Fourth International

The Court-Martial System Of the U.S. Army By Michael Cort

The End of French Democracy By Terence Phelan

After the Lend-Lease Law The Editors On the United Front Leon Trotsky Hitler's "New Order" William Simmons Franco's Dilemma Grandizo Munis The War Deal's Economics . William F. Warde

Manager's Column

A little more than a month has gone by since the launching of the subscription drive, run jointly by FOURTH INTERNA-TIONAL and the MILITANT. In a steady stream, subscriptions of all denominations--very many of them for a much longer period than the two months offered in the special combination -have been flowing into the business office from all parts of the country. To the time of this writing, the total has just topped 500 subscriptions to the two publications.

As might be expected, the heavy results are coming from the industrial areas in which a concerted, long-term mass distribution of our press has been carried on. But the steadiness with which new subscribers are cropping up in the agricultural towns of the South and West is something to cause amazement. Here we have concrete evidence of the persistence with which the ideas of socialism penetrate by every sort of means into all parts of our diverse population and find everywhere an enthusiastic response and a demand for a steady supply of our material.

The Minnesota cities have again run away from the rest of the field in this subscription activity. The comrades in Minneapolis and St. Paul have tied the record of the rest of the country combined. They have been able to do this not only because their whole history of class-struggle activity in the labor movement is bearing its logical and inevitable fruit but chiefly because they moved forward in this job with efficiency and a high degree of organization.

Our Twin Cities workers have subdivided themselves into teams which operate on a competitive basis, visiting every likely individual in Minneapolis and St. Paul and taking a number of the smaller Minnesota towns in their stride.

Chicago, Boston and Detroit are chasing each other over the scoreboard, one snatching the lead from another with every mail. Detroit published a special leaflet advertising the special combination offer. Chicago, as part of its program for securing subscriptions, organized a FOURTH INTERNATIONAL Published by the Fourth International Publishing Association

Volume II March 1941 No. 3 (Whole No. 10)

116 University Place, New York, N. Y. Telephone: Aironquin 4-8547. Subscription rates: \$2.00 per year; bundles, 14c for 5 copies and up. Canada and Foreign: \$2.50 per year; bundles 16c for 5 copies and up. Entered as second-class matter May 20, 1940, at the post office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879.

Editorial Board: JAMES P. CANNON JOSEPH HANSEN ALBERT GOLDMAN FELIX MORROW WILLIAM F. WARDE Business Manager: LYDIA BEIDEL

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sub-raising social; but Boston, viewing such methods with disdain, has vowed to beat out her rival in the West "the hard way"—by going door-to-door. At the present writing, Boston's Spartan determination has her in the lead as against Chicago, Newark and Detroit.

* * *

On the heels of the phenomenal success of the subscription campaign have come, as one would expect, a definite improvement in the distribution of the magazine as well as an increase in remittances to the business office. Chicago, for instance, aside from the fine work it has done in the subscription drive, has exerted a tremendous effort and finally wiped out the huge debt which for years menaced the peace of mind of the comrades there.

The honor roll for promptness in payment is shared with Chicago by Minneapolis, St. Paul, Allentown, Reading, Rochester and Toledo. Not only do these places keep a vigilant eye on the regular settlement of their monthly debts, but they have been careful not to permit old accounts to clutter up their reputations and activities.

The virtue of these places, however, is thrown into even sharper relief by the schocking state of things with some others. We hope something will shock them into a realization that, even if a debt is so old it has become a local tradition, it is still a scandal and a pain in the neck of the business office of the magazine. If we could look in several directions at one time, we are confident that our burning stare would be felt in the backs of the following sections: Akron, Baltimore, Boston, Cleveland, Flint, Indianapolis, Los Angeles, Newark, New Haven, New Orleans, Philadelphia, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, Texas and Youngstown. If some of these places did not communicate with us for other reasons than reference to the old indebtednesses, we should think they had repudiated the monetary system all on their own hook.

* * *

At long last, correspondence has come through from our cothinkers in England. One letter comes from an individual who has followed the work of our movement for some time. He writes briefly and to the point and with an objectivity that is worthy of a working-class militant: "I am or was a subscriber to the FOURTH INTERNA-TIONAL, Have been bombed out of London since September and have not got any F. I. since then. I shall get money from the United States in February and if you will send me the F. I. for October and November I will remit payment then." We complied with his request and surely enough his remittance came through from friends in Boston this week.

A second London letter comes from one of our correspondents and reads in part: "We have received your letter of 14th December. It has taken nearly two We certainly should months! have kept you regularly informed of developments over here. Our earlier letters to friends in New York never seemed to arrive, so we rather gave up trying . . . Trade union membership is steadily increasing and has now reached over six million — a good sign for the future. But political life is at a very low level; partly because the workers as a whole accept the was as an unpleasant necessity, but nevertheless a necessity; because so many are working long hours or are engaged in such occupations as firewatching or ARP outside working hours; and partly because it is the big centers that have suffered most from the blitz and there practically nothing goes on in the evenings.

"We can be optimistic for the future, but work is slow and painful at the moment. Our ranks have been seriously thinned by the calls of the armed forces, but we are carrying on as well as we can.

"We would very much appreciate hearing from you from time to time. We receive literature from you, though erratically and after long delay. But that cannot be helped. Best wishes for our friends.

"P. S. Three bombs have just dropped somewhere near. What a life!"

If the number on your wrapper reads:

N 51, or F 10, your subscription expires with this issue. In order to avoid missing a single issue of FOURTH INTERNA-TIONAL, be sure to send in your renewal order immediately. \$2.00 for one year, \$3.00 for one year in combination with the SOCIAL-

IST APPEAL

FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

VOLUME 2

MARCH 1941

NUMBER 3

After the Lease-Lend Law

By THE EDITORS

For years we warned the American workers of the imminence of war, of its inevitability if the capitalist class was permitted to remain in power. The lend-lease law is an enormous step toward total participation in the war. But—every worker must understand this—the lend-lease law has not yet plunged us into the war.

Between the lend-lease law and complete participation in the war there is a gap, ever narrowing but still a gap which it is extremely important to understand. The Gallup polls continue to show that large sections of the population which supported the enactment of the lend-lease law remain opposed to actual warfare. There will be many a sleepless night for the rulers of this country before they risk the plunge. The temper of the organized labor movement does not enable Roosevelt and Wall Street to go confidently to war.

The anti-war sentiments of the population and the attitude of the labor movement are not the sole determinants of this situation. American imperialism would like now to use the tactics that Great Britain used when it was the dominant power in the world—supply the money and armaments and let other countries do the actual fighting. Undoubtedly Roosevelt and those he represents would like to attain their objective of defeating Hitler without sending troops and even, if possible, without having the navy participate in the conflict. They would prefer to have others do the fighting and dying. Likewise the ever-deepening conflict in the Pacific, which George Stern describes in an article in this issue, may hold off for a time. A short time—but that means so much more time in which to organize the American proletariat for the tasks that lie ahead.

The foregoing considerations dictate a precise understanding of the debate over the lend-lease bill. Of course no fundamental principles separated the debaters. They all agreed on the principle of helping Great Britain and thus protecting the interests of American imperialism. The American capitalists prefer the victory of British imperialism because the British is the weaker and the less dynamic of the two imperialist camps and consequently represents less—in fact, no—danger to the interests of American imperialism. A victory of British imperialism means, in reality, a victory for American imperialism, for the British empire in the course of this war is certain to come more and more under the domination of the United States.

Hence there is no difference within the ruling class on whether to help toward a British victory. The difference arises on the question, to what extent the United States should go to *assure* a British victory. A section of the capitalist class, mainly represented by the mid-western Republican leaders, prefers a victory for Britain but are not prepared to go the limit to prevent a German victory.

These "isolationists"—the name is really a fraud—are confident they can thwart Hitler's attempt at achieving hegemony in South America. They believe they can enter into some arrangement with the Nazis over other questions and thus avoid a war with Germany for the time being. They would like to see Britain win, but its defeat, they feel, is not an unmixed evil: that defeat would immediately throw Canada, Australia and other sections of the British empire into the clutches of American imperialism.

It is quite natural that this position should be championed by the Republican Party, which has its main strength in those sections of the country farthest removed from the Atlantic seaboard. Not the least of the motivations of the Republican politicians is that they are an opposition party anxious to find an issue upon which they can regain control of the government.

The "anti-war" arguments of this group merit nothing but contempt from the workers. Class-conscious workers can scarcely get excited over the "isolationist" idea that Roosevelt is about to strip "our" defenses for the sake of helping Great Britain. The ones who use that argument show that they differ with Roosevelt only on the question of how best to defend American imperialism.

When the lend-lease bill was passed, one after another of the "isolationist" leaders arose to swear fealty to Roosevelt in executing the law. Where differences are deep-going, there can be no such round of camaraderie and handshaking as "isolationists" and interventionists joined in. And if the interventionist arguments did not convince these "isolationists" then the development of the war has done so for many.

For, the fact is, if you accept the imperialist premises which the "isolationists" and interventionists both agree to, then the interventionists have logic on their side. A victorious Nazi Germany *would* menace the interests of American imperialism throughout the world. Europe cannot solve, even temporarily, the needs of German imperialism. It requires immediately the raw materials and natural resources of Asia, Africa, South America, it must reach out for them—and collide head-on with American imperialism.

As this perspective becomes ever clearer, the ranks of the "isolationists" thin away rapidly.

But the struggle against the entry of America into the war never depended on these people anyway. Unanimity in Congress does not change the real relation of forces outside the artificial and distorted atmosphere of Washington. Tens of millions still do not want entry into the war; and their ability to fight against entry is objectively favored by the plans of American imperialism, which seeks to delay if possible total American involvement.

The next phase of the struggle against American entry into the war can be organized against the use of the navy to convoy war material to Britain. Propaganda to prepare the people to accept convoys began even before passage of the lend-lease law; some of it was astonishingly brazen, for example, the speech of Commander Edward Ellsberg, U.S.N.R., at the Overseas Press Club on March 1st. "We are in the war now," he insisted. "I have spoken to the government, and I know that we will be doing this convoying before long. We do not have to declare war now anymore than we did when we shelled Vera Cruz in 1914. At that time the Navy had orders to accomplish an objective. It did so even though it meant killing some Mexicans."

Following his pattern (and Hitler's) of whittling down opposition by accomplishing an objective in several stages, Roosevelt may begin with "partial" convoys: U.S. destroyers and subchasers will "only" accompany freighters across the Atlantic to the Azores, and will not proceed into the "war zone" around the British isles. Needless to say, a sea battle between the U. S. warships and German submarines can take place a hundred miles out of New York just about as well as it could twenty miles off Liverpool. But Roosevelt's maneuver will serve its purpose: tens of millions of American workers and their families, who don't want American entry in the war but who want to see Hitler destroyed, will half-believingly accept "partial" convoys as the way to achieve both their desires.

Under these conditions, to fight against the use of convoys will be decidedly going against the stream. But the fight must be made. Many a worker who will now brush our arguments aside, will find them haunting his thoughts more and more often in the next period.

We must ask such workers: "You want to see Hitler destroyed, you think that the Roosevelt government can be the instrumentality for that, yet you oppose entry into the war. Why? If you seriously believe what you say you do, you should be demanding entry into the war. Why should you and those like you be sheltered from the war's consequences, if you believe that Britain is fighting your battle? You are being disgustingly selfish."

Am I really selfish? such a worker will ask himself. He knows that in other matters he has demonstrated his ability to merge his personal interests in the greater good. He has risked bones, perhaps his life, on picket lines. Why, then, is he unwilling to do as much in the "war for democracy"? If he thinks his way through he will find that, at the bottom of this "selfishness" lies skepticism concerning the real nature of this "war for democracy."

* * *

That skepticism will grow under the impact of the coming clashes between the workers on the one hand, and the employers and their government on the other.

Roosevelt's Labor Strategy

In the period of peace, the American capitalists could afford to permit Roosevelt to experiment with social legislation. The American ruling class was rich enough to tolerate the "social appeasement" methods of Roosevelt, rich enough to afford, grumblingly, the luxury of democracy.

Altogether different is the situation now, when the capitalists are preparing for a show-down with German imperialism. Rights the workers exercised in times of peace now become intolerable to the ruling class.

Especially is this so since the American workers do not seem to be swayed in the least by appeals to patriotism. They are now acting as they have always done in periods of economic upswing, when strikes become the order of the day. That the present economic upswing is due to war preparations, has not caused the workers to break this invariable rule. Without much theory, but hard-headed about what they want, the workers are continuing their class struggle.

In attempting to stifle these struggles, there is a nice division of labor between the "softs" and "hards." Congressmen Smith and Vinson introduce bills to legislate the union shop out of existence in war industries, Knudsen proposes legislation compelling a 40-days "cooling off" period and a 60 per cent pro-strike vote of all employes (both union and non-union) before a strike can be legally called, and so on. The "softs" thereupon "save" labor by persuading the "hards" to agree to the more modest proposal of a special mediation board for the war industries. By the time this appears, Roosevelt will probably have issued an executive order setting up such a board.

We can predict with certainty that, whether this board is or is not legally endowed with compulsory powers, it will crack down on the unions. Roosevelt will follow the silk-glove method as long as it gets results. But the rising cost of living, the legitimate anger of the workers at the contrast between the restrictions placed on them and the profiteering of the bosses, and the workers' consequent militancy in protecting their interests, will in the end drive Roosevelt to an open clash with the trade union movement. The silk-glove method depends on the effectiveness of Roosevelt's collaborators in the unions, the top bureaucrats. They will, however, prove to be a weak reed for Roosevelt to lean upon. Already important strikes have taken place despite the top leadership. In addition the CIO leadership has not, and is unlikely to secure, the kind of grip on the new CIO unions-auto and aircraft, steel, electrical manufacturing, rubber, etcetera-that could make such collaboration with Roosevelt possible. It is more likely that a section of the CIO leadership will go part of the way along the road with the militant workers. Roosevelt will find himself with no other weapons than naked governmental action against the unions.

Whatever time we have before total war envelopes the United States must be utilized to the full to strengthen the workers' organizations, to prepare the workers to resist the tremendous pressure that the government and its agents in the labor movement will exert to prevent the workers from continuing their struggles for better conditions. Roosevelt's mediation board and every other act of the government that tends to restrict any of the workers' rights, must be fought. We must systematically expose the hypocrisy of every appeal to the workers to cease their militant activities as a patriotic duty to the country. We shall have one major aid in this task: the huge profits of the war industries will be an ever-galvanizing proof that the bosses sacrifice nothing while the workers are asked to sacrifice everything. It will not be difficult to demonstrate that excess profits taxes and other legislation "to end profiteering" will be but fig-leafs to cover the continuing profiteering of the bosses. Government acts to "freeze" prices of consumers' goods will be shown to be empty gestures; the worker's wife will know that every day she goes to market. All these goads will impel the worker on the road of struggle.

In the face of a rising labor movement the government's strategy will undoubtedly include court prosecutions of various kinds against the weaker links in the labor movement. Each and every prosecution must be fought off by a united labor movement. The imprisonment of Earl Browder and the attempt to deport Harry Bridges are but the first moves of this kind. We must help all the workers to understand that such attacks against one section of the labor movement can be nothing but the beginning of attacks against the whole labor movement. The workers must realize that they should defend a Browder and a Bridges for the same reasons that they defend bureaucrats like Hutcheson of the Carpenters and Joseph Ryan of the Longshoremen.

We shall never tire of repeating that the labor movement must deal with those inside the movement who are enemies of working class progress—the labor fakers, the racketeers, the Stalinists and all other servants of the capitalist class inside the unions. Only labor can clean the ranks of labor. The "help" of the government always turns out to be a daggerthrust against the workers. Against the capitalist class and its government, we must defend the Browders, as well as the Hutchesons. Otherwise we give the ruling class an entering wedge with which to disrupt the labor movement.

From Economic to Political Struggle

The militancy of the workers at the present time must be assessed for what it is and nothing more. They are not hostile to the war program of the Roosevelt government. They simply want to take advantage of the spurt in industry to improve their conditions. In pursuing this aim they are evincing a firm indifference to the cries that they are endangering "their" country. But they are by no means indifferent to the issues of the war. On the contrary, they very much want to see Hitler beaten, and for the present, they see no other way to achieve this except by Roosevelt's program.

A realistic and precise understanding of this attitude of the workers provides the basis for a bridge from their present economic struggles to real political struggles against the imperialist war.

We must tell the workers plainly that it is not enough to fight for better conditions in the factories. We must tell them that whatever better conditions they will win will, in the end, be wiped out by the further development of the war, if they do nothing else except fight for these better conditions.

Far from telling the workers to be indifferent to the war, we must insist that the greatest of all problems confronting them is the war. This is not our war; it is not a war for democracy against fascism; it is a war between imperialist rivals. But we cannot stop with this thought, important though it is. We cannot if for no other reason than that the workers will not listen to us if we stop there. They want to see Hitler destroyed, and so do we. We must make central in the thoughts of the workers this single thought: this war must be turned into a war for real workers' democracy and that can be done only if the workers take over control of the government.

A fighting, positive attitude is what the situation demands. And we have it, in our party's military policy.

Our military policy impresses upon the workers two

simple but decisive ideas. First, in this epoch of total war the workers must become adept in the military arts. Second, they must do so under the direction of their own class organizations.

All those in the labor movement, like the Norman Thomas group and the Stalinists, whose "anti-war" agitation is essentially pacifist, are committing a terrible crime against the workers who listen to them. They are telling these workers to counterpose ballots to bullets, social reform to armed struggle, peace to war. Every word is false. What these workers must learn, and transmit to the great mass of the workers, is that they cannot, they dare not, surrender to their enemies the monopoly of knowledge of military means. Everything in this epoch of war will be decided arms in hand. He who teaches anything else to the workers is helping to deliver them defenseless to their class enemies. As Lenin said in 1916: "An oppressed class which does not strive to gain a knowledge of arms, to become expert in arms, to possess arms, deserves nothing else than to be treated as a slave."

This military knowledge must become the property of the workers as a class. That is not achieved by becoming soldiers in the armies of capitalism. The unorganized workers, wearing the uniform of their masters, are in that situation tools of their masters, unable to determine what they should learn, how they should learn it, and what they should use that knowledge for. Let the drafted worker go, since he has no choice today, and let him learn as well as he can, so that he can serve his class so much the better afterward; but that is not the kind of military training we favor. We want military training of the class. We want our class separated from the capitalist class in military training as in everything else. That is why we demand military training of workers, financed by the government, under control of the trade unions. That is why we demand the establishment of special officers' training camps, financed by the government and controlled by the trade unions, to train workers to become officers.

A class program of military training—that is our positive approach to the workers today. It is the first answer to the question: how to destroy fascism, to really destroy it, not only in Germany and Italy, but here too.

Franco's Dilemma By GRANDIZO MUNIS

In a preceding article on Spain,* written before the capitulation of France, we maintained that Franco would be compelled to restrain his pro-German sympathies and pursue a foreign policy commercially favorable to the democracies. Hitler's victory over France, which gave him a zone of contact with Spain on the Pyrenees frontier has altered matters somewhat but, contradictory as it may appear, it has excessively injured Franco, still further compromising the stability of his regime. The Caudillo must bitterly curse fate for the little resistance put up by France, because the constant danger of a Nazi invasion on the northern frontier limits the liberty of his foreign policy. If before he was a friend and debtor to Hitler, today he is virtually his prisoner. Gradually, or by force, and whenever the Fuehrer desires, his Spanish imitation will have to cede the use of the Mediterranean and Atlantic ports (Mahon, Cartagena, Ferrol, Cadiz, Melilla) and give him the facilities to try to destroy the Rock of Gibraltar;

* "Spain: One Year After Franco's Victory," in the August, 1940 Fourth International. perhaps by dragging Spain into the war or allowing the passage of German troops. English naval superiority will be maintained in the Mediterranean so long as Britain controls the key to the Straits, Gibraltar. The latter is practically invulnerable except from Spain and her Moroccan protectorate.

