



# INTERNATIONAL

WORKERS OF THE WORLD — UNITE!

## *The African Revolution*

By JEAN-PAUL MARTIN

*Editorials on:* THE BERLIN CRISIS; ECONOMIC CONJUNCTURE  
POLISH CP CONGRESS; ALGERIAN REVOLUTION; IRAQ; CYPRUS

## *XXIst Congress of the CP of the USSR*

By ERNEST GERMAIN

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*Texts on:* THIRD INTERNATIONAL; GAULLISM; BERLIN CRISIS  
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NEWS FROM THE WORLD WORKERS' MOVEMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL

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# FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

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## *Editorial*

### GERMANY: THE CRUCIAL STAKE

We are entering a new period of international high tension. Since the Kremlin raised the question of Berlin and the peace treaty with the "two Germanies," international public opinion has been going through alternating phases of alarm and relief.

At the moment we are in a phase of relief. The Kremlin has obtained a "summit" conference in principle, in exchange for a prior conference of foreign ministers. It will consequently soft-pedal matters until the "summit" conference. There will be a beginning of negotiations with a view to a compromise.

But what compromise?

When the Kremlin last November decided to raise the question of the status of Berlin, it was clearly aiming at obtaining and getting ratified a change in the present status quo in Europe, speculating on a new global correlation of forces.

The matter is one of imposing the recognition of East Germany and of eliminating the pro-imperialist enclave of West Berlin. It is consequently a question of thus rendering official the split of Germany into two states, each having a different social regime. Any compromise not essentially favorable to this possibility would not be able to satisfy the Kremlin.

Why has the Kremlin chosen this precise moment to raise this particularly explosive question? Basically because it considers that the new global correlation of forces is in its favor. Military experts recognize that the USSR at the moment holds military superiority, including in the field of atomic weapons, thanks to the already commenced mass production of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

On the other hand, the Kremlin is quite aware

that at the present time nobody, save the German masses, really wants German reunification. Great Britain, and even France, fear a unification that would enormously increase the already redoubtable economic potential of West Germany. Great Britain in particular, more and more outdistanced by West Germany in the export of manufactures and the conquest of foreign markets, is currently remembering the "German danger" and is rekindling national prejudices towards it. Adenauer does not want German reunification at the present stage, either, fearing to lose the parliamentary majority that his party still holds to the benefit of the Social-Democracy, which has been steadily increasing the percentage of its votes in all recent elections. As for the United States, its German policy is based on lining up with Adenauer.

The Kremlin therefore thinks it can render official a de facto situation that nobody at present would like to change at the risk of touching off war.

Yet between the tacit recognition of the "two Germanies" and the official recognition of East Germany, which would also have de facto control over West Berlin, there is a big difference. By agreeing to such an operation, the Atlantic allies would appear to have retreated under Soviet pressure in the crucial field of Germany and Europe. The repercussions in West Germany and in the entire world would risk being profound and uncontrollable.

For this reason, despite the dissensions that have appeared so far among the Atlantic allies, and more especially between the British and the Germans, it is the line of "firmness" that will dominate in the negotiations with the Kremlin.

The crusaders of the Atlantic alliance are getting ready to play "on the brink of the abyss," to reject both a unilateral modification in the present status of Berlin and a peace treaty with East Germany. They will, rather, make an offer of an overall deal linking the future of Berlin with the question of German unification and with European "security."

The Kremlin, backed by its Warsaw Pact allies and China, will certainly reject such a proposition. And then there will begin a major trial of strength, in fact the most important one since the Second World War. It will be seen later along what line of retreat, compared to the present positions of both sides, the negotiation of a compromise might be begun.

It is necessary in any case to understand that the negotiations will be tightly played out, that both sides will be playing "on the brink of the abyss," and that the present "relief" will several times in coming months give way to alarm. On both sides, the general staffs have their plans ready for any eventuality, and their forces mobilized to prevent any "surprises."

The reasons for this new international tension in prospect must be sought in the essential postulates of the current international situation. The years are going by without any halt in the mad super-arms race. On the imperialist side, there is no relaxation in this field. On the contrary, the military budgets of the principal imperialist countries, as well as their production of atomic weapons, are on the increase; atomic tests go on; the multiplication of military bases throughout the world continues; Japan and Germany are rearming, including soon with atomic weapons.

Faced with this trend, the workers' states are obliged to resort to an analogous military effort, to the detriment of their economic development and the liberalization of their political regimes.

Under these conditions, coexistence, which is a fact, is far from being carried on "peacefully," but turns fatally to tension and what is in reality a life-and-death struggle between the two social systems.

In the impossibility of freezing at any given level economic evolution, technical development, military potentials, as well as relationships between capitalist states and dependent states, and social relationships within these states, in the impossibility of freezing as it were the international revolution now in course, "peaceful coexistence" is a chimaera constantly brought into question by "international crises" bringing us "to the brink of the abyss."

It is true that the conservatism inherent in the nature of the Soviet bureaucracy, its fear of the "uncontrolled" propagation of the world revolution, drives it to seek compromises with imperial-

ism and "Yalta agreements" that obtain it advantages in return for outright betrayals of the revolution. This is a factor which, beside mutual fear of an atomic war, has so far operated to prevent our being precipitated from the "brink" into the "abyss" itself.

Nevertheless, the only realistic means of fighting against the aggravation of the danger of atomic war and against war in general is further to weaken imperialism by the victorious revolution in the capitalist and dependent countries.

In order that this fight may become possible, moreover, it must resolve upon its course in relation to the real problems and interests of proletarian revolution and not in relation to the goals of Kremlin diplomacy.

In the case of Germany, to want to weaken imperialism by keeping the country divided and East Germany in "quarantine" means squarely to turn one's back on the German revolution. The masses in both East and West Germany could not long remain reconciled to the permanence of the division of their country. To prevent their wandering off to the paths of reactionary nationalism, there must be clearly traced out for them the perspective of a *unified and independent socialist Germany*.

Under present concrete conditions, there could be no question of dismantling the social structures of East Germany for the benefit of a capitalist restoration in a unified capitalist Germany. There could be no question either of subjecting West Germany to the bureaucratic and police-ridden political regime of Ulbricht, liegeman of the Kremlin. The German masses must have the right to build a unified democratic socialist Germany, allied on a basis of equality with the USSR and the other workers' states.

For such a prospect to be fulfilled, there would be needed a profound evolution in the present situation in West Germany and in the USSR. It would be necessary for the German Socialist Party to take a clear position about the social structures of East Germany and declare itself resolved, on coming to power, not to manage capitalist society but to institute a genuine socialist regime in West Germany. It would be necessary that in the USSR the Kremlin, which determines the fate of the regime in East Germany, declare itself ready to submit the fate of a Germany unified on socialist bases to the free verdict of the German masses organized in the parties of their choice.

This perspective, under present conditions, seems to be an illusion. Yet it is the only one that takes into account the aspirations and interests of the German masses.

The German Socialist Party, in its new plan for unification, has become resigned to the idea

of a confederation between the two German states as a provisional and transitional stage toward unification. That is a position to be considered within the frame of a perspective looking forward to a genuine unification of the country on the basis of a democratic socialist regime.

The pressure of the international masses must in the critical coming months be brought to bear in the direction of paralyzing possible adventurist attempts on the part of imperialism, for example, that of forcing access to Berlin manu militari. It must also make itself felt on both

sides of the present demarcation line in Germany to demand the unification of the country in the framework of a democratic socialist regime.

Without the vigilance and active intervention of the masses, the European masses in particular, there is a danger of our witnessing the most perilous yet of exercises "on the brink of the abyss."

Let the proletarian vanguard at least make no mistake about it: such is in fact the stake in the new trial of strength over Berlin and Germany.

April 1959

## Editorial Notes

### THE EVOLUTION OF THE ECONOMIC CONJUNCTURE

It is still too soon to come to a conclusion as to whether the recession that began in 1957 is giving way to a new upsurge or whether it is to be prolonged for a further period of relative stagnation. At all events, in the United States the gradual and uncertain recovery that began in May 1958 is showing signs of speeding up.

In March and April industrial production increased two points over the previous month (instead of only one point, as was the case until February 1959). Furthermore, the steel industry has been for several weeks already operating at more than 90% of capacity. It is true that it is the revival in this field which is contributing to increase the general index of industrial production, and that furthermore this revival is in part artificially stimulated by the prospect of a possible prolonged strike of the steel workers in June and/or of a new increase in steel prices. But the revival in steel is also due to the spurt in the auto industry (more than 20% over last year) and in other durable goods.

Besides this, the building boom, that kept up during the whole period of the recession, is continuing without showing any signs of getting winded soon.

The dark patches in the picture of an accelerating recovery are the following:

Unemployment, although diminishing, stays at more than four million officially, more than five million according to trade-union leaders. It is thus confirmed that the matter is one of "technological" unemployment resulting from progress in automation, an increase in productivity being at the origin of the increase in production. It is foreseen that, with numerous advances in productivity and the growing number of young people entering the labor market, reabsorption of the unemployed — 6% of the whole labor force — will be difficult.

The revival in the sectors of machine-tools, industrial construction, and durable goods, although begun, remains still very slow.

Exports continue to stagnate, in the face of increased imports, causing a serious hæmorrhage of the country's gold reserves.

What is more, stock-market speculation goes on worse than ever, the public more and more playing industrial shares against government bonds.

From this brief description of economic developments in the United States there may be derived the following conclusions, which might serve as lines indicative of their later evolution.

In order that the revival may speed up to the rhythm of a new boom, there must at some moment be introduced the factor of new and important private and public investments. This prospect for the moment does not take form.

Despite a relative stability of prices since the revival, the danger of a new inflation haunts the American economy and worries those responsible for it.

What is happening with exports and the stock market is a sure indication of a flight from the dollar, whose purchasing power is diminishing. The Treasury must now constantly fight against the danger of threatening trade and budgetary deficits which would lessen American industry's competitive abilities in the present climate of revived international competition.

The Treasury is faced with the problem of refinancing \$ 260,000 million of debt during the next five years. Early this year the Treasury offered to pay interest rates of 3½% for a one-year extension and 4% for a three-year extension of its maturing bonds. But the holders of 22% of the total debt demanded cash, probably considering that speculating on the stock market is safe, but to save in bonds is gambling. Almost a third of the Treasury debt is in savings bonds which pay 3½% interest and can be converted to cash at any time.

As for the economy of Western Europe, there also there are signs of revival, slow and uncertain for the moment, most visible once more in the case of Western

Germany. In any case the new rate of expansion still remains perceptibly lower than that of the 1954-1957 boom, especially in comparison with that of the current expansion of the economy of the U S S R and the other European workers' states.

The advances scored by all these states in 1958 are in the neighborhood of between eight and ten percent compared to the preceding year, and seem to be further speeding up during the present year.

## THE IIIrd CONGRESS OF THE POLISH UNITED WORKERS' PARTY

Speaking on 4 November 1956, immediately after the October events, to the National Conference of Party Cadres, Vladyslav Gomulka declared that the period of party history running from 1948 to 1956 was "past and gone forever" and that a "new period" had begun with the VIIIth Plenum of the Central Committee. This new period, he affirmed, ought to be characterized by transformations that must reach into almost all fields in the life of our nation. The content of the proposed transformations, conceived in the most general and broad manner, is the democratization of our life, carried out in the spirit of the basic principles of socialism.

Speaking on 20 March 1959 to the IIIrd Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party, Gomulka did not find a word to say about the October days, the October conquests, the "new period," and "the democratization in the life of our nation"! On the contrary, he presented things as if there had been continuity in the direction and line of the party from 1944 to the present, as if there had only been a few "infractions against socialist legality" which had been committed "under the influence of the personality cult and of Beria," as if the main adversary were revisionism. Doubtless he stopped just in time before affirming that the fundamental historic decision of the VIIIth Plenum had been — the condemnation of revisionism!

We know the "realist" argumentation by which Gomulka and his fraction justified the liquidation, bit by bit, of the conquests of October: the petty-bourgeois and bourgeois danger is great in Poland itself; Poland must continue to form part of the Soviet bloc (it is "condemned thereto by its geographical situation"); the U S S R cannot permit a "break-up of its zone of influence" under the pressure of "centrifugal forces." Consequently, if one wants to live in peace with the Kremlin, it is necessary to suppress — first in the party, then little by little outside the party — any expression of political opinion displeasing to the Soviet bureaucracy.

That this argumentation is based on a series of obvious sophisms needs no demonstration here. What is more important is to grasp the implacable dialectic to which Gomulka himself has succumbed. He, who preferred to go to jail after 1948 rather than to condemn Tito in an unjustified way, this time hurled numerous slanders against the Yugoslav Communists. He, who, immediately after Poznan, in his famous speech to the VIIIth Plenum, had justified the use of the strike weapon by the workers, today forbids them to use it. He, who had set so many hopes on the workers' councils, has been led in practice to replace them by "conferences of workers' autonomy," to which he assigned, in his report to the IIIrd Party Congress, the

typically Stalinist tasks of increasing production and safeguarding "labor discipline."

This is no matter of Macchiavellian duplicity. What we find here is a pragmatism that is trying to solve problems on a day-to-day basis, without thoroughly analyzing the causes of the "terrible things" that had happened in Poland between 1948 and 1956, without understanding the *social* nature of the bureaucracy, without grasping the mechanism that connects the democratization of public life with workers' democracy, the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Leninist sense of the term. Yesterday a victim of the bureaucracy, Gomulka has become in a few years its instrument and its main support.

This does not mean that in practice nothing remains of the "conquests of October." Despite its seeming monotony and appearance of monolithism, this congress was rendered possible only by the beginning of the political revolution that Poland experienced in October 1956.

The Stalinist fraction, then solidly installed in the leadership of the party and controlling innumerable drive-wheels in the state administration, especially thanks to the Soviet backing it openly enjoyed, has been largely eliminated. Klosiewicz and Matuszewski had already been eliminated during the XIth Plenum of the C C that preceded the IIIrd Congress. During the congress, Mazur, Mijal, Wasilkowska, Minc, and other Stalinists failed to be reelected members of the Central Committee. Three of Gomulka's solid supporters, Kliszko, Gierek, and Spychalski, were added to the Political Bureau.

This defeat of the Stalinists, surprising in view of the practical measures which had meanwhile discouraged the working class and thrown it back into passivity, are essentially to be explained by Moscow's change of line. To carry on the struggle against a fraction actively supported by the Kremlin, the active support of the proletariat was indispensable. To crush a small fraction abandoned by Moscow and isolated from the people, a passive support by the masses was sufficient. This support Gomulka has not lost. His victory could therefore be decisive.

Furthermore, though Gomulka himself did not raise the problem of "dogmatism" in his report, various speakers alluded to it, "in various senses," it is true. Novak, the only "Natolian" to take the floor during the congress, tried to justify his attitude by affirming that, since revisionism was the main danger in 1956, he could have been quite honestly mistaken about the scope of the reforms visualized at that moment. Besides, for him revision is flatly identified with "the reestablishment of capitalism!"

So there was Gomulka almost caught in the trap of

his own current theory. It was Zavadski, an ex-Stalinist who had gone over bag-and-bagage to the Gomulka camp between the VIIth and VIIIth Plena, who was entrusted with the attack against "dogmatism." He made it to the frantic applause of the congress, which showed, on that occasion at least, for what language it still had a nostalgia.

Certain other controversies show through the congress minutes like a recurrent watermark: that of the rhythm of industrialization and that of agrarian policy received the most attention. On the first question, which had aroused passionate debate at the XIth Plenum of the Central Committee and which had provided the Stalinists with their last opportunity "to take the offensive," Gomulka used compromise formulæ. He did not exclude the possibility of the C C's revising the goals of the Plan, if they turned out to be too pessimistic during the coming years. On the other hand, on the agrarian question he remained intransigent. The socialization of agriculture remains the ultimate goal of the party; but it cannot be reached save by the peasants voluntarily joining in it.

The peasants, showing confidence in Gomulka, have undertaken to invest in Polish agriculture, whose ad-

vances in the last two years have been remarkable. If there is one fixed quantity in Gomulka's policy which he has since 1956 not permitted to be varied, it is indeed his "course toward the peasants." To get it accepted (without much difficulty, for that matter) by Khrushchev, he was ready to sacrifice his friends and his allies. And so it is rather paradoxical to hear him fulminate against the revisionist "agents of the class enemy" when the only class that has lastingly profited from the "conquests of October" is precisely — the peasantry!

Foreign observers who were able to be present at the congress or who were in Warsaw at the time it was being held confirm that the atmosphere remains very relaxed in the Polish capital. Discussions, sarcastic remarks, needlings, objective historical researches — all that continues as it has for 30 months. Still, it would be lulling oneself with illusions to believe that Gomulka's backsliding in all political fields will have no effects in the sphere of freedom of speech. The censorship is functioning more and more efficiently; magazines are suppressed; the publication of certain books is forbidden. A glacial wind is destroying the young buds of the October Spring. But other Springs will follow.

## THE FUTURE OF THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION

The Algerian revolution is once again at a crossroad.

The struggle carried on for nearly five years by French imperialism to exterminate the Algerian masses has not succeeded in bringing to their knees the peasants and workers fighting under the banner of the FLN.

There are now, on the Algerian side, more than 600,000 dead, innumerable villages destroyed, prisons and concentration camps full of Algerian militants, both in Algeria and France, more than a million "displaced persons" in Algeria, penned up under inhuman conditions that will forever stigmatize the barbarous face of the imperialist brigands engaged in this dirty colonial war.

Savage and gone wild, imperialism, encouraged by the lack of even the slightest effective resistance on the part of the French proletariat, is visibly seeking to change the relationship of forces between the Arab and European elements in Algeria by the outright mass extermination of the women, the children, and the men of that martyred country. This is one of the most horrible operations perpetrated in our century by imperialism before it leaves history's stage.

This atrocious balance-sheet of imperialist repression gives the measure of the strength of the Algerian revolution. Struggling practically alone for nearly five years under the most adverse conditions, the peasants and proletarians of Algeria are still valiantly standing up to the unleashed forces of imperialism. Here we have an example of the incredible revolutionary potential of the colonial masses in our epoch, which should serve to stimulate the revolutionary struggle of the French and European proletariat, so shockingly far behind the action of our colonial brothers.

The terrible blood-letting being inflicted by French imperialism on the valiant Algerian revolution, however, is not without grave disadvantages for that revolution's

future. The question of financial, material, and moral aid to it is now urgent. It is impossible not to be surprised and indignant, especially that the profuse promises of help made on various occasions by certain Arab states and workers' states do not materialize and remain a sort of verbal propaganda aimed at their own masses, who solidarize themselves with the Algerian revolution.

It is urgent that an end be put to fobbing off the sacred cause of the Algerian revolution for purposes of internal "popularity" or of diplomacy, and to move on to real financial, material, and moral aid.

From this viewpoint, we must hail the decision of People's China to aid the Algerian revolution on a large scale. It is also possible that the Kremlin, to bring pressure on de Gaulle, now Adenauer's ally and a fervent crusader for the Atlantic Alliance, may stake heavily on the Algerian card, and materially aid — and even, at a later stage, recognize — the Algerian government.

The possibility of Chinese and perhaps Soviet aid will not fail to produce a differentiation within the FLN between an "Eastern" and a "Western" tendency. The former will unquestionably receive more and more the support of the peasant and proletarian ranks of the movement, determined to continue the fight and anxious to get the means (money, arms, etc), wherever they may come from. This is the healthy tendency, the attacking flank, of the revolution.

The "Western" tendency would like still to temporize with American imperialism and its "Bourguibist" allies of the Maghreb, Bourguiba himself and the King of Morocco. It is itself a "Bourguibist" wing inside the FLN, i.e., a pro-Western and pro-bourgeois wing always tending to find an "acceptable compromise" with French imperialism.

It must be hoped that this tendency, fought against by the partisans within Algeria and the proletarian and plebeian cadres outside, will find itself isolated within the leading organisms of the F L N, and that it will capitulate or take itself off in one way or another. The constant danger lying in wait for the Algerian revolution, deprived of the active support of the French proletariat, is, naturally, the development of this "Bourguibist" pro-Western and pro-bourgeois tendency that might be capable of taking an orientation toward a compromise that favors French imperialism.

To fight against it effectively, it would be necessary that the F L N turn itself from the vague movement that it is at the present time, into a political party, with a definite national and social programme, and with a more precise organizational structure, able to exercise a genuine control from the base to the summit. It would also be necessary, profiting by the teachings of all revolutions that have ended in genuine victories, to transfer the leading organisms to Algeria itself and link them up with the real base of the revolution: the combatants and the Algerian population. Abroad, it would naturally be necessary to have *various delegations* of the leading organisms resident in Algeria itself and indissolubly tied up with the revolutionary army.

These measures are in reality the only ones that would be able to permit avoiding the bureaucratic and neo-bourgeois corruption of the leadership of the revolution, to politicize the movement, and to increase its organizational efficiency, including on the military plane.

The later conduct of the Algerian revolution is not an exclusively military question, which can be solved on the level of increased financial and material means. It is above all a political question, a question of programme and perspectives. The army can become a genuine revolutionary army, welded to the civilian population, only on the basis of a clear and arduous social programme, defining the simultaneously *anti-imperialist, national, democratic, and social* goals of the revolution. The aim of national independence must go hand-in-hand with a specific programme about agrarian reform, nationalizations, industrialization, liberation of women, and the democratic structure of the new power.

To endow the revolution with a well-structured and disciplined party, with a precise programme, and with leading organisms linked with the revolutionary army and with the masses of the country and effectively con-

trolled by them, is to inspire the revolution with a new and invincible drive.

These changes would have an influence even on the level of the conduct of the war, facilitating operations by small ultramobile units composed of conscious revolutionary fighters who would derive all possible profit from their close relations with the population, from the terrain, and from their adequate weapons.

Naturally other political problems must already now occupy the attention of a really politicized leadership of the revolution: the strategy of the war, a war limited to Algeria or one including the whole Maghreb; in the latter case an adequate policy by the Algerian revolution toward the Tunisian and Moroccan populations who would be able to be really won over to such perspectives only on the basis of the hardened *social physiognomy* of the Algerian revolution; propositions of a transitional solution to be presented to French imperialism, backed up by an increased war effort, etc.

For example, imperialism's interest in the petroleum and other wealth of the Sahara is unquestionably at the present time at the basis of its obstinacy about keeping Algeria under its effective control. To make it easier for it to back off this position, the Algerian government might visualize for a whole period the setting up of a joint company for the exploitation of the Sahara, with participation by the Algerian state, French capital, and possibly also Moroccan and Tunisian participation, the *sine qua non* precondition being that the Algerian state hold the absolute majority of the shares. Furthermore, though we are opposed to indemnization of imperialist enterprises, the Algerian government may be forced thereto in a transitional solution; and in this case the profits of this exploitation might be able to cover the indemnizations to be envisaged to the European agriculturists and industrialists to be expropriated in Algeria.

It is here a question, naturally, only of some indications, simply by way of example, for a concrete policy to be worked up in order to facilitate the extrication of French imperialism from its present blind refusal to negotiate seriously, as long as an overwhelming decision cannot occur on the strictly military plane.

The future of the Algerian revolution now depends also on its capacity to produce an adequate leadership and to politicize itself in its entirety to a maximum extent.

## THE REVOLUTION IN IRAQ

Under the powerful drive of the country's revolutionary masses, Iraq is engaged in gradually getting rid of the after-effects of imperialism. After the country's withdrawal from the Bagdad Pact, it is announced that the Royal Air Force will soon leave the big British base of Habbaniya.

Kassem has moreover let it be understood that his government is studying the expropriation of French capital's 23% share in the Iraq Petroleum Company. This company is currently producing 35 million tons of oil per year and is the third largest oil company in the Middle East.

This measure, conceived as an aid to the Algerian revolution, should normally lead either to the nationalization of the company and the expropriation also of the shares held by American, British, and Dutch capital, or to a redistribution of the shares, after a previous expropriation, this time excluding French participation.

In any case, Iraq is little by little leaving the imperialist orbit, which cannot fail to arouse the greatest worries among the imperialists.

At the same time we are witnessing the beginning of a violent "anti-communist" campaign by Nasser, aimed mainly against Iraq. It was indiscutably the



Egyptian regime which fomented Colonel Chawaf's abortive coup d'état last March.

To understand these developments, it is necessary to get a better grasp of the meaning of events in Iraq since the outbreak of the 14 July 1958 revolution which overturned the pro-imperialist regime of Nouri el Sa'ïd, "the Englishman."

The July revolution was headed by a team of "Nasserist," viz, "national," "anti-imperialist" officers, with ideological if not directly social links with the bourgeoisie.

These officers dreamed — in confused terms, naturally — of a regime capable of enabling the industrial bourgeoisie to develop, by shaking off, at least partially, the shackles that imperialism and the native feudalists had been able to impose on the country's progress.

Among, them, at that period, there was a good proportion of advocates of immediate union with the U A R, the most eminent representative of whom was Colonel Aref, since then arrested and sentenced to death.

But the ranks of the revolution — the proletarians and the impoverished petty bourgeoisie of the cities, and the mass of the landless poor peasants or share-croppers working for a few thousands of big feudal proprietors — were infinitely more to the left than this "head."

Under the pressure of these ranks, and faced with the weakness of the Iraqi bourgeoisie, the stubborn resistance of the feudalists, and the plots of the pro-Nasserist elements in the army driving for unification with the U A R, the military regime of Kassem soon developed into a *Bonapartist power*.

The Iraq Communist Party, the strongest of all the CPs in Arab countries, with cadres tempered by long and sanguinary experience in the underground, had received the order from the Kremlin to proclaim its support for the country's bourgeois strata, holding out to them the bright prospect of an autonomous development, owing to Iraq's oil resources, and to "social peace" guaranteed by the CP.

At the first stage the whole operation was aimed at encouraging the bourgeois strata and their representatives in the government, first of all Kassem himself, to resist the temptation of fusing Iraq with the U A R. The support of the strong Kurdish minority, organized by nuclei of leading elements won over by the Kremlin, operated in the same direction. There can be two explanations for this policy of the Kremlin: either the Kremlin might simply be trying to bring pressure on Nasser, suspected of moving away toward the West, or even to bring him back into the Kremlin's orbit; or else the Kremlin was convinced that it could, without great risks, direct Iraq along the road to a genuine "Popular Democracy."

We shall come back to this aspect.

Let us for the moment limit ourselves to noting that the policy followed by the CP, the genuine master of the masses in this country, of unconditional support to Kassem and the "patriotic" bourgeoisie, has effectively stimulated resistance to Nasserist pressure — all the more so in that the successive plots of the feudalists, in revolt against the agrarian reform (however timid it may be) promulgated by the regime, of pro-imperialist elements, and of pro-Nasser officers, have in fact rendered the Bonapartist government more and more dependent on the support of the masses, over whom the Communist

Party is now unquestionably ruling. Imperceptibly Kassem has become the super-Kerensky of the Iraq revolution. The Mosul coup d'état caused the revolution to take a gigantic stride forward, by facilitating the revolutionary irruption of the masses into the political arena and by disorganizing the reactionary forces even further. It is now known that Colonel Chawaf's Mosul uprising, which for some hours turned into a massacre of Communist elements, later ran up against strong popular resistance.

The thousands of workers of Mosul and of peasants from the neighboring countryside, the Communist newspaper *Ittishad el Chaab* reports, took arms and fought against the insurgents. They occupied the principal centres of the city, and penned in, captured, and executed the chiefs of the rebellion.

At Bagdad itself gigantic demonstrations, accompanied by general strike actions, led by the Iraq CP, developed as a sign of sympathy for the victims of the Mosul rebellion and of solidarity with the proletarian fighters.

"The Mosul rebellion," *l'Humanité* of 12 March 1959 admits, "was crushed by armed workers' militias."

These militias in fact exist and are developing in Iraq. Kassem had to reauthorize them. They more and more form one of the essential forces of the country, a "dual" power, side-by-side with other organizations of a soviet nature, and facing the Bonapartist government of Kassem, who finds himself obliged to resort to their protection.

In this connection, the most important development in April was the formation of the first Federation of Agricultural Unions, which Kassem was forced to authorize. The resolutions adopted at the constituent congress of this federation advocated, among other things: the execution of "traitors, both old and new," the formation of peasant militias, and the general arming of the people.

Under these conditions it is becoming clear that the further evolution of Iraq is now in the hands of the Iraq CP and the Kremlin.

The path to total revolutionary power is possible and even necessary. In lack of this alternative the danger that is now lying in wait for the Iraq revolution is the following: either the Kremlin sacrifices it as a bargaining counter in a new compromise with Nasser; or else the latter — profiting by the dislocation of the conservative forces that support Kassem and by a disorientation of the masses in case of a prolonged wait that does not end in the complete victory of the revolution — succeeds in bringing off a new coup d'état, unexpectedly overthrowing Kassem.

It is to be hoped that the vigilance and dynamism of the masses, possibly whetted by a new reactionary attempt, will be able to push the Iraq CP further than the Kremlin now wishes.

In this case the proletarian revolution can be victorious in one of the most important Arab countries of the Middle East, which would not fail to have incalculable repercussions on the development of the revolution throughout this whole region. Nasser is raging against the Iraqi revolution, for he is conscious of its proletarian character and of its dynamism.

The contradiction between the present development of the Iraqi revolution and the historic task of the unification of the Arab nation is only an apparent one.

The Iraq CP, instead of defending itself against Nasser by becoming the champion of the "independence" of Iraq, ought to have worked up a concrete programme for the unification of the Arab nation which could not be in opposition to the imperative needs of the Arab social revolution. When what is in question is a unification between two Arab countries of the same social system, the imperative need of unification takes precedence over the political character of the regime under which the unification would be carried out. But when it is a question of a unification between an Arab country engaged in carrying out simultaneously its anti-imperialist and its social revolutions, and a country still under a feudo-capitalist regime, the imperative need

of carrying out its social revolution can postpone the hour of unification into the same national whole. This is the case at present with Iraq and the UAR, countries between which, however, there must not be the slightest difficulty about immediately establishing relationships, of federative union, for example.

Events are showing that a total, lasting, and progressive Arab national unification, the aspiration of the Arab revolutionary masses, in reality will be brought about only by themselves in the carrying out of their social revolution.

April 1959

## CYPRIOT "INDEPENDENCE"

One phase of the Cypriot revolution has just been completed. The Zurich and London Agreements have led the nationalist leadership of the Cypriot revolution to be satisfied with formal independence for the island, embellished by all sorts of limitations imposed by British imperialism and its "Atlantic" allies, the Turkish and Greek governments.

The Cypriot masses have accepted, especially since 1955, immense sacrifices, in a tenacious, heroic, day-by-day struggle really to get rid of imperialism and to attain genuine self-determination. In this struggle the aspiration of the overwhelmingly Greek majority of the island to be integrated in the Greek nation has not been lacking for a single moment.

The agreements reached at Zurich and London, in the absence of any democratic consultation of the Cypriot masses, guarantee the continuance of the military bases of British imperialism on the island, add thereto the military presence of the Turkish and Greek governments, and authorize the counter-revolutionary intervention of all of them against any attempt by the Cypriot masses to alter the status quo, exclude union with Greece, and have much the effect of a de facto status of partition of the island between the Greek majority (four fifths) and the Turkish minority.

Far from guaranteeing the legitimate rights of the Turkish minority within the framework of democratic and fraternal coexistence with the Greek majority of the island, the Zurich and London Agreements set up a most complex mixed administrative status aimed at perpetuating ethnic antagonisms to the detriment of union between the Cypriot Greek and Turkish toiling masses against their common exploiters: British imperialism, the Greek and Turkish bourgeoisies, and the native "notables."

The agreements were the result of pressure by Washington on London as well as on Ankara and Athens to find an acceptable compromise and thus to safeguard the higher interests of the Atlantic alliance. The Greek government of Karamanlis was only too hasty to see the Cypriot question "solved," for the Greek masses had a tendency to use it in order to fight in reality against imperialism and the Greek bourgeoisie.

As for Archbishop Makarios, the Cypriot national leader, he represented the combination of interests of the Greek bourgeoisie and of the Cypriot "notables." The EOKA, judged from the viewpoint of its leadership, was the military instrument of the political leadership of the nationalists. As for Grivas, it must not be forgotten that this new national "hero" was, in Greece, along toward the

end of the German occupation and immediately thereafter, the leader of the fascist organization "Khi," launched against the revolutionary movement of the Greek masses. Makarios and Grivas, the uncapturable leader of the EOKA, had to capitulate to orders received from Athens and to their own fear of seeing the mass movement in the island become once more polarized to the left.

But this danger is only postponed. The Cypriot masses, who were able to develop ingeniously specific forms of armed struggle adapted to the conditions of the island — a "terrorist" organization that was disseminated, camouflaged, and protected by the complicity of the whole population — will not be ready to swallow the bastard regime of "independence" under the real control of the N A T O.

Taking as their point of departure the first results won by their tenacious struggle, they will continue their already commenced revolution to reach genuine self-determination. This will be in the framework of a Cypriot Workers' and Peasants' Republic, possibly federated with Greece, with the rights of the Turkish minority fully guaranteed, and all the after-effects of imperialism definitively liquidated.

The Cypriot Stalinists have for a long time been satisfied to let the Cypriot question degenerate into an apple of discord among the British, Turkish, and Greek Atlantic partners. For this reason they reacted only in a very mild way to the shift in the leadership of the national movement from their hands to those of nationalists of the Makarios and Grivas stripe. Now, with the island becoming entirely a military base of the N A T O, and the nationalists having laid down their arms, it is easy to foresee that the Stalinists will again become the ardent champions of the national struggle, while once more sabotaging the masses' aims of a specifically social nature. According to statements by E Papaioannou, leader of the A K E L, reported in the 14 February issue of the Stalinist organ *Uma*, published in London. "The Cypriot Left, despite its reservations about the Zurich-London Agreements, is going to work with unselfishness and patriotic consistency for the unity of all the Cypriot Greeks, independent of ideological and political divergences," etc.

The Cypriot Trotskyists, while participating in the national movement, as it is, independently of its leadership, will find the way to put forward the genuine transitional programme, both national and social, capable of leading the Cypriot revolution to complete victory.

10 March 1959

# THE AFRICAN REVOLUTION

## *Toward the Independence and Unity of Negro Africa*

By JEAN-PAUL MARTIN

In its turn, Negro Africa is passing through the bourgeois-democratic phase of its revolution before proceeding inevitably on to the proletarian, socialist revolution.

It is true that the question of a Negro African nation south of the Arab countries — from Egypt to Morocco — is complicated by the variety of races, dialects, beliefs, and customs. It is not difficult, however, for a Marxist to understand that what we are now witnessing is the emergence and formation of *a sort of national Negro-African consciousness*, embracing all the Negro-African peoples whose rudimentary tribal society has been subjected to capitalist penetration, bringing with it the break-up of existing forms and the birth of modern ways of living, whose characteristics are urbanization and even, in some places, intensive industrialization.

This African national consciousness now in process of formation rests on the following solid foundations: *the common origin of the Negro-African peoples in a tribal society based on a subsistence agriculture, its structure almost everywhere analogous; many customs held in common, a type of civilization common to all these peoples and fashioned by their history, prior to the penetration of big capital beginning in the XVIIIth century; the level of living standards that the Negro-African masses have suffered, both during the terrible centuries of the slave trade and of forced labor, and at present with the mass impoverishment that brings in its wake speeded-up detribalization and their influx into the urban centres of Africa.*

Within a common geographical framework, these economic, cultural, and social factors are now producing a kind of recasting and remingling of the Negro-African masses into a common national whole, awakening, across the tribal differences and vast trans-continental deserts, a common African national consciousness.

Granted, this is but the beginning of a process of which the meaning is clear to only a minority of bourgeois elements, petty-bourgeois intellectuals, and the students and young workers who are growing up in the towns. But to the extent that these are becoming, at a quickening pace, the new axes of reconstruction of African political and economic life, this awakening of consciousness by the urban élite will have profound repercussions on the Negro-African masses all over the continent.

*The ideas of independence and Negro-African unity have become the force determining the political process under way in territories under not only French but also British, Belgian, and even Portuguese influence.*

To understand the heightened rhythm and ebullient dynamism which typify the development of Negro Africa, events in this part of the world since the Second World War must be clarified.

### DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1945

Imperialist penetration of Negro Africa has decisively leaped forward since precisely this date, to the extent that Africa in its entirety has become the last economic and strategic reserve of imperialism in retreat. Capitalist investments in this part of the world, in the first post-war decade alone, have exceeded \$ 6,000 million — as much as, if not more than, the total invested between the first discovery of diamonds at Kimberley in 1871 and 1945. The majority of these investments have been made in the mining areas: diamonds, gold, and uranium in the Congo, and so on.

