material, consult the Lebanon item in the section "News of the World Workers' Movement and the International."]

THE ASSASSINATION OF IMRE NAGY

What is striking about the assassination of Imre Nagy and his companions is the conditions of the trial and the justifications given in the 17 June 1958 communiqué of the Hungarian Ministry of Justice. Unable to have recourse to "confessions," the trial — if any trial took place — was carried out within four walls without any audience or even lawyers. The procedure of "confessions" had been disparaged by Khrushchev himself following upon the revelations in his speech against Stalin and the spectacular rehabilitations of Rajk, Kostov, and other men condemned on the basis of ignominiously extorted "confessions."

What is more, it is stated in the ministry communiqué that the executed men pleaded "not guilty," and in any case had made only partial "confessions."

It seems in reality that they were able to resist the physical and moral tortures and repeated the exploit of Kostov and so many others who never "confessed."

In any case, a public trial of Imre Nagy, beside the enormous agitation that it would have caused in Hungary itself, in all the "people's democracies," and in the entire world, threatened to turn into the pure and simple accusation of the present responsible figures of the Hungarian government, notorious accomplices of Nagy during the 1956 events in Hungary — and Janos Kadar first of all.

Will there be so soon forgotten the "compromising" declarations of Kadar, a minister in the Nagy government, and co-founder with him of a new Hungarian Communist Party? Was it not Kadar who on October 30th 1956 declared that he was "in full agreement with my friend Nagy"? And was it not also he who on November 1st 1956 before the microphones of Radio-Budapest said the following?

The youth of the Petöfi Circle fought in the first ranks against the despotism of Rakosi and political banditism; we are proud of you who have taken your true place in the armed uprising. You were suffused with genuine patriotism and loyalty toward socialism.

During the evening of November 2nd 1956, it was again Kadar who made a speech describing the Hungarian revolution as a "glorious upsurge," and adding that "those who prepared this uprising — writers, workers, peasants, students — come from our ranks."

But other statements by Kadar concerning Imre Nagy's safety are no less compromising. On November 14th 1956, after the crushing of the revolution by the intervention of the Red Army, and his installation at the head of the government, Kadar, receiving a workers' delegation, declared:

Imre Nagy is not being held. He left parliament as a result of his own decision. Neither the government nor the Soviet troops wish to limit his freedom of movement. It depends on himself whether to participate in political life.

Imre Nagy had taken refuge, as is known, in the Yugoslav Embassy at Budapest. The courageous protest handed by the Yugoslavs on June 23rd 1958 to the Hungarian government affirms that Imre Nagy and his

companions had not at that period committed "any of the acts with which they are reproached" in the Hungarian ministry's communiqué. What was in question there are accusations that are "untrue and completely invented."

The same note of protest recalls that "the Hungarian government pledged itself to guarantee the safe return [of Imre Nagy and his companions] to their homes, and not to apply any sanction against them." A few days later, on December 1st 1956, the Hungarian government reaffirmed that the safety of these persons "will be assured and no sanction will be taken against them for the acts which they previously committed." There is Kadar — to use his own November expression — taken in flagrante delicto of "political banditism."

In reality Imre Nagy and his companions were executed on the orders of the Kremlin at a given moment corresponding to a new stage in its policy. It is quite plainly a question of a premeditated act aimed at terrorizing the masses and the opponents of the Kremlin's neo-Stalinist policy in the "people's democracies" and to dam up the "revisionist" current.

Khrushchev is allying himself with the "Molotivist" elements of the Soviet and the international Stalinist bureaucracy in order thus to consolidate his power.

"Destalinization" as a line of gradual and partial "liberalization" could not but fail in face of a most explosive internal situation in the U.S.S.R., the other "people's democracies," and internationally. The whole dynamics of the situation were driving toward revolutionary reforms, effectively abolishing the bureaucracy's political power in those countries. For now some time already the Kremlin has been trying to slow down this process, to mark time, or even to take partial backward steps. It now finds itself forced to have recourse even to physical terror.

But a complete return to the regime of Stalin is inconceivable without the use of terror on a colossal scale in the U.S.S.R. itself and in the "people's democracies." It would be necessary in addition to run the risk of eliminating Gomulka in Poland and Tito in Yugoslavia through a possible war against those countries. Such an enterprise is gigantic in scope and runs counter to the strong basic currents of history at the present stage.

Stalin was the monstrous Thermidorian caricature of Bolshevism. Khrushchev is the cynical caricature of senile Stalinism. To keep himself in power he is dedicated to compromises between concessions and repressions, until the revolutionary proletariat's next explosion, built up in the world he governs, and internationally. The most serious danger represented by the political regime of Khrushchev is that of war. The international Stalinist bureaucratic caste is indeed capable of seeking in the long run a way out from the contradictions that are ripping at and undermining its power, by taking a chance on conflicts that may set off a world conflagration. Meanwhile his actions only help reaction and imperialism's war plans.

The assassination of Nagy deepens the isolation of the Communist Parties from the Socialist Parties and the

petty-bourgeois masses, as well as the disorientation of their own members. This murder, combined with the campaign against Yugoslavia and its economic blockade, furthermore largely destroys the efforts of the Kremlin's

campaign toward the "uncommitted" countries like India, Egypt, etc. Once more the Soviet bureaucracy proves to be a major obstacle to the spread of the world revolution and even to the defense of the U S S R.

THE FALSE JUSTIFICATIONS OF GOMULKA

The speech made by Gomulka on June 29th at Gdansk means that he has joined the Kremlin in its campaign against Belgrade and about the assassination of Nagy. A clear stand on these two affairs by the Polish leadership was expected, for its prolonged silence ran the risk of being interpreted as a disapproval of the Kremlin's action. And at the present time the Kremlin would hardly stand for such a disavowal on the part of Poland. Strong pressure was brought on Gomulka, both directly by the Kremlin and also by the Natolin fraction inside the party, to rejoin the "socialist camp" by approving Nagy's execution and the new campaign against Tito. Gomulka, on the road to capitulation for some time already, showed himself disposed to take a few further steps along it. With certain nuances — suitable of course to the "Polish path" to capitulation — he roughly endorsed the Kremlin's arguments on the Yugoslav and the Hungarian affairs: if there is again a conflict between the Kremlin and Belgrade, the fault this time lies with the "Yugoslav comrades," who, with their "false revisionist theories," "aid and encourage reactionaries." As for the assassination of Nagy, "it does not behoove us," exclaims the very prudent Comrade Gomulka, "to judge either the extent of the faults with which the accused men were reproached, or the justice of the punishments inflicted. It is a purely Hungarian affair."

Gomulka accuses the Yugoslavs of having the pretentiousness of "wanting to build socialism" with "their own forces" and refusing to join the "socialist camp" led by the Kremlin. But he finds that the execution of Imre Nagy is just simply "a purely Hungarian affair," on which he does not have any very exact opinion.

In reality he incidentally found the opportunity in the same speech to reverse the evaluation he made in the past about the Hungarian revolution of October-November 1956, and to emphasize only "the counter-revolutionary wave and the forces hostile to popular power," toward which "Imre Nagy, who was a revisionist, capitulated little by little"!

Gomulka and his followers justify among themselves their own capitulation "little by little" to the Kremlin by the famous "geographical" reason of their being next-

door neighbors of the U S S R, of Poland's isolation, as well as by their desire to safeguard the few individual liberties and other compromises that still exist in the country. This reasoning, however, must be rejected as disastrous.

Each serious capitulation prepares the next step on a road at whose end there is only total submission. Each serious capitulation loosens the bonds between the leadership and the masses and renders the leadership more prisoner than ever of the pressure of the Kremlin and its agents on the spot.

Gomulka's policy is disorienting and disorganizing the country's revolutionary forces that carried him to power at the time of the Polish October. He risks not having their support tomorrow in the eventuality that he decides to resist when he draws the line for some last stand.

What is more, the only way to make the Kremlin hesitate is to oppose to it, as the Yugoslavs did, the coherent force of a whole people, determined in case of need to fight for the things that it considers just as essential as "daily bread" or even as life itself. Such a force is created only on the basis of a consistent ideological line that stubbornly maintains certain essential positions. In the worst of cases, a revolutionary proletarian leader should better be able to face once more the jailers and even the executioners of the Kremlin by refusing to carry out stupid and abject orders, than to demoralize his organization and his people by the example of a humiliating capitulation without any prospects.

But where are they now, the revolutionaries capable of getting rid of their "statesmen" complex and their servitude to "higher reasons of state" in order to rediscover their genuine mission as Marxist militants bound up with the democratic organizations of their class?

Such men will be formed, not in the school of bureaucrats, "enlightened" or not, à la Gomulka, but in that of the new generation of revolutionaries who made the Polish October and will know how to lead it, despite everything, to its victorious conclusion.

THE DEPRESSION IS SPREADING

It is now almost a year since the "recession" began in the United States. By its duration and extent it has given the lie to all optimistic prognoses, and though it has not taken on the forms of a genuine classic economic crisis, it is already plainly a question of a depression rather of than a simple "recession" like that of 1948-1949 or 1953-1954.

In the first half of the current year all economic indices

in the United States marked an almost continuous decline. Automobile production dropped 41% compared to the previous year; steel, 21%; oil, 13%; freight car loadings, 17%; new industrial orders, more than 10%. It is further estimated that expenditures for equipment for this year will be \$ 6,300 million less than 1957, that is 17% (instead of 13% estimated at the beginning of the year).

Industrial expenditures, properly so-called, for the third semester of this year may even be 29% less than in the corresponding period of 1957.

The development of unemployment is no less indicative of the extent of the economic slump and its prospects. Despite seasonal diminutions occurring in April and May, it remains at about 5 million fully unemployed, without counting the number of part-time unemployed, and the reduction in working hours per week. But it is highly characteristic that the falling-off of the number of workers in industry itself is steady and was not affected by the seasonal conjuncture.

According to the most "optimistic" official estimates, unemployment next winter will remain between 5 and 5½ million. According to "less optimistic" estimates, it will, on the contrary, exceed 7 million. "Optimists" and "pessimists" conclude that in any case full employment cannot again be foreseen before the middle of next year, or even the beginning of 1960.

The only encouraging factors in this rather sombre picture of the American economy were the slight increase in industrial production in May (of one point), and more particularly, for a few weeks, that of steel. The relative steadiness of the stock market, still speculating on "an upturn soon," has been so far another encouraging sign.

The slight recovery in the steel industry (which, incidentally, is beginning to sag again) is explained, however, by the production of new models of automobiles — despite the continuing stagnation in sales — and by forward buying before the price of steel goes up again as a consequence of wage increases (occurring, according to the terms of the collective contract, in July).

Meanwhile the signs of a "recession" elsewhere, including in the capitalist economy of western Europe, are multiplying. According to two reports published in June by the Secretariat of the United Nations (one by

the Economic Commission for Europe, at Geneva; the other by the United Nations, at New York), the industrial production of European capitalist countries will this year fall off, or at best stagnate. The reports establish clearly that the economic depression which is spreading through the capitalist world, is of an *over-production* nature. The main difficulty, these reports state, arises from the gap between the steadily increasing productive capacity of industry and the inadequate growth of demand.

This phenomenon, already characteristic of the American "recession," has also appeared in Germany and in Great Britain, where most industries admit to having a productive capacity only partly used and in a declining percentage.

France still forms an exception, explained however by the time-gap between the lessening of demand for consumers' goods already visible in that country, and the still increasing demand for capital goods. Soon, however, the latter will inevitably feel the effects of the falling-off of demand already affecting consumers' goods.

The reports quoted foresee that the dollar deficit in world trade will soon grow worse, bringing about additional measures of restriction of imports from the United States.

Hence, toward the end of the year, we shall enter a stage where the aggravated depression in the United States threatens to be combined with that beginning in Europe, and this in conditions of world trade, that are becoming more difficult than ever for lack of "liquid" assets.

Hence, far from heading toward a revival in the United States at the end of this year, we already see being sketched out the more probable prospect of a generalized and aggravated depression in the capitalist economy as a whole.

AFTER THE ITALIAN ELECTIONS

The results of the general elections held on May 25th in Italy brought out no serious change on the level of relationship of class forces, but they nevertheless deserve to be weighed for what they tell about the political situation in the peninsula.

The party that has governed Italy since the end of the war, the Christian-Democracy, marked an advance compared to the 1953 elections, of 2.2%, but this was at the expense of the extreme-rightist parties (monarchists, neo-fascists) whose support fell off pretty much everywhere, reducing them henceforth, on the national scale, to very low percentages. This shift of rightist votes toward the so-called "democratic" centre was in any case the most considerable element of the May 25th polls.

As for the centre parties (Social-Democrats, Liberals, Republicans) who have been for long periods the allies of the Christian-Democracy, even on the governmental level, they more or less marked time, which means that their weight, even on the parliamentary level, will still be rather weak.

The workers' parties in general consolidated their positions. The CP remained stationary (it increased its vote only 0.1% on the national scale), while the PSI of Nenni advanced somewhat (1.5%) by absorbing, among others, those votes which in previous elections had gone to the two pro-socialist formations that are now integrated in the party itself.

All this confirms particularly that, despite the difficulties

of 1955-1956, which were years of comparative stagnation for the workers' movement, the masses continue to place their electoral trust in their parties. That also means the failure of all the manoeuvres of those who tried to make the crisis caused by the XXth Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR result, not in a renewal of the workers' movement, but in its weakening for the benefit of the class enemy. It must be specified that the national average of the results achieved by the workers' parties involves in reality a quite interesting regional differentiation. In the peasant provinces of the South, the CP and the SP advanced, sometimes quite sharply, while in the industrial circumscriptions they either merely held their own or even fell back. In particular, if the three great industrial zones (Milan, Turin, and Genoa) are considered, the CP obtained only a relative success in Milan, while it was in trouble in Genoa and especially in Turin. Let us emphasize: in no case is it a question of considerable shifts, but, especially in certain cases (Turin), of a tendency that has persisted for several years and that therefore must not be underestimated. It is the symptom of an uneasiness which has quite deep roots and which it is ridiculous to try to reduce to simple organizational questions (as the CP seems to be doing).

What are in any case the perspectives in the period now beginning? On the level of bourgeois political leadership, there must be emphasized the failure of an operation that

cost the big Italian bosses a great deal. Their obvious goal in the elections was to strengthen the Liberal Party in such a way as to make possible a bi-partisan government (Christian-Democrats and Liberals). In this government the Liberal Party, being the most direct spokesman of the big economic organizations of the bosses, would have had an even more conservative role. More particularly it would have had to stop the so-called tendencies toward a statified and directed economy, especially on the part of certain sectors of the majority party. Now the Liberals advanced a lot in the Milan region, but very little or not at all in the rest of the country: in consequence they have not a number of seats sufficient to constitute a government with the Catholics. What is more, the relations between the two parties worsened as a result of electoral polemics, which renders collaboration problematic, at least within a short time.

There is no doubt but that, even on the purely governmental and parliamentary planes, the majority party is still going to experience serious difficulties. The instability begun by the 1953 elections has not been overcome; in any case, we have not gone backward, namely, to the "equilibrium" of the deGasperi period.

Nevertheless, the advance we have mentioned offers the Catholics rather better chances than before in the following sense: whereas, prior to May 25th, if they wanted to form a centre government—excluding either the workers' parties or the extreme right—they had to combine all the others (which was becoming more and more difficult), now they can choose a centre-left alliance (with the Social-Democrats and the Republicans) or a centre-right alliance (with the Liberals and certain Monarchists).

But it will not be the alchemy of parliamentary combinations that will determine developments in the next years. It will once more be the mass movement that will have the decisive word.

If we judge on the basis of votes, we must conclude—we repeat—that the workers' parties have kept their forces intact. But it would be profoundly erroneous to consider only this element. Behind these votes there are concrete workers whose state of mind may be quite different, even if their ballot does not change.

Compared to 1953—not to speak of 1945-1946—the evolution has been unquestionably negative. The workers continue to vote for their parties, but they have lost confidence in the possibility of effectively changing the basic situation. They are still voting, but they are much less active in either the parties or in the trade unions. Those who would like to ignore this fact might have some bitter surprises.

But in the five-year period from 1953 to 1958 the process has not always been in the same direction. In 1955-1956 the situation of the mass movement was worse than it is now. We have been for some time now in a stage of recovery—that is the element to consider, which the simple confrontation of election data does not allow us to grasp.

The latest months have been characterized by broader and more vigorous trade-union struggles than in the preceding period. Furthermore, in the factory committees the CGT (CP-SP) has had unquestionable successes at the expense of

the Catholic and Social-Democratic federations. The gains have generally been limited but—what is important—they show a reversal of trend.

That means that the situation in the mass movement has grown somewhat better. There is an objective possibility of preparing, organizing, and launching struggles, and this possibility will be increased if the coming months confirm the economic difficulties which, for the first time in several years, have just appeared in the first half of this year. The editorial of the June issue of the organ of the Gruppi Comunisti Rivoluzionari, Italian Section of the Fourth International, draws the following conclusions:

In this situation the workers' movement has as its task to develop a consistent class opposition against the bourgeois Christian-Democratic regime.

We clearly affirm that all other possibilities that are being more or less openly canvased, are either just plain fantasies or involve very dangerous illusions. It is a fantasy, for example, to believe that the Christian-Democracy can be moved by the fact that the workers' parties have consolidated their positions and hence take into consideration the "concrete" propositions of the CP leadership. It is an illusion to bring up the possibility of a government "with a new political majority, of which the left parties, without discrimination, would form a part" (according to the terms of Longo, reporter at the CP's Central Committee session following the elections). The task of the workers' movement is above all to determine clear perspectives for economic and social struggles. The objective situation is driving in this direction, and will drive even more so if the symptoms of recession increase. The struggle of these past months, the recovery (even though partial) of the CGT in the factory-committee elections, show that there exist concrete possibilities of success, that the masses will answer if concrete perspectives are set, if adequate methods of struggle are adopted.

To fight in the factories to defend living standards, to reaffirm the workers' political rights, to make the working class's specific weight felt more every day—there is what is possible and necessary. To struggle in the rural regions so that technical progress does not fall on the peasants' backs, so that the very grave unemployment of agricultural workers is not further increased—there is another concrete goal. To fight on the general political plane in such a way that the dominant class has a daily feeling of the proletariat's strength, does not take a chance on reactionary measures, and is forced to loosen the vise of repression.

All that means class opposition, revolutionary opposition: an opposition that aims not especially at parliament, at more or less clever manoeuvres, and more or less illusory combinations, but that aims at deepening class contradictions, at winning positions of strength for the proletariat, at weakening the adversary's front by sharp struggles and broad mobilizations, at aiding the later maturity of the masses, even the most backward strata of them.

RIGHTIST VICTORY IN BELGIUM

The June 1st parliamentary elections in Belgium show on balance a victory for the Social-Christian right. In the Senate it regained the absolute majority that it had lost in 1954. In the Chamber, it failed of the same goal by very little; even so, it won eight seats, four from the Liberals, two from the Socialists, and two from the Communist Party. Overall, therefore, the bourgeois parties have won four seats from the workers' parties; what is still more significant is that the Social-Christians and Flemish Nationalists together

received 48.5% of the votes, the highest percentage since simple universal suffrage was established in 1919. How is this victory of the right to be explained? It reflects the disappointment felt by part of the middle classes and of the workers toward the Socialist-Liberal coalition government that had been in power from 1954 to 1958. The discontent of the middle classes explains the shift of Liberal votes, the discontent of the workers that of Socialist votes, to the Parti Social-Chrétien. This shift is no doubt stronger

than appears from the election results, for it must be supposed that the SP, at the same time that it was losing votes to the benefit of the clericals, was winning them away from the CP.

Despite the prosperity that Belgium has experienced throughout most of the preceding legislative period, this discontent has quite specific objective causes. Belgian agriculture, especially stock-raising, is going through a rather grave crisis. For a large number of small peasants, the income they derive from their farming is less than that of workers.

Craftsmen and small traders are also having an uneasy time. They have a tendency, as in France, to blame social-security costs which they consider too high, the "excessive" tax burden, etc. Indeed, semi-Poujadist currents have been showing themselves both inside the PSC and on its periphery. But it does seem that the majority of these discontented people wanted to make their vote "count," by voting finally for the PSC.

As for the workers, they several times ran head on into the conservative policy of the Van Acker coalition government. This was particularly the case last year in public services, metallurgy, and the building trades. The most right-wing leaders of the reformist trade unions throughout the whole preceding period played the role of the government's direct agents, trying to avoid "labor conflicts that embarrass the government." On the other hand, the leaders of the Christian trade unions, strengthened by the opposition of the Social-Christian Party, did not fail to exploit this situation by taking the leadership of various struggles for labor's demands and by appearing in the eyes of some sectors of the working class as more militant and more dynamic than the reformist leaders.

To this there is added the fact that, despite the opening of the Brussels Universal Exposition, the recession began to spread in Belgium ever since the beginning of 1958. Unemployment has increased in quite grave proportions. Now it has spread particularly in the regions where it had already been grave during the previous 1952-1953 recession; at that time the unemployed blamed the Social-Christian government and voted Socialist; this time they blamed the Socialist-Liberal government and voted PSC.

By its June 1st setback, the Socialist Party was also paying for the total lack of programme in its election campaign. The PSC tackled it with certain demands that were of clearly socialist and working-class origin: increase in workers' pensions to the franc equivalent of \$ 800 a year; reduction of military service to twelve months; fiscal adjustments for the benefit of the workers; etc. Instead of opposing to these demands still more popular demands (for example, free medical care and free pharmaceutical products), as the Socialist Party's left wing had vainly demanded, the reformist leaders concentrated their election fight around praise for the social accomplishments of the preceding government. As a result, it became inevitable that part of the Socialist voters let themselves be won over by the tempting promises made by the PSC.

Lastly, the political climate dominated by the "school war" unquestionably had a weight on the election results. The Belgian bourgeoisie governs the country thanks to the sup-

port won by its most powerful party, the Social-Christian Party, within the working class itself: for a large working-class sector, religious solidarity still counts for more than class solidarity. The reformist leaders thought they could modify this situation by guaranteeing lay education primacy over Catholic education. But in this way they permitted the clergy to play up religious solidarity heavily. This could have been weakened only by sufficiently broad social struggles or demands to bring out the manifestation of class solidarity. These struggles did not take place; these demands were not formulated; thus an election setback became inevitable.

The government crisis opened by the June 1st elections has so far ended up in the formation of a homogeneous Social-Christian government led by Eyskens. This government is in the minority in the Chamber, in the majority in the Senate. It appears to be a transitional government; it can maintain itself only thanks to the benevolence of certain Liberals, thus preparing, at a later stage, the formation of a broader coalition government, Catholic-Liberal or even tripartisan. In fact the bourgeoisie has every reason to be satisfied with the new ministerial team, within which it has several of its most representative politicians. But it must avoid two dangers: first, that of social troubles which would occur in case the recession grows worse (this is already the case in the coal industry, where 25,000 miners have been on strike for a week in the Liège region); next, that of a deterioration of the situation in the Congo, where the representatives of the native population have recently put forward more and more radical demands for self-administration.

Within the workers' parties, the June 1st setback has produced a climate of uneasiness and discussion. The CP, one of the smallest in Europe, has lost two of its four deputies and a quarter of its votes, even in the regions where it was best rooted. It finds itself back at the weakest level of its past, that of the early '20s. Yet its leadership had swapped its extreme sectarianism of the "cold war" period for a servile opportunism, constantly lining up with the positions of the trade-union and reformist bureaucracy. But this policy, which allowed the Stalinists to increase their trade-union influence a little bit, proved not to pay off on the political level. The results of the Hungarian events, the CP's contradictory attitude toward the Van Acker government, and the clearer and clearer lack of delimitation from the reformists—these are the causes of this defeat. In fact, the Belgian CP no longer offers the workers the perspective of a workers' leadership in replacement of that of the Belgian SP; nor does it offer them the perspective of the building of a replacement leadership within the Belgian SP. It no longer has any perspectives at all.

As for the Socialist Party, the voices criticizing the right-wing policy followed by the Van Acker government are growing louder; and their audience is also growing wider. They propose, and quite rightly, a change of policy that puts the emphasis on structural reforms. But they do not yet understand that this change of policy is impossible without a change of leadership, and that this change of leadership would soon clash with the nature and the fierce resistance of the reformist bureaucracy.

THE RUHR ELECTIONS

On July 6th the population of the largest and most important "Land" of the German Federal Republic went to the ballot-boxes. North Rhine - Westphalen is the most industrialized part of West Germany. It is the region of coal deposits and of the iron and steel industry. North and south of the heavy-industrial nucleus lie great areas of conversion industries, and in between, especially in the north, agricultural Westphalen.

In the history of the development of German labor the

working-class strata of the Ruhr region played an ideologically less class-conscious role than those of the East German regions such as Thüringen, Saxony and Berlin, and those of the West German industrial centres such as Hamburg, Stuttgart, Frankfurt, and the Wuppertal-Cologne region in North Rhine - Westphalen. The steady immigration of labor from the more backward regions of eastern Germany (East Prussia - Schelsien) during the industrial upsurge at the turn of the century caused to be established in this

region a strong Catholic Christian labor tendency with a strong organization that even today has deep roots among the workers.

On all these grounds the 6 July elections were of great significance because they would show what political evolution was taking place among the masses of such mixed workers. The decisive choice in the elections was: For or against the Adenauer policy, for or against arming the German Bundeswehr with atomic weapons. All other questions were pushed into the background by these problems.

As in the elections to the Bundestag, the German Socialist Party, the SPD, fought on the defensive, without any reliance on a socialist policy. As in those elections, it was in appearance a question only of another bourgeois alternative to the Adenauer regime.

The struggle against the atomic threat was carried out in a bureaucratic way. The mass marches in Hamburg and Bremen were high-points that could not and would not again be reached, because through their dynamic character they constituted a danger to the bureaucratic petty-bourgeois leadership of the SPD.

In this way the election struggle waged by the SPD was nowise to be differentiated from its traditional parliamentary election propaganda.

The election results showed the following tendencies.

Adenauer's party, the CDU, lost 800,000 votes and fell from 54.4 % of the effective votes to 50.5 %. The SPD gained 200,000 votes and rose from 33.5 % to 39.2 %. The former coalition-partners of the SPD lost serious parts of their body of voters. Hence the SPD's purpose, to check the Adenauer regime in the Ruhr, in spite of a comparatively good electoral success, could not succeed because of the voting losses of its possible coalition-partners.

What does this election show?

1) The trend of the working class to the Social-Democracy, as the only alternative to Adenauer's policy and as the representative of the working class's day-to-day interests, continues, in spite of the non- and anti-socialist policy of its leadership. That is shown by the very clear successes of the SPD in the industrial bastions, such as Mühlheim, Duisburg, Gelsenkirchen, Dortmund, Bielefeld, etc., where more than 50 %, and such centres as Cologne, Wuppertal, Düsseldorf, Essen, Oberhausen, etc., where more than 40 % of the votes were for the SPD.

The SPD defensive tactics, however, failed to politicize broader circles of the working class.

2) The Christian workers were not to be won over either by godless propaganda or by Social-Democratic conciliationism toward the princes of the church and getting dressed up in Christian costume. Only by an openly led class struggle, a struggle for the workers' own particular interests, were

these working-class sectors to be freed from following their religious leadership.

3) That the working class of the region did not give an even greater concentration of votes to the SPD comes from the fact that the percentage of SPD votes cast by women in their separate voting-booths ran on the average 10 to 12 % below the men's votes. Had their voting been equally massive, the SPD would have reached 50 %.

4) The prohibited Communist Party, the KPD, tried to participate in the elections by means of "independent" slates. It is revealing that Adenauer's CDU, which had forced the illegalization of the KPD through the Supreme Court, in all cases favored the recognition of these "independent" slates. It wanted thereby to bring about a split in the working-class vote. The "independent" slates did not appear with clear revolutionary propaganda, but just legally with slightly sharper formulations against Adenauer and his policy. But in the election they merely made completely obvious the total bankruptcy of the West German KPD. Not even those who had been inscribed members of the KPD before it was banned voted for these slates. To show their electoral percentages, one has to insert several zeros between the decimal point and the figure. This experience has shown that Stalinism is no political factor in labor developments in West Germany.

5) The loss of votes by the Refugee Party, the BHE, from 4.6 % to 1 % shows that the refugees have been assimilated into the political life of the Federal Republic and that the refugee problem is vegetating only in the outer circles of politics.

6) All right-wing Radical parties lost precipitately in votes and just were not in the race. Here is the demonstration that the bases are not yet present for a fascist mass development in the Federal Republic.

The satisfied petty bourgeoisie still sees, as the representative of its interests, the big capitalist party of the clergy, the CDU.

7) The CDU fought and won its election campaign in defense of rearming the Federal Republic with atomic weapons by means of unbridled anti-Bolshevik hate-propaganda. The Budapest events, occurring during the election campaign, fitted in with the anti-Bolshevik complex of the petty bourgeoisie and gave plausibility to the CDU's rearmament propaganda among the middle classes. Thus the crime of Budapest was an active help to Adenauer in the Ruhr elections.

8) The losses by all bourgeois parties to the benefit of the CDU shows that the Germany bourgeoisie also from now on sees in Adenauer and his policies (foreign policy!) the great defender of their interests.

9) The stability of both big parties (CDU and SPD) demonstrates a tendency in Germany toward a two-party system showing a polarization of the class struggle.

THE QUESTION OF CYPRUS IN AN IMPASSE

"Perfidious Albion" has never ceased to engage in ruses about the fate of the Cypriot masses. To keep its domination over the island, which holds an important strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean basin, the British bourgeoisie has used all means: repression, concessions, postponements, national divisions. Most of the time, indeed, it has used all these means together.

For some time now, faced by the powerful national-liberation movement of the Greek masses of Cyprus, London has decided to bring into the game Turkey and the island's Turkish minority, some 80,000 strong.

By turning Turkey against Greece, and the island's Turkish minority against the some 400,000 Greek Cypriots, London has reserved for itself the role of indispensable arbiter, needed to maintain order and unity in the island.

Pushed by the British bourgeoisie, Turkey, which in 1954

was in favor simply of the British status quo in the island, has now gone over to the unrealistic position of *dividing up the island*, in order to bring the question of the country's self-determination to an impasse. Not satisfied to agitate for this position, now a matter of "principle," Turkey is stirring up the Turkish Cypriot minority to genuine pogroms against the Greek population — with, naturally, the obvious complicity of the British authorities.

It is enough to mention in this connection that a large part of the British auxiliary police — about 4,000 men — is recruited from the very numerous illiterate unemployed among the Turkish minority, and that these police have, on several occasions of late, joined their compatriots in the attacks launched against the Greek Cypriots.

In this connection there may be quoted, among others, the evidence of Clive Evatt, an Australian Labour MP, who

stated that the collusion between the British police and army and the Turkish minority is completely obvious (*NY Times*, 10 June 1958).

Turkey is currently demanding the dividing up of the island in face of the demand for self-determination and union with Greece asked for by Athens and the EOKA — which allows London to prepare a “compromise” of co-dominium of the island by the Greeks and the Turks under the control of Great Britain. And this for a period of seven years, after which the people of Cyprus would be called on to decide about their self-determination.

The solution of the question of Cyprus is complicated by the interplay of various contradictory forces. London wants to keep the island as an important military base, whose usefulness was demonstrated not only at the time of the Suez expedition, but also at present with the situation existing in Lebanon. Washington, more and more worried about the Middle East and at present considering a joint intervention with London against the anti-imperialist Arab forces in Lebanon, lines up with London's position about the island, despite the difficulties that this position involves concerning its alliance with Athens.

Athens as well as Ankara are exploiting the Cyprus question as a counter-irritant to their reactionary and anti-popular internal policies. On the island itself, the national-liberation movement is divided between a right wing led by the Archbishop Makarios and the terrorist organization EOKA, in the hands of agents of the general staff of the Greek army, on the one hand, and, on the other, the AKEL, an organiza-

tion controlled by the Stalinists. On its side, the Turkish minority is led by the agents of Ankara and London.

Under these conditions, the national-liberation movement, though fed by an indomitable revolutionary combativity on the part of the island's peasant and worker masses, does not succeed in putting forward a programme and a leadership capable of thwarting the intrigues of imperialism and the Greek and Turkish bourgeoisies. This programme ought to set clearly forth that the goal of the struggle is self-determination for the island within the framework of a Cypriot workers' and peasants' government which would give satisfaction to the economic and social aspirations of the peasant and worker masses of the island, both Greek and Turkish.

The Greek majority would have the right, if it wished, to carry out a federative union with Greece. The Turkish minority would see its rights as a national minority absolutely guaranteed by the workers' and peasants' government of the island.

Only such a programme, firmly defended against imperialism, the Greek and Turkish bourgeoisies, and their agents, would have any serious chance of reestablishing *class unity* among the poor Greek and Turkish masses of Cyprus, with a prospect of genuine national and social liberation for these masses.

The Cypriot revolutionary Marxists have the duty of advocating such a line in joining the national-liberation movement as it now exists.

THE WORKERS' PARTIES AND DE GAULLE

By PIERRE FRANK

In its history France has experienced several Bonapartist operations prior to that of deGaulle, and comparisons between them still offer some interest. From both the bourgeois and the proletarian point of view, the deGaulle operation presents an extraordinary picture.

It was the war of Algeria following on that of Vietnam which led the French army to bring off its coup de force. This was carried out in an atmosphere unconnected with this political operation. There was no economic crisis as in 1851, no military collapse and exodus as in 1940. The war of Algeria had lasted three and a half years, and throughout that whole time in the metropolis the bourgeoisie had gone on showing an indifference, a really surprising unconcern, about the war. Everyone was occupied with his own business, which was prosperous. Everyone was thinking about his coming vacation. The parliamentary regime had become the least of the worries of the bourgeois.

But if there was really one thing that differentiated the deGaulle operation from its predecessors, it was the situation of the working class. It was not suffering from a bloodletting, as after June 1848. It was not, as in 1940, mobilized and with the C P in illegality. It had not been pushed into the background of the political scene. It had its parties, its trade unions, its press.

But, just like the bourgeoisie, it was but little concerned with the war in Algeria in the immediately previous years. These years of prosperity had assured it of a limited but unquestionable improvement in its living conditions ; it had obtained three weeks of paid vacations. It also looked with contempt on the parliamentary game and the interminable ministerial crises. For this state of mind in the working class, it was the traditional leaderships — of the Socialist and Communist Parties — that bear the responsibility. If, for the first time in French history, a Bonapartist operation could succeed without the prior defeat of the working class and the popular masses, it was owing to those leaderships, and it is not unuseful to point out how they prepared such a defeat.

I: THE SOCIALIST PARTY

The overall line of the Guy Mollet leadership is well known, but his perfidy appears still more in the detailed examination of his various proceedings. Guy Mollet reached the leadership of the S P in 1946-1947 at the head of a *left* tendency that blamed the Daniel Mayer leadership for too timorous a policy.

But Guy Mollet quickly turned right, anticommunism becoming the fixed quantity in his political variations. He also constructed, for the first time in the history of the S P, an apparatus that guaranteed him control of the party. As French policy, beginning with the Liberation, evolved toward the right, the S P ended up by finding itself in the opposition between 1952 and 1955. It returned to power at the beginning of 1956 after the election victory of the "Republican Front" composed essentially of a combination of the S P and the Radical Party then led by Mendès-France.

Although the latter was the recognized leader of the "Republican Front" during the election campaign, Guy Mollet became the head of the new government, in view of the preponderant place held in the National Assembly by the S P — with the exception of the French C P, to which, at that moment, no attention was paid in the parliamentary world. In the legislature elected in 1956, everything depended on the Socialist group : this was seen in May 1958.

During the election campaign Guy Mollet had vigorously criticized the war of Algeria : an idiotic and hopeless war, he called it. The victory of the Republican Front, paralleled by the strengthening of the Communist parliamentary group, meant that the country was expecting from the new parliament a policy of peace in Algeria. Willingly or not, Guy Mollet fell into the traps of the ultras and settlers of Algeria. His first choice for Minister of Algeria had been General Catroux, a "republican" who was saying that he would stop at nothing. But when Guy Mollet was received at Algiers with tomatoes, he persuaded Catroux to resign and in his place named Lacoste, who was to give a full demonstration of his socialism. In proceeding to make this designation, Guy Mollet, who had retreated before the fascist riot of 6 February 1956 at Algiers, considered it something "healthy."

Beginning with that moment, it was a steady retreat before the settlers and the army. In Algeria itself Lacoste was not directing anything ; but he was covering up everything and had become the principal traveling salesman to make France accept the war of Algeria and all the infamies that it brought in its train.

As for the Guy Mollet ministry, it was "special powers," it was "pacification" by the sending of about half a million draftees, it was the Ben Bella affair. It was also the Suez campaign. It was the whitewashing given the torturers.

This policy (which was nowise countered by that of the F C P) aided the progress of the reaction in France. In the S P itself, there could be observed the development of a fascisizing wing (speeches of Lacoste and Lejeune at the S P Toulouse Congress). But, unlike what happened in 1933-1934, when the Blum leadership was forced to expel the "néos" (Déat...), the Guy Mollet leadership made a bloc with this current against those who were calling for another Algerian policy, however moderate it might be. The leadership took sanctions against its opponents, going as far as expulsion (Philip) and above all depriving in practice almost the whole minority of its right of expression in the party congresses and conferences.