There are two reasons why Hitler has not yet made use of Spanish terrain and Franco's servility to destroy Gibraltar. He expected to conquer England spectacularly by means of a frontal attack and, secondly, Franco's internal security is so fragile that to force him into the war could provoke an eruption. The first of these reasons becomes less and less valid; the second, on the contrary, gains strength daily.

Mass Hatred of Franco

Franco governs in the midst of a gigantic passive resistance by the workers and peasants. A great part of the petty and some circles of the big bourgeoisie, as well as numerous officers, are also to some degree or other hostile to him, but the fear of revolutionary consequences which might follow Franco's fall, restrains them from struggling against the latter and the Falanga Espanola.

The majority of the population in the Iberian peninsula, more so than even among the Spanish emigration, live under the impression that there will soon be a change in regime. A letter recently received from a city of Old Castille relates: "Situation cloudy; overcast; tempest expected." Another from Madrid written by one of those individuals who received the conquerer with palm leaves, mournfully says: "Here nobody knows from where the shot will come, but the whole world believes that you will return soon (the refugees); I hope that you have not included me in your blacklist." Still further strengthening this report illustrating the general aversion to fascism, a fugitive who recently arrived in Mexico from Barcelona refers to what happened during a military parade organized in Barcelona to commemorate the taking of the city by the fascist troops. Many regiments and uniformed Falangist companies were parading. At the end of the line marched a brigade of workers made up, as all of them are, of Loyalist ex-militiamen compelled to do forced labor. The outburst of cheers were so general and prolonged when the latter passed by that the authorities had to remove them from the parade. These anecdotes are confirmed by the Falangist press. Not a week passes without it threatening the dissatisfied and rumormongers, admitting that the very ranks of the Falange Espanola are plagued with "reds and concealed enemies of the fatherland." The political joke, a weapon which the Spanish people have used with merriment and well-aimed irony, blossoms again. All Spain is overflowing with an endless stream of stories against the regime and its men. Recalling Primo de Rivera whose fall was preceded by a wave of laughter, the Falangist press demands especially strong legislation against jokes. The Spanish people do not eat but they laugh their fill at their rulers; within a short time they will be forbidden to laugh.

The growing instability of Franco grows with the war. Hitler and Mussolini cannot give him anything; they can take away much. The problem of provisions, far from being resolved, is aggravated daily. If Hitler were not on the frontier like a gendarme, Franco would be able to pursue a relatively free foreign policy which would permit him to obtain provisions from the British Empire, the United States and the countries where Wall Street gives orders. The universal discontent arises precisely from the fact that not even the privileged classes for whom Franco rebelled are satisfied. They eliminated the "Marxists," but the crisis gradually deepens, profits fall and bankruptcies multiply.

Worse than the present situation, the difficulty for Franco is to find a way out that might lead to improvement. The political tendencies of the Falange and the proximity of Hitler force him to tighten the alliance with the Axis. But pursuing that course, all the internal problems which nourish his instability will be aggravated. And if forced by his Italian and German cronies into the war, the edifice of the "new empire" would collapse, perhaps instantaneously, on his head.

Franco would be able to find an immediate perspective for improvement in a friendly neutrality toward England and the United States, which would recompense him with loans and sufficient international exchange. Thus, there is no lack of will as far as Franco and the United States and England are concerned. The ambassadors of those two countries persistently exert themselves to make Franco a subject knight, similar to the late Metaxas. While Samuel Hoare, the new English ambassador, on arriving in Madrid, drinks a toast to the future greatness of the Spanish empire, hinting slyly of the restitution of Gibraltar, the American ambassador makes special donations to the *Falange Espanola* and delivers speeches praising its patriotism. A commercial accord which as far as we know here has not actually been put into effect has been signed between England and Spain.

Anglo-America's Two-Way Prospective

In spite of their diplomatic acrobatics to ingratiate themselves into the good graces of the dictator, the Anglo-American bourgeoisie regards with distrust his secret commitments to the Axis. As a warning, the United States has made felt the weight of its economic pressure by refusing to grant a loan to Franco. But in order not to irritate Franco too much, Washington has at the same time allowed Argentina to give him a credit of 100 million pesos for the purchase of wheat. For her part, England regulates commercial relations with restrictions and measures of maritime inspection which would permit England to reduce Spanish imports to virtually nothing as soon as it would be in England's interest to do so.

Politically, England pursues the same duality. On the one hand, soft words of endearment for the Falange Espanola, on the other, threats of a monarchist restoration. During the past few months, the English press defended the Spanish fascist party, as if it were its own, calling it a champion of peace and Spanish greatness. At the same time it encouraged the monarchical secret center, holding it in readiness for action. A few weeks ago there appeared in Mexico the Marquis of Castellano, representing, it appears, Alfonso and some generals who favor a Bourbon restoration. A secret accord, known as the "pact of Xochimilco," was drawn up after conversations with refugee republican and socialist leaders. It is indubitable that without the approval of England none of these gentlemen would dare utter the word restoration. It is a political trick for England with which to attract Franco into her orbit. But England, as well as the United States, knows very well that Franco cannot march toward their camp beyond the point allowed by Hitler, unless the former decides to accept British aid and run the risk of confronting Hitler with arms. It is interesting to point out in this respect a book recently published in England: "A Key to Victory: Spain," by Charles Duff. The author, a Fabian no doubt, pleads for democratic intervention in Spain, to be launched from Portugal.

For Franco (as well as the monarchy, if intervention will attempt to restore it), this remedy will be worse than the disease. But if from one angle or another its consummation will be impossible, nevertheless Duff hits the mark when he considers the strategic importance of Spain. The fear of an internal collapse is the only factor which has obliged the Axis to respect, until now, the neutrality of Spain. The defeats of Italy, diminishing the prestige of the dictators, demand rapid reparation. It is also necessary for the Axis to round out its dominion in Europe, to keep Stalin in the panic which retains him as an ally of Germany. The Axis will be able to attain that end only with great difficulty without Spain declaring war on England or, at least, conceding military bases capable of counteracting the strategic importance of Gibraltar and allowing it to be attacked. Mussolini and Franco are discussing this question while we are writing this article.

The consequences of any accord they reach will be to worsen Franco's situation. The provisioning of the population and trade with England and the United States, indispensable to bolster the economy of the country, will become more and more difficult in proportion to the increase of Franco's commitments to the Axis. If, on the contrary, resisting the requirements of the latter, Franco develops economic collaboration with the democracies, he exposes himself to a German invasion and, perhaps, as Duff proposes, the soil of Spain will become a theatre of war. In both cases, a black future for Franco and revolutionary perspectives for the Spanish proletariat. I affirm without doubt: Whatever position the Caudillo adopts, the fall of his regime will follow shortly after the last rifle shot, if not before. The tenacious resistance of the Spanish proletariat during the civil war so exhausted the bourgeoisie that, unless the objective international situation comes to their aid, the Spanish masses will once again take the revolutionary initiative. In every sense, and together with France and Italy, Spain belongs to the number of European countries where the objective and subjective factors, slowly but surely, converge toward great revolutionary upheavals.

Mexico, February 10, 1941

Translated by Bernard Ross

The Court-Martial System Of the U. S. Army

By MICHAEL CORT

On March 8th the United States Army's publicity office in Washington announced issuance of a new manual of discipline; the New York *Times* headlined the story: "Iron Discipline Abandoned by the Army."

The true facts are very easy to verify. Apart from no longer requiring soldiers to salute officers off post, and one or two similar items, the new manual changes nothing. It says, quite correctly, that "modern warfare requires self-reliance in every grade; individuals capable of independent thought and action, who are inspired by a distinct feeling that as an individual or as members of a unit they are competent to cope with any condition, situation or adversary." A good guiding principle—but it does not guide army discipline. The key to understanding the army's system of discipline is the courtmartial, which remains untouched by the "new" manual.

By the end of this month 800,000 civilians will have been drafted into the U. S. Army, and will receive their first samples of the organized brutality that constitutes army discipline. If the statistics of the last war hold good, one out of ten of these men will be court-martialed.

The army's problem in 1917 (just as today) was to digest great numbers of workers who entertained democratic illusions concerning their rights in the army. A good soldier, in the army's opinion, was one that obeyed all orders quickly and unthinkingly. To achieve this state the commanding officers instituted a reign of terror in the training camps of America. Men were prosecuted for trivial offenses and given long prison terms and in some cases death. Safely screened from public view, this campaign proceeded without interference. In the spring of 1918, for a few brief months, an accident occurred. A man with previously concealed liberal views slipped into the position of acting Judge Advocate General. When he was thrown out, he blew the lid off.

Brigadier General T. S. Ansell had the reputation of being "soft with his men," but if the hierarchy had ever known the extent of his heresy he never would have become, as a result of seniority, acting Judge Advocate General. Upon his graduation from West Point, Ansell began specializing in military law. He saw in the army terror, not the inevitable compulsions of an oppressive economic system, but rather abuses of democracy that could be corrected by legislative reform. All through his army career Ansell kept his reformist theories to himself. When, however, he became the Judge Advocate General, and had access to the Secretary of War without going through the General Staff, he flooded that department with reports and recommendations.

Far from receiving a sympathetic ear, Ansell discovered he was embarrassing President Wilson and Secretary of War Baker, and that they took steps against him. He was summarily removed from his position and demoted in rank to a Lieutenant Colonel. Within a few short months Ansell was forced out of the army entirely and then, as a private citizen, opened his campaign for reform of the military code. He was mainly responsible for the introduction into the Senate in 1919 of the Chamberlain Bill aimed at democratizing the military code.

Wilson and the officer caste succeeded in beating back all demands for substantial reform, but the brief glimpse into the court-martial procedures afforded by Ansell remain in written and documented form.

On the shelves of the New York Public Library is a volume which bears the inscription, "U. S. Military Affairs Committee, Hearings, Senate 66:2." It is the record of the hearings on the Chamberlain Bill. Within this volume is partially revealed the viciousness of bourgeois military justice. The army got rid of Ansell, and the Secretary of War, with the help of the American Bar Association, white-washed the Articles of War. But they have not yet purged the public libraries. This half-forgotten volume of official government records provided the source material for this article.

Powers of Life and Death

The present military code was taken from the British code of 1774 with merely the word "Congress" substituted for the word "King." The code has been amended in minor respects from time to time but has never undergone any basic changes. Congress has consistently exempted the army from all Constitutional restrictions. Bound only by a few pseudo-legal formalities, the commanding general may select the man to be tried, select the counsel to defend him, select the jurors to try him, determine the procedure of the court, define the offense, apply what rules of evidence he chooses to observe, and apply any sentence... one day to death.

"Everybody knows these courts are afraid of their commanding officers," Gen. Ansell told the Senate committee. "They know they are under the General's hand. He will likely change their station and punish them if he does not like the way they do on a court. So they say this, 'The commanding general up there is pretty stiff. He cussed us out that last case. We said the man ought to have a small sentence, and he came back and cussed us out and said he was going to dissolve us and put a lot of his remarks on the record. So let's put it up to the old man. We'll give a sentence high enough to suit him. Let's give this fellow a sentence of 25 years, and let the old man cut it down to five if he wants to.'" Not only does the commanding general control the severity of the punishment meted out, but he has the power to return an acquittal, with instructions to the court to reconsider its verdict and find the defendant guilty. Major General John F. O'Ryan submitted statistics to the Senate committee covering 6,000 court-martial trials of enlisted men in the A.E.F. Of the 6,000 tried, only 800 were acquitted, and of those acquitted over ten per cent were subsequently found guilty by direct order of the commanding officers. All verdicts do eventually pass over the desk of the Judge Advocate General in Washington, but he is bound by a firmly established tradition of support and confirmation of all findings passed upon by the field generals.

There has been, from time to time, agitation for the establishment of a civilian appellate court with full review authority. The army hierarchy has firmly resisted this reform.

"In a military code there can be no provision for a court of appeal," Judge Advocate General Crowder told the Senate committee. "Military justice and the purpose which it is expected to subserve will not permit of the vexatious delays incident to the establishment of an appellate procedure."

Speedy execution of sentence is, of course, aimed not at justice but at the terrorist effect it has upon the soldiers. The army will tolerate no delay beyond that occasioned by the submission of the case to the Judge Advocate General . . . sometimes not even that. Ansell told of a court-martial in a training camp in southern Texas while he was acting Judge Advocate General. Eleven Negroes were accused of rape and sentenced to death. Ansell heard of the case and determined to read the trial minutes thoroughly when they reached him for review. When he received the transcript, he found, as he had expected, that the trial had been of the most summary character and that simple justice demanded an entirely new trial. Upon ordering this he discovered that the men had been executed *before* the case had been submitted to the judge Advocate General's office.

During this same period 20 Negroes were accused of rape in a New Jersey training camp. They received the barest semblance of a trial and were sentenced to death. This time Ansell received the case before the execution and ordered a new trial. Ansell later testified before the Senate committee: "I was subject to great pressure from the General Staff. Many members of the Staff admitted that the case was not too good against the defendants, but they insisted that an example had to be made whether the boys were guilty or not. They pleaded with me to hang five, any five, of the 20 and let the rest go free."

The Class Basis of This Terror

If the savagery of the officer caste appears, at first glance different in kind from the daily ruthlessness of the capitalist class in civilian lfe, it turns out upon examination to be but one form of capitalist justice. The army is the concentrated image of bourgeois society.

This is illumined by the testimony of Major J. E. Runcie, Professor of Law at West Point for many years, who spoke out when he returned to civilian life. He testified to the Senate committee:

"The Cadet stays there for four years and he finds the enlisted men engaged not in military duties, but in domestic ones. Many of them have no arms, their only uniforms are working ones, laborers' and artisans'. The inevitable result is that the Cadet comes out with a feeling that his privilege is to be served, a feeling of class distinction.Courts-martial maintain this structure. Enlisted men receive more severe punishments than do officers. More than that, an enlisted man may be tried and convicted of something that is no offense at all... under the military code. For instance, two years ago at West Point an enlisted man was tried and convicted of lack of respect for, and obedience to an officer's wife." The conviction had been under Article 96 of General Articles of War, which reads, in part, "... conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service. Punishment at the discretion of the court."

Ansell told the committee that soldiers were not allowed to walk on the front walks at West Point and that even on visiting days they were required to take their sweethearts and mothers through the rear alley-ways.

Testimony before the Senate committee included the case of a lieutenant who, on his time off from bridge construction at the front, got drunk with a friend who happened to be a private. This officer was court-martialed, charged with "conduct unbecoming an officer." Major Elmore, the prosecutor, said in his summation: "If this man had done what he did alone, or in company of other officers, he would have been guilty of no offense. Having done what he did in the company of an enlisted man, I insist that dishonorable discharge from the Army is not enough for him, but that a sentence of hard labor must be added." The defendant received three years, two of which he served after war had ended.

Runcie also revealed that many officers, who had incurred the disfavor of the top bureaucracy, were charged with a crime but never called before a court. Their cases would remain on file in Washington to serve as hostage in case the offending officer failed to mend his ways. Other, more difficult officers would be tried and convicted but never sentenced. Their sentence would be held in abeyance pending their good behavior.

Apart from such cases, used to preserve the hierarchy, charges against officers are usually quashed. Both Ansell and Runcie testified that the most flagrant cases of misconduct by officers are consistently ignored by the Judge Advocate General and the General Staff.

"I knew an officer that was an inveterate gambler and swindler," said Runcie. "All his life he cheated at cards but one day his crime was so flagrant that charges were brought against him. A court-martial was convened and set to proceed when suddenly an arbitrary order from a superior officer arrived which set aside the court. There was nothing that could be done."

Court-Martial Procedure

The great power exercised by the commanding officer would seem to reduce court-martial to little more than meaningless superstructure. And yet that very superstructure is so weighted against justice for the soldier that it is worth examining. To begin with, there is no designated judicial or police authority. Any officer can bring charges against any soldier at any time. And, as we shall see, a simple charge is usually tantamount to conviction. The defendant may be charged with the most trivial offense punishable by a \$5 fine or 24 hours in jail, and yet he is often kept imprisoned a month before his trial is started. When officers have grudges against certain men and can discover only minor infractions of law, they keep the men in the guardhouse the full statutory period before bringing them to trial.

The defendant is then questioned by his superior and enjoys no legal protection from self-incriminating testimony. Ansell reported that the army "habitually forces testimony out of the accused by third degree and then uses that testimony against him at the trial."

When the defendant is finally brought to trial, the personnel of the court is determined by the commanding officer. March 1941

The defendant has no challenges without cause and only one challenge with cause. This challenge is then tried by the remaining members of court. In other words, to change the composition of the court all officer-judges would have to vote for the enlisted man and against a fellow officer.

The defendant is usually allowed to retain counsel of his own though under the code the Judge Advocate is charged with the responsibility for the defense. The counsel available to the defendant has usually had, up to that moment, no familiarity with the case. Runcie testified: "Recently there was a sentence of imprisonment for life where the counsel for the defense had been a bystander suddenly appointed, and said in open court that he never before had seen the accused and that he had no knowledge of the case."

Since the court has the power to affirm or deny the defendant's choice of counsel, it may use this means to prevent him from getting the best counsel. Where counsel is designated by the Judge Advocate, it is usually an inexperienced "shavetail." Examination of 5,000 cases by Ansell during his brief term as Judge Advocate General, revealed that a second lieutenant (lowest commissioned officer) was counsel in 3,871 cases, or 77 per cent.

Should the defendant happen to obtain good counsel, the rules of the court prevent him from effectively helping his client. The counsel is restricted to giving advice to the defendant and framing questions which are handed by the accused to the Judge Advocate on slips of paper. Any legal objections are also handed on slips of paper to the Judge Advocate who silently rules upon them. The counsel may not address the court or interfere in any way with the proceedings.

There are three classes of court-martial: Summary, Special and General. The Summary and Special are the lowest courts and may be convened by a captain and brigade commander respectively. These courts are used a great deal near the front, for their procedure is quick and simple and no minutes are kept of the trial. The General Court-Martial is used to try all officers and soldiers accused of the more serious crimes.

The principal characteristic of these courts, common to all three, is the unique position enjoyed by the Judge Advocate. His authority over the court and the course of the trial finds no counterpart in civil jurisprudence.

As Judge he passes upon all evidence submitted to the court (there are no established rules of evidence in the military code), he is also the prosecutor and charged with obtaining a conviction, and he may allow the defendant to obtain a counsel of his own, or he may reserve that function for himself.

Ansell attributed much of the viciouness of military justices to the multiple powers of the Judge Advocate. "The files are full of these cases," he said, "but there is one I remember particularly. A lieutenant, a quartermaster, was put (by his commanding officer) to making a trap for an enlisted man out in a western department, to catch him and to see if he was stealing goods out of a storehouse. The lieutenant set the trap and said that he caught the man, which I very much doubt. He was, of course, the prosecuting witness. Then he was appointed Judge Advocate of the court, and then he was assigned counsel for the accused, and he functioned in all three capacities. The man was convicted."

This procedure actually makes the other judges superfluous, for the Judge Advocate can so control evidence and procedure as to allow only the verdict he may desire. Even with this degree of authority the Judge Advocates have always preferred to sit in Summary or Special Courts-Martial where the numbers of judges is sharply reduced; three to five officers on the Special, a single officer on the Summary court. An additional advantage of the lower court is the absence of any official stenographer. The more flagrant cases of persecution are most often found in the lower courts where the officer runs little chance of future embarrassment because of written records.