It is the Southern part of Negro Africa, indeed, which has seen the biggest development, investments there absorbing around 20% to 30% of national income, and the economy increasing around 6% per year. Next come the British East African territories, with Kenya at their head. The least developed parts, where agriculture still predominates, are the West and Equatorial African territories, where investments have scarcely reached a level of 8% of the rather low national revenue.

Industrial production in South Africa in the decade after the war increased tremendously, nearly 30% per annum, only to fall, since 1955, to the nonetheless impressive rate of 20%. In Southern Rhodesia industrial production has trebled since the war. In the Congo it has more than doubled, with real bounds forward on the part of some private industries, such as textiles (where production has increased 600%) and chemicals (400%). Trade among the three Southern regions has likewise strongly developed, above all between South Africa and the Rhodesias.

The Eastern, Central, and Western parts of Negro Africa have undergone a less important development, for the type of capitalist exploita-

tion, centred on agricultural production and the export of mineral wealth, has not succeeded in ensuring a rate of investment which would have permitted speeding up the industrialization of these countries, diversifying their agricultural economies, and thus lessening their close dependence on the price of a few materials in the world market.

Because of this, the social and economic situation in these territories, far from improving, has rather worsened — in spite of undeniable economic (including industrial) advances.

We shall take a look now at the economic situation in these territories and the effects of imperialist domination upon them, for this is the background to present political events.

### THE ECONOMY OF NEGRO AFRICA

Despite their undeniable mineral wealth<sup>1</sup> and the big possibilities for industrial development through the application of hydro-electric power,<sup>2</sup> the main revenues of the Eastern, Central, and Western parts of Negro Africa are drawn predominantly from agriculture.

About 90% of exports from Kenya and Uganda are of agricultural products (coffee, tea, and sisal from Kenya, cotton from Uganda). Cocoa accounts for 70% of Ghana's exports, and groundnuts, palm-oil, and cocoa together contribute an analogous proportion to the exports of Nigeria and French West Africa.

An agricultural economy is frequently based on a single exportable product, making it extremely vulnerable to fluctuation in prices on the world market. The very high prices which these products commanded during the decade following the last war gave an unprecedented push to the development of a mercantile agricultural economy.

Production of the main agricultural products has trebled and quadrupled since the war. But the European planters have cornered the best land in most African territories, except in some parts of French West Africa, Ghana, Northern Nigeria, and Uganda, and to some extent now in Kenya, where production is mainly in the hands of small tenant farmers.

Through lack of sufficient investment and scientific methods of cultivation, the land remaining to the African farmers, particularly the vast reservations given up to African subsistence agriculture (about 70% of the total cultivated surface) has a very low — and diminishing —

<sup>1</sup> Gold, manganese and bauxite in Ghana; tin and columbite in Nigeria; chrome, diamonds and iron in Sierra Leone; iron in Guinea and Liberia; bauxite in the Cameroons; copper in Uganda, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Negro Africa possesses two thirds of the world's potential power in the hydro-electric field, its reserves being valued at 200 million kilowatts.

productive yield. The sun in tropical Africa exhausts these lands, and intense heat alternating with torrential rain ruins them for cultivation. Thus the indigenous agrarian economies seem caught in an insoluble dilemma: they cannot become productive without increased investment, but by themselves cannot produce the investment without which they cannot become more productive.

The bourgeois critics of the difficulties of native agrarian economies delight in highlighting the so-called defects of a tribal system of society and its consequences on the mentality and conduct of indigenous peoples, so as to blame them for the low rate of primitive accumulation. To listen to these critics, the difficulties standing in the way of further economic development of all Negro Africa arise mainly from the laziness and indolence of the "natives" and their swollen unproductive families, who gobble up the meagre income of those who get around to doing any work; and from land ownership in common, by the tribe or the kinship group.

This last argument seems more serious and deserves a closer look.

Farmers have the use of the land but no freehold rights. The Chiefs or elders allot to each family enough land for extensive cultivation on a lengthy shifting rotation which may include 5-10 years of fallow to 4-5 years of cultivation (and they may reallocate every year).<sup>3</sup>

Penetration by European exploiting capital, however, together with a continuous increase in the African population as a result of medical progress, the abolition of slavery, and the end of inter-tribal wars, have completely upset the "natural" balance of this system of exploiting the land.

The land available to a larger population was reduced in Kenya, Tanganyika, Nyasaland, and in the French, Portuguese and Belgian areas by the alienation to European use — in most of these it was a small area, but in Kenya perhaps a fifth of the potentially good land, being unoccupied at that time, was taken. In South Africa 90% passed to European use, though much of it in areas not yet seized by the Bantu — and now some of it is being repurchased for the Bantu; in Southern Rhodesia, a country conquered by force of arms, 50% was taken.<sup>3</sup>

Before the imperialist penetration of Africa, the relative stagnation of African tribal society was due to — among other things<sup>4</sup> — the pos-

<sup>3</sup> *The Economist*, 13 December 1958.

<sup>4</sup> Another reason is to be sought in the relative isolation of the African population from each other, separated by distances and by various geographical obstacles.

sibilities for *extensive* cultivation and tillage, given the vastness of the available land in comparison with a somewhat sparse population.<sup>5</sup> *Today the poverty of the African peasants, who make up the overwhelming majority of the population, springs above all else from the increasingly inferior status as farmers into which they have been thrust, both as regards quality and quantity of the land available to them and as regards methods of cultivation (fertilizers, machines, modern agricultural technique), in comparison with the merchant agriculture of the big European plantations and enterprises.*

The remedy for this situation is certainly not the abolition of the system of tribal ownership of the land in common and its replacement by individual private plots, as argued by the apologists of capitalist exploitation. Such a "solution" could definitely profit only those who were the most favored from the point of view of having the necessary capital to acquire an area of land sufficient<sup>6</sup> for cultivation in a rational and productive way (fertilizers, machines, agricultural methods adapted to tropical conditions), while it would, by the destruction of the tribal communal subsistence economy, swell the mass of impoverished natives.

#### ASPECTS OF THE MECHANISM OF IMPERIALIST EXPLOITATION

At the moment, despite progress in the field of political administration which has found expression in the ever-increasing role of the African élite, nearly all economic and administrative organizations are in European hands<sup>7</sup>.

Mines, plantations, even trade in native agricultural products, scientific research and education, various key administrative offices — all these vital wheels of power remain to the Europeans. Moreover, the capital necessary for the mineral, agricultural, and industrial understructure and development comes, in its decisive majority, from the European metropoleis — and recently, on an increasing scale, also from the United States, in the form of public and private investment.

<sup>5</sup> "Whenever economic problems gathered to a point of crisis which might elsewhere have induced a change in economic relations — and hence a growth towards higher forms of social organisation — the Bantu (Africans) simply moved to new lands, warring if necessary with others who stood in their way." (Basil Davidson: *The African Awakening*.)

<sup>6</sup> Which, bearing in mind the geographical conditions and tropical climate, must be more extensive than elsewhere, allowing for conservation of the soil, rational rotation, etc.

<sup>7</sup> Who number about half a million as against some 100 million Africans in Central Africa (not counting South Africa).

The apologists of the "generous" aid allotted by the metropolitan imperialists to Negro Africa stress the importance of public investment devoted to the development of these territories, but naturally refrain from mentioning the absolutely fantastic profits still taken by capitalist private enterprise out of the "Black Continent."<sup>8</sup>

Let us meanwhile see, from a closer angle just what is this "aid" given by the imperialist metropoleis to the "development" of Negro Africa:

The exploitation of the mineral and agricultural resources of the African territories in itself already requires great *underlying public works: transport, electricity, administration, some health and educational services, for the maintenance and training of personnel for the imperialist enterprises.*

In this field a big effort has been made, especially since the war, on the basis of which it is now considered possible to set going certain far-reaching schemes of *industrialization*.<sup>9</sup>

How has this effort been financed?

In the British African territories, the funds were raised locally and by metropolitan help as follows: half from local sources, a third from loans, and the rest by subsidy from the metropolis. A country like Ghana, however, has itself supplied 90% of the capital invested in its development. France claims to have invested an average of \$ 150 million a year during this time, as against the \$ 70 million which Britain spends in its territories.<sup>10</sup> Reinvestment of some part of the fabulous profits of local Belgian enterprise has made development of the Congo possible. France contributes \$ 20 million a year to make up the dollar deficit on the foreign trade of her Negro African territories. On the other hand, these territories enable her to save between \$100,000,000 and \$200,000,000 a year by buying there for francs certain commodities for which she would have to pay in hard currencies elsewhere.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Basil Davidson in his now well known book, *The African Awakening*, cites several examples of what he calls "the astronomical takings in Africa" before and after the last war, the dividends of several mining companies reaching 50 to 100, 200 and even 300%. "During the years of mining boom, after the Second World War," adds Davidson, "profits rose to heights never reached before. Even the original plundering of India clicks like small change in comparison with this," etc.

<sup>9</sup> The planned exploitation of very rich iron deposits at *Fort Gouraud* in Mauritania; phosphates at *Taiba* in Senegal; bauxite at *Los* and *Boké* in Guinea; the *Volta River project* in Ghana; the *Ingu Zone project* in the Belgian Congo, etc.

<sup>10</sup> By contrast, the share of *private* capital from Britain is considerably greater than that of French private investors.

<sup>11</sup> Enquiry by G Mathieu in *Le Monde*, 22, 23, and 24 September 1958.

Taking into account that public investment in these territories does not reach above 100,000 million francs a year, plus about 30,000 million privately invested, and that about half the *total amount spent* by the metropolis on its overseas territories comes back to it in the form of *repatriated private capital*<sup>11</sup>, it is not difficult to see that the balance of payments as between the metropolis and its African colonies is, in fact, highly favorable to the former. This furthermore explains the feeble economic and industrial development of the African territories as well as the derisory average income of their inhabitants: *less than 100 metropolitan francs per day* and "perhaps less when one takes account of the fact that the urban population is better paid."<sup>11</sup>

The greater part of public funds sent overseas by the metropolis, at the cost of the tax-payers, returns afresh to France in the accounts of private firms, big trading companies, or private individuals (wages, salaries, dividends).

The filtering pump which the franc zone constitutes has therefore the effect of *transforming public capital into private wealth, without the overseas territories deriving from the capital provided by the French tax-payers any economic advantage in proportion to the importance of these sums: only a third of metropolitan public expenditure in Negro Africa goes to investment, and only a small part of this to the increase of production*<sup>11</sup> [our emphasis].

The part devoted to useful investment not only remains weak but "is in fact diminishing, both in relative and in absolute value."<sup>11</sup>

*This makes the economic and industrial development of these territories absolutely impossible within the framework of their present colonial dependence and in face of a constant and noticeable increase in population.* Under these conditions, the rate of primitive capital accumulation stands no chance of reaching the level of 15% — much less the 20-25% — of national revenue deemed necessary for any large-scale economic and industrial development of an underdeveloped country.

### THE BALANCE SHEET OF IMPERIALIST EXPLOITATION

The transformation of the traditional *tribal subsistence economy* of Negro Africa into a *broadly capitalist economy* whose purpose is to export the mineral and agricultural wealth of the Negro-African territories; the absence of local industry and a local market sufficiently developed as yet to absorb productively the masses thrown upon it by the continuous detribalization; and to lessen the dependence of Afri-

can economy on the fluctuation of prices in the world market — all these factors have produced a chaotic overturn of the old society, having as its predominating trait *the mass pauperization of the African peoples.*

A growing part of this population pours into the urban centres, reflecting the steady commercialization and industrialization of the traditional African economy<sup>12</sup>.

The fever of revolution now gripping the Negro-African masses, underlying the political events now tumultuously crowding upon each other, is the expression of the bursting of the old integument under the pressure of new economic forces still insufficient to permit social reconstruction and stabilization on a higher level.

These forces at their present level of development (that is, the level permitted by still dominant colonial domination) cannot satisfy the accumulated needs of the masses — either from the quantitative point of view (constant increase in population) or absolutely (because the Negro African masses, having seen the technique of modern urban living, demand the same standards as the privileged European minorities).

Hence the revolutionary crisis now spreading throughout Negro Africa, a crisis deepened by the facts that the post-war boom in the prices of raw materials and agricultural products was already over by 1957, and that world-wide political events — the struggles and victories of the

<sup>12</sup> In 1953 the total number of Congo Africans living permanently "hors chefferis" — outside the tribal areas — rose to about two and a half million, or roughly a quarter of the country's whole population.

The post-war rhythm of development of the towns in Negro Africa is particularly impressive. To quote a few examples: the native population of Leopoldville jumped from 16,701 in 1923 to 46,884 in 1940, reaching 96,116 in 1945, 118,710 in 1948, 244,000 in January 1953, and about 400,000 at the present time. Elisabethville, Stanleyville and Coquilhatville have experienced a similar rate of expansion. Nairobi in Kenya has had an increase in population from 53,000 in 1945 to 95,000 in 1952. The countryside south-west of Douala is emptying into the town.

Intensive urbanization is a phenomenon common to the whole of Negro Africa, where millions of people are flowing towards the growing commercial, administrative, and industrial centres. Yet it is hard to imagine the living conditions of most of the inhabitants of the "native quarters." Let us again take the example of Leopoldville, where a big effort has been made to improve the "native quarter." In the old native city, the average density of population is 302 per hectare. In the whole quarter there is not a single storeyed house: that means that more than 300 people are living in a space 100 metres square. During 1954 and 1955, no house was built for a rent lower than 300 Belgian francs a month. But the great majority of workers do not draw more than 1,000 francs per month, and though, with a reasonable wage, one-third spent on rent may not be excessive, on a starvation wage of this sort decent lodging is completely beyond the native workers' reach.

colonial revolution, economic advance in the USSR, China, and the other workers' states, setbacks and difficulties for imperialism — are transformed on contact with the colonial situation into revolutionary energy which is penetrating even into the very subsoil of the jungles of tropical Africa.

#### RECENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

The Accra Conference of last December has unquestionably given a new impulse to the African freedom movement. Since, there have been the conference of trade unions at Conakry and the setting up of the African Workers' Confederation presided over by Sekou Touré, prime minister of independent Guinea.

But even in September 1958 the nationalist organizations of the "British" East African territories — Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika, Nyasaland and the Sultanate of Zanzibar — held at Mwanza in Uganda a meeting that was a sort of preparation for the Accra Conference.

A "Pan-African Movement for the Liberation of Central and East Africa" was set up, whose programme foresees:

the development of pan-Africanism, to free East and Central Africa from imperialism, white supremacy, economic exploitation, and social degradation; nationalist activities must be developed to win self-government and parliamentary democracy; programmes, tactics, plans, and efforts must be coordinated.

The Accra Conference was followed by important political developments in West as also in Central and East Africa. In the West, as Guinea consolidated its independence and stepped up its move for federation with Ghana, the first steps were taken towards a new "primary" federation, called Mali, which would group the territories under French control — Senegal, the French Sudan, the Upper Volta, and Dahomey. This federation, sabotaged by French imperialism and elements of the *compradore bourgeoisie* associated with Houphouët-Boigny, the RDA leader, has proved ephemeral.

It has just broken up (as has the RDA) to give birth to the no longer federative but unitary state of Senegal and the Sudan, and to the Party of African Federation (PFA), presided over by Senghor and by Mobido Keita, its general secretary.

The new party controls the legislative assemblies of Senegal and the French Sudan and is putting into practice, albeit in embryonic form, the "federal executive" project for all French West Africa, decided on at the Bamako Congress in September 1957, and obstinately sabotaged since then by imperialism and its associates.

After the formation of this new party, only the sections of Niger, Dahomey, and the Ivory Coast remained with the RDA controlled by Houphouët. These developments are certainly not the last on the road that leads inexorably to political independence for the countries still under French control in Negro Africa. In 1960 three more territories on the West African coast will reach formal independence: the Cameroons, Togoland, and Nigeria. So will Somaliland in the East. The trend towards formal independence with federative links will gather further speed throughout Negro Africa.

The Western coastal area has developed quickest politically. There are two reasons for this. Because of the climate the European population is small. And the coastal strip is relatively urbanized thanks to the commercial, industrial, and administrative activities centred there.

By contrast, Central, Eastern, and Southern Africa have experienced a less rapid political advance, for various reasons. In the South-East, more highly populated by Europeans than elsewhere, they have monopolized political power, putting obstacles in the way of African participation and a fortiori of the self-government demanded by the overwhelming majority of the Africans.

The champions of the "white man's Africa" are, beside South Africa, Kenya and Southern Rhodesia. But these states until quite recently felt themselves somehow protected from African nationalism coming from the west, because they considered that they possessed a veritable *cordon sanitaire* with the Belgian Congo as its centre, and the Portuguese possessions of Mozambique and Angola as its western and eastern flanks, hence were preparing to bring under white control a whole chain of states and federations in the East and Centre of Negro Africa.

This ridiculous house of cards has collapsed after recent events in the Congo and Nyasaland. Like thunder out of a blue sky, the fury of the Negro masses erupted in Leopoldville, placing the political status of the Congo on the order of the day. Everyone sensed that the era of paternalistic Belgian colonialism has been irremediably ended.

The rapidity with which the Belgian government reacted has been remarked. Through the mouth of King Baudouin it announced that Belgium was ready to lead the Congo "towards independence, without delay but likewise without inconsiderate haste." This means that Belgian big capital is not disposed to fight an "Algerian" war to defend the exorbitant privileges of some 85,000 Belgians and other Europeans living in the Congo in the midst of a population of about

12 million Africans seized by a fever for independence.

How much longer will the Congolese masses wait before imposing, in action, immediate independence for their vast and fabulously wealthy country? "The general atmosphere in Africa in 1960," justly wrote *The Economist* on 31 January 1959, "may make it impossible for the Belgians to stick to their plan of moving 'without inconsiderate haste'." Congo independence will naturally shatter, in the very heart of Negro Africa, the last barriers in the way of political independence for this whole region.

Somaliland, under Italian mandate, will become independent in 1960 and serve as a pole of regroupment for the other Somali territories so as to form a "Greater Somaliland," linked eventually with Arab Sudan and Egypt. Uganda, a territory still under British control, with a very sparse European population and some five million Africans, has a number of nationalist parties divided, not on the aim of independence, but only on the best way to win it. Tanganyika, another territory under British mandate, with about eight and a half million Africans to fewer than 20,000 Europeans, will not be long delayed in gaining independence.

In Kenya, the brutal repression of Mau-Mau in 1954 has not prevented the 62,000 European settlers from "[acquiring] the mentality of those who live on the slopes of Mount Etna. They now know that there is a great deal of lava about but hope the eruption will not come in their life time." (*The Times*, 27 January 1959.) A pious hope, needless to say, in danger of being shattered by the onrushing wave of pan-Africanism throughout Negro Africa.

The tension reigning in Kenya between the small European minority, which has monopolized political power and rules through a white terror, and the mass of the some six million Africans, is extreme, subject to a sudden explosion at any moment.

Surrounded by the Congo, Uganda, Somaliland, and Tanganyika, territories gripped by nationalist fever and promised complete and rapid independence, Kenya is totally cut off from the "white" states to the south, and is bound sooner or later to pass under the political control of its African population. Then, it is to be hoped, the hour of avenging justice will sound for the particularly despicable colonizers of this martyred African territory.

In East Africa, the Europeans are an isolated minority, almost besieged in the middle of a huge African population. In Central Africa, the position of the Europeans is perceptibly different.

In Southern Rhodesia, the white supremacist

regime is based on a European population of 207,000 against some two and a half million Africans. In Northern Rhodesia there are 72,000 Europeans and 2,220,000 Africans. But in Nyasaland, on the other hand, the third territory in the Central African Federation, the European population is an infinitesimal minority among 2,500,000 Africans. In round figures, about 300,000 Europeans to more than seven million Africans.

Owning the best land, and with heavy investments in the very rich mines of the area and in the various industries being developed, the settlers in these territories have a natural tendency to imitate the ultra-racialist policy of their South African neighbor, which assures them absolute political control of the Central African Federation. The latter was created in 1953, and Nyasaland was obliged to join despite the unanimous opposition of its African population.

Since then the African nationalist leaders have on several occasions asked for: (a) immediate secession from the Federation, which is dominated by Europeans; (b) internal African self-government, either under the control of the Colonial Office or in an African-dominated Federation with Tanganyika and eventually Uganda.

Sir Roy Welensky, Prime Minister of the Federation and spokesman of the racialist European settlers, is pressing, on the contrary, for Dominion status (like South Africa) for the Federation in 1960, so as to pursue his policy of racial oppression without hindrance. Thus Nyasaland, at the beginning of March, became the scene of the most serious agitation by the Negro masses that Africa has experienced since the Mau-Mau resistance in Kenya.

The movement began when the government of Southern Rhodesia, on the pretext of an imaginary "plot," declared a state of emergency and arrested the leaders of the African National Congress, including Dr Hastings Banda, the organization's head<sup>13</sup>.

Following this act, bloody repression by the white authorities and African mass resistance spread like a prairie fire throughout the Federation. Fear of "the whip hand from Salisbury," fear of white oppression, have strengthened the determination of the African masses not to allow the installation of a new hell like that existing in South Africa.

This latter country, the champion of white

<sup>13</sup> The national movement in Nyasaland evolved following the significant rebellion of Africans between January 23 and February 4, 1916, initiated by the Reverend John Chilembwe, a local clergyman. (See *Independent African*, by Shepperson and Price, Edinburgh University Press, 1958.)



supremacy, has at the same time served as a stimulus to the pan-African nationalism which has developed as a reaction against the monstrous *apartheid* policy of the Union. This policy, however, faced by a constantly increasing African population, despite the extent of European settlement (one European to every three Africans), is heading towards a total impasse. For the African population forms the essential part of the labor force upon which the upbuilding and expansion of the country's economy depends.

Latterly the new ultra-reactionary Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd introduced the "Bantu Self-Government Bill," abolishing the symbolic representation of Africans in the House of Assembly and creating eight native "states" under the suzerainty of the Pretoria government. This "solution" means in effect partition of the country, while depriving the very numerous African population of the towns of any participation in political administration.

It only remains to say a few words about the Portuguese territories — Angola in the East, Mozambique in the West. These still suffer a hateful pre-capitalist exploitation, forced labor being the rule both for public works and in private enterprise. But the number of political prisoners languishing in the mediaeval prison island of São-Thomé, off Angola, as well as several recent demonstrations, attest the irresistible strength of the national movement which is now rising, reaching into every corner of even the most backward parts of Negro Africa.

#### PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE AFRICAN REVOLUTION

The irresistible movement towards African independence and unification is in the hands, for the time being, of leaders and parties ideologically, if not socially, bourgeois in character. This is inevitable in the first phase of the developing African revolution. The general staffs of the African nationalist parties contain a mixture of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois intellectuals<sup>14</sup>, educated in the imperialist metropolitan capitals — Paris, London, Brussels, Lisbon. Sometimes there are also among them some trade unionists and even ex-Communists. The Houphouets, Mamadou Dias, Senghors, Keitas, Sekou Tourés, Nkrumahs, Abubakrs, Awolowos, and Azikiwes et al, in French and British West Africa, and the Mboyas, Kianos, Bandas, Nyereres, Kasavubus et al, in Central and East Africa, are men of this stamp.

<sup>14</sup> Intellectuals always play a big role in colonial and undeveloped countries because of frightful mass illiteracy. According to UNESCO statistics, illiteracy is 95-99% in French Africa; 85-95% in Tanganyika and Nigeria; 75-80% in Ghana and Kenya; and nearly 100% in the Portuguese possessions.

The ideology they hold in common — though in varying degrees — is pan-African nationalism; that is, the counterposing of the African masses, without distinction of class<sup>15</sup>, against European colonialism. Pleading the limited development of native bourgeois structures among a great mass of poor farmers and workers, these leaders and their parties in general reject the class struggle and seek only the creation of the bases for capitalist development under African control.

Pushed by the movement of the African masses in search of a new social equilibrium, conscious of the weakness of imperialism and the economic potentialities of Negro Africa, encouraged by East-West antagonism, these leaders strive for the elevation of the African élite to undisputed *political* control, in *economic* partnership with imperialism.

So as to bargain for this status from a position of strength, they are led to erect against imperialism *federated* or even *unified* groups of states bigger than the territories created artificially by the imperialists — the more so in that this tendency towards unification also corresponds to the wishes of the African masses and to the imperative requirements of any real economic development.

The imperialists, with rare exceptions, seem to have understood that it is impossible to perpetuate their direct control over the Negro African countries. Accordingly, so as to preserve their advantageous economic and strategic positions in this part of the world, they encourage the role of the African bourgeois élite. By so doing they reckon they can polarize pan-Africanism and deflect it from an alliance with Arab "neutralism" still recently too much drawn into the Soviet orbit, and from Communist influence. American imperialism is the boldest bidder in this game. The part played by its representatives at the recent Accra Conference and the friendly relations linking it with Nkrumah, champion of *pan-Africanism* against *Communism*, have been only too well noticed. Nkrumah's ideological adviser, George Padmore, has not failed to goad him in this direction.

But the course of the African revolution will show, as in the case of the Arab revolution it is already being demonstrated, that the historic task of unifying the Negro nation now in formation can be carried through only by a new leadership, socialist and working-class in character. Negro-African unification will prove to be, above all, the deepest desire of the African revolutionary masses; whereas the various African

<sup>15</sup> Sekou Touré recently told a correspondent of the *New York Herald Tribune* that there is "only one class of Africans."

élites, of a bourgeois social character, will turn out each to have their special narrow aims, each differently linked with imperialism, mutually antagonistic and organically incapable of accomplishing this historic task.

Moreover, the industrialization and economic development of Negro Africa is a task which cannot be fulfilled by capitalist methods. On the basis of its existing colonial economy, and the parsimony and "strings" with which the imperialist powers dole out their aid, Negro Africa will not be able to effect the *primitive accumulation of the necessary capital for a genuine industrialization on a big scale within the relatively short available time.*

In fact, like the other underdeveloped areas, Negro Africa *faces rather the possibility of economic retrogression, with whatever advance is made in absolute terms remaining too little and too late in comparison with the increasing size and needs of the population, and the progress of the advanced countries.* The gap between it and them, far from steadily diminishing, is more likely to become greater.

The solution would be quite different within the perspective of a socialist revolution under working-class leadership. The problem of primitive accumulation would be resolved by the nationalization of the surplus-value at present extorted by imperialism, by putting millions of people now in process of pauperization into productive work, and by the disinterested help of the workers' states. A bold agrarian reform,

backed by help from the socialist state, would allow rational cultivation of collective land, of the tribal areas, and of the expropriated and nationalized European plantations. New land would be reclaimed by clearing the jungles and establishing irrigation works.

This is the perspective by which Negro-African revolutionary Marxist cadres working in the various nationalist organizations and the trade-union movement must be oriented. While giving critical support to the bourgeois African organizations to the extent that they lead an effective struggle against imperialism, and for independence and unification, these Marxist cadres have the duty of preparing the formation of autonomous working-class parties, inspired by the programme of the Negro-African socialist revolution.

Left centrist formations and a growing trade-union movement already exist in West Africa, constituting the embryos of the proletarian class parties of tomorrow: the UPC in the Cameroons, the P A I, the dissident P R A in Senegal (which has broken with Senghor), the trade-union militants in Guinea.

The Negro-African revolution is distinguished by a tendency to leap over stages. It will not be long before revolutionary Marxist parties place themselves at the head of the Negro-African masses and advance with giant strides towards the Socialist Revolution.

April 1959

# ON THE FATE OF THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL

*(Some Episodes)*

By P RICHARDS

Although the foundation of the Communist (Third) International goes back now to over 40 years, no well-documented or scientific record of its history has yet been published. There exist only descriptions of certain episodes of its activity, as well as attempts at overall records of the course of development of the Communist movement in individual countries. In the '30s the Executive of the Communist International itself thought of publishing a history of the decade and a half of its activity and a highly schematic description of the activity of its most important institutions. This was to summarize the accumulated experiences and to draw conclusions for the workers' movement and its future development.

A commission was set up under the chairmanship of C I Executive Committee member D Z Manuilsky (recently deceased), to which were assigned also the then best-known leaders of the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union, Germany, Italy, France, etc. In addition to the most important documents which were to be found in the archives, testimony was to be sought from many persons who had directly participated in the movement and at various periods in the activity of the C I. But after a few sessions of the commission entrusted with preparing this historical work, it became evident that, though there was an abundance of materials in hand, the sifting of these materials presented difficulties which, in the then reigning political ambience of Moscow, could not be overcome.

These concerned especially the historical role of figures who had played a leading part in the founding and the first years of the life of the Communist International. There had already begun the period in which even the mention of the names of Trotsky, Zinoviev, et al, who had been the closest collaborators with Lenin in the foundation and leadership of the Third International, was not allowed. In the same way, there were bound up with the first "heroic" period of the Third International many names of leading communists who had later fallen into discredit. Another big difficulty was in connection with an evaluation of various actions of the Communist International, which could not be truthfully set forth and concerning the historical

judgment of which great divergences of opinion existed.

The *History* had first been planned to fill one or two volumes. There soon came a circular from Manuilsky suggesting the expansion of the work to some six volumes. The sessions dragged on from month to month, and the more extensive the collection of materials became, the more clearly it appeared that the publication of such a history could not take place in the '30s.

But even in the following years, in which hopes had been placed, the Executive of the Communist International did not succeed in publishing a work on its own history. For it happened that many eminent members of the commission that was to prepare this history fell victims in the '30s to Stalin's terror.

And a few years later, in 1943, after the "self-liquidation" of the Communist International ordered by Stalin, there followed the transfer of these archives to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, where they have been under lock and key for fifteen years, and as before, their publication forbidden.

Until the publication of the documents collected in these archives, the testimony of individual participants in the Communist movement in the past can describe only certain episodes which — whether they recall periods and deeds in the history of the C I, or remember hitherto unknown details — contribute to an understanding of its fate.

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Although the foundation of the Third International had become — in view of the situation created by the First World War in the workers' movement, of the new historic fact of a workers' state created by the October Revolution, and of the growing revolutionary ferment in Central Europe — a historical necessity which the leaders of the Bolshevik Party recognized and carried out by their own forces, still it is worth noting that at the First Congress of the International there was no unanimous opinion about the main question. When the question of founding the new, the Third, International was put to the vote, one delegation that had found the road to Moscow abstained. It was the delegation of the K P D, the German Communist Party.

The delegation had been elected at the Founding Congress of the KPD at the end of 1918, and had needed two months filled with many difficulties to break its way through to Moscow. The delegates had no mandate to vote the immediate foundation of a new International, and all the efforts of the Russian comrades and of the representatives of the other parties (and they were few enough) could do nothing to change the attitude of the German communists.

This attitude was based on a proposition by Rosa Luxemburg, who had asked and obtained that the German delegation withhold its agreement to the founding of a new International as long as the state power lay in the hands of the workers of a single country — in this case, Russia. There existed the danger that such an International might in time become the instrument of state policy of this country rather than representing the interests of the workers of *all* countries.

Rosa Luxemburg herself, in the period elapsed between the departure of the delegation and the 1 March 1919 Founding Congress International, had been murdered in Berlin. Later the opinion was expressed in the leading circles of the Communist International that, if she had been able to take part in the congress herself, she would have changed her mind. The KPD — despite its abstention at its foundation — later became an active section of the Communist International. But in the '30s, when, after the KPD's heroic struggles and its tragic defeat, the National-Socialists came to power in Germany, the past struggles of the German working class were analyzed in the circles of German émigré Communists in Moscow, and thereby the "directive" that had been adopted at the suggestion of Rosa Luxemburg also came into question:

It well may be that her opinion thereon was based on the fact that it was to be expected that within a short time a second workers' state (namely, Germany) would exist. Then the KPD, as the representative of the German proletariat, would meet with the Russian Bolsheviks as an equal partner in the Third International. [...] Thus, however, Rosa's reservations — in the light of the difficult experiences of the period lying between December 1918 and Hitler's coming to power in 1933 — take on a particularly sombre prophetic tone [...]; the International [...] as the instrument of the state interests of Russia, was not appropriate to the real representation of the interests of the world proletariat.

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In the first years the workers of the Soviet Union not only formally considered the Comintern as the "General Staff of the World Re-

volution," but they also held it for certain for long after the seizure of state power — essentially until Lenin's death — that the achievement of the revolution in other (and especially Western), countries would be brought about with the aid of this International. Without the proletarian revolution, the victory of socialism in a single country was for them unimaginable.

This conviction of the Soviet working class and of the first generation of Russian Bolsheviks, who had taken state power in October 1917 not as exponents of a Russian proletariat limited in its possibilities, but in its name as the vanguard of the world proletariat, was so widespread and deep-rooted that even Stalin in his speech at Lenin's funeral mentioned fidelity to the Communist International as an integral part of his pledge to Lenin's memory.

But no later than 1926 it was shown what this vow was worth in Stalin's mouth. He had, from the first minute, tried to transform the Comintern into a propaganda section of his party secretariat and to use it as a shop-sign for the international workers' movement (which he neither knew nor cared about), but also to reduce as much as possible its influence on questions concerning the Russian Communist Party, although the Comintern's fate depended principally upon developments in the Soviet Union.

When the struggle for power inside the CPSU, between the Old Bolshevik nucleus and the Stalin-led bureaucratic wing fighting ever more brutally for power, reached its decisive point, Trotsky made the attempt (much too late, in the opinion of many of his supporters) to appeal to the communists of other countries organized in the International, to bring before their eyes the fateful meaning of Stalin's monopoly of power not only for the Russian proletarian revolution but also for the world revolution whose leadership was the immediate task of the Communist International.

During the VIIth Plenum of the Executive of the Communist International in 1927 (in between the CI's Vth and VIth Congresses), there occurred the now historic struggle between Trotsky and Stalin, whose outcome showed the whole powerlessness of the communist leader in face of the perfidious tricks and the unscrupulous administrative pressure of the Stalin apparatus.

The result of the Plenum was less the removal of Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, et al, leaders connected with the Communist International since its founding, than the death sentence of the whole Communist International as such.

What followed in the 17 years between 1927 and 1943 was the death-agony of the Third International, condemned to death by Stalin. The directives sent by the Third International to

various countries — aimed sometimes at senseless adventures without perspectives, sometimes at ridiculous manoeuvres and panicky capitulations — weigh down consciences with many bloody chapters. But it must immediately be added in the interests of truth that in all essential questions these were directives for which the apparatus of the International and the obediently listening leaders of the individual parties were only intermediaries.

These directives came from Stalin and expressed the interests of his policy, for the consolidation of his power in the Soviet Union and the strengthening of his prestige by international standards, without caring in the slightest degree for the interests of the world proletariat or the proletarian masses in the individual countries.

It is a whole other chapter how comrades who were extremely sincere and filled with a limitless spirit of devotion and sacrifice were involved in carrying out various instructions coming from Stalin's apparatus for their own selves as for the groups, instructions that were false and treacherous to the interests of the toiling masses, but told themselves: "It is a question of a great battle on a world scale, and Stalin's strategy of genius therein consists of sacrificing everything and everybody who stands in the way of his plan to win the battle for world power. And if thereby the Communist International is sacrificed, that is done in the interest of Stalin's 'higher plans'."

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There came the moment when the Communist International, in its death-agony and long since reduced to a propaganda auxiliary, again occupied Stalin's attention.

On the one hand, during the war against Hitler, there had begun a powerful upsurge of the revolutionary workers' movement which placed the Communists, who had become mass parties in many countries, before the immediate task of the conquest of power after having driven out the Nazi occupants. At the head of the Communist groups in various countries there were outstanding figures who, with a revival of the International, could have begun a revolt against the pseudo-communist ukases of Stalin's apparatus.

On the other hand, the existence of the Comintern was a welcome bargaining point. In his deals with Churchill and Roosevelt, Stalin could offer the dissolution of the Comintern as a sacrifice that he would make in order to concretize his full loyalty and fidelity to the alliance.

And so it remained only for Georg Dimitrov, entrusted since 1935 with the administration of Comintern affairs, to sign the formula of self-dissolution, which was confirmed by the Executive of the Communist International.

But the ideals which, 40 years ago, at the time of the founding of the Third International, animated the leaders of the working class, who thought thereby to carry on the traditions of Marx and Engels and the First International, have survived the dissolution of the Third International in the hearts of the worker masses.

And if many years must still pass before a true history of the Third International is written, it must contain the elements of true heroism of its best fighters as well as the shame of Stalin and his petty accomplices who betrayed and strangled it.

# THE XXI<sup>ST</sup> CONGRESS OF THE C P OF THE SOVIET UNION

By ERNEST GERMAIN

A "dreary" congress, a "disappointing contrast with the XXth Congress," an "insignificant" congress, a "purely technical meeting": such are some of the formulae used by Western observers about the XXIst Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which met in the Soviet capital from 27 January to 5 February 1959. All these remarks contain a kernel of truth — but only a kernel.