Overthrown as premier, Guy Mollet became the power behind the throne in the two following cabinets (Bourgès-Manoury and Gaillard) who kept Lacoste on as Minister of Algeria. Guy Mollet also forced his party to swallow the formation of these governments and to support them, although resistance to this policy began to develop in the party.

When the Gaillard government was overthrown, Guy Mollet pretended to be angry with the right ("the most stupid in the world," he claimed) and had the National Council on May 2nd and 3rd vote that the S P would no longer take part in any government, being satisfied to assure it of its support. He thus succeeded in strengthening his authority over the S P, an authority that had been somewhat damaged. At the time the Pflimlin government was formed, the S P was outside the government, and, by this fact, Lacoste was no longer Minister of Algeria.

It was then that the Algiers plot took an open form. Lacoste, who was informed about it, let it go on, hoping that he would be the beneficiary from it. He refused to return to Algeria at a time when constitutionally he still had to assure "current affairs," i e, public order (against the fascists), and in speeches spurred the ultras on to action.

GUY MOLLET AND THE SOCIALIST PARLIAMENTARY GROUP

As soon as the Algiers coup occurred, there could be noted dissonances between the attitude of Guy Mollet and that of the Socialist parliamentary group. The very day of the Algiers coup, May 13th, Guy Mollet was trying to discourage Pflimlin from going through with his appeal to be invested by the National Assembly. The Socialist parliamentary group, on the contrary, which was not aware of this intervention by Guy Mollet, was pushing Pflimlin to ask for this vote by the National Assembly, which granted it to him.

The next day, May 14th, the Socialist group and the Directing Committee decided on participation in the Pflimlin government. "When the Republic appears menaced, the Socialist Party is always present," declared Guy Mollet, who was becoming vice-

premier, accompanied by other Socialist ministers, among them Jules Moch at the Interior, where ten years before he had distinguished himself by a ferocious repression of the miners' strike.

On May 15th, a joint appeal by the Directing Committee and the parliamentary group :

The Republic is threatened. Civil and military insurrection in Algeria and the manifesto of General deGaulle are evidence that the assault against the republican regime has been launched [...] To face this peril, the Socialist Party has decided to participate in the government [...] But the Republic is defended not only in parliament and the government [...]

But in face of a declaration by deGaulle, there were to be noted two different attitudes, that of Guy Mollet and that of the spokesman of the Socialist parliamentary group at the National Assembly in its 16 May session.

Guy Mollet asked deGaulle to make an effort :

It is true that General deGaulle has given the Republic back to the fatherland [...] We see that Algeria's belonging to our national community is brought into question, and we greatly regret that we do not read the slightest phrase of condemnation of this in General deGaulle's message. We should need to have the general complete his declaration, clearly insufficient.

Naegelen, in the name of the Socialist group, uttered a condemnation :

We were expecting something quite different from General deGaulle. His statement is only an accusation harking back to all candidates for dictatorship in all countries, against the regime of parties [...] Over the head of the parliament elected by the nation, over the head of the legally invested government, over the head of the chief of state, General deGaulle has addressed the country to say that he is ready to assume the powers of the Republic : this plural is indeed an indication that he is demanding dictatorship. To this overweening pretention, we rise in opposition.

On May 18th, Jules Moch made a thunderous declaration on the radio, alluding to his role as a strike-breaker :

The fate of the Republic is at stake [...] Strengthened by former experience, I can give the assurance that the government will not disappoint or fail in its duty.

Following a new declaration by deGaulle, which was in part an answer to the solicitation of Guy Mollet, on May 19th, the Socialist parliamentary group and the Directing Committee stated :

The S P notes that General deGaulle has demanded powers that would be conferred on him as a result of an exceptional procedure whose modalities he would himself determine, and has thus denied the Constitution of the Republic. The S P has confidence that the government

will maintain order and legality, resist all pressures, and maintain national unity within the framework of the Republic.

But on this same day, Pinay announced that he had advised Guy Mollet to make contact — either alone, or, better, together with Pflimlin — with General de Gaulle in order to find out his intentions. But, he added, the vice-premier refused to undertake such an initiative... Indeed!

On May 23rd, on emerging from a meeting of the Socialist group, its president, Deixonne, stated:

The Socialist group would not lend itself to a compromise from which our freedoms would suffer [...] We will not pay for the return of Algeria to legality by the loss of the Republic [...]

At this moment still the Socialist group was unanimous. It is true that Lacoste was not present. But on the 24th an article by him appeared in *The new Republic of Bordeaux* (Gaullist), in which he wrote: "I am overwhelmed and filled with admiration" (by what was going on in Algeria).

On May 25th, following on the Ajaccio coup, the S P associated itself with a declaration of the "National Committee for Republican Defense" (Radicals, M R P, S F I O, etc.) in which can be read:

[...] calls on the members of the organizations signing this message to be ready for any eventuality and to consider themselves mobilized for safeguarding our endangered national unity and freedoms.

Late on the 26th, the Socialist parliamentary group voted a resolution supporting the strike decided on by the C G T:

The group has expressed the wish that the success of the strike launched by the C G T will be aided to the maximum extent. It furthermore hopes that there will be organized tomorrow in Paris a big mass demonstration. The Directing Committee of the party will meet in order to take an official decision and to plan the modalities.

But that did not suit Guy Mollet, and later, on the 27th, the Directing Committee issued the following communiqué:

The Directing Committee of the S P formally denies the information appearing this morning in certain newspapers according to which it might be taking a decision in favor of demonstrations in agreement with the C P or the C G T. The party's members are asked to conform strictly to the instructions that have been communicated to the federal secretaries.

But for the first time there occurred a division in the Directing Committee, composed of 43 majority Molléists out of 45 members. This text was adopted by 17 votes against 9.

During the night of the 26th-27th there occurred an interview between Pflimlin and deGaulle, and on the 27th deGaulle made a statement according to which

he had begun the process of constituting his government. The same day the Socialist parliamentary group adopted, by 112 votes against 3, and 1 abstention, a manifesto in which it was said:

General deGaulle has just made it known that he is undertaking what he calls the "regular process" in view of forming his government.

The Socialist parliamentarians declare:

[...] 2° that they will in no case rally to the candidacy of General deGaulle, which, by the very form in which it is posed and by the considerations that accompany it, is and remains under any hypothesis a challenge to republican legality.

Thus, parliamentarily, deGaulle seemed not to have a chance. On the 28th the great demonstration from the Nation to the Republic took place.

But the same day it was learned that Guy Mollet had got in touch with deGaulle through the intermediary of a Socialist deputy, Piette, more familiar with certain services than with the class struggle, and that as a result of these relations Guy Mollet (vice-premier, let us not forget) had written deGaulle a letter, without the knowledge of the premier and naturally without the knowledge of the Directing Committee of the S P. The text of this letter has never been published. The 29th of May was to be the day of the final manoeuvres. Coty was to send a message to parliament. Within the S P Guy Mollet — the bureaucrat — was running the risk of no longer carrying weight with either the Directing Committee or the parliamentary group. So we saw the intervention of the former President of the Republic, Vincent Auriol — the "democrat" — who, in the last previous months, had given his support to the minority against the Guy Mollet leadership. The exchange of letters between Auriol and deGaulle has been published. It was a manoeuvre in the grand style to pacify the "consciences" of a few Socialists and republicans.

On May 30th *Le Populaire* was still trying to save appearances:

In spite of everything, and having weighed all the risks and dangers, the S P will take a position in conformity with its traditions and its past: it will not disavow itself.

The same day Guy Mollet went to deGaulle's home at Colombey, accompanied by the president of the Socialist parliamentary group, who is not usually mistaken for a master-mind, and who returned convinced. Guy Mollet finally obtained the capitulation of part of the Socialist deputies (among them that swaggerer Jules Moch), enough to give a pseudo-appearance of legality to deGaulle's accession to power. The powerful demonstration of May 28th brought pressure on the Directing Committee and on the parliamentary group in the opposite direction to the pressures and manoeuvres of the Guy Mollets, Auriols, Lejeunes, et al., who were carrying on a campaign for deGaulle. It finally ended up in the following

votes : Directing Committee and parliamentary group, meeting jointly : 77 for deGaulle, 74 against. But the figures, broken down, give the following : Directing Committee : 18 for, 23 against ; deputies : 40 for, 50 against. It was the Socialist senators who brought about the Gaullist majority.

At the time of deGaulle's investiture by the National Assembly, the parliamentary group divided up : 42 for deGaulle, 49 against, 3 absent. True, the deputies who had voted against deGaulle were not going outside the framework of parliamentary democracy, but such a vote constituted a very hard blow to the Guy Mollet leadership. Mollet himself, furthermore, at one moment turned in his resignation, but withdrew it again soon afterward. Since then, the Directing Committee has decided to postpone the party congress first set for the end of June and to replace it by a national conference.

The minority — who hope to become the majority — are organizing to demand this congress. They are counting on the support of the Socialist International. It is, however, possible that things will not be pushed to a split before the presentation of the draft constitution worked up by the deGaulle government, about which any ambiguity will be all the less possible in that it can be answered only by a Yes or a No.

Thus the deGaulle operation was able to be carried out with the complete support of Guy Mollet, accompanied by all his artful dodges as an old manoeuvrer in parliament and at congresses. The S P's general secretary has a seat in the deGaulle government, and tries thereby to give it a surety of republicanism and liberalism.

THE MEANING OF THE DIVISION IN THE SOCIALIST PARTY

Guy Mollet has not only betrayed the working class (that was done long ago) ; he has betrayed even his own party, whose natural milieu is bourgeois parliamentarianism. Without such a betrayal, deGaulle could not have had the slightest appearance of legality, he would not have had a parliamentary majority and would have had to push the coup d'état to the point where it fully took on the aspect of a military intervention against the National Assembly.

The resultant situation within the S P, the state of split that has aroused savage rightists against Guy Mollet, has something very surprising about it. But this situation is quite explicable.

The S P, at the Liberation, found itself with a diminished working-class base, especially among the most decisive layers of the working class that went over to the F C P. But the place occupied by the S P on the chess-board of the Fourth Republic guaranteed it (save for a short period) a key position in governments, and caused various currents to converge on this party. In the south of France, it replaced in some areas the Radical Party, with a petty-bourgeois peasant electoral base. In addition, while at the time of

the Third Republic it already had a clientele of petty functionaries (schoolteachers, postal employees...), after 1945 it saw its ranks swelled by high and middle functionaries (prefects, governors of colonies, ministerial administrative assistants...) who came to it especially to aid their careers.

In this situation it was automatic that the S P tops, already far from the working-class ranks, were going to become even more strongly bourgeoisified. In appearance, the S P had succeeded in winning important positions in the state. The reality was that the state had topped the S P, and the apparatus created by Guy Mollet was often very close to the state apparatus.

The recent crisis tends to break up what was, socially speaking, artificially united. In spite of where it has been led by ministerial participations, the S P, by its origins and by the place it occupies in the political structure of France, had remained the traditional reformist workers' party, whose existence is fundamentally bound up with that of parliamentary democracy. It would be wrong to claim that the lines of the present division are already unchangeable and that they are of an impeccable class purity. But the resistance to deGaulle has shown itself there where the S P has a serious working-class base or clientele, whereas the careerists were turning toward deGaulle. A remarkable example was afforded during the crisis by the Nord Federation. It is, together with that of the Pas-de-Calais, the most numerous in the S P, one of the most rightist and anti-communist. For years Guy Mollet was guaranteed a majority in his party just by the addition of a few votes to those of these two federations. The Nord Federation was at all times one of the most hostile to any united front with the C P, even in the short periods of collaboration at the time of the 1935-1936 Popular Front and the 1944-1946 Liberation. But on May 27th the Socialist Nord Federation supported the strike order given by the C G T miners' union.

We shall certainly see some comings-and-goings among the Socialist deputies and leaders in the next months ; but on the organizational level, the tendency that will stand out is that of the S P appearing as the reformist workers' party, struggling to defend or restore the parliamentary frame that is its natural working milieu.

Thanks to such a change, essential questions like that of the Communist-Socialist united front will appear in a new aspect.

II : THE COMMUNIST PARTY

The policy of the French C P, majority party of the working class since the Liberation, has since that period had a steady line which, in the same way as that of the S P, caused the recent defeat.

Thorez claims priority in the conception of the parliamentary "new paths" toward socialism. We shall leave verification of the matter to those whom the

question might interest, but there is no doubt that the whole policy that he has followed since the Liberation was — even during a few leftist jolts — basically parliamentary, and nowise aimed at going on to a society building socialism. In fact, during the whole period elapsed since the Liberation, the F C P leadership has never stopped saying that the alternative for France was not capitalism or socialism, but democracy or fascism. It would be easy to give several pages of quotations from reports to the Political Bureau. As we shall see further on, the F C P leadership persists in the same conception even after deGaulle's arrival at power.

This policy is explained above all by a lining up with Moscow, which constantly seeks a maintenance of the status quo. That implies a bourgeois France in which the F C P tries to aid a bourgeois wing less dependent on Washington, anti-American if possible. Because of this, it can be said without exaggeration that, though the F C P leadership criticized the authoritarian conceptions of deGaulle, it has long handled him personally with kid gloves because of certain hopes the Kremlin had in him. Let us not forget that Thorez was a minister of deGaulle, and that at that period — on his return from Moscow — he made the "patriotic workers' militias" dissolve and give up their arms, in order that there might be "a single army, a single police, a single state." (Thorez, Ivory Speech, 1945).

When deGaulle, after giving up power, made a first political incursion in 1947 against the "system," the then editor-in-chief of *L'Humanité* was censured because he had allowed himself to engage in a mere irreverent pleasantries against deGaulle. Even during the last period of the crisis, deGaulle was never treated on the same level as the Soustelles and Massus. The slogans for the May 28th and June 1st demonstrations were to spare deGaulle any harsh epithets. And anyone could note the deferential and respectful attitude of the Communist deputies in the National Assembly when deGaulle presented himself there for his investiture and later for the vote of the project granting the power to prepare a new constitution.

The search for bourgeois allies had led the F C P leadership to the worst of betrayals, that of the Algerian revolution. The F C P's variations in this matter have been numerous, but it has never made a recognition, frank and consistent in application of policy, of independence for Algeria. We refer our readers to the document written on this question by the F L N itself, which we published in our last issue. It is the most crushing indictment, showing that the F C P's policy was never in conformity with the principles professed by this party in the name of Marxism-Leninism on the colonial question. Since then we have seen — even during the crisis — the F C P deputies again vote "full powers" to Pflimlin, who was flaunting his intention of carrying out a more intense military action in Algeria and who turned these "full

powers" over to General Salan who was then obeying the orders of the "Public Safety Committee" of Algiers and not those of the Pflimlin government.

"L'HUMANITE" DAY BY DAY

Let us see how the F C P evaluated the events then taking place and what policy it followed.

The main accent was laid on parliamentary action. On May 13th, the coup de force at Algiers. The same day, investiture of Pflimlin. The Communist group abstained, making the following declaration :

The proposed premier having affirmed the desire of his government to continue the war in Algeria, the source of all the evils from which the country is suffering, the Communist group decides not to grant him its votes. But at the hour when, faced by the riots in Algiers and by generals entered into rebellion against the Republic, the proposed premier declares that he will not yield to the factious coup de force, the Communist deputies unanimously decide on voluntary abstention from voting, thus giving the government a possibility of being formed.

Thus it was above all on the "firmness" of the government and the parliament that the F C P leadership was laying its stake.

The mass meeting at the Cirque d'Hiver planned for the 14th was prohibited by this "firm" republican government. The F C P leadership simply accepted this prohibition and sent its functionaries to disperse those who had come in spite of the prohibition :

The slogan was : "Go back to your neighborhoods, disperse, go find other republicans to prepare the answer to the fascist coup de force."

(*L'Humanité*, 15 May)

May 15th : first declaration by deGaulle exploiting and encouraging the coup de force at Algiers. *L'Humanité* promptly published an extra, in which were recommended, among other things, appeals to Coty : "Multiply, by thousands and thousands, protests to the President of the Republic, for safeguarding the Republic."

May 16th : the government obtained the vote of the state of emergency (including the Communist votes), which was never to be used against Algiers or de Gaulle, but only to prevent any interventions by the workers.

In *L'Humanité* of May 17th, an article by Fajon, member of the Political Bureau, the director of the newspaper, presented this vote as a victory for democracy :

In the great combat undertaken to bar the road to deGaulle and military dictatorship, yesterday was a good day [...] By launching their attack against the Republic four days ago, deGaulle and his accomplices thought they would win without striking a blow. Their coup did not come off. It is democracy that has won a first great victory.

May 19th : press conference by deGaulle, who was

taking one step forward toward power. In answer to this conference, a Political Bureau statement of the same day affirmed: "Victories have been won. For five days fascism has been held in check."

May 20th: the National Assembly voted special powers for Algeria, powers entrusted by Pflimlin to Salan. The Communist deputies voted in favor.

In *L'Humanité* of May 21st, an editorial by Pierre Courtade thus commented on this vote:

It was a good day [...] The Republic is asserting itself. It is winning not only time — which was only twenty-four hours ago a dramatic necessity — it is growing stronger [...] We are stronger today than yesterday. And the whole left is with us. So is the Republic which will emerge improved from this test.

In *L'Humanité* of May 22nd, an editorial by Waldeck-Rochet, a Political Bureau member, who repeated the argumentation of Courtade:

The National Assembly condemned the men of the plot by according immense majorities to the nation's legitimate government which, despite its weaknesses, has stated that it wants to fight for the respect of republican legality [...] Last Tuesday's vote on the special powers enabled the government to consolidate its position.

An editorial by Fajon in *L'Humanité* of May 23rd:

On the parliamentary level, [our party] has given the Pflimlin government the possibility of getting formed, next of obtaining the means it demanded in order to defend republican legality, and finally of consolidating itself as a result of massive votes.

Thus the danger has retreated. [Our emphasis]

On May 25th, far from retreating, the danger was expressed by the coup de force at Ajaccio.

Beginning with this moment, the F C P's leadership was to raise timid protests toward the Pflimlin government: it is not energetic enough, it does not turn to the country...

L'Humanité of May 26th: "The government limits itself to yesterday's timid decisions."

L'Humanité of May 27th, in a report on the previous day's speech in parliament by Duclos: "The government has fallen behind the state of mind of the republican country..."

But on this same day deGaulle made a new declaration that openly announced that he had made official contacts with members of the government, that he had set going the process that would bring him to power.

At the National Assembly, Duclos spoke up to say to Pflimlin: you want to leave and make place for deGaulle. But the conclusion to such a quite correct affirmation was just simply: we shall vote in favor of your project of reactionary revision of the constitution.

On May 28th, when Coty turned officially to deGaulle, the Political Bureau, in a statement, was still counting parliamentary noses: "Yesterday there were

only 165 supporters of deGaulle at the Assembly, whereas 408 votes were cast for the defense of the Republic."

Thus the emphasis was put on the firmness to be given to the official authorities of the Republic to defeat the plot of the rebels. And, what is more, it was announced day after day that this parliamentary policy was winning successes.

Beginning with May 13th — if we are to believe *L'Humanité*, directly inspired by the F C P's Political Bureau — we were going from success to success against fascism, the Pflimlin government and the parliament were growing stronger in their determination to defend the republic, and then suddenly, at the very moment when several hundreds of thousands of workers were demonstrating in the streets of Paris, an accident happened: the government collapsed, the parliament capitulated, and Gaullism carried the day! While the deputies were carrying on the battle "for the Republic" by supporting a government which, in the shadows, was conspiring deGaulle's coming to power, what was asked of the workers?

The most current term, "vigilance," in practice meant most of the time immobilization in headquarters. Street demonstrations were cut down, and, when the authorities forbade them, called off.

There were work stoppages, strikes, but these were carried out in a sporadic way, without coordination, and never with the perspective of an active general strike that would bring about a conflict with the state forces that were raising deGaulle to power.

On the whole, the workers' actions were subordinated either to the parliamentary and legalistic tactic toward the Pflimlin government, or to the intentions and decisions of the other "republican" groups.

TOWARD THE BOURGEOIS TOPS

This whole policy, in the opposite direction to the real evolution of the class, found its expression in the mammoth demonstration of May 28th.

The coup of Algiers occurred on May 13th. Demonstrations had taken place in various provincial cities, but working-class Paris had not demonstrated in any force. What was going on? The F C P leadership did not dare issue in its own name alone a call for a big street demonstration: it knew that a call — from itself alone — would not have produced much of an echo. Formally there was no joint appeal, there was no united front, for the leaders of the left bourgeois organizations and the Socialist Party, of Force Ouvrière and the C F T C, rejected any agreement with the Stalinist leaders. Granted, there were tacit agreements, and the Radical and Socialist leaders were well aware, when they launched the call for the demonstration of 28 May, that the F C P and the C G T would join in it.

The masses answered on May 28th because for them it was in fact a question of a joint Communist-Socialist demonstration. While all the leaders, from the

bourgeois to the Stalinists, were still in agreement that there should be no shout or banner other than "Long live the Republic," the Paris workers were spontaneously shouting: Popular Front, Unity of action, The left to power, Peace in Algeria. For the workers, Popular Front has another meaning than what it has for the leaders. For the workers, the Popular Front is in fact Communist-Socialist unity in action, for down in the ranks they see only a few Radical shopkeepers to whom they attach no importance, and they do not grasp the role of the bourgeois leaders at the Popular Front's summit.

The F C P leadership, therefore, lined up with some uncertain parliamentary top people, and was way behind the aspirations of the masses.

It did not try to correct itself either the next day or in the following days. But, when deGaulle's coming to power became sure for June 1st, it decided to cover up its whole opportunistic policy by an operation of a pseudo-leftist appearance, street demonstrations in which only members of the party were in practice to participate, in order to be able to say that only the party had fought to the end and that the defeat was owing to the others.

LIKE THE BOURBONS

Soon after the end of the crisis, on June 9th and 10th, there was held a session of the Central Committee of the F C P, in which the leadership showed that, like the Bourbons, it had learned nothing and forgotten nothing. The champions of self-criticism found that everything had been very good, that the leadership had been clear-sighted, that the party had showed itself to be a "fine party," and that it should just go on as in the past.

When Thorez said that he had a "fine party," he specified immediately what he meant thereby: the apparatus has not experienced break-ups like those in 1939-1940. Thorez perhaps spoke too soon.

There are two explanations by the F C P leaders about what has just happened. In his closing speech at this C C meeting, Thorez said:

A crisis of the regime opened and has wound up in the formation of a government of personal dictatorship which opens the way to fascism.

The army, in its present composition, has taken on more and more the aspect of pretorian troops, it has been led more and more to set itself above the nation.

The Gaullist plot is the sign, not of the strength of the bourgeoisie, but of its weakness. By having recourse to personal power, to dictatorship, it recognizes that it is unable to guarantee its domination any longer by traditional means. It makes the confession of its impotence to solve the problems of its own decline, by which it is assailed.

In an article in the June 21st *Humanité*, devoted to Algeria, he repeats the same explanation:

The malfunctioning of institutions was not the

deep cause of the crisis that France is passing through. It was, rather, the expression and the sign thereof. The dominant reality was and remains [...] the incapacity of the ruling classes to solve the problems posed by our epoch. First of all must be emphasized their impotence in face of the questions raised by the general crisis of colonialism.

Thus the profound cause is capitalism, unable to solve the problems of the period, whose weakness forces it to throw itself into the desperate measures of dictatorship. Quite right.

But here is another explanation in the resolution adopted by the same C C:

The cause of the evils from which France is suffering is neither democracy nor the parliamentary regime, but on the contrary the permanent violation, by anti-communism, of the wishes of universal suffrage and the principles of the representative regime.

It is no longer the incapacity of the bourgeoisie, but the bad way in which parliamentarism is applied. But by whom, if not by the representatives of the bourgeoisie, and precisely because parliament is no longer a good instrument for capitalist domination?

And so, instead of calling on the proletariat to solve the problems by the seizure of power and the building of socialism, Thorez declared to the C C: "What is necessary is to correct that bad application that has been made of institutions and to guarantee at last their normal functioning."

And the C C resolution specifies:

The remedy for governmental disorder and impotence does not consist in throwing democracy overboard, but on the contrary in guaranteeing its normal functioning by reestablishing the country's independence and by giving the working class and its party, side-by-side with the others, the place belonging to it in parliament and in the government. Nothing but its place, but its full place [...]

The choice is not between fascism and communism. It is between a personal dictatorship backed by reaction and militarism leading to fascism, and a regime of democracy so as to carry out the policy desired by the majority of Frenchmen.

What impeccable reasoning! The bourgeoisie is incapable of solving problems by the parliamentary regime. It is therefore necessary to go back to this regime, while asking the bourgeoisie only to give the working class — read, the F C P leadership — the place belonging to it in the bourgeois parliament and also a few seats in the government.

At the C C session held some weeks before the crisis, the reporter Servin was explaining that it could not be a question of fighting for socialism because the relationship of forces was not in favor of the working class, which was weak. Now the F C P leadership explains the reactionary coup de force by the weakness

of the bourgeoisie. But in any case, whether the relationship of forces between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie be in one direction or the other, for the F C P leadership it is never the moment to put the struggle for power on the order of the day. In fact the situation in France has shown that the parliamentary regime is at its last gasp, and that — as the Communist International declared in its early years — either the working class would go over to the attack on the regime, or else capitalism, savagely defending its domination over society, would not hesitate to go beyond parliamentary forms to instal regimes of open dictatorship.

The evolution of the Stalinists on the question of workers' power is truly significant. At the beginning of the struggle against the Left Opposition in the years 1923-1929, the proletarian revolution was, according to them, on the order of the day in economically advanced countries, but not in underdeveloped countries like China. Thirty years later, when capitalism has been broken as a social system over a third of the globe, including China, socialism is no longer on the order of the day even in the advanced capitalist countries of Western Europe !

Now let us see how the F C P leadership proposes to carry on the struggle against the rising dictatorship.

All toilers, all democrats, all adversaries of personal power, owe it to themselves, from now on, to prepare a massive NO by our people at the time of the October consultation. The organization of this great campaign from now on dominates all our activity. (Thorez)

They will fight with all their energy both for peace in Algeria and so that, at the time of the referendum, universal suffrage will say **no** to the personal and military dictatorship that would open the road to fascism. (Thorez)

Against the violence of the parachutists, against the armed might of the bourgeois state, the F C P leadership opposes... universal suffrage, in this case by answering **no** in a plebescite, i e, a mockery of universal suffrage itself.

The F C P leadership had praised to high heaven the conception of the "new paths," i e, the use of parliament to build socialism. But in fact there is no more parliament. How, even if one accepts the perspective of a reestablishment of bourgeois parliamentarism, an illusory perspective, how can it be arrived at without recourse to violence ? The leadership is a prisoner of its parliamentary and legalistic conception just at the moment when its preferred instrument has ceased to function.

The F C P leadership has not brought the slightest criticism to bear on its conception of the "new paths" ; it has not even retained a certain reservation which it had introduced into its conception, namely, that violence must be resorted to if the bourgeoisie resorts to it. By omitting, after the Algiers coup, this part of its conception of the "new paths," the F C P leader-

ship shows that for it what was in question there was just a stylistic clause, without any real value, that it had just plain settled down into bourgeois parliamentarism, and that it was no more concerned about the fight for socialism than the S P leadership was.

The F C P leadership believed that it could profit by this period of crisis and the days immediately following, in order to strike blows at oppositionals, engaging particularly in expulsions in the intellectual circles where for so long now it has wanted to strike. This bureaucratic offensive, however, happened to be topped by the bureaucratic offensive of the Kremlin, signalized by the assassination of Imre Nagy and his companions. Soviet intervention in Hungary had much cut off the F C P from other labor and socialist formations of all tendencies. Events in France — the war of Algeria, the reactionary danger, and finally deGaulle's coming to power — had not permitted it to surmount this situation, but at least openings had been created. This time its cutting-off threatens to be irremediable, for the feeling of broad layers of workers is: With you ? why, that would be worse than deGaulle. Truly Khrushchev has worked for deGaulle better than anybody could have done.

A NEW STAGE

A stage in the history of the French workers' movement, opened at the Liberation, is now closed. After having had the possibility at that moment to set up, almost without striking a blow, a Socialist-Communist government that would have opened the road to the European socialist revolution, that movement was led by these two leaderships of ill omen to see deGaulle come "coldly" to dictatorship.

The slope to climb back up will be hard to scale. French capitalism has occupied controlling positions from which it can be dislodged only by the action of the working class raised to the highest level. All the old political formations set up in the Third and Fourth Republics will undergo shakings-up, overturns, and disappearances. There must be added to them the old workers' leaderships which — originating at different periods out of the class struggle — have, under different forms, settled down into the parliamentary political world of French society. We are entering into an era of struggles, of splits, and of regroupments in these old formations. The present background of defeat will generate difficulties during a whole period for the revolutionary Marxist current and for those who will try to find a line of revolutionary behavior again. But at a later stage, that cannot be far off, the exigencies of the objective situation will on the contrary operate in the direction of a pitiless elimination of half-measures, of unfinished ideas, of timorous thinking, and will stimulate the creation of a new leadership capable of leading the revolutionary struggle for the seizure of power.

21 June 1958

THE NEW PROGRAMME OF THE JUGOSLAV COMMUNISTS

By ERNEST GERMAIN

Ten years after the first Kominform resolution which condemned the Yugoslav communists for heresy, three years after Khrushchev's sensational trip to Canossa, humbly begging pardon from his "dear Yugoslav comrades," a new and open rift has broken out between Moscow and Belgrade. This rift was already potentially inevitable since the Hungarian revolution; but when Tito and Khrushchev met last year in Rumania, they both seemed inclined to patch up their differences. But when the Yugoslav C P refused to sign the "joint declaration of CPs" assembled in Moscow last November, a general wave of Stalinist criticism was launched against Belgrade. The rift came into the open with the publication of the Draft Programme of the Yugoslav Communists, with their refusal to "correct" the Draft following the Kremlin's instructions, and with the publication of harsher and harsher criticism against that Draft by various leaders of the bureaucracy and its henchmen.

It could naturally be pointed out that the crisis in the relations between Moscow and Belgrade has not yet reached the boiling point which we witnessed after the second Kominform resolution in 1949. Diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia on the one hand, and the USSR and the "people's democracies" on the other, have not yet been severed; the conflict between parties had not yet been generalized into a conflict between states. Many signs, however, point in the direction of a new and severe aggravation of the crisis, the present period being only an interlude like the one between the first and second Kominform resolution. Already Khrushchev has called the Yugoslav communists "agents of the class enemy inside the labor movement" in his speech before the Rumanian C P Congress ("New Road," Bucharest, 5 June 1958); already the Chinese Stalinists have called Tito and his friends "revisionists being used as spies by the imperialists" (article reprinted in *Pravda*, 10 June 1958); and just a few days ago, Khrushchev called the Yugoslav leaders "bandits" in his Leningrad speech. When one adds to these expressions the hysterical appeals of the Albanian Stalinists against the "Belgrade traitors," the signs are indeed ominous! If the anti-Yugoslav campaign should stop before reaching a stage comparable to that of the second Kominform resolution, this would mean only that a new shake-up had in the meantime occurred in the Kremlin, and that new and powerful forces in Soviet society were energetically calling the leaders of the bureaucracy to a halt.

THE MEANING OF THE NEW RIFT

Why did the Soviet bureaucracy launch this new campaign of slanders and lies against the Yugoslav communists? Is it because they remain aloof from "joining the Soviet bloc," and thereby "split the socialist camp"? This is indeed the main accusation which is generally advanced in Stalinist circles against the J C P leadership. We shall analyze further the positions of that leadership on matters of foreign policy; some of these positions are evidently unacceptable from the standpoint of revolutionary Marxism. But we do not think that they are the real cause of the new Moscow-Belgrade rift.

First of all on international matters Tito's position of "aloofness" from the two power blocs is nothing new. He has defended that position in a consistent way for at least six years; he did not stop defending it before, during, or after the reconciliation trip of Khrushchev and Bulganin to Belgrade. That position did not prevent the reconciliation; surely it could not be the real cause of the present rift.

In reality, Tito's policy of "active neutralism" was used by the Kremlin in its general strategy of "easing international tension" after Stalin's death. It was a welcome preparation for the first Geneva conference; it allowed Tito to play the role of initiator in forging the bloc between Moscow and colonial bourgeoisies like those of India, Indonesia, and Egypt. Tito's trip to the Far East preceded similar trips of Soviet leaders. It could even be said that the whole line of international policy developed at the XXth Congress of the C P of the Soviet Union, with its heavy stress on "peaceful coexistence" and on "various peaceful roads toward socialism," was to a great extent copied from or at least initiated by the Yugoslav communists. As there are no sufficient signs that the Kremlin has adopted a fundamental change in foreign policy and is opposed now to negotiations or compromises with Wall Street, evidently the Yugoslav foreign policy could today be of the same help it was in the 1954-56 period. It is therefore not in the realm of that policy that the secret of the present rift lies.

This secret lies in the realm of ideology, or more exactly of the objective role which the Yugoslav communists' programme plays and will play in the process of "destalinization." The Kremlin's new attack against Tito is a desperate attempt to smash or at least to condemn to silence all these critical and centrifugal tendencies within all the C Ps, especially the C Ps of the Soviet Union, China, and the "people's

democracies," which have developed since Stalin's death and especially since the XXth Congress of the C P S U. A direct line runs from this anti-Yugoslav campaign to the execution of Nagy and his companions. Every Communist is given notice that the time for discussing "revisionism" is over. It is no longer a question of discussion; it is a question of faithfulness or betrayal. And traitors — witness Nagy — will not escape the punishment they deserve.

THE "TWO CAMPS" AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

Even on those questions on which the Yugoslav communists adopt incorrect positions, the criticism by the Kremlin and its henchmen is profoundly unjustified. It is unjustified because the Yugoslav communists could quote dozens of passages of speeches or articles by Khrushchev, Bulganin, Togliatti, Novotny and other "eminent leaders of the international labor movement," which contain exactly the same ambiguous, "revisionist" formulæ which are now objected to by the critics of the Yugoslav communists' program. It is also unjustified because this criticism uses the same methods of gross falsification so characteristic of Stalinist polemics in general.

Let us take a significant example. The central organ of the Chinese C P, *Shenminshibao*, published an editorial in its edition of 5 June 1958, where we read the following passage:

The draft program of the Association of Yugoslav Communists concentrates [!] its attacks against the proletarian revolution, attacks the dictatorship of the proletariat, slanders the socialist countries and the socialist camp, and offers apologies for the capitalist, imperialist countries and the imperialist camp [...]

They interpret the existence of two fundamentally different political and economic world systems — the socialist camp and the imperialist camp — as a "division of the world between two antagonistic military-political blocs." They present themselves as people who stand outside these two "blocs" [the socialist and the imperialist one], i e, who stand above those camps.

This is an absolutely slanderous attack against the *present* position of the J C P (in the past some Yugoslav Communists have indeed defended these like these), against the Draft Programme, and against the speeches and decisions of the Ljubljana Congress of the J C P where the Programme was adopted. Here for example are some passages of Tito's main report to this congress, which indicate clearly that the J C P does not treat the imperialist countries and their alliances on the same level as the workers' states:

The signature of the Atlantic Pact [constitutes ...] the building of a military bloc which was oriented toward carrying out plans of world conquest, and which tended to attain its goals from a "position of strength" [...]. During the last

years, the members of NATO have taken more and more actively measures for strengthening their strategic, technical, and military positions [...] In this way, the Soviet Union and the other Eastern powers have been encircled by a military strategical network [of bases].

[... The weakening of the Western European powers] has led to the building of the Western bloc, which is dominated not only militarily, but also economically and politically, by the strongest capitalist power, America. It faces the strongest socialist power, the Soviet Union, around which the newly constituted socialist states, i e, the countries of people's democracy, have grouped themselves. This grouping can also be explained for defensive reasons, especially if one takes into account the fact that the Western states cannot accept to this day the suppression of the capitalist system in these countries [...].

(*Les Nouvelles Yougoslaves*, No. 221, 9 May 1958, pp 2-3)

These and many other quotations indicate clearly that the Yugoslav communists do not at all suppress the fundamental class differences between the imperialist and aggressive nature of the Atlantic Pact, and the historically defensive and working-class nature of the Warsaw Pact.

At the same time, however, the Yugoslav Party Programme states that Stalin's postwar policies greatly *helped* the imperialists by welding together the Atlantic Pact. The Yugoslav communists refer in this respect to the attacks against their own country in 1948-9; one could also refer to the Berlin blockade and to the peculiar manner in which Czecho-Slovakia became a "people's democracy"! All these narrowly military, bureaucratic "coups" undoubtedly violated the sentiments and consciousness of millions of workers and poor peasants in the above-named countries, disoriented and demoralized broad working-class layers in the West, and thereby facilitated the launching of the anti-communist "crusade" by U S imperialism. It is understandable that those C P leaders who for many years servilely approved this policy of Stalin, do not like today to be reminded of their past sins. But that does not mean that the Yugoslav communists have suddenly lost the right to explain what really happened after the Second World War.