Ansell revealed a method commonly used to circumvent the restriction upon length of prison sentence emanating from lower tribunals. A certain captain in France had a grudge against a soldier but could never get anything on him. One day this man overstayed his leave by a few hours and he was jailed. The captain's problem was to conduct the trial in a lower court, so that no stenographic record would be made of it, but also to give the man a longer sentence than a Summary court had the power to impose—six months. The captain solved his dilemma by bringing three charges against the man: absent without leave, failing to report for duty, and disobeying a command. The man was tried in a Summary court-martial on all three charges, one at a time, and given six months on each charge. The captain thereby succeeded in imposing eighteen months' imprisonment at hard labor.

Officers' Prestige at All Costs

Summary, Special or General Courts-Martial, stenographic record or not, the findings of the court reflect the desires of the commanding officer and subsequent review by the hierarchy generally serves to uphold his hand. One example of confirmation of unjust convictions merely to maintain the solidarity of the officer caste occurred in 1917 in a Texas training camp. Ansell, who was acting Judge Advocate General at the time, had intimate knowledge of the case and presented it to the Senate committee.

Eleven non-commissioned officers were gathered around a crap game in a company street during their free period. About half of them were engaged in the game, the other half being spectators. Captain Harvey, graduated the year before from West Point, discovered this game, placed them under arrest and ordered them to their barracks. The next morning he noticed that these eleven men were absent from drill and went to their barracks. The men explained that the Articles of War provided that no man shall perform military duties while under arrest. They said further, that if he released them from arrest they would report for drill at once. Captain Harvey was enraged and immediately charged them with mutiny. Between the time of the officer's charge and the trial, these men were demoted from their non-commissioned status to the rank of private and stood trial as such.

When this case came before Ansell for review, he threw out the findings and ordered a new trial. Ansell's reversal, however, was countermanded by the War Department, and the convictions stood. Ansell told the Senate committee: "It was perfectly obvious to all of us that the men should never have been tried at all, and that the trial was illegal in many respects. The charge was imperfect, defense made for them was not the defense that should have been made, and their rights were disregarded during the trial. The young West Point officer's conduct was lawless and arbitrary and he ought to have been court-martialed for his part in the affair. But this case went through the entire proceeding from bottom to top of the military hierarchy without a discovery of any of these errors. Or at least, no action upon them. The men... received long prison terms at hard labor. The War Department held that all proceedings, findings and judgments of a court-martial are final, beyond all remedial, curative power, when those proceedings and judgments are once approved by the commanding general who brought that court into being."

Official records, removed from the Judge Advocate Gen-

eral's office by Ansell, revealed that out of every 100 charges brought against soldiers by officers, 97 were tried; and out of every hundred trials 96 were convicted. From April 6, 1917 to August 31, 1919, there were 30,916 men tried before General Courts-Martial and an estimated 400,000 men tried by the Summary and Special courts—this according to the testimony of Brigadier General Edward Kriger of the Judge Advocate General's office. These figures, which applied to an army of 4,000,000, meant that over ten per cent of the army was tried by courts-martial during the war.

Significantly, it was not during overseas service that the soldier was in greatest danger of being court-martialed, but immediately upon induction into a training camp. Faced in 1917 with a great influx of civilians, the army launched a reign of terror as the best method of keeping these new men in line. The slightest infraction of a rule brought immediate and awful retribution. News of this terror began to seep out, and frightened parents and wives demanded a Congressional investigation. The army succeeded in stalling this investigation until after the war ended. However, even in 1919 public opinion was running high against the hierarchy and Judge Advocate General Crowder felt compelled to defend his office with the words, "We never expect the defendants to serve the full sentences. It was merely that severity was necessary at that time to teach discipline."

Some Typical Case Histories

What Crowder meant by discipline was, of course, a blind, unthinking, automatic submission to the slightest whim of a superior. The fact remains that one man in ten was tried, usually convicted, and served sentence. Here are just a few of the cases that Ansell quoted from the terror of '17:

A farm boy of 20 was drafted and sent to Camp Dix in New Jersey. During his first month there he was assigned to K. P. duty. He saw the cooks smoking and so he lit one of his own cigarettes. A sergeant entered the kitchen, saw the boy smoking and bawled, "Drop that cigarette you God damn rookie. Give me that package of cigarettes in your pocket." The boy, not understanding army discipline, replied that he could see a package of cigarettes in the sergeant's pocket and if the sergeant could carry them there was no reason why he couldn't. The boy was immediately brought to trial, convicted and sentenced to 25 years hard labor. This case reached public attention and a great protest filled the ears of Congressmen. The American Bar Association appointed a board to whitewash army discipline. The report of this board read, in reference to this particular case, that the soldier's conduct was, "... a canker of gangrene that the surgeon must cut out lest it spread to the whole military body."

John Schroeder, Machine Gun Company, 56th Infantry, had a very ill mother. He knew that his company was due to go overseas any moment and he tried desperately to get a few days' leave to visit his mother before leaving but without success. He received word from a relative that his mother was dying, left his camp without permission and rushed to her bedside. In the four days he was absent his company was ordered abroad and boarded ship. Schroeder returned to his camp to find his company gone and himself charged with "trying to evade overseas service." He was obviously not guilty of that particular and serious charge, but his attorney, a second lieutenant, persuaded him to plead guilty and throw himself upon the mercy of the court. He was sentenced to 25 years hard labor.

The extent of the terror can be judged by Ansell's testimony that the following cases constituted a single day's report from a single camp (Dix):

Pvt. Sanford B. Every. Convicted of unlawfully having

a pass in his possession. Ten years at hard labor.

Pvt. Clayton H. Cooley. Absent without leave July 29 to August 26. 40 years hard labor.

Pvt. Charles Cino. Ill with the advanced stage of a venereal disease. Instead of being hospitalized he was ordered to get his pack and drill. He escaped camp. 30 years hard labor.

Pvt. Calvin W. Harper. Absent without leave. 20 years hard labor.

Pvt. Salvatore Pastoria. Took two weeks off to see his sick wife and his year-old baby ill with malnutrition. 15 years hard labor.

Pvt. Marion Williams. Refused to surrender a package of cigarettes and told the sergeant to "go to hell." 40 years hard labor.

Pvt. Lawrence Sims. Absent without leave. 25 years hard labor.

Classic examples of army persecution, which later achieved great notoriety in America, were the death sentences passed upon four young volunteers in France.

Sebastian, 19 years old and Cook, 18, were assigned to an advance observation post in the American sector of the western front. They were under bombardment continually and had received no relief for seven days. On the eighth day, when relief did arrive, they were discovered asleep at their post. Their trial lasted exactly 40 minutes and the entire transcript of evidence and testimony covered four loosely written pages. They were sentenced to death.

The other two volunteers, Ledoyen, 19, and Fishback, 18, were behind the lines under a sadistic drill-sergeant who maneuvered them long hours every day in deep snow. After a long morning drill and a brief respite for lunch, the sergeant, in spite of the obviously exhausted condition of the boys, ordered them out for further drill. They were not able to get their packs on their backs and fell into their bunks in a semiconscious condition. They were court-martialed for refusing to obey a command, and sentenced to death.

Without any direct knowledge of the two cases, according to Ansell's testimony, General Pershing sent word to President Wilson that the death sentences were necessary to the good of the service. Wilson turned to the General Staff for advice and the General Staff decided that since Pershing had personally entered the case there was nothing it could do but uphold his hand regardless of the merits of the cases.

Wilson finally yielded to public opinion and commuted the sentences to long prison terms. The War Department then issued a statement that the army never intended that the sentences be executed as handed down and that their severity was merely for a "beneficial effect upon army discipline."

Throughout the month-long Senate hearings there was only one private heard, but his testimony was probably the most damning. He was Pvt. W. B. Thomas, Company F, 16th Engineers. He had been an attorney before the war and because of that he was in great demand as a defense counsel. He testified before the Senate committee that after he had defended several men his superior came to him and said that he was "making a big mistake" by defending all these men. When Thomas ignored the warning his superiors began to prepare a trap for him. In the meantime Thomas was selected by the men to head a delegation to the captain to get an accounting of the men's pay placed in his keeping. The captain refused to give an accounting of the company funds and again threatened Thomas.

A month later, Thomas, on leave, went into a small French town near his camp. While there he took suddenly ill and went to the Red Cross depot. The nurse put him to bed and then sent him to the base hospital where he was kept for

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three weeks. When Thomas returned to his company nothing was said concerning his hospitalization. A month later, however, when he again headed a delegation trying to get an accounting of the men's funds, the captain preferred charges against him and he was court-martialed for being absent without leave the three weeks he was in the hospital. Thomas obtained statements from both the Red Cross depot and the base hospital that he was seriously ill, but the court convicted him on the technicality that he had failed to report to the company medical officer *before* going to the base hospital. He served three months at hard labor and when he returned to his company he was informed by Colonel Fowler that he would be forbidden to act any more as counsel for soldiers.

Why Congress Did Nothing

The end of the war and the demobilization of troops opened to the press and public a fund of information and evidence concerning military justice. It was then that Congress appointed committees and made brave speeches. What these crusaders did not at first recognize was that the repressions they wailed over were, and remain, an integral part of the military code, not abuses of it. Demands were made in Congress that enlisted men sit as jurors on all courts-martial. These demands were labeled by the army hierarchy as "Bolshevist," and as "absolutely unworkable." The army was right, in essence. The military code could not be democratized without playing havoc with the officer caste and the army caste is only a sharply focussed reflection of the capitalist oppression the army serves.

The demand for military reform was easily beaten back once the Congress became fully aware of the class interests involved. Peace descended upon the War Department and the office of the Judge Advocate General.

But there was still work to be done. A new file was installed which contained the names and case histories of every man dishonorably discharged from the army. Employers were to be informed of the "bad record" made by these men and were to be urged to replace the "trouble maker" with a man with a good army record.

The story here told occupies about one-third of the bound Senate hearings on proposed changes in the Articles of War. The other two thirds of the volume are taken up with defense of the articles by various members of the hierarchy and the Wilson cabinet. They did not deny Ansell's case histories. They simply drew different philosophical conclusions from them. Their philosophy was that of all oppressors. Judge Advocate General Crowder stated their philosophy when he said, in summarizing his arguments against any reform: "The disintegration of the Russian (Czarist) army was due not to agelong tyranny or oppression or reaction, or any other like cause, but entirely to a failure to treat disobedience in small things and great things alike."

That is, the real danger is in not being severe enough.

China and the Russian Revolution By LEON TROTSKY

(Note by Natalia Trotsky: The foregoing was written by Comrade Trotsky in the early part of July, 1940, as a first draft. Events prevented him from continuing the work and it was unfinished when Comrade Trotsky was murdered by a GPU assassin the following month. It was to have been the introduction to the Chinese translation of his History of the Russian Revolution.)

The day I learned that my History of the Russian Revolution was to be published in the Chinese language was a holiday for me. Now I have received word that the work of translation has been speeded up and that the first volume will be issued next year.

Let me express the firm hope that the book will prove profitable to Chinese readers. Whatever may be the shortcomings of my work, one thing I can say with assurance: Facts are there presented with complete conscientiousness, that is, on the basis of verification with original sources; and in any case, not a single fact is altered or distorted in the interests of this or that preconceived theory or, what is worse yet, in the interests of this or that personal reputation.

The misfortune of the present young generation in all countries, among them China, consists in this: that there has been created under the label of Marxism a gigantic factory of historical, theoretical and all other kinds of falsifications. This factory bears the name "Communist International." The totalitarian regime, i.e., the regime of bureaucratic command in all spheres of life, inescapably seeks to extend its rule also over the past. History becomes transformed into raw material for whatever constructions are required by the ruling totalitarian clique. This fate was suffered by the October revolution and by the History of the Bolshevik Party. The latest and to date most finished document of falsification and frameup is the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, issued some time ago under the personal direction of Stalin. In the entire library of mankind I do not know, and hardly anyone else knows, of a book in which facts, documents—and furthermore facts known to everybody—are so dishonestly altered, mangled, or simply deleted from the march of events in the interests of glorifying a single human being, namely Stalin.

Thanks to unlimited material resources at the disposal of the falsifiers, the rude and untalented falsification has been translated into all the languages of civilized mankind and circulated by compulsion in millions and tens of millions of copies.

We have at our disposal neither such financial resources nor such a colossal apparatus. But we do dispose of something greater: concern for historical truth and a correct scientific method. A falsification, even one compiled by a mighty state apparatus, cannot withstand the test of time and in the long run is blown up owing to the internal contradictions. On the contrary, historical truth, established through a scientific method, has its own internal persuasiveness and in the long run gains mastery over minds. The very necessity of reviewing, i.e., recasting and altering-still more precisely, falsifying-the history of the revolution, arose from this: that the bureaucracy found itself compelled to sever the umbilical cord binding it to the Bolshevik Party. To recast, i.e., to falsify the history of the revolution, became an urgent necessity for the bureaucracy which usurped the revolution and found itself compelled to cut short the tradition of Bolshevism.

The essence of Bolshevism was the class policy of the proletariat, which alone could bring about the conquest of power in October. In the course of its entire history, Bolshevism came out irreconcilably against the policy of collaboration

with the bourgeoisie. Precisely in this consisted the fundamental contradiction between Bolshevism and Menshevism. Still more, the struggle within the labor movement, which preceded the rise of Bolshevism and Menshevism, always in the last analysis revolved around the central question, the central alternative: either collaboration with the bourgeoisie or irreconcilable class struggle. The policy of "People's Fronts" does not include an iota of novelty, if we discount the solemn and essentially charlatan name. The matter at issue in all cases concerns the political subordination of the proletariat to the left wing of the exploiters, regardless of whether this practice bears the name of coalition or left bloc (as in France) or "People's Front" in the language of the Comintern.

The policy of the "People's Front" bore especially malignant fruit because it was applied in the epoch of the imperialist decay of the bourgeoisie. Stalin succeeded in conducting to the end, in the Chinese revolution, the policy which the Mensheviks tried to realize in the revolution of 1917. The same thing was repeated in Spain. Two grandiose revolutions suffered catastrophe owing to this: that the methods of the leadership were the methods of Stalinism, i.e., the most malignant form of Menshevism.

In the course of five years, the policy of the "People's Front," by subjecting the proletariat to the bourgeoisie, made

impossible the class struggle against war. If the defeat of the Chinese revolution, conditioned by the leadership of the Comintern, prepared the conditions for Japanese occupation, then the defeat of the Spanish revolution and the ignominious capitulation of the "People's Front" in France prepared the conditions for the aggression and unprecedented military successes of Hitler.

The victories of Japan, like the victories of Hitler, are not the last word of history. War this time, too, will turn out to be the mother of revolutions. Revolution will once again pose and review all the questions of the history of mankind in advanced as well as in backward countries, and make a beginning for overcoming the very distinction between advanced and backward countries.

Reformists, opportunists, routine men will be flung aside by the course of events. Only revolutionists, tempered revolutionists enriched by the experience of the past, will be able to rise to the level of great events. The Chinese people are destined to occupy the first place in the future destinies of mankind. I shall be happy if the advanced Chinese revolutionists will assimilate from this History certain fundamental rules of class politics which will help them to avoid fatal mistakes in the future, mistakes which led to the shipwreck of the revolution of 1925-1927.

Hitler's "New Order"

By WILLIAM F. SIMMONS

From the Northcap to the Dardanelles, Hitler's "new order" now embraces most of continental Europe. His furious sweep of conquest obliterated national boundaries and sent governments into exile. The greater part of the continent, exclusive of the USSR is "united" into one economic bloc under the domination of German capitalism to serve the requirements of German imperialism and, above all, to serve its permanent war needs.

But this is the least stable of all social orders. The changes wrought in Europe produce their own internal dynamics. The much vaunted stability of Hitler's order will become transformed into its opposite of social crisis and convulsions right in the heart of the vastly expanded Nazi domain. Hitler's negation of the European state system leads directly to his own negation.

This may seem contradictory in view of the terrifying power now in the hands of the Nazi regime. However, the implications of this "new order" are contradictory in the extreme. In some ways, no doubt, it serves for the moment to bolster and strengthen the decaying capitalist system by giving it a much more rational form of organization. But the very rationalization of both the economic foundation and the political superstructure of the "new order" lays the basis for and forces the tempo of advance toward a Socialist United States of Europe. Soon it will be demonstrated in real life that there is no other way out.

On this point, however, there should be no mistake. Hitler's aims and the objective consequences of his murderous advance are two entirely different things. Hitler's aims have, of course, nothing in common with socialism. On the contrary, the actually motivating force in all of his conquests is the dire need of German capitalism, today in mortal combat with its British cousin and tomorrow facing the far more serious struggle with the American empire.

The reorganization of continental Europe serves strategic-

al considerations of importance to the German army general staff, and it also aims to solve the problem that is called "lebensraum" for Germany's teeming population. But the real purpose, summing up all other considerations, is the one of buttressing and rejuvenating, under German hegemony, the decaying capitalist system of which fascism is the most extreme and the most violent expression. Accordingly, the reorganization first eliminates the weaker sections in the structure: small nations are wiped out. Their possibility of continued independent existence, squeezed in as they were, in the fierce competition between giants, was questionable anyhow. A conquered Britain-if and when-may serve as a buffer against the American empire; but the ruthless reorganization cannot tolerate any buffer states on the continent. In Hitler's modernized scheme of capitalism the division into small nations is only an obstacle to be eliminated. His stubborn views on the question of race will also be subject to modifications whenever required by further imperial necessities.

German capitalism has learned from the Soviet planned economy and attempts to utilize the lesson for its own purposes. "Der Staat greift zu!" Hitler is gearing European industry to serve the Nazi permanent war needs. With each advance into new territories efforts are made to harness material resources. Unemployed manpower is put to work. Formerly independent countries are turned into spheres of regulated production, operating to an extent in harmony with their means and resources, but mainly in accordance with the requirements of the Nazi domination. Hence agriculture in certain specific regions is to be industrialized. Plans are even advanced for the modernization of French peasant economy. Backward regions such as the Balkans-those parts so far included in the "new order"-are drawn into greater Germany's production orbit. Everywhere, and particularly in the last named regions, technological advance begins to make new strides. Restrictions are imposed on the capitalist proprietors for the good of greater Germany, while prices and wages are regulated.

It goes without saying that for the German capitalist structure all these factors further accelerate concentration and centralization of industry and finance; but they also call forth a constantly increasing state supervision. Behind it all the permanent war needs exert ever greater pressure. There need be no doubt that this mighty whiplash of rationalization raises the level of labor productivity despite the suppressed, and therefore inarticulate, hostility of labor. More profits accrue to the masters. Moreover, we should never fight the fact that only a vastly increased labor productivity could have made possible the rapid rejuvenation of German capitalism under Hitler.

The Seeds of Decay Within

Here we have certain elements of capitalist expansion presented in a new form but resting on the same old foundation of private property: the system has not devised any other. Viewed against the background of the uneven development of capitalism, such expansion for one particular section of the general system is, of course, possible. The war itself, however, is the proof that it is not possible for the system as a whole. The exact possible limits of this expansion we do not know. But we do know that it takes place in the period of general capitalist decline and decay. The historical spiral of capitalist development is now definitely on its downward course. The "new order" is the most desperate effort yet witnessed of keeping this system alive against its own elements of destruction. And, as will soon be verified in the process of real life, each of the steps taken in this expansion carries its own deadly contradictions, vastly intensified by the imperialist war.*

Throughout the "unified" continent the formerly existing mutual and reciprocal relations have now changed. There is a change of quantity into a vastly expanded German empire for, in reality, this is what Hitler's "unification" means. With this there appears also a difference in quality. Formerly the mass of the people in each separate nation were held in leash by their ruling national capitalist groups who were engaged in a constant struggle of competition for markets, resources or territory, one nation against another. It is true that the smaller nations could reach out only for the smaller crumbs; but that made the competition no less fierce. Mutual hostilities became the rule rather than mutual friendships. Thus this multiple state system served as a buffer against international working class solidarity. It facilitated the sway and domination of each national capitalist group over its objects of exploitation and made it easier for unscruplous bureaucratic labor leaders to function in each national arena as agents of their bourgeois masters.