After the dramatic XXth Congress, culminating in the denunciation of the Stalin cult and Khrushchev's secret report, the XXIst Congress could not offer an equivalent in the way of sensation. The Soviet bureaucracy, after the harsh lesson of the October-November 1956 events in Poland and Hungary, made an exceptional effort to retighten up its political control over the whole of its realm. Khrushchev accepted the point of view that any new "resounding" stage of destalinization would be a direct threat to the rule of the bureaucracy. It was, furthermore, after this concession made to Molotov & Co that the "anti-party group" seems to have misestimated the extent of the victory it had won; it went over to the attack in the Political Bureau in June 1957, with the consequences we now know. But in its defeat, it kept the advantage on one essential point. At the XXIst Congress there was no new denunciation of Stalin; his name was scarcely mentioned once or twice.

But on the other hand, nothing that was said or done at this congress gives any credit to the hypothesis that the decisions of the XXth Congress have been in their turn subjected to revision. On the contrary, the reporter himself and a large number of speakers insisted on the fact that the "violations of Soviet legality," the "in-fractions of socialist democracy and of internal party democracy," had been totally and definitively abolished. The XXIst Congress thus appears to be a congress which on the political plane confirms and consolidates the main trends of "destalinization" without going beyond the limits set by the bureaucracy beginning with late 1956.

The emphasis of the congress was given to the Seven-Year Plan, lengthily developed in Khrushchev's report. We have already analyzed the main aspects of this plan in our last issue<sup>1</sup>; we shall therefore not treat them again now. It is

<sup>1</sup> Vide "From the XXth to the XXIst Congress of the CPSU," in the Winter 1959 number.

other subjects discussed at the XXIst Congress that we wish to treat more extensively, subjects to which neither the bourgeois nor the Stalinist press paid sufficient attention, and which nevertheless reveal important trends in the development of Soviet society and of the policy of the CP of the USSR.

## *THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE "ANTI-PARTY GROUP"*

Next to the Seven-Year Plan itself, it was the denunciation of the "anti-party group" that served as the general theme for all the congress speakers. And in what terms!

Like a Byzantine litany, the "shameful," "shameless," "ignoble," "criminal," "fractional" machinations were denounced in a stereotyped and monotonous way by the bureaucrats who succeeded one another on the rostrum. What a far cry it is from this congress to not only the congresses of the Leninist period but even to the congresses of the beginning of the Stalinist period, when the Bolshevik tradition and cadres had not yet been destroyed. There, at least, political arguments — even if false, demagogic, or even slanderous — were still exchanged. Here there is nothing of that. What is in question here is a "denunciation" lying midway between an excommunication and a stool-pigeon's report. On the level of style, the CP of the USSR seems still not to have overcome either the "personality cult" or the after-effects of the "criminal activities of the enemy of the state, Beria."

If we examine it closer, however, this dreary litany still reveals some interesting facts. First of all, out of a total of 83 Soviet speakers who took the floor at the XXIst Congress, 60 denounced the "anti-party group" and 23 did not. Who are these 23? *We shall find among them, with three exceptions, all the workers and agriculturists from the ranks who took the floor at the congress, as also all the academicians and savants.*

This deserves to be noted. The 83 speakers are divided between 64 party and state bureaucrats (including the sole army spokesman, Marshal Malinovsky) and 19 representatives of the "ranks" (workers, agriculturists, and intellectuals). Out of the 64 bureaucrats, 58 took part in the ritual "denunciation"; seven abstained. Out of the 19 representatives of the "ranks," only three (a worker and two kolkhoz-members) attacked the "anti-party group"; 16 abstained.

We must naturally be careful not to attribute to this revealing fact more importance than it deserves. Among the bureaucrats who did not join in the campaign against the "anti-party group" is to be found the wretchedly famous Semichastny, secretary of the C C of the Komsomols at the time of the congress (he has since then been removed from that post), and Khrushchev's son-in-law. Semichastny has the reputation of being a hyper-Stalinist in "firmness"; he "distinguished himself" by comparing Pasternak to a "hog that dirties his own pen." It is, furthermore, not very probable that he had been an ally of Molotov, since he owes his whole rise to Khrushchev. The fact that he demonstrated a "lack of orthodoxy" can be explained simply by an oversight or by the desire to show that the Komsomols "do not engage in politics."

Furthermore, the workers who abstained from attacking the "anti-party group" are described to us as workers only by the official congress documents. We do not know whether we have here genuine workers, or foremen, or superintendents, or members of management personnel.

Nevertheless, this curious division of the speakers deserves being emphasized; it deserves it all the more in that Khrushchev in his reply referred by name to a certain number of speakers who had given "remarkable" exposés — and who with a few exceptions were precisely the speakers who had abstained from attacking the "anti-party group"!

What is more, there was a certain gradation in the attacks against the "anti-party group." Whereas the majority of speakers were satisfied to repeat the above-mentioned adjectives, toward the end of the congress, the attacks became more and more harsh and more and more loaded with implications.

Thus J P Kolushchinski (leader of the Omsk C P) spoke of the "group of conspirators." Zhudin outbid him by affirming that, if the "criminal conspirators" had not been "disarmed" by the C C, Communism would have been "decisively weakened" in the U S S R. Kuzmin, head of the Plan Commission, took a step further by accusing Pervukhin and Saburov of having in bad faith (hence with evil intentions?) slowed down the development of the petroleum and chemical industries, and of having pushed solid-fuel rather than liquid-fuel thermal power-plants. The accusation almost touches on the domain of sabotage! One Chegalin, a party chief from Stalin-grad, picked up and broadened this same accusation, and one Denisov, a bureaucrat from Saratov, even accused the "anti-party group" of having knowingly wished to slow down the advance of the country toward communism.

All these accusations are of a nature to recall the formula "enemy of the people" which Attorney-General Rudenko uttered at the last session of the Supreme Soviet. Yet Khrushchev, in his reply, did not echo them. The members of the "anti-party group" were not expelled from the party; Pervukhin and Saburov were not even expelled from the Central Committee. It is true that the renewal of this organism was not on the agenda. But Kuzmin's "campaign" was without any doubt aiming at "extreme" measures, and these were not taken. Kuzmin himself, soon after the congress, was removed from his functions. Must there be seen in this a sign that the leadership wanted to reassure the mass of the bureaucrats and party members? The latter, of course, must have feared that the attacks against the "antiparty group" were giving the signal for new "extreme" measures which, however, it had been promised to avoid.

We said that the style of this congress remains closer to that of the Stalinist congresses than to those of the 1923-27 period, not to mention the congresses in which Lenin took part. The composition of the congress, revealed by the report of the mandates commission, concretizes this statement by some terrifying details. Of the 1,269 delegates to the congress, eight — repeat, *eight* — were Old Bolsheviks, i.e., members of the party at the moment of the October Revolution. Now at that time the Bolshevik Party had 240,000 members, of whom tens of thousands were young people between 20 and 30, who would today be between 62 and 72. Many died in the civil war, but tens of thousands survived. Furthermore, at the end of the civil war the Bolshevik Party in March 1921 had 732,500 members. Now of these members, of whom surely a third were people under 35 (who would be less than 73 today), 45 — repeat, *45*, out of 'say 200,000 — were delegates to the XXIst Congress.

Do we need other figures to realize what a frightful hecatomb Stalin made in the ranks of the Bolsheviks?

It is furthermore significant that Khrushchev himself did not join the Bolshevik Party till after October 1917 in spite of the fact that he was already 23 at the time of the Revolution. He was not to be found among the élite of the Russian working-class youth, of whom tens of thousands, of his age or younger, entered the party ranks before the victory of the Revolution.

Let us further add that, out of 1,269 delegates, there were only 399 workers and kolkhoz-members, and 50 intellectuals active as such; the rest, viz 820 delegates, were bureaucrats. The latter thus formed close to two thirds of the congress delegates: a significant proportion, even if it is slightly less than that at the XXth Congress.

*THE LIQUIDATION OF THE "VIOLATIONS OF SOVIET LEGALITY AND DEMOCRACY"*

A large number of speakers took the floor on the subject of the decisions of the XXth Congress concerning the "repression of the violations of Soviet legality and democracy." This was the third theme more or less generally treated at the congress.

Although many statements on this matter as well were rather stereotyped, several remarks deserve to be signalized.

Thus Khrushchev himself stated that there were no longer any political prisoners in the USSR today, and that nobody was any longer persecuted for his political opinions. Mikoyan spoke at some length on the same subject and stated in particular:

Soviet democracy has taken great steps forward, and, the farther one goes on, the more thorough this evolution becomes, at the same time that the social order of the country is consolidated and perfected. Each step that brings us nearer to communism gives more and more importance to the role of persuasion, of social influence, of Communist education, and of the conscious discipline of the members of Communist society, and tends to reduce more and more the use of means of constraint. Among us today there are no longer reprisals against citizens for political reasons.

Mikoyan's tone here is different from that used by all his colleagues. He is the only speaker who states that "the XXIst Congress is the organic development of the XXth Congress." One senses that it is a different school that is speaking here, and in fact Mikoyan is one of the eight congress delegates who were already party members in October 1917. That is felt in his words. It is furthermore interesting to note that Mikoyan states that never before have the bonds between the party and the masses been so solid as now. Of course this ritual affirmation is to be found in all previous congresses of the Bolshevik C.P. But perhaps it should be connected up with the "withering away of the function of constraint"? Perhaps it will be admitted today, that when the state and the police, far from withering away, attain a degree of unknown total power, as was the case between 1934 and 1954 this scarcely testifies to society's being solid, but on the contrary internally rent, and proves, not the enthusiastic rallying but on the contrary the opposition — even if it be tacit — of the citizens toward the state?

There is no doubt but that this opposition has lost much of its violence now that the fundamental needs of consumers are beginning little by little to be satisfied. Nevertheless Chelepin, the

new police chief, felt obliged to observe that the security services (political police), while limiting their functions, remain indispensable; and he also contradicted in fact the affirmation according to which these services were aimed exclusively abroad. His objectives, he said, are:

a few renegades, degenerates, drunkards, and blatherers who might be capable [!] of falling into the nets of the enemy.

If there were really only such exceptions, it is not very easy to see why it would be necessary to maintain an extremely cumbersome and expensive apparatus (even though it has been considerably reduced, as Khrushchev—doubtless truthfully—says). Indeed, though the cohesion of Soviet society has been increased in these last years, we are still far from a "classless society." It is there, and only there, that lies the secret of the survival of the "domestically oriented organs of repression." But this cannot be explained without casting doubt upon the dogma of the "completed construction of socialist society."

Khrushchev as well as Chelepin insisted on the need to transfer to "social organizations" certain functions heretofore fulfilled by the state apparatus. Chelepin quotes the large number of juvenile delinquents brought before the courts (which, parenthetically, casts a very harsh light on the "social harmony" reigning in this "classless society"). He quite correctly deplores this, and asks that it be made possible for the youth to be reeducated and corrected in a friendly way by the trade unions, the youth organizations, and the factory collectives, rather than by courts and reform schools. Khrushchev on his side proposes the administration by the trade unions of vacation homes, the turning over of sporting equipment to sports organizations, and the development by benevolent organizations (especially amateur theatre groups, amateur orchestras, etc) of divers cultural activities.

All these developments are to be welcomed and mark the unquestionable lessening of tension now being shown in social relations in the USSR. But certain Western apologists — especially the German group "Arbeiterpolitik" — have in this connection spoken of a "withering away of the state." This is an exaggeration that comes close to the ridiculous. At that rate, "the state would have withered away" long since in bourgeois democracy, where phenomena now signalized have been current practice for decades. The day when workers' councils take over the management of the plants, the day when groups of workers carry out in turn the administrative functions of big municipalities, the day when groups of citizens take the initiative of publishing *political* daily papers all over the USSR — that will be the day when it will be



possible to talk about a "withering away of the state" in the meaning in which Lenin used the term. For on that day, the democratized workers' state will be both a state and a state-that-is-withering-away, by its growing fusion with the mass of its citizens.

In the USSR, where the administrative apparatus remains the most cumbersome in the world, and where the political and administrative initiative of the workers is infinitely limited compared to the first years of the Revolution, to talk about a "withering away of the state" is cynically to fool the masses — unless it is to fool oneself.

Chvernik stated that "all Communists condemned without real cause have been readmitted to the party," and he added that these measures concerned particularly "leading cadres [!] of the party, the state, the economy, and the army." Suslov promised that the minutes of the congress and of conferences of the Bolshevik Party would be reproduced. It is unquestionable that the most hysterical falsification of history tends to "wither away" in the USSR, but it is not replaced by an objective search after truth, at least not by the leaders of the party and the state.

The preface to the *Memoirs* of Antonov-Ovseienko, and the preface and notes to John Reed's *Ten Days that Shook the World* — two of the most sensational publications in the USSR in recent years — show that destalinization stops at the level just preceding the big "purge." Trotskyism continues to be fought against by the use of political calumnies, but they are the calumnies of 1926-32 rather than those of 1936. The objective result of this evolution is to give the youth and honest researchers the possibility of getting reoriented by their own means; and that is promising for the future!

The "liberalization" of public life in the USSR was a concession not only to the broad masses but also to the mass of the bureaucracy who, under Stalin, were excluded from the effective exercise of power and in permanent danger of losing their privileges and their lives for arbitrary reasons. We have often insisted on this fact, as we have emphasized in this connection that the present leadership of the party was seeking to broaden the bases of the dictatorship, to associate a growing number of bureaucrats in the exercise of power.

We have found a striking confirmation of this thesis in economic decentralization. We find another one at the XXIst Congress in Kirishchenko's declaration, according to which, in plenary sessions of the Central Committee, and at conferences that end up in Central Committee decisions for important questions,

there are invited the most progressive [!]

personalities in the country, the leading [!] collaborators of the organs of the party, the state, and the economy, i.e., the big plants and the kolkhozes, savants, engineers, technicians, etc.

This enumeration speaks volumes. Democracy *within the bureaucracy* is manifestly spreading; the plenary sessions of the Central Committee are more and more transformed into representative assemblies of the bureaucracy as a whole. But Kirishchenko forgets one trifling detail: do not the *non-leading* workers of the plants perhaps belong to the "most progressive personalities" in the country? It is doubtless by mere oversight that they are not invited to these sessions . . .

### THE STRUGGLE FOR IMPROVEMENT IN THE STANDARD OF LIVING

The fourth key-theme of the XXIst Congress — after the Seven-Year Plan, the denunciation of the "anti-party group," and the "reestablishment of the Leninist norms of Soviet legality and democracy" — was the steady improvement in the standard of living of the Soviet people. In this matter, the achievements of these last years have unquestionably been impressive, even if often all promises have not been kept, or not been kept by the proposed target-dates. <sup>1</sup> Many speakers came forward to confirm with figures the progress achieved or the progress forecast for the coming years. Let us hope that all these plans — especially that of the construction of housing, the most impressive and the most urgent of all — will be actually carried out and that the Soviet people will see its living standards rise notably after decades of terrible sacrifices.

Nevertheless, the leaders of the bureaucracy, who for the first time could quote solid arguments in favor of the Soviet regime, could not refrain from falling into facile and outrageous demagoguery; it is not easy to get rid of bad habits.

Thus in comparing sugar consumption in the USSR and the USA, XXIst Congress speakers quoted figures of current production and forecasts for seven to twelve years hence, carefully not mentioning that the major part of American consumption is covered, not by domestic production, but by the import of Cuban sugar! Other speakers, outbidding Khrushchev's declarations, recklessly affirmed that by 1970 the standard of living of Soviet workers will already be higher than that of American workers *at that time* — an unfounded affirmation, as we have already demonstrated. <sup>1</sup> Khrushchev himself contends that medical care in the USSR is the best in the world, and quotes as proof the expenditure of 360,000 million rubles for public

health during the coming seven-year period. But that comes after all to only 250 rubles per capita annually, i.e., scarcely half what the state is spending in Great Britain to finance the health services. And so on.

Once more it was Mikoyan who, contrary to many speakers who insisted on "absolute priority for the development of heavy industry," stressed what is particular about the Seven-Year Plan:

The Seven-Year Plan is characterized to a much greater degree than our preceding economic plans by the fact that, while basing itself on the enormous successes of heavy industry and its later development, it foresees a much more rapid growth than heretofore in the production of consumers' goods and a more rapid elevation of the welfare of the population.

Here we have simultaneously a programme and a confession, both quite truthful. We must not doubt the promise, which is sincere (even if it will not be possible to fulfill it completely). But the confession is no less real. It inflicts a smashing denial to the lackeys of the bureaucracy, and especially its lackeys in the West, who outdid themselves in concealing or minimizing the sacrifices imposed on the Soviet population during past decades, and described for us in pastel colors the miserable life of the mass of the people, in this way insulting it in its distress. Another speaker, Kirishchenko, moreover, completed this confession by confirming that we were right when we criticized with the same argument the latest economic work by Stalin.<sup>2</sup> There in fact he said that

everyone knows the situation in which our agricultural production found itself just a few [!] years ago. There was too little wheat, there was a great penury [!] of meat, milk, butter, sugar, vegetables, and other important food products.

Other speakers moreover pointed out in passing just as deplorable cases of penury which persist even today in the world's second industrial power. The poet Tvardovski pointed out that it is extremely difficult to find in stores shelving on which to keep one's books. Another speaker, the worker Gorbunov from the Leningrad shipbuilding works, reminded that it is difficult, even for big enterprises, to find nails, bolts, and small tools, and that they are often forced to manufacture them at great cost. Here again we find the bureaucratic leaden lid that burdens the functioning of the planned economy and continues to cause it enormous losses and wastes.

### THE DEFICIENCIES OF BUREAUCRATIC PLANNING

In this connection the XXIst Congress confirmed the complaints of the XIXth and XXth Congresses — which is a good demonstration that the reforms introduced in the meantime have not changed the roots of the evil at all.

Thus the vice-president of the council of ministers, Sasyadko, announced that as of 1 January 1959 there were in the U.S.S.R. not less than 320,000 (!) construction projects that remained unfinished, and that the expenditures frozen in this construction reached the sum of 179,000 million rubles. This situation has enormously slowed down the rhythm of advance of the economy. Aristov added that in the Russian Federative Republic alone there were 60,000 machine-tools and 15,000 groups of machines, already produced and capable of functioning, that had not been installed. Hence another source of losses.

The regular and uninterrupted supply of raw materials and auxiliary products is far from being ensured. The worker Gorbunov, already quoted, stated that just the regularization of supplies to the Leningrad shipbuilding works would permit of a 20 to 30% increase in production without any additional investment. "There are the unused reserves in our industry," he shouted. Indeed they are; and an identical situation was denounced by Malenkov... at the XIXth Congress of the C.P.

Another speaker, Koslov, spoke at some length about the losses caused by excessive metal scrap. He figured these at 4,500,000 metric tons a year, i.e., 25,000 million rubles in value.

Various speakers went on about certain harmful consequences of industrial decentralization — which was otherwise duly vaunted by the whole congress. They emphasized the development of regionalism, of plant or local egotism, the violation of supply contracts, and the arbitrary modification of the choice of products, etc.

One of the facts officially revealed for the first time by the XXIst Congress was the lack of calculation of comparative costs of investment projects carried out up till now in the U.S.S.R. Thus various steel-making projects were compared by Sasyadko to calculate their long-term profitability, taking into account the *remuneration of investment*; a project that produces 16% on its invested capital must be preferred to a project that brings in only 7%, he affirmed. Indeed it seems that Soviet planners will henceforth be led to include interest charges (the calculation of monetary profitability and not only the increase in physical productivity) in the choice among various investment projects.

The enormous diversity in production costs

<sup>2</sup> *Les Problèmes économiques de l'URSS*, published by Les Editions de la Quatrième Internationale.

was emphasized, especially by speakers treating the subject of electric power-stations. One speaker from Tadchikistan — since then removed from his functions — proposed the construction of a hydraulic power-plant that would furnish current at 0.3 kopecks per kWh (this was a veiled attack on Khrushchev who asked for concentration on thermal power-stations using gas or petroleum products). The average cost per kWh in the big electric power-stations was figured by Novikov, minister of the electric industry, at eight kopecks. But side-by-side with these big plants, there are little ones that provide current at from one to two rubles per kWh! Novikov revealed, moreover, that these “small power-stations,” to the number of 100,000, concentrate 80% of the personnel of the Soviet Union’s electric industry while furnishing only 10% of the current.

It is certain that such anomalies continue in many branches of the Soviet economy, and that “decentralization” is not exactly what overcomes them.

#### ONE LAST TIME: ON THE COMPLETED CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIALISM IN A SINGLE COUNTRY

Though the XXIst Congress of the Soviet C P was above all a practical, and even pragmatic, congress, it could not pass over in silence a series of more and more complicated and contradictory theoretical problems that are posed to the theoreticians of the bureaucracy, as well as to all Marxist theoreticians per se. What is the real stage of social development that the USSR is now going through? What are the stages that remain for it to traverse before it reaches a higher stage of social development? What political, economic, and social transformations must accompany this evolution?

These questions are all the more painful for the theoreticians of the bureaucracy in that they all touch, directly or indirectly, on the problem of the bureaucracy itself. And so the official theoreticians go forward into this “terra incognita” only on tiptoe, constantly looking over their shoulders, and each time retracing their steps. It is not by chance that the famous programme of the Soviet C P, which has been promised to us for years, is still not drafted, and that at the XXIst Congress a speaker put forward the proposition that Khrushchev’s report be used as the inspiration for drafting this programme!

It cannot be questioned that the first secretary of the Soviet C P has a certain courage, even in the field of theory. He has hurled himself valiantly into it, as if it were a question of plowing up virgin lands or imposing a new technique for raising Indian corn. Unfortunately, Marxist

theory is not a fallow field, even if Stalin did his possible and impossible to render it arid and uncultivated. And Khrushchev, who has the merit of raising certain questions, can proffer only banal answers, which his courtiers hasten to acclaim as remarkable if not indeed showing genius.

Khrushchev observes that in the USSR socialism has completely and definitively triumphed; this verb was picked up by numerous speakers, who found in it a sensational innovation. What must we think of this?

It is now nearly ten years ago that our movement, on the morrow of the Chinese revolution, affirmed that the relationship of forces was evolving in a decisive way in favor of the anti-capitalist camp and at the expense of the imperialist camp. Nothing that has happened since then justifies revising this estimate; on the contrary, it has been completely confirmed by events. This *world* evolution in the relationship of forces — a function both of the victory of the Chinese revolution and the steady progress of the colonial revolution and of the economic advances carried out in the USSR — has unquestionably reinforced the Soviet regime to a degree unknown before 1941. It is, however, difficult to see in it a confirmation of the theory according to which it is possible to achieve socialism in a single country. For is it not precisely the *international extension* of the Revolution that has modified the global relationship of forces between the classes?

We can approve Khrushchev when he affirms that a restoration of capitalism in the USSR can be considered as excluded. Such a restoration could be a function only of an international reinforcement of the counter-revolutionary forces as compared to the forces of the revolution. Such a reinforcement can scarcely be forecast in a foreseeable future.

Unfortunately, as we have already said in the past, the Kremlin has gone over from one extreme to the other: from an overestimation of imperialist strength (which characterized the strategy of the Stalinist epoch) to a no less dangerous underestimation. If we go along with Khrushchev when he affirms that a restoration of capitalism is impossible in the USSR, we no longer go along with him when he affirms that the “victory of socialism is definitive.” For he forgets that there is alas a tertium quid here: viz the reciprocal destruction of the United States and the Soviet Union in a nuclear war.

To affirm that such a material destruction of the bases of the Soviet economy is impossible would be to affirm that American imperialism is no longer in a position to unleash a world war. Several speakers at the XXIst Congress more or

less declared this; but what we have here is an extremely dangerous illusion — an illusion which for that matter does not seem to influence the behavior of the heads of the Soviet armed forces, to judge by the mass of the annual military expenditures.

Can it furthermore be affirmed, as Khrushchev (following his teacher Stalin) does, that socialism is already “definitively achieved” in the USSR? That immediately involves flagrant contradictions. Socialism is a social system superior to capitalism, characterized by the disappearance of social division into classes. Now Soviet “socialism” foresees only seven to 15 years from now surpassing the level of productivity of American capitalism, and the disappearance of social classes — especially the distinction between the working class and the kolkhoz peasantry — is postponed by Khrushchev himself to a rather misty future.

It is therefore more logical, and furthermore more in conformity with Marxist tradition, to state that in the USSR we are still witnessing a *transitional society* between capitalism and socialism, but one which is beginning to near its goal, as the upsurge of the productive forces, the raising of the levels of living and culture, and the “industrialization” of the countryside, permit of the solution of the main contradictions of this stage. Needless to add, the overthrow of the dictatorship (even slightly democratized) of the bureaucracy, and the reestablishment of a full and complete soviet democracy, are the conditions sine qua non for the achievement of the construction of a socialist society.

In reality, several characteristics quoted by Khrushchev for a *communist* society are in fact characteristics of a *socialist* society, as for example the attainment of a level of productivity, of living standards, of health, and of culture, superior to that of the most advanced capitalism. If therefore Khrushchev affirms in a rather surprising fashion — fortunately revising Stalin — that “communism” will not be built in a single country, but in the “socialist camp” as a whole (i.e., over one third of the surface of the globe, even if it were admitted that this camp did not become more extensive in the coming years), he is in reality affirming, perhaps unconsciously, that history has definitively swept away the “theory of socialism in a single country,” and that it will doubtless be a dozen if not more countries that will end up all together at the socialist society.

### PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

But if numerous questions raised by Khrushchev as questions of *communism* are in reality questions of *socialism*, what then are the real problems of communism?

It is known that in his *Critique of the Gotha Programme* Marx distinguishes between the two stages of socialist society, the lower stage, and the higher stage, called the communist stage. He enumerated the following characteristics thereof:

- 1) In the lower stage — which today we call the socialist stage — *value* and *exchange* have disappeared. What remains is the *exact measure* of labor contributed by each individual to society; for it is this measure that presides over the *egalitarian* sharing out of the means of consumption.
- 2) In the higher stage — which today we call the communist stage — the *measure* of labor of each person will have disappeared at the same time as the measure of what each consumes. The rule of “from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs” will be applied. We shall be in the reign of abundance, rendered possible by
  - a) a prodigious development of productive forces;
  - b) a psychological revolution caused by the automatic satisfaction of all fundamental needs in the course of the preceding stage, which will thus cause to disappear the desire for becoming individually rich as a motive for economic and social activity.

It suffices to cast a glance over this succinct summary to realize that the problems of communism — the problem of passing over from an egalitarian distribution to a distribution of abundance — can scarcely yet be raised in a serious way in the USSR.

The academician Ostrovitianov, who has brought off the tour de force of remaining an official economist in the USSR for 30 years — before Stalin, during Stalin, and after Stalin — affirms that during the higher stage of communism the production of commodities and commodity-money relationships will wither away. He adds that, thanks to electronic calculating machines(!), it will be possible directly to measure the time of social labor in everybody’s individual labors.

The confusion is obvious. It is during the transitional phase and at the beginning of the first stage of communism — the socialist stage — that commodities, value, and money will wither away and give place to accountancy in working hours of each person’s effort. To the extent that Ostrovitianov insists on the *upsurge* in the categories of commodities, value, and money, not only inside the USSR, but also in relations between the USSR and the “socialist” countries, he provides, in spite of himself, the best proof that the construction of a socialist society is far from being achieved in the Soviet Union.

Khrushchev explains much more correctly that

in the communist society the *measured* sharing out of consumers' goods will disappear — including when they are measured by the “electronic calculating machine.” What will remain, he says, is the need to share out in a scientific way the available labor forces among the different branches of industry. We are here very close to the famous formula of Yarochenko, the young economist with whom Stalin was obliged to cross blades before his death: the only economic problems that will remain in communist society will be the problems of the *organization* of production.

Only to arrive at this conclusion, Khrushchev is obliged to borrow from Stalin the famous absurd formula of “from each according to his abilities, to each according to his labor [!]” as the formula that would guide the sharing out of goods in a socialist society. This formula is not found in any classic work of Marxism; it is a crude counterfeit. Better yet: it must veil the *bourgeois* character of the norms of distribution in the U S S R, a definition that corresponds to the whole Marxist tradition and which, according to Khrushchev, has been recently taken up again by “certain scholars.”

Discussion of the “problems of communism” thus inevitably comes back to discussion of the “problems of socialism,” and this leads to the analysis of the *real* problems of the stage of transition that the U S S R is still going through. This analysis runs up against the fact that a whole series of definitions currently in vogue within the bureaucracy are of the nature of apologetics. But the Soviet youth, which has so vigorously attacked the *practical problem* of the bureaucracy, will not fail to raise these theoretical problems as well.

The US Social-Democratic periodical, *The New Leader*, published in its 18-25 August 1958 issue an extremely significant article by David

Burg, a young Soviet émigré who was a student there until 1957. He describes therein the “neo-Bolshevik current” which is one of the main currents of the non-conformist intellectual youth today in the U S S R:

[The neo-Bolsheviks] are searching for a “true Marxism.” [...] There is a widespread nostalgia for the pre-Soviet period and for the early years of the post-revolutionary period. Today Soviet youth frequently show their opposition to the regime by holding the mirror of the classics of Marxism-Leninism up to contemporary reality. In their view, the purges of 1937 liquidated the true leaders of the Revolution. They contrast Thermidor with October. [...]

[...] They idealize the Revolution and call for a return to the original ideals of Leninism, which they think they find in some of Lenin's works (*State and Revolution*). They frequently talk about “bureaucratic degeneration” of the regime and the emergence of a ruling, privileged bureaucracy which has constituted a dictatorship against the people. Those who subscribe to these views lean toward the traditions of the old revolutionary parties and favor radical methods of active combat.

The neo-Bolsheviks, he concludes, see “the bureaucracy as only a malignant growth” to be removed by “surgical means” in order to permit “a basically healthy” social organism to “develop normally.”

This youth, which is Trotskyist without knowing it, and which is drawing nutriment more and more from the same sources from which our ideas sprang forth, will prepare and execute its “surgical operation” in spite of Khrushchevian euphoria.

## CORRECTION

In Comrade Ernest Germain's article, “The U S S R from the XXth to the XXIst Congress of the C P S U,” in our last issue, the end of the second paragraph, second column, on page 20, should read as follows: “Khrushchev himself, when he was responsible for Soviet agriculture, used the same method. It was corrected in 1953, just after Stalin's death. The correction was made by Malenkov (*Pravda*, 9 August 1953); Khrushchev repeated it a month later,” etc.

# ONE YEAR OF GAULLISM

By PIERRE FRANK

When this issue is published, it will be nearly one year since de Gaulle was installed in power, the parliamentary French Republic having given way to a regime of a typically Bonapartist personal power.

In a series of articles published in previous issues of this magazine, we have seen *how* the operation was carried out. A recently published book, *The 13 Plots of 13 May*<sup>1</sup>, though written in a journalistic tone to glorify those who benefited by the operation, confirms the gist of what we pointed out. The groups that were kicking up a row in Algeria, the little groups (fascist or other) in Paris — all that meant very little. They provided more noise than action. The overthrow of the parliamentary regime was possible only because of the combination of two factors: the refusal of the army's top cadres, especially the chief of the general staff, General Ely, any longer to obey the civil power that derived its authority from the parliament; the activity of the general-secretary of the Socialist Party, Guy Mollet. According to the authors of this book, he "was a 14th plot all by himself and perhaps the most representative of them all." And indeed de Gaulle was able to come to power only because Guy Mollet sowed the greatest confusion in the SP and thus more than contributed to the paralysis of the working class, disoriented by the whole policy of the French CP, especially on the Algerian question.

We have also seen, in the previously published articles, the deeper *why* of the operation: because the dynamic and modernized part of French capitalism could not go forward with a parliamentary structure of power which under the then conditions of French society gave too many possibilities for the archaic and sometimes even parasitic sectors of the economy to impede the necessary advance of the reëquipped sectors. We may say that this understanding of the deeper causes of the change of regime is now spreading to many circles both in the workers' movement or its periphery and in bourgeois spheres.

Never before has the French bourgeoisie brought about such a change of regime under genuinely peaceful conditions. Never before has it had a power concentrated in so few hands. The new parliament is not even asking to use the meagre prerogatives accorded to it by the new constitution. The governmental cabinet is above all an office for recording the decisions

taken by de Gaulle and a few key-men, some of whom are not even ministers. A "Community" has been set up between the Fifth Republic and several republics that were formerly colonies, which has no statute and is worked out among a few men without any control over them.

Thus de Gaulle pictures himself in the lineage of Louis XIV and Napoleon I. "L'état, c'est moi." I order... my government... my ministers...

But what has he done in the year now ending? We leave aside those speeches worthy of a colonel presenting the regimental flag to recruits. We shall mention only as a reminder his paternalist proposals about international policy to a world which is quite able to distinguish between the France of capitalism's beginnings and the France of today.

Where the new regime has produced some impression among the open-mouthed is in the Malraux floor-show. Since the University was almost unanimously hostile to the new regime, de Gaulle has enjoyed making a bit of noise about a few decisions concerning the administrations of the state theatres.

During the last 12 months, the government has issued a spate of ordinances which have considerably modified certain fields, especially in the administration. Nobody can say what all these ordinances contain — nobody, that is, save the prime minister to "My General," Debré, who is a real fanatic about administration and who believes in the virtues of the state bureaucracy.

But two questions were posed to the new regime: the economic situation created by the launching of the European Common Market and by a recession in Europe; and the Algerian affair.

In economic matters, the government could not do other than to put itself at the service of French capitalism so that it may take its place in the Common Market. It also utilized the recession in order to make a strong attack on the conditions of the laboring people, especially on social security. Wages have again fallen behind prices. All this was done in the name of economic "liberalism": the principal financial expert who prepared the government's decision invoked the authority of Bastiat! Already, however, a tendency is coming out for measures of a Keynesian sort.

Still, the French economy, whatever the means employed, is going forward — into a blind alley, for the government wants to engage in numerous projects, including the manufacture of an atomic

<sup>1</sup> M and S Bromberger, *Les 13 complots du 13 mai*, Paris (Fayard).

bomb, while showing itself incapable of finding a solution to the war in Algeria that is costing about 2,000 million francs a day.

If de Gaulle arrived at power without too great difficulties, if Guy Mollet and Thorez, each in his own way, led the masses astray, it was above all because the governments resulting from the 2 January 1956 elections, where the voters voted for peace, got deeper and deeper into the war, and many people thought that de Gaulle could bring peace in Algeria. His private remarks prior to May 13th, like those of an oracle, were interpreted by everyone in the meaning that best suited himself. Illusions about de Gaulle's position on Algeria existed — perhaps still exist — even among the FLN tops.

Once arrived in power, he continued this game of sibylline declarations, after which the press and parties would engage in ridiculous exegeses. He regained — probably with some difficulty — the control of the top men of the army in Algeria; the matter is more doubtful concerning a whole series of officers who are not near the end of their careers. He did not succeed in breaking up the FLN — which seems to have been his main objective — because he really had nothing to offer. And now he is seeing in Algeria the revival — this time aimed against himself — of the discontent of the ultras, who attribute the continuation of the war to aid from abroad, to defeatists and traitors in France, and to de Gaulle's complicity with them.

De Gaulle's biggest success in France had consisted in pushing into the background the Algerian war which from 1955 to 13 May 1958 had been at the centre of all manifestations of political life in France. In the recent municipal elections, it was a question of social security, of unemployment, of the pensions for the last two wars' ex-servicemen; the Algerian war was scarcely mentioned, in fourth or fifth place. The Communist Party did nothing to breast this current. And so it is not to be hoped for that this state of affairs will be rapidly overcome. But it is inevitable that the war of Algeria will come back, and strongly, into the foreground, for there are the above-mentioned costs which will bring about disastrous economic consequences; for there are, despite the lies in the press, an exacerbation of the fighting in Algeria and daily losses in human lives. If the reaction is alone in making itself heard at present, it is nonetheless true that the great masses of the metropolis do not feel that this war is in their interest and are skeptical about its outcome. The deficiencies and betrayals of the workers' leaderships contribute to making the Algerian question into a factor of putrefaction in the social body.

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We had defined Gaullism as a Bonapartist and not a fascist regime. Just as Trotsky had done for pre-1933 Germany, the distinction thus made had for its aim an understanding of the correlation of various social forces in order to deduce therefrom the prospects and possibilities for the workers' movement.

De Gaulle, we said, wanted to set up a strong power; he was able to establish a regime that will demonstrate brutality toward the masses, but the resolute use of the forces of the state does not alter the fact that this regime has only a weak social base of its own. It will operate especially by balancing between opposed social forces. In the last analysis, this means, socially speaking, that the new regime, even when it proves its strength, is extremely unstable, and that it must at certain moments find itself faced with critical situations which will afford possibilities to the workers or risk being exploited by fascicizing forces. The new regime has not avoided civil war, as is thought by so many petty-bourgeois imbeciles who would not hesitate to call themselves men of the left; it has only postponed the deadline for awhile, changed the correlation of forces, and turned the initiative over to the bourgeoisie.