If we believe nevertheless that the Yugoslav Party Programme should be criticized from the standpoint of revolutionary Marxism, this criticism refers to two problems. In the first place, the analysis of the world situation by the Yugoslav communist leaders included unjustified illusions about the so-called "neutral" states (in reality about the colonial bourgeoisie). In the second place it underestimated in a dangerous manner the *permanent war danger* which remains as long as imperialism, and above all U S imperialism, still disposes of overwhelming power.

In his Ljubljana Congress report, Tito declared for

example that the Yugoslav communists collaborate in a very close way with all those countries which are "independent from the power blocs," and that we could convince ourselves that we had identical views with the *leading personalities* [!] of these countries, on all [!] important international issues, especially the question of peaceful coexistence and the peaceful solution of different problems [ibidem, p 4].

If one remembers that these countries include not only Burma, India, Indonesia, and Egypt, but even Abyssinia, one feels immediately how much these declarations are unprincipled and unMarxist. It is really possible for a leader of a workers' state to declare that on all (!) important international issues he has the same position as... the semi-feudal Emperor of Abyssinia? We know that the bourgeoisie of colonial and semi-colonial countries is manoeuvring between the blocs. We know that, partly because of its inherent military-economic weakness, partly because of its fear of the revolutionary potential of its own masses, this bourgeoisie wants to prevent brutal international collisions. We cannot doubt either that a workers' state, especially an isolated one like Yugoslavia, could under certain specific conditions and for certain specific purposes exploit this orientation of the colonial bourgeoisie. But it is evident that it should under no conditions slur over class limits, create illusions about the nature and the intentions of the colonial bourgeoisie, and especially never hide the fact that — besides its absolute incapacity to solve the internal problems of its own countries in a progressive manner — in the last resort this colonial bourgeoisie *will line up with imperialism against the anti-capitalist forces*, if a final clash takes place on a world scale.

On the other hand Khrushchev and his accomplices have no right to criticize the Yugoslav communists on these points, for they have consistently followed the same opportunist line toward Nehru, Nasser, and Sukarno, not to speak of the King of Afghanistan and even the Shah of Persia.

On the question of "peaceful coexistence," Eduard Kardelj declared at the Ljubljana Congress:

For Lenin, the slogan of coexistence was a means of defense, a barricade to protect the revolution [...] But Lenin also knew that in his time the slogan [?] of coexistence was a still weak barricade of the revolution, that the bourgeoisie was still powerful, that international capitalism was still solid and still capable of launching counter-offensives against the October Revolution, and actually prepared a war of aggression against the USSR. That is why Lenin declared normally: Coexistence — yes; but the masses should never forget that imperialism is not in favor of coexistence and will try sooner or later to destroy us. But the present world situation is very different from the one in Lenin's time. Historically speaking, socialism has already won ideologically and

materially. It is no longer encircled, no longer isolated, and no longer has to defend its very existence.

That certainly does not mean that the most reactionary leading circles of capitalism have abandoned the idea and hope of liquidating socialism. But the relationship of forces on a world scale today are such that these hopes become more and more unrealistic, even in the eyes of the most stubborn defenders of capitalism. Precisely for that reason the idea of peaceful coexistence finds more and more numerous supporters; not only among the popular masses but also among certain political circles of the bourgeoisie [ibidem, p 30].

We are opposed to the opinion that Lenin's formula remains as true today as it has been for the last 40 years. "Coexistence" — of course, in the sense that the revolution victorious in one or several countries does not start "revolutionary wars" in order to impose workers' power on other countries where the majority of the toilers do not yet accept that idea¹. But for coexistence, as for marriage, there must be at least two! As long as imperialism exists and still has powerful means at its disposal, it will and *must* try, according to its social nature, to destroy the workers' states, i e, to reunify the world market under the power of capital.

Our International was the first organization in the international labor movement to point out, at its Third World Congress, the fundamental change in the relationship of forces on a world scale in favor of the anti-capitalist and at the expense of the capitalist forces. But we have never drawn from this analysis *dangerously irresponsible underestimations of the actual power of American imperialism*. On the contrary, we have repeatedly pointed out that the permanent war danger results precisely from that peculiar dialectical combination of conditions, wherein the relationship of forces is already developing in favor of the Revolution, while at the same time American imperialism, growing weaker in a relative sense, still keeps in an absolute sense tremendous power to strike back and defend its dying cause. It is precisely under this combination of circumstances that one cannot arrive at the overoptimistic conclusion that imperialism can be "convinced" of peaceful coexistence, i e persuaded to leave the scene of history without making a last and desperate stand to defend its class power!

Only if one draws from the present world situation the conclusion that American imperialism has no more power left to put up a last fight for the sake of

¹ Incidentally, the only time that Trotskyism was mentioned at the Ljubljana Congress was at the point in Kardelj's speech where he attributed to our movement the absurd idea that it was opposed to "coexistence" in that sense, and in favor of immediate and universal "revolutionary war" by workers' states. This is of course a typical product of Stalinist falsification.

capitalism and "free enterprise," can one conclude that the war danger is today less real and permanent than in Lenin's days. But such a conclusion, we repeat, is absolutely unwarranted and criminally light-minded. It should not be forgotten that today the potential of American steel production is still double that of the USSR, and still much higher than that of all workers' states combined. And even were this no longer a fact, the tremendous military power of American imperialism would be sufficient to destroy civilization and mankind as a desperate preference to passively accepting defeat at the hands of the Revolution. This is why the *Manifesto* of the Fifth World Congress of the Fourth International was absolutely correct, and much more responsible, when, while giving full support to all actions for banning nuclear and mass destruction weapons, it simultaneously warned the toilers of the world: **THE ONLY REAL AND FINAL WAY TO ESTABLISH A LASTING PEACE IS TO WRING POWER FROM THE HANDS OF CAPITALISM IN ITS LAST IMPORTANT BASTIONS, especially in the United States.**

As long as this has not been done, the shadow of nuclear destruction will remain cast over mankind, as a terrible warning that the question of the abolition of capitalism has become today a question of life or death for the human race.

May we add that on this question also the Stalinist critics have no right to call in question the Yugoslav communists, for they are guilty of identical, if not worse, mistakes? It will be surely sufficient to quote in this respect the following foolish passage from an editorial of the Chinese C P's central organ, dutifully reproduced by *Pravda* (2 June 1958):

Compared to powerful China and the socialist camp, led by the great Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, and the whole imperialist camp are no more than midgets [sic].

If one recalls that the "midget" USA has a potential steel production 25 times bigger than that of China, one can fully measure the profundity and sagacity of statements of this kind!

"STATE CAPITALISM"

Important targets for Stalinist criticism are those parts of the Yugoslav programme which refer to so-called "state capitalist developments" in advanced and underdeveloped capitalist countries. We should note immediately that the Yugoslav communists no longer consider these "state capitalist developments" to be a "new and final phase of capitalism." Neither do they consider them to represent "objective socialist elements" in Western reality. These truly revisionist theses, developed in the beginning of the fifties under the influence of Djilas, have now been abandoned, and the affirmations to the contrary by Stalinist critics are — once more — pure and simple slander. In his important speech at the Ljubljana Congress,

Kardelj correctly pointed out the *dual nature* of increasing state intervention in the capitalist economy. On the one hand, this intervention objectively expresses the fact that a further growth of productive forces becomes more and more incompatible with private property. On the other hand, it constitutes the provisional, transitory "solution" of this contradiction by the capitalist class *in the absence of the socialist solution*. Kardelj drew the attention of his listeners to the famous remark of Lenin, that there are no "absolutely insoluble" situations for capitalism. The growth of state intervention in the capitalist economy is nothing else but the price mankind pays for its failure to apply the proletarian revolutionary solutions. At the same time, it expresses objectively the growing disintegration of capitalism.

These formulæ contain more Marxist understanding than the many carloads of printed incantations about the "ever-growing general crisis of capitalism" which Moscow continues to pour out on to the unfortunate Communist Parties of the world. They also contain, however, one line of reasoning on which we cannot follow the Yugoslav comrades. Kardelj speaks about the "state capitalist bureaucracy" which "becomes more and more independent [?]," while remaining "a part of the capitalist class" and its "monopoly capitalist top layer," whose collective interests it defends. This seems to us a bit contradictory — in contradiction both with itself and with facts. In reality, as we had occasion to point out in our polemic with Djilas's state-capitalist thesis, and as we also emphasized in a recent review of a fine book by America's foremost sociologist on this question², one should not confuse two diametrically opposed processes: the *expropriation* of the capitalist class by a (workers') state, and the direct *appropriation* of all directing organs of the state by the capitalist class. Russia and America today symbolize these fundamentally different, while formally sometimes analogous, processes. In the first case the power of the bourgeoisie is destroyed and the bourgeoisie itself disappears physically or at least as a class. In the second case the power of the bourgeoisie is consolidated and even strengthened, and it continues to enjoy past and to acquire new wealth and privileges. To equate these two processes for reasons of apparent similarities is really to succumb to infantile formalism.

The *fundamental* tendency in the American, British, French, and Western German economies, i e, the economies of advanced capitalist countries, is not the "growing independent power of state [capitalist] bureaucracies." It is on the contrary the growing *personal union* between the monopoly capitalists and the

² Ernest Germain: "La théorie du 'capitalisme d'Etat'" in *Quatrième Internationale*, May-July 1951.

Ernest Germain: "Sociology of the American Owning Class" (a critique of Wright Mill's *The Power Elite*) in *Fourth International*, Spring 1958.

leading statesmen and leading militarists, i e, the growing direct personal administration of state and army by monopoly capitalists themselves. Beside this fundamental tendency runs a *secondary* one, which is the periodic absorption by the capitalist class of the technically most successful administrators of the big stock companies, state administrations, and armed bodies. This is nothing else than the classical process of partial renewal of the capitalist class personnel which has been going on for four hundred years at least.

In the colonial and semi-colonial countries, on the other hand, there is being repeated a process which we witnessed in Western Europe between the XVIth and XIXth centuries and in America and Japan in the second half of the XIXth century: the process of exploitation of the state for the purpose of furthering *private* primitive accumulation (through theft, corruption, breach of trust, nepotism, etc.). The biggest ventures are undertaken first by the state, in order to be sold or actually given away later to individual capitalists. Decisive in both cases, those of advanced and those of backward capitalist countries, is the fact that the main goal of the "state capitalist bureaucrats" is in no way different from that of other capitalists: they aspire to accumulate *private* capital, to acquire *private* fortunes, and to leave the less secure administrative functions for the *final security of property*. In this sense, the idea of the "independence" of that "bureaucracy," opposed in any sense whatsoever to the "proprietors of the means of production," seems to us to be wrong and misleading.

THE CLASS NATURE OF THE SOVIET UNION

We have already said that the Yugoslav communists have substantially revised the wrong positions they adopted some years ago about the "identity" or the "similarity" of the "state capitalist tendencies" which they then discovered in the West and the East. The same progressive revision of past mistakes has also occurred on the subject of the class nature of the Soviet Union. It is interesting briefly to recall the successive positions which the J C P has adopted on that vital issue.

After the first Kominform resolution of 1948, and even briefly after the second Kominform resolution, the J C P substantially maintained the orthodox Stalinist position on the USSR as "a country which has victoriously completed the building of socialism and is on the road towards communism." This position was expressed for example in the main documents of the Vth Congress of the J C P which met in Belgrade from July 21st to July 28th 1948. Late in 1949, especially after the publication of Melentije Popovic's *On the Economic Relations between Socialist Countries* and after Djilas's speech to Belgrade students on March 19th 1950 ("On New Roads to Socialism"), the Yugoslav communists began systematically to analyze the phenomenon of the Soviet bureaucracy, and

the elements of exploitation and material privileges on which it was based.

This whole process of revision of Stalinist ideology corresponded to two contradictory motives. On the one hand it was a purely pragmatic answer to the attacks of the Kremlin, i e, the result of experiences undergone in the course of the fight against the Soviet bureaucracy, and in that sense it retained the character of a posteriori apologetics for day-to-day politics. On the other hand it was a reflection of serious theoretical endeavor, or more exactly, the reflection, in the field of theory, of the new progress of the Yugoslav revolution, which culminated in the establishment of workers' councils in the Yugoslav factories.

When the Korean War broke out, the pragmatic apologetic tendency clearly took the upper hand over scientific Marxist analysis. The ideological evolution of the J C P changed in its orientation; it stopped moving leftward, and started to move to the right amidst the panic fear of a Soviet military attack and under the great and growing pressure of "helpful" American imperialism. In that period, the terrible confusion of Djilas's ideas played an important and regrettable role in the (dis)orientation of the whole J C P. After Djilas published his *Contemporary Themes* at the beginning of 1951, the theory of "state capitalism" in Russia, developing side by side with "objectively socialist elements" within "Western state capitalism," became more or less official J C P doctrine. In fact, the Yugoslav communists began to suppress class criteria in theory just as they were doing it in practice (e g, their votes in the UN, which objectively helped American counter-revolutionary intervention in Korea). But this retrogressive process was again a contradictory one, for inside Jugoslavia the system of workers' councils and growing self-administration became consolidated during that very same period.

After Stalin's death and the beginning of "liberalization" by the Soviet bureaucracy, a second period of turn in the ideological evolution of the J C P occurred. It was the result of three different experiences:

- 1) experience with the growing hostile pressure of Western imperialism on Yugoslav economy and society, which contradicted illusions about Western "democracy" of the Djilas type;
- 2) experience with the growing differentiation of Soviet bureaucracy and society, impossible to explain in terms of the theory of "state capitalism";
- 3) experience with the logical conclusions to which Djilas drove his theories of "state capitalism" and of the "new class," and especially the objective political results of these theories.

Now the theoretical appraisal of the Soviet Union's class nature once again was changed, and once again

the J C P went overboard on the other side. After Khrushchev's 1955 pilgrimage to Tito, the Yugoslavs started again to talk about the "great socialist Soviet Union"; they now spoke about the problem of bureaucracy only with the greatest prudence, or did not mention it at all any more. "State capitalism" and "bureaucratic degeneration" were once again banned as heresies. But "peaceful coexistence" between the Kremlin and the Yugoslav revolution did not last very long: it broke on the rocks of the Polish and Hungarian October. And the pressure of these revolutions forced the J C P again to return to the problem of bureaucratic degeneration of the workers' states, and to propose the building of workers' councils and the exercise of power by them as universal solutions in the fight against bureaucracy. This was an important step forward, compared with the most progressive statements of 1950. Therein lies the real secret of the new rift between Moscow and Belgrade.

Whereas the J C P limited itself during the 1950-53 period, and even more so during the years 1954-56, to presenting the administration of factories by workers' councils as the "Yugoslav road to socialism" — an "experiment," interesting indeed, on which Soviet comrades commented in a patronizing manner during many tourist trips to that country — the Polish and Hungarian revolutions as well as the growing political awareness of the Yugoslav working class itself forced the J C P to declare today that the "Yugoslav road" is the only correct one. That is why that "way" is codified in a "programme"; that is why the Kremlin is so furious and desperate about these goings-on, for the Yugoslav programme launches a new discussion about "bureaucracy," about "workers' councils," about "self-administration as the content of Soviet democracy," in all Communist Parties, at the very moment that the Kremlin is trying to suppress discussions on these subjects.

As a matter of curiosity, we might mention the numerous variations in the evaluation of Trotskyism by the few international followers of Titoism, as a truthful mirror of the variations in the evaluation of the class nature of the Soviet Union by the J C P leadership. Till late in 1949, they considered Trotskyists just "fascist spies in the service of American imperialism," remaining faithful at least on this point to the Moscow line. During the period from the end of 1949 till the autumn of 1950 there occurred a sharp turn: Trotskyists were now considered "honest communists coming to the aid of socialist Yugoslavia in its fight against the Kominform slanders," but "slightly sectarian as a result of isolation," and "with too little understanding of the new world reality." From the end of 1950 till 1954, on the contrary, Trotskyists were considered "near-Stalinists, who objectively act like agents of the Kremlin by defending their theories about the Russian workers' state and the defense of the Soviet Union." As soon as the reconciliation between Belgrade and Moscow took place,

however, the Trotskyists became "objectively counter-revolutionary" because they still insisted that a political revolution had to overthrow the bureaucratic dictatorship in the Soviet Union, whereas, as "experience had taught," the bureaucracy was busy reforming itself. Has experience in the meantime taught these unfortunate disciples that the results of a scientific Marxist analysis are a little bit longer-lived in these tempestuous times of ours, than crassly apologetic justifications for tactical turns, disguised as "theories"?

THE SOCIAL NATURE OF THE SOVIET BUREAUCRACY

We have already pointed out that the passages of the new Yugoslav Programme and of the speeches at the Ljubljana Congress which refer to the *general problem of bureaucracy in a workers' state* constitute the most progressive part of the ideological work of the Yugoslav communists. It is necessary therefore to analyze these passages in detail.

The programme of the Yugoslav communists does speak about "socialist states"; but this formula has become an empty shell. In fact, the Yugoslav communists openly stated that they treat all the problems concerning the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and the so-called "people's democracies" as *problems of the transition period between capitalism and socialism*. Thereby, they tacitly abandoned the Stalinist theory of "the completion of the building of socialism in the Soviet Union," i.e., the theory of "[the completion of the building of] socialism in one country," and returned to the Marxist conceptions which Leon Trotsky and the Fourth International consistently defended on this matter.

Kardelj dwelt extensively on the problem of bureaucracy in his Ljubljana speech, and stated among other points:

The programme points out that [this problem] does not arise only out of remnants of the bourgeois or of capitalism, but that bureaucratic tendencies develop inevitably in the transition period AS A RESULT OF THE INSUFFICIENT LEVEL OF PRODUCTIVE FORCES, and that, as social forces, they tend to consolidate transitory forms of social relations and even to give them a certain state deformation.

(*Les Nouvelles Yougoslaves*, No. 221, p 29)

And further:

If we deny these phenomena, if we do not discover their sources and causes, we are unable to fight them. Worse, we would even become ourselves their victims, under certain circumstances, and we would cease to be the most progressive social force. That is why we think that the fight against bureaucratism is one of the principled ideological and political instruments for building socialism. And in that respect the programme does not hold that bureaucratism is

a question of quality of people (although of course it is related to that problem also), but that it is a question of *quality of social relations in the transition period* [ibidem, p 29].

Tito on the other hand openly stated that the fight against the bureaucracy can only be won if the necessary material, political, and juridical conditions are created in order to allow the citizens of our country [...] to become really the effective administrators of the whole social life [ibidem, p 11].

Finally, he included in these conditions not only the self-administration organs of the working class in the factories, but also "the increase in the standard of living [of the workers] in direct proportion to the increase of the productive forces and of the productivity of labor [ibidem, p 9]."

We find thereby that the Yugoslav communists have themselves reconstructed the main elements of the Marxist, i e, Trotskyist, theory of the bureaucracy in a workers' state. These elements are :

- 1) The bureaucratic deformation of a workers' state is to a certain extent inevitable, both because of the pressure of the capitalist past and environment, and because of the new contradictions which arise in the transitional period from the still insufficient level of development of productive forces and of mass culture.
- 2) These deformations can, however, be limited, or at least their development into bureaucratic degeneration can be prevented, if the communist vanguard understands the objective and subjective preconditions of an efficient fight against the threat of bureaucratic degeneration. The role of the subjective factor is therefore decisive.
- 3) The objective conditions for a successful fight against the danger of bureaucratic degeneration must be created by a correct policy of the communist vanguard at the head of the workers' state, a policy which allows the self-confidence and the self-administration of the masses to make their broadest possible extension (under the given circumstances) : workers' democracy, workers' councils, increasing standard of living, international extension of the revolution which allows a "tired" section of the working class to be replaced by a "fresh" one at the head of the revolutionary process, etc.
- 4) If the communist vanguard does not understand the danger and the conditions necessary for fighting it, or understands them in an insufficient way, it ceases to be a revolutionary instrument. Worse, it becomes itself bureaucratized, it becomes itself an instrument for establishing and for consolidating the bureaucratic dictatorship (in general, however, this

requires a complete change of its cadres, by physical or moral elimination of the old cadres).

It is true that Kardelj and Tito stated these points in a very prudent manner, and that they did everything possible not to "provoke" the Kremlin. Kardelj stated that he received "many amendments" calling for a sharper denunciation of Stalin's policies and present conditions in "people's democracies" and in the Soviet Union. But, generally speaking, the theoretical progress is real and important, and the new doctrine of the Yugoslav communists is a much greater danger for the Soviet bureaucracy than the theory of "state capitalism" which collided at every step with actual evolution and was far from being "explosive" in a communist movement.

WORKERS' COUNCILS AND WORKERS' SELF-ADMINISTRATION IN JUGOSLAVIA

This theoretical progress corresponds to the new progressive conquests of the Yugoslav revolution in the last years, especially the consolidation of the system of workers' councils, of workers self-administration, in the municipalities, and of the slowly increasing political activity of the Yugoslav working class. The first *Congress of Yugoslav Workers' Councils* which was held at Belgrade from June 25th to 27th 1957 offered important material on the subject.

It is interesting to see that the "Theses" adopted at that Congress called the idea of self-administration of the workers in workers' councils the "general tradition" of the international labor movement from the utopian socialists through Marx, Engels, the Paris Commune, the October Revolution, till the Spanish Civil War and the recent developments in Poland and Hungary. They thereby identify themselves with the tradition of revolutionary workers' democracy, of soviet democracy, which is above all embodied in our movement.

Tito stated at that congress that 600,000 workers had been members of Yugoslav workers' councils between 1950-51 and 1956-7, i e, a full third of the Yugoslav working class ! 77 % of the current members of these councils were manual workers continuing to work at the bench. The statistical Manual which was distributed to participants at the congress states that, in 1956, 1,014 factory managers had been relieved of their jobs, only 20 by decisions of political (party) bodies, 352 by decisions of administrative bodies (state organs), and 501 by decisions of workers' councils or general assemblies of workers of a shop ("workers' collectives," as the Yugoslavs call them).

Of course, we should not put into these figures more than they can tell. Bureaucracy has certainly not been "abolished" in Yugoslavia. But it is clear that a growing counter-pressure is being exercised by the workers against bureaucratic elements, and a growing awareness of the possibilities of workers' democracy is manifesting itself. Even if one supposes that most of

the councils are tele-commanded by C P members, there is an important difference from the Russian, Stalinist, system. In this system the party apparatus decides and applies its decision; the workers are "convinced" afterwards, by propaganda. In the Yugoslav system, even if the party apparatus still decides (it certainly does in most cases), these decisions cannot be applied without *previous* discussions in the councils. It is not necessary to emphasize what a tremendous school of self-administration is thereby built up, or to point out the de-bureaucratizing results this process has inside the C P itself.

The above quoted "Theses" themselves did not deny that the workers' councils are still far from functioning perfectly in Yugoslavia. They pointed out that economic "decentralization" has created tendencies toward particularism and "shop-egoism" (anarcho-syndicalism). They admitted that powerful bureaucratic tendencies developed inside the councils themselves. They explained this process by the insufficient level of development of the productive forces. This explanation is correct but insufficient. Political, subjective, forces also play a decisive role here.

In any case Tito and the other Yugoslav communist leaders were forced to acknowledge these facts after the January 1958 strike of the Slovenian miners at Trbovlje. They sent the now famous Circular Letter to all Communist branches in February 1958, in which they denounced bureaucratic tendencies within the communist movement. It is interesting that, on that occasion, and for the first time since 1941, Tito was forced to approve an action of the masses — i. e., this Slovenian miners strike — against the C P apparatus. Under heavy pressure from both Moscow and Washington, he cannot resist without supporting himself on the masses, and must give in to their demands to a large extent. But the question remains: how is it possible that, notwithstanding "economic decentralization" and workers' councils, there are powerful bureaucratic tendencies today in the Yugoslav communist movement? Isn't there a flaw in the Yugoslav communist theory and practice? There is one, and it is a political one.

ONE OR MORE WORKERS' PARTIES?

Both the new Yugoslav Programme and the speeches at the Ljubljana Congress mention the problem of the multi-party system — in a resolutely negative way. Tito stated (ibidem p 8) that Djilas proposed the readmission of several parties and (!) the restoration of capitalism. Kardelj launched the formula of the "new reactionary romanticism" which has for its purpose a "return to bourgeois-democratic forms." In other words, the Yugoslav communist leaders maintain the one-party-system dogma.

It is, however, evident that in taking that position they involve themselves in a series of inextricable contradictions.

They declare on the one hand that socialism is today

immeasurably stronger than in Lenin's day — and at the same time they support themselves on Lenin's banning of factions, avowedly justified at that time, but only by the great *weakness* of the first workers' state at the beginning of the NEP. They even declare that socialism has already triumphed materially and ideologically in the international field — and at the same time declare themselves so threatened by a Djilas³ that they condemn him to many years of jail on the basis that he "greatly harmed" socialist Yugoslavia! On the one hand they state

that there are no infallible ideological judges, who can determine what is right and what is wrong [...] The only definite judges are experience and history [Kardelj's speech, ibidem, p 31];

they add that

without a struggle of opinions and freedom of criticism, one cannot [...] guarantee the creative activity of an organization. One would on the contrary develop routinism, formalism, and dryness, which kill revolutionary ardor [Rankovic's speech, ibidem, p 23];

and they even say that it is necessary "constantly to expand inner-party democracy" and to safeguard "criticism from the bottom toward the top" (Rankovic, ibidem). But at the same time they maintain the dogma of the one-party system, which can only be justified if one assumes that the members of the Central Committee are to such a degree "infallible" and sure to find the correct answers, that one considers the building of factions and other working-class parties a greater evil than the risk of constant errors which threatens that unchecked leadership.

Indeed, without the right to build factions, the leadership is really unchecked, and no really free discussions are possible. For once that discussion transgresses the borders of one party section, once communists try to contract other communists, in other sections, towns, or regions, in order to fight for the triumph of what they consider to be correct ideas, the accusation of "factionalism" will force them to draw back in order not to be expelled; or worse, the threat of such an accusation will lead them right from the start not to fight for their correct ideas and thereby allow the organization to succumb to a dangerously wrong line.

And without the right to build several working-class parties, the right of building factions cannot be wholly and effectively granted. For there is always a point in a faction fight where the accusation of "preparing a split" or "building in fact a second party, a party within the party" can be launched, wrongly or rightly. If such an accusation means not only expulsion

³ We are irreconcilably opposed to Djilas's ideas. At the same time we are opposed to his arrest and imprisonment, and ask that he be freed and allowed to defend his ideas in speech and writing.

from the party but also an end to all political activity, nay, an end to individual freedom, then of course there exists such a severe check on any development of the faction fight, that most workers will prefer to remain silent with their correct opinions, and will leave the party leadership alone with its wrong line, rather than take all these risks.

The absence of freedom of factions and of freedom for building other working-class parties in fact means that no real political discussion is possible against the national leadership, on issues of national policy. It reduces discussion to second-rate problems, consolidates the more or less permanent character of the central leadership, and puts local and regional leaders in a position where they fear being removed only by action from the top, not by action from below.

SUCH A POLITICAL SYSTEM IS IN DIRECT OPPOSITION TO THE STRUCTURE OF THE WORKERS' COUNCILS AND WORKERS' SELF-ADMINISTRATION, AND MUST EITHER REDUCE THAT STRUCTURE LARGELY TO A DEAD LETTER, OR ADAPT ITSELF TO THAT STRUCTURE BY REFORMING ITSELF.

That is why so many Yugoslav communists continue to have "an inhuman attitude towards criticism from below." (Tito, *ibidem* p 14) They dare take such an attitude, notwithstanding the existence of workers' councils, because they know that the apparatus is based on the principle of collective solidarity, and that it takes a lot to have a bureaucrat removed by bureaucrats. Should they, however, know that they could be removed from below; nay, should they fear that any grave mistake would cause a faction fight against them on a local and regional scale, with all its nasty consequences for the national party, then such a risk would already be a very powerful check, a powerful means of debureaucratizing the party itself and causing it to adopt a strictly principled attitude of proletarian democracy. "Paradoxically" (but this is one of those dialectical truths which appear paradoxes only to people who have not learned to think), the proclamation and effective application of the right to build factions and other working-class parties would be, *in practice*, the best means of *reducing* to the utmost the likelihood of really witnessing a multiplication of either such factions or such parties.

As for the argument that such a multiplication of factions or parties would weaken the workers' state, the Yugoslav communists themselves have answered it in advance when they state that economic decentralization, while somewhat weakening the state apparatus, has immensely strengthened society, for it has allowed the workers to identify themselves with it and to participate more actively in the administration of their own affairs. Why should that argument, correct in the field of economics, suddenly cease to be true in the field of politics?

THE WITHERING AWAY OF THE STATE

The question of the party leads to the question of the state. On this question also Yugoslav communists have made a good step forward, by abandoning the incorrect and crassly hypocritical theory of the "immediate withering away of the state" in Yugoslavia today. Basing himself on Lenin's *State and Revolution*, Kardelj correctly points out *the dual nature of the process*: in the transitional period between capitalism and socialism, society, the proletariat, still need the state; but that state is a state of a specific type, at least if it is of legitimate origin. It is a state which begins to wither away from the day of its birth, inasmuch as it tends to draw greater and greater masses of toilers into the immediate day-to-day process of (self)-administration of the economy and of society as a whole. The withering away of the state is thereby neither postponed into the far distant future, nor established as a definite goal which can be reached in a short time, within a single country. It is an aspect of the growth of socialist forces within the transitional period itself, a proof of the consolidation of socialist elements within the workers' state, the surest sign that the process is an unequivocally progressive one, heading towards the victory of socialism.

This thesis is correct, and is on a much higher level than the primitive apologies of Stalin ("the state becomes stronger and stronger even after the victory of communism in one country") or than the petty-bourgeois anarchistic fancies of Djilas. When the Yugoslav communists add that they openly proclaim the right to control key functions in that state for a long period, we are inclined to approve them, under one condition:

THAT THEY CONVINCED THE MAJORITY OF THE JUGOSLAV WORKERS OF THE NECESSITY FOR THAT CONTROL, ON EVERY IMPORTANT ISSUE DEBATED BY SOCIETY, IN OPEN IDEOLOGICAL DISCUSSION.

Only under these conditions is that control healthy and progressive. Only under these conditions are the communists leaders and not tyrants, do they convince and educate instead of commanding, are they followed instead of being obeyed.

With all the criticism that can be made of the remnants of Stalinist ideas in the Yugoslav communist programme, which are only the ideological counterpart of the remnants of bureaucracy in Yugoslav society, it is easy to understand after this analysis why the Kremlin's henchmen are out to "get Tito" and launch their new slander campaign against socialist Yugoslavia. For the idea of the socially privileged and parasitical nature of the bureaucracy, the idea of the workers' councils and the democratic self-administrative organs of the toilers which do not weaken but strengthen the workers' state — these ideas are today dynamite within the realm of the Soviet bureaucracy! It is because they tremble lest these ideas undermine, not the "unity of the socialist camp," nor the "purity

of Marxism-Leninism," but their own power and privileges, that these bureaucrats try to prevent by all means a discussion of "Jugoslav subversion" in the Communist Parties of the world.

They cautiously opened the doors for a little bit of discussion after 1953 ; they even proclaimed that "all flowers were allowed to flourish." They thought in that way to canalize dissent ; but they could only stimulate social criticism which, on the waves of rebellion against exploitation, oppression, police tyranny, and violation of national freedom, had to advance towards the inevitable political revolution. In Poland and in Hungary they got a first taste of things to come ; they didn't like it a bit. So they are now trying to sweep back the tide with the iron broom of "fighting revisionism." But the attempt is vain ; it is even slightly incongruous. One cannot denounce Stalin's crimes in February and apply Stalin's most bloody repression methods in November, and hope the party will remain silent ! One cannot first explain calmly that the Kominform condemnation of Jugoslavia was "a product of the treacherous activities of those arch-enemies of the people, the imperialist spies Beria and Abakumov," and three years later explain with equal calm that this same Kominform resolution in fact... was substantially correct, without sowing doubts and debates in one's own ranks.

The attempt to "liberalize" the bureaucracy's government started with a new approach towards Tito's Jugoslavia ; it ended, for the time being, at least on

the political field, with the Polish and Hungarian revolutions. But the attempt to reestablish a new kind of Stalinist monolithism failed because of the courageous resistance of the Jugoslav communists. They have a right to the full and enthusiastic support of all revolutionary Marxists, because by that resistance they have for a third time in one generation served the best interests of the international labor movement and of mankind. Their ideas today are a powerful ferment in all Communist Parties. Their ideological progress, with all its contradictions and shortcomings, corresponds to the objective progress of their admirable revolution. And so, once again, Marx's great prediction has come true :

[...] proletarian revolutions, like those of the nineteenth century, criticize themselves constantly, interrupt themselves continually in their own course, come back to the apparently accomplished in order to begin it afresh, deride with unmerciful thoroughness the inadequacies, weaknesses, and paltrinesses of their first attempts, seem to throw down their adversary only in order that he may draw new strength from the earth and rise again, more gigantic, before them, recoil ever and anon from the indefinite prodigiousness of their own aims, until a situation has been created which makes all turning back impossible, and the conditions themselves cry out :

Hic Rhodus, hic salta !

TWENTY YEARS OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL (1938-1958) (A History of Its Ideas and Its Struggles)

By MICHEL PABLO

II

From the Outbreak of the War (September 1939) to the Assassination of Leon Trotsky (August 1940) [continued]

DIVERGENCES IN THE INTERNATIONAL

The declaration of war and the new crimes and betrayals of Stalinism subjected the International to enormous pressure and to a decisive test. Would it capitulate in its turn to social-patriotism or to anti-Soviet hysteria? Would it change course by reversing its fundamental positions about the war, the USSR, and Stalinism?

The quality of a revolutionary movement is tested by the most decisive events of history, wars and revolutions, which raise class tensions to the pitch of paroxysm. With the declaration of war, the Fourth International began to live in a growing isolation — as it had foreseen — from mass trends.

News arriving about the activities of the sections indicated an almost desperate struggle against the stream, and reflected the first measures of repression taken precisely against the revolutionary Marxists who were fighting against the imperialist war. In September 1939, the Belgian police arrested Walter Dauge, secretary of the Parti Socialiste Revolutionnaire, the organization of the Fourth International, for his activity against the war.

In Canada the Trotskyist militant Frank Watson experienced the same fate, as well as several militants in France.

The declarations of the organizations of the Fourth International against the deepening imperialist war, appealing to the proletariat to take action, were multiplied: in Belgium, France, Greece, Denmark, England, Canada, Australia, the United States, China, and in several countries of Latin America. At the same time, while criticizing Stalin's action, the organizations of the Fourth International energetically made a distinction between the Kremlin, political representative of the bureaucracy, and the USSR as a social state; they stood up against the anti-Soviet hysteria encouraged by Stalin's crimes and called for the unconditional defense of the USSR against imperialist plots.

With courage, lucidity, and cool heads, the Fourth

International fought on every front to defend its line, that of revolutionary Marxism applied to a given situation. It was a splendid struggle, carried on by forces which, though limited, saved the honor of the revolutionary proletarian movement and prepared with absolute confidence for the future.

The Fourth International, however, forms an integral part of the social context, and the pressures that were being exercised on the working class also ran through its own ranks, though in an inevitably deformed way. A serious ideological struggle soon took place in its ranks, centred around its policy toward the war, and more particularly toward the USSR. The centre of this struggle was the Socialist Workers Party, the Trotskyist organization in the United States, the country which, by the evolution of circumstances, was at the heart of the resistance against the fascist countries and which encouraged and was soon to lead the camp of the "democracies."

It is not by accident, furthermore, that the divergences crystalized around the question of the USSR and Stalinism. This question had occupied a key place, a central place, in the ideological formation of our movement, whose origins go back to the struggle following Lenin's death inside the C P of the USSR and the Third International against the rising Stalinist bureaucracy. Furthermore, the years 1936-1939 marked the Peak of Stalinist Thermidorian reaction: the Moscow Trials; the defeat of the Spanish revolution; the reactionary reversal of the situation in France; the Hitler-Stalin Pact; the unleashing of the war; the Soviet invasion of Poland and Finland.

In face of such a development in the situation, it was almost inevitable that voices, even within our own ranks, should rise up to cast doubt on our positions about the USSR and Stalinism. The revisionist trend, of which there had already been some manifestations before the outbreak of the war, was taking root in the specific context of the evolution of Stalinism and the international situation. It took on its most highly developed expression within the American organization, which played, beginning with the formation of the Fourth International and up to the end of the war, a central role in the life of the International.

This is explained both by the fact that it happened to be located outside the zone of military operations and Stalinist repression, and by the importance of its human and material means.

Between August 1939 and April 1940 there occurred within the S W P an important ideological struggle which had consequences in the entire International and which in every way raised basic questions on the theoretical and political as well as on the organizational plane for the whole of our movement. The results of this struggle were later incorporated in a durable and organic way in the formation and development of the Fourth International — whence the need to insist upon it in a more detailed way.