Now most of the national boundaries are wiped out, most likely never to be restored—at least not in their old meaning. Intent on not repeating the mistake of the Allies in 1918 of imposing severe outright indemnities upon the vanquished, the Nazis are proceeding instead to exploit the labor forces of the defeated and occupied countries. The capitalist proprietors become Nazi satraps, compelled to relinquish a good deal of their power to the masters of the new empire. These masters rule supreme throughout the "new order." As a result the mass of the people are thrown together on common ground. They all face the one common oppressor. This is a quantitative change producing an enormous qualitative difference.

Social conflicts, to be sure, are harnessed in a more severe straitjacket. They may not break through this harness immediately; but social contradictions remain, new ones are added, and they intensify within this new framework.

At first these contradictions are manifested in the very much distorted form of an increased, if not an entirely new feeling of national patriotism. In Denmark, for example, where the population has so far been the least rebellious, it has shown a rising affection for the king who was left intact even though his throne was knocked out from under. He became a national symbol and the center of this new feeling. The new and greater affection bestowed upon him is in reality the confused expression of reaction against imperialist oppression. But a king is, of course, the weakest of reeds to lean upon and, besides, Hitler cannot afford for very long to let even such feeble symbols remain. In an effort to squelch all manifestation of opposition he will soon replace them with his own henchmen. Replacements of this kind have taken place in a number of instances already and they were not confined merely to political posts. Hitler's henchmen are taking over the direction also of productive enterprises. They have to drive all productive efforts ahead ruthlessly and relentlessly to satisfy the ever growing war needs of the expanded empire. They will stand out the more clearly as collectors of capitalist profits, guardians of a frightfully decayed system, the very embodiment of the most intense exploitation, mass misery and mass slaughter: A bonapartist police regime which loses all remaining semblance of a people's movement. These slavedrivers will become the immediate center of all hatred of exploitation.

Under these conditions the genuine people's movement develops from below, and in opposition to the Nazi regime and all that it stands for. The distorted form of this opposition expressed in deeper nationalist feeling has little or no possibility of realizing any aspiration of return to old national boundaries in the sense of restoration of the many small independent states. This nationalist feeling can neither obscure nor serve as a substitute for the far more fundamental urge of actual European—and wider—unity against the common oppressor. That urge for unity will follow inevitably in the next stage. Thus the basic Nazi tenet of more intense nationalism produces its opposite reaction—internationalism.

Hitler's "new order" faces the dilemma: its permanent war needs grow more rapidly than its acquisitions. There could be no more telling proof of this than the constant expansion of the Nazi orbit, both the conquests and the penetrations. And Hitler cannot stop even with a possible victory over Great Britain. Being the most desperate representative of the hardest pressed capitalist sector in a world of uneven capitalist development, in which imperialist competition grows ever keener, he must go on. Now he attempts to harness the resources of the European continent. But this harnessing follows the pattern of "autarchy," a reactionary measure which is in direct conflict with the essentially progressive implications flowing from the obliteration of national boundaries and the "unification" of Europe. The interdependence of nations, or of national economies, is by no means lessening. On the contrary, it is increasing. Any attempt at "autarchy"

^{*}This article was written two months or more ago. Since then, the verification predicted by Comrade Simmons has begun: Hitler's plan to rule through a wide stratum in the occupied lands that would come to amicable terms with Germany and govern as "independent" nations, has broken down completely in Holland and Norway, great strike struggles in Holland were halted only by death penalties and naked bayonets, there have been serious physical clashes between the Nazis and Norwegian workers, etc. Hitler knew how the universal hostility of the conquered populations had destroyed the morale of the German troops during the last war in Belgium, France, the Ukraine, and sought in this war to avoid direct military rule of the occupied countries. In that he has already failed.—EDITORS.

brings out immediately, and more sharply, the growing need for the world market.

Besides, in the scheme of intensified capitalist exploitation, Europe cannot substitute for colonies. The greater the industrialization of war the more urgent is the question of raw materials. Not merely raw materials in general, but certain specific and essential kinds that most often are available in sufficient quantities only in certain parts of the globe. And the problem presented is not only the one of buying these raw materials for cash or barter, it is primarily the problem of securing control over the sources of supply as well as of the avenues of transportation. In other words, the "new order," even though it may embrace the whole of continental Europe exclusive of the USSR, intensifies and enlarges all the needs of national capitalism. Above all it will require for its survival new fields of capital investment and exploitation of cheap colonial labor. However, the orbit of the world market is narrowing, not for any rational reason, but because of the lack of buying power of the masses. So, while Hitler may now be reaching out for the Mosul oil fields, tomorrow he faces the American empire in a far more deadly struggle for control of the world market and for redivision of the world. The permanency of war is inescapable-except for the proletarian revolution.

The Workers in the "New Order"

What, then, is the position of the proletariat in Hitler's "new order"? Specific information is scant. Some of its general features, however, we do know. It would be preposterous to attempt to describe here the strain of war upon the mass of the population, the frightful devastation from which no geographical sphere is totally exempt, the life in constant fear of bombings, the actual destruction of homes with its attendant misery, or the killing and maiming of both young and old, that could be described adequately only by those who have experienced its tragic realities. It is important to remember that all these terrible consequences of war always bear down the heaviest upon the proletariat. The effect that these must produce we can also understand. They constitute some of the bitter lessons out of which our class will mature.

This is the class that carries the actual burden in the raorganized Europe. In the first place, the reorganization is a gigantic levelling process. It is a levelling downward. For the mass of the people it means, above all, a terribly reduced standard of living. From now on they will subsist on permanent ration cards. Obviously the lack of consumers' goods, if not actual starvation, will pinch ever harder. On top of this is the forced tempo in the factories. Labor in this new scheme of exploitation is forced labor. In the occupied countries new antagonisms and eventual conflicts in industry are added to the hatred of the oppressors.

Knowing in general the conditions in what was pre-war Germany, it is clear to us that the German workers themselves can in no way be exempt from this enormous strain. The common notion that the German nation as a whole would draw benefits from the conquests is simply preposterous. The class lines are much more sharply drawn there. Nor could Hitler just simply take measures to feed the German masses at the price of starvation in the occupied countries. In the first place that would be too risky, and in the second place, while the Nazis take loot from these countries, nevertheless each one of them, for one reason or another, is considered important in the whole scheme of the "new order," and is not altogether stripped. We may be sure that the German masses suffer the economic privations no less than the others, and in addition they bear the brunt of the battlefield. While these privations grow at home the German soldiers find themselves "defending" the fatherland far from the soil of their ancestors and most often in hostile territory. The effect on the soldiers of being surrounded by universal hostility is inescapable.

Moreover, the Nazi advance in the Balkans, for example, immediately brings the agricultural products of such granaries into competition with the German farmers, undermining if not destroying the last of the limited privileges which they had enjoyed ever since the days of the Hohenzollerns in order to play the assigned role of a social counterweight to the industrial proletariat. The industrialization of agriculture which follows in such territories must necessarily mean a growing proletarianization of the native populations. But this process is not confined to such territories. Throughout the spheres of the "new order," the economic reorganization, its greater concentration and centralization of industry together with the growing state supervision, leads to a constant elimination of the middle class and an ever greater proletarianization of the population. At the same time the industrialization of waror to put the matter in other words: the fortunes of mechanized warfare depending so completely and exclusively on the production in huge quantities of all its intricate implements, raw materials and fuels-elevates the industrial proletariat to a position of new and greater importance. Not one battle could be won; nay not even started, without its productive labor. The factories, the mills and the mines become the most decisive part of the battlefront. All the Nazi glitter smeared on to the "new order" would fade and decompose and the hideous structure itself would collapse if the industrial proletariat should fail to furnish these all important sinews. In the hands of the proletariat lies a power far greater and far more magnificent than all the imposing Nazi conquests could ever convey.

We do not forget the devastating blows suffered by these working masses during the last two decades, failures and betrayals by their parties, both socialist and communist, the terrible defeats and the destruction of their organizations. In fact the monstrosity of the present mechanized mass slaughter could become possible only on the background of such disasters. The workers were once again reduced to the lowest depths of wage slavery, long exacting hours of toil, a miserable wage level, and all their rights wiped out. For a long time reaction to any stimulus on their part seemed less than normal.

Now, however, new political conjunctures are appearing in rapid succession and are striking sledge hammer blows at the decrepit capitalist structure. Simultaneously the warrevived gigantic industrial machinery, while grinding profits out of the toil of the workers, is also inevitably pounding a new consciousness into their minds. They will begin to wield their new power and put it to the test, at first to realize their most elementary demands; but rising also to greater heights. Out of their experience a new leadership will be forged. There will be proof aplenty that the crushing of labor organizations by no means eliminated the class struggle. On the contrary; new fuel is being added to fire the smouldering flames of revolt. The proletarian hatred of the fascist regime must of necessity become universal regarless of former national boundaries. And the workers alone, finding their new place in the "new order," can lead to a better road in the coming upheavals. Their aim will eventually become crystallized into the exact opposite of the Hitlerian "unification" of Europe, the complete synthesis-the free people in a Socialist United States of Europe. Undoubtedly there will be stimulus aplenty leading in this direction. It does not matter whether it finds its initial impulse in Berlin, Prague, Oslo or Paris.

The End of French Democracy

By TERENCE PHELAN

Terence Phelan witnessed the fall of France from Paris, where he remained till September. Long detained in Portugal, he has finally made his way to this country. We publish here the first of a series of his articles. Though their lateness prevents these articles from having the journalistic timeliness of such bourgeois reports as those of Andre Maurois, "Pertinax," and Genevieve Tabouis, this lateness is offset by their being the first account that is both eye-witness and Marxist. To believe the bourgeois journalists, one would suppose France fell because Reynaud had the wrong kind of mistress, or because Germany had five tanks to France's three or because the Nazis bought General X, or other E. Phillips Oppenheim nonsense. Here is the real story that American workers can make some sense of, telling how the French ruling class had succeeded in so smashing French democracy, long before Hitler attacked, that there was nothing left with which to fight.

Only 25 days after that misty dawn when siren-wakened Parisians saw the first attacking German bombers weaving unharmed in a sinisterly beautiful net of rose and gold antiaircraft fire and heard the unforgettable rumble of bombs destroying the suburban airfields, what was left of those same Parisians apathetically watched the grey-green wave of German men and guns roll along the diagonal boulevards, down the proud Rue Royale, past the efficient batteries of cameras, radio commentators, and reviewing officers in the spacious Place de la Concorde. The outer world was apparently amazed. It need not have been. The scene was only the last act in a grim drama whose first act was laid in 1933.

The so-called "Battle of France" was, from the viewpoint of history, a mere mopping-up operation. French democracy had already lost the war in three decisive battles. Their dates: 1933, 1936, 1938. The respective battle-grounds: Germany; Spain and France; France itself. Principal organizer of the defeats: democratic capitalism. Principal tool: Stalinism.

The Genesis of Hitler's Combat Troops

It is primarily as an eye-witness reporter that I write, an eye-witness to events in France since 1936. But to make you understand the German troops I saw, I must underline here the importance of the first battle in which French democracy was defeated—more accurately—helped to destroy itself: the rise of Hitler to power.

The Weimar Republic was built on the bodies of the slaughtered revolutionists of 1919. It was an economic monstrosity, strangled by Versailles, riven with internal contradictions, incapable of viability or genuine consolidation. By 1933 it had reached its final crisis. Socialism or fascism must take its place. The German capitalists got solidly behind Hitler. And what were the French and British democracies doing about it? They were helping Hitler take over. Fact: read the books, read the newspapers of the time. No prating about "democracy" then; no, the danger then was Bolshevism and the British and French governments were secretly behind Hitler as a bulwark between the socialist revolution and their own gorged regimes.

The outside help of the French and British governments could not alone have put Hitler in power. The way was paved for Hitler by the Socialist and Communist Parties of Germany. Thirteen million Socialists and Communists, filled with a sound combative instinct, were ready to fight before reaction got firmly into the saddle. The Socialist leadership, however, helped elect Hindenburg who appointed Hitler Chancellor. The Stalinists, then in their "Third Period," having already on a regional scale (the Prussian referendum) formed a united front with the Nazis to vote for the ouster of the Social Democratic Government, operated on the slogan: "First Hitler, then us!" The main enemy, they claimed, was "Social-Fascism," meaning the Socialists.

Once in power Hitler consolidated his regime. The old parties were destroyed; the workers' cadres smashed; the great mass of German workers were beaten down, exhausted, confused, disgusted with both Social-Democracy and Stalinism. Meanwhile a new generation, nurtured in semi-starvation and desperate struggle, a dynamic youth, impatient of "socialist" and Stalinist betrayal, fell prey to Hitler's skillful demagogy. All the forces of genuine renovation and progress which had been misled, wasted, and thrown away by the corrupt, blind "democratic" and Stalinist leaders were now perverted in a new desperate hope. That youth now forms the shock troops of Hitler's armies. The fanatical young combat troops whom I saw roll singing into Paris on June 14, 1940 were motivated by one burning idea-that they were fighting against capitalism. (Try to sell them Weimar again!) They are deceived in that belief, but the belief is a fact. And it is a fact that makes the Stalinist policy of 1928-1933 in Germany one of the greatest crimes of working-class history.

Millions of French capitalist money swelled Hitler's coffers and helped produce the first requisite for France's collapse: the establishment in its traditional imperialist rival of a powerful regime, which took the greatest factory in Europe, galvanized its despairing youth, rationalized its chaotic economy on an outright war basis, and aimed it straight at the heart of the gorged victors of Versailles. Germany, on the eve of this war, was a nation spark-plugged by a broad-based minority, dynamic and fanatical, plus a majority which, though certainly not actively for Hitler at all, negatively supported his war with the hopeless thought: "We lost the last war and starved for 20 years; what will happen to us if we lose this one?" The revolution lost inside Germany, it was not the ghost of Weimar which could overthrow Hitler; there was nothing capable of stopping Nazism except genuine revolution sweeping back from the neighboring countries.

The World Alliance Against Spain

That revolution was not lacking. The years 1936-1937 saw the turning-point of an era. They were like a mountain range off which the rains of history could roll, by the slightest of deviations in events, down one side to world socialism, down the other to the present imperialist blood-bath and social chaos.

In France, not only were the factories almost universally occupied, but over many of them flew the red flag, and factory committees, the embryos of soviets, were in many a factory in real if not titular control. Blum's Popular Front government tried its skillful best to hold the revolutionary workers back, to save democratic capitalism for its masters. But it took the Stalinist leader, Thorez, to utter at that moment the greatest fink slogan in all history: "Comrades, comrades, we must know how to call off a strike!" But even more important for France than France itself at that moment was Spain. The workers and peasants of Spain had risen, had wrested arms from the half-traitorous Popular Front government which had let the military-fascist conspiracy grow to open uprising. The fascists were exterminated in practically all Northern and Eastern Spain, and the workers were advancing through Aragon. Real power was in the hands of the workers' and peasants' committees, which seized and administered the factories, and distributed and organized the land—a stage fully reached in advanced industrial Catalonia, and rapidly being reached in the rest of Spain.

Franco had behind him only unwilling conscript Spanish troops, ready for revolt at any really encouraging chance of success, and the Moors. As for the latter, a Fourth Internationalist arrived back from meetings with the principal chieftains of Spanish Morocco, with an agreement to the effect that, if the Popular Front government would give Morocco autonomy, they would pull their tribesmen away from Franco. But the Stalino-bourgeois Madrid government quashed the project, refused to sign the treaty, reaffirmed Spanish capitalism's imperialist rights in Morocco, and definitely lost the Moors to Franco.

Italian and German aid still consisted only of a few planes, a few technicians, its weight not yet determinant and critical. World capitalism was in a genuine panic. Its leaders knew that if the Spanish revolution took the next step, the seizure of state power, they had to intervene. Yet they knew it would be suicidal. Only France was contiguous and prepared. But Blum, even with Thorez's backing dared not attempt to send mobilized French workers, filled with revolutionary fervor by the partial victories already won by workers' solidarity at home, against their Spanish brothers. Had Blum done that it would have been the Spanish revolution that spread through France instead of French military intervention that smashed the Spanish revolution. And that event would have changed history. After that, it would have been impossible to check: no frontiers, no Gestapo, no GPU, could have kept that revolutionary wave from spreading over Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia.

Capitalism and its Stalinist ally moved fast but delicately, like a man trying to rush a blazing keg out of a room full of loose dynamite. They divided the tasks with the skill and wordless cooperation of desperation. Roosevelt, with almost panic haste, slapped a "neutrality" act on arms to keep them from the Spanish people. The French Popular Front government invented the skillful trick of "non-intervention," which kept real help from the Loyalist side, while allowing Italian and German violations to get by with only high-sounding moral protests. Germany and Italy threw every ounce of weight behind France.

Trickiest job of all was entrusted to Stalin, anxious at that moment to prove his utility to democratic capitalism: that of using the prestige of the October revolution as a cover to shore up the tottering capitalist government of Loyalist Spain against the revolution, to build up quickly an antirevolutionary "Communist" party out of the backward Spanish middle class, to slander the revolution itself as the "fifth column," and finally, in the terrible days of May, 1937, in Barcelona, to smash the revolution by outright military repression.

There never was a more striking example of the dialectic interrelation of imperialist rivalries and cooperation in crisis. The rival imperialisms and Stalinism were all struggling and squabbling among themselves, yet they all had one clear goal in common. Germany and Italy wanted an outright Franco victory; France, England, and the Kremlin preferred a Loyalist victory as long as the Loyalists remained capitalist. But all without exception primarily wanted a defeat of revolution; and whether they worked on the Franco side in open attack, or on the Loyalist side with slander and assassination, it was the Spanish revolution they considered the primary enemy, with Franco secondary.

The heroism of the Spanish proletatriat is now historic. Openly attacked by its declared enemies, secretly sapped of morale by its pretended friends, and misled by its own cowardly leaders, Socialist, anarchist, and Poumist alike, it held off this concerted world attack month after month, giving way inch by inch, till the bloody Stalino-capitalist repression of the 1937 May Days in Barcelona gave the final death blow to the Spanish revolution and guaranteed the eventual victory of Franco. From then on, Spain was doomed. It was not to restore the 1931-1936 misery under Azana and Lerroux that the workers of Barcelona had attacked machine-gunguarded buildings with sticks and one pearl-handled revolver, or that the Madrid proletariat had made every house a fortress. Slowly but surely Spain collapsed.

Almost holding their breaths with fear, the French democratic capitalists had meanwhile been cautiously and skillfully counter-attacking in France against the Spring trade union gains. Once their "Socialist" and Stalinist lackeys had persuaded the workers out of the occupied factories, and held them back from renewing the struggle, the capitalists started nibbling away at the gains of the revolutionary strikes. Time and time again during late 1936 and early 1937, the bosses had to give way on this or that sector as the workers, filled with a profoundly correct instinct, pushed aside the restraining hands of their traitorous leadership and defended their gains with militant sit-down strikes. But bit by bit, the bosses worked their way back, chiseling on contracts, wriggling out of agreements, and always calling on the Popular Front leaders to check the workers; meanwhile, on the legislative front, passing increasingly repressive laws (the Socialists and Stalinists voted 'em all), and finally establishing compulsory arbitration, outlawing strikes. By the end of 1937 French labor saw gain after gain lost, it knew not how; puzzled at how it had been tricked; discouraged and beginning to grow cynical.