In the months following May 13th, it might have seemed that our analysis was erroneous: how could it be said that the new regime had a narrow social base when in the September referendum it had collected 80% of the votes? when in the November legislative elections it had succeeded in taking about 1,500,000 votes away from the Communist Party — something unseen since the Liberation? Not to mention the collapse of old bourgeois parties like the Radicals.

The March 1959 municipal elections have provided a more complete chart of what happened in the country. Granted, the purely local and municipal aspects of these elections must be taken into account. But the political trends were clear in the big cities, where these elections have a pronouncedly political character. The Communist Party won back close to a million votes; the polarization was also visible on the right; the Radical Party, formerly the great occupier of the town halls, disappeared, part of its inheritance falling to the Mollet Socialists, part to the right. Whereas, after the November elections, the government thought it had got too much of a good thing, after the municipal elections it did not know what kind of a face to put on the matter. "I do not concern myself with the electoral conjuncture," the general finally said, not ill content to leave his prime minister to get out of the scrape as best he could.

The alleged Marxists of the Thorez and Du-

clos stripe, whom a combination of circumstances has put at the head of the majority of the workers in France, pretend not to remember the votes of the second half of 1958, and cynically declare to the members of the French C P: the municipal elections show that the voters agree with us because our line is correct. This political existentialism in reality just conjures away a phenomenon that is new and of considerable importance.

It is possible that between September-November 1958 and March 1959 about a million former Communist voters may have voted UNR and then returned to voting P C F. It is more likely that the real figure of the voters who thus oscillated between these two formations was in the neighborhood of half a million, for various indications testify to the fact that there was a change in the nature of the abstentions: in September and November, it was former rightist abstentionists who took the trouble to vote in order to support de Gaulle, while former Communist voters stayed home, considering that it was at that time useless to vote. In March 1959 the opposite phenomenon occurred: on the right, many people, disappointed in de Gaulle, went back to abstentionism, while the left went to the ballot-boxes because everyone felt that an anti-government vote was coming.

Whether the first or the second hypothesis be accepted, a phenomenon unknown since the Liberation appeared: very big shifts (either from abstention to voting or vice versa, or from one extreme to the other) were made by a considerable number of voters, to the amount of between half a million and a million.

In this way, de Gaulle's arrival at power, which was to put an end to the cascade of ministries, which was to ensure political stability, was accompanied by considerable oscillations on the part of very broad masses, going from one extreme to the other. This phenomenon is apparent in the election results, while on the surface of things there was only political apathy to be seen.

How to explain such a contradiction?

The operation of May 13th destroyed the completely tottering equilibrium of the Fourth Republic, but did not replace it by any new equilibrium of a genuine sort. The old political representation has become inadequate, and great masses are hunting for solutions, for extreme rather than temperate solutions. This is what they had the opportunity of expressing by their ballots; but they are apathetic and have not taken any action because, first, de Gaulle had at his disposal a certain amount of credit (which is still not entirely squandered), and then because nobody called on them to act, especially not the

workers' and leftist organizations which are presenting as the only perspective the renovation of defunct republics.

This apathy does not mean that society has been politically atomized, as a fascist regime would have done; it indicates a long ripening of forces which do not succeed in finding a way out, and to which nobody possessed of authority is proposing a solution.

And so, despite all the instability inherent in the new regime, nothing indicates that it cannot last for some time. For big capital, it is an almost ideal regime, since weaker interests have no means of bringing pressure on the direction of the state. The real forces of fascism, i e, the networks that Soustelle & Co are setting up, do not yet have mass strength. The working class finds itself paralyzed by its leaderships. All this combines to enable the Bonapartist regime to tack along and to appear to be powerful over a society that does not know how to pull itself together again.

Under these conditions, although the workers' movement is no longer in the state of prostration that it found itself in on the morrow of de Gaulle's arrival at power, and although in the most recent period we have observed some stirrings, we must not have the illusion that the working class is already climbing back up the hill. Indeed, it has not yet had the opportunity of seeing the new regime in all its aspects: there have been no big strikes or big clashes with the forces of capitalist order. The working class's still great parliamentary illusions have even been strengthened by the municipal election results.

Nevertheless, a new element has just come to light within the masses: a rapprochement between the Communist and Socialist rank-and-file. Whereas for several years now there were observable growing reservations among the Socialist voters about voting for better placed Communist candidates on the second ballot — this was seen even among voters of the U G S, which did not hesitate to call for voting for P C F candidates, and this tendency was still being shown in the November 1958 legislative elections — for several weeks now the contrary trend has been observed; in spite of the directives of the Socialist leaders, a large number of voters transferred their votes to the Communist candidates; and in the municipal elections agreements were made in quite numerous places throughout France for joint lists on the second ballot.

It can easily be imagined how the leadership of the P C F argues from this fact that it proves the correctness of its policy. It does so with all the more effrontery in that it quotes only the most favorable figures. Now if these are ex-



amined more closely, it can be seen that, for every Socialist who turned toward the candidates of the P C F, there were two and sometimes three who did not do so. In other words, for the moment this trend of the rank and file toward unity is not strong enough to flood irresistibly over the reformist leaderships' heads. True, it is necessary to take into account the social composition of the body of Socialist voters, which is not formed only of workers — far from it. But an enormous pressure for unity in the working class would be necessary to overcome this situation, and we are not yet at that point. For if the new regime is acting in a way that aids a trend towards unity, the policy of the P C F has nowise changed the feeling of distrust of very broad masses toward the P C F, the methods it uses in various organizations, and the "Hungarian-style socialism" that it advocates.

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Thus the first year of the Gaullist regime is about to end without apparently anything stirring. That is both true and false. Since his arrival at power, de Gaulle has strengthened the state machinery, but he has not yet had any clash with the masses. What has been revealed by the elections is that transformations have been produced which, though molecular, are very deep and run in an absolutely unforeseeable direction.

Under these conditions, the present atmosphere of apathy will probably still continue for a period, till the day when everything that is ripening in the depths will surge up, to the great

surprise of everybody. We must be prepared and prepare the workers' movement, under the current sluggish conditions, for the period that will follow, and especially for its abrupt turns.

As a result of the theoretical and political research now being done in little groups with few or no roots in the worker masses, we are witnessing a profusion of the most confused conceptions. There are many who reject what Stalinism (in theory at least) retained of Bolshevism, while keeping the opportunism cultivated by the leadership of the P C F. On one point, however, some slight progress has been made: the idea is developing that, among the causes of the May 1958 defeat, there is to be found the lack of a perspective and programme of transition toward socialism. Thus, although there is confusion — and to spare — about the content of this programme, on the means of promoting it, especially concerning the question of the government to be advocated for this purpose, the idea is making progress — without being stated in these precise terms — that the dilemma is not democracy or fascism, as the Stalinists à la Thorez claim, but socialism or fascism, as only we Trotskyists have been declaring for years now.

And it is only by opening up the prospect of a fight for a socialist society that there can be effectively prepared the overthrow of the personalist regime. The great worker masses have not yet reached this point, but their coming experience will orient them along this road.

*April 1959*

# DEMOCRACY, SOCIALISM, AND TRANSITIONAL PROGRAMME

By MICHEL PABLO

The spectacular collapse of the French Fourth Republic and the installation of a Bonapartist regime producing a de facto abolition of parliamentary democracy should normally have aroused among the Communist Parties at least a critical re-examination of their theses about "democracy," the "democratic" bourgeoisie, and the possibility of "going over to socialism by peaceful paths."

Nothing of the sort has occurred. For example, we shall hunt in vain among the labors of the XXIst Congress of the CP of the USSR for even the most slightly serious analysis of the events in France and of the present situation of the international workers' movement. On the contrary, all the emphasis is laid on the advances of the USSR and the other workers' states, by which advances socialism will tomorrow make its break-through into the entire world. The "French episode," in this perspective, is naturally not worth pausing over very long.

As for the French Communist Party, the organization principally affected by the events in France, which has had its parliamentary representation cut down to a minute number of deputies in the new phantom parliament, it still finds a way in the draft theses for its XVth Congress to claim credit for having since 1946 pointed out that "a peaceful going over to socialism was not excluded" and to reaffirm that its perspectives remain "the possibility of going over to socialism by peaceful paths, including the use of the democratic parliament!"

In the days of Lenin's Third International, such "stupidities" were the suitable attribute of Second International Socialists. But for a long time now official Communism, having sunk into the Stalinist Menshevik school, has been repeating and aggravating the "stupidities," crimes, and betrayals of the reformist Social-Democracy.

Before the stubborn logic of facts, however, the embarrassment of the Stalinist "theoreticians" is now visible. In various of their recent writings, attempts have been made to reconcile the criticism of "bourgeois democracy" with the struggle for "renovated democracy," and, across the latter, to extend a bridge toward socialism. There is no "democracy in general," V Joannes<sup>1</sup> teaches us, suddenly remembering Lenin's theses on bourgeois democracy and the dictatorship of the proletariat. "Democracy" is a class regime,

a form of domination by the bourgeoisie. V Joannes then lets himself go in an analysis of the economic and political evolution of industrial capitalism and monopoly capitalism, to show why, at the present stage, the "monopolist big bourgeoisie" can no longer exercise its dictatorial domination in the form of classic parliamentary democracy.

Having thus established "the ultra-reactionary evolution of bourgeois democracy," V Joannes tackles the part concerning the conclusions to be drawn from this analysis. The question, he writes, is the following:

Who is going to win: *fascism*, the goal of the reactionary authoritarian rule (as in France for example), or *democracy*, the vital condition for progress and regeneration?

Thus, after a minute analysis where our author fiercely demonstrates the inanity of "pure democracy," the class character of "democracy," and its inevitable crisis in the present evolution of the capitalist regime, he unexpectedly resuscitates abstract "democracy" and sets it up in opposition to fascism! Marxist realism gives way to petty-bourgeois fantasizing, which wears itself out in powerless logical constructions of a regime midway between monopoly capitalism and socialism, called "democratic republic," or "renovated democracy," or "progressive democracy," etc.

If the crisis of bourgeois democracy is taken as starting-point, for the same reason given by V Joannes, the logical conclusion to be drawn should be to set up, in opposition to the strong state (Bonapartist or fascist) toward which the bourgeoisie necessarily heads, not "*democracy*," the bourgeois regime which the bourgeoisie, also necessarily, abandons, but *socialism*, the democratic regime of the masses exploited by the bourgeoisie.

*In the case of the crisis of bourgeois democracy, such is the alternative, and no other.*

"The most important point," Lenin wrote in his theses on bourgeois democracy for the Ist Congress of the Third International,

which the Socialists do not understand and which constitutes their theoretical myopia, their imprisonment within bourgeois prejudices, and their political treason toward the proletariat, is that in capitalist society, *as soon as the class struggle that underlies it becomes aggravated, there is no middle point between the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the dictatorship of the proletariat. All dreams of an intermediary solu-*

<sup>1</sup> In his "Concerning Certain Tendencies in Bourgeois Democracy," published in the March 1959 *World Marxist Review*.

tion are only petty-bourgeois reactionary laments.

To set democracy up against *fascism* (or *Bonapartism*) means from the Marxist sociological viewpoint to imagine the possibility of fighting against one bourgeois regime by means of another bourgeois regime, by staking on a supposedly fundamental contradiction between the monopolist big bourgeoisie and the "national" and "democratic" middle bourgeoisie, to which the workers' movement would serve as a contributory force.

It is needless to insist on the flagrant unreality of such a basic intra-class contradiction between the big bourgeoisie and middle-bourgeois strata.

The crisis of bourgeois democracy is the sure reflection of a deep *social crisis* that puts the bourgeois social regime in danger — which means that the interests of the capitalist class as a whole take priority over its undeniable intra-class divisions; which also means that in fact only incurable petty-bourgeois dreamers can imagine the possibility of an intra-class struggle setting up, in opposition to the strong state sought by the big bourgeoisie, the state of the "democratic republic" of a middle bourgeoisie aided by the proletariat.

In reality the periods of crisis of bourgeois democracy, i.e., of acute social crisis, show themselves also by an *extreme* polarization to *right* and *left*, the *bourgeois parties of the parliamentary democracy becoming empty shells*.

The recent French experience has once more wholly confirmed this implacable logic of the class struggle which clearly traces the outline of the real alternative: *Bonapartist or fascist strong state of the bourgeoisie, or proletarian power*.

Naturally the struggle for the latter, the struggle for socialism, is inseparable from the struggle for *democratic liberties*.

These, however, do not form an *end in themselves, and even less the attributes of a social regime intermediate between capitalism and socialism, but are the by-product of the revolutionary struggle of the masses, within the framework of the capitalist regime, for socialism*.

It is perfectly true that the working class in this basic struggle for socialism needs democratic conditions in order to develop its action and organization. But what is still more wholly true is that these conditions of *democratic liberties* have to be wrested by the proletariat's steady revolutionary struggle against the anti-democratic evolution of the bourgeoisie. That is to say, it is the basic fight for socialism, the revolutionary struggle against the capitalist regime, that determines and guarantees successes in the field of democratic liberties, and not action for abstract "democracy."

It is the might of the proletariat as a class, finding itself and fulfilling itself in the revolutionary struggle, that wrests and preserves the conditions of democratic liberties, while any class-collaborationist policy for "democracy" can only aid the destruction of these conditions.

The question therefore comes back to the *nature of the programme* to be put forward, and the character of *forces in alliance* to fulfill it.

The struggle for socialism can be conceived within the framework of a programme of prior struggle for "democracy." That is the usual case with the present *minimum* programmes of the Communist Parties which set as their goal a "renovated" or "progressive democracy" and *which all involve a prior stage of struggle essentially on that level*.

The necessary struggle for *democratic liberties* can, on the contrary, be conceived as a subordinate part of the basic fight for socialism, guided by that perspective, within the framework of a *transitional programme*. Such a programme would dialectically enumerate slogans that were simultaneously *democratic, transitional, and socialist*, topped by the transitional *slogan of a government of the workers' parties*.

Certain Stalinist theoreticians have been led to skirt this conception, but without wholly reaching it. Far from it. The Italians are sometimes a vanguard in this field, the school of Togliatti, for example, distinguishing itself from the quite Stalinistically rigid school of Thorez by a great elasticity in its conceptions and organization.

In his article "Democracy and Socialism,"<sup>2</sup> Pietro Ingrao on several occasions touches lightly on the question of the dialectic and the struggle for socialism. He concedes that it is not a question here "of two different struggles, *first* to win democratic liberties, *then* to build a new social regime, but of one and the same struggle." But his "new social regime" is only a "progressive democracy," which,

by proceeding to modify the most backward structures of Italian society, and by giving a new social content to democratic liberties, would cut the roots of fascism and render impossible the reappearance of a regime of open reaction.

In his conception, it is a question here of an intermediate regime, a *transitional regime*, as he terms it, toward socialism.

The confusion on this question is the following: *transitional demands* are mixed up with the goal of a *transitional political regime*, distinct from the proletarian regime and, as a result, still, socially speaking, *bourgeois in essence*.

The correct idea is that which recognizes the

<sup>2</sup> *World Marxist Review*, January 1959.

need of *organically and dialectically* linking together in the programme *elementary democratic demands with economic transitional slogans comprising reforms of the structure of capitalism.*

The error consists of then limiting oneself to this part of the programme, of not completing it by *socialist* slogans (for example, statification of the means of production, etc), and especially of *confusing transitional slogans with a transitional political regime other than the regime of the government of workers' parties.*

What it is essential to understand is that the *transitional political solution* determines the structure, spirit, orientation, and dynamics of the transitional programme to be worked up, and that this solution cannot be a regime of collaboration with the bourgeoisie, within the framework of classic bourgeois institutions, but in fact a *new regime.*

*Elementary democratic demands and structural reforms* acquire this or that content, this or that effectiveness, only in relation to *the nature of the political power.* They must consequently be formulated and enunciated in a programme so as to aid the accession of a political power outside the control of the bourgeoisie, to lead thereto as it were by their own internal logic.

This power will not yet be the dictatorship of the proletariat, but a sort of direct antechamber leading to it.

In the concrete currently existing conditions, particularly in the advanced capitalist countries, this transitional political power will be able to take on the form only of *a government of the workers' party or parties, supported by the revolutionary organization of the masses in committees.*

We thus reach the question of the *forms and means* for arriving at such a new political power that goes outside the framework of bourgeois political power. Lenin and the Third International of his time had conceived the fight for workers' power in the advanced capitalist countries as the result of the extra-parliamentary revolutionary action of the masses, the necessary participation in bourgeois parliaments having as its aim only to use them so as to give a hand to this action by the masses and to destroy right from the inside any illusions about bourgeois parliamentarianism.

It was the sort of "new, unaccustomed, anti-opportunist, and anti-careerist" workers' parliamentarianism that Lenin was preaching to the "Left Communists" in the *Infantile Malady.* Today the Khrushchevs have reached the conclusion that this thesis is out of style, for the "new situation created by the victories of the socialist world and the defeats of imperialism" permit of reaching socialism by the use of parliament.

But elsewhere these same "theoreticians" never stop emphasizing that the grip of monopoly capitalism on the state apparatus in all the advanced capitalist countries is greater than ever. The logical conclusion from this fact ought naturally to be that never was the working class in reality farther removed from the driving wheels that determine the control and management of the state and the economy, and that consequently never was the need so urgent to smash up the old state machine now dominated by the monopolists.

The conclusions that Lenin drew in his theses on bourgeois democracy not only still remain valid but are *strengthened by the fact that monopoly capitalism has increased its power in all the advanced capitalist countries.* He wrote:

It would be the greatest stupidity to believe that the most profound revolution in the history of humanity, that the transfer of power, for the first time in the world, from a minority of exploiters to the majority of the exploited, can take place within the old framework of bourgeois and parliamentary democracy, can occur without clear breaks, without creating new institutions incarnating the new living conditions, etc.

Such, however, is not the opinion of the present "renovators." The French C P, which staked its honor on defending the Fourth Republic forsaken by the masses, is filled with an admirable courage. Relying on France's "old democratic traditions," and without being at all affected by the Gaullist "episode," it is preparing to claim the place that must belong to the working class in the democratic and parliamentary institutions of the "renovated democracy" of tomorrow.<sup>3</sup> For the "struggle for socialism," it gravely tells us in its theses for its XVth Congress, "*lies in the perspectives of the struggle for democracy and its continued progress.*" (Our italics in both quotations.)

In reality, it is the outright opposite that is true. In our period, *democratic liberties*, as well as an effective resistance against the evolution toward the *strong state of the bourgeoisie*, could be the result, the by-product as it were, only of the *revolutionary fight of the proletariat for its own power.* The struggle for "democracy" in reality is included in that for the socialist perspective.

In this perspective the use of the bourgeois parliament occupies only a place clearly sub-

<sup>3</sup> V Joannes, for his part, in the above-quoted article, formulates the general strategy of the CPs in the advanced capitalist countries at the present stage as follows: "To lead the masses by means of concrete action to the demand for action and broader participation in the political and economic management of the country at all levels."

ordinate to the extra-parliamentary struggle of the masses.

Some Stalinist theoreticians who understand to what a degree the French experience renders now untenable the position of the "parliamentary road to socialism" would like to put the emphasis on the extra-parliamentary presence "of a powerful mass movement" and the interrelations that must exist "between action in the parliament and action in the country."

Pietro Ingrao, already quoted, writes in this connection:

We have always considered erroneous and one-sided the definition according to which the road toward socialism in Italy could be only the "parliamentary road."

It must never be forgotten that the strength and effectiveness of the workers' opposition in parliament depends precisely on its ability to intervene in the developments of the class struggle in the country in such a way as to establish a dialectical liaison between its own activity and the renovating revolutionary struggle of the working class and all the workers.

It is this idea of the dialectic liaison between the activity in parliament and "the renovating revolutionary struggle of the working class and all the workers" that must be further deepened. The Stalinist theoretician on several occasions just touches on the question of the dialectical liaison between democracy and socialism, between democratic and transitional slogans, between parliamentary and extra-parliamentary activity, but without succeeding in getting outside the framework of a fundamentally reformist orientation and practice. He foresees for example that extra-parliamentary action may produce a change in the correlation of forces in parliament "in favor of the working class and the people," probably alluding to the possibility of detaching a wing from the Christian-Democracy that would join the Communists and Socialists on the parliamentary level.

In reality the goal of the extra-parliamentary revolutionary action of the masses could not be to bring about a parliamentary government of a coalition between *the workers' parties and one wing of the bourgeoisie*, but to impose a government of the workers' parties, and to support it in the application of its transitional programme.

By educating and mobilizing the masses for a whole period of years on the basis of a transitional programme oriented toward workers' power of the workers' parties in the advanced capitalist states, it would turn out to be possible to impose this political solution, either by winning the parliamentary majority or by forcing

the bourgeoisie to accept the government of a coalition of workers' parties.

In both cases, the parliamentary origin of the workers' government would in fact be the result of the revolutionary united-front mobilization of the masses. This mobilization, as well as the adequate organization of the masses, would then be the guarantee that a workers' government might apply its transitional programme against the inevitably fierce resistance of the bourgeoisie.

A consistent class policy on the basis of a concrete transitional programme adapted to the conditions in each country, and a united front of the parties claiming to be of the working class, would be able also in certain cases to win a parliamentary majority, and in others to impose a government of the workers' parties even if were minority from the viewpoint of parliamentary representation. Then, beginning with the formation (however it came about) of a workers' government, everything would depend on the degree of extra-parliamentary mobilization and organization of the revolutionary masses, enabling the workers' government to begin to act by going outside the bourgeois framework.

The "new road" to socialism in each advanced capitalist country, i.e. the concrete transitional road to socialism, depends on three conditions: the working up of a transitional programme adapted to the peculiarities of the country; a systematic united-front policy of the workers' parties; the orientation of the programme and the front toward the government of the workers' parties applying this programme and backed by the extra-parliamentary mobilization and organization of the masses.

This road is the only one that is realist and able to enthuse and mobilize the masses. In the moments of grave crisis in bourgeois democracy which will not fail, as in France, to occur in all countries, broad masses of the petty-bourgeoisie of town and country, as well as the backward layers of the proletariat, will desert the centre bourgeois formations and move toward the extremes. These are the moments that can permit the workers' parties to polarize either an absolute majority or the active and decisive political majority of the masses and impose their government.

Everything depends on their programme and their determination to fight for workers' power.

The discomfitures being accumulated by the Communist and Socialist Parties, faced by reheartened bourgeois reaction, are in reality the price they are paying for their class-collaborationist policy at the service of "democracy," and of their division.

There will be no "renewal" save by the *rediscovery of united struggle transitional to socialism*.

# BERLIN AND THE GERMAN LABOR MOVEMENT

By W BECKER

The foreign policy of the Soviet leaders has always as its goal the status quo, a world compromise with the United States. But they are no longer disposed or forced to pay the same price for it as they were half a decade ago. This change of attitude in Moscow's foreign policy reflects the change in the relationship of forces between imperialism and the non-capitalist world, especially the USSR.

Meanwhile there has been no less a change in the relationship of forces between the colonial revolution and world imperialism, to the disadvantage of the latter. Professor Henry A Kissinger, the American strategist of the "break-through," expresses this profound change as follows:

I believe that the West as a whole is standing before a really very great crisis, which does not have to do with only the Russian pressure. On the one hand, this steady pressure of the new countries in Asia and Africa, which is being strengthened through their very strong resentment against the West, *so that the area in which Western values are valid becomes ever more narrow...*<sup>1</sup>

[Our italics.]

Kissinger, who has recognized after his own fashion how much imperialist policy's margin for manoeuvre is growing steadily limited, has also understood that as a result the situation grows ever more explosive. He is of the opinion that Berlin is worth a war — even if it should prove to be World War III. Thereby he is saying: we have our backs to the wall. And in fact American imperialism, determined to defend its life, would sooner blow up the whole world than capitulate, unless in its own country it runs up against the only force capable of preventing this madness because it can settle its social causes — the working class. Just as for any other capitalist country in the world, this law is valid for the German Federal Republic.

The discrepancy between historico-political needs and the factual situation is as crass as can be imagined. The world is, without any doubt, now heading for a new peak of crisis in its already crisis-laden existence. This time it is at the Berlin powder-magazine that the fuse is burning. Faced with this development, the Ger-

man working class stands devoid of any orientation or leadership.

The Anti-Atom-Death Movement, which never had a real life — thanks to persevering sabotage by apparatuses of the Social-Democracy and the trade unions — is dead. There are nowhere bases for a movement similar to that against remilitarization. Nothing indicates that the SPD or one of the big unions is thinking of intervening in the matter with extra-parliamentary measures. Hence, even if the worst is spared us, we shall end up with a compromise that will be as dubious as all the agreements that have been made on the shifting foundation of a world shaken by social crises. But the danger of war in Europe remains latent because its causes persist.

The following theses set out from this premiss, and draw the trial balance of the experience of half-a-decade's division of Germany. They are to show that there is still today a perspective, the socialist perspective, which contains to a considerable degree a possibility of solution for the German question.

## THESES FOR A SOCIALIST FOREIGN POLICY

1) The existence of Berlin as the phantom capital of a non-existent Germany threatens to take on the form of a detonator of the Third World War. Only the German working class can carry out what is incumbent on Germany in the prevention of this war of annihilation. If the German working class is unable to solve this task, Germany will become one of the decisive battlefields in the catastrophe of all mankind.

2) The political solution of the German question must prevent the military extermination of our people. The iron curtain that separates the two parts of Germany impedes the workers of the German Democratic Republic from coming to an understanding with their class comrades in the German Federal Republic; it also prevents the workers of the German Federal Republic from seeing and grasping the deep-going process of social change taking place in the East.

3) The German bourgeoisie, rigged out in Christian-Democracy, has shown itself, by its acceptance of the rearming of Germany and of the supplying of atomic weapons to the Federal Army, to be the worthy successor of the bourgeoisie of the fascist Third Reich and of the imperialist Reich of the Kaiser. Because of its di-

<sup>1</sup> The original text in English being unavailable, the quotation above is a retranslation from the German text in the magazine, *Der Spiegel*.

minated international weight, it can no longer start its own independently conducted war to attain its foreign policy objectives of winning back its lost territories and providing political support for its economic expansion. It can, however, make its remaining Federal Republic into a fortress within whose walls its Western partners can build up their atomic strength for the defense of their joint capitalist interests. The German bourgeoisie can thus, with the German question, provide the "juridical pretext" for starting the Third World War for the defense of international capitalism against the assault of the colonial peoples and, in case of need, the working class.

4) If the Soviet bureaucracy, with the agreement of its tool Ulbricht, has chosen Berlin as its target-objective in Europe, it is for the following reasons:

a) It has given up hope of *politically* winning over the West-German working class — and probably the whole West-European working class. Hence it prefers to plug the Berlin leak and strengthen the Democratic Republic economically and militarily in order simultaneously to consolidate politically the blindly devoted Ulbricht regime.

b) It has taken over as its own foreign policy Dulles's formula of the calculated risk, i.e., of going right to the brink of war to achieve its political aim; it is applying it to the question of Berlin and Germany, and has thus conjured up a real danger of war.

5) In the Potsdam Agreements the four victorious powers pledged themselves to treat Germany as an economic unit and to break the domination of the monopolies, the militarists, and the fascists. They employed therein the same formulae, which, however, covered up opposed social interests. The results were:

a) The destruction of capitalism and big landed property in the Democratic Republic, but by typically Stalinist-bureaucratic police methods, i.e., the elimination and even repression of any democratic initiative by the working class.

b) The reestablishment of the power of the monopolists and militarists in the Federal Republic, against the resistance, ineffective because reduced to parliamentary prattling, of the Social-Democracy and the trade unions. There was thus destroyed the basis on which it might have been possible to set out on political paths leading to the reunification of Germany.

c) Since the "destalinization" introduced after Stalin's death is only a form of self-defense by the Stalinist bureaucracy, it was not extended, once the limited goals set by the Khrushchev fraction had been reached, to the democratization of political life, i.e., to the reestablishment

of a system of plurality of parties on the basis of a socialist constitution and to the reestablishment of freedom of fractions within the Communist Parties and trade unions. In this way the Soviet bureaucracy itself blocked its own road toward the working class in the West.

The further sharpening of the international situation, through the German question and the orientation toward military solutions, is the result of the *objective* impossibility for the German bourgeoisie and the Soviet bureaucracy to find a lasting compromise acceptable to both sides, i.e., to take the road to socialization in the Federal Republic and to democratization of political life in the Democratic Republic. Coexistence on an international treaty basis can never be more than a highly unstable interim situation, threatened at every moment, which expresses in world forces a momentary balance that is steadily coming to an end. This will under present conditions lead, not to a long period of relaxation of strains, but to an increased sharpening of tensions.

6) After the end of the Second World War, Stalin, prisoner of his conservative-bureaucratic conceptions, hostile to revolutionary mass movements, and repeating his old erroneous practice in foreign policy, believed, more than his former Western allies did, in a long period of peaceful coexistence. Trusting thereto, he sacrificed the Communist movement of Greece, he sacrificed the Communist-led French and Italian underground movements, whose disarming was required by him and carried through by the Communist Parties of both countries.

Stalin was ready to sacrifice the Yugoslav and the Chinese revolutions, and in this way to negotiate a longer period of calm for the Soviet Union. This failed, owing to the enormous pressure of the Chinese revolution on the ever more independent position of Mao Tse-Tung, who finally refused, against Stalin's wishes, to submit to Chiang Kai-Shek. This attitude aided the rapid victory of the Chinese revolution, whereby the decisive turn in the relationship of forces on the international scale was furthered.

Not only Stalin's calculations, but also those of the US bourgeoisie, were upset by the victory of the Chinese revolution. It was forced, with Marshall Plan aid, to go over to the offensive. The United States achieved a temporary economic and political stabilization of the West.

Germany, which by its division into two parts, forms the European frontier between the "West and East," in this way becomes the central point of the USA's efforts at stabilization and its European stronghold in its conflict with the Soviet Union. The economic consolidation and milit-

ary rearming of the Federal Republic form the US A's first European defense line.

7) The Soviet Union was right to complain that the reestablishment of monopolies in the Federal Republic broke the Potsdam Agreements. Stalin, however, hoped in compensation to use the Communist mass movements in France and Italy as auxiliary troops of Soviet diplomacy, to prevent a consolidation of relations between the capitalist states and to force his former allies to come back to the Potsdam Agreements. He hoped in this way to be able to prevent the West from encircling the Soviet Union. He also never abandoned the thesis of the social transformation of the Federal Republic as a precondition for co-existence with the West.

Khrushchev, however, explained in his Berlin note that the difference in the political and social systems of the Federal and Democratic Republics was not the nub of the question. He thereby drew the trial balance of his bankrupt policy of seeking to win over the Western working class. After the French Communist Party was defeated, after it was decided to rearm the Federal Republic atomically, and after no action of resistance by the German workers' movement was forthcoming, Khrushchev — basing himself on the current advance of the USSR in arms — in his own Stalinist-bureaucratic way deduced the lesson from these events. The distrust that exists in every bureaucrat toward the working class made him give up the search for a way out oriented along class-political lines. He prefers the economic and political isolation of the Democratic Republic and the reënforcement of military frontiers to any efforts at winning over the German working class.

8) A German socialist foreign policy must start out from the basic consideration that the causes of a Third World War arising out of the German situation can be removed only if:

a) by the socialization of heavy industry,

banking, insurance, and the power industry, monopoly capital's power is definitively broken in Germany. Without this transformation of the social structure of the Federal Republic and the internal policy connected therewith, no fundamentally new foreign policy in search of reunification is possible.

b) the possibilities of a gradual democratization within the Eastern bloc are consistently aided. A precondition therefor is the *lessening (or cessation) of military pressure* on the Eastern bloc through an active fight against German rearming. Another precondition is the establishment of normal diplomatic relations with all the states of the Eastern bloc.

c) relations are established with all the Communist mass parties and trade unions in the *West*, to forge a Socialist-Communist united front against European reaction and its neo-fascist dangers. The Communist mass movements which have been formed under the conditions of parliamentary bourgeois democracy are an expression of the free will of the working class of these countries, and hence should not be measured by the same scale as is used with the CPs of the Eastern bloc.

d) by the use of all trade-union and political means of struggle and propaganda for a socialist programme of reunification, negotiations are carried on with the Ulbricht regime to set up a German confederation. Within such a confederation, there must always be maintained the spirit of a democratic-socialist offensive which regards the confederation as a transitional form toward a unified socialist Germany.

Only in this way can the Ulbricht clique be undermined from inside, without provoking an immediate intervention by the Soviet Union, and can the Adenauer regime be overthrown and a political and not military solution of the German question be ensured and the annihilation of Germany in a Third World War be prevented.



# THE SITUATION AND TASKS IN PRESENT-DAY JAPAN

(*Excerpts<sup>1</sup> from Draft Theses*)

By T K

## II: THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND THE STATE IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN

8. The social and economic structure of Japan is based on capital goods production (state and private capital) and petty commodity production. The relationship of forces between these two elements is measured as follows:

9. Class structure:

Capitalism (working class, 43%; bourgeoisie, 5%): 48%; petty commodity production: 51%;

Standing army and police: 1%.<sup>2</sup>

It is characteristic of the social and economic structure of our country that half the people are small producers; this fact distinguishes our country from such advanced capitalist countries as the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany.

10. The relationship of the two elements varies according to industry. In agriculture, capitalism is very weak and small producers amount to 96% of the agricultural population. But in forestry, fisheries, manufacturing, services, and commerce, the capitalist economy embraces from one third to four fifths of the population. In mining, transportation, and communications, capitalism has the overwhelming majority.

These varying relationships give its particular character to each branch of industry. In branches where capitalism holds the majority, the petty producers are dependent upon and become an organic part of it. Here the small producers are hardly independent of but supplementary to capitalism. In agriculture, however, the situation is the contrary. Though in the other branches, small producers are overwhelmed by and subordinated to the high productivity of capitalism, in agriculture, particularly in farm production, domestic or foreign capitalism does not yet threaten and exists only in embryo. Because of this fundamental fact, peasants maintain their existence today as independent private producers, though they are now in a process of class decomposition,

<sup>1</sup> Sections I to 8 are a study of the international situation as background for the Japanese situation. Since their line is identical with that of the International as a whole, these sections have been omitted for considerations of space.

<sup>2</sup> From an article by Shimada in *Vanguard* no 134.

included in the capitalist economy by commodity circulation, and exploited by capitalism.

11. In the capitalist economy there exist side-by-side big modern industry, home industries, manufactures, and divers types of petty shops. The latter three types lack the material characteristics proper to capitalism. The relationship of forces between the first (state capital and big private capital) and the last three (middle and small capital) is as follows:

Small companies with less than a million yen<sup>3</sup> capital each amount to 71.4% of all companies and 13.2% of all capital; while big business with more than 100 million yen capital each amount to 0.33% of all companies and 58.8% of all capital (these data are from 1955). This becomes even clearer when we learn that about 1,100 companies of big business dominate and control 67.1% of all corporate capital. In manufacturing, firms employing more than 300 workers amount to 0.4% (1,700) of all firms, while those employing less than 50 workers amount to 97% (420,000) of all firms. But in number of all employees, the former have only 26%, while the latter have 50% of total manpower. In output, the former amount to 43%, the latter to 20% (again, 1955 data).

Workers' productivity in manufacturing plants employing more than 300 is quadruple that of those employing less than 30. The annual value added is, in the former, 62,900 yen, and, in the latter, 15,800 yen, per worker.

12. Big capital, with productivity quadruple that of small capital, employs only one fourth of the total manpower, but its output is between one half and two thirds of the total. Small capital employs more than half the total manpower, but produces less than a third of total output.

The wages of those employed by big capital are twice those of workers employed by small capital.

13. The above general analysis shows the overwhelmingly superior position of big capitalism in the economy, though it employs a minority of the working class. But this general survey requires completion by concrete studies of the relationships in each branch of industry.

In heavy industry and the chemical industry,

<sup>3</sup> 360 yen = US \$1; 1,000 yen = £1.

the superiority and control of Big Business is complete. In these fields, small capitalists occupy a secondary position. In light industry, however, modern machinery has not yet won hegemony. In some branches such as food, textiles, wood, furniture, and leather, small enterprises occupy first place not only in employment but also in output. In these fields, the hegemony of Big Business is exercised only indirectly, through high productivity and quality, control of finance capital, state power, and so on.

14. Between big and small capital lies middle capital. This group is always uneasy, being threatened from above by high productivity, new machinery, and cartel control, and from below by low organic composition. The role and scale of this group varies from one branch of industry to another, but if we call middle capital all enterprises running between one and ten million yen capital each, it forms 16.5% of all capital. It seems that it amounts to 20% both in percentage of workers and in output. Its productivity is one third to one half that of big capital. It is characteristic of our capitalist economy that this group is secondary and weak: on the one hand, big capital holds the greater part of production and all finance; on the other hand, small capital has half the working class and between a quarter and a third of production.