The divergences which had been for some time ripening within the S W P leadership burst out on the occasion of the signature of the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 22 August 1939. The very day the pact was signed, Max Shachtman, at that period one of the leaders of the S W P, declared: "The next meeting of the Political Bureau [of the S W P] must begin with a discussion of our evaluation of the Hitler-Stalin Pact with regard to our **characterization of the Soviet state** and future perspectives." On 5 September 1939, James Burnham, another leader of the S W P at that period, submitted to the Central Committee a document on "the character of the war," in which he brought into question the evaluation of the USSR as a workers' state "in any sense whatever."

Burnham considered that the involvement of the USSR in the imperialist war would not create any distinction concerning the particular case of the USSR, and declared himself to be opposed to its unconditional defense, i e, independently of this or that policy of the Kremlin, of Stalin.

From then on, the struggle in the S W P was opened up. Leon Trotsky soon (25 September 1939) replied to Burnham's document by his article, "The USSR in the War," whose importance in the ideological history of our movement could not be minimized even today. From the theoretical and political point of view, the struggle against the Shachtman-Burnham revisionist tendency was carried on almost exclusively by Leon Trotsky, who found the occasion to reaffirm and deepen his former conceptions about the USSR and Stalinism¹. His behavior in the course of this struggle, furthermore, is highly interesting from the viewpoint of the conceptions he developed concerning the way of treating divergences in an organization of our movement and on the organizational level, properly speaking — hence the need to draw all the lessons from this experience, which is among the most important and richest in the history of the Fourth International.

On the theoretical and political plane, the ideological struggle inside the S W P quickly raised all the most fundamental questions: the dialectical materialist essence of Marxism's method of analysis; the character of the social regime of the USSR; the character of the period; perspectives.

¹ The collection of all Leon Trotsky's writings during this struggle have been published in English with the title *In Defense of Marxism* by Pioneer Publishers, New York.

THE METHOD OF MARXISM

In a given political context, characterized by the outbreak of an imperialist war in which the USSR would soon be involved, in alliance with Hitler or, once more, with the "democracies," it was a question of grasping once again the social character of the USSR and of determining the line and the tasks of the revolutionary proletariat toward both the war and the USSR. How to proceed in this difficult and complicated matter? with what criteria? with what method? The discussion quickly turned on the bases, the structure, and the functioning of the analysis itself. Was it possible, in defining the special character of the USSR, to start out from the "concrete political questions" of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, of the invasion of Poland or of Finland by the Kremlin, political acts carried out in a style related to that of fascism and imperialism? Or was it necessary rather to start out from **class criteria**, from the class definition of political phenomena, so as to arrive at valid conclusions?

Let us take for example the war question. War is a political phenomenon, a **function** and **not a characteristic constitutive organ of society**. To understand war, its "just" or "unjust," progressive or reactionary, character, and to define a correct line toward this political phenomenon, one must start out from, not the **function**, but the **state** and the **society** of which it is a function. In other terms, a far-reaching class analysis is needed in order to determine the character of this or that war.

At the given conjuncture of the period, only such a dialectical materialist method could permit of getting away from the dangers of pragmatism and eclecticism and taking a correct position toward the war carried on by the "democratic" allies and their fascist adversaries, toward the "defense" of Finland, toward the USSR's "aggression" against it, toward the resistance of the colonies against the homelands. In what case was it a question of an imperialist war, of an "unjust war," and in what case was it a question of a "just war"? By starting out only from the "concrete facts," from the "circumstances," from the forms of the war, it was easy to end up for example by endorsing the cause of the "democracies" against fascism, or of the "defense" of "poor little Finland" against the "aggression" of the USSR. But the conclusions might be quite different if one looked upon the war as a **political phenomenon**, as a function of states and societies of a different class character. The first way of proceeding was that of Burnham, an open adversary of the dialectic, and of Shachtman. The second was that of Leon Trotsky. In a famous passage of his article, "From a Scratch to the Danger of Gangrene" (24 January 1940), Trotsky defined in an epigrammatic way the divergences about the conception of method. Here is the passage:

In Marxist sociology the initial point of analysis is the **class definition** of a given phenomenon, e.g., state, party, philosophic trend, literary

school, etc. In most cases, however, the mere class definition is inadequate, for a class consists of different strata, passes through different stages of development, comes under different conditions, is subjected to the influence of other classes. It becomes necessary to bring up these second and third rate factors in order to round out the analysis, and they are taken either partially or completely, depending upon the specific aim. But for a Marxist, analysis is impossible without a class characterization of the phenomenon under consideration.

The skeletal and muscular systems do not exhaust the anatomy of an animal; nevertheless an anatomical treatise which attempted to "abstract" itself from bones and muscles would dangle in midair. War is not an organ but a function of society, i. e., of its ruling class. It is impossible to define and study a function without understanding the organ, i. e., the state; it is impossible to gain scientific understanding of the organ without understanding the general structure of the organism, i. e., society. The bones and muscles of society consist of the productive forces and the class (property) relations. Shachtman holds it possible that a function, namely, war, can be studied "concretely" independently of the organ to which it pertains, i. e., the state. Isn't this monstrous?

This fundamental error is supplemented by another equally glaring. After splitting function away from organ, Shachtman in studying the function itself, contrary to all his promises, proceeds not from the abstract to the concrete but on the contrary dissolves the concrete in the abstract. **Imperialist** war is one of the functions of finance capital, i. e., the bourgeoisie at a certain stage of development resting upon capitalism of a specific structure, namely, monopoly capital. This definition is sufficiently concrete for our basic political conclusions. But by extending the term **imperialist** war to cover the Soviet state too, Shachtman cuts the ground away from under his own feet. In order to reach even a superficial justification for applying one and the same designation to the expansion of finance capital and the expansion of the workers' state, Shachtman is compelled to detach himself from the social structure of both states altogether by proclaiming it to be — an abstraction. Thus playing hide and seek with Marxism, Shachtman labels the concrete as abstract and palms off the abstract as concrete!

THE SOCIAL CHARACTER OF THE USSR

The question of method, once settled, naturally does not give a master-key for solving the problems raised by the war and the behavior of the Kremlin. For even while admitting that the character of the war

must in the final analysis be determined by the social character of the state and the society that wage it, that does not solve the problem of grasping whether the USSR might be considered a workers' state, even a degenerated one. And even though Shachtman in particular did not dare to bring directly into question, during the August 1939 - April 1940 discussion, the Fourth International's position on the social character of the USSR², this question in reality lay behind the whole discussion and determined the positions of the revisionist tendency.

During this discussion Trotsky was led to specify, for a last time, almost on the eve of his death, the organic whole of the reasons which justify the Fourth International's position on the social character of the USSR as a **degenerated workers' state**. Here is an example of applying the dialectical materialist methodology of Marxism to a given social phenomenon, grasped in its history, its birth, its evolution, its contradictions, its perspectives, i. e., grasped in its **concrete dialectical totality**.

Those who — like the Burnham-Shachtman revisionist tendency during the struggle within the SWP — have struggled or are still struggling against the definition given by the Fourth International to the social character of the USSR generally err by **pragmatism** or **eclecticism** or by a combination of both, by attacking this or that separate aspect of the conception of our definition of the USSR and showing themselves unable to grasp it, we repeat, in its concrete dialectical entirety.

To understand the USSR and its definition, there must be taken into account: its **birth**, through a proletarian revolution that overturned old property relations and installed new relations based on a statified and planified economy; its **evolution**, always on the basis of **these** relations, despite the expropriation from government and political power that the proletariat had undergone in the meantime, and consequently despite the contradiction set up between **production relations**, fruits of the Revolution, and **political power** in the hands of a privileged bureaucracy; and its historic **perspectives**, as a transitional formation set in the dynamic of our period, which is that of the irresistible and irreversible development of the world revolution, destined to put an end to the isolation of the USSR within what is historically a relatively brief time.

The revolutionary birth of the USSR is important as an argument against those who pretend to forget or want to forget that the **new property relations** established in the USSR (**statified and planified economy**) are not the attribute of a sort of peaceful and organic evolution of capitalism toward a "state capitalism" or a "bureaucratic collectivism," but the result of the struggle of concrete social forces, a struggle

² As contrasted with James Burnham, who at this period affirmed that the USSR was neither a "capitalist" nor "workers' state.

culminating in the proletarian revolution. That is to say that these relations prove to be the fruit of a proletarian revolution, without which it is practically impossible to arrive at such relations.

In practice, furthermore, in the concrete historic case in which the proletarian revolution is developed by means of nationally limited victories, beginning by backward countries on the periphery of the capitalist system, the beginning also of the socialist reconstruction of society must inevitably pass through the establishment of such relations. History has given no proof that it is possible to proceed otherwise, through other relations.

This last argument is of value against those who, for example, while assigning primacy to the character of the **political power**, minimize the importance of production relations as the decisive criterion for characterizing the **social nature** of a regime.

Since the proletariat in the USSR has been expropriated from political power, which is held by a privileged bureaucracy, reason the adepts of "state capitalism" or "bureaucratic collectivism," production relations are not sufficient to characterize the USSR as a **workers' state**, even a **degenerated** one.

Let us recognize first of all that these relations are those by which the reconstruction of the society that follows the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism, of imperialism, in a given country, inevitably begins. That is a historical fact. Another historical fact, already proved by an experience of some 40 years, is that these relations constitute an immense progress over capitalism from the viewpoint of the development of **productive forces**. This aspect of the question has long remained covered up by the enormous difficulties that the USSR, which was among the most backward countries in the world, had to overcome before laying the foundations for a modern economy, and by the monstrous errors and deformations arising from Stalinist administration.

Despite that, the new property relations have successfully passed all the tests of isolation and war, have grown stronger, and are at present expanding with a rapidity, a strength, and a brilliance, which in the coming years will toll the knell of capitalism, including on the economic plane.

But can one not conceive, on the basis of these relations, of the consolidation of an intermediate social regime, for example, between capitalism and socialism, not foreseen by the classics of Marxism? To this question also the only satisfying answer is that which Leon Trotsky gave at the time of the struggle inside the S W P. Writing to James Cannon on September 12th 1939, he specified :

The USSR question cannot be isolated as unique from the whole historic process of our times. Either the Stalin state is a transitory formation, it is a deformation of a worker state in a backward and isolated country, or "bureaucratic col-

lectivism" (Bruno R., *La Bureaucratization du Monde*; Paris, 1939) is a new social formation which is replacing capitalism throughout the world (Stalinism, Fascism, New Deal, etc.). The terminological experiments (workers' state, not workers' state ; class, not class ; etc.) receive a sense only under this historic aspect. Who chooses the second alternative admits, openly or silently, that all the revolutionary potentialities of the world proletariat are exhausted, that the socialist movement is bankrupt, and that the old capitalism is transforming itself into "bureaucratic collectivism" with a new exploiting class.

The tremendous importance of such a conclusion is self-explanatory. It concerns the whole fate of the world proletariat and mankind. Have we the slightest right to induce ourselves by purely terminological experiments in a new historic conception which occurs to be in an absolute contradiction with our program, strategy and tactics? Such an adventuristic jump would be doubly criminal now in view of the world war when the perspective of the socialist revolution becomes an imminent reality and when the case of the USSR will appear to everybody as a transitory episode in the process of world socialist revolution.

In his writings against the revisionist tendency, Trotsky found the occasion for a broad development of this argumentation, obviously of extreme importance. The events of the war and later developments only justified the general significance of this argumentation. The war ended, not with a decline of the proletariat and of the revolution, but with the opening of a long revolutionary period, in which the relationship of forces between capitalism and the revolution changed, and in which also the relationship of forces between the bureaucracy and the proletariat is more and more changing in the latter's favor.

That is the general meaning of events both in the capitalist world and in the USSR and the "people's democracies."

It is true that this whole process has taken and is still taking the most sinuous and complicated forms, as well as a longer time than that foreseen by Leon Trotsky. It could hardly be otherwise, given the depth and breadth of the overturns that have occurred in the world situation since the outbreak of the war, the multitude and complexity of the factors involved therein, factors themselves modified in the course of events. But the general line of developments is following the perspective sketched by Leon Trotsky, and fully justifies his revolutionary optimism.

On the scale of history, the time elapsed since then is still only a moment, which has yet been filled with tremendous revolutionary gains, and which stores up a revolutionary dynamism destined to shake "heaven and earth" from top to bottom.

THE SOVIET BUREAUCRACY AND THE
"UNCONDITIONAL" DEFENSE OF THE USSR

The problem of the class nature of the USSR is obviously connected with that of the class nature of the Soviet bureaucracy which assumes political power in the USSR. **A new social class or a parasitical and temporary social caste?** — that is the whole question, and not only from a purely terminological point of view.

Leon Trotsky tried to clarify it, at the time of the struggle within the S W P, from a **scientific and political** point of view. Once more he analyzed the formation of the Soviet bureaucracy **historically**, noting that it was a question of a social stratum **in evolution**, not yet having reached **stable forms**. He posed the question in these terms: "does the bureaucracy represent a temporary growth on a social organism or has this growth already become transformed into an historically indispensable organ?"³

The convulsions, the permanent crisis, in which the Soviet bureaucracy keeps Soviet society, demonstrate that this organ, before stabilizing itself and becoming historically necessary, has in reality entered into a deep contradiction with the interests, the aspirations, and the needs of that society. From this viewpoint it appears to be rather a temporary parasitical excrescence than a **stable class having a historic function to fulfil**.

As was the case with the class nature of the USSR as a state, so with the class nature of the Soviet bureaucracy, the definitive answer can be found only by adopting a **historical perspective**. If the proletariat should in the long run show itself unable to take political power in the USSR back into its own hands, and if in the advanced countries the revolution should also end up with the abdication of proletarian power to the profit of that of the bureaucracy, it would be necessary to conclude that capitalism would be followed internationally by a new social regime of exploitation assumed by the bureaucratic class (and not caste), as it is currently being formed in the USSR. A few decades, however, do not constitute a historically conclusive experience — all the more so in that there is still no valid reason to suppose that the international proletariat has exhausted its revolutionary capacities, or that the regime of the Soviet bureaucracy has been able to achieve a lasting stabilization. All post-war experience is there to demonstrate the contrary, the world as a whole having entered into a stage of deep revolutionary transformations, the most dynamic and radical in the whole history of humanity. How, under these conditions, can conclusions be drawn about processes in full development? The most controverted point of this class analysis of the USSR and the Soviet bureaucracy in reality was — and in one sense still remains — the "uncondition-

al" defense of the USSR, i e the defense of the basic social and economic structures of the USSR against imperialism and internal reaction, independently of this or that policy of the Kremlin, of the political leadership of the Soviet bureaucracy.

That is a key position of our movement, which has distinguished us from all the other currents of the communist movement and which we have maintained inflexibly throughout the worst difficulties.

The "unconditional" defense of the USSR is not a slogan, **but a political line subordinated to the defense of the interests of the world revolution**. The confusion that exists around this question arises from the confusion about the **methods** and **means** of this "defense." This nowise means any embellishing of the Kremlin bureaucracy, or any rapprochement with it, acceptance of its policy, or conciliation with the policy of its bourgeois or other allies.

The defense of the USSR coincides for us with the preparation of world revolution. Only those methods are permissible which do not conflict with the interests of the revolution. The defense of the USSR is related to the world socialist revolution as a tactical task is related to a strategic one⁴.

The defense of the USSR — as, now, of the other workers' states — takes on meaning in case of an attack by imperialism or native reactionary forces, or of a war involving workers' states and capitalist states. In such cases our movement, independently of this or that policy of the Kremlin, would stand for and put into practice revolutionary defeatism in the capitalist camp, but would be for a sort of united front with the leadership of the workers' state against imperialism. In no case would we write an equal-sign between a capitalist state and a workers' state, or adopt an equally "neutral" line toward both, or leave to imperialism the task of overthrowing the bureaucracy.

Naturally, even in such an extreme case, our movement would not abandon its **revolutionary propaganda** against the political regime of the bureaucracy, preparing for its overthrow, **but, for the "next immediate period," subordinated to the interests of the immediate military fight in common against imperialism**.

The complexity of such a line, which remains to be concretely defined in each case, is caused by the complex and contradictory dialectical nature of the USSR and the bureaucracy. Questions which history has made complex cannot be solved by simplistic formulæ, without thereby falling into a pragmatism that imperceptibly carries us far from a correct class line. The experience of both the "neutralists" toward both camps and the adepts of the "third camp," has clearly demonstrated their practical and objective slide into one single "camp," that of imperialism.

³ "The USSR in War."

⁴ Ibid.

HOW TO HANDLE DIVERGENCES WITHIN THE PROLETARIAN PARTY?

The struggle carried on by Leon Trotsky against the revisionist tendency within the S W P and the International possesses even today another important aspect for us: that concerning the way of handling divergences arising within a section of the International. There is, first of all, the need to allow to tendencies that may arise the possibility of expressing clearly and freely, in writing, in documents, their exact political positions, without hasty characterizations of their possible class nature, and without organizational restrictions or threats.

The ideological struggle, however implacably it must be waged on the strictly theoretical and political plane, must at the same time be paralleled by "very cautious and wise organizational tactics."⁵

Majority and minority must accept free political discussion and the verdict of a democratic-centralist organization.

After several months of discussion, Trotsky had reached the conclusion that the revisionist tendency within the S W P had strong petty-bourgeois characteristics. But he hastened to add that these characteristics were neither the only traits of this tendency nor definitively crystalized. In another conjuncture this tendency might possibly put forward other characteristics.

There is no fatal predestination in political struggles, which develop in a moving social and political context, in which the subjective factor, the maturity, the efforts, and the tact of the truly revolutionary Marxist tendency can have much influence on the final result. Trotsky raised the question whether the then dominant petty-bourgeois character of the revisionist tendency excluded their living together in the same organization with the "proletarian" tendency. He answered his own question in the negative, and he even considered the possibility of the "proletarian" tendency's being a minority and remaining disciplined within an organization led by the revisionist tendency. He naturally foresaw that such an eventuality would in any case have only a provisional character, but one that would permit a better political clarification.

In order to avoid a split, Trotsky went to the length even of accepting the publication of the internal discussion documents before the general public. Trotsky's organizational flexibility, however, was not sufficient to outweigh the centrifugal forces that were precipitating the revisionist tendency outside the Fourth International.

The national conference of the S W P, held from 5 to 9 April 1940, after an ample and democratic discussion of several months' duration and the publication of some 13 internal bulletins, ended in a factual split, the revisionist tendency categorically re-

jecting the democratic-centralist functioning of the organization.

Trotsky drew the final political conclusions from the split that occurred in the S W P in his 23 April 1940 article titled "Petty-Bourgeois Moralists and the Proletarian Party." He noted therein that the revisionist minority, despite the serious organizational concessions granted it by the majority, wanted to break the democratic-centralist framework that characterizes every revolutionary proletarian organization. The minority, an intellectual "aristocracy," felt that it was rendered inferior in a proletarian organization that it did not lead. But the basis for this capricious, undisciplined, and irresponsible attitude was obviously to be found elsewhere. Trotsky wrote:

The petty-bourgeois minority of the S W P split from the proletarian majority on the basis of a struggle against revolutionary Marxism. Burnham proclaimed dialectical materialism to be incompatible with his moth-eaten "science." Shachtman proclaimed revolutionary Marxism to be of no moment from the standpoint of "practical tasks." The minority grouped itself under the banner of the "third camp." "What is this animal?" Trotsky ironically asked. "There is the camp of capitalism; there is the camp of the proletariat. But is there perhaps a 'third camp' — a petty-bourgeois sanctuary?" "Advanced workers!" Trotsky concluded. "Not one cent's worth of confidence in the 'third front' of the petty bourgeoisie!"

Scarcely a month after the split, James Burnham, co-leader with Max Shachtman of the revisionist tendency, abandoned that tendency as well, his ideas having already developed toward those contained in his well-known book, *The Managerial Revolution* which appeared a few months later.

Shachtman in his turn soon adopted Burnham's thesis on the USSR as a "bureaucratic collectivist" state, neither capitalist nor proletarian, and naturally gave up the "unconditional" defense of that state, already involved in the war.

The split in the S W P was followed by a split, although a very small one, in the International, where a series of elements like Lebrun, Johnson, Trent, and Anton, who had seats on the International Executive Committee, had in reality adopted the political and organizational positions of Shachtman.

THE ASSASSINATION OF LEON TROTSKY

Scarcely had the struggle within the S W P and the International been closed than a fateful date approached: that of the assassination of Leon Trotsky by the agents of Stalin. As Victor Serge wrote quite correctly:

Beginning with the Moscow Trials, the assassination of Leon Trotsky became both a political and a logical necessity. It is of no use to shoot tens of thousands of men if the loftiest head of the revolutionary generation, the one that it will

⁵ Letter of 19 December 1939 from Leon Trotsky to John G. Wright.

be impossible to strike out of history, freely survives.

And it is obvious that against Trotsky, denounced as the most diabolical character in history, anything is permitted in the eyes of the Russian world poisoned by the frame-up trials.

It was the declaration of World War II and the prospect that the USSR would be involved in the conflict that speeded up Trotsky's assassination. The frantic campaign of the Mexican Communist Party against Trotsky's presence in Mexico was preparing the ground. In March 1940 the Hernan Laborde leadership of the Mexican C P, accused of being "pro-Trotskyist," (!) was purged by the G P U, and the campaign against the right of asylum and against Lázaro Cárdenas, President of Mexico, Trotsky's "protector," redoubled in violence.

In May 1940 Trotsky's fortified house at Coyoacán, in the suburbs of the capital, was attacked by 20 Stalinists armed with machine-guns, who had succeeded in tying up the police who were guarding the house, and in carrying off Trotsky's bodyguard, Robert Sheldon Harte, a young American militant of the S W P. ⁶

Comrade Natalia Trotsky relates:

They had fired on us, in our bedroom, sixty bullets in cross-fire aimed from four different directions. It was precisely this excess in machine-gunning that saved us. The killers had no doubts about getting us by these combined salvos, and they were afraid of killing one another. ⁷

The Mexican police soon got their hands on several of the organizers and executants of the attack, all members and sympathizers of the Mexican Communist Party. But those who were principally responsible, foreign agents of the G P U, remained in the shadows. Trotsky engaged in great activity to denounce Stalin's role in the outrage and to unmask in the eyes of international public opinion the way the G P U functioned inside each Communist Party, prepared and introduced its crimes. He was convinced, furthermore, that there would soon be a new attempt to assassinate him, Stalin having decided on his death. In his 8 June 1940 article, "Stalin Seeks My Death," he wrote with cool lucidity:

The accidental failure of the assault so carefully and so ably prepared is a serious blow to Stalin. The G P U must rehabilitate itself with Stalin. Stalin must demonstrate his power. **A repetition of the attempt is inevitable.**

Indeed, his physical extermination had for a very long time already become an imperious necessity for

Stalin. Trotsky knew that he was condemned and destined to die from one day to another, for the immense means at Stalin's disposal must in the long run prove more powerful than whatever measure of protection taken by himself and his friends. Reasoning with his usual serenity, he concluded in this same article: "I can therefore say that I live on this earth not in accordance with the rule, but as an exception to the rule."

The new attack, this time fatal, occurred during the day of 20 August 1940. Leon Trotsky got up that day in excellent humor, Natalia Trotsky relates. "A double dose of barbiturates had assured him of a sleep that had done him good. Not for many days had he felt so alert. 'Ah, I'm going to work well,' he said."

Toward five o'clock that afternoon he received in his study one Jacson Mornard, a self-styled Belgian, son of a diplomat, who had been introduced into the circles of several close friends of Leon Trotsky by Sylvia Ageloff, a member of the American Trotskyist organization. Jacson Mornard, who had succeeded in winning the affection of Ageloff and the unanimous sympathy of other people close to Trotsky, came, so he said, to present an article. Natalia Trotsky reports what then followed:

Not more than three or four minutes had elapsed when I heard a terrible, soul-shaking cry and without as much as realizing **who it was that uttered this cry**, I rushed in the direction from which it came. Between the dining room and the balcony, on the threshold, beside the door post and leaning against it stood... Lev Davidovich. His face was covered with blood, his eyes, without glasses, were sharp blue, his hands were hanging.

"What happened? What happened?"

I flung my arms about him, but he did not immediately answer [...]

And he said to me calmly, without any indignation, bitterness or irritation, "Jacson." L. D. said it as if he wished to say, "It has happened."

Jacson Mornard had struck him on the head with a short mountain-climbing pick hidden under his raincoat. The murderer had tried to hit a second blow, but Trotsky had hurled himself on him. Meanwhile Trotsky's bodyguards, Comrades Charlie Cornell, Joe Hansen, and Harold Robbins, who had run in, had roughly overcome the assassin, who was shouting: "They forced me to strike him!... They're holding my mother!... They've imprisoned my mother!..." Despite rapid treatment by doctors and the extraordinary resistance of his organism, Leon Trotsky died calmly on August 12th 1940 at 7:25 p.m. He was 60. Before he underwent trepanning, he called Joe Hansen to him and dictated a few words by way of a political testament. They were these: "Say to my friends, please, that I have no doubt about the victory of the Fourth International. Go forward!"

⁶ Suspected of having betrayed Trotsky, Sheldon Harte was found dead on June 25th 1940, killed during his sleep and buried in an isolated cottage in the mountains, at Talminalco, in the Desierto de los Leones, rented by the brothers-in-law of David Alfaro Siqueiros, Leopoldo and Luis Arenal.

⁷ *Life and Death of L. Trotsky*, by Victor Serge.

The Mexican government took charge of the funeral. For five days, the body, with an honor guard of militants, was shown to the public in a hall in the Calle Tacuba ; about 100,000 persons, mostly simple Mexican workers and peasants, paid silent homage to the heroic and exalting life of the revolutionary. "Jacson Mornard" was quickly identified as a false name hiding an authentic G P U agent. All the details of the organization of the outrage, the international figures who contributed to it, and even the exact identity of the assassin, are still not entirely known. According to the revelations of General Sánchez Salazar, former chief of the Mexican Secret Service, who carried out the investigation of the murder, the real name of "Jacson Mornard" is **Mercader**, he is of Catalan origin, and his mother, who lived in France and Belgium, had gone over to the service of the G P U during the Spanish Civil War.

The death of Leon Trotsky occurred at a moment when the international situation was dominated by the resounding victories of Hitler in Europe. The campaign of France had just been victoriously ended

by Hitler, and England's turn was awaited. Italy, speculating on the eventuality of a rapid ending of the war, had decided to enter the conflict. Hitler seemed to be at the apogee of his power.

Under these conditions, Stalin's crime was not forcefully brought into question either in the fascist countries, which were still treating Stalin carefully, or in the "democratic" countries, which were speculating on a possible break between Stalin and Hitler.

Only vanguard revolutionary militants had painfully felt this terrible blow. The most powerful head of the world revolution had just been fractured by the Thermidorian reaction. The richest and most living contemporary Marxist thought, the most indomitable revolutionary character, a stimulus and example for all, had just disappeared. Thenceforward it was necessary to find the path alone, it was necessary to carry on the struggle by forging in action the intelligence and characters of those who would keep high the banner of the Fourth International.

In spite of everything, it was indeed necessary to go forward !

[In the next issue: *The Fourth International during the Second World War*]

THE THIRD EXECUTION OF THE HUNGARIAN COMMUNE

By P RICHARDS

It was no accident that, after the victory of the October Revolution, the first European country where the Commune triumphed was Hungary. The soviets which were set up at Budapest scarcely a year after the Russian Revolution were not only an echo thereof but also the heralds of a great revolutionary wave in Europe. The credit for this belonged above all to the Hungarian working class, which had already trained itself earlier in powerful strike movements and by playing the leading role in the great popular uprisings for Hungary's national freedom, in the struggle against the magnates and capitalists. The Hungarian proletariat's enormous determination to be free was already shown almost 40 years ago in the victory of the proletarian revolution in Hungary. This success was to be attributed, to a considerable degree, to the wonderful cadres of the Hungarian Socialist (later Communist) Party. Lenin and the leaders of the Bolshevik Party spoke of their merits with great admiration.

When the Hungarian revolution was crushed by the intervention of the armies of neighboring countries (especially Rumania and Czechoslovakia), the Soviet Union opened its doors to the revolutionary refugees who succeeded in escaping from the savage White terror. During the '20s, there could be seen in Moscow and other cities of the Soviet Union many Hungarian political refugees who, together with the Russian proletariat, were wholly sacrificing themselves to consolidate socialist power and participate in the beginnings of socialist construction. They were exceptionally active and held important posts, including in the Red Army. The building of a true and fine socialism in the Soviet Union — that was the ideal that spurred them on and meant for them not only the continuation of their previous revolutionary activity in Hungary but also a serious preparation for a renewed struggle for socialism in their own country.

A Hungarian revolutionary, a Hungarian communist, would have been unable to conceive that in the Soviet Union — which was for him the very substance of workers' solidarity and genuine comradeship — anything bad could happen to him as a political refugee. Yet it turned out otherwise. Already in the first stages of the inner-party struggle, which began in the '20s, the elementary laws of hospitality and of the right of asylum were rudely violated. The clique led by Stalin, stimulated by egoism and the desire for power, found that among the Hungarian political émigrés (as well as, incidentally, among the Poles and Italians espe-

cially) there were too many Trotskyists, and, later, supporters of the Leningrad Opposition.

Petty chicanery and reprisals against the Hungarians in the Soviet Union began already in the '20s: these proletarians of "the old school" wanted worker's democracy, they wanted freedom of thought, especially in the party, they protested against the steady lowering of the working-class masses' living standards on the one hand, and against corruption and arbitrariness on the other.

Stalin's attempts to stimulate a Great-Russian chauvinist tone and to push the Soviet Union's foreign policy toward imperialist channels roused indignation among the Hungarian communists, and especially among the best of them.

Already at the beginning of the '30s a large number of active Hungarian political émigrés had found themselves removed from their posts and sent to distant regions; secret arrests and sentences by the G P U, which already existed, began; neither the comrades in question nor the closest relatives of those who were arrested knew why and to what punishments they were sentenced, or even of what they were accused.

In the mid-'30s, when the reprisals against the Bolshevik Old Guard took on a mass character, the persecution of political émigrés, especially the Poles and Hungarians, became general. Since the veterans of the October Revolution themselves were being sacrificed to a regime that was becoming more and more cruel, why should consideration be paid to the survivors of the Hungarian Commune? What was really the most tragic aspect of this matter was that at this period the fascist regimes in Europe, especially Hitler, were reaching the full development of their repressive activity: the European proletariat and, so to speak, the best and best-formed of its representatives, could not believe that Stalin was using precisely this moment to make a bloody liquidation of the victims of reaction and fascism who were within the frontiers of the Soviet Union.

And a highly developed blockade of the frontiers aimed at not allowing a word about these crimes to be known abroad, completed the disorientation of the masses throughout the world.

When, in 1937-1938, the police measures to guarantee what in today's official documents is called the Stalin personality cult, but which was in fact his autocracy, reached its highest pitch, the series of persecutions of the political émigrés was topped by two crimes of

particular enormity: one was the dissolution of the Polish Communist Party and the execution of its leaders; the second, the arrest and physical liquidation of the Hungarian communists, with, at their head, the president of the first soviet government there, Bela Kun.

All this took place on Stalin's personal orders, and was carried out — long before Beria appeared in Moscow — by N Jezov, a quite insignificant person who effectively executed the orders given by Stalin in the name of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U S S R.

In the press there appeared only reports full of insults and calumnies. About Bela Kun it was said that "his hands were stained with workers' blood." He himself tried till the last moment, at the seat of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, of which he was a member right up to the moment of his arrest, to appeal to Stalin, for that was the only — and, as events proved, the vain — hope of the man literally hunted for months by all the running-dogs of the regime. It was only in his prison cell, when he was sick and helpless, in filth and stink, amid an ever-changing public of prisoners, awaiting his last minute, that Bela Kun expressed the opinion that if he had fallen into the hands of Horthy or Goemboes, they would surely also have killed him, but less cruelly than Stalin did.

Today it is established by the Soviet judicial authorities, solemnly stated by party authorities, and officially published in the Soviet press, that, in the case of the Polish party, of many thousands of political émigrés, of Bela Kun and other leaders of the first Hungarian Commune, it was a question of provoca-

tion, of banditism, of (White, counter-revolutionary) terror, carried out, not by them, but **against** them by Stalin and his henchmen!

It took more than twenty years for the truth about the crime committed against Bela Kun and the Hungarian communists of the "first" generation to come to the light of day. But in the meantime, Stalin had continued his work of destruction against the Hungarian communists: he sent Laszlo Rajk and — with him, before him, and after him — many other Hungarian communists, to the gallows. Whatever may have been the role of Rakosi and his group in these trials and shameful executions, they were — as has been established — like Jezov formerly, only momentary tools in carrying out Stalin's orders.

The authorities of the state and the party, the official press of the Soviet Union and of the "people's democracies," have in the meantime stated that here again it was a question of counter-revolutionary provocations. That was the second execution of the Hungarian Commune.

It is only logical, and shows the inexorability of historic laws, that more than five years after Stalin's death there took place for the third time the execution of the Hungarian Commune in the person of Imre Nagy and his comrades. As the memory of Stalin has not been stigmatized by the publication of the truth about his wretched crimes, and the people around him — his henchmen, pupils, and police — remain at their posts just as before, they are continuing the same practices in similar conditions.

And only a genuine rebirth of the workers' movement throughout the world can put a stop to their work.

THE UNITY OF THE ARAB EAST

By M K and J A

The real development of the Arab East during these last years, and particularly during the most recent phase, brings evidential proof that the unification of the Arab nation, its liberation from direct or indirect foreign domination, and the raising of its economic and social level, do not form mutually distinct stages, but are intertwined in one and the same process of development. It cannot be a question of first completing liberation before then going on to unity. Every bourgeois national movement puts first the question of the unification of the nation's parts into a state, in order to be able to develop itself.

We do not in this article propose to take up the state of the peoples who were living in the Near East before the VIth and VIIth centuries, any more than the spread of the Arab nation in the Middle Ages, beginning from the Hejaz northward toward what is now the Turkish frontier, then eastward in Iraq, and finally over all North Africa. At that period the existence of an Arab nation — and not Arab nations — from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic and from Aden to the Turkish frontier and the Euphrates, became a **historical** reality, which has not been able to be destroyed in spite of its division into separate states in modern times. When we witness nowadays the unheard-of enthusiasm of the masses in all the Arab countries for Nasser, it is not a question of "love" for a mystical personage. It is a question of a personality who expresses the Arab people's determination to unify.

Ask a Europeanized inhabitant of Lebanon of a semi-barbarian of the Hejaz to what people he belongs ; he will not answer Lebanese or Hejazi, but will proudly proclaim that he is an Arab. Arab national consciousness is deeply anchored in the masses.

The national question cannot be treated according to a pedantic schema. History shows that peoples have dissolved, that others have split up ; great migrations have destroyed some peoples and created others ; the artificially created state frontiers of today give less than ever a true picture of national limits. In the USA there was formed, and there is still being formed today, a new nation which results from the mixture of all the nationalities of the earth. There are peoples whose constituent parts are not homogeneous ; there are differences in economy, mentality, etc.

In his explanation of the concept "nation," Stalin stated that four points characterize a nation : language, territory, economy, and the psychic formation that is translated by community of culture. The schematic and pedantic use of this definition allows both the Kremlin "specialists" and the leaders of the Com-

munist Parties in the Arab countries to speak of Arab peoples and not of the Arab people. They have not grasped that a people is the result of a certain **historical development, of historical factors, which bring the human masses to a national common denominator.**

THE ARAB NATIONAL MOVEMENT

At the time of the decline of the Arab empire, its people fell under the horribly oppressive and rough domination of the Turks. The former Arab empire was divided up according to administrative needs into provinces and sanjaks. It was often a case of regions and even countries being dominated by feudal suzerains, who were subjected to the central power of Constantinople and paid taxes to it.

It was only the partition of the world among the Western powers at the end of the First World War that parceled up the Arab East into states by the tracing of artificial frontiers : separate states saw the light of day under the names of Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Transjordan, Palestine, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the various little English-controlled principalities along the Persian Gulf on the Arabian peninsula. These designations as countries have no relation with what nation their inhabitants belong to ; it is a case of exclusively geographical names: Lebanon is the name of a mountain ; the name of Syria has remained in memory of the Assyrian people, who disappeared millenia ago ; Transjordan means the other side of the Jordan ; etc.

In this field it was the French who pushed furthest. They created within the frame of present Syria two midget states — the Allaouites and the Jèbel Druze — in order to be able thus to insert a wedge in the Arab national movement. They did not succeed, however, seeing that it was absurd to speak of an Allaouite or a Druze people, just as it is absurd to speak of a Coptic, Maronite, or Ismaëlian people. These are religious minorities that formed within the Arab people. Among these minorities, furthermore, there is no separatist movement, as many an interested person in the world would like to have it believed.