And thus was lost the second battle, with the defeat of the only force that could have beaten Hitler, beaten him from within by an uprising of a revivified German labor movement encouraged by the victory of socialism in two neighboring countries.

The Anti-Labor Laws of 1938

1938 gave the final death blow to any hope that France would be able to defend herself. With every passing month, under the vicious drive of Daladier (the same Daladier who had walked with clenched fist while Stalinist cheer-leaders shouted "Daladier to power!" in the 1936 elections), the workers were driven back, angry and confused, the Stalinist misleaders pleading with them to accept all because of the Franco-Soviet pact and the "defense of democracy against fascism."

On July 11, 1938 the government promulgated a law called L'Organization de la Nation en Temps de Guerre* that would, on the outbreak of hostilities, convert France into a

^{*} An American newspaperman, for whom I occasionally did some part-time work, could scarcely believe his eyes when he read this book-length law through. Recognizing its immense importance, he tried to publicize it as one of the most important news events of the year. His paper never even mentioned it. He thought it was mere ignorance on its part; a Marxist could tell him that it was part of the conspiracy of silence of the capitalist "democracies."

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totalitarian nation. It was the most amazing law ever voted in a so-called democracy. But international attention was carefully distracted from it.

This law-known as the Law of July 11-made every French worker an industrial serf. It "requisitioned"-the way a government might requisition a mule or an automobile -all men 18 years or over; it also requisitioned en-bloc in the factories all women and children of whatever age. "Requisitioning" meant that a worker could not change his employment, or be absent from it, or late to it, without penalties of from six months to five years imprisonment; that his wage was frozen for the duration of hostilities (with the exception of niggardly "speed-up" bonuses) no matter what change there was in the cost of living (the government promised to freeze prices, too; but of course they rose 50 to 100 per cent by Spring); and his wage was frozen, not at what he was then getting, but at the previous five-year average-i.e., from 1934 on, before the 1936 wage-gains-producing immediate wagecuts.

The law also provided that the government might take over factories if the bosses didn't run them to the government's liking. The state in such cases guaranteed a return on carital equal at least to standard war-loan interest-rates plus factory-owners' estimate of obsolescence. In a word, if you were such an incompetent boss that you couldn't make enough profit, the government did it for you. And of course there was a long procedure of protest open to the boss, while only jail was open for the protesting worker. As any American worker can guess, requisitions of factories when necessary were carried out very amiably by adjustment; requisition of workers was enforced with savage rigor.

Supplementary legislation added to the basic law, among other things, the following:

To carry on any conversation, even privately, which did not actively support the war, or criticized its prosecution or the war-laws, was "tenir propos defaitistes"—a "crime" punishable by anything from one week's imprisonment to death the usual sentence was two years. The operation of this law was particularly foul: while the real Hitlerians, the real fifth-columnists, discussed the advantages of a Hitler victory over their champagne in elegant salons in complete security, any trade-unionist who grumbled about intolerable conditions in a cafe was whisked off by police-spies to jail.

Overtime pay was practically abolished by means of a vicious kick-back war-tax, working hours were increased from 40 to 72 and up per week, seniority was wiped out, speed-ups became so intolerable that, for example, a good third of the Hispano-Suiza airplane motors were rejects, and every hardwon labor right was abolished. As Stalinists lost influence among the French workers and genuine revolutionaries began to take their places, the "democrats" dropped the mask of the classic definition of high-treason, "collusion with a foreign power" (in this case, Soviet Russia), and came out with a naked declaration that any attempt to dissuade the army or the rear from an all-out prosecution of the present war was high treason, punishable by death.

In addition to these measures, and to a total suppression of all free speech and discussion, and a newspaper censorship against which even the reactionary newspapers protested, there was another weapon against trade unionists: any worker liable to military service who had been given an "affectation speciale" in a factory because his technical skill was irreplaceable in the industrial effort, needed only to raise his voice once in complaint against the terrible wages and hours and speed-up to find himself immediately transferred back to a combat unit and assigned a sacrificial advance patrol post.

"Totalitarianism on the Cheap"

One way of characterizing this legislation is that in it the French ruling class, with typical thriftiness, tried what may be called "totalitarianism on the cheap."

It was theoretically possible for French capitalism to rally the workers and peasants around itself sufficiently to make a stand against Germany by converting democracy from a blah-blah word used in Bastille Day oratory to something real and tangible, in the hard cold cash of workers' salaries and farmers' subsidies, in the no less real and important increase in civil liberties and power of the people to keep genuine control over the government. But in practice that would have meant democratically sharing-in one case, its wealth; in the other, its power-with its fellow citizens. French capitalism was not only unwilling, it was incapable, of doing either. With its increasing economic degeneration, its diminishing returns, its insoluble crises, French capitalism couldn't afford to share wealth; indeed, in order to survive at all, it was forced to an increasing extent to take back what few gains the French masses had won from it. Nor, after the lesson of 1936, did it dare permit any increase of political democracy which, every time it started genuinely to operate, showed that it led straight toward a revolution which would throw off the French nation's back the strangling incubus of outdated capitalism and lead it on to socialism.

The other alternative was fascism. American workers should clear their minds of a dangerous confusion (created by the Stalinists during their Popular Front period) between fascism and classic reaction. Classic reaction, as in Czarist Russia or Petain France, depends primarily on straight mercenary police; fascism depends primarily on a genuine massbase of convinced and often fanatical partisans. There has, for example, been considerable misunderstanding about the role of Colonel de la Rocque and his Croix-de-Feu, later the Parti Social Francais. The Croix-de-Feu resembled, among comparable German parties, not Hitler's National-Socialists, but Hugenberg's Nationalists. The Croix-de-Feu had no demagogic pretense of anti-capitalism, no fake pro-labor policies to bind hopeless masses and desperate youth to their cause; and, representing only a purely negative petty-bourgeois antiproletarianism, it fell to pieces at the first serious test. Genuine French fascism was represented by the Parti Populaire Francais of the Communist renegade Jacques Doriot. In the pre-war period it got little support from the internally warring and short-sighted French capitalists. Because fascism also costs capitalism a-plenty. To date there is no example of its being simply imposed from above. It rises from below, supported from above; and its basic mass appeal is that it is revolutionary and anti-capitalist. Its real purpose of course is to preserve capitalism (big money capitalism) at all costs; for which purpose it milks far-sighted capitalists of as much money as is needed to maintain its plug-uglies, bully-boys, exservicemen, and street gangsters during the struggle for power, and its immense apparatus of administration and repression once it has consolidated fascist-capitalist power. Beyond this, in order to retain some degree of popular support in a positive way (the concentration camps take care of the negative side), fascism has to divert sums into flashy workers' housing and similar projects, into job-security schemes and other paternalisms. It costs money.

French capitalism either wouldn't or couldn't pay. One of fascism's historic roles is "protecting capitalism from itself," by "lessening the anarchy of production and distribution," etc. (What this phrase really proved to mean in Germany was "protecting" big monopoly capitalism against small "independent" capitalism: the latter naturally went to the wall in the "rationalization.") French capitalism, despite the famous "Sixty Families," despite some mammoth corporations, despite the usual interlocking directorates and the super-control of certain "industrial" banks, was much more atomized, much less unified, much more riven with internal rivalries, than was 1932 Germany. For instance, "colonial" banks and combines, whose interests lay in the empire's colonies, and whose outlook was international, clashed seriously with those cartels and trusts whose interests were wholly within France itself; light conversion industry equally constantly clashed with heavy capital-goods industry. Uncertain, short-sighted French capitalism divided its support among dozens of groups, fascist, semi-fascist, nationalist, straight reactionary, parliamentary, extra-parliamentary—even the Second Internationalist "socialists" when circumstances required.

Unwilling and unable to pay the stiff price of either expanding democracy or genuine fascism as a means of getting some sort of mass base among its more and more indignant people, French capitalism tried "totalitarianism on the cheap." French capitalism tried to get the totalitarian advantages of fascism without paying the corresponding cost that German capitalism had proved necessary. It would make no sacrifice either that of subsidizing a mass-movement, or that of subjecting itself to a rationalizing economic discipline. It simply put what it liked of German totalitarianism into the *Law of July.*"

On November 30, 1938, the CGT (General Confederation of Labor), under desperate pressure from below, half-heartedly called for a general strike to defend the last vestiges of the 1936 gains. It is difficult to say which was the more criminal: the way in which the strike was announced and argued for and against so far in advance that the bourgeoisie could liesurely prepare to exterminate it; or the miserable lack of preparation of the strike itself. Daladier saw his chance and struck. Rarely has any strike been repressed with such refined savagery, followed by such vicious reprisals. The strike was an almost total failure; and the subsequent reprisals against workers, government employees, even school teachers—all strikers were rehired only individually, with all seniority lost, and every militant weeded out even if it halved factory production—really broke the back of the French labor movement.

Daladier proudly announced that France was at last "one united nation." It was one of the silliest statements ever made by any political figure. The bourgeois press of the world acclaimed it. By vicious repression and discouraged apathy France was united into a hollow rotted facade, ready to fall apart at a push. Thus French "democracy" had itself added the final touch: after aiding its mortal enemy to power, after helping smash the only force that could have swept that enemy from power, it so smashed all real democracy within itself that in its hour of need it had no convinced defenders.

The writer was one of six investigators sent through the working-class districts of Paris by a bourgeois journalist, to "take the public pulse," "get the tone of French morale," in the winter of 1939-1940. Some others, we understood, were interviewing soldiers on leave from the front. Considering the extraordinary political range of the investigators involved, our reports were amazingly unanimous. One of the other investigators—a bourgeois democrat—woefully summed it up as follows: "By God, if a German column rolled this afternoon through the Porte de Clichy, ten per cent of the Paris populace would run home to secure a few valuables; the other 90 per cent would stand with its hands in its pockets watching the Germans and saying: 'Ah, merde alors, qu' ils vont vite, ces salauds-la!' (Cripes, don't those bastards move fast!)." We all looked at one another and slowly nodded agreement.

Later the bourgeois journalist summed our reports up as follows: "True, there are contributory causes-treason, wretched staff work, graft-ridden preparation, lack of support by the English (who are saving their own skins), new technical methods on the Germans' part; but all those things are secondary. The primary reason France is collapsing to Germany lies basically in one question and its answer. The plain ordinary French poilu has said to himself: 'Life under Hitler would probably be worse than life under Reynaud. But would it be enough worse so that that difference is worth dying for?" What's the answer?" He returned to the wall map in his office, motioned us close, pointed to the Dunkirk pocket, wiped out in the various-colored crayons representing successive days, and to the colored-crayon tongues lapping like angry flames across the Aisne and Somme toward Paris. "There's the poilu's answer," he said, "an answer in geography."

* * *

Meanwhile, in the circles of the bourgeoisie, there was profound disunity.

The Impasse of the Bourgeoisie

"Totalitarianism on the cheap" was the program of the united bourgeoisie. They were united, too—together with their "socialist" lackeys—in working tirelessly to bring about their ideal war—to turn expanding Germany eastward in an exhausting war which, they fondly hoped, might at one stroke exhaust their imperialist rival and wipe out socialism in Russia.

But if that could not be done, the French bourgeoisie divided sharply on a further course.

A broad sector of French capitalism, politically represented by such men as Georges Bonnet, Flandin and Laval, favored voluntarily coming to terms with Germany. Concluding that France had proved too weak in economic potential to be a first-rate power, they proposed to accept the reduction of France to a secondary position, even if it meant becoming a satellite of the Axis. They preferred to do that peacefully rather than risk disaster at the coat-tails of British imperialism. One need hardly add that these pessimistic realists were neither more nor less "patriots" than the opposite wing, led by Reynaud and Blum, of the pro-English tendency. Both groups equally feared revolution at home and abroad. They differed on the remedy.

This sharp difference on policy toward Germany led, after war broke out, not to unity but to divided counsels, indecision, immobilization, escapism.

Indecision ran from passive drifting to outright treachery. The highly placed traitors in France were traitors not because they preferred some foreign power (in this case Germany) but because they preferred to smash the republic completely. Said one of them to the writer, in a smart evening salon in the Faubourg Saint-Germain: "We've got the right war, but the wrong enemy. It's socialism we should be fighting against." And this man had one of the most responsible non-ministerial posts in the French government.

There was an even more extraordinary example of this feeling shown at the front itself. In the last war, there was revolutionary fraternization between the opposing *privates*, despite furious attempts to prevent it by the officers. In this war the writer met a lieutenant who quietly boasted of fraternization between German and French *officers* in his sector of the front during the Sitzkrieg. Once a week they dined together, and drank champagne toasts to an immediate peace followed by an alliance together in a war against the Soviet Union.

There were laws about treason. Was a single one of these

people ever arrested by the government? Of course not. They were sacred cows, untouchable. Because they were linked by every tie of famly, of finance, with the other, the pro-war faction. Their differences were no more than family disagreements. Jean would say, "Cousin Paul is mistaken. I worry about his ideas. Still, he made several good points." Within such circles, criticism of the "war against Hitlerism" was permissible, excusable. But let Jacques Docques, turret-lathe operator in the De Woitinne Aviation Works, say that he wouldn't work the fourth consecutive Sunday, and he was damned if he saw what this war was gaining for the French workers anyway, and the lofty Jeans and Pauls fused instantly together in denunciation of him as a spy, a fifth-columnist, a traitor, a Red—and away he went to four years in jail.

On the scale of general policy, this tendency was illustrated spectacularly during the Soviet-Finnish War. The main war was all but forgotten by the French government press, which positively howled for intervention against the USSR. For a moment the French bourgeoisie was temporarily united; Alpine troops were rushed to Scotland, ready to sail the moment Norway and Sweden gave permission, among the salonnards there was gossip of projects for making peace with Germany in order to turn all force against Russia. And if Daladier did not carry out the project, it was not for lack of will but that, in the face of Norwegian and Swedish resistance and Germany's apparent unwillingness to cooperate, it was beyond his power.

If these gentry had meant one word of what they'd said about a democratic crusade to stop Hitlerism, they'd have retreated to North Africa, they'd have retreated to the southwest corner of Hell, and kept on fighting. But that would have meant abandoning their noldings in France, fighting on like the common *poilus* to whom they had preached their crusade. Naturally, of course, by their very class nature, they did nothing of the sort: they came to terms as quickly as possible with the invader, while they still had economic bargaining-points, in order to retain the jackal's share of the power to continue to exploit the people of France.

In a series of penthouses atop the National City Bank of New York Building on the Avenue des Champs-Elysees are the elegant quarters of one of Paris's smartest clubs, a haunt of French and international business leaders—the Grand Pavois. For years it had been denounced in the liberal and labor press as the nastiest nest of Hitlerites in all Paris. Even during the war, the moment the newspaper revolt in the late winter had somewhat eased the censorship, such liberal weeklies as *La Lumiere* returned to the attack with facts and dates and figures. *La Lumiere* promptly caught hell from the censorship: a defense of these patriotic figures was made; the Ministry of the Interior and its police of course never raised a finger—they were too busy jailing trade-union militants. Some days after the German occupation of Paris, this writer met the bourgeois journalist mentioned above, whose offices were in that building; he had, in his surprised innocence, an indignant little story to tell.

The afternoon of the occupation, he had been watching. the German troops marching up the Champs-Elysees, when he heard a hail from the balcony above his, that of Le Grand Pavois. Invited up, in that lonely and deserted building, for a drink, he found three members of the club (the others had instantly left Paris when it was announced the city would be defended house-by-house, street-by-street, but were shortly on their way back, now that Paris had been declared an open town and had quietly fallen). The three representative members were in the best of spirits: the Nazi flag was flying from the staff, an honorary membership had been dispatched to the General commanding the troops of occupation, and they'd found the barman again. "Tragic, tragic," said the Club's secretary, "a terrible defeat." The journalist agreed. "But essentially," the secretary continued, meditatively sipping his whiskey-soda, "the best thing that ever happened to France. Now we're rid of Parliament; now we're rid of these damned cabinets; now we can settle our accounts with the Jews and with these damned Red workmen. The war was a mistake and a disaster; but it has ended as a blessing in disguise."

As the journalist told me this, I thought of the concentration camps all through southwestern France, where there lay on lice-ridden straw hundreds of thousands of anti-fascist fighters—French labor militants, Spanish Loyalists, anti-Mussolini Italians, German anti-Nazis—imprisoned by French "democracy" for wanting to fight against Hitlerism too hard; lying there waiting, waiting, under unremitting guard (there were always enough *gardes mobiles* for that, however strained the fighting lines might be) until the German wave passed over them, and they were sorted out to be sent back to Lipari, to Hitler's headsmen, to Franco's garrotters.

That was the way democracy was defended against fascism.

From the Arsenal of Marxism

The Tactics of the United Front

By LEON TROTSKY

The problem of the united front is today once more a burning question. As in all other questions, the great documents of Lenin and Trotsky's Communist International have been long buried by the Stalinist bureaucracy.

The following were the first theses on the united front adopted by the Communist International. Trotsky wrote them on March 2, 1922, during the enlarged plenum of, the Executive Committee of the Communist International which convened late in February and extended into March. The immediate occasion for these theses was the situation in the Communist Party of France which is described in the second part of the theses. They became the basis for the general theses on the united front adopted by the Fourth Congress of the Communist International, which Trotsky also wrote. Although the document is dated in certain parts, in the main it is still the most valuable treatise on the united front which the revolutionary movement possesses. Apart from a defective translation in the early issues of Inprecorr (International Press Correspondence) it has never been published in English before. This is a new translation.

I. General Considerations on the United Front

1. The task of the Communist Party is to lead the proletarian revolution. In order to summon the proletariat for the direct conquest of power and to achieve the latter, the Communist Party must base itself on the overwhelming majority of the working class.

So long as it does not hold this majority, the party must fight to win it.

The party can do so only if it is an absolutely independent organization with a clear program and with strict internal discipline. That is why the party had to break ideologically and organizationally with the reformists and the centrists who do not strive for the proletarian revolution, who have neither the capacity nor the desire to prepare the masses for revolution, and who by their entire conduct thwart this work.

Any members of the Communist Party who bemoan the split with the centrists in the name of "unity of forces" or "unity of front," thereby demonstrate that they do not understand the A.B.C. of Communism, and that they themselves happen to be in the Communist Party only by accident.

2. After assuring itself complete independence and ideological homogeneity of its ranks, the Communist Party fights for influence over the majority of the working class. This struggle can assume a swifter or more protracted character depending upon objective circumstances and the expediency of the tactic pursued.

But it is quite self-evident that the class life of the proletariat is not suspended during this preparatory period prior to the revolution. Clashes with industrialists, with the bourgeoisie, with the state power, on the initiative of one side or the other, run their due course.

In these clashes, insofar as they involve the living interests of the entire working class, or its majority, or this or that section, the working masses feel the need of unity in action of unity in resisting the onslaught of capitalism or unity in taking the offensive against the latter. Any party which mechanically counterposes itself to this need of the working class for unity in action will unfailingly be condemned in the minds of workers.

Consequently, the question of the united front is not at all, both in point of origin and essence, a question of mutual relations between the Communist parliamentary fraction and that of the Socialists; or between the central committees of the two parties, or between L'Humanite and Le Populaire. The problem of the united front—despite the fact that a split is inevitable in this epoch between the political organizations basing themselves on the working class—grows out of the urgent need to secure for the working class the possibility of a united front in the struggle against capitalism.