15. Let us list our social and economic structure in the following way:

- 1) capitalist production:
  - a) big capital;
  - b) middle capital;
  - c) small capital;
- 2) artisanal production.

Now when we compare the productivity of these groups, we can set a ratio from top to bottom of 8 : 4 : 2 : 1. The figures tell us the relationship of forces and the overwhelming superiority of modern capital in Japanese society.

The ratio of workers employed shows an opposite picture: 1.5 : 1 : 2.5 : 5.

The ratio of output: 4 . 1 . 3 . 2.

These three ratios show us in a simplified way the social composition of contemporary Japan. In spite of its complex reality, its tendencies, and the superiority of big modern industry and big capital, in essence it has a remarkably petty-bourgeois character.

16. The five big capitalist monopolies — *Mitsui*, *Mitsubishi*, *Sumitomo*, *Furukawa*, and *Yasuda* — have rebuilt their trusts, covering all important industries, each through its own big banks. It may be said that the big steel monopoly, the electric monopoly, the national railways, and the Japanese airlines are in fact joint enterprises of these trusts. New industries

in oils, chemicals, and atomic power are also founded by them.

In this way, our social and economic composition resembles a pyramid, with a summit consisting of private monopolies, such as the five big "Zaibatsu," and state capital, through a middle section of private capital, big, middle, and small, down to the base of small commodity production. Private monopolies exploit even the base of small commodity producers by means of state capital. We also find a great mass of petty farmers and an industrial reserve army in both towns and villages (hidden unemployment in both small capitalist and petty commodity production), owing to the backwardness of capitalism in agriculture.

\*

The petty bourgeoisie, forming one half the population, is in full decomposition. In the present situation, with capitalism in a death agony within its own iron frames of both private property and the national state, the decomposition of the petty bourgeoisie is tremendous. Several hundreds of thousands of the laboring population are at the same time thrown out of the productive process.

With the capital accumulation and class decomposition in agriculture now in progress, the small farmers have a tendency to become either bourgeois or proletarians.

Hegemony within the bourgeoisie is in the hands of big business combined with the state apparatus. The chief shareholders and top staffs of a few hundred mammoth companies and the leading banks, i.e., a few hundreds of the richest and most privileged part of the bourgeoisie, hold the highest ranks in the state bureaucracy, through which they can control the state apparatus. The Diet conceals this monopoly of the capitalists from the eyes of the people. It is by means of the Diet that the bourgeoisie can make its own will "the people's will" and its own sovereignty "the people's sovereignty."

17. The concrete incarnation of the capitalist dictatorship (that is in fact carried out by the monopoly of finance capital) is some ten thousands of the biggest capitalists, a hundred thousand of the middle ones, and a million of the small ones. This dictatorship takes the form of parliamentary democracy, made possible by means, on the one hand, of an alliance with the petty bourgeoisie, composing half the population, and, on the other, of the support of the Social-Democracy as the political form of the upper stratum of the working class. Thus bourgeois democracy, as the present form of capitalist dictatorship, not only has a state apparatus belonging to the bourgeoisie, but also is administered by the Liberal-Democrats and the

Socialists. The petty bourgeoisie through the former, and the working class through the latter, are mobilized in support of the capitalist dictatorship.

18. The Treaty of San Francisco changed Japan's status from that of an occupied country to that of a dependent ally. This alliance is essentially different from the alliances among the imperialisms before the First World War. It is a united front of the international bourgeoisie and reaction, to defend imperialist rule against the world revolution. Within this alliance the economic and military superiority of Yankee imperialism is overwhelming; on the basis thereof the USA makes its weaker allies, according to the case, either into protectorates (the Latin American countries, the Philippines, South Vietnam, Thailand, South Korea, the Bagdad Pact bloc, etc) or into dependent allies (Japan and Western Europe). But they are themselves not the principal objects of Wall Street. It is in order to crush the class struggle and the colonial revolution and to win the counter-revolutionary war against the workers' states that imperialism and reaction are at present uniting all over the world. In their panic about the world revolution, inner oppositions among the allies do not hold a prominent place. In order to defend the capitalist system against the revolution, it is natural for the Japanese bourgeoisie to cede Ryukyu to the USA and to limit its own sovereignty in US bases. Here its "internationalism" prevails over its "nationalism." Finally "the national state and national sovereignty" must be subordinated to class interests. The international union of the bourgeoisie for a counter-revolutionary war is primary, and the internal opposition between the USA and Japan within this union is secondary.

19. In the military field, the dependence of Japan upon US imperialism is decisive. In the neighborhood of Japan, the USA has naval and air superiority, and South Korea, a US protectorate, has superiority in ground forces. The reconstruction of Japan's military power is undertaken as part of the preparation of the counter-revolutionary Third World War, in accordance with the Pentagon's timetable. The keystone of Japanese diplomacy is agreement with the USA. This means sympathy with US imperialism's offensive against the Chinese revolution. Consequently our foreign trade is dependent on the USA and alienated from China.

Year by year since the Treaty of San Francisco. Japan's internal political and economic dependence on the USA has diminished. This has meant economic power and political stability for Japanese capitalists. But a rise in the class struggle and a crisis in the present regime will once

more intensify their dependence on US imperialism. At present US imperialism is playing the role of reserve army for the capitalist dictatorship in Japan.

20. Thus the supreme necessity for the capitalist states in the contemporary world is the defense of capitalism against the world revolution by means of the international capitalist alliance. For them too their class interests prevail over national interests. Therefore the Japanese bourgeoisie is making a desperate attempt to keep the revolution from our country, against the gigantic pressure of the workers' states and the Chinese revolution, by means of dependence on the USA in the military domain, in diplomacy, and in trade.

In sum, the top bourgeois in our country take direct hold of the state apparatus and attract the petty bourgeoisie and the laboring masses to the side of the capitalist dictatorship through the Liberal-Democrats and the Socialists. And the immense power of the USA constitutes its final reserves.

The foregoing is the essence and disposition of forces in Japan.

### III. THE COMING REVOLUTION: ITS CHARACTER, TASKS, AND MAKERS

21. The bankruptcy of capitalism is shown by the facts that not only private property and anarchic distribution come into collision with the social character of production, but also that its national boundaries are inconsistent with the worldwide character of production. Hence the working class must not only replace capitalist property by statified and planified economy, but also wipe out the national boundaries in favor of an international planned economy. It is this problem that modern society must resolve to become a socialist society.

The productivity created by capitalism comes into collision with private property and the national state that heads it. This is the reason why the redivision of the world by national monopolies and imperialism is a most important aspect of capitalism. But it is an impermanent solution. Two world wars, a world panic, and a series of local wars and partial panics brought us monstrous waste of life and wealth, and the present preparation of the counter-revolutionary world war will also bring them on us.

Our coming revolution will not be complete in itself with the overthrow of the Japanese bourgeoisie, but must be international in the sense of being an organic part of the worldwide class struggle. Our coming revolution is part of the permanent world revolution that never ceases to advance to the Socialist United States of the

World under workers' democracy. Because contemporary capitalist productivity cannot function regularly without conscious operation on a world scale, and because the capitalists all over the world unite in order to maintain their imperialist domination and prepare the counter-revolutionary war, our coming revolution is essentially international whether we are conscious of it or not.

22. The proletariat of our country is essentially a part of the international proletariat, and the bourgeoisie of our country is a part of the international bourgeoisie. Therefore, our revolution, as it develops, must on the one hand take as its opponent not only the bourgeoisie of our country but also the international bourgeoisie, American imperialism in particular; and, on the other hand, it must unite with the world proletariat, particularly the Russian and Chinese. In the USSR and People's China, workers' states, the workers cannot yet enjoy workers' democracy of orthodox Leninism and higher productivity. Particularly in the USSR, the dictatorship of the privileged bureaucracy is an intolerable obstacle to economic development and to world revolution.

Nevertheless, our revolutionary working class is in the same camp as the workers' states in Russia and China and opposed to the Japanese bourgeoisie and world imperialism. These two camps are each moved by a supreme strategy, on which every partial front depends.

The workers' states in Russia and China are reserves to the revolution in Japan; Yankee imperialism, reserves to the counter-revolution in Japan. They belong to the respective class camp in our country and form the main force of each. Therefore each reserve plays a decisive role under definite conditions. From the end of the war till the Treaty of San Francisco, American imperialism, as reserves of the Japanese counter-revolution, stood at the head of the struggle against the rise of the working class in Japan. For the power of our bourgeoisie was very weak. But the USSR to a large extent acted against the interests of the revolution by means of the reactionary nationalism and chauvinism of the bureaucratic leadership during and just after the Second World War.

After the Treaty of San Francisco, American imperialism moved aside. Now the main force of the enemy is the Japanese bourgeoisie. The reserves are not out front. But their reappearance will be determined by the political and economic situation in the next phase.

23. The reserves of the working class have been rapidly reënforced since the end of the Second World War. Evidences of this fact are the overthrow of the capitalist system in Eastern

Europe, the commencement of the great rise of the colonial revolution, the development of the victorious Chinese revolution, the economic and military might of the USSR, etc. Nor are these all. Stalinism, the political expression of the privileged Soviet bureaucracy that is a conservative obstacle to the working-class movement all over the world, is in decline and on the road to its conclusive fall. This reality does not weaken the workers' states but makes their progress more rapid and gives a stimulus to world revolution.

24. In the above-mentioned situation of the revolution and counter-revolution, our revolution marches on. It is essentially a socialist revolution, part of world revolution. This revolution aims at the overthrow of capitalism in Japan, the foundation of a statified and planned economy through a workers' state there, and an advance to working-class rule throughout the world. In the process of the revolution the working class must overthrow and destroy the Japanese bourgeoisie and its reserves — American imperialism. And the perspective that the revolution must overthrow American imperialism as the final step does not give a character of nationalism to the revolution but reveals the essence of its internationalism.

25. The main force of the revolution is of course the proletariat. It forms 44% of the national population. The main body of the counter-revolution is the bourgeoisie. It forms only 5%. Between these two camps is the petty bourgeoisie, with which the counter-revolution at present and the revolution in the future must unite as an ally. It forms 51% of our population.

The strategy of the revolution is to unite the working class against the capitalist class, to separate the petty bourgeoisie from the capitalist class, to neutralize the petty bourgeoisie, draw it toward the working class, and get it to take part in the struggle against the capitalist class; thereby to isolate the capitalist class, covering only 5% of the population, to encircle it with the overwhelming majority of the masses, and to disarm and destroy it.

Along its march, the revolution must spread and develop the class struggle in the US army and isolate the handful of Wall Street agents from the American workers and farmers in uniform, in order to paralyze and break down this army. This task must be closely combined with the struggle for socialism by the American proletariat.

26. The working class, main force of the revolution, is composed of the modern stratum (in state and big private enterprises), the pre-modern stratum (in small enterprises), and the intermediate stratum. And in the modern and

intermediate strata there is a distinction between regular and irregular workers.

The trade unions of today have organized six million workers, viz, almost the whole modern stratum, half the intermediate stratum, and a very small part (perhaps 5%) of the pre-modern stratum. Most of the more than one million irregular workers do not have their own trade unions as a weapon of self-defense.

Among the workers in big business enterprises, there is a tendency on the one hand for the supervisory workers to become well-to-do, and on the other hand for the irregular workers at the bottom to become fixed and crystalized as such. Many irregular workers do the same work as that of the regulars, but their wage is at the level of that of workers in the pre-modern enterprises.

Though in this way the working masses are divided by the economic structure and policies of the capitalists, as a class they have only one aim: the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of the statified and planified economy. At the same time achievement of this aim must mean the amelioration of living standards and the liberation of the poorest bottom layers comprising the majority of the working class. The anti-capitalist unity of the working class will be brought about only when the enormous masses of the pre-modern and intermediate workers are mobilized by the powerful revolutionary initiative of the middle and lower strata of the workers in big business enterprises. To mobilize the class means in fact to win over the majority of the class, to liberate and organize the energy of the lower working masses who are being crushed by life and are not organized in trade unions. In such a process, the working class will overcome the split into various strata and will march on to the revolution.

27. The union with the petty bourgeoisie can become substantial only as an open agreement between classes on the basis of constant revolutionary propaganda and repeated united actions against the capitalists. It obliges the working masses to unite as a class for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie. In this struggle it is necessary for them to separate the petty bourgeoisie from the bourgeoisie, to neutralize it and draw it to them.

Agreement between the working class and the petty bourgeoisie is absolutely not one between the former and the politicians and political representatives of the upper stratum of the latter, agents of the capitalists. (They appear as Liberal-Democrats and Right-Wing Socialists in the ranks and as Right-Wing Socialists in the Diet and the Prefectural Assemblies.) Agreement will be reached only when the working class reno-

vates the leadership of the mass movements and controls it under the influence of the revolutionary workers' party.

A relatively upper stratum, one third or one fourth of the petty bourgeoisie, is the most conservative sector of the masses, an important support to the capitalist dictatorship. If the working class succeeds in neutralizing this stratum in the struggles, the bourgeoisie will fall like a general without soldiers. In such a process, the small capitalists, comprising the overwhelming majority of the bourgeoisie, are also drawn along into neutralization together with the upper strata of the petty bourgeoisie. Of course, this perspective is dependent, on the one hand, on the objective contradictions of interests among certain groups of the bourgeoisie, and, on the other, on the development of the class struggle and the capacity of the working class to utilize consciously these contradictions among the enemy.

The poorest majority strata of the petty bourgeoisie consist of the underemployed and the part-time workers. They are nearly proletarianized — nay, they are lumpenproletarianized. Their interests are clearly incompatible with the present regime. When the revolution begins to march, they will start along with the revolution and part of them will struggle actively. Only the statified and planified economy of the workers' state will open up for them the perspective of an improvement in living conditions. Alliance with the petty bourgeoisie generally means alliance with these elements. The working class must support their demands, unite them at the rank-and-file level, make agreements between their organizations and the workers' organizations at the leadership level, and advance with them to the overthrow of capitalism.

28. The fundamental tasks of the Japanese revolution are:

1) The overthrow of the capitalist regime maintained by the alliance between American imperialism and the Japanese bourgeoisie dependent thereon; the expulsion of all the forces of American imperialism from Japan.

2) The arrival to power of the working class at the head of all the laboring people and the establishment of the soviet government by the workers and peasants; the carrying out of the dictatorship of the proletariat supported by the poor masses of the towns and villages.

3) The confiscation without compensation of all capitalist means of production (industry, credit, trade, transportation, mines, and forests) by the workers' state.

4) The creation by the workers' state, supported by the laboring people, of the planned economy on the basis of the foregoing confiscations, the rapid improvement of productivity, and the

establishment of the preconditions for the free and equal socialist society.

5) Through the development of state collective farms of the agricultural workers and poor farmers, and by the gradual intensification of coöperation among small farmers on the basis of state aid in funds and techniques, the final incorporation of all agricultural production into the workers' statified and planified economy.

6) Establishment on firm foundations by our revolution of the advance to the socialist society by coöperation with the victorious proletariat in Asia and Africa, and in particular the USSR and China, the establishment of the Socialist United States of the World in coöperation with the working class all over the world, and setting out on the road to the attainment of communist society in free and equal union among all the world peoples.

#### IV. PROSPECTS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY WORKERS' PARTY — PARTY AND CLASS

29. It is an indispensable precondition for the completion of the revolution to found the revolutionary party that represents and concentrates the class interests of our laboring masses. The working class must unite under the leadership of the revolutionary party in order to complete the class's strategic aims. At present the objective conditions for these strategic aims are completely ripe. The sole problem to be solved is the formation of the revolutionary leadership capable of leading the masses to these aims.

30. The Socialist Party is a reformist workers' party — because, though it does not *fight* for some reforms, it plays the role of satisfying the workers by partial reforms *granted* by the capitalists and of keeping the workers' struggles within the limits permitted by the capitalists, whereas the present situation leaves little room for serious reforms, which meet with the life-and-death resistance of the capitalists, and necessitates the release of the powerful energy of the mass movements in order to crush capitalist resistance. The capitalists concede a little to the upper strata of workers, while they attack and mercilessly exploit the majority of workers. If the working class, faced with this splitting policy, does not raise the struggle for partial demands to a level capable of releasing the energy of the lower strata of workers, i.e., an anti-capitalist struggle through which the working class can win substantial concessions, the working class will be drawn into the vortex of this splitting policy and its demands will become reformist demands separated from the revolutionary struggle against capitalism.

The SP does not represent the interests of the workers as a class. It (1) is mainly based on

the upper stratum of workers in the modern capitalist enterprises (private big capital and state capital); (2) plays a role as the agent of capital in the pre-modern capitalist enterprises; (3) is based also on the radical part of the petty bourgeoisie. In general, its left wing represents (1) and its right wing (2) and (3).

Therefore the SP forms a chain that draws the overwhelming majority of the workers and a part of the petty bourgeoisie to the hegemony of the above-mentioned strata through the party apparatus.

Lastly, the SP is a main support to bourgeois democracy.

31. The historical origin of reformism is to be sought in the pre-imperialist epoch when the conquest of power by the proletariat was not yet on the order of the day, i.e., when the workers' party definitely distinguished two tasks — the struggle for the everyday interests of the masses, and propaganda for socialism.

In the imperialist epoch, objective conditions broke through the Great Wall of China between strategy for the socialist revolution and the everyday struggle. Nevertheless, when the task of combining these two came up on the order of the day, the parties of the Second International completely laid bare their bankruptcy. Under the conditions of the imperialist epoch, these parties on a world scale fell into the hands of representatives only of the upper strata of the privileged workers, only one part of the working masses. And in opposition to the interests of the overwhelming majority of the working class, they fell into the hands of supporters of the splitting policy of the imperialists.

For the upper strata of workers, separated from the overwhelming majority, placed at the top of the trade unions, patronized and utilized by the capitalists, relatively stabilized and granted a part of the excess profits of the monopolies at the expense of the majority, reformism is suited to their conservatism not only by ideology but to some extent by objective conditions. Because of this base, the SP can pay no attention to the resistance of the masses, can take on itself the trouble of mediating between the masses and the capitalists, and can play the role of a principal political apparatus of the working class.

32. The renovation and intensification of capitalism, particularly private monopoly capitalism, after the Korean War, made an effective basis for reformism. At the same time it produced a relative — and in part an absolute — lowering of the standard of living of the majority of workers, which produced also an intensification of class opposition. Accordingly the working class is forced to choose between two courses — a reformist course and a revolution-

ary course. Each of them is respectively the basis for ZENRO and SOHYO. The history of SOHYO is a rough process where the masses, in a zigzag, experimentally, and without the guidance of a revolutionary party, resisted a reformist course, but the left reformists dragged down their efforts. In ZENRO the hegemony of the labor aristocracy is fundamentally established. In SOHYO it has been shaken and pushed to the left by pressure from below, and its leadership is maintained only by radical speeches dangerous to itself, and by manoeuvres.

The two-party system that was brought about by the unity of the conservative parties and that of the Socialist parties is part of the policy of shutting the working class as a whole up within reformism under the conditions of the renovation and intensification of capitalism. It permits the working class to struggle for reformist de-

mands but forbids it to struggle for revolutionary demands. This is a premiss of capitalist strategy. From above, it consciously intensifies reformist strength inside the working-class movement.

33. At the beginning of 1957, the two-sided operation — repression and reform — by the ruling class, and the reformist course included in the above operations — symbolized by the establishment of the two-party system — came into distinct collision with the resistance of the masses. But the resistance of the masses is spontaneous and generally zigzag in form, as it is not guided by a revolutionary leadership. And in these struggles the worker militants of the CP and the SP Left Wing are rapidly growing and crystalizing. Though they are weakened by their leadership and occasionally lose their way, on the whole they are advancing toward the course of class struggle.

[To be concluded in our next issue.]

# ON THE PROBLEMS OF THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION

By SAL SANTEN

## AS APPROACHED BY CHINA...

It cannot be doubted that the sympathy and solidarity of the Chinese Communists, leaders included, with the struggle of the colonial masses in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, is sincere and profound. The struggles of the Cuban and Congolese gave rise to nationwide demonstrations in China. Recently a mass rally was held in Peking to demonstrate China's solidarity with the cause of the Cameroons, etc. Support was given to the people of Oman. There is sincere concern about the fate of Vietnamese and Korean prisoners of war in the hands of the enemy.

Especially since the victory in Cuba of Fidel Castro over the brutal dictatorship of Batista, the Chinese Communists show a lively interest in the fight of the Latin American masses against American imperialism. On February 21 the *People's Daily* devoted an article to the Latin American liberation struggle.

It should be said immediately: there is a gulf between China's practical solidarity with the struggle of the colonial masses and the theoretical approach to the problems of the colonial revolution by the Chinese C P leadership. It is as if their own experience of bitter defeats owing to the policy of class collaboration in 1925-27 has not taught the Chinese Communist leaders at all, in spite of the example of the victory of 1949, possible thanks only to the war to the end against Chiang Kai-Shek.

After analyzing the hatred of the Latin American masses towards American imperialism, the article comes to the conclusion that the formation of a national united front is characteristic of the present anti-United States struggle in Latin America. This front, according to the *People's Daily*, is based on the alliance of the national bourgeoisie with the workers, peasants, and petty-bourgeoisie. It says:

Though the national bourgeoisie of Latin America is dependent on United States monopoly capital, so the alliance between them is transient, while the contradictions between them are permanent. In recent years, anti-imperialist, especially anti-United States imperialist, sentiments have grown among the national bourgeoisie, because they have suffered heavy blows from United States imperialism and been influenced by the

mounting anti-United States struggle of the mass of the people. Although the national bourgeoisie is fearful of the growing political activity of the workers and peasants, in view of its sharp contradictions with United States imperialism, *it is compelled to co-operate with the people. On this basis a national united front is gradually being formed in Latin America.* [Our italics.]

It is a matter of fact that the national bourgeoisies in Latin America are striving for independence from imperialism. It is a normal tendency, to be observed in the colonial and dependent countries everywhere in the world. To draw from it the conclusion, however that the national bourgeoisie "is compelled to cooperate with the people," is — to put it mildly — a bit euphemistic. The truth is that the national bourgeoisies have tried, and to a certain extent continue to try, to use the anti-imperialist struggles of the masses as a means to obtain concessions from imperialism, but only in their *own national bourgeois interest*. At the very moment the struggle of the masses goes beyond the class interests of the national bourgeoisie, i e, begins to become a danger for the national bourgeoisie itself, the latter does not hesitate a single moment to call on imperialism for aid *against* the struggling masses.

The Latin American masses have a brief but very rich experience in this field. In Argentina, the "coöperation" of Perón, and later on of Frondizi, with the people, ended at the very moment when the masses, through their struggle, began to endanger the bourgeois regime. In Bolivia the M N R, brought to power by the revolutionary struggle of the workers and poor peasants, has become an agency of imperialism in order to prevent the formation of a workers' and peasants' government by the masses themselves. In Latin America there are already numerous examples of the same character.

While the Latin American workers and poor peasants have every reason to be in complete solidarity with the Chinese revolution, and to welcome its uninterrupted development in China itself, they should be aware at the same time that the policy advocated for them by the Chinese leaders is a mortally dangerous one. The task of the Latin American masses, in order to prepare victory, is to *liberate themselves* from the



national bourgeois leaderships, to find the way to *independent* class action, as the only means to follow the Chinese example: to take power and to break the imperialist domination.

Though the Chinese approach to the Latin American revolution is Stalinist in essence, it can be said in favor of the Chinese Communist Party that finally — contrary to 1925-27 — it followed in China another, independent path which ensured the victory of the Chinese revolution. Its lack of understanding of the revolutionary problems of Latin America demonstrates its pragmatism and empiricism. It would be false, however, to conclude from it that the Chinese CP attitude flows from the desire to prevent the Latin American masses from taking power, in order to maintain "peaceful coexistence." It simply repeats the Stalinist wisdoms, without taking any notice of the disastrous consequences such a policy would have for the Latin American masses.

### ... AND INDONESIA

The attitude of the PKI (the Indonesian Communist Party) toward the problems of the *Indonesian* revolution is also Stalinist, *Menshevik*, to the core. Compared to the Chinese approach to the Latin American revolution, however, it is much more dangerous. China is far away from Latin America. The Latin American workers' vanguard is not waiting for an article in the *People's Daily*, in spite of their solidarity with China, in order to work out an adequate policy.

The policy of the PKI, however, has its direct influence upon the struggle of the Indonesian masses themselves. The leadership of the PKI is a cynical one, which received its "education" entirely in the school of Stalinism, in Moscow itself. Aidit, general secretary of the PKI, is an adept of Stalin. He knows his way in the Moscow hierarchy better than in his own party. If the Indonesian Communist rank and file is inspired by the Chinese revolution, and this cannot be doubted, the PKI leadership is completely faithful to the Soviet bureaucracy.

In the interest of "peaceful coexistence," the PKI leadership has at any cost prevented the masses from taking power. Its coöperation with the national bourgeoisie does not even have the appearance of being in the interest of the national revolution. When the workers last year occupied the Dutch factories and enterprises, the PKI ordered them to return them to the Indonesian army, headed by Nasution, an anti-communist.

Thanks to the aid of the PKI leadership, the Indonesian Djuanda government succeeded in "restoring order." Having obtained this unex-

pected success, the Indonesian national bourgeoisie is doing everything to concentrate state power in its hands, at the cost of the revolutionary masses.

Under those circumstances, Sukarno's "principles" about "guided democracy" are a real weapon in the hands of the Indonesian bourgeoisie. They weaken the role of the Indonesian mass movement in political life and strengthen Sukarno's "independent" position as "arbiter." While in the past Sukarno's Bonapartist position was steadily undermined by the strength and combativity of the mass movement on the one hand, the weakness of the national bourgeoisie on the other hand, "guided democracy" intends to lay the foundations for "stable" Bonapartism in Indonesia. It guarantees even the *political* position of the army as a "functional group" within the state.

A genuine communist party, with a passion for preparing the masses for taking power, would, of course, launch a life-and-death struggle against "guided democracy." Even from the formal democratic point of view it would have had to warn the masses about the consequences of it, as being directed against themselves.

Not so the PKI. On February 24th it issued a statement saying that it would accept restoration of the 1945 Constitution "only on condition that it were done within the scope of, and to carry out, guided democracy and the concepts of President Sukarno 100%." It had supported Sukarno's concepts and the proposal for guided democracy from the very beginning. Guided democracy was the way to carry out fully the President's concepts. In implementing guided democracy, a democratic and constitutional approach should be provided for Sukarno, so that he could give competent leadership in legislative and executive affairs. The return to the 1945 Constitution meant opening such a way for the President, it pointed out. So far the PKI. It should be stressed that the 1945 Constitution authorizes the President to govern by decrees!

The submission of the Indonesian mass movement to the interests of the national bourgeoisie could not be posed in a clearer way. There is no reason to be surprised about it. If one starts from the need to "coöperate" with the national bourgeoisie, the ruling force in the country, the way to submission is only a gradual one.

### THE FUTURE OF THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION

It is not by chance that we have made this comparison between the Chinese and the Indonesian approach to the problems of the colonial revolution. We repeat: no doubt the Chinese Communist leadership started from other *intentions* than the PKI leadership. The Chinese CP

leadership has no genuine interest in preventing the Latin American masses from taking power, whereas the PKI leadership consciously restrains the Indonesian masses from taking power.

But in politics, as we learned from Marx, good intentions are not enough. Decisive are the effects of the policy one advocates.

And *as such* there is no difference between the Chinese and the Indonesian approach.

For revolutionary Marxists the conclusion is clear. With the policy of Stalinism it is impossible to secure new, decisive, socialist victories of the colonial revolution. Therefore an independent class policy is needed, which succeeds in

uniting the broad masses against both imperialism and the national bourgeoisies.

The preparation of such a policy cannot be left to chance. If the Chinese Communists, after all their experience of defeat and victory, have not succeeded in mastering a clear understanding of the colonial revolution, how could one expect such an understanding from the masses themselves *without the conscious political intervention of the revolutionary Marxist vanguard?*

The future of the colonial revolution, it cannot be stressed enough, depends more than ever upon its impregnation by revolutionary Marxism, i e, *the Fourth International*.

# CRISIS IN THE DANISH C P

By GEORG MOLTVED

## PREFATORY NOTE

The following article just missed the deadline for our last issue. Its solid facts are unchanged by its late appearance, but to update it, the following subsequent events may usefully be noted:

The predicted party was indeed constituted by Aksel Larsen, former chief of the Danish C P, with the name Socialistik Folkeparti (People's Socialist Party), in February. Larsen was named president and parliamentary deputy. The number of signatures needed for the latter office was overfulfilled. Branches have been formed throughout the country, and a congress was called for

the end of April to adopt a programme and elect a regular leadership.

In the Danish parliament there are now representatives of both Communist Parties. In the next elections the Stalinists will be eliminated.

The weakness shown by the new party has been that, in fighting against Stalinism, it has set reformist trends going; but its strength will come from the fact that it will be obliged to admit revolutionary groups to membership and to function in accordance with democratic principles.

March 1959

One of the countries where the settlement of accounts with Stalinism occurred with particular clarity is Denmark, not only because of the country's smallness, but also because the man who had headed the party for 30 years was driven into opposition and for this reason aroused particular attention for the policy of the opposition.

The Communist Party of Denmark, after the defeat of the Nazis in 1945, made a spectacular advance, not because of the skill and foresightedness of its chiefs, but thanks to the skilful and disciplined intervention of rank-and-file Communists in the fight against the German forces of occupation — an action which is not questioned even by the bourgeois participants in this resistance struggle. But recruiting was helped also by the victories of the Soviet Union and partly also by hopes of the development of a revolutionary current in a series of capitalist countries, especially Germany and France.

The Communist Party, which previously had had only three members in the parliament, won 18, entirely at the expense of the Social-Democracy, which during the occupation had been more than passive — indeed, opposed — to the liberation struggle. But soon the rank and file of the Communist Party underwent great disappointments. Although they had carried on the resistance struggle without chiefs (these were all in German prisons), they loyally gave back the political leadership to the old chiefs, who showed a surprising lack of desire to continue the struggle. A certain reformism, of long standing in the party, had a new flowering. Without concern for the class struggle, the chiefs made propaganda for the continuation of the collaboration carried on with the bourgeois during the years of the resistance into the political life of the future. We do not know whether the Soviet Union had provided the direct stimulus to such a policy; but the leaders, educated in the Stalin-

ist school, received no directives in the opposite sense either. Soon the party was strongly suffused with reformism, a utopian idea of slipping peacefully into socialism solely by parliamentary work. The shift to the right, this bowing down to the bourgeoisie, did, however, bring about a certain desolidarization from the Soviet Union. The whole thing had an air of Social-Democracy about it.

This lack of realism and an unequivocal desolidarization from real socialism, combined with the hesitations and vacillations of the party's leadership, after some years caused a decline in the party's influence and authority. The large number of Social-Democrats who had joined it went back to their old party, and the most outstanding Marxists either abandoned the party in great disappointment or were expelled if they made an audible criticism. When the fiasco was obvious, the party received the advice from the Soviet Union to keep less to the right and above all to keep close to the Soviet Union. That meant, not an abandonment of reformism, but the firmer use of Stalinist terror in the party, with expulsion of all Leninists. This policy led to an even greater desertion from the party, till the explosion finally came as a consequence of the XXth Congress at Moscow and the later settlements of accounts with Stalinism in Poland and Hungary. The majority of the members reacted by resignations: the number of members fell from 50,000 in 1946 to 11,000 in 1957. But a revolt broke out inside the party as well. The gagged members found their voices again. Part of those who had resigned, together with Left Social-Democrats and some Trotskyist groups, formed a new Socialist Party which, apart from some victories in municipal elections, had no importance, partly because it did not know how to work up a clear socialist programme, but above all for lack of skilled leaders.

It was then that Aksel Larsen, head of the C P

for many years, found the moment ripe for revolt. It is true, he himself had been the most zealous about reformist policy, but at the same time an adversary of the over-strong influence of the Soviet Union on the party. In his youth, in Moscow, he had supported the Trotskyist Opposition and had been banished to a province in the North, and then exiled, after running the risk of losing his right to membership in the party. Bukharin saved him. For six years he was not accepted by the Soviet Union. Nevertheless he very quickly became the chief of the Danish party, which was then almost falling to pieces. As its chief he showed great faculties for organization by pulling the party together again and won a considerable popularity in the working class, showing much oratorical talent as a member of parliament.

For several years he and some other party leaders carried on a clandestine struggle against Stalinism, unnoticed by the party members, because party loyalty forbade any disagreement becoming apparent. He saw quite clearly that the party was heading toward decomposition, and he at least did not want to accompany it into ruin. After the Hungarian crisis his protests coincided with those of several others, and he was forced to make his opposition overt. It went beyond the question of Hungary and led to demands for party democracy and the right to criticize the Soviet Union. His appearance in the arena of the opposition was the signal for all the other oppositions, both the Marxist-Leninist groups and the purely reformist groups, to hoist their colors. The open revolt in the party could be calmed only by calling a special congress for October 1958.

There was no doubt but that the Stalinist wing would have the majority therein, although most of the members were evidently for the opposition. The chief of the party knew it too: it was not in vain that he himself had for several years worked out statutes and usages that rendered illusory the democratic rights of the members. A strong point of the opposition was that almost all the Communist trade-union leaders were with it. Everything indicated that Aksel Larsen would be expelled at the congress, especially when his most outstanding collaborator in the opposition, Kaj Moltke, who was the foreign politics editor of the party's paper, *Land og Folk*, was expelled shortly before the congress. Moltke was much more to the left than the party chief, an outstanding Marxist and a dangerous adversary, especially since he had a strong position among the members.

The party's position toward its chief was a bit difficult. Pospelov, the Soviet adviser who was present, advised expulsion for all members

critical of the Soviet Union, with the exception of Larsen, who must have no official functions — this in order not to destroy the party any more than was necessary. It aroused much attention in Denmark, and also in other countries, that the Soviet Union was openly meddling in the party of this small country. Never in the past had a Soviet delegation been present at a Danish congress; one now arrived which, through Pospelov, represented the very top of the Soviet party. (The previous year he had been in Italy to pacify the party there, and he had been named to lead the delegation to the Yugoslav congress not long before the Soviet Union threw Yugoslavia out into the exterior darkness again.) Pospelov was the collaborator and successor of Suslov, who, a few years before, had destroyed the Communist Party of Norway by methods previously unknown in the Scandinavian countries. Several months before the Danish congress, Aksel Larsen had been the victim of a violent attack in the newspaper of the Dutch party, *De Waarheid*, where the party chief, de Groot, accused Larsen of being an "enemy of the party" and a deserter to capitalism. This article was reproduced in *Pravda* without comment; Aksel Larsen knew then the position of the Soviet Union toward him and the opposition. It is probable that the leadership in the Soviet Union was afraid that the revolt in the Danish party would spread by chain-reaction to other countries and for this reason intervened, also so as to render what was left of the party still more devoted to the Soviet Union.

To expel Larsen meant even more than an action against an important member, because he was also a member of parliament, and, what is more, controlled all six Communist mandates. For his mandate was what is called a constituency mandate (the only one the party had at its disposal) which has to be won in order for it to receive supplementary seats. His expulsion would have the effect that the other five would not be reelected in the next elections. But the sanction was carried out; Aksel Larsen himself provoked it. He did not want to stay in his old party, isolated and stripped of influence. At a theatre, after the performance, he had himself photographed by the press with a noose around his neck, a macabre allusion to the coming congress. *He was expelled, not at the congress, but a few days later, after having arranged meetings of his fractions in some cities in the country.*

What is left of the party is now composed exclusively of Stalinists, completely subject to the conditions of the Soviet Union. It has been a costly business. For, whereas the party had to organize an annual collection to raise about 400,000 Danish kroner to pay the costs of the

apparatus, this could not be done during the revolt and was postponed. If it is taken into consideration that about half the members have left the party in the past two years, and that its press also is having a hard time, the need for considerable contributions from abroad can be understood. The break-up of the party is probably going to continue. After his expulsion, Aksel Larsen announced the formation of a new socialist party, the People's Socialist Party, which, under this name, has been officially registered with the parliament.

Provisionally, Aksel Larsen is asking for written support for his parliamentary mandate, rather as a moral guarantee and as a means of agitation. He wants at least 15,000 signatures — which he will surely obtain. This Spring the party will begin its activity, when a programme will be distributed and discussed. More than half the members of the Communist Party have joined it, and the above-mentioned Socialist Party of Denmark is near a fusion with it. Several groups with a radical Marxist-Leninist viewpoint, most of whose members have been expelled from the DKP for their conscious Marxist attitude, have also offered their support to the new party. These groups are seizing this opportunity instead of working in isolation with no possibility of doing practical work, a situation to which they were forced to subject themselves for many years. They will profit by the promised freedom of expression to form the left wing of the new party and will stand as sentinels against reformism.