Already well before the First World War — properly speaking with Napoleon's invasion of Egypt — Western imperialism began to install itself in the Arab East. Indeed, beginning with the last decades of the last century, the English were already dominant in Egypt, even if it was formally attached to the Turkish Empire and became a British colony only after the First World War. The national movement therefore had to fight not only against the Turks, but also against the growing political, economic, and fi-

nancial influence of the English in Egypt. At times these battles took the form of sanguinary combats. The most serious uprising was that of the Egyptian peasants in 1881 under the leadership of the intelligentsia and the army officer Ahmed Arabi, an uprising that the British army crushed in blood.

In Turkey there was born the bourgeois-democratic movement generally known under the name of "the Young Turks"; the young Arab intelligentsia took an active part in this movement. But after having overthrown the sanguinary Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid, the "democratic" masters of the power turned with all the more violence against their former Arab collaborators. After the victory of the "Young Turk" bourgeois revolution, not only did the Arabs not win their freedom, but national oppression was to become still more intense.

During the First World War the Arab leaders placed their hopes in "liberation" by the Western democratic imperialisms, and some of them made contacts with England and France. Many of them were arrested and hanged by the Turkish commander in Syria, Jamal Pasha.

At the same period, England was negotiating with Hussein, Emir of Mecca, future king and founder of the Hashemite dynasty. At no moment did this man dream of national liberation. On the contrary. He allied himself with the English in order to avenge himself for the minimum reforms of the "Young Turks." For him, the Young Turks were "revolutionaries"; that the Arab leaders had been hunted down by them interested him very little. He was hoping to create, with the alliance of the English, a sufficiently strong reactionary power against the national-revolutionary aims of the movement; besides, the English paid well. In 1916 began the so-called "Great Arab Revolt," and with it the alliance of the Hashemite dynasty with British imperialism that still exists. Domination over an independent Arab kingdom, promised to Hussein, was never attained. British imperialism was engaged in an imposture. Indeed, at the same moment it was signing the famous Sykes-Picot Agreement, which settled the division of spoils between British and French imperialisms. And there was much more. The security of their zone of domination against the impetuous Arab national movement was not sufficiently guaranteed by the Hashemite feudalists and conservatives. That is why the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, Balfour, in November 1917 transmitted to the future President of the State of Israel, Dr Weizman, the "Balfour Declaration," which has become famous. This promised the Zionist organization a "Jewish National Home" in Palestine; i e, the creation of a useful tool of imperialism against Arab independence.

When, by the publication of the archives after the October Revolution, the secret Sykes-Picot Treaty was divulged, that was the end of the Arab national movement's friendship with England and France. The

hatred became terrible. But meanwhile there had occurred the partition of the Arab East. After Hussein's son Feysal had been chased out of Syria by the French, he was, thanks to British imperialism, crowned king in Iraq, as was his brother Abdullah in Transjordan, almost exclusively inhabited by Beduins.

With the dislocation of the Arab world into states, a new situation arose for the national movement. First, it found itself faced, no longer by one great adversary, but partly by the English and partly by the French. To that was added the fact that the two imperialist powers set up in their respective zones of domination little state entities which in their turn produced a further dividing up of the movement; then the big Arab feudal landowners, compradores, and reactionary politicians, who were interested in the maintenance of foreign domination, also began to cling to the maintenance of particularism, since this permitted them to enjoy their privileges and guaranteed their social, economic, and political positions.

This new state of affairs, however much a handicap it might be for the development of the atomized national movement, could not, however, stop it. At varying rhythms, it made its way in all the Arab countries, with still more power than under Turkish domination. The limited industrialization permitted by imperialism created a proletariat which began to set its mark on the national movement. Whereas in its beginnings the movement had been represented by a circle of "enlightened" rich men, it became more and more a movement of the masses.

The hindering factor of the Church and of the strongly religious state of mind withdrew more and more into the background. The founder of the Egyptian Wafd party, Sa'id Zaglul, who played an important revolutionary part at the beginning of the '20s, launched the slogan: "Addin l'Allah, w'al-utan l'djamie [Religion for God, and the Fatherland for everybody]." A series of scholars began to demand the separation of church and state. The audacity of expressing such an aspiration in an Islamic state in itself signified a genuine revolution.

During and after the Second World War legal left organizations appeared for the first time. Trade-union associations were set up everywhere. New cultural forces and progressive publications developed. The idea spread that a low material level is the result of national oppression. In 1916 there burst out in Egypt a wave of demonstrations and strikes which had as their goal the departure of the English. In Cairo and Alexandria **workers and students formed joint committees** which led this movement. Side-by-side with slogans of an anti-imperialist nature others also appeared against the big landowners and native capitalists.

The Arab leaders sought for means to master this more and more impetuous movement. The kings and presidents got together and consulted. English "spe-

cialists in the struggle against communism" played an important role in this matter. Nevertheless, even bloody reprisals could not put a stop to the drive. Only the outbreak of the Israelo-Arab war in 1948 had tragic results also from this point of view. The leading strata could exploit the state of war and the strong wave of chauvinism resulting therefrom in order to bring the masses back, temporarily, to silence. **The Soviet Union, which had been one of the main instigators of the partition of Palestine and the creation of the State of Israel, thereby brought help to the reactionary leaders.**

This repression, however, could not solve the problems of imperialist domination and the low level of the social and economic situation. But, given the fact that the masses were not yet sufficiently organized, had not yet arisen again from their defeat, and as a result of the lack of a revolutionary Marxist leadership and the execrable behavior of the leaderships of the traditional workers' parties, a new force appeared: young officers revolted by the inhuman social and political conditions; what journalists now term "Nasserism." When in 1952 the young Egyptian officers' caste drove out the king and forever destroyed the power of the feudalists by an agrarian reform, not only was the rotted structure of the Arab social edifice brought to totter, but it was also the beginning of the liquidation of foreign domination, the beginning of a still more vigorous national consciousness, and of the concrete basis for the unification of the Arab East. Such is, as we have already mentioned, the real basis for the indescribable enthusiasm of the masses in all the Arab countries for Nasser.

The Nasser regime has nothing to do with socialism. The Nasser regime, a regime of the national bourgeoisie struggling for independence and the development of its economy, is empirical in its actions and represses the independent movement of the working class. Though it is true that the conquests of the Nasser regime — by agrarian reform, industrialization, raising of the cultural level, laïcization of the schools, universities, and tribunals, construction of housing for the poor, etc. — are much too slight to be able to solve the basic problems of Egyptian society, they nonetheless represent a revolutionary factor. The definitive triumph over backwardness by the complete use of the potential resources of the economy can be the doing only of a **socialist Arab East**. The stories going round to the effect that Egypt and Syria might be satellites of the Soviet Union, exactly like the "people's democracies," are plain silly. Whereas in the U S S R and in the "people's democracies" capitalist domination and the capitalist mode of production have been abolished, here the national bourgeoisie reigns, with the goal, precisely by industrialization, of developing and strengthening capitalism.

In the relations between Egypt-&Syria and the U S S R, there is an aspect that did not previously

exist. Up till now, the bourgeoisie of colonial and backward countries that became "independent" sought the aid of the strongest capitalist countries so as to strengthen their economic position by a share in the profits, whereas the Arab national bourgeoisie is seeking this aid from the U S S R. The U S S R is today in a position to give economic aid to backward countries, to contribute to the development of their industries, and it nowise asks in return a social revolution, not even legality for the Communist Party and the independent workers' movement. While it puts itself at the service of the national bourgeoisie, it calmly watches the oppression and incarceration of Communists and other left elements by that same bourgeoisie. For the Kremlin bureaucracy, the criterion in its relations with each country is the question of the country's momentary attitude toward American imperialism. For the national bourgeoisie, from the viewpoints both of the struggle against imperialism and of the fight against the threat coming from the toiling masses, this aid is more advantageous than that of the Western powers.

THE ECONOMIC FACTORS OF THE TENDENCY TO UNIFICATION

The imperialist politicians and publicists, their allies in the Arab countries, and the Zionists, all like to present the idea of the unity of Arab countries and the unity already achieved between Egypt and Syria as a desire for conquest by the Egyptian regime. Every rising bourgeoisie takes the road to national unification. When a reactionary like Bismarck unified the German states, this unity as such — despite the simultaneous beginning of the growth of German imperialism — was a progressive fact from the economic and social viewpoint. This is even a thousand times more true for the Arab East, at a time when the process of unity is being carried out in the roughest of fights against imperialism. Unity is an indispensable precondition to any attempt to overcome backwardness — not only political backwardness, but also economic backwardness.

The Nasser regime's agrarian reform was only a very limited one, since only some 10% of the landless or poor peasants obtained any land through it. But this reform, even were it much more extensive — and a socialist regime ought to go much further in this field — could not of itself solve the agrarian problem. Only combined with a far-reaching industrialization could it reach this goal. But every industrialization requires a vast market, hence the need of unity. The objection might here be raised: hence Nasser wants to conquer markets for his country, therefore he has imperialist "aims." That argument is very naïve, if not consciously hostile. Here there is not one country which is conquering another, but countries populated by the same nation which are unifying. What is more, industry was being developed in Syria prior to the unification at a previously un-

known rhythm, yet, as we shall show later, the Syrian bourgeoisie was precisely one of the most active promoters of the Syro-Egyptian fusion. Anyone with a normal mind cannot imagine that a bourgeoisie in full expansion begs the bourgeoisie of another country to take its situation in hand.

During the last 40 to 50 years the Egyptian fellahin have become impoverished to an incredible degree. One of the important causes of this is the rapid growth of the population — some 1.5 million annually — without its being possible to increase the arable area sufficiently, while industrialization is not important enough to be able to absorb this “population surplus.” On the contrary, there are in Syria and Iraq enormous areas of arable land desperately calling for labor; and even public works begun in Syria, with irrigation networks, cannot be carried out for lack of hands. Iraq and Syria, unlike Egypt, are “underpopulated,” or, more exactly, countries lacking labor forces comparable to their existing possibilities.

The natural wealth of the Arab East is still not wholly known. But even if only what is already known is taken as a basis, not only does the disproportionate distribution of population among the Arab countries appear absurd, but one realizes what economic resources remain unused.

It is in the field of oil that the evil is worst. The masters of Saudi Arabia and the little principalities where there are fantastic oil resources, are swimming in the gold they collect in the form of “royalties” from the American and British oil monopolies. These fortunes are squandered and not devoted to any productive sector, and only a very small part of them is expended for public needs.

It is not true that the Arab countries are rich only in oil. In fact, the search for mineral wealth has been quite limited. Great wealth is nonetheless known to exist. In the north of Iraq there is lignite, and recently copper and iron ores and sulphur were discovered there; in the south there is gypsum and sand suitable for glass-making. In Syria: natural bitumen, salt crystals, sulphur, manganese, asbestos, and chrome. In Lebanon: lignite, iron ore, sand particularly precious for the production of glass, already used therefor by the ancient Phœnicians. In Jordan: high-quality phosphates in considerable quantities, chemical products of different kinds in quantities beyond estimate in the Dead Sea, whose extraction by distillation is economical, manganese ore in the Patra region, iron and copper ore, perhaps also oil. In Saudi Arabia: besides oil, gold. In Yemen: beside soil of good quality for agriculture, there is iron, copper, gold, and silver. In Egypt: rich mines of iron very close to the surface; in the east, manganese ore; to the west of the Nile, chrome, nickel, tungsten; and in the Sinai desert, zinc, lead and a little gold, great quantities of sodium, salts, sulphates, asbestos, coal, and oil.

All this wealth is scarcely scratched. When one realizes this economic potential, besides the rich sources of oil already being utilized, the excellent cotton of Egypt and also in these last years of Syria as well, the citrus plantations of Palestine, and the immense agricultural possibilities in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen — then the aspiration for unity becomes something self-evident. For the exploitation of these riches and of its economic potential, each of these countries taken alone is limited and dependent on foreign capital. **It is the unity of all these countries and their independence from the economic interests of international finance capital that will allow the full utilization of this economic potential. Unity and independence are not only a basic need of the broad masses and of the revolutionary socialist movement, but a first objective in the bourgeois-democratic tasks.**

Another important factor is the mass of intellectuals. The number of university students has been growing ever since the end of the world war, and, after their education, many of them find no employment; some of them make their way to the most backward countries of the Arab East so as to find there some means of existence, and thus carry the idea of unity even into these countries.

In Beirut alone there are three universities, of a relatively high level, while the whole artificial state structure has a population of less than a million and a half. If there be added thereto the highly developed production of intellectuals in Egypt, an idea can be formed of the pressure brought to bear by this element in the direction of greater state unity, independence from foreign intellectual forces, and development of the economic base.

Incidentally, there must be mentioned in this context the great mass of professionally qualified forces in the western part of Jordan, whose basis for existence in more developed Palestine was taken away from them, and who now find themselves in a more backward Jordan, semi-patriarchal, semi-feudal, which has moreover no basis for existence from the economic viewpoint.

THE UNIFICATION OF EGYPT AND SYRIA

In the public speech in which he officially announced the achievement of Syro-Egyptian unity, Nasser said that, while pan-Arab unity was, it was true, the main goal, he was nevertheless surprised by the rapid achievement of this even partial unification. If we consider the present situation, we cannot but accept these words.

Our exposition has shown the urgent need for unity for the progressive development of the Arab East, of capitalist growth, of industrialization. Such is Nasser's goal. But the road toward that goal is studded with ambushes for Nasser, including from the viewpoint of the movement of the masses. It is true that the organized workers' movement is harshly hunted down and repressed in Egypt; yet any observer whatever can

note that the process of development desired precisely by Nasser and his men has aroused — and that throughout the Arab East — a mass movement hitherto unknown, which threatens to go over his head. Nasser needs the masses for his bourgeois-democratic tasks, but a mass movement is a base for a socialist revolution; that is why at the same time he represses in blood any manifestation of the independent workers' movement. For this reason also he could not accept with so much rapidity and light-heartedness unity with Syria, where the independent workers' movement is strongly organized. And so it can be admitted that the initiative for unification at that moment was not of his doing, and that he was ready to accept it only under certain very specific conditions.

In order to understand the immediate origins of the fusion that has taken place and also Nasser's conditions, let us look at the other side, the political situation in Syria.

The three main parties in Syria — apart from the Communist Party — were "Hiseb as-ch'ab" (People's Party), "Hiseb al-watani" (National Party), and "Hiseb el-ba'ath el ichtiraki" (Party of the Arab Socialist Renaissance).

The first two came from the "National Bloc," which existed before and during the war, and which was the leadership of the national movement in Syria. Some of its chiefs in the mid-'20s led the famous Syrian uprising against French domination, and some were already militants in the Arab national movement under Turkish domination. During and after the fall of the dictator Chichakli, the oppositions became more clearly crystalized than in the preceding period. It is true that there were capitalist and even feudal elements in both parties; but the People's Party proved to be the typical representative of the feudalists and the compradore bourgeoisie, campaigned for union with reactionary Iraq, and tried to sabotage and repress any progressive movement.

Syria's development, however, finally reduced it to silence, and during the Syro-Egyptian unification this party did not dare raise its head.

The National Party, whose leader, Sabri el-Assali, was premier during the last years, proved to be, as opposed to the People's Party, the representative of Syria's national bourgeoisie, in favor of collaboration with Egypt and economic relations with the U S S R, of developing Syrian industry, and of being politically more independent from the West.

The third party, known under the short form of its name, El-Ba'ath, resulted from the 1953 fusion of the Arab Party of Renaissance (especially intellectuals under the leadership of Michel Aflak and El Bittar) with the Arab Socialist Party under the leadership of Akram Haurani, who had won a reputation by his defense of the poor fellahin against the big landlords. The party's programme is of a quite petty-bourgeois confusion, which does not prevent its two

essential points from being typical of a left wing of the national bourgeoisie while revolutionary by their content:

- 1) State unity of all the countries of the East;
- 2) Agrarian reform.

The other points are: a raising of the masses' living level; an understanding between workers and entrepreneurs in industry; neutrality between the two power blocs; "Arab and not Marxist socialism." This party had won a very considerable influence both among the masses and in the state apparatus and the army, and was, concertedly with the National Party, the main force that brought about the fusion with Egypt.

To a certain degree, although under very different conditions, the National Party and El-Ba'ath found themselves in a situation analogous to that of Nasser. Like him, they needed the masses in the struggle against internal reaction and against imperialism. But, also like him, as representatives of the national bourgeoisie, they are conscious of the danger of the movement of the masses. While in Egypt the masses have no right to organize, in Syria this right was the most developed in all the Arab East, and the workers there were organized in an independent way. Against imperialism the leading strata had to accept the aid of the U S S R, and the influence of the Syrian C P grew. What they feared for their domination was not so much the U S S R, or the C P whose programme does not even reach the degree of progressiveness of that of the Ba'ath, but that the ardent upswing of the masses might go over their heads. Under the conditions in Syria, they could not hold out alone against the potential threat of the mass movement, and they were hence the eager instigators of the fusion with Egypt, while Nasser accepted it willingly provided, however, that all Syrian political parties were dissolved. Nasser stated that he was acting in this way to prevent the reaction from growing; in reality he is afraid of the existence of parties in the face of this spontaneous upsurge of the masses.

This analysis must not minimize the essential factor in the fusion: reënforcement against the aggressive imperialism of the United States and against native reaction. What matters here is to grasp exactly the class reasons for the form of unification. The Syrian national bourgeoisie felt too weak to be able to confront various dangers. It is interesting that it has not yet dared to take the most elementary step among the bourgeois-democratic tasks: an agrarian reform. Only now, with the aid of its Egyptian sister, the plan of such a reform is being worked up.

THE IRAQ-JORDAN FEDERATION

The bourgeois press sees in this union a counter-measure, inspired by the Western powers, against the Syro-Egyptian union. Western journalism likes to consider events in backward countries only from

the viewpoint of the interests and policy of the great powers.

It is indiscutable that the great powers exercise strong pressure on the internal and external policy of all countries, particularly small countries and all the more so if they are economically and socially backward. But it is wrong to consider the internal policy of the two countries of the Hashemite crown only from the viewpoint of the imperial interests of the United States and England. The formation of the Iraq-Jordan Federation is the result of an immediate historical and economic necessity. Of course the pressure of the Syro-Egyptian Union constituted on the spot the essential factor for the formation of the Iraq-Jordan Federation which has as its task that of serving as an antidote to the anti-imperialist front. But even without this conjunctural situation, objective and subjective pressures would in the final analysis have forced unity.

The review *International Affairs*, published in Moscow, which always expresses the Kremlin's momentary point of view, says quite correctly in its March 1958 issue that in the last analysis this federation is also an expression of the drive for unity arising from below. Elsewhere it states the problem as follows :

The attitude of the Iraq-Jordan Federation toward the colonialist Bagdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine will be without any doubt one of the principal criteria of its nature.

It does not declare that the decisive criteria it states raise the question of the social nature of the power in the two countries and that the most important criterion of the later development of this federation is the question of the maintenance or modification of their social nature. The anti-imperialist attitude of Egypt-Syria rests on the fact that in Egypt the influence of feudal vestiges and of the compradores has already been entirely extirpated and that in Syria it is well on the road to being. The Iraq-Jordan power, however, represents the big landlords and the comprador bourgeoisie.

The Communist Parties of the Arab East still have not caught up with *International Affairs* on the question of the Iraq-Jordan Federation. Until the beginning of the Egypto-Syrian fusion, they were against complete unity. When, however, this fusion became a reality, they fell over into the other extreme of recognizing it uncritically. In the Iraq-Jordan Federation, on the contrary, they see exclusively an imperialist intrigue and call on the Iraqi and Jordanians to break up the unity that has just been established. It is interesting to note that Nasser, in the speech he made just after the birth of the Iraq-Jordan Federation, in which he vehemently attacked its leaders, did not utter the slightest word to demand the Federation's dissolution. He unvarnishedly told the masses of these two countries that the unity is positive, but that they must drive out the agents of imperialism. This takes its place on the same plane as

the statement of the Syrian ex-President, Kouatli, at the time of his discussion with the King of Jordan, Abdullah, since assassinated : Union of Syria with Jordan? Yes, but on condition that the constitution be republican ! In other words : Unity of the Arab East with the expulsion of the Hashemite kings and their acolytes, who represent the feudalists and the compradores.

Even the creation of the Arab League after the world war, which the English sought to exploit as an imperialist tool, and which was a very loose bond among the Arab states, pledging them to very little, was a concession to the tendency to and the politico-economic need of unity. It is necessary to see not only the negative side. Just as in the Syro-Egyptian union there must not be seen an event constituting only a wonderful progress — considering that it is a question of a regime of the national bourgeoisie which is oppressing the independent movement of the masses — just so there must not be seen in the Iraq-Jordan Federation nothing but the intrigues of internal reaction and of imperialism. This federation is also a result of the aspiration of the masses for unity, has its economic importance, and contains socially and economically a potentiality for the overthrow of native reaction.

CONCLUSIONS

In order to leave no misunderstanding floating around, we want to affirm clearly at the end of our exposition that we do not see, in the unity of the Arab East, an ideal, or any Ersatz of the socialist revolution. In the same way, the theory of the march toward socialism by stages is alien to us, seeing that the national bourgeoisie, though it is progressive up to a certain point and can act against imperialism, is nevertheless incapable of fully accomplishing even the democratic tasks.

That is why the theses of the Fifth World Congress of the Fourth International state :

The Fourth International struggles for the creation of mass workers' parties, independent from the political formations of the bourgeoisie, the petty-bourgeoisie, and Stalinism.

The task of the workers' party in the colonies is not the creation of the bourgeois power, but of the workers' and peasants' government which, on the road to the building of socialism, accomplishes the democratic tasks ; that means that it carries out agrarian reform, industrialization, and national unification, while simultaneously nationalizing the principal means of production and basing itself politically on councils of the toiling classes.

The present situation, however, is such that, as a result of the opportunist policy of the leaders of the traditional workers' parties and the Kremlin, throughout the world the mass workers' parties on whom these tasks are incumbent exist only in embryonic form. These embryonic organizations, in order to

grow, must operate within reality, i e, act within the framework of the progressive movement that actually exists, without giving up their own political and organizational independence. Such is the meaning of the following terms in the above-mentioned theses :

The Fourth International [...] unconditionally supports all struggles of peoples against imperialism, independently of their leadership at any given moment.

Such is also the meaning of our position on the question of the unity of the Arab East, and possibly of the unity of the Arab East and the Maghreb, which, however, depends on later developments. Once more : this unity is not an independent goal (in itself) for revolutionary socialists, but an integral part of the world combat for socialism. That is why we support, in the Arab East, any anti-imperialist action, even by the bourgeois leadership, and every economic measure that contributes to raising the social level of the masses. At the same time we stigmatize its policy of repressing the independent movement of the masses, and we work for the creation of mass workers' organizations and for the formation of the revolutionary Marxist party.

Let us contrast with that the position of international Stalinism. Léon Feix, one of the leaders of the French C P, wrote in its theoretical organ, *Cahiers du Communisme* :

Certain nationalist leaders call for the fusion of the three countries (Tunisia-Algeria-Morocco) within an Arab or Moslem Maghreb, linked with all the Arab or Moslem countries from Morocco to Pakistan. This is an old idea of the Arab League, taken up again and put forward by leading bourgeois circles from Cairo to Karachi. [...] It is a long time since Lenin and Stalin showed the inevitably reactionary character of nationalist currents based on race or religion [...].

This way of presenting things is absolutely false and slanderous. At whom was Lenin aiming ? Who were these "pan-Islamists" ?

During the civil war in the Soviet Union after the October Revolution, Enver Pasha, the sanguinary master of Turkey, at that period one of the worst oppressors of the Arabs, engaged in enormous anti-Bolshevik propaganda among the Moslems of the Caucasus and inside the Soviet Union. To draw on the masses, he played on their religious state of mind, and spread "pan-Islamism." This propaganda, based on religious feelings, was qualified by Lenin as reactionary, and that was justified a thousand times over. But against whom is the "communist" Léon Feix polemicizing ?

The "leading bourgeois circles" are talking, not of

any "pan-Islamism," but of the unity of the Arab nation. Nor are they speaking, as Feix pretends, jointly with Karachi, which is not at all Arab, but jointly with Damascus, Baghdad, Amman, etc., i e, in the name of the Arab nation. This aspiration to national unity and independence is of a highly progressive, and not "reactionary," nature.

There is more. During the controversy between the Pan-Indian Congress and the Moslem League before the partition of India, the Arab national movement took a clear position in favor of the Congress and accused the League of being pro-imperialist. Can there be a better proof of the inconsistency of this Léon Feix ? The Stalinists are committing a crime against the struggle of the colonial and backward peoples by distorting and slandering the national movements in this way. To top all, these "communists" talk about "the historical common interests of France and Algeria." Here we have a phraseology exactly like that of the imperialists.

Let us now take a look at the leader of the Syrian Communist Party, Khaled Bagdache. He, like his eminent teacher Stalin, recognizes only an evolution by rigorously respected stages. He was against full state unity for the Arab East. First, he says, each country must be liberated separately. This "communist" has not the slightest notion of the dialectical interaction of various factors. He was unwilling to understand that the unification and the liberation of the Arab East are two mutually inseparable factors.

The same "communists" of the Arab East who, so short a time ago, were against the Syro-Egyptian Union, uncritically deify it today — while these people say to the Iraqi and Jordanians that they must destroy the Iraq-Jordan Federation, instead of demanding the unification of the Federation and the Republic and the expulsion of the Hashemites and their politicians.

In their recent enthusiasm for Nasser's efforts at unification, the Stalinists forget both independent proletarian action and all the left elements who are rotting away in Nasser's dungeons ; they have already forgotten that Nasser has illegalized the Syrian C P, the biggest in the entire Near East.

WE TROTSKYISTS SUPPORT "NASSERISM" TO THE EXTENT THAT IT IS PROGRESSIVE. BUT WE FIGHT AGAINST THE REPRESSION OF THE INDEPENDENT WORKERS' MOVEMENT, FOR THE CREATION OF A MARXIST WORKERS' PARTY, AND FOR THE FORMATION OF A WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' GOVERNMENT OF THE ARAB EAST.

1 June 1958

Documents

Four Declarations of the International Secretariat

I

AGAINST IMMINENT DICTATORSHIP IN FRANCE!

In France the Fourth Republic is in its death-agony. The regime of bourgeois democracy in that country is now living out its last moments. Frontally attacked by the rebel generals and the fascist settlers of Algeria, undermined by the intrigues and plots of their reactionary allies in the metropolis, this regime has become a farce, a sheer fiction, to which there still desperately cling the heteroclitic cohorts of "republicans" running all the way from certain bourgeois parliamentary formations to the Socialist and Communist Parties. Rarely has the parliamentary cretinism of the traditional workers' leaderships taken on so grotesque and criminal a form. The real power is already in the hands of extraparliamentary forces, which are deciding about the evolution of events.

And while these forces are imposing on the rump parliament the playing out of a scenario aimed at bringing about the "cold" transfer of power to de Gaulle — the dictator already plebiscited by the army, the settlers, and the whole extreme-right of the metropolis — the Socialist and Communist leaderships multiply their acts of confidence in the puppet government that is cynically making a deal with the rebellion, continuing the war in Algeria, tying down the working class, and strangling the republic!

IMMINENT DICTATORSHIP

That "left" "democrats," either frightened or incurably poisoned by a substratum of petty-bourgeois chauvinism, should dream of a providential solution that would restore to a bourgeois and imperialist France its "grandeur," tarnished by so many defeats and blighted hopes, and bow down before de Gaulle — this is still explicable. But that so-called workers' leaders pretend to be wanting really to struggle against the dictator's coming to power, to defend the "republic," by granting their confidence and full powers to a government which delegates them to General Salan and immobilizes the working class, that is the height of treason for those among them who do so consciously, the height of reformist cretinism for the others.

Of what use to these leaderships has been the extremely bitter experience of Hitler's arrival at power through the series of parliamentary Bonapartist governments, from Brüning to Papen, in face of a divided and disoriented working class, or the experience of Austria in 1934, or that of Spain from 1936 to 1938, or that of France during the same period? In each of these cases, when the regime of parliamentary democracy became incapable of solving the problems of the bourgeoisie, and got ready to cede its place to a "strong" government, it was never possible to stop this fatal trend by supporting transitional Bonapartist bourgeois governments. There was no other way to safety than the

autonomous revolutionary mobilization of the class, carried to the highest pitch!

The death-agony of parliamentary democracy in France is the result of the military, political, economic, international impasse in which the new colonial war against Algeria has ended up, in face of the factual incapacity of the metropolitan working class to give it a revolutionary outcome.

Both in order to carry on this war, on which the fate of all that remains of the French colonial empire depends, and in order to control the situation in case of a defeat in Algeria and make the metropolitan masses support the damages, the French bourgeoisie has an inexorable need of a "strong" government.

The parliamentary democratic regime has for a long time now been an inconvenience to it in the new conditions in which wars and colonial defeats have placed it. The measures and discussions for the strengthening of the executive and the reform of the constitution were the expression of a dictatorial Bonapartist trend more and more necessary for the regime. The real power was gradually escaping from the hands of parliament to become concentrated in the hands of extraparliamentary forces, first of all the army and the regime in Algeria. Independently of the forms that the installation of a "strong" government may take, it will rapidly develop toward a military Bonapartist dictatorship, in which all the reactionary, pro-fascist, and fascist forces will form a coalition as a "popular" base.

Furthermore, no illusion is possible concerning a regime led by de Gaulle. By his past, his training, his conceptions, the forces at present supporting him, the conditions surrounding him, and the problems which he will have to solve, the man will be inexorably led to base his regime on a reactionary foundation of military dictatorship backed by the extreme-right forces that have already plebiscited the general.

Only the revolutionary mobilization of the working class would be able to check such an evolution. But the class has in reality been for years now educated and led by opportunist leaderships who have systematically blunted its combativity, confused its prospects, and weakened its class reactions.

By cultivating a chauvinist fermentation in multiple forms, by practising class collaboration, by standing for "new," "peaceful," and parliamentary paths to socialism, by discrediting the revolutionary forms of class struggle, these leaderships have prevented the active joining of forces between the metropolitan proletariat and the colonial revolution, maintained reformist illusions, and paralyzed class mobilization.

They are now harvesting the fruits of this long practice. Some of them excuse their present attitude of a revolting support for the government of a state of emergency, of

full powers, delegated to Salan, for the aggravated continuation of the war in Algeria, and of the dictatorial reform of the constitution, by arguing that the class is incapable of being mobilized.

It is true that the chauvinist, opportunistic, and class-collaborationist policy systematically carried out for years now by the Socialist and Communist leaderships has created a factual situation in the masses. But to continue and aggravate this policy means to head inexorably for defeat without even trying to fight a single important battle with the class forces that still exist, and to mortgage the whole future by an evil example. It is not true that a joint appeal by the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, and the trade unions, could not still mobilize vast sectors on a programme that defined the genuine way to put a stop to the dictatorship's coming to power :

An end to the war in Algeria and a proclamation of its independence, cutting the ground out from under the factionists !

Immediate demobilization of all the soldiers now

in Algeria ! Popular tribunals for the factionists ! Action committees in the metropolis, fraternizing with the Algerian workers in France, determined to fight, including by means of the general strike and armed struggle, against the factionists, against the coming to power of the dictatorship, for the defense of liberties, for the government of workers' parties and organizations, based on committees !

SOCIALIST AND COMMUNIST MILITANTS, PROLETARIANS OF FRANCE :

There is still time for a last-minute upsurge on this programme in order to save the honor of the French labor movement, to hold out an active fraternal hand to the Algerian revolution which is still gloriously fighting all alone, to defend democratic liberties, to open up a socialist perspective in France and in Europe, the only way to genuine safety and greatness !

THE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

Milan, 24 May 1958

II

ON DE GAULLE'S COMING TO POWER

The reign of the French Fourth Republic has ended. It foundered in an extraordinary scene of confusion, decomposition, and cowardice, the result of the unprecedented capitulation of the democratic parliamentary forces of the centre and the left, including a large part of the Socialists, and of the flagrant impotence of the Communist Party to mobilize the masses, running from the scandalous and criminal support of the Pflimlin government, which coldly opened the path for de Gaulle, to spasmodic last-minute "leftist" activities. While cries of triumph were resounding, for a victory that was after all unexpected, from the reactionary scum — Parisian gilded youth, fascist hordes, paratroopers, gendarmes, soldiers, Algerian settlers — demonstrating from the Champs-Élysées to the Forum of Algiers, the immense popular masses were confused, betrayed, outraced by events and the resignation of their "élites."

The scenario for bringing de Gaulle to power, prepared behind the scenes ever since the outbreak of the "Algiers coup," was in fact run through without a hitch. Pflimlin used the full powers and the state of emergency, which the Socialists and Communists had granted him, to tie down the working class and coldly prepare, in "legality" and at the least possible cost, the passing of the power to de Gaulle. In this task he was actively seconded not only by the political apparatuses of the bourgeoisie, including the puppet President of the Republic, not only by the administrative bureaucracy of the bourgeois state, but also by the treacherous leaders of the Socialist Party à la Guy Mollet, and the subtler but no less treacherous attitude of the Communist Party. Disregarding the constitutional majority which the vote of the Communist Party gave him by a broad margin, Pflimlin imposed his own fall at the desired moment, so as to bring about the "crisis" in which the appeal to de Gaulle, "the providential man," became almost inevitable.

The President of the Republic, backed, with rare exceptions, by the general staff of the political leaders of

the right, the centre, and the left, took it on himself to finish things off.

Thus the whole scandalous support given since the beginning of the crisis by the Communist Party to the "government of the Republic," to "its army," to "its police," to "its administration," served fundamentally only to open the way peacefully, by parliamentary paths, to the Bonapartist and dictatorial power of de Gaulle !

The de Gaulle solution clearly expresses the impossibility in which the great majority of the French bourgeoisie finds itself to rule by classic parliamentary means. For the bourgeoisie, democracy and the republic are not organizations of principle but simple means, valid only under certain circumstances. Let these circumstances change, let the need be felt for a strong executive power exercised without hindrance, and we immediately see the machine of the bourgeois state rise up above the impotent parliament, to be entrusted to the "strong" hands of some Bonaparte or other, on a military or outright fascist basis.

It was through such a process that the Weimar Republic let itself be strangled by Hitler, that the Austrian Republic sank into the sanguinary regime of Dolfuss, that Republican Spain was crushed by Franco, that the France of the Popular Front ended up under Daladier's regime of reaction and war.

The present shipwreck of the French Fourth Republic is the result of the crisis of the regime of bourgeois democracy, for which the proletariat was not able to find a revolutionary outcome. It expressed the military, economic, political, international impasse into which the capitalist regime in France had got itself, as a result of the disasters which that regime experienced during the war and the colonial wars which it has never stopped waging since that time.

The most direct cause of the fall of the republic in France is to be found in the strength of the Algerian revolution which is leading Algeria to independence and is tolling the knell of all that is left of the French colonial empire.

De Gaulle is the last hope of the French bourgeoisie for carrying out the liquidation of the empire under conditions preserving at least some of this bourgeoisie's vital economic interests, while maintaining and consolidating its regime in the metropolis.

It is even not excluded that the definitive balance-sheet of the de Gaulle experiment may be, not so much a "harder" colonial policy than that of (for example) the "socialist" Lacoste, but a *firm dictatorship in France, capable of imposing the inevitable concessions to the colonial revolution, and of compensating for them to some extent by an increased exploitation of the metropolitan masses.*

WHO "BETRAYED" THE REPUBLIC ?

The bourgeoisie, by burying the moribund republic with its own hands, did not exactly "betray" : it did not betray its own class interests.

Pushed by its most dynamic elements, who brutally knocked aside the theatrical props of a henceforth out-moded democratic décor, it brought on stage the "strong" Bonapartist power — based on the real force required at the present moment for the safeguard of its interests : the army.

The army, backed by the mass of the settlers in Algeria, in reality only precipitated the sole solution to which the colonial policy of the bourgeoisie as a whole was inexorably leading, including those petty-bourgeois strata who are represented in the Socialist Party.

Both so as to carry on the war against the rising colonial revolution and so as to face up at home to the economic, political, and social consequences of such an enterprise, condemned to failure, a "strong" government was necessary.

Thus the true cost of the prolongation of the war in Algeria was fatally, as it were, dictatorship in France itself.

The proletarians of that country and of the whole world will have to meditate on this bitter lesson : wars of oppression against the colonial revolution can under present conditions result only in the strengthening of reaction in the home countries.

To allow the bourgeoisie to conduct a historically doomed struggle against colonial peoples means, far from maintaining the standard of living and the liberties of the metropolitan masses, to end up inexorably in the superexploitation of those masses and the loss of those liberties.

Since the Second World War the colonial peoples have never ceased to fight for their independence and to win victories, in spite of their practical isolation and the almost total lack of active support by the metropolitan proletariat.

This grave split between the colonial revolution and the proletarian movement in the metropoleis could not continue except at great cost to the proletarians of the capitalist countries.