For those who do not understand this task, the party is only a propaganda society and not an organization for mass action.

3. In cases where the Communist Party still remains an organization of numerically insignificant minorities, the question of its conduct on the mass-struggle front does not assume a decisive practical-organizational significance. In such conditions, mass actions remain under the leadership of old organizations which by virtue of their still powerful traditions continue to play the decisive role.

Similarly the problem of the united front does not arise in countries where—like in Bulgaria, for example—the Communist Party is the sole leading organization of the toiling masses.

But wherever the Communist Party already constitutes a big, political organized force, but not the decisive magnitude —wherever the party embraces organizationally, let us say, one-fourth, one-third, or even a larger proportion of the organized proletarian vanguard—it is confronted with the question of the united front in all its acuteness.

If the party embraces a third or one-half of the proletarian vanguard, then the remaining half or two-thirds are organized by the reformists or centrists. It is absolutely selfevident, however, that even those workers who still support the reformists and the centrists are vitally concerned in maintaining the highest material standards of living and the greatest possible freedom for struggle. We must consequently so devise our tactic as to prevent the Communist Party, which will on the morrow embrace all the three thirds of the working class, from turning into—and all the more so, from actually being—an organizational obstacle in the way of the present struggle of the proletariat.

Still more, the party must assume the initiative in securing unity in this current struggle. Only in this way will the party draw closer to those two-thirds which do not as yet follow its leadership, which do not as yet trust it because they do not understand it. Only in this way can the party win them over.

If the Communist Party had not broken drastically and irrevocably with the Social-Democrats, it would not have become the party of proletarian revolution. It could not have taken the first serious step on the road to revolution. It would have forever remained a parliamentary safety-valve under the bourgeois state.

Whoever does not understand this does not know the first letter of the A.B.C. of Communism.

4. If the Communist Party did not seek for organizational avenues to the end that at every given moment joint, coordinated actions between the Communists and the non-Communist (including the Social-Democratic) working masses were made possible, it would have thereby laid bare its own incapacity to win over—on the basis of mass actions the majority of the working class. It would degenerate into a society for Communist propaganda but never develop into a party for the conquest of power.

It is not enough to have a sword, one must give it an edge; it is not enough to give it an edge, one must know how to use it.

After separating the Communists from reformists it is not enough to fuse the Communists together by means of organizational discipline; it is necessary that this organization should learn how to guide all the collective activities of the proletariat in all spheres of its living struggle.

This is the second letter of the A.B.C. of Communism.

Reformist Leaders in the United Front

5. Does the united front extend only to the working masses or does it also include the opportunist leaders?

The very posing of this question is the product of misunderstanding.

If we could simply unite the working masses around our own banner or around our practical current slogans, and skip over reformist organizations, whether party or trade union, that would of course, be the best thing in the world. But then the very question of the united front would not exist in its present form.

The question arises from this, that certain and very important sections of the working class belong to reformist organizations or support them. Their present experience is still insufficient to enable them to leave the reformist organizations and to join us. It may be precisely after engaging in those mass activities which are on the order of the day, that a major change will take place in this connection. That is just what we are striving for. But that is not how matters still stand at present. Today the organized portion of the working class is broken up into three formations.

One of them, the Communist, strives toward the social revolution and precisely *because of this* supports concurrently every movement, however partial, of the toilers against the exploiters and against the bourgeois state.

Another grouping, the reformist, strives toward conciliation with the bourgeoisie. But in order not to losé their influence over the workers, they are compelled, against the innermost desires of the leaders, to support the partial movements of the exploited against the exploiters.

Finally, there is the third grouping, the centrists, who constantly vacillate between the other two, and who do not have an independent significance.

The circumstances thus make wholly possible joint actions on a whole series of vital questions between the workers united in these three respective organizations and the unorganized masses adhering to them.

The Communists, as has been said, not only must not oppose such actions but, on the contrary, must assume the initiative for them. precisely for the reason that the greater is the mass drawn into the movement, the higher its selfconfidence rises, all the more self-confident will that mass movement be and all the more resolutely will it be capable of marching forward, however modest may be the initial slogans of struggle. And this means that the growth of the mass aspects of the movement revolutionizes it, and creates much more favorable conditions for slogans, methods of struggle and, in general, the leading role of the Communist Party.

The reformists fear the potential revolutionary spirit of the mass movement; their beloved arena is: the parliamentary tribune, the offices of trade unions, arbitration courts, Ministerial ante-chambers.

On the contrary, we are, apart from all other considerations, interested in dragging the reformists from their havens and placing them alongside of ourselves before the eyes of the struggling masses. With a correct tactic we stand only to gain. A Communist who doubts or fears this resembles a swimmer who has approved the theses on the best method of swimming, but dares not take the risk of plunging into the water.

6. Unity of front consequently presupposes our readiness, within certain limits and on specific questions, to correlate in practice our actions with those of reformist organizations, to the extent to which the latter still express today the will of important sections of the embattled proletariat.

But, after all, didn't we split with them? Yes, because we disagree with them on fundamental questions of the working class movement.

And yet we seek agreements with them? Yes, in all those cases when the masses that follow them are ready to engage in joint struggle together with the masses that follow us and when they, the reformists, are to a lesser or greater degree compelled to become an organ of this struggle.

But won't they say that after we split with them we still need them? Yes, their blabbermouths can say this. Here and

there somebody in our own ranks may take fright at it. But as regards the broad working masses—even those who do not follow us and who do not as yet understand our goals but who do see two or three labor organizations leading a parallel existence—these masses will draw from our conduct the following conclusion: that despite the split we are doing everything in our power to facilitate for the masses unity in action.

7. The policy aimed to secure the united front does not of course include in itself guarantees that actual unity in action will be obtained in all instances. On the contrary, in many cases and perhaps even in the majority of cases, organizational agreement will be only half attained or perhaps not at all. But it is necessary that the struggling masses should always be given the possibility of convincing themselves that the non-achievement of unity in action was not due to our formal irreconcilability but to the lack of real will to struggle on the part of the reformists.

In entering into agreements with other organizations, we naturally assume a certain discipline in action. But this discipline cannot be absolute in character. In the event that the reformists begin putting brakes on the struggle to the obvious detriment of the movement and act counter to the situation and the moods of the masses, we as an independent organization always reserve the right to lead the struggle to the end, and this without our temporary semi-allies.

This may give rise to a new sharpening of the struggle between us and the reformists. But it will no longer involve a simple repetition of one and the same set of ideas in a shutin circle but will signify—provided our tactic is correct—the extension of our influence over new, fresh groups of the proletariat.

8. It is possible to see in the policy a rapprochement with the reformists only from the standpoint of a journalist who thinks that he removes himself from reformism by ritualistically criticising it without ever leaving his editorial office and who is fearful of clashing with the reformists before the eyes of the working masses and giving the latter an opportunity to appraise the Communist and the reformist on the equal plane of the mass struggle. In this seeming revolutionary fear of "rapprochement" there lurks in essence a political passivity which seeks to perpetuate an order of things wherein the Communists and reformists each have their own rigidly demarcated spheres of influence, their own audiences at meetings, their own press, and all this together creates an illusion of serious political struggle.

9. We broke with the reformists and centrists in order to obtain complete freedom in criticising perfidy, betrayal, indecision and the half-way spirit in the labor movement For this reason any sort of organizational agreement which restricts our freedom of criticism and agitation is absolutely inacceptable to us. We participate in a united front but do not for a single moment become dissolved in it. We function in the united front as an independent detachment. It is precisely in the course of struggle that broad masses must learn from experience that we fight better than the others, that we see more clearly than the others, that we are more audacious and resolute. In this way, we shall bring closer the hour of the united revolutionary front under the undisputed Communist leadership.

II. Groupings in the French Labor Movement

10. If we propose to analyze the question of the united front in its application to France, without leaving the ground of the foregoing theses, which flow from the entire policy of the Communist International, then we must ask ourselves: Do we have in France a situation in which the Communists represent, from the standpoint of practical action, an insignificant magnitude (quantité negligeable)? Or do they, on the contrary, embrace the overwhelming majority of organized workers? Or do they occupy an in-between position? Are they sufficiently strong to make their participation in the mass movement of major importance, but are they insufficiently strong to concentrate the undisputed leadership in their own hands?

It is quite incontestable that we have before us precisely the third case in France.

11. In the party sphere the predominance of the Communists over the reformists is overwhelming. The Communist organization and the Communist press surpass by far in numbers, richness and vitality the organization and press of the so-called Socialists.

This overwhelming preponderance, however, far from secures to the French Communist Party as yet the complete and incontestable leadership of the French proletariat, inasmuch as the latter is still strongly under the influence of antipolitical and anti-party tendencies and prejudices, the arena for whose operation is primarily provided by the trade unions.

12. The paramount peculiarity of the French labor movement consists in this, that the trade unions have long served as an integument or cover for a peculiar, anti-parliamentarian political party which bears the name, syndicalism. For, however the revolutionary syndicalists may try to demarcate themselves from politics or from the party, they can never refute the fact that they themselves constitute a political party which seeks to base itself on trade union organizations of the working class. This party has its own positive revolutionary proletarian tendencies but also its own extremely negative features: the lack of a genuinely definitive program and a rounded-out organization. The organization of the trade unions by no means corresponds with the organization of syndicalism. In the organizational sense, the syndicalists represent amorphous political nuclei, grafted upon the trade unions.

The question is further complicated by the fact that the syndicalists like all other political groupings in the working class, have split, after the war, into two parts: the reformists who support bourgeois society and are thereby compelled to work hand in hand with parliamentary reformists, and the revolutionary section which is seeking ways to overthrow its adversary and is thereby, in the person of its best elements, moving towards communism.

It was just this urge to preserve the unity of (the class) front which inspired not only the Communist but also the revolutionary syndicalists with the absolutely correct tactic of struggle for the unity of the trade-union organization of the French proletariat. On the other hand, with the instinct of bankrupts who sense that before the eyes of the working masses they cannot, in action, in struggle meet the competition of the revolutionary wing, Jouhaux, Merrheim and Co. have taken to the path of split. The colossally important struggle now unfolding throughout the entire trade union movement of France, the struggle between reformists and revolutionists, is for us at the same time a struggle for the unity of the trade union organization and the trade union front.

III. The Trade Union Movement and the United Front

13. French Communism finds itself in an extremely favorable situation precisely as regards the idea of the united front. In the framework of political organization, French Communism has succeeded in conquering the majority of the old Socialist Party, whereupon the opportunists added to all their other political qualifications, also the quality of "dissidents," i.e. splitters. Our French party made use of this in the sense that it has implanted on the social reformist organization the designation of dissidents (splitters), thus bringing to the forefront the fact that the reformists are disrupters of unity in action and unity of organization.

14. In the field of the trade union movement, the revolutionary wing and above all the Communists cannot hide either from themselves or their adversaries how profound are the differences between Moscow and Amsterdam-differences which by no means are simple shadings within the ranks of the labor movement but are a reflection of the profoundest conflict which is tearing modern society apart, namely, the conflict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. But, at the same time, the revolutionary wing, i. e. first and foremost the conscious Communist elements, never sponsored, as has been said, the tactic of leaving the trade unions or of splitting the trade union organizations. Such slogans are characteristic only of sectarian groupings of "localists," K.A.P.D.,* certain "libertarian," anarchist grouplets in France, which never wielded any influence among broad working masses, which do not aspire or strive to conquer this influence but are content with small churches of their own, and with rigidly demarcated congregations. The truly revolutionary elements among the French syndicalists have felt instinctively that the French working class can be won on the arena of the trade union movement only by counterposing the revolutionary viewpoint and the revolutionary methods to those of the reformists on the arena of mass action, while preserving at the same time the highest possible degree of unity in action.

15. The system of nuclei in trade union organizations adopted by the revolutionary wing signified nothing but the most natural form of struggle for ideological influence and for unity of front without disrupting the unity of organization.

16. Like the reformists of the Socialist Party, the reformists of the trade union movement took the initiative for the split. But it was precisely the experience of the Socialist Party that largely inspired them with the conclusion that time worked in favor of communism, and that it was possible to counteract the influence of experience and time only by forcing a split. On the part of the ruling clique of the C.G.T. (Confederation of Trade Unions) we see a whole system of measures with the aim of disorganizing the left wing, of depriving it of those rights which the trade unions afford it, and, finally, through open expulsion—counter to all statutes and regulations—of formally placing it outside the trade union organization.

On the other hand, we see the revolutionary wing fighting to preserve its rights on the grounds of the democratic norms of workers' organizations and resisting with all its might the split implanted from above by appealing to the rank and file for unity of the trade union organization.

17. Every thinking French worker must be aware that when the Communists comprised one-sixth, or one-third of the Socialist Party, they did not attempt to split, being absolutely certain that the majority of the party would follow them in the near future. When the reformists found themselves reduced to one-third, they split away, nursing no hopes to again win over the majority of the proletarian vanguard.

Every thinking French worker must be aware that when the revolutionary elements were confronted with the problem of the trade union movement, they, still an insignificant mi-

* The ultra-left Communists of Germany, who formed their own party, Kommunistische Arbeiter Partei Deutschland. nority at the time, decided it in the sense of working in common organizations, being certain that the experience of the struggle in conditions of the revolutionary epoch would quickly impel the majority of the unionized workers to the side of the revolutionary program. When the reformists, however, perceived the growth of the revolutionary wing in the trade unions, they—nursing no hopes of coping with it on the basis of competition—resorted immediately to the method of expulsion and split.

Hence flow conclusions of greatest importance:

First, the entire profundity of the differences which reflect, as has been said, the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, has been clarified.

Secondly, the hypocritical "democratism" of the opponents of dictatorship is being exposed to the very roots, inasmuch as these gentlemen are not inclined to tolerate, not only in the framework of the state, but also in the framework of workers' organizations, methods of democracy. Whenever the latter turn against them, they either split away themselves, like the dissidents in the party, or expel others, like the clique of Jouhaux-Desmoulins. It is truly monstrous to suppose that the bourgeoisie would ever agree to permit the struggle against the proletariat to come to a decision within the framework of democracy, when even the agents of the bourgeoisie in the trade union and political organizations are opposed to solving the questions of the labor movement on the basis of norms of workers' democracy which they voluntarily adopted.

18. The struggle for the unity of the trade union organization and trade union action will remain in the future, as well, one of the most important tasks of the Communist Party --a struggle not only in the sense of constantly striving to unite ever larger numbers of workers around the program and tactic of Communism, but also in the sense that the Communist Party—on the road towards the realization of this goal directly as well as through the Communists in trade unions strives in action to reduce to a minimum those obstacles which are placed before the workers' movement by a split in organizations.

If in spite of all our efforts to reestablish unity, the split in the C.G.T. becomes sealed in the immediate future, this would not at all signify that the C.G.T. Unitaire,* regardless of whether half or more than half of the unionized workers join it in the next period, will conduct its work by simply ignoring the existence of the reformist C.G.T. Such a policy would render difficult in the extreme-if not exclude altogether-the possibility of coordinated militant actions of the proletariat, and at the same time it would make it extremely easy for the reformist C.G.T. to play in the interests of the bourgeoisie the role of La Ligue Civique** as regards strikes, demonstrations, etc., and at the same time provide the reformist C.G.T. with a semblance of justification in arguing that the revolutionary C.G.T.U. provokes inexpedient public actions and must bear full responsibilities for them. It is absolutely self-evident that in all cases where circumstances permit the revolutionary C.G.T.U. will, whenever it deems necessary to undertake some campaign, openly address itself to the reformist C.G.T. with concrete proposals and demands for a concrete plan of coordinated actions, and bring to bear the pressure of the public opinion of labor and expose before this public opinion each of the uncertain and evasive steps of the reformists.

Even in the event the split of the trade union organization becomes sealed, the methods of struggle for the united front thus preserve all their meaning. 19. We can, therefore, state that in relation to the most important field of the labor movement—the trade unions the tactic of the united front demands that those methods by which the struggle against Jouhaux and Co. has already been conducted on our side, be applied more consistently, more persistently and resolutely than ever before.

IV. The Political Struggle and the Unity of Front

20. On the plane of the party, there is, to begin with, a very important difference from trade unions in this, that the preponderance of the Communist Party over the Socialist, both in point of organization and press, is overwhelming. It is consequently possible to assume that the Communist Party as such is capable of securing the unity of the political front and that therefore it has no impelling reasons for addressing itself to the organization of the dissidents with any sort of proposals for concrete actions. This question, if posed in a strictly businesslike and lawful manner, based on an evaluation of the relationship of forces and not on verbal radicalism, must be appraised on its merits.

21. When we take into account that the Communist Party numbers 130,000 members, while the Socialists number 30,000, the enormous successes of the Communist idea in France become apparent. However, if we take into account the relation between these figures and the numerical strength of the working class as a whole and the existence of reformist trade unions and anti-Communist tendencies within the revolutionary trade unions, then the question of the hegemony of the Communist Party in the labor movement will confront us as a very difficult task, still far from solved by our numerical preponderance over the dissidents. The latter may under certain conditions prove to be a much more important counter-revolutionary factor within the working class than might appear were one to judge solely from the weakness of their organization, and the insignificance of the circulation and the iceological content of their organ, Le Populaire.

22. In order to evaluate a situation, it is necessary to give a clear accounting of how the situation unfolded. The transformation of the majority of the old Socialist Party into the Communist Party came as a result of a wave of dissatisfaction and mutiny engendered in all countries of Europe by the war. The example of the Russian revolution, and the slogans of the Third International seemed to indicate the way out. The bourgeoisie, however, was able to maintain itself in 1919-1920 and was able, by means of combined measures, to establish on post-war foundations a certain equilibrium, which is being undermined by the most terrible contradictions and which is heading toward vast catastrophes, but which provides relative stability for the current day, and for the period immediately ahead. The Russian revolution, in surmounting the greatest difficulties and obstacles created by world capitalism, has been able to achieve its socialist tasks only gradually, only at the cost of an extraordinary strain upon all its forces. As a result-the initial flow of unformed, uncritical revolutionary moods has given place unavoidably to an ebb. Only the most resolute, audacious and young sections of the world working class have remained under the banner of Communism.

This does not mean naturally that those broad circles of the proletariat who have been disillusioned in their hopes for immediate revolution, for swift radical transformations, etc., have wholly returned to the old pre-war positions. No, their dissatisfaction is deeper than ever before, their hatred of the exploiters is sharper. But, at the same time, they are

^{*} The trade union center of the expelled left wing unionists. **Bourgeois strike-breaking organization in France.

politically disoriented, they do not see the paths of struggle and therefore remain passively expectant—giving rise to the possibility of sharp oscillations to this or that side, depending on how the situation unfolds.

This big reservoir of the passive and the disoriented can, under a certain combination of circumstances, be widely utilized by the dissidents against us.

23. In order to support the Communist Party, faith in the revolutionary cause, activity, loyalty are needed. In order to support the dissidents, disorientation and passivity are necessary and sufficient. It is absolutely natural that the revolutionary active section of the working class should extrude from its ranks a much larger percentage of members of the Communist Party than the passive, disoriented section is able to supply to the party of the dissidents.

The same applies to the press. The elements of indifferentism read little. The insignificance of the circulation and content of *Le Populaire* reflects the mood of a certain section of the working class. The fact that the complete ascendancy of the professional intellectuals over the workers prevails in the party of the dissidents in no way runs counter to our diagnosis and prognosis: Because the passive and partially disillusioned, partially disoriented worker-masses precisely serve, especially in France, as the feeding source for those political cliques composed of attorneys and journalists, reformist witchdoctors and parliamentary charlatans.