In this settlement, what is remarkable is that neither Aksel Larsen nor the already mentioned trade-union chiefs had imagined setting up a new party, but only getting away from the DKP and awaiting developments. But the rank-and-file members poured into the arena. Various branches in the provinces and in Copenhagen were united in their demand for the creation of a new party. This happened in an almost explosive way. Aksel Larsen was driven forward, much farther than he had imagined. It was only then that he decided to associate himself with the formation of a new party. This pressure from below is a trait full of promise for Marxist developments.

And what will these developments mean? First, that the role of the DKP is finished in

Danish politics and that its significance for the Danish workers' movement is reduced to a minimum. Next, that the new party, as far as can be judged from declarations and analyses, will be forced to observe democratic rules for elections and votes, and to leave the power in the hands of the members to a degree never seen in either the DKP or the Soviet Union. As the DKP has practised reformism to a considerable degree, the new party at worst will do the same; but, in the best of cases, it will be susceptible to Leninism, all the more so in that it is forced to admit the Marxist groups.

The opposition has declared, not only that it is opposed to the N A T O, but also that it is in favor of total Danish disarmament — not a penny for militarism. This finds a deep echo throughout the whole working class and among large parts of the peasantry, where anti-militarism is traditional. The DKP's position had been absurd; it wanted military expenses reduced to half of whatever the N A T O asked.

Since Aksel Larsen, in full agreement with his leadership, has had strong reformist tendencies, it can well be feared that these will rub off on the People's Socialist Party. His aspiration was to fuse with the Social-Democracy or to collaborate with it, even to participate with it in bourgeois governments. For this reason, the Social-Democracy ought not to be embarrassed when it was the government, so as not to risk having it replaced by a bourgeois government. This is a tactic that is not unknown among other Communist Parties, in France for example, and that unquestionably is connected with the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, which does not want to see disorders, let alone revolts, in capitalist countries.

The Soviet Union, however, remains interested in keeping a Communist Party as an organ that it can use for Soviet propaganda, for the publication of Soviet magazines, for the organization of the trips of delegations, the exchange of lectures and art exhibitions, and, naturally, to be always at its disposal to explain and glorify the advances of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries — superficial glorifications that do not penetrate into the serious problems of these countries. It is to this that the Communist Party of Denmark is now reduced.

January 1959

## XXIst Plenum of the International Executive Committee

### THE ARAB REVOLUTION

Report Presented by Comrade MICHEL PABLO

#### II

#### BALANCE SHEET OF THE PRESENT BOURGEOIS LEADERSHIP OF THE ARAB REVOLUTION

It is these data <sup>1</sup> that must be taken into account when judging the role played by the bourgeois or petty-bourgeois leadership of the Arab revolution in this post-war period, to draw its trial balance, and to evaluate its prospects.

The outstanding events in the Middle Eastern and Arab revolution in general, in the new stage opened since the end of the Second World War, are: the Mossadegh experiment in Iran; the 1952 Egyptian political revolution and the rise to power of Nasserism; the liberation of Tunisia and Morocco; the Algerian revolution of November 1954; the formation of the U A R; the 1958 Lebanese and Iraqi revolutions.

In all these events a bourgeois or petty-bourgeois leadership of the revolution asserted its authority, heading up the national anti-imperialist struggle. In some cases, the leading political role played by the bourgeois parties and personalities — themselves of bourgeois social origin or definitively attached ideologically to the bourgeoisie — was perfectly clear: Mossadegh in Iran; the Istiqlal in Morocco; the Néo-Destour and Bourguiba in Tunisia; various bourgeois and petty-bourgeois formations in Lebanon and Syria. In other cases, such as those of Egypt and Iraq, the leadership of the revolution was taken over by a Bonapartist officers' group, whose social essence and orientation should be better grasped. This is more generally the case of *Nasserism*.

Events have completely demonstrated, it seems to me, the correctness of the essential theses of revolutionary Marxism on the development of the colonial revolution in our time and the role of the native bourgeoisie. They have confirmed the possibility for the bourgeoisie to struggle, up to a certain point, against imperialism, and this in turn confirms the necessity of a *national anti-imperialist united front* rallying all classes, in

the case of colonial and semi-colonial countries.

But events have equally demonstrated the limitations of the native bourgeoisie in all essential fields: real independence from imperialism; national unification; agrarian reform; industrialization; the emancipation of women. Because of the fact that the native bourgeoisie, including the nucleus of the industrial bourgeoisie, is in all these countries *both* economically weak, too tied up economically with imperialism, with the feudalists, and with the other native exploiting strata (mercantile and usurious bourgeoisie), and afraid to base itself firmly on the peasant and worker masses, events have shown that this bourgeoisie *cannot achieve and complete the aforementioned essential tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution*. <sup>2</sup>

Mossadegh's failure in the nationalization of oil in Iran; the balance sheets of the Istiqlal regime in Morocco and the Néo-Destour regime in Tunisia; today's trial balance of the Iraq revolution — all this experience is present to show clearly the limitations of a revolutionary leadership that is in the last analysis bourgeois. (We shall treat separately the case of the present Algerian revolution.)

These limitations are all the more flagrant in that the international conditions of the post-war period have in reality given the national bourgeoisies of the colonial and semi-colonial countries *exceptional* possibilities and chances, because of the antagonism between the East and West and the quite new possibilities of diplomatic, military, financial, commercial, and technical aid at the disposal of the U S S R and the other workers' states. <sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> That is, the tasks proper to the *bourgeois social revolution*, which, in the past, in European countries, permitted overthrowing feudalism and installing modern capitalism.

<sup>3</sup>*Egypt*: The volume of trade between Egypt and the U S S R increased more than *11 times* between 1953 and 1957. For a whole series of goods, the U S S R is now Egypt's main supplier. Thus, in 1957, among Egyptian imports the U S S R figured for: 43% of the wheat; 37% of the oil; 37% of the sawn lumber; 50% of the plywood; 27% of the tractors. The U S S R, furthermore, is now buying more than 30% of Egyptian cotton, and also rice.

<sup>1</sup> For the first half of this report, see our last (Winter) issue.

Owing to these new circumstances, the national bourgeoisie has the possibility of pushing its relative independence from imperialism much further than in the past, and at the same time to stand up victoriously to possible aggressions by imperialism, as was the case at the time of the Anglo-French 1956 Suez expedition, and again at the time of the events following the 1958 revolution in Iraq.

But the class nature of the national bourgeoisie prevents it from profiting by such an exceptional situation to make radical riddance of the economic consequences of imperialism and the feudalists, whose existence is a major obstacle to the extension of the internal market and to a rapid and large-scale industrialization. The economic positions of imperialism are nowhere completely eliminated in the Arab countries, including Egypt — far from it.

In the case of certain expropriations and statifications, which took place under the drive of the masses and of urgent political and economic needs — such as those of the Suez Canal and other enterprises in Egypt — the imperialists have been given fat compensation, which loads the national economy with burdens which reduce to just that extent the possible resources that could have been devoted to industrialization.

The case of petroleum, which is determinant for the economic future and the industrialization of the Arab countries, is characteristic of the general weakness of the bourgeoisie confronted by imperialism. The new relationship of forces set up between the two might be able to lead the bourgeoisie to negotiate the terms of the contracts with the oil companies in a way more favorable to itself. This process has already started.<sup>4</sup>

*But the stage of the statification without indemnization of these companies, a primordial*

Syria: In 1957 Syria's imports from the Soviet Union represented, in value:

Machinery and equipment . . . .	47%
Petroleum products . . . . .	24%
Rolled iron . . . . .	13%
Sawn lumber . . . . .	9%

Soviet imports coming from Syria were represented mainly by cotton (more than 70%).

The product of the sale of Soviet goods, in the case of both Syria and Egypt, was entirely devoted to the purchase of these countries' agricultural products.

The credits granted by the USSR to the UAR at present add up to about \$ 450,000,000 (of which about \$ 200,000,000 for construction of the Assuan Dam).

<sup>4</sup> In the form of "integrated" companies which are set up with Japanese and Italian capital in certain cases, sharing the profits according to more advantageous formulae than the traditional "fifty-fifty," and giving a right to share in the profits arising not only from the production, but also from the refining, the transport, and the sale of petroleum. It is in these terms that Saudi Arabia recently wanted to draw up a contract with the Standard Oil of Indiana.

*precondition for ensuring the primitive accumulation necessary to get industrialization started on a big scale in the Arab countries, will not be entered without the revolutionary drive of the Arab masses and without a leadership that goes well outside the bourgeois framework.*

The task of the unification of the Arab nation is no less compromised under the present bourgeois or petty-bourgeois leadership of the Arab revolution. *Arab unification is too progressive a task not to subordinate to it the character of the regime under which it might be able to be brought about.*

The unification of the Arab nation would form the most propitious framework for the economic, social, and political flowering of the Arab revolution. *From this point of view, the political forms in which this process is carried out are less important than the content itself.* If for example Arab unification could be brought about in the framework of a single centralized state, governed by Nasser, however anti-democratic this state might be, one would not be able to be against such a unification. One would be satisfied merely to continue the struggle for democratic freedoms and for socialism within such a state.

But it is in practice improbable that Nasserism unify the Arab nation under the form either of a *centralized inter-Arab state*, or even of a *confederation of Arab republics*. All forms of association of the Arab states as *transitional forms toward unification in a single centralized state* or an effective *federative republic*<sup>5</sup> must be considered progressive and supported if they tend to be carried out.

The present difficulties within the UAR between Egypt and Syria, as well as the attitude of reserve on both sides between the UAR and Iraq about extending unification also to the latter country; Bourguiba's hostility toward the UAR; the dissensions even within the Maghreb — these are so many important indications of the *organic*, and not merely *conjunctural, inaptitude* of any one of the Arab bourgeoisies — even of the relatively most dynamic among them — to set itself up as the assimilating and unifying element of the Arab countries as a whole.

The different fractions of the Arab feudocapitalist ruling classes are too heterogeneous from the viewpoint of economic and social structure, each too differently tied up to imperialism, too particularist, to polarize themselves by their own will and movement around a single axis in a single national framework. Only a strong political power endowed with great economic dynamism would be able to break the

<sup>5</sup> Between the United Maghreb Republic and the United Arab Republic of the States of the Middle East, for example.

centrifugal particularist tendencies and bring about unification, which is *above all the common revolutionary aspiration of the Arab masses*.<sup>6</sup>

Nasserism does not have this scope. Nasserism represents par excellence a *Bonapartist power* which exploits the strength of the mass movement in Egypt and in the Arab countries as well as the antagonism between the East and West, to the final profit of the social stratum — still limited but steadily being reinforced — of the *national industrial bourgeoisie*. This bourgeoisie, *capitalist par excellence*, does not at present have sufficient strength to rule through a parliamentary democratic party and government. To impose its rule it needs a strong state able to face both imperialism and the economically backward native feudo-bourgeois strata, without being outflanked on the left by the autonomous revolutionary movement of the masses.

The military power of the “anti-imperialist” “national” officers — offspring mostly of the middle bourgeoisie of the towns and country, sons of medium large landowners, businessmen, or functionaries — who aspire in vague social terms to “modernize” their country, to “catch up with” the West etc — such a power is, for this stratum of the bourgeoisie, a dream come true as a political tool.

Basically Nasserist Bonapartism works in favor of the development of capitalism, both through the fact that part of the state administration, growing wealthy because of its functions, becomes capitalist, i.e., an owner of capital, and through state action as a whole, which is trying to make up for primitive capitalist accumulation and is aiding industrial capitalist development<sup>7</sup> against the limitations to this development produced in

<sup>6</sup> Arab national unification must also include real autonomy and even self-determination for the different *ethnic communities* that exist in certain states, for example the Kurds in Iraq. It would furthermore have to solve, in the Middle East, the question of the state of Israel and the Arab refugees. These people, 800,000 in number, are still living uprooted and unemployed in camps, generally in tents. The only fair solution for their painful and explosive problem is their reinstallation in Palestine, the Arab country par excellence, the present state of Israel being absorbed as a *national minority* enjoying a regime of self-government and full cultural freedoms within a United Arab Republic of the Middle East.

<sup>7</sup> Empirically Nasserism is finding its vocation as a political regime for the development of the industrial bourgeoisie. Ever since 1952 Egypt's effort at industrialization has been speeding up, despite still limited practical results (only 200 million Egyptian pounds industrial capital in 1956).

The policy of the Nasserist state is more and more marked by the drive for industrialization: mixed enterprises, with strong participation by the state; a “Committee of Production” given the job of speeding up the development of industry; the “Committee of the Plan” in 1956; a five-year plan in preparation, which should begin in 1959.

the past by the omnipotence of imperialism and feudalism.

The inter-Arab policy of Nasserism in trying to create a vaster inter-Arab market from which imperialist and feudal obstacles would be at least partly eliminated, and in trying on such a basis to bring other fractions of the Arab bourgeoisie to tie into this undertaking, is also purely capitalist in its economic essence.

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We have just seen the limits of the anti-imperialist struggle of the national bourgeoisie as well as those of its struggle for national unification and industrialization. It remains for us to demonstrate the limits of its struggle against the feudalists, which clearly appear in the extreme timidity of the agrarian reforms undertaken since the war by the national bourgeoisie.

In *Egypt*, the agrarian reform has to date benefited less than about 10% of the immense mass of the fellahin, while having accorded fat indemnities to the “expropriated” proprietors.<sup>8</sup>

The extension of the agrarian reform now going on in *Syria* sets the ceiling on private property left to the feudalists at 200 acres of irrigated land, increased by 100 acres in case of children, plus 750 acres of non-irrigated land. For the rest of his land taken over by the state,

This plan is to concern 256 million pounds sterling — a modest sum, after all — of which 36 million granted by the Soviet Union, 44 million by West Germany, 8 million by East Germany, and 10 million by Japan.

Nevertheless, the mobilization of local capital in favor of industry, including that given to landowners in the guise of payment for their lands expropriated by the agrarian reform, has so far been a failure.

<sup>8</sup> The law of 1952 limits property in cultivated land to 200 feddans, or to 300 feddans, for the first two children give a right to 50 extra feddans each (300 feddans = 311 acres). Uncultivated properties are not affected by the agrarian reform. Thus 666,000 untilled feddans could be recuperated, plus 180,000 feddans belonging to the royal family. In July 1956, 500,000 individuals divided into 65,000 families had benefitted by plots from the 260,000 feddans that had been confiscated. The overall agrarian reform will affect 1,500,000 fellahin in all, out of more than 18,000,000. The indemnity paid to the former owner is set at ten times the rental value of his lands, plus the price of installations, machines, and trees. It is paid in 3% Treasury Bonds payable after 30 years. In July 1956, 5,000 million francs of these bonds had been delivered, and their interest payments honored.

The land sold is payable in 30 years, at a price equal to 30 times the tax rate, plus 3% interest, plus 15% of the expenses of exploitation. The whole is payable on the annual harvest. In theory, the plots cannot be broken up, even on an inheritance basis.

The fellahin owners cultivate their lands within a collective framework — in obligatory coöperatives — receiving their share of the harvest on an area pro rata basis. The most important aspect of the reform is the authoritarian lowering of the *formerly exorbitant rental rate*, changed from between 40 and 50 Egyptian pounds per feddans before the reform to between 18 and 21.



the owner is indemnified on the basis of a price for the land equal to ten times the average annual rent (which is often, as in Egypt, four times greater than the rent of an equal area in Europe).

As for the land distributed to the peasants, it will be formed of plots of 20 acres of irrigated land or 75 acres of non-irrigated land, payable in 40 years at an interest rate of 1.5%. This reform also will not affect at the end of the five years required for its application, more than an infinitesimal part of the more than three million landless peasants in Syria.

As for the agrarian reform in *Iraq*, which in a sense precipitated the extension of the agrarian reform in Syria, it is even more moderate "in view of the fact that *Iraq* possesses three times more cultivatable land than Syria"! — as certain Arab apologists for the reform very paradoxically argue (cf the Oct 1958 *Arab Review*, published by the Arab Students' Union in England).

This reform, also spread over five years, proposes that the upper limit of private property shall be brought down to 618 acres of irrigated land and 1230 acres of non-irrigated land. *In all these cases, the class of former big landowners will be succeeded by a stratum of rich peasants who, sheltered from financial troubles — if only because of state indemnities — will have no difficulty in economically dominating, one way or another, the small peasants who have become owners of tiny plots, in a thankless climate, without suitable material and technical aid from the state.*

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As for the liberated countries of the Maghreb — Tunisia and Morocco — apart from limited expropriations, with indemnity, of a few settlers' estates, no serious attempt at agrarian reform has yet been undertaken.

*Under these conditions it can be affirmed without any exaggeration that the crucial problem, the agrarian problem, remains essentially intact in the Arab countries, and that it is an illusion to expect a radical solution thereof from the present leadership of the Arab revolution.*

As for the emancipation of women, whose condition in these countries, as a result of Islamic prescriptions and the feudal past, is among the most anachronistic and grievous in the world, the solution of this task also is tied up with the radical economic and social transformation of these countries, which cannot be accomplished under the present feudo-capitalist regime.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> The participation of women in the Arab revolution in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and now in Algeria, has partly loosened but nowise broken the mediaeval yoke that still lies upon them.

It is only the Moslem women of the *mountain regions*

## FOR A NEW REVOLUTIONARY MARXIST ARAB LEADERSHIP

Both to wind up and complete the Arab revolution's bourgeois-democratic tasks, properly so called, and to tackle the socialist reconstruction of the Arab nation, *it is necessary to cause a new leadership of the revolution to arise, representing the proletariat and the poor peasant masses of the Arab countries. In other words, a revolutionary Marxist leadership.*

It must be admitted, however, that this task is running very late as against history's timetable, and that it has been terribly complicated, in the Arab countries as elsewhere, by the changing foreign policy of the Soviet bureaucracy. By their thoroughly opportunist and class-collaborationist policy, the Communist Parties, docile instruments in the Arab countries just as elsewhere, have in reality so far sabotaged the creation of *autonomous* class political parties that stimulate the autonomous organization and action of the proletariat and the poor peasants.

Granted, such a necessary *class policy* does not mean to minimize in any way whatever the alliance with the national bourgeoisie in the effective struggle against imperialism and the feudalists. But this equally necessary alliance must take the form of a *united front* among *autonomous* class organizations with a view to *effective action*, for *precise goals*, each of the participants in the front fully safeguarding *its own political physiognomy* and its full right to *criticism of its conjunctural allies*. That is the Leninist policy of the united front. In colonial and dependent countries, in view of the dual role of the national bourgeoisie, this policy involves the merciless ideological criticism of the inevitable limitations of the national bourgeoisie, and the no less inevitable class struggle against it, in order to complete the bourgeois-democratic revolution and to tackle the socialist tasks properly so called.

Instead of following such a line, the Communist Parties of the Arab countries were forced by the Kremlin to line up, sometimes with the positions of the metropolitan bourgeoisie, sometimes with those of the national bourgeoisie, thus betraying both the struggle for national independence and the struggle for social liberation.

Every time the Kremlin wagered on the alliance or the neutralization of a metropolitan bourgeoisie, it cynically sacrificed to this goal the interests of the anti-imperialist struggle and of the social revolution in the countries depend-

or of the *nomad tribes* who have here and there kept a certain freedom, sometimes possibly the inheritance of the matriarchal institutions of former times (women of Kabylia, but especially women of the Chaouia Berber culture of the Aurès, Touareg women of the desert, etc.).

ent upon this metropolis. Before and during the Second World War, in order to maintain its alliance with Great Britain and France, the Kremlin forced the Arab Communist Parties to tone down their struggle for national independence, and even flatly to sabotage this struggle just so as not to hinder its imperialist allies. After the war, at another stage, when the movement for national independence became in spite of everything irresistible, in order to win the good graces of the national bourgeoisie in its own struggle against the Atlantic powers, the Kremlin forced the Communist Parties here and there to line up completely with the positions of the national bourgeoisie, to tone down and even openly to sabotage the autonomous class struggle for the social revolution in these countries.

Is it necessary to recall the sabotage of the anti-imperialist struggle in which the Syrian, Iraqi, Egyptian, and other Communist Parties engaged during the war, a struggle sacrificed on the altar of the Kremlin's alliance with Great Britain, France, and the United States? Is it necessary to recall how, "full of understanding" for the "historical bonds" allegedly existing between their respective countries and France, the Communist Parties of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia in fact long sabotaged the struggle for the national independence of these countries and then were taken into tow by the nationalist leaderships which took the initiative in such a struggle? Is it necessary to recall the almost unconditional support that the C Ps of Egypt and Syria gave Nasser from 1955 on, after the big arms agreement between Egypt and Czechoslovakia, a support that went even to the extreme of self-liquidation and open sabotage of any class policy in these countries?

It is true that this unconditional support to Nasserism now seems to have been partially withdrawn from him, in a new turn-about by the C Ps of Syria, Egypt, and Iraq, which are criticizing Nasser, taking stands against the extension of the U A R to Iraq, and singing the praises of the sovereignty of each Arab state, now Iraq first of all.

Naturally, what is mainly responsible for this policy, at first sight puzzling, is also the Kremlin itself, which probably considers it dangerous to strengthen Nasser any further, for fear lest he soon do without the Kremlin's support and swing over to the Western side. This zigzagging and utterly opportunist policy — determined by the changing objectives of the Kremlin's foreign policy and not by the well understood imperative needs of the anti-imperialist and social revolutions in the colonial and dependent countries — is applied by the Kremlin through a few key men in the Communist Parties, for the majority

of their members and even of their cadres have no consciousness of the role of simple pawns that their parties play on the chess-board of the Kremlin's foreign policy. It well might be, in the case of a very strong revolutionary movement of the masses, that they might drag certain of these parties beyond the limits assigned to their action by the Kremlin, as was the case with the Algerian C P, joining — tardily and against the line of the French C P — the Algerian revolution led by the F L N; and this might tomorrow be the case with the C P in Iraq.

In general, however, these parties, with the exception of the C Ps of Iraq and now again of Syria, are at present largely discredited and isolated from the broad Arab masses. This raises the problem of the creation of the new, revolutionary Marxist, leadership in the Arab countries, with prospects of working not essentially in the C Ps but by other ways specific to each country.

The primordial task in all the Arab countries currently consists in grouping together, on the integral programme of revolutionary Marxism, i.e. of the Fourth International, a nucleus of Arab cadres who at the same time are inside the real mass movement of their respective countries, and who begin to work up a *platform*, a *transitional programme*, that takes into account the peculiarities of their countries. This concrete transitional programme must combine anti-imperialist and national democratic demands with socialist slogans properly so called, in order thus to show in each country the concrete specific road that leads from the present situation to the radical, socialist, solution, within the Arab context. The preparation of such a programme must go hand-in-hand with the definition and propaganda of the *transitional party* that will work for this programme.

The struggle for the socialist solution is inseparable from the struggle for the formation of the revolutionary Marxist mass party, the indispensable instrument for socialist victory. But the creation of the revolutionary Marxist mass party passes in each case by concrete transitional paths.

In this way it may be that the revolutionary Marxists of countries like Morocco or Tunisia reach the conclusion that the formation of the revolutionary Marxist party takes the path of the creation of a *Labor Party based on the trade unions*,<sup>10</sup> *in view of the strength of the trade-union movement and the tendencies to spontaneous politicization it has shown (Tunisia) and currently continues to show (Morocco)*. This way can, furthermore, turn out to be of a more gener-

<sup>10</sup> *Worker, proletarian*, in its ideology and programme; *Worker and Peasant* in popular nomenclature.

al interest, for the trade-union movement is called upon to play an identical role, also of a politically pioneer nature, in a whole category of countries.

Such a party will have to work up a general programme as advanced as possible, and especially a *transitional action programme*, giving a concrete answer to the unsolved problems of genuine independence from imperialism, Arab unification, agrarian reform, economic and industrial development, and the emancipation of women.

In the more special case of Algeria, it is obvious that both the revolutionary Marxist tendency and the essential forces of a *mass Labor Party* of tomorrow will emerge from the inevitable social and political differentiation within the present F.L.N. The F.L.N., at its beginnings an anti-imperialist national united front, is constantly undergoing a differentiation through the deepening, the experience, and even the difficulties, of the revolution. Its base is essentially plebeian, composed of rural laborers of the big colonial estates, of poor peasants from the mountain regions and the oases, of Khammès,<sup>11</sup> of nomads from the Sahara, craftsmen, petty traders, and workers from the cities of Algeria and from the proletarian emigration in France. Its leadership is taken by elements who have emerged from these milieux, mixed with intellectual elements and a few rare representatives of middle-bourgeois strata.

The disproportion, much greater than elsewhere, between plebeian elements and petty-bourgeois and especially bourgeois elements, which is in favor of the numerical and social importance of the former, causes the Algerian revolution to be far deeper and harder to "bourgeoisify," to "Bourgeoisify," than the Tunisian or even the Moroccan revolution.

Nevertheless the fact must not be minimized that, for lack of a clear revolutionary Marxist ideology, even the best-intentioned and most pro-plebeian petty-bourgeois elements inevitably fall back into the orbit of a policy which, finally, is bourgeois.

This danger is always lying in wait for the leadership of the F.L.N.: I am speaking, of course, not of the openly pro-bourgeois if not themselves bourgeois elements, like Ferhat Abbas, but of its left intellectuals and its military leaders of peasant stock. This is all the more the case in that the Algerian revolution is now burdened by the weight of: the de Gaulle regime with its "economic and social overtures," its ambiguity about Algeria, and also its stepped-up repression; the pressure of the Tunisian and Mo-

roccan bourgeoisies, attracted by the prospect of coëxploiting the riches of the Sahara together with imperialism; the prostration of the French workers' movement; and also — it must be said — the ineffectiveness of the political programme and general leadership of the Algerian revolution.

It is not a matter of bringing into question the enormous positive accomplishment of the F.L.N., the initiator of the revolution and the organizer so far of a fierce and nothing less than astonishing resistance to the extraordinarily powerful war effort of an exasperated and savage imperialism. It is rather a matter of understanding that the very deepening of the revolution under the new conditions in which it is put, requires that its social programme be made more specific, and that the structure and functioning of the F.L.N. be made more democratic, so that the plebeian base of the revolution may be more associated with it and therein find the reasons, the prospects, and the justification of its long combat and its immense sacrifices.

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The creation of revolutionary Marxist nuclei in each Arab country, inside the real mass movement, must go hand-in-hand with *their inter-Arab liaison*, in order to form in reality the initial nucleus of the *mass Arab revolutionary Marxist party of tomorrow*. The Fourth International is disposed and firmly decided to aid, by a great effort in all fields, the accomplishment of such a task. Its militants are collaborating closely and fraternally, without the faintest desire to impose their views bureaucratically, with all Arab comrades who are revolutionary Marxists or who are turning toward revolutionary Marxism, independently of complete agreement on the totality of the positions of the Fourth International, in order to help them to group together organizationally both by countries and on the inter-Arab plane, to work up their platform, both inter-Arab and country by country, and to publish an inter-Arab revolutionary Marxist theoretical organ.

This is a great and urgent task. The future of the Arab revolution depends upon it. From the depths of that revolution there have already emerged admirable and heroic figures seeking more or less confusedly for its socialist future, its only future.

In the lineage of a proletarian like the Egyptian Mustapha Khamis<sup>12</sup> or one of the first glori-

<sup>12</sup> Leader of the union workers of the big Kafrel-Dawar textile-mill in the suburbs of Alexandria, who on 12 August 1952 gathered before the offices of the management, demanding a raise in pay and the firing of a member of the company's secretariat and of the head of

<sup>11</sup> Share-croppers on a one-fifth basis.

ous moudjahidines of the Algerian revolution, Larbi Ben M'Hidi,<sup>13</sup> the Arab revolutionary Marxists will know how to carry the revolution, for which fellahin and proletarians have accept-

the labor bureau, "in the name of Mohammed Naguib and the revolution!" Condemned to death by a court martial and executed, having refused to "denounce those who put him up to it," to the last minute he shouted "Long live the revolution!" and murmured, "I shall not die."

<sup>13</sup> After several weeks of tortures, Ben M'Hidi, a heroic

ed so many sacrifices, to its victorious goal: *the Arab Socialist Republic*.

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fighter right from the first hour of the Algerian revolution, still had the strength to spit out his contempt for an imperialist army of executioners, and the courage to proclaim in the faces of his torturers: "We shall win because our cause is just, and because your tortures are impotent against our faith in an independent Algeria."



## *Appeal of the Latin American Bureau of the Fourth International*

# TO SPUR ON THE STRUGGLES OF THE LATIN AMERICAN MASSES FOR THEIR LIBERATION AND SELF- DETERMINATION: ANTI-IMPERIALIST UNITED FRONT AND PROLETARIAN UNITED FRONT

Instability in Latin America is spreading and taking on a deeper character. The exploited populations of Latin America are rising up and uniting in their struggles against imperialism. The petty bourgeoisie, in all its middle and poor sectors, small tradesmen, peasants, workers, secondary and university students, is uniting or tending to unite in practical activity, in demonstrations and struggles against imperialism and its national agents and allies.

Nixon was chased away by the repudiation, the stones and spit of the masses of Peru, Colombia, Venezuela, and Bolivia. The delegation of the 26th of July movement, the representatives of the Cuban revolution, in their tour through Latin America, were received and welcomed with all the warmth, solidarity, and fraternity of the Latin American peoples.

All sectors of the exploited population have something in common, in complaints, protests, opposition, and motives for struggle against imperialism, whether in the problem of electricity, of petroleum, or of the land that arouses millions of peasants to struggle. The whole exploited population of Latin America expresses its powerful spirit of struggle in a keen and permanent way.

Struggles for national liberation, the expulsion of imperialism, and agrarian reform are appearing in permanent form everywhere in Latin America. The specific character of these movements is not precise and clear. The 26th of July movement began as a movement for the "moralization" of the regime and ended up by organizing guerrillas and defeating Batista's armies, supplied and armed by the army of Yankee imperialism. The forms in which the movement of national liberation is presented or begins does not matter; basically it contains historical social elements of social liberation. The peoples have sensed that they are more powerful than the most powerful of the armies of Yankee imperialism or armed by it.

The process of the crisis of growth leads each time to greater explosions and graver demonstrations of instability. Neither the bourgeoisies nor imperialism have means or forms for limiting or mastering this process. The governments of Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, and Colombia are,

in one form or another, ruling by permanent state of siege, by decree-laws, by special powers, by the permanent intervention of the army and repressive measures of intimidation, in the military mobilization of the masses. Neither parliament nor special laws and powers are enough for them.

### *THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIES SEEK THE PROTECTION OF IMPERIALISM*

The problems of the crisis of growth lead all the governments, all the bourgeoisies, to seek protection, alliance, and juncture with imperialism (particularly and fundamentally Yankee imperialism), on the basis of yielding economic, military, and political concessions, which are translated into social, political, and trade-union repression against the exploited populations. The masses do not accept this; they reject, oppose, and actively fight against this situation.

The bourgeoisie has no way other than to increase its dependence on Yankee imperialism so as to defend itself from the masses. Financially dependent on imperialism, the bourgeoisie must depend on its impositions and interests. But it is also for their own interests and prospects that the national governments and bourgeoisies are consciously on the side of imperialism against the masses. They have no other means. Neither economically, financially, socially, nor politically do they have a prospect of any other way out.

The Bolivian and Cuban revolutions, the struggles in Argentina, Colombia, Peru, Mexico, Guatemala, Venezuela, and Paraguay — all the masses are caught up in great struggles. A powerful process is developing that involves all Latin America. Guerilla struggles à la Fidel Castro are spreading. In Paraguay and Guatemala guerrilla struggles are being prepared to overthrow dictatorships, and there as in Nicaragua, Santo Domingo, and Haiti, sectors of the liberal bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie at the service of imperialism, aspire to head up the movements of liberation from the dictatorships that are being prepared.

The 26th of July movement shows that it is preparing armed struggle to overthrow the dictatorship of Somoza and Trujillo. In all these movements, even though led by bourgeois parties and agents of imperialism, popular support shows the desire to overthrow dictatorships by demanding the turning over of the land, industrialization of the countries, social, economic, and political betterment and advancement, social liberation.

The 26th of July movement is organizing the overthrow of Somoza and shows that it is preparing that of Trujillo, partly as a direct means of defending itself against possible and real counter-revolutionary coups. In general all these movements, despite their bourgeois leadership and their proposing inter-bourgeois goals for the struggle, demonstrate the existence of the anti-imperialist wave, which these leaderships conceal, because all those dictators are agents financed, backed, and supported by Yankee imperialism in particular.

There exist all the conditions for a powerful movement of an *anti-imperialist united front*, to develop at the present stage the intentions, desires, and needs of the great exploited worker, peasant, and petty-bourgeois masses.

This process is shaking the whole Latin American social structure. It is necessary to accentuate, strengthen, and aid in supporting and developing this revolutionary process. It is the path of progress for Latin America.

#### FROM SANTO DOMINGO AND NICARAGUA IMPERIALISM IS PREPARING INVASION

Yankee imperialism is preparing and organizing coups and counter-revolutions from Santo Domingo and Nicaragua. The answer is not to organize invasions or guerrillas. It is necessary to arouse and call on the masses of these countries to seize the land, beginning by distributing it, in Cuba, carrying out immediate social and economic transformations for the benefit of the masses, expropriating imperialism and installing workers' control, and completely carrying out the agrarian reform; to call on the masses to carry out these social and economic measures; to call on them to organize guerrillas to attain these goals.

The masses, rising up in their struggles, will themselves decide if they wish or need military help, and what kind of military help. The aid of the Latin American workers' movement can and must be to send workers' militias and put them under the leadership of the organisms with a class programme. The experience of the invasion of Fidel Castro shows that the real basis for his victory was calling on the peasants and promising to fight for a programme of agrarian reform and anti-imperialism.

This is the way to drive out, overthrow, and hang the remaining dictators in Latin America, and not only those who are declaredly and manifestly so, but the others as well. The tour of Latin America being made by the 26th of July guerrilleros declaring that they will carry the revolution through to its end, accusing Yankee imperialism, and will carry out the distribution of land, reflects the enormous pressure that the masses are bringing to bear on them. The workers have repeatedly occupied the imperialist enterprises and demanded their nationalization. This is the process in which the intentions and desires of all the Latin American masses are involved.

Recently in Bolivia, as a reaction to an article in *Time* about a proposition to divide up Bolivia, the Partido Obrero Revolucionario (Trotskyist) called on the masses to demonstrate and mobilize, and there took place a very big and combative demonstration and mobilization.

In Colombia, guerrillas continue, with occupation of the land. In Venezuela the workers demonstrate their desire to nationalize petroleum. The workers' trade unions and federations, the workers' and peasants' organizations, must call for the *Anti-Imperialist United Front*, based on a programme of expropriations and the expulsion of imperialism.

#### THE CLASS UNITED FRONT

The Latin American revolution, the process of national liberation, are steadily advancing. It is necessary to provide conscious impetus, to press for all the strength that is potential therein.

In Central America, attempts at invasion of San Salvador, armed and led from Nicaragua, with the complicity and backing of Trujillo, Haiti, Guatemala, and Somoza, have twice failed. It is Yankee imperialism which maintains, finances, and supports these movements, as a means of preventing, disturbing, and in case of need limiting and defeating (e.g., Guatemala) anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchic movements and mobilizations against the dictatorships.

Behind these clashes and disputes in Central America, moreover, and the threat of invasions and coups d'état, there finds expression the crisis of growth, and the inability of imperialism to control and dominate this process of development and of revolutionary mobilizations.

This process of Latin American mobilizations and revolutions is part of the world process of colonial revolutions, but at the same time it obeys the dynamics of its own process, which in its turn contributes to the development of the colonial and world revolution.

Lacking class workers' leaderships and class revolutionary parties and programmes, the movements led by the petty bourgeoisie or the bourgeoisie tend to yield in juridical disputes with imperialism. But the basis of the Latin American revolution is much deeper than is expressed by these bourgeois and petty-bourgeois leaderships. In this way the Latin American revolution of national liberation combined with social liberation is ripening. Under the leadership of a petty bourgeoisie that is still undergoing radicalization, the process is led in a way that limits its enormous economic, social, and revolutionary-political possibilities.

It is the petty bourgeoisie that leads and orients it with this perspective, and consequently shuts it in and leads it into limitations. The petty bourgeoisie cannot and does not want to give it all the power to develop, all the forces that are potentially contained in this revolutionary process of the Latin American masses.

The warnings and appeals to liberate Santo Domingo, Haiti, and Nicaragua are correct, but not their forms. It is necessary to lead mobilizations toward real anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist struggles, expropriating imperialism, nationalizing the principal sources of the economy, as with the monopoly of foreign trade, the nationalization of banking and insurance, and the workers' and peasants' government.