The example of France is now before us as evidence. *Faced by the loss, inevitable in spite of everything, of its colonies, the imperialist bourgeoisie will try to compensate for its losses at the cost of its own metropolitan masses.*

The grave inaction that the metropolitan masses have so far shown toward the struggle of their brothers in the colonies is due above all to the chauvinist, opportunist, and class-collaborationist education and policy of their traditional Socialist and Communist leaderships.

The European and world Social-Democracy, with few exceptions, has shown itself in practice to be bound up till death with the imperialist bourgeoisie. It has not seen the way to lift its little finger to help the colonial revolution, and it solidarized itself practically with the executioners and traitors in the style of Lacoste and Guy Mollet, who for months on end carried on the war against the Algerian revolution, opened the path for de Gaulle, and yet still form part of the Socialist International !

The left-centrist tendencies that exist in various Socialist Parties have the task of drawing all the necessary conclusions from the French experience by finding the way back to revolutionary Marxism.

Without a well-thought-out revision of chauvinist and opportunist policy, without unconditional and effective support of the colonial revolution, without a sincere abandonment of class-collaborationist practices, without recourse to the revolutionary extraparliamentary organization and action of the masses, without the clear will and perspective of setting up in a united front with the other workers' formations a genuine workers' and peasants' government, the Socialist Parties within which these tendencies are active will be irremediably condemned, as in France, to act as grave-diggers not only of socialism but also of bourgeois democracy.

As for the Communist Parties, belated champions of "new" — "peaceful" and "parliamentary" — ways to "socialism," they will now have plenty of opportunity to meditate on the validity of these ways and on the example offered them by the experience of the French Communist Party. *The "new ways" in France, favorite land of the play of "parliamentary democracy," have served to bring to power, not socialism, but the worst reaction !*

And this with the practical support and acceptance of the French Communist Party, which voted the full powers, the state of emergency, and the dictatorial constitutional reform asked for and prepared by the Pflimlin government. And though the French C P — after having been humiliated in the most contemptuous manner by the bourgeoisie, which rejected its votes — pretended at the last minute to turn its policy "left," to denounce the betrayal(?) of Pflimlin, to call the masses to "vigilance" and "action" — the one as vague as the other — this must not be allowed to cover up the reality of its policy : *at no moment did this party believe in the possibility of barring the road to dictatorship by the revolutionary action of the masses, and at no moment was this party really capable of mobilizing the class along these lines.* This was clearly demonstrated in practice. The tardy "left turn" of the French C P's policy had no meaning other than to camouflage, in the eyes of its own members and the working class, its policy of retreat and impotence.

Really to fight against a dictatorship based on the army, what was quite plainly necessary was a mobilization of the class, carried to its highest pitch, namely, an *insurrectional general strike, with the mass uprising of armed workers, the occupation of the factories, the railway stations, the airfields, and the streets and squares.*

In reality, in such a case, it was a question of the beginning of the Revolution. Such was the historic alternative placed before the French working class and its leaderships : *to face up to the counter-revolution already begun and fight it by the Revolution.*

The leadership of the French C P, a pack of narrow-

mindless petty bureaucrats, corrupted to the marrow of their bones by the most vulgar opportunism — that so-called “head of the Revolution” — was naturally not prepared, materially or ideologically, for such an eventuality. The Kremlin’s attitude toward de Gaulle, furthermore, makes one think that orders were transmitted for the French C P to go easy with “the general,” since the Kremlin was wagering on a possible “anti-Americanism” (!) on his part.

Anyway, in the best of cases, when the leadership of the French C P, sunk up to its neck in the swamp of the “new ways,” saw — no farther away than the end of its own nose — the spectre of the counter-revolution on the march, it could only bluff by means of actions as spasmodic as they were impotent. What is more, its long practice of chauvinistic, opportunist, and class-collaborationist policy had really isolated it from the masses, themselves affected by this policy.

One cannot with impunity practise for years on end a line cultivating chauvinist fermentations and reformist illusions, systematically discrediting the revolutionary forces and means of action of the working class, and then think to be able, at a given moment, to make an appeal for the revolutionary action of the class and have it find an echo.

The experience of the French Communist Party demonstrates to what a point these parties, once revolutionary, have in reality degenerated into vulgar parliamentary formations, for which the masses still vote but rarely mobilize themselves.

THE RESULTS OF DE GAULLE'S VICTORY AND THE TASKS OF THE PROLETARIAT

De Gaulle is not exactly and cannot be a new Hitler. Neither by his national base nor by the international context that surrounds his experiment, can his regime support such a comparison. It would, however, be equally erroneous to underestimate the consequences of his victory.

This quite plainly constitutes the first important post-war defeat in Europe, whose unfavorable results will be felt in the evolution of the situation in Spain, Germany, Italy, and Europe in general.

Furthermore, the Algerian revolution, isolated up till now from the active support of the French labor movement, runs the risk of being even more so.

This would not fail to have weight in a political differentiation within the F L N by favoring a rightist national wing to the disadvantage of a left tendency more aware of the social aspects of the revolution, and more indomitable in its opposition to imperialism.

The essence of the Gaullist dictatorship, its main support, is at present the army. Outside of Algeria, where the settlers provide a genuine fascist mass base, its “popular” bases in the metropolis are still extremely slight. On the other hand, the international context is still marked by the advance of the colonial revolution, the strengthening of the workers’ states, the difficulties — now including economic difficulties — of imperialism, *i e*, by a relationship of forces that is still unfavorable to imperialism.

The disparate social forces which want to take shelter behind the symbol of the dictatorship, the complex and contradictory character of the problems to be solved, will soon bring into the open the real difficulties that the dictatorship will have to face. In the case that it

might be obliged to show itself “liberal” toward the colonial revolution and proceed to concessions towards it, it would run the risk of encountering from the very beginning the active opposition of the settlers and other indomitable “ultras” of “Great France.” In the case where, on the contrary, it would line up with the positions of the settlers, it would run the risk of sinking deeper into the war and the general impasse.

Its eventual economic and political severity toward the toiling masses in France furthermore threatens to thaw out definitively their relative apathy, in favor of a militant regroupment.

The financial difficulties arising from the continuation of the war in Algeria and of the deterioration of the trade balance, added to those of the foreign policy of the dictatorship toward its allies and toward European institutions, can also undermine the stabilization of the regime.

But what will above all determine dictatorship’s stability, strength, and power, is the ability of the proletariat to reorganize itself with a view to a tenacious resistance culminating in a revolutionary offensive for a workers’ and peasants’ government in France.

The choice facing France is not republic vs dictatorship, but revolution vs counter-revolution. The bourgeoisie in its vast majority buried with its own hands a republic which was no longer convenient to it as a political system of governing. Faced by this class solution, by military Bonapartist dictatorship, the proletariat can oppose it only by the power of the workers and peasants. Those intermediate solutions to which petty-bourgeois ideologists and incurable optimists are clinging have lived out their time in France — and that for a whole period.

It is no longer possible to go backward without thus in fact settling into bourgeois dictatorship.

The dictatorship has come about through lack of a mobilization of the masses carried to the highest pitch. Only such a mobilization in the future will bring about the collapse of the dictatorship by opening up the perspective of a democratic socialist republic in France. It is necessary, with patience and tenacity, to get prepared for a new Resistance with its path lighted by this perspective. It is necessary to rebuild the united front in resistance committees. It is necessary to extend collaboration in action to the Algerian workers in France, brothers in the fight, vanguard of the struggle against French imperialism.

It is necessary to drive out of the Socialist Party and the Communist Party the treacherous or bankrupt leaderships, the Mollets and Thorezes! It is necessary to strengthen the revolutionary Marxist tendency in order to provide the masses with a leadership capable of assuring victory tomorrow.

It is necessary to fight step by step against the wiping out of liberties, for the end of the war and for the independence of Algeria, and against any lowering of living standards.

It is necessary to brighten the partial daily combats by the perspective of armed insurrection that will overthrow the dictatorship and install a Workers’ and Peasants’ Government in France!

THE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT
OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

Milan, 1 June 1958

III ON STALIN'S PATH

The Kremlin has just executed Imre Nagy and his companions, members of the Hungarian Communist Party. *Without warning, in (they say) a closed trial, with no public hearing, and even with no "confessions," the Kremlin has just committed this crime.*

It is a question here of an assassination which could have been done without any "trial," coldly perpetrated at a given moment for given purposes.

The Kremlin is in this way trying to terrorize, in the USSR itself, in the "people's democracies," and in the Communist Parties, those who oppose its policy and the rule of its present leadership.

The assassination of Imre Nagy is a sanguinary warning to "revisionists" who do not completely line up with the positions of the political leadership of the Soviet bureaucracy.

At the moment when the campaign against Yugoslavia is doubling in violence, the Kremlin does not hesitate to show that it is determined to push the struggle to the point of physical extermination, as in the days of Stalin.

But, far from showing the force, cohesion, and stability of the present Kremlin leadership, this abominable action proves on the contrary that we are again witnessing a furious and exasperated struggle between opposing tendencies within international Stalinism. It is difficult to say whether, in this struggle, Khrushchev himself is the inspirer or the prisoner of a "harder" neo-Stalinist tendency which is trying to consolidate its position against opposing currents. What is clear, on the contrary, is that the struggle within the bureaucracy has now reached a new paroxysm.

The USSR's own difficulties, arising from Khrushchev's "revolutionary" reforms in the field of industry and agriculture, which have upset the bureaucratic social structures, together with those that exist in the "people's democracies," where a quite Stalinist severity is again ruling, as well as those arising from the once more aggravated international situation, are at the origin of a new tendency struggle within the political leadership of the Soviet bureaucracy and of international Stalinism. The hesitant, contradictory, and spasmodic policy of Khrushchev during the recent period is a characteristic of this crisis. His reversal of position, especially in the Yugoslav affair, despite the discredit thereby brought upon Kremlin policy among the "uncommitted" countries and within international public opinion, is the sign of the rise within his tendency of Stalinist elements in the USSR itself and elsewhere, determined to carry on the struggle against their opponents, including by means of physical extermination.

Because of the fact that "destalinization" was soon blocked in the USSR, in the "people's democracies," and in China, the unsolved contradictions within these countries have on the contrary taken on a redoubled sharpness.

At the same time, far from developing toward an easing of tension, the international situation has on the con-

trary experienced an explosive aggravation, particularly in the Middle East.

Khrushchev's policy, in the USSR, in the "people's democracies," and internationally, is far from having shown a balance-sheet of victories.

Under these conditions, the "harder" neo-Stalinist forces are now trying to get back the upper hand completely so as to face up, by an extreme bureaucratic severity and even by terror, to the difficulties of every sort that have piled up.

Khrushchev seems to be manœuvring so as not to find himself against the stream.

We shall see, and perhaps before long now, the outcome of this new crisis that is rumbling in the tops of the international Stalinist bureaucracy. Meanwhile, it is the international workers' movement that is suffering from the baneful repercussions of this neo-Stalinist policy and practice.

While this policy and practice are arousing immense discontented masses against the political regime and even against the social regime of the USSR, the "people's democracies," and China, and are preparing new explosions as in Poland and Hungary, they are demoralizing the proletariat of the capitalist countries, leading it to submit without a fight to reactionary coups de force, such as that of de Gaulle in France.

The present policy of the Kremlin, a mixture of the most vulgar opportunism and of wholly Stalinist bureaucratic and police procedures, is in practice a policy of liquidating the Communist Parties as organizations connected with the masses and capable of mobilizing them. The example of France is immensely significant. This policy directly serves reaction and aids the war plans of imperialism.

The Fourth International calls on the members of the Communist Parties to oppose a resolute resistance to the Kremlin's return to a terrorist course in the Stalinist manner. Do not forget the past, the infamous Moscow Trials, the trials of Rajk and Kostov, and their disavowal by Khrushchev himself! Do not again accept with an uncritical mind the same ignominies and the same crimes!

It calls on them to protest against the execution — without a public trial and without the free presence of international workers' observers — of Nagy and his companions.

It calls on them to get rid of the present Stalinist leaderships which, liegemen of the Kremlin that they are, accomplices of its past and present crimes, absolutely block the way to a renewal of the Communist movement, render impossible practical collaboration with the other political forces of the working class, discredit communism, practically liquidate their own organizations, and open the way to reaction and war.

THE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT
OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

Milan, 17 June 1958

IV HANDS OFF THE ARAB REVOLUTION!

Once more imperialism is trying to use war to dam up the rising colonial revolution. The Middle East, epicentre of the Arab revolution that is hastening from victory to victory, is currently the scene of a brutal and cynical intervention by the counter-revolutionary forces of imperialism.

The heroic uprising of the Lebanese masses against the reactionary and pro-imperialist Chamoun regime was already a first pretext for thinking about this intervention.

The uprising of the Iraqi masses who have brought down the abject regime of Noury Es Saïd, warder of imperialist interests in the Middle East, made imperialism decide to intervene in Lebanon and Jordan to save these puppet regimes which are in the direct and cynical service of imperialism. The fabulous profits amassed by imperialism and the very limited native cliques contrast with the immense misery of the peoples of these countries. But, since Mossadegh's nationalization of Iran oil, and especially since Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal, and finally since the lamentable failure of the imperialist intervention against Egypt, the Arab masses in the Middle East have become conscious of their invincible rights.

Irresistibly they are driving to take into their own hands the wealth of their countries by expropriating imperialism and the native cliques in its pay.

Imperialism, however, has decided to defend the some three thousand million dollars invested in these countries, and even more the exorbitant profits that it annually draws therefrom — all the more so in that a monopoly price for oil is possible only by control of the fields and the low production costs of Middle Eastern oil.

Imperialism furthermore needs to control the Middle East as an important strategic region, vital for its war plans against the USSR, the workers' states, and the proletarian revolution as a whole — hence the fierceness with which it wants to halt and strike down the Arab revolution that up till now has foiled these plans.

During the Suez expedition, American imperialism thought it well to desolidarize itself from the action of the French and English pirates, already so compromised in the eyes of the Arab masses, in order to gain time and the good graces of at least part of the Arab bourgeoisie. But now, faced by the rising strength of the Arab revolution that is showing itself to be more decisive than the plans and enterprises of betrayal or cowardice, whether from the outside or the inside, American imperialism has been forced roughly to tear off its mask of "anticolonialism" and to head up the new expedition à la Suez.

This fact provokes an immense danger of a world war. For imperialism's enterprise in this vital region will inevitably run head on into the de facto united front between the colonial revolution and the workers' states. Dogged by its growing difficulties in conquering the colonial revolution and the growing strength of the workers' states — however degenerated or deformed

may be the political regime assumed in them by a bureaucracy — difficulties to which is now added the economic depression which is spreading over the capitalist world, imperialism is seeking a way out through war.

Of course it thinks that this might be limited to a sort of repetition of the war of Korea, in which the effectiveness of tactical atomic weapons might now be tried out. But the dynamics of a war in the Middle East, under the new military and political conditions, run the risk of soon proving incompatible with any limitation to a given region. The dress rehearsal runs the risk of proving to be the first night itself: The War!

Let the masses of the metropolitan countries, in Europe and the United States, become rapidly conscious of imperialism's mad race toward atomic world war. Let them shake off their numbness; let them rise to their feet, with extreme energy and extreme determination, to demand:

the immediate withdrawal of imperialism's troops from the Middle East!

the right to self-determination for subject peoples!

It is high time to show active solidarity toward the colonial revolution, so as to avoid defeats like those which de Gaulle's coming to power in France has been, and war would be tomorrow!

It is time, by revolutionary action raised to the highest pitch, to disarm imperialism which is on its way to murdering all humanity!

The *Fourth International*, conscious of the extreme gravity of this moment, appeals to the big workers' organizations and to the proletarians of the entire world to act without delay.

It calls on the *British Labour Party* and *Trade Unions* to support, including by the general strike, the demand for an immediate withdrawal of the British troops sent to the Middle East.

It calls on *American* trade unions and workers' organizations to act in the same way.

It calls on the *French Socialist Party, Communist Party, and Trade Unions* to oppose any sending of troops to the Middle East, and to demand the end of the war in Algeria.

It calls on workers' organizations everywhere, the class as a whole, to determined and immediate action against the counter-revolutionary war, and for the defense of the colonial revolution, the USSR, and all the workers' states.

It proposes the immediate holding of an international workers' conference so as to oppose a *class united front* to imperialism's war.

Proletarians of the metropolitan countries, arise!

If you fail to act quickly and resolutely, you run the risk of cruel awakenings!

INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT
OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

Milan, 17 July 1958

*Political Resolution of the XVth Conference
of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario
(Bolivian Section of the Fourth International)*

FROM THE PRESENT CRISIS
TO THE WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' GOVERNMENT

I. THE BEGINNING OF
THE SECOND REVOLUTION

The latest events have opened a new stage in the revolutionary process in Bolivia: a stage of clear definition of the opposing camps, of regroupment of the revolutionary forces of the masses, a stage that will lead to a decisive trial of strength. These were the first serious combats in the Second Bolivian Revolution, of the death-struggle between the capitalist power — in crisis, yet able to last through the First Revolution — and the workers' and peasants' power, whose first elements also emerged from the April Revolution, and which, in order to hold out, are forced to extend themselves.

THE MASSES' STRENGTH DEFEATS SILES'S COUP

Driven by the needs of imperialism and by the general needs of capitalism in Bolivia, the government launched an attack to destroy the miners' and factory-workers' trade-union organizations, to disregard their main conquests, and to break the action of the workers' parties. The quick answer of the La Paz factory-workers, the depth and strength of the mine strike, the rapid break-up at the base of the "reconstruction bloc," which threatened in a few days the collapse of that whole bureaucratic apparatus, demonstrated the revolutionary strength of the masses, and their ability to organize and extend the struggle from below. It demonstrated that the workers in struggle are able in a few days to bring about the revolutionary regroupment of the broad masses, overthrowing the whole work of years by the leadership of the MNR and the bureaucracy of the COB.

The anticommunist plot of the end of January, the sharpening of the clashes produced by the announcement of Paz Estensoro's return and Siles's resignation, demonstrate the deep contradictions and internal splits within the ruling capitalist sectors. Siles' resignation in particular laid bare the extreme division into tendencies in both the government camp and the "rosca" opposition. The crisis found a temporary solution only through the active intervention of North American imperialism, by an agreement to strike a blow against the workers' organizations — both political and trade-union — in which was centred the resistance against government policy. The "hard line" of Cuadros Quiroga carried the day, momentarily silencing internal contradictions.

But the vigorous reply of the factory-workers and miners, and the solidarity which this struggle encountered among the rest of the labor movement, blocked these plans. Within two weeks the "strong men" who arose at the beginning of the coup either fell or were about to fall. Those who announced that the recommendations of the Ford Bacon and Davis Report would be applied, those who announced at the beginning of the coup that the "marginal" mines would be shut down and personnel reduced in the others, those who

considered that workers' control was finished, either fell entirely or retreated back to where they had started from. The government began the coup by promising a general reorganization of the trade-union movement, of the Comibol, and of the country, and it ended it by a ministerial crisis, a crisis in the management of the Comibol, and a crisis in its "reconstruction bloc." As the culmination of this defeat, it had to accept the reintegration of the labor directors of the Comibol, as previously in the CNSS.

The Siles government underwent its greatest political defeat at the hands of the workers' movement. Previously it had succeeded in neutralizing the COB, in getting rid of its "co-government," in organizing a bloc of trade-union bureaucrats who aided its plans for the destruction of the workers' conquests by means of a terrorist trade-union dictatorship. Lechín capitulated in all these cases with the explanation that "the workers do not want to fight." But when Siles and imperialism set out to smash the workers' organizations, to break their vanguard unions by means of repression and provocation, there arose from below a resistance and a counter-offensive which succeeded in disorganizing, at least for the moment, the forces of reaction.

THE STRUGGLE WAS ORGANIZED FROM BELOW

Lechín and Torres, in a defeatist spirit, limited themselves to calling for a staggered strike. Some leaders of their tendency, such as Lima and Saavedra, under the attacks of the Silists, chose to resign from their posts. It was from the factories (Saíd, Forno, Breweries, and many others), directly from the working-class bases, that there arose the struggle against the Silist coup de main, to the point of inflicting a complete defeat on the "reconstructors," forcing them to correct themselves.

Among the miners, it was the workers and their trade-unions themselves who gave the struggle their own organization, their own methods, and their own goals. The unlimited strike and the hunger strike went beyond the Lechinist directives. The miners' radios smashed the lying official propaganda. The miners' and peasants' militias that concentrated in San José checked the military provocation against the strike. The ten-mine Strike Committee that was formed in Oruro represented an enormous stride forward in the miners' tendency to provide themselves with their own leadership, combative and capable of centralizing and organizing the struggle. The hunger strike, the inclusion of women in the struggle, the support of the population of the mining districts, made the most recalcitrant sectors of the government retreat, as occurred with Minister Cuadros Quiroga himself in Potosí.

In this whole struggle, one of the aspects that forced the government to give way most rapidly was the great power of attraction the masses had on the organizations controlled by Silism. In the mines that have been under the terrorist dictatorship of the comandos, such as Huanuni, Colquiri, Milluni, a genuine uprising of the workers so as to join in the strike threatened their rule. The workers of Pulacayo,

¹ For updating news on Bolivia, see p 64.

of San José, and of Potosí accomplished in one day what Lechinism had not been able to do in many years: to break the bureaucratic control of Sanjinés of the railwaymen, and to win their solidarity, as also that of the building-workers and factory-workers, and, as in the case of those of Araca, of the peasants.

By opening up a channel after a long time the workers showed not only their will to fight, their great combativity, but also their maturity, their initiative, their natural tendency to organize the struggle, to provide it with a leadership arising from their own ranks, to unite and centralize themselves from below, and to give fresh life to their militias to back up their demands. The masses not only keep the April conquests alive but also raise them to the level of the new needs of their struggles.

IT WAS NOT AN ISOLATED BATTLE, BUT THE BEGINNING OF A WAR

This attempt at a frontal blow against the workers' organizations was not the result of a casual predominance of a "hard" tendency in the government. When the Siles government set out to beat down the organizations that had founded the Bolivian labor movement, the main forces that made the April Revolution — miners and factory-workers — and the political vanguard, it was not because it had the strength to decide in its own favor the war that it was declaring. It was because the capitalist leadership had reached the limit of its possibilities. The economic, social, and political crisis had reached a limit in which the capitalist power cannot coexist with the conquests and organisms of the masses. Furthermore, the maintenance of the conquests and organs created by the masses during and since the April Revolution cannot be kept up under a capitalist leadership.

II. THE BANKRUPTCY OF THE CAPITALIST ADMINISTRATION

THE CRISIS IN TIN AND OTHER METALS

Capitalism has no possibility of lessening the economic contradictions from which the Bolivian economy is suffering. The economy is suffering from the tremendous blow of the fall of prices of tin, lead, copper, zinc, wolfram, and other metals, in the international market dominated by imperialism. It is simultaneously suffering from the brutal restriction of its tin quota imposed by the International Council with its seat in London. Bolivia, according to the terms of a North American law, cannot trade in "strategic" materials with the Soviet Union, China, and the "people's democracies." But neither can it sell all its minerals in the imperialist market: it has to undergo the restrictions imposed thereby on the volume of purchases and on prices.

The recession in the United States has lately aggravated this situation even further, and threatens to worsen it by new customs duties which that country is planning to set up against lead and zinc imports. In the United States and in the world market, it is the big mining companies expelled from Bolivia by the April Revolution which dominate the market, the International Tin Council, and the Buffer Stock. It is they who, through these organisms, continue to rule Bolivian mining, imposing on it their conditions, quotas, and prices. It is they who buy, smelt, and trade in Bolivia's tin and other metals.

The policy of these big companies, whose game the Siles government plays and aids, is that of bringing nationalized mining to bankruptcy. They are trying to strangle the Comibol in its own contradictions, those of the international market and its internal ones arising from the failure of its capitalist administration, the exhaustion of veins and of mines. Through the Ford Bacon and Davis Plan, the big trusts want to impose their administration and criteria on nationalized mining. Despite Bolivia's enormous wealth of minerals, new mines are not opened, and on the other hand the richest national mines, held in reserve, are "rented out"

to big imperialist companies, as in the case of the "Matilda" mine. Imperialism, in close alliance with the Siles government, is trying to "liberate" mining from workers' control, from the miners' unions and Federation, and from the armed militias.

THE OIL WAR IN BOLIVIA

The great oil wealth of the Bolivian subsoil has made the country a new battlefield in the world oil war. The big trusts expelled from the mines come back with oil concessions, as if into a colony. Imperialism, in alliance with the petty-bourgeois government of the MNR — then led by Paz Estenssoro — succeeded in obtaining, as an offset to the nationalization of the mines, a colonialist Oil Code.

At the same time the big companies have imposed their typical pirate methods in order to force concessions under the most advantageous conditions. They have imposed on the YPFB a financial, technical, and transport boycott, to bring pressure for the turning over of the richest areas assigned to this nationalized company, as in the case of Madrejonas. The agreements with Brazil, with the "recuperation" of a large part of the area assigned by the treaties of 1938, were preceded by a big "nationalist" campaign whose spokesmen were the imperialist press agencies, and were then presented as a triumph of the diplomacy of the Siles government. This area has begun to be assigned, the day after the signing of the treaties, to North American companies. It was indeed a triumph of diplomacy..... but for Standard Oil.

At the same time that the big imperialist firms are obtaining these concessions, the real production of oil continues in the hands of the YPFB. The government's propaganda to justify its policies, to the effect that these oil give-aways diversify the economy, is refuted by the facts themselves. The big oil companies, like the tin companies in another period, require "guarantees" in order to begin production. They require that "trade-union power" be overthrown, that a return be made to uncontrolled hiring-and-firing. They require a dictatorship against the masses that reestablishes the free functioning of capitalism.

THE FAILURE OF THE STABILIZATION PLAN

A little over a year since it was applied, the Eder Stabilization Plan has failed. Far from stabilizing and raising the economy, it has gone on sharpening the crisis. This fact was recognized by the decrees at the beginning of this year, when the government purposed to freeze salaries for one more year, to proceed to disguised free hiring-and-firing, and the "cold" liquidation of the CNSS. Capitalist stabilization is incompatible with the conquests of the masses, with their living standards, and hence with their organizations. At the same time, the graft in the administration, the shady deals that become known day after day, demonstrate that administration's demoralization and internal decomposition.

"American aid" can succeed only in prolonging the life of this administration without solving any of its problems. Its use as blackmail has forced the most reserved sectors of the MNR leadership to follow the political instructions of the State Department, but it has increased the disequilibrium and crisis in the government. North American imperialism is using its "aid" to urge drastic measures on the Bolivian capitalist sectors.

In sum, nationalization of the mines, agrarian reform, full employment, increased wages, social security, and the organisms of control and power with which the workers and peasants guarantee their conquests — militias, workers' control, trade-union organizations — do not fit into the capitalist organization of the economy. Therefore the capitalist stabilization of Bolivia requires destroying the masses' conquests and organizations, restoring the coercive power of the army and the carabineros, imposing an imperialist-capitalist dictatorship. On the other hand, as the mine strike showed, the masses prevent capitalism from going any further. But in turn, in order to maintain their conquests and

to protect themselves from the consequences of the collapse of the capitalist economy which fall primary on them, the masses' struggle must be transformed from a defensive into an offensive one, into a struggle for a profound economic transformation, and into a struggle for the destruction of the forces that are attacking them.

THE SOVIET AND RUMANIAN OFFERS

Within this capitalist crisis, the offers made by the Soviet Union and Rumania, of loans and investments, at very low interest and for long terms, of smelting plants for all the ores that Bolivia produces, of oil equipment, of the purchase of unlimited quantities of lead and copper, of the installation of factories for the treatment of raw materials, only accentuate capitalist contradictions.

It is not capitalism that can envisage this development in Bolivia. The perspectives opened up by these offers would still further strengthen the workers' conquests and much more greatly undermine capitalism. This regime cannot profit by these offers without deepening its own disintegration, and that is why Siles rejects them with the arguments of the FBI.

III. THE MASSES REJECT THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CRISIS

The latest clashes are the end-product of a process of growing disagreement and opposition which is reaching and stirring up all the masses — workers, peasants, and urban petty-bourgeoisie.

WORKERS' OPPOSITION

Not only have the aggregate meetings of the miners of Potosí and Oruro demonstrated the break of the ore workers with the capitalist government of the MNR. A still stronger process is taking form in this last period in the mines, where the workers, faced by the threat of shut-downs, or by the administration's arbitrary behavior, have been occupying the installations, expelling the authorities, and taking charge of the management of the mines. At the same time they appealed to the FSTMB to back up their action.

The miners rejected the Stabilization Plan, and the demand for higher wages has been a central point in their resolutions. But one of the most explosive problems in the mines is that of the shutting down of marginal mines, and mass firings in the others. The last strike showed this. It was those mines most directly threatened by shut-downs and unemployment which went the furthest in the struggle, as in the case of San José, Pulacayo, Kami, Unificada, and others. It was not only the imprisonment of Cabrera that mobilized the workers, but also the direct threat the government measures brought against their jobs and living standards, and against their organizations.

The raising of the level of understanding about the real meaning of this struggle was shown in resolutions like that taken in January by the meeting at Catavi, refusing to recognize the government's measures about free hiring-and-firing and wage-freezing, declaring that such decrees were null-and-void in Catavi, mobilizing the militias, and calling on other trade unions to unify their action. How enormous was the worry of the government and of imperialism about this resolution was expressed by the fact that Catavi was the centre of their provocation aiming at unleashing repression. Among the factory-workers, the opposition to the "Three Decrees" was equally vigorous. Here the danger of unemployment is as real as in the mines. The shutting down of factories, the stopping of wage payments, and threats to social gains, were answered by the workers, as in the case of the Glass Works and the Manaco shoe-factory in Cochabamba, with determined actions that made the bosses and the government beat a retreat. The latest factory-workers' aggregate meeting in La Paz, and the quick reply and defeat imposed on the Silists in their attempt to break up the organization, indicate that the masses in the factories are

not disposed to give in to the capitalist attacks. Similarly the factory-workers' conference in Tarija broke through the wage-freeze, in spite of the efforts of the government and the "reconstructionists."

The bulk of the "reconstructed" unions sometimes showed even greater opposition to the government's policy. The La Paz building-workers broke publicly with the government. They, more than any other sector, are suffering from enforced idleness. The railwaymen have openly broken — first by the Uyuni strike at the beginning of January, and then by their solidarity in Uyuni, Oruro, and Potosí — not only with the government, but also with the directives of Sanjinés & Co. The Conference of the La Paz Railway Federation, till now a base of support for the bureaucracy, was also a defeat for the government, when it solidarized itself with the miners and asked for them 100 % payment of wages for the days on strike.

The La Paz printers, the Oruro factory-workers, the Potosí building-workers, also showed their opposition to the government's policy and their spirit of struggle. There may be added to the practical insurrection which threatened the mining bases of Huanuni, Colquiri and Milluni, shattering the whole Silist apparatus in the trade-union movement, not only the enormous weakness of the government, but also the possibilities of joint mobilization and unification in action of the working masses of the entire country.

THE PEASANT INSURRECTION IS STILL ALIVE

The Stabilization Plan, imperialism, the rosca, and the government have a clear programme for the rural regions: hold back the agrarian reform. Eder said so, and Siles repeated it: in order to increase agrarian production, it is necessary to pledge assurances to the "men of enterprise" that their properties will not be seized. In other words, the increase in agricultural production is not to be tackled as a problem of technical advance, of the social, economic, and cultural raising up of the peasant, but, just as in the cities, as a matter of giving guarantees to capitalist functioning, to "investors," to the latifundists who have succeeded in retaining their properties.

The strategy of imperialism and the government is simple. They are trying to separate the peasants from the workers, to neutralize the peasants while they try to break the workers' movement, and then to attack the peasants' gains. When the rosca attacks the peasants and universal suffrage, it does not conceal the hatred and thirst for revenge it feels against those who have deprived it of its lands and its feudal power in the rural areas.

Apparently the peasants did not intervene in the latest struggles. Save for the support of the peasants' militias of Araca who came to defend San José, there were no mass interventions by the peasants. Nevertheless, the peasants view with deep alarm the social and political crisis, in which they feel that all their gains are threatened. This alarm has been for some time now turned against the functionaries of the agrarian reform and of the Ministry of Rural Affairs, who for them constitute the immediate expression of the obstacles and hindrances that are trying to be set up against the agrarian reform.

In spite of the Barrientos Mamamis and the bureaucrats of the entire country, the crisis continues to deepen between the peasants' movement and the government. The current clashes all over the country between rival federations, for or against the Ministry of Rural Affairs, are the deformed expression of the struggle that is going on down below. Up till now, the peasants' organizations, on a national and even on a regional scale, have been led by elements of the urban petty-bourgeoisie, lawyers and functionaries, ministry staff.

The tendency of the peasants is to oppose the government, to resist the Silist agents. But they lack a centre. The COB leadership of Nuflo Chávez surrendered its positions without a fight. The peasants are seeking a centre in this tendency, but they do not find one. By their pressure they have pushed

things to a differentiation within Silism itself. The La Paz Peasants' Conference, at the same time that it renewed its support to Siles, resolved to raise an army to defend the agrarian reform in danger, each peasant family having to choose one of its members on a permanent basis for this army.

The desertion of the Lechinist leadership keeps the crisis in a certain confusion. There is no channel leading out of it. A centre is lacking. In Choroma, where the armed Peasants' Union Centre has kept up the war against towns like San Pedro de Buena Vista, the refuge of the peasants' despoilers, the peasants' insurrection has remained very much alive. Thirty thousand peasants, despite the assassination of their leader Narciso Torrico, are keeping alive the agrarian revolution, forcing the bureaucrats in Ucureña and elsewhere to keep up and extend their solidarity, because of the pressure of the peasant mass. The isolated uprisings on estates of the Atiplano, of Chuquisaca, and of Cochabamba, are expressions of the peasants' spirit of struggle which burst out into broader fights like those now drawing near.

The workers' struggles, such as the recent one of the miners, will offer the centre of regroupment, the channel of development, for the agrarian revolution that is now dammed and isolated. There will be needed a conscious action by the workers' organizations, by the workers' centres that are being formed in the struggle, like those carried out by the Viloco miners toward the Araca peasants, to liberate and channel the peasants' enormous revolutionary forces, restrained by the bureaucracy and by their own isolation, and separated from the workers' struggles in this latest period by the paralysis and capitulation of the Lechín-Nuflo leadership. In that way the workers will replace the peasants' petty-bourgeois leadership made up of the leaders of the COB and approved by Siles.

THE CRISIS OF THE PETTY-BOURGEOISIE

The urban petty-bourgeoisie is also being stirred by the profound contradictions that are shaking the whole regime. It was the basis of support for the Stabilization Plan. It was mobilized by the government so as to hold back the workers' mobilization in June and July of last year. Nevertheless, within its ranks also the consequences of this plan are having their repercussions. Its material situation not only has not improved, but has worsened.

During the entire last period strikes in petty-bourgeois sectors have occurred much more than among workers. Functionaries of the Interamerican Services, bank clerks and municipal employees at various points throughout the country, and schoolteachers, have repeatedly gone on or stood ready for strikes. These are the very sectors who apparently had supported Siles, who had "sworn" — at least the leaders had — on the sixth of March: "No more strikes."

The mobilizations of support for Siles, just as formerly the votes for the Falange, are rather the result of the lack of a lead from and action by the workers which would objectively open up for the petty-bourgeoisie a road of struggle in order to improve its situation. Objectively, broad sectors of the petty-bourgeoisie are opposed to government policy, are disposed to carry on a struggle, and objectively the way is open for their supporting the proletariat in its fight.

The process of searching and uneasiness that has been produced for some time now in intellectual circles, especially university ones, concerning problems such as oil, logging concessions, economic problems, free hiring-and-firing, and the growing critical position, not particularly in favor of the rosca, that can be noted in these milieux, is the product of this effervescence and uneasiness of the urban petty-bourgeoisie in general.

IV. THE CRISIS OF THE POLITICAL FORCES

The policy of the Siles government, of the MNR leadership, of imperialism, of the rosca and its parties, and of the high command of the armed forces and the carabineros, is centred

on one goal : to strangle the revolution, whether quietly or violently, to free capitalism from all the limits and controls that were imposed by the April revolution. But they have advanced to a certain point beyond which they cannot go further.

Since the beginning of the Stabilization Plan, and more especially since the Second Congress of the COB, the Siles government has kept the initiative against the workers' movement, basing itself on the political failure and the paralysis of the COB leadership, on the open capitulation of part of it, and on the backing given it by the rosca, and by the urban petty-bourgeoisie, irritated and without perspectives.

But in the process of the revolution none of these forces or of these capitulations changed the relationship of forces. During this whole period the urban petty-bourgeoisie could not be brought to engage in an open clash in a violent form with the proletariat and the peasants. When Siles was unable to go any further along the "cold" path, the coalition with the rosca was broken. Tendencies toward coups de force began to blossom out again, finding support even within the government itself. The January plot was the manifest beginning of this new stage.

Under the guarantee of imperialism and the weakness of the government, the rosca has recommenced a more aggressive political activity, through the Falange and through the PURS. In the heat of the effervescence of the petty-bourgeoisie, and the lack of a channel leading to the reestablishment of its alliance with the proletariat, a whole series of parties killed by the April revolution are reviving again, and seeking to profit by this process to bring water to the rosca's mill.