24. If we view the party organization as an active army, and the unorganized mass of workers as the reserves, and if we grant that our active army is from three to four times stronger than the active army of the dissidents, then, under a certain combination of events, the reserves may turn out to be divided between ourselves and the social reformists in a proportion much less favorable to us.

Danger of a New "Pacifist" Period

25. The idea of the "left bloc" is pervading the French political atmosphere. After a new period of Poincare-ism, which constitutes an attempt on the part of the bourgeoisie to serve up a warmed-over dish of the illusions of victory to the people, a pacifist reaction is quite probable among broad circles of bourgeois society, i.e. first and foremost, among the petty bourgeoisie. Hopes for universal pacification, for an agreement with Soviet Russia, obtaining from her on advantageous conditions raw materials and payments, decreases in the burden of militarism and so on, in a word, the illusory program of democratic pacifism, can for a certain period become the program of a left bloc, which will come to replace the national bloc.

From the standpoint of the development of the revolution in France, such a change of regimes will be a step forward only if the proletariat is seized very little by the illusions of petty-bourgeois pacifism.

26. Reformist-dissidents are the agency of the "left bloc" within the working class. Their successes will be all the greater, the less the working class as a whole is seized by the idea and practice of the united front against the bourgeoisie. Strata of workers, disoriented by the war and the tardiness of revolution, may venture to support the left bloc, as a lesser evil, in the belief that they do not thereby risk anything at all, and because they see at present no other road.

27. One of the most reliable methods of counteracting within the working class the moods and ideas of the left bloc, i.e. a bloc between workers and a certain section of the bourgeoisie against another section of the bourgeoisie is the persistent, resolute fostering of the idea of a bloc between all sections of the working class against the whole bourgeoisie.

28. In relation to the dissidents this means that we must

not permit them to occupy with impunity an evasive temporizing position on the questions relating to the workers' movement, and to use platonic declarations of sympathy for the working class, as a cover for utilizing the patronage of the bourgeois oppressors. In other words, we can and must, in all suitable instances, propose to the dissidents a specific form of joint aid to strikers, locked-out workers, unemployed, war invalids, etc., etc., recording before the eyes of the masses their response to our precise proposals, and in this way counterpose them to certain sections of politically indifferent or semiindifferent masses in whom the reformists hope to find support under certain propitious conditions.

29. This kind of tactic is all the more important since the dissidents unquestionably are intimately bound up with the reformist C.G.T. and with the latter constitute the two wings of the bourgeois agency in the labor movement. We take the offensive both on the trade union and political fields simultaneously against this two-fold agency, applying the very same tactical methods.

30. The impeccable and agitationally extremely persuasive logic of our conduct is as follows: "You, the reformists of syndicalism and socialism," we say to them before the eyes of the masses, "have split the trade unions and the party for the sake of ideas and methods which we consider wrong and criminal. We demand that you at least refrain from placing a spoke in the wheel during the partial unpostponable concrete tasks of working class struggle and that you make possible unity in action. In the given concrete situation we propose such and such a program of struggle."

31. Similarly the indicated method could be employed not unsuccessfully in relation to parliamentary and municipal activities. We say to the masses, "The dissidents, because they do not want a revolution, have split the mass of workers. It would be insanity to count upon their aiding the proletarian revolution. But we are ready, inside and outside the parliament to enter into certain, practical agreements with them, provided they agree in those cases where it is necessary to choose between the known interests of the bourgeosie and the definite demands of the proletariat, to support in action the latter. The dissidents can be capable of such actions only if they renounce their ties with the parties of the bourgeoise, i.e., the left bloc and the bourgeois discipline."

If the dissidents were capable of accepting these conditions, then their worker followers would be quickly absorbed by the Communist Party. But just because of this, the dissidents will not agree to these conditions. In other words, to the clearly and precisely posed question whether they choose a bloc with the bourgeoisie or a bloc with the proletariat in the concrete and specific conditions of mass struggle—they will be compelled to reply that they prefer a bloc with the bourgeoisie. Such an answer will not pass with impunity among the proletarian reserves on whom they are counting.

V. Internal Tasks of the Communist Party

32. The above outlined policy presupposes, naturally, complete organizational independence, ideological clarity and revolutionary firmness of the Communist Party itself.

Thus, for example, it is impossible to conduct with complete success a policy aimed at making hateful and contemptible the idea of the left bloc among the working class, if in the ranks of our own party there are partisans of this left bloc bold enough openly to defend this scheduled program of the bourgeoisie. Unconditional and merciless expulsion in disgrace of those who come out in favor of the idea of the left bloc is a self-understood duty of the Communist Party. This will cleanse our policy of elements of equivocation and unclarity; this will attract the attention of advanced workers to the acuteness of the question of the left bloc and will demonstrate that the Communist Party does not trifle with questions which threaten the revolutionary unity in action of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie.

33. Those who seek to use the idea of the united front for agitating in favor of unification with the reformists and dissidents must be mercilessly ejected from our party, inasmuch as they serve as the agency of the dissidents in our ranks and are deceiving the workers about the reasons for the split and who is really responsible for it. Instead of correctly posing the question of the possibility of this or that practical, coordinated action with the dissidents, despite their petty-bourgeois and essentially counter-revolutionary character, they are demanding that our own party renounce its Communist program and revolutionary methods. The ejection of such elements, mercilessly and in disgrace, will best demonstrate that the tactic of the workers' united front in no way resembles capitulation to or reconciliation with the reformists. The tactic of the united front demands from the party complete freedom in maneuvering, flexibility and resoluteness. To make this possible, the party must clearly and specifically declare at every given moment just what its wishes are, just what it is striving for, and it must comment authoritatively, before the eyes of the masses, on its own steps and proposals.

34. Hence flows the complete inadmissibility for individual party members to issue on their own responsibility and risk political publications in which they counterpose their own slogans, methods of action and proposals to the slogans, methods of action and proposals of the party.

Under the cover of the Communist Party and consequently also in that milieu which is influenced by a Communist cover, i.e., in a workers' milieu, they spread from day to day ideas hostile to us, or they sow confusion and skepticism which are even more injurious than openly hostile ideologies.

Organs of this sort, together with their editors, must once and for all be placed outside the party, and the entire workers' France must learn about this from articles which mercilessly expose the petty-bourgeois smugglers under a Communist flag.

35. From what has been said also follows the complete inadmissibility of this, that in the leading publications of the party there should appear side by side with articles defending the basic concepts of Communism, other articles disputing these concepts or denying them. Absolutely impermissible is the continuation of a regime in the party press under which the mass of worker-readers find, in the guise of editorials in the leading Communist organs, articles which try to turn us back to positions of tearful pacifism and which propagate among workers a debilitating hostility toward revolutionary violence in the face of the triumphant violence of the bourgeoisie. Under the guise of a struggle against militarism a struggle is thus being conducted against the ideas of revolution and uprising.

If after the experience of the war and all the subsequent events, especially in Russia and Germany, the prejudices of humanitarian pacifism have still survived in the Communist Party, and if the party finds it advisable in the interests of the complete liquidation of these prejudices to open a discussion on this question, then the pacifists with their prejudices cannot in any case come forward in this discussion as an equal force but must be severely condemned by the authoritative voice of the party, in the name of its Central Committee. After the Central Committee has decided that the discussion has been exhausted, all attempts to spread the debilitating ideas of Tolstoyanism and all other varieties of pacifism must unquestionably bring expulsion from the party.

36. It might, however, be said that so long as the work of cleansing the party from prejudices of the past and so long as the work of attaining internal cohesion remains uncompleted, it would be dangerous to place the party in situations where it would come into close proximity with reformists and nationalists. But such a point of view is false. Naturally, one cannot deny that a transition from broad propagandist activity to direct participation in the mass movement carries with it new difficulties and therefore dangers for the Communist Party. But it would be completely wrong to suppose that the party can be prepared for all tests without directly participating in struggles, without directly coming into contact with enemies and adversaries. On the contrary, only in this way can a real non-fictitious internal cleansing and fusing of the party be achieved. It is quite possible that some elements in the party and the trade union bureaucracy will feel themselves drawn more closely to the reformists, from whom they have accidentally split, than towards us. The loss of such fellow-travellers will not be a liability but an asset, and it will be compensated one hundred fold by the inflow of those working men and women who still follow the reformists today. The party will in consequence become more homogeneous, more resolute and more proletarian.

VI. The Tasks of the Party in the Trade Union Movement

37. Unqualified clarity on the trade union question is a task of first-rate importance, by far surpassing all the other tasks before the Communist Party of France.

Naturally, the legend spread by the reformists that plans are on foot to subordinate the trade unions organizationally to the party must be unconditionally denounced and exposed. The trade unions embrace workers of different political shadings as well as non-party men, atheists as well believers, whereas the party unites political co-thinkers on the basis of a definite program. The party has not and cannot have any instruments and methods for subjecting the trade unions to itself from the outside.

The party can gain an influence in the life of the trade unions only to the extent that its members work in the trade unions and carry out the party point of view there. The influence of party members in the trade unions naturally depends on their numerical strength and especially on the degree to which they are able to apply correctly, consistently and expediently the principles of the party to the needs of the trade union movement.

The party has the right and the duty to aim to conquer, along the road above outlined, the *decisive influence* in the trade union organizations. It can achieve this goal only provided the work of the Communists in the trade unions is wholly and exclusively harmonized with the principles of the party and is invariably conducted under its control.

38. The minds of all Communists must, therefore, be completely purged of reformist prejudices, in accordance with which the party is looked upon as a political parliamentary organization of the proletariat, and nothing more. The Communist Party is the organization of the proletarian vanguard for the ideological fructification of the labor movement and the assumption of leadership in all spheres—first and foremost in the trade unions. If the trade unions are not subordinate to the party but wholly autonomous organizations, then the Communists inside the trade unions cannot pretend to any kind of autonomy in their trade union activity but must act as the transmitters of the program and tactic of their party. To be most severely condemned is the conduct of those Communists who not only do not fight inside the trade unions for the influence of the ideas of the party but actually counteract such a struggle for the sake of a principle of "autonomy" which is applied absolutely falsely by them. As a matter of fact, they thus pave the way for the decisive influence on the trade unions of individuals, groups and cliques who are bound neither by a definite program nor by party organization and who utilize the amorphousness of ideological groupings and relations in order to keep the organizational apparatus in their own hands and to secure the independence of their clique from any actual control on the part of the workers' vanguard.

If the party, in its activity within the trade unions, must show the greatest attentiveness and caution towards the nonparty masses and their conscientious and honest representatives; if the party must, on the basis of joint work, systematically and tactically draw closer to the best elements of the trade union movement—including the revolutionary anarchists who are capable of learning—then, the party can on the contrary no longer tolerate in its midst those pseudo-Communists who utilize the status of party membership only in order all the more confidently to foster anti-party influences in the trade unions.

39. The party through its own press, its own propagandists and its members in the trade unions must submit to constant and systematic criticism the shortcomings of revolutionary trade unionism for solving the basic tasks of the proletariat. The party must tirelessly and persistently criticize the weak theoretical and practical sides of trade unionism, explaining at the same time to its best elements that the only correct road for securing the revolutionary influence on trade unions and on the labor movement as a whole is the entry of revolutionary trade unionists into the Communist Party; their participation in working out of all the basic questions of the movement, in drawing the balance sheet of experience, in determining new tasks, in cleansing the Communist Party itself and strengthening its ties with the working masses.

40. It is absolutely indispensable to take a census of all the members of the French Communist Party, in order to determine their social status (workers, civil employees, peasants, intellectuals, etc.), their relations with the trade union movement (do they belong to trade unions? do they participate in Communist meetings? in meetings of the revolutionary trade unions? do they carry out the decisions of the party on the trade unions? etc.), their attitude toward the party press (what party publications do they read?), and so on.

The census must be so conducted that its chief aspects can be taken into account before the Fourth World Congress, convenes.

March 2, 1922.

The War Deal's Economics By WILLIAM F. WARDE

For a long time it seemed to the lofty plutocrats of the United States that they could escape embroilment in Europe's and Asia's wars and get others to fight for them. This era of pacifist illusions and pretentions is now as dead as William Jennings Bryan. Despite all their wealth and advantages, their continental security and resources, the capitalist rulers of the United States could find no better solution for their difficulties than their Japanese, German, English, French and Italian counterparts. They, too, have been obliged to militarize the nation in preparation for waging war in all corners of the globe. Imperialist capitalism can maintain itself today only by the most bloody, brutal, barbarous methods. The supreme law of monopoly capitalism is: rule the planet—or perish!

The entry of the United States into the inter-imperialist combat opens a new chapter in the history of American imperialism—the most crucial in its career. The First World War, it is now obvious, was a dress-rehearsal for the star role American imperialism is destined to enact in the Second World War. The interval between wars was only a period of preparation for the present titanic struggle for the repartition of the world. By its intervention in the war American imperialism aims at dictating, not only to its imperialist enemies but also to the peoples of the world, the conditions under which they may live, work, and be exploited. This is the real, the ultimate war aim of the Roosevelt government.

The Permanent Crisis

We have time and again insisted that the United States has not been drawn into this dance of death through any chance combination of historical circumstances or by any such secondary factors as the rise of Hitlerism or the fall of France. The driving force behind the war party comes from the permanent crisis within our social system engendered by the monopolist forces of American capitalism. So long as big business controls the economy and government of our country, intervention in the war was absolutely inescapable.

It is no secret that the economy of the United States has been in a chronic crisis since 1929 and that this condition is something new in our history. The editors of the New York *Times*, whose devotion to the capitalist system is unquestionable, wrote last month: "So far as actual production was concerned, previous depressions had run only a year or two; the depression of 1929 has continued to drag along in America."

In proof they cited the following statistics on the rate of industrial expansion during the past four decades compiled by the National Bureau of Economic Research. "From 1899 to 1909 factory output increased at the rate of 4.7 per cent a year. From 1909 to 1919 the rate of increase was 3.4 per cent a year. From 1919 to 1929 it was 5.1 per cent a year. From 1929 to 1937, however, the rate of increase fell to 0.4 per cent; and if 1929 is taken as the terminal year, the rate of annual change was a *falling off* of 0.1 per cent."

These figures provide the most objective test of the achievements of Roosevelt's regime, since the national productive forces and the extent of their output form the material basis for progress in all other spheres. Roosevelt promised that his New Deal policies supplemented by Hull's tradepacts would restore American economy to its former flourishing condition. The President did not, and could not, make good. His reform measures and alphabetic agencies, his billions of expenditures, his cajoling of capital could not hoist American industry back to 1929 levels; nor did the few reciprocal trade-pacts negotiated by Hull expand foreign trade to 1929 dimensions.

When the economy took another alarming nose-dive

toward the end of 1937, the policy of internal reform finally demonstrated its insufficiency. The debacle of the New Deal was soon followed by a similar breakdown of the pacifist foreign policy in the face of the approaching imperialist dogfight.

The bankruptcy of Roosevelt's original policies in the economic and political spheres at home and abroad led him to seek new ways of solving the chronic crisis of American capitalism. Only one road was left open to him: a military adventure along the lines charted by the vital requirements of the big business and banking interests of North America.

Roosevelt and Big Business

As in all highly developed capitalist countries, only two decisive social forces exist in the United States: the capitalist class and the wage workers. At the head of the capitalist class stand the monopolists. At the head of the proletariat stand the trade unions, who lead the rest of the masses behind them.

Roosevelt the reformer hoped that he would reconcile the conflicting claims of these opposing classes. He wished to be the impartial and benevolent arbiter of their differences and dispense justice to all.

In working out this policy of class compromise Roosevelt was forced to lean now on the one class and now on the other. This gave his regime a two-faced character: one side, the side of social reform, reflected the concessions made to the masses under pressure of their demands upon the government. The other side was turned toward their millionaire masters.

The early part of Roosevelt's administration which coincided with the first stormy upsurge of the labor movement represented the peak of the masses' influence upon Roosevelt's regime. The people's power was at no time decisive. Whether the disbursement of federal funds or the settlement of an important strike was at issue, the monopolists who operated upon the administration behind the scene had the last word. They fixed the limits of the New Deal's activities, curbing Roosevelt whenever he threatened to exceed the concessions they would make.

Nevertheless Roosevelt's policies were not completely and directly determined by the monopolists, who would have preferred a more docile and pliable President; one, like Hoover, who would give nothing to the people and everything to the plutocrats. Big business was especially irked by the inability of heavy industry to respond to the emergency treatments cf Roosevelt and Hull and, like all rich cantankerous patients, blamed the doctors for failing to cure them.

Roosevelt, however, couldn't inject new vitality into heavy industry by purely internal and peaceful means. The tremendous productive forces and resources controlled by the monopolists needed the whole world for their expansion. But our monopolists encountered abroad the same restrictions upon their activities that their own state imposed upon foreign competition. The growing German and Japanese expansionism began to crowd out American monopolists from the world markets, threatening to place heavy industry on more reduced rations.

The purely economic and diplomatic measures taken by Roosevelt and Hull could not counteract this menace. Where physics and plasters couldn't effect a cure old-time physicians used to resort to blood-letting. The quack-doctors of capitalism have no more scientific remedy for the ills of their system. Throughout the thirties, bourgeois economists and politicians scanned the horizon for the new industry which would reinvigorate American economy. Their search culminated in the rediscovery of the world's oldest industry: war.

In the long run economic necessities override the strong-

est political powers. Roosevelt had hoped to bridle the big business interests and make them accept his liberal program of reforms. It has now turned out that Wall Street has harnessed Washington to its war chariot. The War Deal is the supreme expression of the deepening crisis of American monopoly capitalism.

Economic Consequences of the War Deal

Roosevelt's War Deal has already proved more successful than his New Deal in jacking up industry. Last year for the first time industrial operations surpassed 1929. Here are the Federal Reserve Board's indices of industrial production for three key years.

	1929	1937	1940
Highest Montly Rate	. 114		136
Yearly Average		113	122
The 1040 1 10		•	10351

The 1940 average topped 1939 by 12 per cent; 1937 by 8 per cent; and 1929 by 11 per cent.

The January Bulletin of the National City Bank estimates that new all-time peaks have been registered in production of iron and steel, machine-tools, electrical equipment, aircraft, aluminum, cotton and rayon goods, rubber products, chemicals and electric power. Steel production outstripped the previous record year of 1929 by 4,417,201 tons, or seven per cent, and is at present operating close to capacity of output.

The influence of the war upon economy is also sharply manifested in foreign trade. U. S. exports bounded upward in 1940, totalling \$4,021,564,000, the highest since 1929. One need not look further for the motive force behind the alliance with England and the hostility toward Germany than the facts that the vast bulk of our exports now goes to the British Empire and that Hitler's conquests have cut Continental Europe's purchases from us to an insignificant percentage. The expansion of American exports by \$843,000,000 over 1939 was made possible by the enormous increases in purchases by the British Empire, which more than compensated for the loss of other markets. The British Empire now takes nearly two-thirds of America's exports, the United Kingdom alone taking one-third.

The increasing anxiety over South America, the tender concern for China, the turn toward the Far East? Last year the South American, countries bought \$156,000,000 more American goods than the year before; China, \$22,000,000 more; Japan \$5,000,000 more. Meanwhile this country increased its imports from Latin America by \$102,000,000 and from Asia by \$281,000,000.