Imperialism is not remaining passive toward the process of Latin American mobilizations and revolutions. Each new step of the revolution in Latin America, in Cuba, Bolivia, or Venezuela, is a blow to its authority, its control, and its perspectives, in Latin America. The call made by Yankee imperialism through *Time* magazine to divide up Bolivia is a demonstration of how far it is going and will go. At present it is preparing its agents, Santo Domingo, Nicaragua, and Guatemala, to create difficulties, threaten and invade Cuba, and create military conflicts, up to and including war among the Central and South American states, in order to block the development of the revolution.

It is necessary to call on all the masses and peoples of Latin America to join their production, planning it and setting up a raw-materials pool for marketing it. Not to "plan" with imperialism, as the governments of Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Colombia, etc., are doing, but among themselves, seeing how to exploit to the limit the contradictions of capitalism and imperialism; trading with the workers' states.

### FOLLOW THE EXAMPLE OF THE CHINESE MASSES

In China the masses are giving an example of invincibility and of their capacity for sacrifice, initiative, and accomplishment when they feel that they are producing and struggling so as to raise their living standards in a real and direct way. China, starting out from a level of industrial development ten times more backward than that of Brazil and Argentina, has surpassed them, at least ten times. Even under the leading bureaucracy of the Chinese Communist Party. The forms of workers' and peasants' government, and the planning of the economy and production are the basis for overcoming the age-old backwardness of China. Whereas in Latin America the national bourgeoisies are impotent, they work out miserable plans for the development of heavy industry at the cost of the low standard of living and the social or economic backwardness of the masses, while the main profits and benefits remain in the hands of imperialism and of a small nucleus of national capitalists.

To raise the rhythm and level of the Latin American revolution, it is necessary to combine the struggle for national liberation with the struggle for social liberation. In Cuba the real progress and consolidation of the revolution will be firmly established if this path is taken, i.e., that of the expropriation of imperialism, nationalizations, workers' control, monopoly of foreign trade, planning with the participation of the masses, with attention paid to their needs.

Along this road, the Cuban, Bolivian, or Venezuelan revolution will rapidly raise the level of the struggle; the form of reënforcing the struggle and consolidating national liberation is to struggle at the same time for social liberation. But the proletariat is not intervening as a conscious leadership in the Latin American revolution. The lack of mass revolutionary parties of the working class prevents the unconscious and objective process of the Latin American revolution from developing with all the forces and possibilities that it bears within it in each mobilization against dictatorships and imperialism.

In Cuba, Venezuela, and Colombia there are needed independent class workers' parties with a programme of national and social liberation. While the conditions are being prepared for the organization of these parties (based on the trade unions, in the majority of cases), the intervention of the workers' trade-union movement itself in the struggle for national and social liberation is necessary. Except in Chile, the Communist and Socialist Parties are not leading in this process, and have no strength in it.

The conditions are ripe, and become every day more so, for an *Anti-Imperialist United Front*. In all the countries of Latin America, the masses, more exploited than ever before, feel impelled by their problems to unite against imperialism, oligarchy, and dictatorship.

### ORGANIZE THE FIGHT FOR THE EXPULSION OF IMPERIALISM!

It is necessary that the trade-union organizations — the overall labor federations and the national craft unions, — call on the masses to mobilize in order to carry out demonstrations, strikes, public meetings, and concentrations in support of the Cuban and Bolivian revolutions. But at the same time it is necessary to agitate in the factories, in meetings in neighborhoods and headquarters, cultural

and political meetings, and by all other means, to organize concrete material aid for the Cuban people, solid- arizing with them and volunteering to organize militias both for Cuba and Bolivia, to face up to the intervention of imperialism and the oligarchy.

It is necessary that the trade-union organizations, workers' and peasants' unions and federations, hold a Latin American meeting to organize the campaign and leadership of a *United Front for the Expulsion of Imperialism from Latin America*: for the defense of the self-determination of peoples; for support to popular revolutions and mobilizations against dictatorships; and for a programme of national and social liberation. It is necessary to set up a Latin American organism of the Anti-Imperialist United Front. The trade-union federations and workers' parties must assume this responsibility and call on the masses to mobilize. There is needed a permanent Latin American campaign of agitation and propaganda, of permanent organization of support for Latin American popular and anti-imperialist revolutions, for the holding of a Latin American Congress of the Anti-Imperialist United Front — in Cuba if possible. Imperialism is weak, its military and economic forces are surpassed by the struggle of the Latin American masses that want to free themselves nationally and socially.

The Anti-Imperialist United Front is necessary in order to strike unitedly against imperialism; all the movements, sectors, and layers of the population are swept along, involved, and carried into the fight against it. To develop economically, to raise production, to overcome the crises of growth — the loans and financial investments of imperialism are not the means for obtaining these things. On the contrary, they are the most important barriers thereto.

A determined attitude on the part of the popular and workers' organizations of Latin America will spur on the Cuban masses, will bring pressure and drive them onward to raise the historical social level of the Cuban revolution.

There is needed an Anti-Imperialist United Front, based on a class programme that is revolutionary, anti-imperialist, and anti-capitalist, in order to combine, accentuate, and spur on the process of the Latin American revolution of national liberation toward the path of social liberation of the masses from capitalism.

*The Latin American Bureau of the Fourth International calls on progressive cultural and scientific organizations, on workers' and peasants' trade unions, on political parties of the working class, and on the poor petty bourgeoisie, to set up the Anti-Imperialist United Front, to organize a Centre to coördinate and lead the struggles for the expulsion of imperialism from Latin America; to hold a Latin American Congress of all the trade-union and political organizations of the proletariat and peasantry in order to form a Proletarian United Front to struggle in a combined way in the Anti-Imperialist United Front for the programme and anti-capitalist goals of the exploited masses and for the establishment of Workers' and Peasants' Governments.*

THE LATIN AMERICAN BUREAU  
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# THE RED ARMY AND THE MILITIA

By M TUKHACHEVSKY

## PREFATORY NOTE

Tukhachevsky, one of the most eminent victims of Stalin's 1936-38 purges, has been rehabilitated and has found his place again in the Soviet *Encyclopaedia*. We shall not here go once more into the nature of the present "rehabilitations" which fit into the frame of the bureaucracy's self-defense policy and not into that of a restoration of Soviet democracy. The day will come when rehabilitations will be complete and genuine.

We consider it useful to reprint here an exposition by Tukhachevsky which was published at the time in the Communist International's pamphlet series, *Kleine Bibliothek der Russischen Korrespondenz*. This exposition was made during a discussion that took place at the Scientific Military Society, attached to the Military Academy of the Red Army. The discussion was held under the chairmanship of Leon Trotsky, at that period People's Commissar for the Red Army, who opened it with a few remarks explaining the aim of the discussion: on the morrow of the victorious civil war and in expectation of new aggressions that the Soviet Union would have to stand up to, to establish a certain number of fundamental rules of doctrine for the young army. At the end of the discussion, Trotsky in his final summary drew the lessons from this debate. On the subject of Tukhachevsky's speech, he criticized some "overhasty generalizations": he did not think that they had seen the end of positional war; and

he did not at all think that the militia system was to be condemned absolutely. Better conditions will exist among the peasantry and the working class, he said, which will permit a transition toward the militia.

Our intention in republishing this pamphlet of Tukhachevsky is not to renew these old debates. We have wanted to show, rather, in what a spirit the Red Army was constituted in the time of Lenin and Trotsky. It is the former lieutenant in the Czar's guards, won over by the vigor of the proletarian revolution and become the most eminent military specialist of the young Soviet Republic, who says it clearly: this is a Red army and not a Russian army, it is an instrument of the World Revolution. Even after the workers had taken power and had thus won themselves a fatherland, there was no question of "national" grandeur and the other chauvinist poisons with which today the Stalinists drench the worker militants. The Soviet state and its army subordinated themselves to the imperative needs of the international proletarian revolution. The Soviet workers, in winning back democracy, will not only render justice to all the revolutionaries who fell victims to Stalin; they will also restore the relationships of the international workers' movement and of the Soviet state to what they were in the first years after the October Revolution.

Formerly it seemed thoroughly self-evident and appropriate for the socialist state to provide for its necessary capacity for defense by means of a militia army. Now this point of view is undergoing an ever more critical examination and even a rejection by judgment.

The past plays no small role in this question; belief in infallibility of knowledge once acquired is very slowly lost. This belief has led many not to examine this problem on its own basis, but to consider it in the sense of this or that generalization of a meaningless system within the postulates of a socialist state.

But there are also those who not only consider it superfluous to examine this question afresh, but who — persisting in a once fundamentally understood idea — even demand the immediate establishment of the militia system in Soviet Russia.

This essay proposes to enquire into the question. For this it is necessary not only to examine the utility of the militia system for the dictatorship of the proletariat, but also the nature of the militia system and finally likewise of that system of the socialist army that responds to the requirements of a truly socialist armed force and its tasks.

## DEFENSE AND ATTACK

In the epoch of the Second International the dominant idea in the heads of the Socialists was that of the

"defense of the fatherland." Armed attacks were — without seeking their motives, aims, and causes — indiscriminately rejected. Therein is shown the specific form of the Second International's struggle against imperialism. That is precisely why this problem has been illustrated in a somewhat one-sided way. This struggle — or, better said, this passive half-struggle — with imperialism has driven out of the working class the idea of activity — the idea of an attack of the proletariat on the bourgeoisie, and has rendered it more difficult for it to have a clear vision of the possible consequences of such an attack.

The present military situation of Soviet Russia as the propagator of the Socialist Revolution throughout the world is above all not taken into consideration. But this situation can never occur among imperialist states in a military respect.

But not only the details of this question betray the erroneousness of such a passive conception. The whole foundation of the idea of a military attack by the proletarian class on the bourgeoisie is unsuitably limited from a military point of view. The Second International inoculated everyone with the notion that such a war of attack was permissible only within the narrow limits of a state territory. Naturally life and the Socialist Revolution, in their rich multiplicity, do not allow them-

selves to be squeezed into limits. Uncheckably they spread over the entire world, and their extension will continue as long as there is a bourgeoisie in the world.

By what means shall it seek its goal? By means of an armed uprising in each state, or by means of the armed uprising of the socialist against the bourgeois states, or by means of both together? That cannot be said in advance; the course of the Revolution will show us. One thing is sure: if anywhere a Socialist Revolution reaches power, then it has the self-evident right to expand, it will strive with elementary force to spread by direct action to all neighboring countries, to involve the whole world. Its most important instrument will naturally be its military power.

We see therefore that the Socialist Revolution requires of its army a readiness for active offensive operations within its own frontiers and, if the turn of events compels it, outside them.

### THE RECRUITING SYSTEM

The structure of an army is determined on the one hand by the political goals that it has to attain, and on the other hand by the recruiting system in practice. These are the two decisive components of the system of building an army.

In the period before the French Revolution, when the political and sometimes active goals of the monarchs and their courts were determined without any participation by the people, and when the army was recruited from mercenary soldiery, the entire structure of the relatively small army had a rare regular character. The size of the army depended on the means available to the court, but it had to be regular, because a mercenary army requires long hard training and is not quickly recruited.

The great French Revolution brought a decisive turn in the nature of the army.

Political aims, still active because of their nature, lay close to the hearts of the popular masses. The most fundamental change concerned the system of recruiting. It was changed into a national and obligatory system. It provided the French Revolution with enormous, hitherto unseen, masses of troops, and also changed the whole of strategy by introducing methods that arose from the new form of army.

This system formed the basis for all European armies of the XIXth and XXth centuries.

The Germans were the first to grasp this new form theoretically and made this principle the basis of their "people in arms."

This system developed uninterruptedly. The size of the peacetime standing army did not vary much, but the length of military service grew ever shorter, which had as a result that ever broader layers of the population were made liable to serve militarism. In case of war this trained mass of reserves was called to the colors and in this way an enormous, many-millioned section of the people could be immediately moved into the field.

The development of this system of the people's army progressed in parallel with the development of industry, technics, transport, etc. The manipulation of this colossal army presupposed a big complete railway network and plans worked out to the smallest detail.

The real cadre-troops, however, were no longer so

fit for war and so capable of resistance as formerly. With the shortening of military service the quality of the training of the army and its efficiency had also diminished. All that led to a quicker perfection of military-technical means whereby to strengthen — or, better said, to replace — the morale of the troops. In recent times war techniques have obtained unexpected successes.

This circumstance also forced — in order to use the technical means more and more for the purposes of mobilization — assigning only insignificant means to the cadre-troops. Indeed, if we think of the importance that automobiles, airplanes, etc now have, then it becomes clear that these technical means, which are of the very greatest importance for the state, cannot be constantly withdrawn from the life [of the nation] and can be turned over to the military apparatus only at the beginning of mobilization.

In the same way it has become impossible, as time goes by, to occupy the necessary number of factories with the production of military equipment. Half of all industry would be needed for this. Hence for example it is only at the beginning of mobilization that industry is used to the proper degree for the production of individual firearms. And it is the same case with all the other fields of military equipment.

The nation invested its strength ever more in the economic life of the country. But at the moment of the mobilization call it engaged with its whole weight in the state of war. This system has very appropriately been termed the system of the "people in arms."

In general the military apparatus developed with the growth in population figures, and the increase in technics and industry. The army, insignificant in peace time, swelled up in the few mobilization days to a gigantic size. And so strategy also had to adapt itself to this system. It became, through its strong dependence on the railways, much less free, and was bound up with size of the army and technics. The training of the army steadily fell behind, while that of the staff moved into the foreground; tactics depended almost entirely on the adequacy of numerical calculations and on the degree of precision with which the troops could be moved by means of the railways. The enormous and cumbersome mass armies rendered the active conduct of war ever more difficult, unless an excellent technique and an efficient and widely ramified railway network could be counted on.

These conditions set the limits for the increase in the size of the army, which in addition had to keep pace with the country's industrial development. With the increase of industry the numerical strength of the armed forces could also increase. By the utmost development of technics and industry the army also could be brought to its maximum size; if the most perfect technique of war was taken for granted, the quality of an army could be almost entirely replaced by its quantity. Through an ideal and efficient railway network, such an enormous army, even if it did not know how to manoeuvre, could, with the help of a well-trained army leadership, carry out the most complicated movements. Such an army, which in case of war approximates almost the whole male population of the country, would not in peacetime divert these masses from productive labor. If such an organization must also lead to an inferior training of the troops, it could nevertheless by means



of technical perfection successfully solve its active tasks and overwhelm its adversary by its numbers and technics.

What limit is therefore set to the development of the idea of a bourgeois army based on general national military service?

This limit was unconsciously known; it was called: the "militia system."

But a misunderstanding appeared. The idea of a militia army did not proceed as a logical result of previous military thinking, but emerged quite accidentally and unexpectedly in the socialist camp, and here made itself at home — in the same camp that was fighting against the proponents of the "people in arms."

The demand for the militia was already set forth in the *democratic* programmes of 1848. Democratic ideology knows no classes; for it there is only a single indivisible "people" whose rights have been usurped by "tyrants," "the state," or whatever else. The defense of the "people's freedoms" requires a "people's army."

The idea of the "people in arms" and the idea of the militia — the latter being only the logical development of the former, but not recognized as such by either of the two enemy adversaries — these ideas were long considered to be opposed extremes.

Why was the militia system fought against with such determination and obstinacy by the leaderships of the regular armies? This was not at all for the reason that such a gigantic army with its inferior discipline caused anxiety to military experts. Such a conception can only be attributed to frivolity. Their fear was much more that the militia army cannot carry out large-scale movements on foot; but the technical levels did not up till then allow in a single country the use of such a giant military army as a movable force, ready for action, for railway, automotive, and other means of transport were not yet sufficiently developed. The officers' corps, however, which had everywhere grown up with imperialist conceptions, could not accept the militia army which in its nature is passive and serves only the purposes of defense. The commanders could not use such an army. They dreamed of conquests and victorious campaigns.

The Second International therefore, in its struggle with imperialism, understandably defended the militia system. This system became the tradition of the Socialists. Gradually the real purpose of an army was forgotten; an active socialist war was not thought of, and the fundamental task of an army was considered to be what would disturb as little as possible the economic life of the country.

In this way there was established a lasting misunderstanding about these important questions. One side did not understand that the militia system is the most consistent and powerful military system of the bourgeois state at the highest point of its capitalist development, while the other side, in its struggle against capitalist designs, strove to validate the militia system, which had to be used, on account of the relatively inferior development levels of industry, only for defense. In this struggle the understanding of the real purpose of any army was forgotten, and thinking descended to the fanatical belief in the absolute suitability of the militia army to the socialist order of society.

Now, in the period of the building of socialism, there are still many advocates of this old idea, or, better said, of this old superstition. These admirers of the militia

never once make the effort to analyze the significance of this problem for the country and the class. Obstinate and unreflectingly they require the immediate introduction of the militia system in Soviet Russia. They cannot grasp that any new social order — especially when it follows after powerful revolutionary convulsions — makes a new army system necessary.

Let us try to examine more closely the problem of the armed forces of a state founded on the dictatorship of the proletariat.

It is self-evident that the proletariat, emerging victorious from the class struggle, cannot undertake the recruiting of its army by means of general national conscription. Recruitment can be based only on the obligatory conscription of the working class. Such a system would be distinguished from the bourgeois national one in another way as well. From the fact that the recruiting system of an army is based essentially on the working class, this system itself becomes international. The admission of poor peasantry into the Red Army does not alter this principle.

We see now that the socialist revolution has set up a new recruiting system — the international class army — in opposition to the bourgeois system which has hitherto produced the national and democratic army.

We know that the system of recruiting influences the composition of the armed forces of a state, and also its military science. And our revolution has in fact also overturned the whole of the military art.

We see that the two classes do not fight under the same conditions. The sources of recruitment of the proletariat and the classes close to it are almost inexhaustible, while the sources of the bourgeoisie are extremely limited. Both one side and other can, during an offensive advance, count only on those classes close to themselves in the occupied territories. That is why the chances of the Red Army for an accession of new forces are very favorable, while those of the bourgeois army are generally not. True, the bourgeoisie also mobilizes the laboring strata of the population, but this increase only diminishes the quality of its army.

This extremely characteristic component of our socialist wars alters the whole nature of the conduct of war; and it is above all this component that gives a socialist army and its recruiting system its international character. It gives the Red Army the possibility of almost unlimited recruitment and allows proletarian strategy to accomplish tasks and aims which are out of the reach of any other strategy.

#### THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES

Before we can solve the problem of the structure of a socialist army, we must cast a closer light on some constituents of the armed forces in general and the conditions of war in different circumstances.

Let us first consider the conditions for the use of the militia system. The militia system, like the system of the regular standing army, requires complicated and extremely precise preparatory work if it is to be able in case of war immediately to put the required military forces on a war footing. That presupposes an ideally constituted military administrative apparatus. A mobilization plan, worked out down to its last details, is unconditionally necessary, training must be perfect, and many other things. The militia army, just like the

modern standing army, must be organized according to territorial principles. The different districts must form firm and autonomous units. The technical administrative apparatus must work with absolute precision. This whole preparatory work requires a long time, that lasts not months but years. And finally it must be said that a militia army, just like the standing army, presupposes a homogeneous population — in any case the population must not be split up by the class struggle.

All these conditions having been assumed, the apparatus of a militia army, after systematic preparatory work over many years, can, upon the call to mobilization, immediately set on foot an enormous mass army ready to march.

Now let us see how a revolutionary socialist army is constituted.

Above all it is to be noted that the whole way in which it is set up is diametrically opposed to that of the militia army. The latter is formed at the end of long preparatory work of the military administrative apparatus, whereas the socialist army begins to be formed immediately after the revolution in a wholly elementary way; administrative authorities neither are on hand nor are organized. Little by little the organization automatically develops itself. The army grows and becomes strong. Suffused by a strong class consciousness and by a revolutionary will to victory, it rapidly becomes a regular army ready for war. The military administrative organs are far from developing with the same success. Since they are predominantly composed of specialists, who belong to the class that has been overthrown, they remain for a long time unviable and attached by an umbilical cord to the active army.

It has already been said that the organization of the Red Army is built on the principle of the class struggle. The application of this system produces great difficulties.

At the first stages the Red Army recruits volunteers who come from the laboring classes. These become the Red Army's iron nucleus of troops, consciously defending their class interests, who later can also admit unenlightened elements, educate them, and raise them to the necessary political consciousness.

But even on the supposition that strong class-conscious proletarian cadre troops are available, recruiting runs into many difficulties in many regions with a predominantly bourgeois rural population, and is not without its dangers. Everyone knows what enormous significance the work of political clarification has among our troops, and how hard the newly arrived, indifferent peasant masses are to assimilate. It is only when strong and politically well educated cadre troops are available, with many communists well distributed among them, that the unenlightened peasant masses can be easily and rapidly worked upon.

It is completely incomprehensible how a militia army, which would be composed, in its overwhelming majority, of peasants, might become, immediately after its mobilization, highly qualified politically, and prepared to take the field with communist banners, ready for victory. It is quite clear that such a supposition is completely senseless.

It suffices to observe the Ukrainian partisan leader Makhno — who lived only at the cost of the rich

Ukrainian peasantry, which provided him with the requisite human material, and furnished him with horses, food supplies, etc — to understand fully that the introduction of the militia system in this area would be only cutting into one's own flesh.

In the same way the peasant revolts occurring in many districts provide a good example. It would be not uninteresting to learn how the proponents of the militia system conceive of the struggle with the elements in revolt in these districts by means of a militia army and how they imagine carrying out mobilization in these regions.

#### TASKS AND DURATION OF A WAR

The tasks of a socialist army can be very varied.

The Red Army can fight against domestic counter-revolutionary troop formations with the purpose of completely destroying them; it can fight against the bourgeoisie of neighboring countries if their governments want to strangle the socialist state — in this case also the struggle can hardly end until one or the other adversary is crushed. In general, war, even with interruptions, will last until either the socialist state is completely destroyed and ceases to exist as such, or the revolution has taken over the entire globe.

What is impossible and untenable is the supposition that this world, shaken to its foundations by the great war, might quite peacefully divide itself into two halves, one socialist and the other capitalist, which could now live together in peace and good neighborliness. It is clear as day that such a situation can never occur, and that the socialist war will last until the final victory of one side or the other.

We see therefore that until the final decision in this struggle the moment will never occur in which the proletarian state could dissolve the Red Army it has had to date, to undertake the years of work needed to organize a militia army.

It is true that, after the final victory of the proletarian revolution — that is, if a single communist social order is introduced in the entire world — the militia system could then be introduced. But who would then need it? In any event, the state organism, withering away, would render it quite impossible for this system to produce an army — despite all the imprecatory formulæ from the advocates of the militia army.

We have therefore found that the militia system has nothing to do with the socialist revolution, from the first moment of its birth up till its greatest extension, embracing the entire world.

#### STRATEGIC PECULIARITIES OF ARMIES AND AUXILIARY RESOURCES OF THE NATION

The characteristic traits of a militia army are its enormous size, its relatively limited readiness for combat, and outstanding equipment with the most modern matériel of military technics. All these detailed characteristics are in close relationship one to another.

The big mass armies which are called up by mobilization, which have no cadre-troops and therefore have not been able during peace time to receive any fundamental training in regular troop formations, will obviously have only limited discipline and combat-readiness. Their weakness will be shown with quite particular clarity in the areas of field manoeuvres and tactics.

These lacks absolutely must be compensated for in one way or another by some means, and the technique of war is precisely the suitable means. It will be sought to deploy them in their full strength, to demoralize the adversary and to protect one's own troops. Thanks to these circumstances, a militia army is better suited to defense than to attack.

Nevertheless this characteristic of the militia — its enormous numerical strength — can render very good service in the theatre of operations. For this purpose, there is needed only an exceptionally well-built transport network for transportation by railways and trucks, as also by waterways. Under these conditions, even cumbersome troops of limited combat-readiness can by their well-concentrated mass crush the adversary. But this advantage of the militia operates only if there are excellent means of transport and ideal technical equipment. If we furthermore call to mind what inevitable quantities of defense equipment, food supplies, equine material, etc this involves, then we shall recognize that such a militia army can fulfil its task only in a country with a most highly developed industry. It would be senseless to think that a militia army requires only limited economic expenditures in peace time. It must not be forgotten that guns, cannons, and in general all matériel must be on hand before the war and kept in the best condition.

And so the militia system would be an enormous force, but only if the state is extremely cultivated and has at its disposal a highly developed industry and great wealth. These great means are especially necessary during the war. It is necessary to think only of the millions of guns, the hundreds of thousands of machine-guns, the tens of thousand of cannons, the hundreds of millions of shells, the many thousands of millions of bullets, and so on and so forth, quite apart from the losses in men's lives. Let us only remember the dimensions of the last war of the "peoples in arms," which is to be considered as merely a foretaste of the dimensions of a fight between militia armies. Can any socialist state in its transitional period face up to such expenditures? Without these enormous human masses and without this military technique pushed to its peak, a militia army isn't worth a whistle.

If we now examine more closely whither the militia system would lead our republic, then we shall see the following: above all, we should not be able to organize the military administrative apparatus in time before the beginning of the next war. Second, in a whole series of regions of our country, we should only be arming our own counter-revolutionary adversaries. Third, we should be able neither to clothe nor equip the mobilized millions. Fourth, we should not be able within the necessary time to bring this enormous military mass to the threatened frontier, and the Poles would for example already have occupied Moscow before our militia army had time to concentrate itself in the Volga region. Fifth, our means of transport would not suffice to move the militia army at will to the theatre of war, and an adversary who was considerably weaker but on the other hand well equipped with technical means, could easily beat isolated troop formations. Lastly, we should ourselves be condemning our immense army to death, for we could not provide it with food supplies or with any other equipment.

I have on occasion heard from fanatical admirers of the militia system statements from which it follows that they consider themselves the consistent representatives of the idea of a militarily powerful Soviet Republic. Personally I should have nothing to say against the militia system if it really led to that goal. But unfortunately this system would result only in communist defeats. With us the introduction of the militia system would mean a crucifixion of the Soviet Republic.

There are also many all-too-zealous generals who understandably see their last hope in the introduction of the militia system in Soviet Russia and for that reason become enthusiastic about this system.

In recent times, when there are many party comrades who sharply reject the militia system, the supporters of it are heard to say that they are thinking about another kind of militia than that of the Second International, that the militia should be organized in a quite new way, and so on.

Such arguments mean only that these comrades have not reflected at all seriously about the problem. Without examining more closely the question of the armed forces of a proletarian state, they have grasped at this thing that has long been known — the militia system. But when they saw that such a system is not practicable, they imagined new forms which they obstinately call by the old name. The notion of the "militia system" is something wholly defined — it cannot be transformed at will into another system.

Now let us get on to the question of what conditions the resources of our republic as well as any other republic of councils afford to the armies that are necessary in the transitional period.

There is not much to be said about this. Anyone will understand without more ado that an impoverished country needs above all a small army, whose insufficient quantity must necessarily be compensated for by its quality, for its first task is effectively to guarantee the existence of the Soviet Republic.

#### THE SYSTEM OF THE SOCIALIST ARMY

The quality of an army lies above all in its combat-readiness developed to the highest degree and in its precise and easy mobility. It is not easy to fulfill these requirements, and that is why they involve a long hard period of preparation. Only a regular army can receive such training. We thus observe that a Red Army can be only a regular army.

We should now like to see how the socialist system of recruiting affects the army and the whole military apparatus. We reached the conclusion above that this system is based on the class principle and is an international system. That shows that for the mobilization of the state the registration of the population must be undertaken according to what class they belong to. The whole military training of the youth before they are called up must also take this principle into account. It is self-evident that this principle extends to all areas of military reality, including the training of leaders.

The structure of the army itself fundamentally involves nothing essentially new. All troop units must constantly show their mobile strength, deviations from this rule being permissible only within the country.

But the deeper hinterland, that requires the most human material, in quiet times permits a reduction to

a minimum in troop strength. The active troop units can generally be revictualled by the civil authorities.

Such an army can, without depending on the complex process of mobilization, be immediately thrown on to the chosen front; meanwhile the mobilization is completed, the necessary staging areas are organized, and the reserves for the army filled out.

In addition, in case of danger from abroad, reserve formations can be built up. That depends on the available stocks of weapons, equipment, etc.

The fact that the Red Army built upon this system is far from requiring the whole human material of the state shows that in the most important industrial areas military mobilizations can become entirely unnecessary. On the other hand, a militarizing of labor will be very useful for increasing its results.

The advocates of the militia will furiously attack such a system; they will claim that it is economically untenable, that it renders impossible the construction of a socialist economy, and so on and so forth.

But these objections are unfounded. First, it has never been claimed that a military system, of whatever nature it may be — hence also the militia system — can be useful to the economic life of a state. Whether it be agreeable or not, the state must for its own defense maintain an armed force, and such a one as corresponds to its military situation.

The guarantee of the existence of the soviet state is the main task; everything else — even economic requirements — must give way to it. Second, though the militia army in peace time requires less upkeep costs, it yet requires far greater quantities of clothing and equipment than the standing army — not to mention the enormous stocks of armaments, that must be held ready for the militia. It would be necessary to make a colossal war industry specially for the militia. Third, it must not be forgotten that it is not the peace-time but the war-time army that ruins the country. During war all the economic advantages are on the side of the standing army, for a few thousand guns that one could otherwise do without already cost enormous sums. These costs increase proportionately to the increase in the army's size.

We have a striking example of this in the great impoverishment that the war of the "peoples in arms" brought to the entire world. We have examples in history for this, that even the poorer peoples with small but well-trained armies can carry on long wars with comparatively more powerful adversaries with numerically far greater armies. It is clear that Soviet Russia, in its arming for new wars that will undoubtedly be forced upon it, dare not introduce an army system that in case of war would wholly ruin the country.

Thus we have sought what type of army corresponds to a state, like Soviet Russia, based on the dictatorship of the proletariat. It remains for us only to study this system in its utilization in connection with any international policy that the socialist revolution must carry out.

We have demonstrated above that this revolution has produced a complete overturn in strategy. And indeed our Red Army has never fought alone against its adversaries. It immediately finds the expected support from the working class of that land against whose bourgeoisie it is waging war. This support is not limited to

revolutionary outbreaks in the bourgeoisie's rear; it consists above all in the fact that the Red Army can fill out its troops from the working class of the occupied territories. This influx is produced not only at the cost of the local population, but also at the cost of the capitalist armies which the workers and peasants gladly desert so as to enter the Red Army.

This accession of international fighting forces is just the characteristic mark of the war leadership of the Red Army.

On all fronts of the different nationalities we observe this same phenomenon. It is particularly the case when the bourgeois army has suffered a defeat. At the time of our penetration into Polish areas Polish soldiers began immediately to come over to us, despite the fact that the army of the capitalist Poles still had its full fighting capacity. This was particularly the case at Bialostok, where the workers greeted our army with enthusiasm and wanted to enter its ranks. Only our rapid retreat prevented the fulfillment of their intentions.

Thus our Red Armies may be considered outside the frontiers of the Soviet Republic to be an international cadre formation.

This system of a World Red Army must be clearly brought to our consciousness.

Can we then view our military tasks only within the frontiers of the republic? Naturally not, for in the republic itself serious military tasks do not lie before us, whereas foreign tasks depend not so much on us as on the outer world, i.e., first of all on the development of the international revolution.

In view of this, every task of our republic must be most closely bound up with the tasks of the world revolution. This is, naturally, particularly valid for the question of the organization of our Red Army, the first cadre-troops of the World Red Army.

If we are conscious of this task, then the question of the system for the Red Army seems even more serious. This army must be a valid model in every regard, including in the political sense. This army must have forgotten of what nationality it was in its majority composed. It must be aware that it is the army of the world proletariat, and nothing else. Wherever this army may arrive, the people must be able immediately to feel that it is a Red army and not a Russian army. Only such an army, composed of class-conscious revolutionaries, can be the instrument for the propagation of the world revolution and for the destruction of capitalism.

#### CONCLUSION

Now that we have cast light from all sides on the question of the use of the militia system for a state with the dictatorship of the proletariat, we must recognize that it is completely unusable.

We have seen that the militia system can be a dangerous weapon in the hands of an extremely highly developed capitalist state. We have seen that a communist social order that extends over the entire world could introduce this system. We have however also learned that this system in the transitional period might be a deadly pit for the socialist state, for it is not even utilizable for defensive purposes. We have seen that the Red Army is set up in a diametrically opposite way to the militia army. But since the socialist state must reckon on an uninterrupted struggle against

the capitalist world, the technical possibility of the organization of a militia army is automatically forever ruled out. We have seen that the militia system, in a whole series of areas, cannot be introduced on grounds of their unsuitable class composition. Such are the grounds for which the introduction of the militia system in the Soviet State is in principle excluded.

On the other hand we have also seen the basic characteristics that the Red Army of a Soviet State must have. We have learned that this army must be a standing army, and that it must be based on the principle of the class struggle and international recruiting.

We saw that this army is destined to take part in the World Revolution, and that our Red Army has the role of being the cadre-troops of the World Red Army.

What its actions must be does not fall within the limits of our considerations here.

It seems to me that the introduction of the militia

among us would be very much in contradiction to the givens of the situation and that it is rejected by so many communists that it were really not worth the trouble of discussing this problem, which could have been solved in no other way. This is correct, but it was desirable once more to examine the question more closely, since it is again brought on to the agenda.

The sterility of the Second International was shown in its fetichism about the militia army just as about the idea of the national assembly. And, like the latter, the militia army also will soon vanish from our horizon.

The Communist International — the leader of the socialist World Revolution — cannot base itself on this militia. The Red Army will, under the leadership of the Communist International, take on a new form — the form of the international armed forces of the world proletariat.

14 January 1921

# News of the World Workers' Movement and of the International

USA

## SPLIT AND CONTINUED CRISIS IN THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY

In mid-February a serious split occurred in the Socialist Workers Party. A minority, whose main strength appears to lie in industrial Buffalo, the steel region of Pennsylvania and Ohio, and The South, and which is led by Sam Marcy and four other members of the SWP National Committee, broke with the SWP over long-smoldering political differences that came to a climax as a result of the recent "Independent Socialist" election campaign in New York. The new group, which accuses the SWP majority of opportunist adaptation to former right-wing Stalinists who have broken with the CP, has begun publication of its own newspaper, *Workers World*.

Within the SWP, another minority, also opposed to what it considers excessive subordination to ex-Stalinist allies in the election campaign but determined to fight for its position within the framework of the party, is engaged in a bitter struggle that comes to a head at the SWP Convention at Whitsuntide, the results of which are for the moment unpredictable.

This crisis coincides — and this is hardly an accident — with crises in the two other organizations that broke with the Fourth International in 1953. For a considerable period of time the International has limited itself to repeated and urgent requests to these groups to reunite with the International, and has leaned over backward in refraining from anything that might be termed intervention,

going to the extreme even of not criticizing some of these groups' political positions which seemed to it erroneous or potentially so. Its motive was threefold: to allow objective judgment to replace fractional fever among these groups' members; to permit history itself to prove to them which policies were correct; and to demonstrate to them that the International, far from liquidating itself or succumbing to the attempts of these groups to break it up, continues with ever greater organizational strength and political homogeneity. Now, however, in view of the danger, whose intensity is revealed by these crises, that many valuable elements will be lost to Trotskyism, the International has decided that the time has come for a more active policy.

It is now publishing in its international internal bulletins key documents from the different sides in the SWP crisis and split so that all the members of the International may be fully informed. It has also addressed an Open Letter to the SWP and the other groups that broke with it in 1953, beginning an exposition of the International's position on the recent evolution of these organizations, and appealing one more time for the urgent necessity of unification within the Fourth International of all militants who claim to stand for the political and organizational principles of Trotskyism.



Tibet

## COUNTER-REVOLUTION AND REVOLUTION

The reactionary world press is shedding bitter tears over the repression of the revolt of the crusaders of far-off Tibet struggling for their "independence." Here is the "Hungary" of the Far East, bled and oppressed by Peking in emulation of the Kremlin. But this comparison by quite external and superficial analogies does not stand up under an examination of the real facts.

Tibet, a remote region on the borders of China and India, is inhabited by a very ancient people whose history was often mingled with that of the Han people, of the Chinese people. Especially since close-knit relations were established in the VIIIth century between the Chinese Tang empire and Tibet, the latter has gone on being sometimes subjected to different Chinese empires, sometimes formally independent, until it became an English protectorate at the beginning of the present century.

In 1947, when India won its independence, Britain's rights over Tibet were passed on to the new Indian dominion. At the time of the victory of the Chinese revolution in 1949, Chinese troops advanced as far as Lhasa, capital of the theocratic state of Tibet. In 1954, China made an agreement with India, according to which the latter country gave up its privileges in Tibet in favor of Chinese influence.

The Chinese left in place a local government called Kasha, composed of six members, and did not overturn the age-old feudal-theocratic social regime. This regime is based on the feudal exploitation of about a million and a half peasants and nomads by "notables," especially the

higher Buddhist clergy, organized in vast and powerful lamasery-convents. At the summit of this strictly hierarchized theocratic state is the Dalai Lama.