THE MNR IS BROKEN UP

This whole process has served to make completely clear the total break-up of the MNR. Up till now, up till the Oruro aggregate meeting, Lechín was trying to keep up the fiction of the unity of the MNR. He thus kept the workers' movement a vassal of the political leadership of the government which was showering blows upon it.

The return of Paz Estensoro was presented — and in many cases hoped for — as the solution of the economic crisis, and as the reunification of the MNR. But it only accentuated the crisis in the MNR. Just the announcement of his arrival caused all the pent-up forces to explode. And Paz Estensoro did not succeed. The crisis of Bolivia is the product, not of the Siles government, but of capitalism. Paz Estensoro represents no other policy than that of the Siles government. It is just another phase, under more stable economic conditions, of the same capitalist government, of the same attempt to stabilize capitalism on a mass revolution. And so, just as the "miracle-worker" Eder had no solution for the Bolivian crisis, neither does "miracle-worker" Paz.

The Siles wing itself, seeing the base it had acquired in June of last year break up as a result of the Stabilization Plan's being shown up before the very eyes of the petty-bourgeoisie, has split into various sectors, among which the two main ones are the "hard" group of Cuadros Quiroga and Ocampo, and the other that connected with the Ministry of Rural Affairs which holds back from "burning the bridges" between itself and its mass base, which today serves as a certain basis of manoeuvre to enable it not to become a political prisoner of the rosca.

The Paz Estensoro sector continues to be lost in present political developments. It has no base of its own for action and orientation within the political process. Behind all these sectors stands imperialism, trying to unify them, to form a capitalist political force with some vigor to it. But its interventionism, combined with its incapacity to impose a rapid solution, simply accentuates the contradictions. Temporary fronts are formed to carry out coups, like that in January or that formed on emergence from the crisis of Siles's resignation of March 6th, but the resistance of the masses checks them, and throws them back again into their internal contradictions.

The army itself and the carabineros are part of this process. Crises follow one after another, and the officers' corps splits up at every crisis. The rank-and-file troops feel no hostility against the workers' and peasants' movement from which they themselves come, and capitalism cannot count on their willingness to fight. The tradition of April 9th is still too strong in this sector, and the government is not strong enough to infuse a certain cohesion and conviction into the masses of the army. The MNR militias, recruited from among the unemployed, are not far from being just a way to earn a living. In a real battle, the workers' movement would have a real power of attraction for them.

THE LECHINIST LEFT HAS BEEN SHOWN UP

What has most felt the effects of this frontal clash between the workers' movement and the MNR government is the so-called Left, in all its sectors except the POR. The polarization of the two camps and their open confrontation have knocked all its predictions and political orientation galley-west, and exposed its impotence.

Faced with the crisis of Siles's resignation, it was overwhelmed by panic. Enormously important political changes were taking place, which required a definite stand. But the attitude of Lechín, when Siles's resignation was being discussed in the factories and mines, was to call for non-intervention, for "not accepting provocation." It was the same attitude that had led him to go on abandoning positions, even to the point of accepting the neutralization of the COB. In the solution of the crisis opened up by Siles's resignation, there were interventions by imperialism, by the Falange, by Acción de Defensa, by the high commands of the army and the carabineros, by the chiefs of the MNR, by the "reconstructionist" bureaucrats; but any intervention by the workers' movement was checked. The result was that, under the shadow of this "peace" offered by Lechín, the reaction was able temporarily to overcome its contradictions and reach an agreement about repression, so that the movement had to intervene tardily in defense of its gains, already under fire from a unified enemy.

Lechinism, "intransigence," and all the other left currents in the MNR failed in their perspectives. Their ideological submission to the MNR, to Paz Estenssoro, keeps them politically immobilized in the midst of the most dynamic process that the masses have ever experienced. The political camps become well-defined, the trade unions fight against the MNR government, its comandos attack the trade unions, and the unity with the government that Lechín wants to preserve, the unity of the MNR, finds no objective grounds for existence.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY

Faced by Siles's resignation, the leadership of the Communist Party proposed a front to support Siles against a coup d'état. Among the first victims of this error of not accepting the fact that Siles himself constituted a coup d'état, were the very leaders of that party, arrested and exiled. The conciliatory policy of the CP has been disproved by events.

The break of the rank and file with the directives of the "Reconstruction Bloc," the action of the railway workers of Uyuni, Oruro, and Potosí, and of the factory-workers of La Paz, carried the militants of the CP far beyond the orientation and directives they had received from their party.

THE OBJECTIVE NEED FOR THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY

This crisis in the MNR and in the forces of the left, which has already had the greatest influence on the leadership of the workers' movement, is constantly rendered more acute by the workers' and peasants' decision to fight, and by the continued advance in the methods of combat. Revolutionary struggles, far from quieting down, are growing deeper.

The previous political structure has broken down, and there is developing more every day an objective political need. The road is opening up for the development of the revolutionary

Marxist party capable of orienting and organizing this new stage of the Bolivian revolution. It is a political struggle that is beginning, and political needs that are developing. Like the other tendencies, the POR also has put its orientation to the test, and it has emerged confirmed and developed by events.

V. THE STAGE OF DECISION

Both camps are growing clearly defined, both forces are becoming polarized, and they tend to drive each other out. The government and imperialism do not have the strength to force a decision in their favor. The masses do not have the unity of purpose and clarity of direction to do so. But the crisis does not allow time for a peaceful political evolution, so that the forces may get ready. Even without preparation, both forces will find themselves drawn into clashes and fights such as have been occurring in the last period.

THE PROSPECTS OF CIVIL WAR

The contradictions are developing without there being a simultaneous development of a force capable of dominating the process. The deterioration in the situation drove the government and imperialism to hurl themselves into a struggle that they do not have the strength to win. The military chiefs and the Falange, led by the same reasoning, can at any moment try a coup that may be able to win out over the weak Siles government, but that will encounter the savage resistance of the masses, who will defend their gains. Sectors of the rosca and local Silist comandos, faced by the development of workers' struggles, and driven by desperation and the impotence of the petty-bourgeois or rosca sectors, may hurl themselves into attempted coups and provocations that lead to armed struggles, like that of San Pedro de Buena Vista, that of Uncía, or the events of Santa Cruz.

But the masses are reacting and will continue to react vigorously, including by armed action, against attacks on their gains, provocations, coups d'état, etc. The answer of the Catavi and Siglo XX workers to the Uncía provocation, and the concentration of militias at San José in face of the provocation and attack of the regiment and the comando, are indications of this tendency. There exist elements of civil war that may burst out at any clash. It could have burst out in the recent mine strike if the government had not retreated in time about the march of the Huanuni comando against Catavi, or the military attack on San José.

There is a danger in this situation. For lack of a centralized leadership and objective, this civil war may explode in the way of dispersed guerillas. Every forward step that the workers' movement takes toward centralizing the purposes of the masses' struggle, and toward turning the action of the most determined sectors of the proletariat into developing the overall action of the masses into a central struggle for power, will be an advance on the road to raise the war of guerillas to a higher level and rapidly centralize it.

THE GENERAL STRIKE AND PARTIAL STRIKES

Another variant in the situation lies in the fact that new attacks and provocations by the government, or a military coup that threatens the masses' overall gains, or other equivalent events, may, in the present explosive situation, bring a general strike on the order of the day. Partial strikes with a tendency to become general are not excluded either.

It is in these actions, to which the objective situation may drive the masses, that there must be raised the objective of a central and offensive struggle against imperialist and capitalist domination and in favor of the toiling masses' own solution of the question of power. The revolutionary strength of the masses is expressed not only in their ability to carry on great struggles but also in knowing how to give these actions their own outcome, in bringing their own solutions to the country's crisis. Otherwise, their forces will be exhausted and dispersed, throwing the field open to capitalism to impose its outcome.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ELEMENTS OF WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' POWER

A military coup, or new dictatorial attempts by Siles, will be objectively — just as the last strike was — elements which will aid the tendency of the masses to strengthen their organs of power, their trade unions and militias, to tend to centralize these organs from below. The development of dual power has again been put on the order of the day for this new stage in the revolutionary struggle of the masses.

THE ELECTIONS

Defeated in its trial of strength, the government finds itself forced once more to face an election campaign which is not at all to its liking, and which it will try to avoid. Imperialism is seeking to bring about the return of the political forces of the rosca into the arena, as a form of broadening its base, and working up other alternatives. This stage will help to push the trade unions to an open break with the MNR, and to develop these unions as the channel for the masses' revolutionary aspirations. But at the same time, as the process develops, the efforts of the reaction will grow more desperate, and the culmination of this mobilization through the trade unions will be, not the bourgeois parliament, but the Workers' and Peasants' Congress.

VI. FOR A SPECIAL CONGRESS OF THE COB, TO DECIDE ON THE FORMATION OF THE WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' GOVERNMENT

To hold back the reactionary coup, the masses have not yet brought into play more than a very small part of their capacity for revolutionary action. As we have seen, the masses' struggle runs up against an obstacle to the full expansion of its strength and its canalization into struggles such as can decide the situation. That is the lack of central objectives that determine the intervention of the masses as a whole and raise their capacity for struggle. The government temporarily has on its side the advantage of confusion among broad sectors. Defensive struggle and the lack of a centre will not develop all the revolutionary energies of the masses.

The economic and political crisis cannot go on indefinitely. There has to be an outcome, either the capitalist or the workers' one. The toiling masses cannot keep up an indefinite struggle against firings in an economy in bankruptcy. They cannot raise, or even maintain, their standard of living in the midst of crisis. The mining crisis, the agrarian crisis, and the industrial crisis require solutions. Capitalism is unable to provide them. Its solution is poverty and unemployment for the workers. They are the ones who must find the solution.

They cannot raise, or even maintain, their standard of living the capitalist regime solve things. Capitalism's solutions mean only blood for the masses. The toilers of city and country need their own economic solutions and their own political solutions. They need to overthrow the capitalist government and set up their own government, chosen by and responsible to their own organisms, which express and carry out the will of the toilers: trade unions, federations, the COB, workers' militias and peasants' armies.

Reaction wants by means of dictatorship to dislodge the workers and peasants from their conquests, to eliminate their capacity to take decisions and carry them out, to intervene in all problems that concern them. On the contrary, it is necessary to open the way so that it is the masses that bring solutions. This channel, through which the will of the workers, peasants, and middle class is expressed, must be the Special Congress of Workers. It is through the organisms that the masses have already created and that they must keep control of, that they will discuss and proportionately choose their delegates, by meetings of the unions, of the mines, of the factories, of the estates, etc. New forms of

organization, like committees and others, will arise out of the struggle itself, and will also represent the opinion of the masses.

THE WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' GOVERNMENT

It is this Special Congress, as the highest expression of the toilers of city and country, that will adopt resolutions on all the economic and political problems, beginning with the central one. To give the Bolivian Revolution the regime that will guarantee its conquests and that will extend them, that will definitively liquidate the enemy forces of the rosca and capitalism, and will plan and guide the real economic and social development of Bolivia. This will be the Workers' and Peasants' Government.

This government will not be a different form of the present regime, but a new regime, organized in accordance with the needs of the masses and of the real possibilities of the economy. Its formation and maintenance will originate in a mobilization of the masses capable of checking and destroying enemy resistance, and will attract the sympathy and support of the Latin American masses, for whom it will constitute a centre for the struggle against imperialism and capitalism that they are currently carrying on. The Workers' and Peasants' Government will emerge from the election of the Special Congress of the COB, and it will be composed of those who have won the confidence of the masses, who have been at the head of their struggles. It will not be a government with a majority of the POR, or of any other party, to the extent that these parties have not won the trust of the majority of the masses. To carry forward their struggle, the channel for the masses will be the trade unions, the COB, the Committees that are created in the process, and it is from there that the government will arise.

CENTRALIZED MOBILIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE REVOLUTION

Under present conditions, the government, imperialism, and the rosca will exhaust all provocations and measures of force to prevent a congress in which the masses may solve the future of the revolution. To open the possibility of taking decisions, free of the pressure of terrorism, to be able to develop its mobilization over the whole extent of the country, it is necessary to accompany its preparation by the mobilization and centralization of the workers' and peasants' militias, as, on a limited scale, the Oruro Strike Committee did in the recent mobilization. The armed threat of the army and the comandos must be faced by the armed force of the masses, as was done in San José and Uncia, and as the peasants' unions are constantly doing.

In case of the outburst of struggles of a guerilla nature, the task of revolutionary Marxists must be to guide, to take the lead of this struggle, to develop the formation of a Single Command, calling on all the masses, whether they have risen in arms or not, to mobilize around it, for the holding of the Special Congress.

AN EMERGENCY COMMITTEE TO DIRECT THE STRUGGLES, CENTRALIZE THE MILITIAS, AND SUMMON THE CONGRESS

The COB, in the hands of the "reconstructionists," is paralyzed. The confederations also, in the hands of this bureaucracy, are transformed into obstacles and enemies to any mobilization of the masses. The last mine strike, on the other hand, showed that the workers' tendency is to form their own organisms, beyond those of the Lechíns and Torreses. These organisms must become permanent ones, forming an Emergency Committee which, at the same time that it takes the leadership of the struggle and centralizes the militias, also summons and organizes the Special Congress.

The tendency of the workers organized in the "reconstructed" union sectors is to join the struggles, as has been demonstrated. Such sectors and federations must be organized in the Emergency Committee. There where the bureaucracy in various ways maintains its control, there must be formed Special Congress Committees which duplicate these leader-

ships and which, if necessary, at a certain stage in the mobilization, take over the leadership and representation of these sectors.

THE CONGRESS, CULMINATION OF THE MOBILIZATION OF THE MASSES

The Special Congress to decide on the formation of the Workers' and Peasants' Government must be the culmination of the mobilization of the masses. As we have analyzed it, the process will build up. The present struggles will be followed by broader and more decisive struggles. Armed clashes, civil war, the general strike, are possible alternatives within a process of growing mobilization, which will incorporate ever broader sectors of workers and peasants.

In order to avoid the dispersal of this process, the exhaustion of the revolutionary forces in partial battles, it is necessary to centralize perspectives. The struggle for the Special Congress will serve as the lever to mobilize the more hesitant or confused sectors. It will aid in avoiding strikes and partial actions that may help the repressive plans of capitalism and turn these forces so as to give an impulse to the masses as a whole.

This will not be a congress of bureaucrats, like previous ones. The bureaucrats, as the railwaymen's experience is demonstrating, are not in a position to face congresses, not even those who, on paper, "control" them. Under these conditions of struggle and mobilization, the congress will strike the masses rather as the most direct road to liquidating the control of the bureaucracies and the ministries over their central organizations, as the most direct road to rescue the COB from them.

Strikes, militias, guerrillas, the general strike — these will be fields in which the idea of the congress, launched now with great vigor, can spread and attract the support of the broad masses.

The miners' radios have been developed throughout this process as a very important arm: an arm to counter enemy propaganda and to make known the workers' and peasants' objectives. From now on the struggle for the Special Congress, for the organization of the militias, for aid in the dispersing of enemy forces, including the army, must count on this basic instrument.

Whereas the Second Congress of the COB was strangled by official propaganda, this Special Congress will be built on this new conquest of the masses.

THE BASES OF THE ECONOMIC PLAN FOR THE WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' GOVERNMENT

The Special Congress of the COB and the government that it forms will have to take the political and economic measures for destroying the power of the capitalists and for organizing the economy on the basis of the interests of the workers. The paralysis in mining, factories, and agricultural production, the workers' extremely low standard of living, the scarcity of food — all these must be faced up to by means of a Workers' Plan.

The first step must be the expropriation of the banks, of the properties of the rosca and of the capitalists, of those big firms that can be run without immediate need of imperialist investments. Concerning others, such as oil properties, it will be necessary to revise the give-away contracts, and to impose workers' control.

The agrarian reform must be completed, legalizing the occupation of lands, distributing those that remain, and working up a plan for the mechanization of agriculture, with a rational use of those tractors and machines already existing in the country, and the obtention of others on a broader scale from the USSR and other countries that may be disposed to provide them under favorable conditions.

The Soviet and Rumanian offers of smelters, oil equipment, factories, technicians, and trade, will be an important basis for the development of the economy, to which the new Workers' and Peasants' Government must have recourse. The alliance of the Bolivian revolution with the workers'

states will open up for Bolivia the advantages of modern technics and science, now closed to it by imperialism.

Together with this collaboration, the resources obtained by the expropriations will be the basis for a planification of the development of the economy.

There must also be immediately carried out a statistical survey of food stocks and an organization of their equitable distribution. And there must simultaneously be planned an immediate development of the production of foods and consumer goods to raise the living standards of the masses.

VII. THE IMMEDIATE TACTIC TO DEVELOP AND CENTRALIZE THE FORCES OF THE REVOLUTION

As we said above, the open break between the workers' movement and the government creates a new dynamics, and develops to the maximum the political needs of the mass movement. All currents — Lechinists, "intransigents," Stalinists, and those around *Masas* — are entering a crisis, or sinking deeper into the crisis in which they were already living. The POR has verified its political line. It possesses the objective conditions for transforming itself into the centre that animates and gives impulse to the struggle; but it must develop its forces very much, at the same time that the forces of the revolution are developing, to be at the high level of the needs of the situation.

TO DEVELOP A CENTRE FOR THE MASS STRUGGLE

The whole immediate effort must be to produce a centre to give guidance and drive to the mass struggle. The present situation, in view of the impotence of the trade-union leadership, contains the danger that it will be frittered away in outbursts and partial actions to whose consequences we have already referred. It is necessary that the whole strength of the revolutionary Marxist vanguard be turned to avoiding such a dispersal, which would only partially bring into action the revolutionary potential of the masses and would prolong the possibilities of the capitalists. A revolutionary centre is necessary so as to concentrate the forces of the masses and to turn then toward a struggle to bring about within a short time the summoning of the Special Congress and the forming of a Workers' and Peasants' Government.

As we already saw, right in the course of the last strike, the mining masses tended to form such a centre, and took steps toward it. Directives were sought much more from the Oruro Strike Committee and the San José Radio than from the La Paz "leaders." Mine militias and peasant unions concentrated under their leadership.

In turning the whole effort toward a Special Congress of the workers to decide on the formation of a Workers' and Peasants' Government, in opening up for the masses real possibilities for organizing and holding this congress, it is necessary to develop those elements of a new leadership which have already appeared in the struggle. It will certainly not be the Lechín leadership that will try to resist the attempts of every sort made by the reaction to prevent the congress. It is a centre organized from below which will, as it did in Oruro, counter provocations, stimulate confidence, and broaden the perspectives of the workers and peasants.

There must be set up one centre at Catavi and one at San José, the first connected with Siglo XX, the second organizing all the surrounding mines of the last strike. To this centre we must connect up Pulacayo, with the mines of the South Central Council, and Potosí. This centre can develop rapidly, continuing the line of the January Catavi resolution and the experience of Oruro and Pulacayo in the recent strike. That is to say, to develop the elements of dual power, as resolved by Catavi, on the basis of the organisms developed in Oruro. Let these organizations extend and consolidate their power, back it up by a solid military organization, in alliance with the main centres of the peasants and urban workers, and concentrate perspectives on the organization of a Special Congress of the COB to resolve on the formation of a Workers' and Peasants' Government. In case of the outbreak

of armed struggles, let it be this centre that takes over their leadership and organization.

These unions, which must consolidate their action by meeting to set up a committee to carry these tasks forward, must send commissions and appeals to the factory-workers of La Paz and other cities, to the railwaymen of the various centres, to the building-workers and flour-mill workers, to the peasants of Ucareña, Chuquisaca, and the Altiplano, to the Coroma peasants in revolt, for the formation of an Emergency Committee to centralize the workers' and peasants' forces and organize the congress. The immediate step is to group together the mining and factory centres most disposed for the struggle.

This action must be accompanied by a systematic campaign by the radio, by publications, by tours, meetings, and assemblies, carried out by this same centre, making clear the failure of the capitalist leadership, and developing the workers' solution for the economic and political crisis. It is those unions that have made the greatest advances in the struggle that must take the initiative.

The other main centre is La Paz, the political centre where in the final analysis all large-scale actions come to a head. The La Paz factory workers, in Siles's own pressure-centre, inflicted a far-reaching defeat on him even before the action in the mines had won out. An action centre formed in La Paz, based on the main factories, will give the mine action an enormous scope, a repercussion in all strata of the exploited population.

THE UNITED FRONT

The open struggle that has begun, and the polarization of forces, at the same time that they destroy the perspective of the old left, free forces that are open to revolutionary development under the impulse and pressure of the masses. The revolutionary Marxists, whose strength is small compared to the needs of the situation, must turn their action during the very course of events in such a way as to aid the development of these forces, to impel them to put themselves at the head of the revolutionary struggle, and to help them to mature through their experience.

The action that we have previously developed will be the centre on which these forces will converge and where they will develop. It will be that struggle which will make these sectors break with the traditions of conciliation and manoeuvres in which the majority of them have been educated. Leaders of the factory-workers, of the miners of San José, Siglo XX, Unificada, Pulacayo, and dozens of other mines, have shown that they can go forward under the pressure of events. Pacts and agreements with these leaders and with peasant leaders are possible and necessary for giving a centre and a certain cohesion of objectives and actions to these sectors who, at the very moment that they saw the failure of their orientation and that of their leaders, found themselves launched into more intense action than ever. Agreements and pacts for central objectives and for some partial objectives — while taking care not to waste or wear out their forces — will aid their experience and stimulate their conscious audacity. Of course this is a stage of rapid experiences, and the revolutionary Marxist vanguard must keep its full freedom of action, and make clear its independent existence, without getting tangled up with vacillating sectors. The bankruptcy of the "reconstructors," the bankruptcy of the political perspective given by the leadership of the CP, open possibilities for the development of the healthy sectors of that party, those most involved in the class struggle. The experiences of Uyuni, Siglo XX, and Potosí among others demonstrate this. The La Paz factory-workers also constitute a field for the development of sectors connected with this party. A united front action which raises the objectives of that party and those sectors to the level of the masses' central tasks as they have been described, will help the development of revolutionary sectors important for future struggles.

The *Masas* group has also been shaken up, where it was

closely tied up with the workers' movement, as in Potosí and Siglo XX, out of its world of abstractions, and the struggle for the Special Congress may lead these sectors to join in the action of the revolutionary Marxist vanguard.

The basis for the development of all these tendencies and of many others that are emerging from the crisis among the "intransigents" and the Lechinists in the workers' and peasants' movement, is the development of a revolutionary centre within the mass movement itself, the development of a concrete alternative. All these tendencies will be much more moved by the political deeds of which the revolutionary Marxist vanguard is capable under the present enormously favorable conditions, than to political reasonings. The proof of political line will be in action, and action will gain more members and allies than even the best explanations.

WOMEN

The latest struggles have once more recorded a fact which has a deep-going tradition in the Bolivian revolution: working-women's joining in the struggles, in the first ranks of action and decision.

The social — and racial — submission of working-women has built up here also an explosive material comparable only to that constituted by the peasants. Yet in the workers' movement women still do not have a place of struggle and leadership in accordance with their participation and combativity.

In the building of the revolutionary forces, the conscious development of the enormous force represented by working-women in Bolivia plays a fundamental part. The Marxist vanguard must bring up this problem throughout the entire workers' and peasants' movement for a conscious solution, which will enormously raise the revolutionary potential and the consciousness of social problems of the revolutionary masses.

VIII. THE PARTIDO OBRERO REVOLUCIONARIO

In a situation which is so fruitful yet which contains so many elements which tend to disperse it, the action of the revolutionary Marxist party is decisive. There exist various possibilities, various alternatives, in the development of the situation. But it is necessary to concentrate and raise the objectives to the maximum degree. The party brings out the most possible and correct perspective, and intervenes in the entire process in order to lead it toward that outcome. Guerrillas, strikes, the general strike — these will represent the tendencies of the masses to struggle; but those masses will not alone settle on the objective that centralizes these struggles into the struggle for power. The highest combative level does not of itself solve this problem. Only the revolutionary party solves it. In this stage of the Bolivian revolution, it is the POR that solves it.

The prognoses, the orientation of the process that the POR predicted, have been confirmed. The POR has emerged strengthened from the same test that burned up other currents. But the stage now opened in the Bolivian revolution requires something more than clear understanding. It requires vigorous action, concentrated and determined, constantly multiplying itself till it reaches the level of the revolutionary dynamics of the situation.

The way lies open for the revolution, for the Second Bolivian Revolution. This revolution is not isolated. It has the support of the growing revolutionary forces of Latin America. Siles himself said to the delegates of the Railwaymen's Conference at La Paz: "If the extremists take power in Bolivia, there will be started a fire in Latin America worse than that in Asia, that nobody will be able to stop." This explains the fierceness with which imperialism is trying to smash the Bolivian Revolution. And this explains the immense revolutionary optimism with which we face our revolution's tasks.

XVth CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIDO OBRERO REVOLUCIONARIO

11 April 1958

News of the World Workers' Movement and of the International

Bolivia

TOWARD NEW REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLES 1

Last March a trial of strength took place between the Siles government and the workers of the mining regions². Since then, following on the retreat that the miners' combativity forced Siles to carry out, political tension in the country has never stopped mounting. It foretells new struggles which, because of the extensiveness they will doubtless take on, and the central questions that they will have to settle, will be perhaps decisive for the fate of the Bolivian revolution begun in April 1952.

Already May Day was not this year the "joyous" day that brought the great Bolivian masses together around the MNR government, considered as the leader of the revolution. At La Paz, two parades took place at the same moment, one organized by the government and the "reconstructors" of the COB, the other by Lechín, leader of the Miners' Federation and representing the "left" wing among the trade-union tops. At the official parade practically nothing happened; there was not even a speech by President Siles. A large number of the workers who took part in it hastened, after the ceremony in front of the Presidential Palace, to the quarter where the meeting called by Lechín was being held. They wanted to demonstrate thereby their determination to maintain class unity and their distrust of the MNR government.

The meeting called by Lechín seemed to have been organized with a concern for preventing its being too intense. But the presence of miners from San José and elsewhere, and of their militias, made the pent-up enthusiasm of the demonstrators burst out. This was then further stimulated by the speeches of Lechín and of Mario Torres, his companion in tendency and in the leadership, which criticized Siles's economic policy, came out for a raise in wages, and condemned the "farce" that the MNR-COB co-government had been.

But far-and-away the most important of all the parades which this year celebrated May Day in Bolivia was that which took place in Oruro, in the heart of the mining region, the scene of great revolutionary struggles. It had been organized by the Oruro Vigilance Committee, the name under which the regional strike committee formed during the March events continues to carry on leading activity very close to that of a genuine organ of workers' power. Miners and militias from San José, Santa Fé, Machacamarca, Mocoaya, and Caracoles, together with railwaymen, metalworkers, construction-workers, and others, marched by, their backs turned toward the country's leaders to express their firm determination to put a stop to the reactionary policy of the Siles government.

In the words of a press that is always ready to simplify things, the speeches made at Oruro, as well as the demonstration itself, were just plain "Trotskyism."

Meanwhile, the crisis within the MNR is raging and continues to imperil the government itself, wherein the Cuadros Quiroga tendency persists in seeing the possibility only of strong measures to restore in the country that social stability desired by American imperialism.

In the hope of restoring the unity of the MNR and of calming if possible the "intransigences" revealed in all political and social circles of the country, an appeal was made to ex-

President Paz Estenssoro, then ambassador at London. Paz unquestionably arouses much sympathy among wide sectors of the toilers. He knew how to withdraw in time from the political arena, with his "Jacobin" past intact. But times have changed, and this method of resorting to the more or less legendary past of "providential" men in order to confront an otherwise changed present and influence the immediate future, will prove as ineffective in Bolivia as elsewhere.

Paz Estenssoro's arrival—followed by the embrace between Lechín and Siles given in public on the advice and in the presence of the ex-President playing the old paternalist—far from having brought about any easing of social tension in the country, exacerbated passions, spurred the intransigence of both sides, and has resuscitated to political life groups that intend to have a say in the solution of the crisis. For the moment Paz Estenssoro has revealed nothing of his projects. Yet he finds himself besieged by workers' delegations whose lists of demands he keeps so as to study them. In short, he is listening to everybody and satisfying nobody. It is believed, however, that he excludes any solution of the crisis without the cooperation of the United States.

A return to an MNR-COB government seems to have been considered. But the prior questions and the preconditions posed by Cuadros Quiroga's crowd in this matter are of a sort to render it impossible. It is indiscutable that a return of Lechín & Co to government functions would be viable only on the basis of a left reorientation, against which the rosca and, so far, Washington, rise up more arrogantly than ever.

Besides, a new experiment of an MNR-COB government is received very coldly by the working class as a whole; it has even been rejected by the majority of the miners, who furthermore bluntly condemned, despite Lechín's explanations, his embracing Siles.

The tone of the miners' attitude toward the situation was given by the regional conference they held at Catavi in May, to prepare the IXth National Congress of the FSTMB, the call for which is being awaited. There were present at Catavi the delegates of twelve unions, including those of Siglo XX, San José, Catavi, Pulacayo, Potosí, and Caracoles. If the highly political and revolutionary level at which the debates of the Catavi conference took place should be successfully maintained at the next National Congress, thus putting a stop to the powerless policy of Lechín & Co, then the relationship of forces in the country would be substantially changed in favor of the working class, and the high road would be opened to the Bolivian revolution.

One of the points discussed at the Catavi Conference concerned the attitude of the miners toward the elections that the Siles government has announced for June.

According to Siles's intentions, this electoral consultation is doubtless aimed at satisfying the MNR "left," disturbed by the unknowns of the present situation. It is not excluded, however, that at the last minute the elections be called off as a result of some "plot" or other, "discovered" in time by the government.

The miners' delegates to the Catavi Conference came out in favor of their National Federation—as it had decided at its previous congress—presenting its own candidates, after having obtained a change in the election law which up till

1 For full background on the economic and political situation in Bolivia, cf "From the Present Crisis to the Workers' and Peasants' Government," p 56.

2 See *Fourth International*, Spring 1958 issue.

now denies this political right to the trade unions. But in case that the change in this law should be refused by the authorities, the miners have considered the possibility of setting up electoral fronts with the workers' parties for the presentation of FSTMB candidates.

The coming weeks threaten to be very agitated in Bolivia. The arrival of Paz Estenssoro, to the degree that the ex-President will certainly not succeed by backstage negotiations or public embraces in dominating a polarization of forces worked upon by deep currents in society, will have served only to bring closer the deadline of a new trial of strength exceeding in scope and in aim all those experienced heretofore. The events of last March, with the setting up of the Region-

al Strike Committee at Oruro, and the appeal of the miners' radio-stations of the district, have revealed that the situation of dual power is still not wiped out in Bolivia despite the ebb of the April revolution. Hidden from time to time or buried under the conciliatory policy of the labor leaders, it reappears at each new serious struggle and more and more drives the opposing camps to eliminate each other.

The coming combats will bring the question of setting up a Bolivian workers' and peasants' government out of the field of ideas and set it up in that of reality.

The POR (Bolivian Section of the Fourth International) which has never ceased to point this way out to the masses, is preparing with all its strength to bring this about.

BULLETIN

As this issue goes to press, we receive the heartening news that Comrades Hugo González Moscoso and Victor Villegas, leaders of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario, who had been

expelled from the country by the Siles government at the time of the miners' strike, have returned to Bolivia and once more taken up their party activity.



Ceylon

STRIKES AND COMMUNAL RIOTS

Discredited by their strike-breaking tactics against the successful strikes of the Trotskyist-led Ceylon Federation of Labour (reported in our last issue), and fearing to lose their positions as union functionaries among government clerical employees and tea- and rubber-packing workers, the Ceylonese Stalinists tried recently to regain prestige by calling out on strike the Public Service Workers' Trade Union Federation, and the packing-industry workers under their control.

The Lanka Samasamaja Party (Ceylonese Section of the Fourth International) disagreed with the original demands and could not persuade the Stalinists to discuss their reformulation. Indeed, the Stalinists passed the word to the factory committees that if LSSP unionists joined in the strike in any plant, the strike was immediately to be called off there because they did not "want the collaboration of 'anti-government' forces." (In return for its establishing full diplomatic relations with the Soviet bloc and with Peiping, the Ceylonese Stalinists support the MEP capitalist government of Ceylon.)

But, though it could not back the strike's incorrect demands, the LSSP moved swiftly to protect the strike when the government tried to break it by the use of scabs under military protection. Under threat of direct action by the LSSP and the unions it leads, the troops were withdrawn. Further action was being planned by the LSSP and other workers' organizations to aid the strike when it was suddenly called off by the Stalinist leadership with nothing whatsoever gained. As a result, practically all branch unions of the Government Clerical Servants' Union passed resolutions calling on its parent body to disaffiliate from the Stalinist-controlled PSWTUF.

The strike in the private sector continued a while longer, but its Stalinist leadership abandoned all demands and agreed to return to work provided there was no victimization. The employers, however, encouraged by the government, flatly refused; and it was only when the government had its hands full with the outburst of communal rioting that the workers were able to get back without victimization, but with nothing gained.

These experiences have revealed more plainly than ever to the Ceylonese workers not only the incompetence and lack of militancy of the Stalinist union leaders, but also the real nature of the MEP government which the Stalinists still try to present as "progressive."

The last days of May witnessed communal rioting unprecedented in Ceylon. Though it took communal form, the basic cause was also economic.

Tamil laborers, brought in during the last century from India

as indentured labor, inhabit the land-hungry Northern and Eastern areas. Until recent years they and the dominant Sinhalese majority lived peacefully together. Want, however, drove more and more Tamils to emigrate south in search of employment. In a country of over 100,000 registered (and in reality an estimated 1.5 million) unemployed or underemployed out of a total population of 9 million, it was easy for reactionary elements in the Sinhalese middle class to stir up unemployed landless Sinhalese peasants to the belief that they could get work on the estates if the Tamils were expelled from Ceylon.

It had been assumed that when English was given up as the official language, it would be replaced by both Sinhalese and Tamil. But in the 1956 elections the then ruling United National Party took a position favoring Sinhalese only, and the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna, competing bourgeois party of the present Prime Minister, Mr S W R D Bandaranaike, promptly outbid the UNP in racial extremism. When the elections buried the UNP, and swept the MEP into government power and the LSSP into being the main opposition party, the language question was still secondary; and had the MEP done anything to implement its election promises of nationalization of plantations, etc., communalism would have been short-lived. But the MEP, welshing on its pledges, tried to distract the masses by bringing out the Sinhalese Only Act, urged by reactionary middle-class MEP elements as automatically excluding Tamil-speaking intellectuals from the government posts that they themselves coveted. The LSSP, at the cost of temporary loss of influence in the Sinhalese sector, adopted the unpopular but principled position of equality for the two languages.

Tamil resistance forced Premier Bandaranaike after a few months to yield ground by recognizing Tamil in government work—not officially, but through a secret pact with the Tamil communalist organization, the Federal Party. But the defeated UNP seized this occasion to step up its anti-Tamil campaign, and the MEP once more competed with it in Sinhalese demagoguery. Finally, on May 26th, sparked by the UNP, there burst out an orgy of murder, looting, arson, mutilation, and rape against the Tamils. The police, always so quick to fire on strikers, had received instructions from Bandaranaike not to fire at rioting communalists, and they looked calmly on as the rioting developed.

The LSSP warned the Prime Minister that if he continued to fail to provide security for all Ceylonese, it would immediately organize the working class and the broad masses in their own defense organizations.

Late on the 27th, Bandaranaike declared a state of emer-

gency, and by the 29th the rioting was under control. But under cover of the state of emergency the Governor General and the Prime Minister have been taking various undemocratic measures, such as the outlawing of political parties, press censorship, arrests of deputies despite parliamentary immunity, and other disquieting actions. These have been

sharply protested in the House of Representatives by Comrade N M Perera of the LSSP.

As of the date of writing, the state of emergency and curfew continue, with the Tamil areas particularly under heavy military occupation. The communal problem remains unresolved and menacing, and the situation continues tense.



France

TWO REMINDERS BY THE FLN

The vast majority of the Algerian workers in France are members of the French Federation of the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN). It recently issued the following documents, which we are glad to reproduce here :

COMMUNIQUÉ

After having examined the situation created by the formation in Algiers of a so-called Committee of Public Safety and the repercussion that this might have in France, The French Federation of the National Liberation Front: *Recalls* that it has never ceased to emphasize the possibilities which the barbarous war waged against our heroic people might offer to the colonialist circles for establishing a regime that would suppress democratic liberties in France and endanger world peace.

Reaffirms that the refusal by the political and trade-union organizations of the working class, in the very interest of those they represent, to bring about the independence of our country, today drives them into a defensive position.

Expresses its profound conviction that the Algerian emigration could not remain passive — without renouncing the revolutionary and democratic spirit that inspires it — toward events that may put its very existence at stake.

Considers that the presence of 400,000 Algerians on the soil of the oppressing country gives them the obligation deliberately to align with those who are ready to demonstrate in action their willingness to put an end to the war in Algeria by recognizing its independence.