The economic impact of the war is likewise reflected in the change in the character of our exports and imports. Aircraft (including parts and accessories) became for the first time the principal American import item. The foreign sales of such military materials as raw cotton, iron and steel, nonferrous metals, machinery, chemicals, explosives and firearms shot upward. Rubber, tin, copper, bauxite, nickel, manganese and other raw materials vital for military purposes were imported in record quantities. From the British Empire came rubber, tin, nickel, and raw wool to help pay for airplanes and steel; from China came tungsten, raw silk, and tin; from the Dutch East Indies came rubber and tin.

Out of such tangible stuffs, and not out of democratic dreams and humanitarian considerations, are the war plans of U. S. imperialism being fabricated.

How foolish do the isolationists of all categories appear in the light of these figures! The foundations of American economy are being radically reconstructed by the war and adapted to fit the needs of the military machine. The illassorted company of pacifist preachers, provincial politicians, Thomas Socialists and Stalinists who pretend that they can prevail against these economic forces pulling the United States into war deceive themselves and what is far worse, deceive those workers who listen to them. Only the overthrow of capitalist imperialism and its replacement by a workers' government can put an end to this reactionary war. There is no other way out for the workers.

Who Benefits from the War-Boom?

In an address at Atlantic City on February 25th, Philip Murray, CIO President, cited the following figures:

		• •	Net Profit
	1940	No. Em-	Per
Corporation	Earnings	ployes	Employe
	\$195.500,000	200,000	\$ 977
American Tel. & Tel.	137,200,000	260,000	528
Standard Oil of New Jersey	110,000,000	55,000	2,000
U. S. Steel	102,180,000	260,000	420
Du Pont	99,900,000	45,000	2,220
General Electric	55,000,000	65,000	826
• • · · ·			

Many of these corporations are making more profits per employe than the average annual wage of their own employees! Bethlehem Steel earned over \$12 a share last year; openshop Douglas aircraft over \$18 per share, after generous provisions for depreciation, surplus, and executive's salaries. According to a New York *Times* report of January 27th, 44 industrial corporations show 1940 net earnings 25.6 per cent above those of 1929.

In addition to these superprofits, the big corporations are being enriched more directly by a bountiful government and War Department. There is hardly a company listed on the Stock Exchanges which is not expanding its plants, adding new properties, or undertaking extensive operations entirely at government expense. Chrysler is building tank plants; Du Pont, explosives; General Motors, airplane engines; Douglas, aircraft factories; Packard, Ford, Studebaker, Buick, engines; Hudson, guns, torpedo parts, and ammunitions, etc. All these productive facilities are paid for by the people and then owned or operated for the exclusive benefit of private corporate interests.

The present war-boom is, however, far more spotty and one-sided than any previous industrial rise in our history. It is largely confined to heavy industry and within these limits to the topmost strata. Many of the smaller industrial companies are given little or no contracts by the government. According to Philip Murray, one corporation, presumably Bethlehem, has government business on its books that it could not hope to execute within three and a half years, although there were at least fifty small steel companies that could take these jobs and produce goods of the same quality with dispatch. Murray added that he was told by a government official that 12,000 industrial plants were capable of producing goods essential to the war and that two months ago 30 per cent of these were "enjoying the benefits" of government contracts while 70 per cent were without government business.

The big corporations are also favored at the expense of their smaller competitors by the allotment of priorities of essential materials, such as aluminum and magnesium. These allotments are designated and controlled by dollar-a-yearmen at Washington who, in many cases, were yesterday leading officers of these very companies and expect to return to them after the war.

Big Business and the Workers

Murray declared he had talked with some of "the most outstanding industrialists in the United States within the last few weeks" and had suggested "that there should be taken from these enormous profits some money that should be given to their employes in the way of wage increases."

"Unfortunately," he added, "the attitude of American industry today is one of absolute, positive refusal to make wage concessions of any description. They contend that if the wage structure is improved and men and women are given more money that it might result in something they call inflation.

"So they suggest, these leaders of American industry, very bluntly, very boldly, that nothing should be done in the United States of America during the period of national defense to improve living standards or to increase wages and that at the same time nothing should be done in the United States by government, labor or industry to disturb the profit-making opportunities of American industry."

Murray would like to obtain wages in friendly conferences with "enlightened" employers or through the pressure of a friendly government upon recalcitrant bosses, instead of through independent strike action on the part of the workers themselves. But this last has proved to be the best and most practical method for extracting concessions from the employers, as the steel workers at Lackawanna, the auto workers in Flint, and the Vultee aircraft workers can testify.

The Crisis of Agriculture

No branch of American economy has been so hard hit by the war as agriculture. World War I lifted American agriculture to new heights; World War II is dragging it down to utter ruin.

Agriculture has suffered almost complete loss of its export markets. Continental Europe now buys nothing from us. Great Britain is using her money and credit to buy munitions instead of food.

Exports of wheat in 1938-39 amounted to 107,000,000 bushels. This year the best estimate is that wheat exports will not exceed 20,000,000 bushels.

Last year we exported 6,000,000 bales of cotton: the top estimate for this year is 1,500,000.

Tobacco growers have lost export markets for 250,000,000 pounds; hog producers have lost markets for 75,000,000 pounds of pork and 140,000,000 pounds of lard; fruit growers will not sell abroad this year 10,000,000 bushels of apples and 3,000,000 boxes of oranges that were normal export quotas before the war.

Roosevelt's henchmen are exploiting this situation to win over the farmers to the war. Assistant Secretary of State Acheson told the National Farm Institute at Des Moines on February 21st that "the prospect of having to sell our surpluses in a Europe which is under the domination of a buyers' monopoly maintained by a foreign dictatorship is one which farmers in this hemisphere cannot face with equanimity... with foreign markets closed or controlled the farmer would find that the domestic market which has been going forward for the past eight years would be reversed." The Southern Senators, ringleaders of the war faction in Congress, want to rescue agriculture by crushing all competition by military force.

Economic Prospects of the War Deal

As the War Deal continues to unfold, it must produce even more serious consequences for economy. The recent raise of the federal debt limit from 49 to 65 billions is only the first rung on a ladder of debt, which will mount, like Jack's beanstalk, to the skies. The war program already calls for an outlay of 28.5 billion dollars. Treasury officials estimate that the new debt limit will have been reached by the end of the next fiscal year. Their estimate is far too optimistic. The government will be compelled this year, as it was last, to step up appropriations to hitherto inconceivable totals. The War Deal is piling up a national debt of intolerable proportions upon the backs of the American people.

This burden will be felt most keenly in heavier taxes, further curtailment of relief and other social services and price inflation. The entry of the government into all markets as the biggest buyer together with the feverish competition of industries for raw materials and available supplies keeps pushing up prices of all commodities. The vast purchases by government agents of food, clothing, medicines, supplies of all kinds involves higher prices for these necessities of life to the ordinary consumer. The average working class family is already finding it harder to make both ends meet. The American people are being forced to forego, not only butter for guns, but autos for tanks, new housing for army encampments, less consumers' goods for more destroyers.

Although a certain percentage of the unemployed is being reabsorbed into expanding industry, the ever-increasing efficiency and technological improvements of industry set limits upon their number. In this respect a different situation prevails in heavy industry today than in the last war. According to the National Industrial Conference Board, from 1916 to 1919 output per man hour fell from 157 to 136 (1900 used as base of 100), owing to the lower level of technology and the greater use of unskilled labor. In the two decades between wars, output per man hour rose steadily, reaching 325 in 1939 and an estimated 335 in 1940.

According to the latest census of manufactures, six per cent less wage-workers produced a three per cent larger vol-

ume of goods in 1939 than in 1929. This tremendous rise in the productivity of labor works against expansion of the labor force, on the one hand, and accounts for the colossal profits reaped by the trusts on the other. This can be clearly seen in the steel industry where the building of continuous strip sheet mills has thrown and kept whole communities, like Newcastle, Pa., out of employment.

While heavy industry expects the boom to last for the duration of the war, agriculture faces further restrictions upon its markets. The spread of the war and the complete involvement of the United States will cut off more foreign markets; inflation will curtail its domestic market.

The gross unevenness of the war-boom and the seriousness of the world crisis produce weaknesses in all parts of our economy and introduce uncertainty in its directing circles. The approaching conflict with Japan, for example, will eliminate our second largest foreign market. The drastic reorganization of American economy now in full swing is making our economy so lop-sided and top-heavy that it lacks the stability to withstand many more severe shocks.

The surprisingly low prices of shares on the stock exchanges despite record earnings signifies that the greatest capitalists themselves lack confidence in the ability of their system to overcome the shocks in store for it or to endure much more damage. The plutocrats thereby display in reality far less faith in the firmness of American and world capitalism than many ex-radicals. The defeatist attitude of the money masters toward their own economy should inspire the revolutionary workers with fresh confidence in their endeavors to replace this decaying system with a healthy new socialist society.

The Pacific War Front

By GEORGE STERN

Birds of prey have supplanted swallows as the harbingers of Spring. This year they herald new battles not only in Europe but in Asia too.

Preparations for extending the Far Eastern front of the Second World War are already far advanced. In anticipation of the German Spring offensive against Britain, Japan has been edging slowly southward. Its new establishments in Southern Indochina and on the Spratley Islands in the South China Sea have brought Japanese forces within seven hundred miles of Singapore, key to the Indies and the mastery of Southern Asia.

At the beginning of March, Britain and the United States, acting in close concert, successfully maneuvered Japan into a frightened pause. On March 1, the British announced the landing of a large Australian army at Singapore. This force, complete with air and mechanized units, moved at once to the Thai (Siam) frontier across which Japan might possibly attack Malaya by land.

A few days later General Marshall, U. S. Chief of Staff, told a Congressional committee in secret testimony that the Far Eastern situation was "serious." He disclosed that the Army was turning over some of its newest bombers to the Navy and that they were being flown to Pacific outposts. This "secret" testimony was allowed to filter to the press. The same week Congress appropriated the often-refused funds to fortify Guam and other Pacific islands. Finally, in the course of the Lend-Lease Bill debate, all efforts to limit use of U. S. forces to the Western hemisphere were repulsed by the Administration on the grounds, openly stated by Secretary of State Cordell Hull, that such limitations would weaken U. S. policy vis-a-vis Japan.

While not as yet necessarily presaging immediate war action, these associated Anglo-American moves constituted a serious warning to Japan that the United States and Britain were ready to pool their Pacific forces to check Japan's southward push. Since it is obviously Japan's policy to go as far as it can without risking American intervention—at least in the present period—these moves temporarily halted Japan's program. Conciliatory statements came from Tokyo. Reports of an immediate "crisis" were hotly denied. For a moment the shouting died down. Then Foreign Minister Matsuoka announced a journey to Moscow, Berlin, and Rome. The time has obviously come for Germany to plot a two-ocean strategy in view of the increased tempo of U.S. participation in the war and Japan has to find out how far it can count upon U. S. involvement in the Atlantic.

For it is clearly understood that the next moves await the march of events in Europe. The outcome of the German Spring offensive—or even of its opening phases—may largely determine in Tokyo and Washington the further tactics to be pursued in the unfolding battle for the wealth of Asia.

This battle lies primarily—in imperialist premises—between the United States and Japan for the legacy of Britain's century-old domination in the Orient. Britain has already in effect accepted a junior partnership in a world-wide Anglo-American alliance. By this means the British ruling class hopes to salvage what it can of its embattled empire. But by this means also U. S. imperialism is embarking deliberately upon a course of world conquest. Its British "friends" as well as its Axis enemies will be compelled to cede power and pelf to it. The outcome of the war in both oceans—again measured by imperialist premises alone—depends upon the effective role of U. S. imperialism. In assessing American war strategy, it must always be kept in mind that a victorious Germany is a far more formidable opponent than Japan. The U. S. war machine will not be ready for several years to fight a war in both oceans on the scale necessary to win. Nevertheless, in whatever combination of strengths and circumstances and whether it be sooner or later, U. S. imperialism is preparing for a showdown with Japan in the Pacific.

Japan, the Weakest Link

Taken by themselves, these two antagonists in the Pacific basin are so disproportionate in size and strength that the outcome of the struggle seems preordained.

Japan came late into the family of imperialist nations. Its capitalist development was a latter-day graft on a feudalagrarian economy. A great military superstructure was erected, perilously overhanging a narrow economic base. From the ranks of an impoverished peasantry proletarian forces were recruited into industrial slavery. Their toil and sweat had to be made to compensate for Japan's lack of all the vital elements of a heavy industrial economy. It has had to depend almost entirely upon imported iron and steel and largely upon imported fuel. The light industries it built have had to be fed with imported raw materials. Its textile plants have had to depend upon cotton imports from India and the United States. Its guns and warships have had to be hammered out of American scrap and have been lubricated and fueled with American oil. Especially since the outbreak of the war in Europe, this dependence upon American or American-controlled sources has pervaded all of Japanese economy.

Coming into a world whose markets and sources of raw materials had already in the main been divided among the older imperialist powers, Japanese imperialism had to resort almost at once to military adventures to extend its slim economic foundations. The history of Japanese efforts at continental expansion go back nearly half a century. Wars were fought against China in 1895 and against Russia in 1905. Korea was annexed and Manchuria converted into a "sphere of influence."

By joining the Allies in the first World War, Japan acquired most of Germany's Asiatic holdings. During the war it tried, with its infamous "Twenty-One Demands," to convert China into a colony. Just after the war it tried to get a foothold in Maritime Siberia. From all these positions, Japan was compelled to retreat. U. S. pressure exerted at the Washington Conference in 1922 forced evacuation of Shantung. The Bolsheviks drove Japanese interventionist forces from Soviet territory. The rise of the Chinese revolutionary movement during 1924-27 dictated a cautious and significant passivity on Japan's part until the revolution was successfully crushed.

Still poor in production goods and bursting with consumption goods produced by sweated labor out of imported raw materials, Japan was less able than most of the capitalist powers to withstand the onset of the world crisis in 1929. The disappearance of free markets, the erection of tariff barriers, the ebb in world production, the collapse of world currencies, goaded Japan into fresh efforts to expand on the continent. The invasion of Manchuria began in 1931 and of China proper in 1937. However, in conditions of world crisis and economic dislocation supplementing and intensifying Japan's own economic feebleness, these adventures proved abortive. Instead they served only to intensify the strain on the Japanese economic structure.

The Japanese army deliberately destroyed competitive Chinese industrial plants to leave the market open for Japan's products. Business men and traders swarmed in after the invading hordes. Yet it proved impossible for Japan to realize on its heavy investment in military operations. Manchuria, occupied nine years ago, has paid no dividends. In China proper Japan has proved unable to consolidate its extensive military gains. Instead Japan itself has been drained of its meager resources. Japanese war and armament expenditures for the current year are budgeted at about eight billion yenseven times more than in 1937. More than three quarters of this is being covered by inflationary methods which are steadily depressing the already low standard of living. In January, 1941, a leading Japanese economist estimated that the standard of living in Japan had declined 40 per cent from the 1937 level.

Despite this, the logic of expansionism compels the Japanese to extend themselves still further. The turn of events in Europe during 1940 opened up dazzling opportunities for expansion southward at the expense of France and Britain opportunities which might never again be presented. Although already involved hopelessly in China with a million men in an army of occupation and billions in material, Japan is trying to grasp its opportunity. Banking upon a complete defeat of Britain and involvement of the United States in the Atlantic, Japan is reaching out for the fabulous wealth of the Indies, for the total mastery of Asia.

Thus at the threshold of incomparably more costly and dangerous conflicts with major imperialist rivals, Japan is a weakened power incapable of sustaining a single major defeat. It must depend not upon its main strength but upon transitory strategic advantages deriving from Pacific geography and Nazi victories in Europe. Moreover, it is doubtful whether it can exploit even these advantages without running even greater risks than defeats in battle. Even if the course of the war in Europe lessens the effectiveness of Anglo-American resistance in the Pacific, in Japan itself the workers and peasants and masses generally are straining at insupportable bonds. The regime of the Mikado and his generals and his admirals has perhaps least chance of all to survive the convulsions of the present war. Japan is the weakest link in the imperialist chain that holds the peoples of the Pacific enslaved.

The Yankees' Advantages

Stemming from a gigantic heavy industrial base woven into might units by a powerful financial mesh, U. S. imperialism has been able in the main to wage its battles on the world market with financial rather than military weapons. The peoples of Cuba, the Philippines, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, and of China too can testify that this has not always been the rule but, by and large, the United States has been able to fight with super-imperialist methods. It used to be called dollar imperialism. It now goes by the name of good neighbor policy. Only now, in the midst of a titanic world conflict, is it being compelled to enforce its claims by brute strength.

The qualitative difference between Japanese and U. S. imperialism can perhaps be illustrated best by reference to China. Japan has had to send its armies into China actually to destroy the budding Chinese industries which might compete with their Japanese counterparts. The United States, on the contrary, is capable of ultimately dominating Chinese economy by providing it with capital goods and draining off super-profits by direct or indirect financial control. Unconsummated inter-imperialist rivalries have so far blocked this course, but it is for this that the United States has for fifty years been the proponent of the "Open Door" in China. It is this perspective that makes China the great potential reservoir for capital investment over which the great powers must inevitably come into conflict.

Because Japan cannot tolerate competitive industrial development in China, it cannot come to mutually satisfactory terms with the Chinese bourgeoisie. It can offer them places as salaried clerks and salesmen. U. S. imperialism, on the contrary, can in theory allow considerable room for Chinese bourgeois enterprise. It can afford it as an overhead charge. That is why the Chinese bourgeoisie rests its hopes today upon successful U. S. intervention in the Pacific and the development of China as an American economic and financial dependency.


But this perspective-and it does not apply only to China—is conceivable only with a return of relative capitalist stability on a world scale. Such stability can be achieved now only through domination of the world by a single power or bloc of powers. The epoch of capitalist decline is unable any longer to support the old rivalries, the old antagonisms, the old divisions of territory and spoils. Capitalism can survive only in the super-concentrated form of totalitarianism. Thus the present war-which is being fought to decide who shall be master of the globe. The United States will achieve this mastery only by defeating Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia and this means years of extended and exhausting conflict in both hemispheres on military and economic fronts. In this conflict, the war between Japan and the United States may well be reduced to the proportions of a single episode, like the crushing of France.


However that may be, the qualitative difference between Japanese and U. S. imperialism gives the latter an important


political advantage. The United States can appear before the subject peoples of Asia as a "liberator" concerned with their freedom and growth. To the Chinese masses especially, the United States could present itself as a rescuer come to strike off the fetters made in Japan. What the Chinese people have to learn now is that victory over Japan won solely through U. S. intervention would open the way not to freedom but to fresh enslavement under new slavemasters. Totalitarian world control will be no picnic for anybody. The standards of present-day exploitation will be standards of plenty by comparison with what is to come. The people of China are fully capable of winning their own freedom through a genuine national revolutionary struggle against the invaders and the native exploiters. In such a struggle they can utilize imperialist antagonisms instead of becoming the hapless victims of interimperialist conflict. Japan is their main enemy today. But the "friend" who will come from across the Pacific to "help" them will become the main enemy tomorrow. For that transformation they have to be prepared, or else suffer new defeats.

American workers rightly sympathize with China's fight against Japan. This does not mean they can support U. S. imperialist intervention in the Pacific. They will be for independent material aid to China by every possible means. But to support an American imperialist adventure in the Pacific is to help tighten the bonds that hold the people of this country, of China, and of Japan, in capitalist enslavement.

Actually the greatest hope of liberation for the people of China and the other subjected lands of Asia does not reside in extension of the imperialist war to the Pacific, or the substitution of U. S. imperialist domination for the British, the Japanese, the German. It resides in the victory of their own national revolutions and of the workers' revolution on a world scale. It is not a change of imperialist masters that the world needs. It is the end of imperialism and the establishment of a world socialist federation.







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