In 1956 a preparatory commission for the status of the "autonomous region of Tibet" was created by Peking. It was to busy itself with the reorganization of the Tibetan army, and to abolish the social system of serfdom under which the overwhelming majority of the Tibetan people were still living. The ecclesiastical and secular reactionary circles, however, did everything to postpone the reforms, gain time, and prepare armed struggle for the "independence" of their positions, threatened by the revolution. The Chinese government, always anxious not to precipitate matters, had let it be known that, during the whole period of the second Five-Year Plan, viz, until 1962, it would abstain from requiring the application of the reforms.

There is no doubt but that the reactionary circles of the country, encouraged from abroad, especially by Chiang Kai-Shek and imperialism, had sworn to bring about a "national" rebellion in order to compromise Peking in the eyes of "neutralist" Asia. Peking could be criticized only for having had a class-collaborationist policy and having failed to stir up a civil war that would have set the peasant serfs against the ecclesiastical and lay feudalists, the lack of which permitted the latter to take the offensive. Already in May and June 1958 rebel bands had begun to attack in the regions of Chambo, Dinching, Nagchuka, and Loka. But it was on March 10th 1959 that the real

rebellion began with an attack on the Chinese garrison in Lhasa itself.

The Chinese government does not exclude the hypothesis that the rebellion was encouraged by imperialism on the basis of the assurance that the Chinese provinces would follow, the peasants rising up against the system of "communes." The Dalai Lama, whom the Chinese authorities had pictured as kidnapped by the rebels, and who has now taken refuge in India, seems rather to have "betrayed" his protectors, and made common cause with the ecclesiastical and secular feudalists, as might have been expected. The affair of the Dalai-Lama's flight and declarations, however, still remains obscure, and seems to confirm certain Chinese government statements. In any case, Nehru has recognized the authenticity of the letters exchanged between the Dalai-Lama and the Chinese representative in Tibet, which testify to his good relations with the Chinese authorities up to the very eve of

the revolt. The rebellion at Lhasa itself was quickly suppressed, and the guerrilla is continuing only in remote places in this mountainous country, particularly favorable to such a kind of "resistance."

Peking is now obliged to overturn from top to bottom the mediaeval social structure of Tibet in order to establish its influence over the mass of peasant serfs and nomads, hitherto ferociously exploited by the ecclesiastical and secular lords. The rebellion has killed "picturesque" Tibet, about whose fate reactionaries throughout the world will be moved to tears.

By entrusting the administration of the Autonomous Territory of Tibet to the democratic organization of the country's poor masses, and by aiding in its modern economic and industrial development, the Chinese revolution would thereby eliminate a bastion of the worst reactionary forces in Asia, allies of imperialism.



## Jugoslavia

### AN IMPORTANT SPEECH BY TITO

It is to be hoped that the Yugoslav leaders will not fail soon to take position publicly concerning the Trotskyist movement, recognizing it as a legitimate tendency of the international communist movement, rehabilitating the memory of its innumerable victims in the struggle against Stalinism, and making known to the Yugoslav public the writings of Leon Trotsky and of the Fourth International.

On the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Yugoslav Communist Party, Tito made an important speech, from which we think it of interest to publish the excerpts below:

During this period (the '30s) the working methods of the Comintern tended to make Communists living in emigration less revolutionaries than functionaries of that apparatus. I do not wish to diminish, by saying this, the importance of the activity displayed by the Communist International, in the first place during the first years and in particular when Lenin was still alive...

At the moment of the big trials which took place in the Soviet Union, Stalin followed, with regard to the other parties and through the intermediary of the Comintern, a policy which destroyed the revolutionary personality of the Communists and created a type of Communist devoid of character. It is then that the principles and the spirit introduced into the work of the Comintern began to become seriously devalued. This policy caused great damage to numerous parties, which was clearly manifested at the moment of the fascist aggression, during the days when the fate of their country was at stake, when they should have manifested their political independence, their bonds with the masses, and their ideological maturity, when they should have organized the people for the struggle against the occupier and put themselves at the head of that struggle. (This policy of Stalin also animated the creation and the activity of the Cominform after 1947.)

It is because of this policy practised by Stalin that our party lost a large part of its cadres, whether because of political demoralization, or because of physical extermination during the great "purges" carried out by Stalin in the USSR, during which there perished many hundreds of tested Communists who had been educated for years by our party and by the international revolutionary struggle. Among them were dozens of old-time leaders of the party, of whom I shall cite only a few, such as for instance Filip

Filipovitch, Stjepan Tsvijitch "Chtéfek," Vladimir Tchopitch, Rado Voviavitch, K Hervatina, et al, who together with a hundred other Communist leaders of our country found death in the Stalin prisons and camps. Today when we are celebrating forty years of existence of our party and have become aware of the atrocious events of those times, it is our duty to remember these comrades and to acquit ourselves towards them, notwithstanding all the mistakes and weaknesses which some of them might have shown in relation with their work in the party, for they were victims of a hard fate, the hardest that can come down upon a revolutionary: that is, to perish innocently under the bullets of men like himself as a traitor to the idea for which he has struggled and to which he has devoted his life. We Yugoslav Communists severely condemn such methods of extermination of men and we have energetically rejected such methods from our practice in the life of our party and our present socialist state (methods that remained in force also after 1948 in the other countries of people's democracy)...

In an interview given to the *Komunist*, organ of the Yugoslav Communist Party, Tito completed his memories of the '30s and of his own stay in Moscow, thus:

I only read. I avoided discussions because the NKVD tapped all telephone conversations. Perhaps this attitude kept me from coming under Stalin's knife.

Because so many things were cooked up in Moscow, I can say that the period there was the grimmest time of my life.

Even in the war it was easier, because in war one at least knows where his enemy is.

As you know, Stalin and the Comintern were not at all pleased to see us form proletarian brigades and take the red star as the symbol of our struggle.

At the beginning of 1942 we received a despatch stating that our policy was sectarianism. [...] We had firmly decided not to follow the directives coming "from up there," and to act in accordance with our own conditions and possibilities.

[...] The struggle for national liberation gradually took on the character of a socialist revolution, because it was simultaneously settling the question of power.

In his speech on the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Yugoslav Communist Party, Tito continued:

It is to our party and to our socialist construction that fell the difficult mission of being a vanguard detachment and of carrying on a pioneer struggle to smash the negative elements accumulated in the development of socialism and reflected in the phenomena so well known from Stalinist practice and theory as well as from the practice and theory of the representatives of the international workers' movement who copied docilely and without critical spirit every gesture, every word, every practical application of Stalin, including the organization of trials against numerous Communists of integrity and the murder of their former comrades.

These phenomena and this development have caused grave damage to the international workers' movement and sooner or later they had to come into conflict with the reality and the imperative needs of the reinforcement of socialism and of socialist development.

This conflict has come to show itself in various places and in different forms. The 1948 conflict between the USSR and Yugoslavia is only one manifestation of a more extensive conflict and of the more general need to eliminate from the road of socialist development the obstacles which have arisen during the period of the ripening and application of Stalinist conceptions. We have had different manifestations of that conflict in the famous events of Poland and Hungary, in the condemnation of the "personality cult" at the XXth Congress of the CP of the USSR, in the new aggravation of the conflict with Yugoslavia which appeared last year.

All those events show that the 1948 conflict was not a fortuitous phenomenon. This conflict is, in reality, an integral part of a much larger and more general process in the development of socialism. It is the exterior manifestation of the unceasing struggle carried on by the progressive forces and the reactionary forces in the course of the progress and development of socialist thought and of society in general.

One may ask why this conflict has burst out especially in the relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia. That is because we had prepared our revolution during a long process of revolutionary struggle, carried on in our country with our own forces. It is because in the course of that struggle we had distinguished numerous specific elements with which we had to reckon in the phase of the armed struggle and in the phase of the building of socialism. It is

because our revolution had adopted all those positive achievements of Lenin and the October Revolution in order to apply them in a creative way under the conditions of our struggle to accomplish our tasks under the new conditions. It is because our revolution had begun to reject all that was negative in Stalinist theory and practice. Those negative elements showed themselves in distrust toward the masses and above all toward the toiling peasantry, distrust toward the revolutionary force of the working class of other countries, ideological monopolism, the establishment of unequal relations between states which have undertaken the building of socialism, and finally the development of erroneous relations among the Communist Parties which materialized particularly in the policy and practice of the Cominform.

All negative elements which had accumulated during a long period of difficult struggles for socialism began to yield and our conflict with the Cominform, after 1948, permitted discerning them and separating them out more clearly. There was seen in that fact the consolidation of the forces which, at the end of a long process of struggle, will be capable of gradually eliminating those errors of socialist practice. Socialist Yugoslavia is an integral part of those forces of socialism and therein lie also the historical justification and the progressive character of our struggle. For it is impossible to conceive the development of socialism without the elimination of all that is negative, without the increase of the positive forces of socialism. Granted, this process will be neither short nor easy, but it is historically inevitable...

In the reply that *Borba* made in its 30 January issue to Khrushchev's report to the XXIst Congress of the CP of the USSR, we may read:

There are no longer any political prisoners in the USSR [Khrushchev declared].

We take this statement just as we have heard it.

*If it is true, we have here a immense progress in the development of the USSR, for in Stalin's time there were too many political prisoners, especially communists of integrity, who left their bones in the jails of Yagoda, Yezhov, and Beria.* [Our italics.]

The latest number (January-March 1959) of *Questions actuelles du Socialisme*, the Yugoslav theoretical magazine published in France, contains an important article by Veljko Vlahovich entitled "The Programme of the JCL and the Intensification of the Ideological Struggle," to which we shall later have occasion to return.

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## Indonesia

### PARTAI ACOMA LEADER JAILED

Despite his immunity as a parliamentary deputy, Ibnu Parna, well-known leader of the Partai Acoma, dissident communist party, has been imprisoned for having published a pamphlet denouncing the de facto dictatorship

Nasution, Chief of the General Staff of the Army.

The International Secretariat of the Fourth International promptly issued a denunciation of the arrest of this revolutionary fighter and a demand for his release.

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## Great Britain

### MASS DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST ATOMIC WEAPONS

Over Easter, the various organizations composing the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament organized a march from Aldermaston (the main atomic research station) to London. The march lasted four days, and over its 53-mile length never had less than 3,000 participants — who on

the last lap swelled to 15,000. The marchers, together with at least 15,000 more demonstrators awaiting them in Trafalgar Square, made up what *Tribune* editor Michael Foot called the greatest demonstration of the century.

The march's biggest weakness was in being predom-



antly middle class; in fact until the last day there was a complete absence of Trade Union banners, and very few Labour Party ones. On the positive side, the youth made up the great majority of the marchers; and there were very large student contingents. In fact, thousands of the youth are being brought into politics for the first time by this campaign.

The march was an arena of ideas: those who believed that the march should be non-political marched alongside those shouting "Out with the Tory government! Out with the bomb!". The CP marchers with their slogans "No Yankee bases!" were greeted with shouts of "Ban all bases!". The marchers readily bought the various publications on sale, and there was continuous discussion.

British Trotskyists participated, and explained that the struggle against atomic weapons cannot be separated from the struggle against all war, and that this means

the fight against capitalism. They furthermore explained that the campaign could not be successful if it stopped at the stage of merely marching; the task is to disarm the capitalist class, not to appeal to its reason.

Despite its middle-class and pacifist aspects in its present form, this movement has objectively progressive content that is capable of development in a revolutionary sense, and thus deserves the energetic critical support of revolutionary Marxists. But, particularly in view of the causes for which the corresponding German Anti-Atom-Death movement fizzled out, it is essential and urgent to inject into this still rather amorphous mass the crystallizing and purposive stiffening of the workers' political and trade-union movements, to broaden mass actions, give them a class political direction, and guide them toward the only force that can really put an end to the danger of the atomic destruction of humanity, worker's power.



## France

### XIVth CONGRESS OF THE P C I

At the end of March the Parti Communiste Internationaliste, French Section of the Fourth International, held its XIVth Congress. The main political points on the agenda were: the situation in France; the building of the revolutionary party.

On the first point, the congress stressed; the Bonapartist character of the de Gaulle regime, ready to use force against the masses but itself lacking a broad mass base; and the feeble policies of the traditional leaderships of the working class.

The second point had as its object to reaffirm the correct revolutionary Marxist solutions in the face of manifold revisionist currents produced by the 1958 defeat of the French workers and the continued crisis in Stalinism, opportunist toward the bourgeoisie and sectarian toward the non-Communist part of the workers' movement. Various solutions of despair — ranging from a complete revision of Marxism and its replacement by impressionistic ad hoc theories about a "new" capitalism, the disappearance of the working class as such, etc. to the wish-

ful thinking of certain oppositional Communists that the CP was finished and a genuine revolutionary party could quickly be built outside it — though largely so far only the elucubrations of isolated intellectuals, threaten to seep down into the ranks of the French workers, many of them disheartened and disoriented by Gaullism's easy victory. The P C I's XIVth Congress reaffirmed the orientation, adopted seven years ago, of concentrating in France on aiding the formation within the CP of a left opposition which through its experiences and our guidance would arrive at the positions of revolutionary Marxism defended by the Fourth International.

The congress also recorded the formal disappearance, at long last, of the organization that had been using the party's name, and thus creating repeated confusion, since the 1952 split of the Lambert group. It may be added that, since then, the principal members of this group, at the congress of "Force Ouvrière," voted in favor of the reformist leadership and of a resolution hostile to a united front with the main labor federation, the C G T.



## Ceylon

### LANKA SAMA SAMAJA PARTY ISSUES NEW PROGRAMMATIC PAMPHLET

In a series of articles originally published in the *Sama-samajist*, weekly newspaper of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party, Ceylonese Section of the Fourth International, and now brought out as a pamphlet with the title *What We Stand For*, Comrade Leslie Goonawardene, secretary of the party, gives a clear and vigorous summary of the transitional programme on which the party is currently trying to mobilize the Ceylonese masses with a view to the installation of a genuine workers' and peasants' government in the island.

Comrade Leslie Goonawardene briefly recalls the history of the party, created in December 1935, in order to justify that "its actions in the past have accorded with its professed aims and objectives." It was the LSSP that first brought political consciousness to the Ceylonese masses of both town and countryside. "Today, after a period of 23 years, the LSSP can boldly say with pride that never once has it betrayed or swerved away from its fundamental aims": national independence and socialism.

In order to complete the national independence of the country, the LSSP is struggling for

the taking back of air, naval, and military bases handed over to British imperialism and the transformation

of the status of Ceylon into that of an independent republic outside the British Commonwealth.

The unity of the Ceylonese nation, moreover, can be achieved and consolidated only by raising the Tamil minority to a status equal to that of the Sinhalese majority, as well as by the recognition of equal rights "to all residents of Ceylon who have resided in Ceylon for a minimum number of years and desire to make Ceylon their permanent home." The LSSP, as is known, did not hesitate to stand up against Sinhalese communalism and take a stand in favor of making both Sinhalese and Tamil state languages in Ceylon.

The LSSP "stands for a real democratic political system and local government, based on the active initiative and participation of the masses."

Comrade Leslie Goonawardene then goes on to analyze the concrete transitional anti-capitalist measures necessary to ensure the economic development of the country: nationalization of all banks and insurance companies; taking over of the import and export trade; nationalization of large estates, and radical agrarian reform, etc.

In conclusion, Comrade Leslie Goonawardene writes:

The path to the national and social liberation of

Ceylon is not an easy one. Powerful vested interests, both local and foreign, will fight desperately in an effort to cling on to their privileges. The path to the goal is one of struggle.

At the head of the Ceylonese masses, adequately organized and mobilized, the LSSP will, however, know

how to lead them on the path to the revolution and proletarian power in Ceylon. Its past, its naturally dominant position among the proletarian masses of the country, its attachment to the line of revolutionary Marxism, to the line of the Fourth International, are the sure guarantees of its final victory.



## Brazil

### SPREADING STRUGGLES AGAINST SPURTING LIVING COSTS

The brutal rise in the cost of living keeps the fires of struggle burning in Brazil. Whereas in an entire year minimum wages increased only 25 to 30%, living costs (even according to minimizing official statistics) shot up 30% just between 31 December and 15 March. In the poorer "states," the disproportion was even more severe.

Though the government and its press try to cover up the situation, reports sifting through show that the peasants of the Northeast continue to attack towns and food warehouses. In Ceará and Piauí the forces of repression have had to be mobilized against "cangaços," the famed peasant-bandit cangaçeiros, who symptomatically are rising up again, this time with more developed social sense. And with the refugees from the drought areas, the bourgeoisie has created a veritable slave-trade, "selling" these starving Northeasterners to work for next to nothing on estates in Minas Gerais, Bahía, Goiás, and even farther.

In the smaller cities isolated but significant struggles occur in uninterrupted succession. Typical was Uberlandia in Minas Gerais, where the population seized and held control of the town for 24 hours, taking measures against hoarders, before being severely repressed by the police.

After a pause, menacing with muffled protests and minor actions in various cities, the return of the students started another wave of struggles. There were widespread strikes of secondary-school students against an increase in school costs. Bloody repression in Goiânia provoked a popular outburst that drove the police from the streets and forced the government to reduce school costs. There then exploded a strike of teachers in the private schools.

At Recife, in Pernambuco, a main centre of this strike wave, a hike in bus fares produced an explosion in which the populace attacked the buses and drove them from the streets; they themselves occupied the streets all night. At Salvador, in Bahía, for similar causes and on the same day, the people took to the streets and set up barricades. The government had to conciliate.

It is noteworthy that everywhere students solidarized with teachers, and the people as a whole with both. The outstanding characteristic of this stage of the struggle is rapid generalization and amplification to new sectors, plus a tendency of the masses — though devoid of any policy — to unify. It should also be noted how the struggle moves from the countryside and small towns to larger cities like Recife and Salvador.

If São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro were, exceptionally, redoubts of "bourgeois order," it was not that the masses did not feel impelled to struggle — though to a lesser degree than in the poorer states — but because their spontaneity is still throttled by a whole conciliationist trade-union and political bureaucracy.

The government was gravely alarmed. Kubitschek, in his characteristic style, launched a new "operation," with a series of ostentatious but anodyne measures. He nervously affirmed in a speech that "the high costs of living have already reached a level beyond which they will rise no further." The government's real measures are not against the high cost of living but against those who are fighting it; and an important one is its effort to win over or buy the trade-union leadership.

This new wave of struggles coincided with a slight shift in the C P, which went over to the attack against Kubitschek — without abandoning its policy of "alliance with the national bourgeoisie." Since the C P has real influence in the trade-union bureaucracy, it was soon able to organize a "Hunger March" from São Paulo to Rio, in which 900 union leaders were to take part. It was strictly a bureaucratic pressure manoeuvre on the government, and the Stalinists carefully excluded the masses, who might have hotted it up. But the government could not risk even this form of agitation.

Suddenly *Ultima Hora*, the big-circulation daily of the "national" bourgeoisie, denounced the march as a "golpista" manoeuvre. For this it profited from the fact that the C P, in its opportunism, had insisted on the participation of the fazendeiros of the FARESP. Indeed, some days before the announced march, FARESP had headed another "march" to Rio, of the producers of milk, demanding an increase in its price.

It is easy to imagine the confusion, which the government used to force a turn on the São Paulo union leadership.

Between 13 and 16 March there was a trial of strength between the C P and the government to line up the union bureaucracy. The government won, forcing the Stalinists to abandon the march and capitulate completely. The corrupt union bureaucrats ignobly granted the government "a waiting period and congratulations for the concern with which the government is facing the question." Hypocritically, for fear of the masses, the bureaucrats tried to justify themselves by "the need to gain time in order to organize the struggle throughout the entire country" — as if the workers in Recife and Salvador were unaware that the cost of living is rising.

Discouraged by always being restrained by their union leaders, the São Paulo workers, in the still favorable conditions of employment there, tend to seek personal solutions for their problems, rather than to mobilize and bring pressure on the trade-union leadership — which can thus get away with such actions as this recent one.

In these last days, the government has fired off all its ammunition in promises, leaving it wide open in face of an inevitable new wave of price increases. Even without leadership or policy, the masses will engage in new spontaneous actions. From Recife and Salvador the path is open to Belo Horizonte and Porto Alegre, and finally to Rio and São Paulo. In the Northeast, the situation continues to grow worse, aggravated by the inevitable failure of Kubitschek's "Operation Northeast" and of efforts of the nationalist "state" government of Cid Campaio in Pernambuco, brought to power by a broad movement of poor masses. Dynamic worker-student or worker-student-peasant united fronts in the North and Northeast easily escape from any bureaucratic or governmental control. In those areas even the C P is more sensitive to the popular struggles.

In bourgeois circles the government's increasing prostration is fully sensed. It was no accident that Lott, who had withdrawn from activity and was preparing to make a trip to the USA, suddenly reappeared and gave his opi-

nion on the high cost of living and demanded control of the imperialist companies' transfer of profits abroad. It seems that Lott's reappearance, more than a manoeuvre toward preparing a replacement government, "stronger" than Kubitschek's, is rather an effort to keep up with the coup d'état plans of other bourgeois sectors, inclined to profit from the general disorder to their own benefit.

Even if the masses, for lack of leadership and a workers' party with its own class policy, cannot intervene independently, the fact remains that the political crisis is sharpening.

If popular actions continue at their present level or become more violent, but remain dispersed, inevitably a bourgeois current, prepared to liquidate the democratic liberties granted by the Kubitschek government, will temporarily impose itself. This does not mean that the Brazilian revolution will be strangled; it will take a more bitter and violent course. But it will cost enormous and unnecessary sacrifices. The "nationalist" Lott, who enjoys the support of all the petty-bourgeois and bourgeois theoreticians of the "national revolution," including the Stalin-

ists, might be the card played by the bourgeoisie against the masses.

The other possibility — and on this all the Brazilian revolutionary Marxist forces must base themselves — is that, through the unprecedented wave of popular struggles, a broad left tendency can define itself in the milieu of the vanguard, especially Communist, in such a way as to raise the level of the masses' actions and give them a programme and centre of leadership, even if it be for the moment only partial.

The bourgeois crisis is deep but not imminent. The very magnitude of the struggles postpones an immediate way out by force — even though it brings it nearer in a more general sense. If the wave of popular struggles grows sufficiently great, it is not excluded that the bourgeoisie will have to retreat and continue playing the "democratic" card for a period.

The struggle for a revolutionary communist tendency that interprets and leads the actions of the masses fits in perfectly with the need to defend democratic liberties in Brazil.



## Belgium

### THE RETURN OF THE ASHES OF COMRADE LESOIL

The ashes of Comrade Lesoil, founder of the Communist movement and the Trotskyist movement in Belgium, were recently brought back to Belgium from Western Germany. Arrested by the Gestapo on 22 June 1941, together with the majority of the well-known pre-war Communist and Trotskyist militants, Comrade Lesoil had been transported to the concentration camp of Neuengamme, near Hamburg, where he died in 1943.

On the occasion of this return of his ashes, the Charleroi comrades wanted to avoid having Comrade Lesoil's name associated in any way whatever with bourgeois "patriotic" ideas or institutions, against which he had

fought for 25 years. For this reason they themselves organized a ceremony at Châtelineau, where Comrade Lesoil had been a municipal councillor. Some hundred friends of the old revolutionary leader were present at this ceremony, which was suffused with internationalist and revolutionary Marxist spirit, as would have been wished by our lamented comrade, who was a personal friend of Leon Trotsky, and who was present at the Founding Congress of the Fourth International, as well as at all the international meetings organized by our movement before the Second World War.

### THE BORINAGE STRIKE

The strike of the Borinage miners against the threatened closure of their pits was by February 15th nearing its climax. At that moment, the miners of the whole country had struck in solidarity with their Borinage comrades. The metal workers in two big districts of the country had joined the movement. General strikes of 24 hours were planned in different regions. In the Liège region, the industrial heart of the country, the workers' vanguard clamored to join the movement. Gas and electricity workers also declared their readiness to broaden the wave of protest by stopping work. Belgian workers were showing a dramatic militancy that made them the centre of attention of the European working class.

It was at that moment that the union leaders joined the government and the employers in an "economic conference" which liquidated the strike wave in exchange for vague promises of economic reform: the constitution of a public investment company (which would permit the creation of factories by the state, in order to absorb unemployment) and the creation of a bureau of economic programming (intended, in the eyes of the unions, to start economic planning, but, in the eyes of the bosses and the government, only to plan state expenditure and the distribution of contracts by the state).

It is true that, thereby, this strike is the first in Belgian (if not in Western European) history, which had no immediate social but only general economic goals: full employment; nationalization of the mines; planned economy. But the educational potentialities of the movement were to say the least weakened by the fact that neither were

these goals reached nor was the working class mobilized in a real trial of strength for their attainment. The movement was stopped before getting up its full momentum and the compromise reached in the "economic conference" quickly proved to be a rotten one.

It is also true that, in mid-February, the whole Belgian working class was not yet ready for such a general strike movement for transitional demands. Lack of education and propaganda; the weight of the past betrayals by the bureaucrats; great regional differences (two thirds of the unemployed are concentrated in the Flemish part of the country) — these are obstacles which have still to be overcome. But the union leaders, especially their centrist left wing, had created big hopes among the advanced workers in the preceding months. Workers' combativity was on the increase; the abrupt "settlement" of the February strike movement has given a blow to the workers' confidence in this leadership. And in the Borinage, where militancy and hopes were highest, the rotten compromise produced demoralization, to the degree that the reformists did not dare to organize a central May Day manifestation, for fear that it would not succeed.

As the general line of the class struggle still goes upwards, the revolutionary Marxists hope that the lessons of that strike will be assimilated in a positive way by the advanced workers. The "right to work" which was written into the February agreement by the government will be taken seriously. It has already led to a 24-hour general strike in the Ghent region (in Flanders), where it is the first big strike movement since 1936.

## Bolivia

ANTI-IMPERIALIST DEMONSTRATION; FASCIST UPRISING;  
BETRAYED STRIKE; EXILE OF REVOLUTIONARIES

Situations for too long ripe tend to decay, and in Bolivia, where for nearly a year there has existed an objectively revolutionary situation that the instinctively combative but politically uneducated masses have been unable to seize and turn to their advantage, there begin to appear some ominous fore signs of an unfavorable turn.

In recent months, Yankee imperialism has grown increasingly impatient with the inability of the Siles government to "establish order" by bringing the working class to its knees. The famed "Stabilization Plan" could not be applied, and was not even renewed when it ran out last December. The *Wall Street Journal* disgustingly editorialized that aid to the Bolivian government was "like throwing money in the gutter." The *American Metal Market* opposed barter of excess agricultural products for Bolivian tin, saying that "Bolivia does not deserve our help." But it was the smart-aleck *Time* magazine that made the cup run over.

On March 2nd and 3rd, anti-imperialist mass indignation reached a new peak when it was learned that *Time* had revived a trite old idea that has been knocking around Bolivia for years, that the country, since it lost its maritime provinces, is an economically unviable national unit whose people would be better off if it were territorially divided up among the limitrophe nations, Peru, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil. News of this gratuitous insult aroused tremendous spontaneous anti-imperialist demonstrations, particularly in the administrative capital, La Paz. The government, unable to prevent them, jumped to lead them and divert them down "peaceful" and pointless channels. But the masses would not be diverted. They moved against the US embassy chancellery and other Yankee imperialist offices. The government's military police first attacked with tear gas, then opened fire, killing two.

Needless to say, the Partido Obrero Revolucionario, Bolivian Section of the Fourth International, had participated in the demonstrations, in the front ranks. The government, hysterical with rage, and anxious to distract attention from its own role as the watch-dog of imperialism, accused the POR of precisely the murders for which it was itself responsible. In a series of communiqués and press conferences it denounced the PORistas, especially Comrade Víctor Villegas, and called on everyone to turn them in to the police. *La Nación*, chief La Paz daily, in a main editorial, tried to whip up a real lynch spirit against the Trotskyists.

Yankee imperialism showed its teeth. Styles Bridges and other US senators demanded armed intervention. Behind the scenes there were certainly threats that if the Siles gang could not handle the situation, there were other gangs in Bolivia that perhaps could. Until the revolution opens the secret diplomatic archives, proof will be impossible, but it is not without significance that the next major event in Bolivia was the uprising of the Falange Socialista Boliviana. This fascist group, the Siles government's "friendly enemy," has long been notorious for uprisings, suppressed without much bloodshed and rarely punished with any rigor. But this time the FSB was in deadly earnest and put everything it had into the attempt.

In La Paz, it seized the armory of the Ballivián regiment, the arms stocks in the city hall, and the state Radio Illimani, and called on the populace to come get the arms and extend the revolt. Though its own nucleus is small, it gets tens of thousands of votes in the elections, and obviously expected that masses of discontented petty bourgeois would join it. But the middle class did not move.

Isolated, the FSB whiteshirts were mowed down by MNR comandos and the Control Político, plus a few army elements. Kalleberg and Walter Alpíre, the leader of the FSB's "coup d'état" wing, were either killed in the fighting or executed at the end of it. The top FSB chief, Unzaga, was also dead, reportedly by suicide, although, as it was remarked with sardonic Bolivian humor, "the idea may have been rather violently suggested to him." Figures of deaths ranged from 72 up to several hundreds.

At first word of the coup d'état, the factory and railway workers immediately mobilized; and miners' detachments arrived from Milluni. At the edge of the workers' districts barricades were immediately built and protective patrols set up, prior to moving against the uprising. But it proved unnecessary for the workers' militias to undertake offensive operations against the fascists: the MNR forces had been sufficient. Elsewhere in Bolivia, workers' and peasants' militias mobilized but their action proved unnecessary.

Once sure the Falange was defeated, Siles next day attacked it on the radio. But, as on March 3rd, he turned his attack against the POR, "contact with which the working class must shake off." Other speakers belabored the same theme.

In this the MNR chiefs show a sure political instinct. Though the POR is numerically still relatively weak and seems heavily handicapped in its race against time to become a mass party, Siles correctly recognizes that its steady organizational growth and even more the now rapid spread of its political influence among the masses, particularly the miners, as they learn by experience the principled nature of its programme and the practical soundness of its proposals, make it the main and implacable enemy of imperialism and its native agents of every degree and tendency. Momentarily freed of fear of attack from the right by the crushing of the Falange, and sure of the support of the Lechinists of the "left" at all critical moments, Siles is concentrating on an effort by all means, "legal" or otherwise, to decapitate and smash the growing revolutionary party. This has been shown once again in the third big struggle in Bolivia in the last quarter: that over the unfreezing of prices in the "pulperías," the mine commissaries, whose commencement was already mentioned in our last issue.

In Bolivia's uncontrollable inflation, it is only these controlled prices that make life possible at all for the ill-paid miners. But the International Monetary Fund decreed that, if they were not unfrozen, further aid to the Siles government would be refused. The government's attempt to comply, however, was blocked by the miners' direct action. In the 13-mine centre of Quechisla in the South the miners seized the pulperia and turned it over to the union to manage. In Catavi, San José, and Huanuni the women put a stop to the unfreezing by stoning the pulperías. The government countered by ordering withdrawal of administrative and technical personnel from mines that rejected unfreezing, and refusing to send further food stocks to them. The San José miners answered by locking the administrators up. All mines continued work without the technical personnel. But, as always, Lechín, Torres, & Co, the bureaucratic leadership of the miners' union, came to the government's aid. While the government on the one hand threatened hunger and the sending of troops, Torres on the other promised pie in the sky. But the rank-and-file resistance was so great that a "compromise," "guaranteed" by Lechín and Torres, was effected, whereby the measure was to be postponed for 120

days. Naturally, once the miners accepted, the government welshed on its promise, and removed 50% of pulperia items from price control as of April 1st.

Meanwhile, the anti-Trotskyist campaign was stepped up on all sides. At the San José mine, the Canadian Oblate Fathers "fingered" the POR members and demanded that they be fired. Elsewhere MNR elements did the same. When a rank-and-file union delegation from Catavi went to La Paz to complain that food was not sent and wages not paid, the union bureaucrats told them to throw out the PORistas and food and money would be forthcoming. The miners indignantly refused: "They are workers like all the rest of us." The press, especially *El Diario* and the Catholic Church daily, *Presencia*, raged against the Trotskyists. The government called for the expulsion of all POR members from the mines as "necessary" if a "stable agreement" were to be reached. Torres, No 2 bureaucrat of the miners' union, backed the ineffable Morales at San José against the Trotskyists, and has been multiplying declarations against "extremists."

The government's all-out drive for arrests began to produce results. Beside Víctor Villegas, editor of the party's organ, *Lucha Obrera*, arrested earlier, Hugo González Moscose, the general secretary, Fernando Bravo James, Andrés Lucio Arenas, and others were seized and jailed. The party is being hounded into illegality. The International Secretariat twice, on March 20th and April 25th, issued declarations appealing to workers' organizations, particularly in Latin America, to protest against the repression striking at the proletarian vanguard of the Bolivian revolution.

The Lechinist union bureaucracy, its authority a little more worn away each time that it puts an end to the miners' repeated and tireless struggles by some rotten compromise, recently realized that, if it continued to try to straddle between a revolutionary policy as represented by the POR, and the counter-revolutionary policy of the MNR government, it was in danger of being outflanked on the left, and eventually even replaced, wholly or in part, by the PORistas. It has visibly made its choice, to line up fully with the government. On the one hand, it threatened, in a melodramatic gesture, to walk out of the union leadership, leaving the humanly combative but organizationally unskilled rank and file leaderless; and Lechin has even made the threat more vivid by personally dropping everything at the most critical juncture and setting off on a trip of several months to the USA and Israel. And on the other, it has opened an organized and coordinated offensive to isolate the Trotskyists and drive them from the mines before the miners, cured by repeated sell-outs of their long faith in the Lechin-Torres leadership, draw the practical conclusions and start replacing that leadership by a revolutionary one.

A first step in this direction, which no doubt stood out as a vivid danger signal to the Lechinists, was the creation by the miners of the Oruro area of an emergency strike committee in which the majority of the elected leaders were members of the POR and of the dissident-

Trotskyist *Masas* group of Guillermo Lora, whose brother César was elected president. The government, after a single negotiation, refused all discussion with the committee, and the bureaucratic union tops at La Paz succeeded in isolating it. Police repression quickly followed, with César Lora and other leaders arrested.

This case of a replacement of the discredited bureaucratic leadership was a step in the right direction and is significant of the beginning of a trend among the mining rank and file. But the process of their full understanding that nothing but defeats can be expected from the Lechinists and that their leadership must be replaced by a revolutionary one, is a long one, whereas events are racing. The first result of the Lechinists' success in dispersing and disorganizing the miners' fight against the unfreezing of pulperia prices has been rather to discourage the rank and file, which is now sullenly watching the hated measure applied in one mine after another.

The victory obtained over the miners with the betrayal of the Lechin-Torres bureaucracy, and the successful crushing of the uprising of the fascist Falange, has unquestionably strengthened the Siles government's hand momentarily, and it will redouble its efforts to roll back the revolutionary tide that has been for a year breaking in wave after wave against it. It will above all do everything possible to decapitate and smash the POR as the Bolivian revolution's vanguard.

But, though the long vacillating scales seem at the moment to be turning a little in the government's favor, the Bolivian bourgeoisie and imperialism have to date only gained a few skirmishes, not won the war. Even the Siles government's victory over the FSB is two-edged, for now, as in Venezuela and Cuba, the reaction has no second arm in reserve. And the masses' slow but sure disillusion with the misleadership of the COB, though for the moment its effects are only at the first stage of confusion and discouragement, will logically lead them to the more active second stage of sweeping class-collaborationist leaders into the dustbin and replacing them by a revolutionary leadership determined to settle once for all with the outlived MNR and its Siles government and to set up a workers' and peasants' government in Bolivia. It is, in a sense, a race with time in a worsening situation, and the small but militant POR, conscious thereof, is redoubling its efforts.

#### BULLETIN

As we are already on press, news comes from bourgeois press sources — not yet confirmed through our own channels — that the Siles government has exiled from Bolivia all the arrested Trotskyists. To what country they have been exiled was not stated. Unless, as has sometimes been done in the past, there is collusion with the government of the country of exile to confine our comrades to some semi-prison island, we may be sure that they will soon be back in Bolivia and at their revolutionary tasks again. The whole International salutes these courageous comrades and sends them warmest expressions of fighting solidarity.



## Chile

### UNIFICATION OF TROTSKYISTS COMPLETED

After long additional negotiations, the unification of Chilean Trotskyists decided on by the last World Congress had just been completed. The formerly independent Partido Obrero Revolucionario (*Nuestra Tribuna*) has unified with the Partido Obrero Revolucionario (Trotskyista), Chilean Section of the Fourth International. This

highly progressive action, which puts an end to a long period of confusion, occurs at a moment when the Chilean workers' movement is taking unusually great and heartening strides forward, a report on which, forced out of this number by lack of space, will appear in our next issue.

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