Proclaims that the present situation shows the necessity of the junction between the French anti-colonial movement and the Algerian emigration in order to hasten the solution of a common problem.

Assuming its responsibilities before history and before the peoples, the Federation of France of the FLN declares itself ready to make the necessary contacts with a view to studying concretely the modalities of joint action.

FEDERATION OF FRANCE OF THE FLN

Paris, 20 May 1958

TO THE FRENCH ANTI-COLONIALISTS

France has been profoundly shaken by our people's revolutionary war of liberation.

The events of the month of May show very clearly that the war of colonial reconquest is in a complete impasse. The present French government, just like its predecessors, envisages, as the only way out, total war and an increased military effort which will still further deepen the internal French crisis.

The acknowledged complicity of certain leaders of the

French Left, the passivity of others, and the indifference of the French people in general, have permitted the continuation for four years of the unjust war of Algeria. Those who, in their doctrine and their principles, pretended to be anti-colonialist, have disavowed themselves and have in fact acted according to the deep wishes of the reactionary circles.

Today the bluff of "integration and equality," even though it tries to impress world opinion by its air of democratic egalitarianism, is basically only another attempt to keep our people under a new-style colonial yoke.

Behind the big circus-spectacle of the organized demonstrations, the dictated declarations, and the parades of the greatest colonial army ever sent to Africa (and incapable of winning), there is a reality: the Algerian soil is slipping from under the feet of the colonialists and their mercenaries.

The policy of the status quo expressed by the new phrase, "Français à part entière," deliberately denies our passionate determination to *live as Algerians in a country which can be only a free and independent Algeria*.

By our tenacious and heroic struggle, the colonial state is on the way to liquidation. Therefore deGaulle has transferred all powers to the French army. In Algeria, there remains now only an occupation army confronted by a people fighting for its independence, and in this context of war, the elections being prepared by the deGaulle government can be nothing but a masquerade. In France, an evolution seems to be taking place.

Many have now understood that without the strong pressure of our National Liberation Army upon the army of colonial reconquest, the latter would not have failed, during the recent events, to launch itself into a bloody coup de force in France.

To these the Federation of France of the FLN recalls that: *the struggle for the maintenance of their liberties in France must necessarily be associated with their struggle for Algerian independence, and an independent Algeria is the best pledge for the liberty of the French people*.

As for the Algerian people, *relying above all upon itself*, it will continue its fight until the restoration of its national independence. The experience of the last few years has only reinforced its conviction that liberty is for those who fight for it, and who know how, if necessary, to die for it.

FEDERATION OF FRANCE OF THE FLN

Paris, 3 July 1958

INTENSE ACTIVITY OF THE FRENCH SECTION DURING CRISIS

The fortnight during which the French crisis developed and reached its peak demanded of the revolutionary militants of the Parti Communiste Internationaliste more activity than is ordinarily required over many months. This period was a school and a test for the party, which met it in a honorable way.

Despite its limited material means, the organization made enormous efforts to spread our propaganda and slogans throughout the working class.

It may be said that the PCI published and distributed more

material in this short period of intense activity than in an entire year of activity at a normal rhythm.

A special edition of *La Vérité des Travailleurs* was published on May 17th in the form of a single-sheet, of which 15,000 copies were distributed in the Paris region, at the gates of the big factories, the entrances to the Métro, the Sorbonne, and the workers' houses in the suburbs.

During the events, three other duplicated manifestos were distributed in the same way.

A manifesto was distributed during the May 28th demon-

stration from la Nation to la République among the demonstrators, with whom it met with great success. Many of them provided our comrades with volunteer help in the distribution.

After deGaulle took power, number 84 of *La Vérité des Travailleurs* appeared — an 8-page issue, with a text analyzing the defeat, its causes and the perspectives from the working-class viewpoint. This issue was published in double the usual quantity, for wide distribution. About 5,000 copies alone were given out as propaganda in Paris workers' districts. This issue seems to have met with considerable success among Communist Party militants.

Comrades of the provinces asked for numerous copies. As the edition was soon almost exhausted, it was decided to republish the texts in the form of a pamphlet.

A special 4-page supplement to number 84 was also published, with two declarations by the International Secretariat of the Fourth International on deGaulle's coming to power. The leadership of the party made a special effort to follow the events from day to day, and sometimes from hour to hour, so as to orient the rank and file correctly in their places of work, their trade unions, and their plants. Meetings of the Political Bureau were held several times a week; meetings of the party's Secretariat every day, and sometimes several times a day.

During this period numerous letters were received from comrades in the provinces who sent in information about the development of events in their region. Political Notes were published by the Political Bureau and sent out almost daily during the decisive week to the comrades in the provinces.

During and after the events, there were received at party headquarters visits of various sympathizers, former party comrades who again drew closer to the party. Approval and support of the party's activity were particularly shown in the form of exceptional financial support by sympathizing comrades. The party received special contributions from the provinces, from both comrades and sympathizers, who made a

particular effort to enable Trotskyism to express itself fully. During and after the events, many new applications for membership were made, both by former comrades and by new elements.

An exceptional Central Committee session was convoked just before the peak of the crisis. It was dedicated essentially to the events and to the reorganization of the party for the new period. The Congress of the PCI was held in early July. A new party school will be held near the end of the month. Its programme has been communicated to the cells.

The party participated in a certain number of public demonstrations, especially in a meeting organized by the "Centre of Defense of Liberties and Peace," with Robert Barrat, Gilles Martinet, and André Philip, where our party could express the point of view of the revolutionary Marxists about the situation and the means for finding a way out of it. The party's statements were received warmly and with approval. A good sale of *La Vérité des Travailleurs* took place at the end of the meeting.

On June 27th the party organized a meeting of the Cercle Karl Marx on the theme "The Working Class Faces deGaulle."

Our whole International has followed and continues to follow the activity of our French comrades with great confidence and complete solidarity. If we have not been able, this time, to influence events decisively, there is no doubt but that we appeared as the real revolutionary vanguard of the French workers. Our inexhaustible activity during the decisive weeks has laid the groundwork for the future activity of Trotskyism in France. In the process of the revolutionary reorientation of the French workers, our French section will be the decisive force. In their coming resistance to the deGaulle dictatorship, the workers will find a leadership forged now at a decisive stage when all other working-class leaderships have shown their complete bankruptcy.

Long live the French section of the Fourth International!



Great Britain

CLASS STRUGGLE WAVE

A new stage in the class struggle has been reached in Britain. The offensive of Macmillan and the Conservative government in imposing the credit squeeze and other measures, as a means of exerting pressure for a wage-freeze, despite rising living costs, has not succeeded in its objective.

In the last few months, the resistance of the workers has stiffened. There has been a wave of struggle to improve wages and conditions among engineers, dockers, busmen, and meat-workers. Apart from the busmen's, these were unofficial strikes, waged with stubborn endurance and willingness to struggle on the part of the workers.

The engineers at Pressed Steel, Swindon, were victorious against employers who were backed by the engineering employer's national organization. In this instance, the employers, wanting a showdown, were compelled to retreat and to make concessions. The workers returned on a no-victimization guarantee, but after the return fresh conflict broke out over a demand for transfer of scabs, with whom the workers refused to work after the strike. This dispute lasted more than a month, without strike pay.

At Smithfield Market, London, meat distribution centre for the whole country, meat transport strikers came out in a dispute lasting nine weeks (again without strike pay). Here again the employers intended the strike to be a showdown with the workers: they set out to break the militants' organization. They laid off 600 porters and tried to demoralize the meat-workers, who had refused to handle scab transport. This, in its turn, resulted in a standstill in the market, the meat-workers striking against the lock-out of the 600. As a further complication, resulting from the strong bonds between food-workers and dockers forged in past

struggles, the dockers came out in an unofficial sympathy strike at Tooley Street Docks, which handle meat imports. In spite of the efforts of union officials, the dockers were adamant in their refusal to touch "black" meat. Nothing could break their class solidarity.

When the employers drafted scabs to handle the imported meat, all the London docks ground to a halt. In the end, notwithstanding the past stand of the employers in refusing to negotiate with unofficial strikers, the government was compelled to step in with an "enquiry."

The real test of strength between British workers and employers, with the Tory government at the latter's beck and call, was provided by the busmen. It had been the intention of the government, in deliberately provoking this strike by awarding 8s. 6d. to a section of the men and nothing to the others, to break the resistance of the busmen and promote a wage-freeze in other industries, making the busmen the example.

The cohesion and solidarity of the busmen was a surprise to the London Transport Executive and the government. Out of 50,000 busmen, there were only nine blacklegs. Fresh workers — Irish, West Indians, women — who had been only a few years in the industry and were new to trade unionism — stood solidly with their fellow workers; there was not a sign of a crack in the ranks even after six weeks. The provocative boast by the authorities, issued at the beginning of the strike, that they would provide protection to those willing to work, was exposed as empty bombast. They dared not even try to operate scab buses.

Frank Cousins, leader of the Transport and General Workers' Union, was caught between the conflicting pressures of em-

ployers and workers. Despite all his attempts at compromise, the government and the employers were adamant in forcing the issue. The militants wanted to extend the strikes to the underground train operators and the power workers, and Cousins was forced to consider this. The busmen's struggle resulted in increases to the railway workers, electric power workers, and other sections.

Cousins manoeuvred very successfully, placing the responsibility for failure to broaden the strike on the shoulders of the General Council of the Trades Union Congress; the latter body was terrified at the demand for extension, as this would have provided an open challenge to the Tory government. The government would have replied to the bringing out of the power workers and petrol lorry drivers by calling in the Army, and this in turn would have promoted further extensions of the stoppage and the rapid development of a pre-revolutionary situation. This frightened the Trades Union Congress more than anything. Behind the scenes, the TUC leaders were whimpering that "constitutional" government would be threatened under such conditions.

Thus once again was the lesson brought out that inherent in reformism lies the inevitability of betrayal once a mass movement of the working class gets under way. On the other hand, the strength of the resistance shown by the bus and other workers compelled the Tory government to retreat — for the time being. The Tories await a more favorable occasion to come to grips with the working class. For the last three years the Federation of British Industries, the banks, the Tory backbenchers and the right-wing press have been clamoring for action against the workers. They were held back, first by Eden and now by Macmillan, on the ground that any gains from a head-on clash would be cancelled by loss in trade and the possibility of provoking a revolutionary outbreak on the part of the workers. Reluctantly, the government has retreated to a formula of 3% wage increases, as compared to the retreat to 5% in former years. The government is waiting for the onset of mass unemploy-

ment in the winter of 1958-9, with the spread of the slump, when it will be impossible any longer to postpone a showdown, before moving again to settle accounts with the workers.

While the trade-union and Labour leaders are lulling the workers with a perspective of "compromise" with the employers and the government, the latter is preparing its implacable revenge.

A new consciousness has been developed in the last period within the working class. The attitude of the *mass* of the organized workers to both economic and political problems is on a far higher level than before the war. In the last months, apart from the big strikes mentioned, there has been a wave of disputes up and down the country in defense of union organization and to prevent the victimization of shop stewards and other militants. The workers, instinctively, have in all disputes regarded with loathing and abhorrence those tools of the class enemy who scabbed or refused to join the unions under these conditions. They have refused to work with, speak to, or have anything at all to do with, blacklegs. This "harsh" and uncompromising attitude has alarmed the employers, who have tried to exert pressure on the workers to change it, through the press, the Church, and even the reformist leaders. Yet, despite this tremendous barrage of propaganda, the workers have proudly maintained their class stand.

The workers have understood class solidarity as the most important aspect of all these struggles. They have grasped the necessity of defending their organization, their cohesion and solidarity, as the most precious of weapons. In this way, they are prepared and hardened, at this level, for the great struggles ahead. On this basis, the revolutionary current must explain the need to preserve a class front and to launch an offensive against the bosses *at a time favorable to the workers*. The revolutionists must consistently expose the cowardice and pusillanimity of the TUC and the reformist leaders.



Greece

ELECTION RESULTS

The May 11th 1958 parliamentary elections upset the plans of the bourgeoisie and imperialism. The EDA, legal camouflage of the Greek Communist Party, brought off a brilliant victory by winning the majority in the country's biggest urban centres, and the greatest number of votes on the national scale, arriving just after the ERE party of Karamanlis, the present premier.

The election law saw to it that the first two parties would benefit scandalously by their position so as to share between them the greatest number of parliamentary seats. As a result of the EDA's reaching second place (instead of the bourgeois party of the liberals, as had been expected), it had, with 24.3% of the votes, a right to 79 parliamentary seats (out of 300!).

The EDA's victory is, however, a real one. Compared to the 1956 elections, it won 50% more votes and won in all the big cities: Athens, the Piræus, Salonika, Volos, Larissa, etc. The fact that it was forced to present itself at the elections alone, without the compromising alliance with the reactionary party of Markezinis (since he rejected the alliance), far from losing it votes, on the contrary contributed

to polarizing the anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist current of the masses around its banner.

In voting for the EDA, the masses voted above all against the poverty policy of the Karamanlis government and its servile submission to the dictates of American imperialism. The reaction, panicked by the election results, is now trying to neutralize them by every means. In order to reduce the number of deputies elected by the EDA, the government wants to invalidate their election by arguing that the EDA is an *alliance* and not an autonomous party with a right to the advantages of the election law, etc. And furthermore, to terrorize the masses who voted for the EDA, the government is again stepping up measures of police repression.

The masses, however, stimulated by the election victory, are disposed to fight for their democratic and economic demands. The main obstacle to their militant regroupment remains the arch-opportunist parliamentary policy of the EDA, centred round the slogan of the "Popular Front" with the bourgeois parties of the opposition, in order to influence particularly the foreign policy of the Greek government.



India

CONGRESS OF REVOLUTIONARY UNIFICATION

The three-day unification conference of the Socialist Party (Marxist), the Mazdoor Communist Party, and the Communist League, to form the Revolutionary Workers' Party of India, took place in Calcutta from May 31st to June 2nd

1958, as a step toward the consolidation of all Marxist forces in India. The conference was attended by delegates of the three constituent organizations from Bihar, United Provinces, Rajasthan, Bombay, Gujrat, Saurashtra, Madras, Andhra, and

West Bengal. Comrade Kanai Paul of West Bengal opened the conference. A message of greetings wishing success to the conference was received from the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International. The conference discussed, and finally adopted unanimously, the programme, constitution, and statement of policy of the new party; and elected a 15-member Central Committee with Comrade Muralidhar Parija (Bombay) as the General Secretary, also a three-member Control Commission.

The Programme adopted at the conference laid down the following 15-point transitional demands:

- 1) Confiscation of foreign assets and withdrawal from the Commonwealth.
- 2) Nationalization without compensation of all key and basic industries, mines, plantations, banks, insurance companies, and the statification of the entire credit system. Monopoly of foreign trade.
- 3) Workers' control and management of factories.
- 4) Release of all political prisoners. Repeal of all repressive laws. Freedom of speech, press, and assembly.
- 5) Stoppage of payment of compensation to the landlords.
- 6) Liquidation of agricultural indebtedness.
- 7) Distribution of land—subject to a minimum economic holding of land—to the peasantry, through their own committees.
- 8) Fixation of a ceiling on land-holding.
- 9) Introduction of large-scale coöperative farming on a voluntary basis.
- 10) Jobs for all on the basis of a sliding-scale of working hours.
- 11) Decent living conditions on the basis of a sliding-scale of wages.
- 12) Social equality for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes.
- 13) [text not received]
- 14) No jingoistic attitude toward Pakistan.

- 15) In the international sector, the fundamental tasks of the party are defined as:
 - a) mobilization of the masses by class actions against imperialist war preparations;
 - b) unreserved support to the national-liberation movements of the colonial and semi-colonial peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin-American countries;
 - c) unconditional defense of the Soviet Union, China, and the Eastern European workers' states against all capitalist attacks;
 - d) complete support to the workers' struggle inside the Soviet-bloc countries against their present bureaucratic regime, for democracy, national equality, and a higher standard of living.

The Constitution of the Revolutionary Workers' Party of India will be based on the Leninist principle of democratic centralism. The flag of the Party will be the red flag with crossed hammer and sickle and with a five-cornered star in the top left corner.

The Statement of Policy analyzed the situation in India since the "Independence Deal" of 1947, and showed that not a single basic problem of the masses has yet been tackled by the Congress government, nor can be solved within the existing capitalist socio-economic framework. It characterized the major Left, such as the PSP, SP (Lohia), and CPI, as basically reformist in outlook and as major obstacles to the revolutionary mobilization of the masses against capitalism. It defines the foremost organizational task facing the Indian revolutionaries as the unification of all genuine Marxist forces, now lying scattered in the different parts of India, into a single organization, and it expresses the firm conviction that both the objective and subjective factors in the revolutionary process, which are now fast maturing both nationally and internationally, will inexorably drive all these revolutionary forces ultimately to unite. The RWPI will strive to bring about a speedy consummation of this process.



Japan

AFTER THE GENERAL ELECTIONS

The General Elections held on 22 May gave the following results:

Parties	Votes	%	seats
Liberal Democratic Party	22,976,830	57.8	287
Socialist Party	13,093,984	32.9	166
Communist Party	1,012,036	2.6	1
Independents	2,380,796	6.0	12
Others	287,990	0.7	1
Totals	39,751,636	100.0	467

Compared to the previous election of February 1955, the SP increased its votes by 1.9 million and its seats by 6. The LP lost 400,000 votes and 10 seats; but since 10 independents are expected to join with the LDP in parliamentary voting, it has in practice maintained its position. The CP lost one seat. Its votes increased 280,000; but, since it presented 114 candidates as compared to only 60 in 1955, its comparative strength shows a decrease.

Press reports indicate that within the SP the relationship of forces has shifted in favor of the left wing. This is misleading. The 99 left-wing members actually include many centre elements; the left-wing bloc is composed of five warring factions; the largest faction, headed by the SP leader Suzuki, is in sharp conflict with the other factions; and Suzuki himself has been captured by the right-centre group headed by Kawakami and Asanuma.

It was widely expected that the SP would win over 200 seats; a prediction confidently made by the SP leaders. In order to win petty-bourgeois support, the leadership had a rightist electoral policy. But here as elsewhere this manoeuvre

did not succeed. In city areas SP growth has been stopped; and in some cities the LDP could even increase its seats at SP expense. In rural areas, the SP continues slow growth, exemplifying the uneven rhythm of urban and rural developments.

On the basis of election results, the SP right wing and the bourgeois press opened a big campaign insisting that the SP must be a party, not of the working class, but of the nation as a whole, otherwise it will never win a parliamentary majority. The SOHYO union federation is counter-attacking, insisting that the SP must become more of a class party.

After the elections the Kishi government stepped up the offensive against the workers, especially the SOHYO. The unions suffering the most from this offensive have been those of the teachers (Nikkyoso) and of the postal workers (Zentei). Many union leaders have been fired and arrested for striking for their demands. The SOHYO majority leadership cannot mobilize the workers for large-scale defensive battles, so that the teachers' and postal workers' unions are becoming isolated, and in the teachers' union even a large-scale split is possible.

There is still, however, considerable fighting capacity among the rank-and-file militants, and a left-centrist current is growing in SOHYO. Though it includes militant CP members, this current will not be absorbed by the CP: If this tendency succeeds in winning the leadership of SOHYO, there will again be a great possibility for a militant left wing in the Socialist Party. The urgent necessity of an organized defensive is so great that the treacherous role of the SP and CP leaderships is growing quite obvious to workers capable of serious thought. Many of them are

beginning to demand a real revolutionary programme for power.

In the students' movement the conflict between Communist students and the CP leadership has burst into the open. A June 1st Communist students' meeting by an overwhelming majority demanded the removal of all members of the CP Central Committee. *Akahata*, the CP central organ, openly announced this event in its June 5th issue, accusing the Communist students of being anti-party provocateurs. Then in its issues of June 10th, 11th, and 12th, *Akahata* published long articles on Trotskyist activity and influence in the student movement. They accused the CP cells in Tokyo University and the Socialist Students' League of being under Trotskyist influence, and warned all party members to be alert and to start a severe struggle against Trotskyism. This is the first open attack on a Trotskyist movement in the Japanese CP since the party was founded in 1922.

This attack is aimed less at the students themselves than at preventing the spread of Trotskyist influence from Communist students to Communist workers. At the beginning, the warnings may succeed in slowing down Trotskyist influence, for the workers have as yet little chance to hear the revolutionary message of Trotskyism. But more and more party members and militant workers are learning about the activity and programme of Trotskyism; and, with their growing doubts about their own leadership, some are

becoming interested by Trotskyist insistence on World Proletarian Revolution instead of "Peaceful Coexistence." The First Congress of the Socialist Students' League—an organization grouping all militant students, and acting as the motive force of the Zengakuren (the 300,000-member Students' Federation) — took a decided position in favor of World Proletarian Revolution, and showed a trend toward the Trotskyist programme. The XIth Congress of the Zengakuren itself, however, while pulling away from the Stalinist conception, stopped half-way at a centrist position, insisting that to obtain "peace" world imperialism must be strongly attacked, but failing to say openly that without the downfall of imperialism there is no guarantee of "peace" at all. There were sharp conflicts between the left-centre majority (90 to 95 % of the delegates) and the right-wing minority supported by the CP Central Committee, concerning the methods of a peace campaign. The right wing wanted to limit action to appealing to the imperialists to conclude a broad compromise with the USSR and China; the majority decisively rejected this concept. But the defensive attitude of the majority under right-wing attack prevented the real Marxist elements in the Congress from as yet developing differentiation and clarity among the majority, composed as it was of a small revolutionary left and a mass of centrist elements. Much work remains to be done.



Lebanon

BACKGROUND OF THE CURRENT CRISIS

On the eve of Yankee imperialism's interventionist landing of thousands of marines in Lebanon, we received from one of our Lebanese comrades a long letter of background material, the following excerpts from which will no doubt prove useful to a clearer understanding of the grave situation there, analyzed in the Editorial Note, "The Crisis in the Middle East":

In March 1957 the United States succeeded in getting the Eisenhower Doctrine accepted by the Lebanese government. It was the only government of an Arab state that dared take this step openly and unreservedly. It became by this fact a tool of the imperialists in their struggle against the Arab liberation movement. Under this government Lebanese territory became the hotbed of imperialist plots and conspiracies against the liberation movements of other Arab countries, especially Syria. All imperialist agents who, after the discovery or failure of their plots, had to flee from Egypt or Syria, found refuge in Lebanon and enjoyed the protection and support of the Lebanese government.

This policy of barefaced service to the imperialists roused popular discontent and a strong opposition. Whereupon the government had recourse to various measures of oppression and deception. The situation in the country grew very tense, and the assassination of Massil el-Matouis, the publisher of the opposition newspaper, by agents of the government, was the spark that caused the explosion. The funeral of Matouis was transformed into a mass demonstration which, because of the government's brutal measures of suppressing it, turned into a general strike and then into a popular uprising. All attempts by the authorities to "reestablish law and order" have till now failed.

Faced by this critical situation, the government called for help to the United States, and Washington lost no time in answering this appeal. The first shipment of arms was sent by air lift on May 16th, and the American Sixth Fleet received the order to keep close to the Lebanese coast. The situation all through the Middle East was thereby aggravated. Moscow soon reacted: an official declaration via TASS on May 19th made it known that "the Soviet leaders were of the opinion" that American meddling in the affairs of Lebanon not only would have grave consequences within

the Lebanese state, but also threatened peace in the whole Middle East.

The situation is difficult. The fighting continues and its outcome is still uncertain. But whatever turn events may take, one thing is sure: this struggle demonstrates that the much-flaunted myth of a Maronite "nationality" is a lie.

The Maronites claim to be the descendants of the ancient Phœnicians. Christian masses established themselves on Mount Lebanon during the epoch of the Arab and Turkish Empires because they felt threatened as a religious minority. In May and June of 1860 there occurred frightful massacres of Christians, on Mount Lebanon by the Druzes, and at Damascus by the Moslems. These acts of terror were directly inspired and organized by the Turkish leaders to provide a distraction from their own difficulties. Such horrible memories cannot be easily forgotten by the descendants of the victims, and their leaders naturally exploit such a psychology for their own purposes.

The French created the state of Lebanon by joining the autonomous territory of the Maronites, already formed during Turkish domination under the pressure of the Western powers, to the neighboring territories with a Moslem majority. The French imperialists then continued in accentuated form the tactic already applied previously: the Maronites received preferential treatment materially and culturally; everything was done to "Europeanize" them more, to separate them from their compatriots of the Arab East, to make them a fifth column against the Arab liberation movement. A large part of the Maronite leaders did not wish to give up their special position. But since declining French imperialism no longer has today power of attraction for them, they became the "good boys" of American imperialism and its only sure strong-points among the Arabs of the East.

These Maronite leaders were pulling so far away from the cause of the Arab East that Archbishop Ignace Mubark in 1947 declared: "Christian Lebanon looks kindly upon the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine." Naturally this man could not, as a result of his pro-Zionist position, remain in his country; he went to Rome and is there under the protection of the Pope. What shows the degree to which this pro-imperialist Maronite leadership,

turned against the Arab national movement, has lost its hold over the masses, and how much they recognize more every day that, as a part of the Arab people, they must find their place in the general tendency of the Arab East, is the fact that the patriarch of the Maronite church, Bulus el-Maouschi, and the last conference of bishops of this church, took a stand against President Chamoun and in favor of the opposition that is now fighting. This position is the expression of pressure from the ranks.

The opposition which has risen arms in hand is not at all homogeneous. In it are associated different ideological and political currents, of the left and right, to prevent the Chamouns, Sohls (Sohl, incidentally, is a Moslem), and Maliks from making Lebanon into an imperialist enclave steadily drawing away from the Arab people. The fighting shows that, behind the Chamoun-Sohl government, apart from American aid, there is nothing except the "Greater-Syrian National Party" created by the fascist Antoine Sa'di, assassinated some years ago, in which are organized Christians as well as Moslems, and the "Phalange," the organization of the Maronite gilded youth.

It is not true that this is a fight between Christians and Moslems. The journalist who was assassinated by Chamoun's agents and whose funeral was the beginning of the uprising, was a Maronite. Ex-president Churi, who is now one of the leaders of the opposition, is also a Maronite. So too is the president of the foreign affairs commission of the Lebanese

parliament, Philippe Takla. And there is the already mentioned position of the priests of the Maronite church. On the other hand, behind Chamoun stand important Moslem figures. The Moslem kings of Iraq and Jordan are raising their voices in favor of Chamoun, not to protect Christians, but because they must defend their class brothers. The reactionary Beirut newspaper *El Chajat*, whose owner and editors are Maronites, does not dare to take a stand in favor of the government and stays neutral.

The continuing struggle is carried out with unequal means. The Lebanese government is currently receiving arms (tanks, airplanes, artillery) from the United States. Even if it were true that the insurgents are receiving arms from the United Arab Republic, the obvious fact remains that they have no planes and very little heavy armament. If, in spite of this, they control three-quarters of Lebanese territory, as has been confirmed by an English Labour MP who has just visited Lebanon, that means that the masses are behind the uprising.

Although the insurgent opposition is not homogeneous and some of its leaders are not even in favor of unity of the Arab East but only against the absolute transformation of Lebanon into an imperialist fortress isolated from the Arab world, the outcome of the combats is of a decisive importance both for Arab imperialism and for the Arab national movement.



Peru

HUNGER STRIKE WINS RELEASE FOR PERUVIAN COMRADES VICTIMS OF PRO-IMPERIALIST REPRESSION

The June 1958 issue of *Perú Popular*, organ of the Lima District Committee of the Peruvian Communist Party, published a letter from all the prisoners in the central prison of that capital arrested as a result of the anti-Nixon demonstrations. This letter, dated May 26th 1958, revealed the deplorable conditions under which the prisoners were living, the secret preparation of their trial, and their unshakable determination to fight in a united front for the economic and social progress of Peru, as well as for their own definitive release. The letter was signed jointly by the members of the Peruvian CP and by Comrades Ismael Frías Torrico and Juan Palacios, leaders of the Peruvian section of the Fourth International.

In the same paper there was published a separate letter signed by Comrades Frías and Palacios, which, among other things, protested against the inhuman conditions of their imprisonment. The letter related that the comrades were shut up in a room 12 by 18 feet with 30 other persons, without ventilation and with only artificial light.

In Latin America protests multiplied against the repression that struck down the Peruvian comrades. In Argentina, a group of parliamentary deputies, writing to Dr Manuel Prado, President of Peru, asked that all the political prisoners be freed. Writers and artists in Mexico made a similar demand. The Unified Workers' Federation of Chile also demanded the freeing of the prisoners arrested as a result of the anti-Nixon demonstrations.

The Fourth International joined in these protests, calling on workers' organizations to demand that the Peruvian authorities free the prisoners and stop the repression against the anti-imperialist fighters.

Finally Comrades Palacios and Frías engaged in a hunger strike to protest against the arbitrary nature of their detention.

The government finally gave way: first Comrade Frías, then, six days later, Comrade Palacios, were released on bail. The news was hailed with enthusiasm by the revolutionary workers' movement in Peru and elsewhere.



USA

A UNITED SOCIALIST TICKET IN THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS

Though the United States never had a mass Socialist Party on the scale of those in Europe, it possesses an old and too often forgotten Socialist electoral tradition. Beginning late in the last century, famed fighter Eugene Debs barnstormed the country in campaigns as extensive as those of the capitalist candidates, and received massive voting support. On the "state" (provincial) level, Socialists were elected to legislatures, and the alas successful effort of the capitalists to prevent the elected Socialist "assemblymen" from taking their seats in the New York legislature provoked an immense scandal at the beginning of World War I. Even as late as the 1930s, in a revival of "radicalism" under the impact of the depression, the reformist Socialist Party presidential candidate Norman Thomas was still receiving surprisingly big protest votes.

The demagogy of Roosevelt changed all that. The Socialist vote dropped to derisory figures. The founding of the American Labor Party gave hope of a revival of independent anti-capitalist electoral activity on at least the British model, but, largely under Stalinist influence, the new party rapidly became a mere appendage of the capitalist Democratic Party (two years ago the ALP was dissolved.) The potential socialist vote was atomized. A handful of ballots went to the Socialist Party or the Socialist-Labor Party of the deLeonites. The Stalinists, apart from some occasional ultra-left zigzags, did everything they could to canalize possible socialist electoral sentiment into support of the Democratic Party, presented as the more "pro-labor" of the two capitalist organizations. The Trotskyists, represented by the Socialist Workers Party, repeatedly entered candidates for various

national, state, and municipal offices, and, though isolated and slandered, strove courageously to uphold the banner of socialism on the electoral as on other planes; but though its campaigns, first for signatures to fulfil reactionary requirements for getting on the ballot, and then for election, carried the message of socialism to ever wider audiences who could otherwise not have been reached, their votes, though a highly creditable showing (usually between 8,000 and 20,000), were inevitably not of a mass nature.

But a change has been occurring in the USA of late. The great sleeping giant of American labor has not yet awakened politically, that is to say, no mass radicalization has spurred great masses of new elements to examine the socialist solution—save for some hopeful stirring among the youth. But among the already radicalized, there has been an extraordinary ebullience, especially since the crisis produced in the CP and its periphery by the XXth Congress of the CPSU and the Polish and Hungarian Octobers. Under the sign of "regroupment," incessant realignments have been taking place, characterized by a generally centripetal tendency, an instinctive search for some kind of unification of socialist forces. Not all the monkey-wrenches thrown into the gears by the semi-routed bureaucracy of the American CP have been able to halt this still confused but highly promising process. This situation has now found reflection on the electoral level as well. In late May, there was issued a call for a conference to form a united socialist electoral grouping, adopt a minimum socialist programme, and nominate candidates for the November elections. Among the sponsors were several former leaders of the defunct American Labor Party: Dr Corliss Lamont, lecturer at New York University; Mrs Muriel McAvoy, widow of the late Clifford McAvoy; Henry Adams; Annette Rubinstein; and John MacManus of the well-known leftist publication, *National Guardian*. Others were: Joyce Cowley, SWP mayoralty candidate in the 1957 New York elections; W E DuBois, noted Negro historian; Russ Nixon, officer of the United Electrical Workers Union; and Richard deHaan, chairman of the Young Socialist Alliance.

Close to 500 people attended the conference, held in New York City from June 13th to 15th. The most intense discussion, lasting seven hours, centred on the question whether to run a "full ticket" (candidates for five offices) or only one candidate. The latter position was presented by the CP leaders, who were already committed to supporting capitalist candidates, especially the notorious "cold-war" enthusiast Averill Harriman, multi-millionaire Democrat candidate for governor, and wanted only one purely symbolic candidate to color up their otherwise class-collaborationist

policy. Seeing that they were going to be in a minority, they walked out before the end of the discussion, but many CP rank and file remained. The final vote was overwhelmingly in favor of a full slate of five.

The programme, while largely of only minimum demands (plus an occasional transitional demand), does call for socialism as ultimately the only solution. It is highly progressive in content, and above all offers the voters a clear sharp contrast with the "planks" of the two capitalist-party platforms, difficult to distinguish one from the other. The United Independent-Socialist programme calls for: peaceful relations with the rest of the world, recognition of China, an end to the cold war, abandonment of foreign bases and withdrawal of troops, renunciation of military alliances; transformation of the arms budget into a peace budget for public works, repeal of taxes on all incomes below \$ 10,000 a year, reduction of the working-week to 30 hours with no reduction in pay, unemployment benefits for the full period of joblessness and at full pay-scale, a moratorium on payments for goods purchased on credit, distribution of surpluses to the needy at home and abroad, state operation of shut-down plants under a management subject to election by their workers, planned trade exchanges with the Soviet bloc; an immediate end to racial discrimination, to "Jim Crow"; restoration of all civil liberties taken away by the witch-hunt (an end to "subversive lists," to FBI snooping, to parliamentary "investigations," to refusal to grant passports), and restoration of civil rights and jobs to its victims; repeal of the anti-trade-union Taft-Hartley Act; formation of a mass labor party. The programme ends with a clear and well-reasoned exposé of what socialism can do for humanity and demonstration that it is nowise utopian, but perfectly feasible. The programme was adopted almost unanimously. Candidates were then chosen for the United Independent-Socialist slate. This first time, a campaign of collecting signatures will be necessary in order to place the new ticket on the ballot. But if it receives more than 50,000 votes in the November election, it will automatically remain thereon. The CPUSA attacks the new grouping on the grounds that the American workers are still unpoliticized and cling to the bourgeois Democratic Party, hence socialists must work within that party to influence their and its leftward development. The Social-Democratic Federation - Socialist Party terms it "totalitarian" because it does not savagely attack what it calls "Soviet imperialism." Obviously neither argument is serious enough to waste space to answer here. The Socialist Workers Party is giving the new electoral slate full backing, and its members have thrown themselves into its campaign with their proverbial energy and drive.

Uruguay

THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN OF THE POR

The Partido Obrero Revolucionario (Uruguayan Section of the Fourth International) has decided to legalize the party in defense of the democratic rights of the workers. For this purpose it needs to present 500 signatures supporting its demand for legalization before the Electoral Court.

The POR has therefore now launched a campaign to obtain this number of signatures in order to participate independently in the elections. At the same time it has started a financial campaign to raise the money necessary for election activities.

Combined with this action, the POR has communicated

with the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, and the trade unions, in order to propose an electoral united class front which, on the basis of an anti-capitalist workers' programme in face of the crisis, will unify the working class and wide sectors of the toiling population in *one workers' candidacy* for the elections. By this campaign the POR wants to open up to the workers a perspective assuring their independence from the bourgeois parties and bourgeois solutions. As an alternative it poses the independent intervention of the broad masses for the solution of the country's problems.

Some Publications of the Fourth International

OTHER THEORETICAL ORGANS

Quatrième Internationale (French)
Die Internationale (German)
Revista Marxista Latinoamericana (Spanish)
De Internationale (Dutch)

RECENT BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS

Léon Trotsky: *Écrits, 1928—1940, tome I*
Léon Trotsky: *Les Bolcheviks contre Staline*
Michel Pablo: *La Guerre qui vient (Capitalisme ou Socialisme)*
Michel Pablo: *Dictature du prolétariat, démocratie, socialisme*
Ernest Germain: *Les Problèmes économiques de l'URSS*

Orders to: Sal Santen, Berlagehof 36, Amsterdam W., Holland

Public Organs of Some of the Sections of the Fourth International

Argentina: *Voz Proletaria*
Bolivia: *Lucha Obrera*
Brazil: *Frente Operario*
Ceylon: *The Samasamajist*
France: *La Vérité des Travailleurs*
Greece: *Εργατική Πάλη (Workers' Struggle)*
Italy: *Bandiera Rossa*
Japan: *Fourth International*
Peru: *Voz Obrera*
Uruguay: *Frente Obrero*

Subscriptions may be channeled through:

SAL SANTEN

Berlagehof 36, Amsterdam W 49, Drieberg Ave., Colombo, Ceylon

LANKA SAMASAMAJA PARTY

SAM BORNSTEIN

21, Sidney Street, London E1