

# LABOR ACTION

Independent Socialist Weekly

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FEBRUARY 25, 1957

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## Russian Line Going Hard?

By L. G. SMITH

Andrei Gromyko has replaced Dmitri Shepilov as foreign minister of Russia. Other changes in personnel have been made by the ruling party, as well as the launching of a "decentralization" program for the economy.

One can now expect, as usual when such things take place, a spate of articles by a host of experts telling those among the American people who are interested exactly what these personnel changes mean from the point of view of this, that or the other faction in the Russian ruling class. Since even in this "de-Stalinized" Russia no public debates of policy are tolerated, and all decisions on major questions as well as their interpretations, are handed out after they have been made, there is no way of telling in advance just what such shifts may "mean." At any rate, we lack the indispensable instrument for such divination with which so many of the commentators seem to be equipped, a microphone in Khrushchev's office.

One thing at least is evident in the trend of the policy of the Russian ruling group, however, because it is public property.

Every effort is being made to crack down hard on the centrifugal forces in the Russian empire and in the world Communist movement which have been gaining momentum ever since the 20th Congress of the CPSU and were greatly accelerated by the Polish upheaval and the Hungarian Revolution.

Is this a return to the "hard" Stalinist

policy, as contrasted with the "soft" period of the ill-fated honeymoon with Tito, the announcement that there may be more than "one road" to the establishment of "socialism" in different countries, and the like?

There can be no doubt that the Russian rulers, backed by their Chinese allies and loudly echoed and applauded by the most servile tools in the satellite and foreign Communist Parties, are trying to turn the helm hard against the "deviations," heresies and signs of independence and disaffection which developed the moment the monolithic power of Stalin's one-man rule cracked after his death. All the old phrases are coming back into currency to set the tone. The old record is being played again with calls for "increased vigilance" and demands for everyone to recognize that among the equal Communist Parties of the world one is more equal than the rest, in the interest of "proletarian internationalism."

But like the power that made that record sound so compelling at one time, the record itself is cracked, and everyone knows it. In such an enterprise only the old methods, applied to the hilt, could hope to have real success, and no person politically sane even dreams that they can be applied to the hilt again in the present circumstances.

It is not enough for an essentially totalitarian regime to thunder against deviations. If it is to reassert its former solidity, it must act in line with its talk. In the foreign Communist movement,

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## Dulles-Demo Debate On Mideast Doctrine Turns Out a Sham

By SAM TAYLOR

After Senate hearings on the Eisenhower Middle East Doctrine lasting more than a month, the Democratic opposition finally produced a molehill. The hearings were long and rambling and produced little in the way of a clarification of U.S. policy in the Middle East, since all sides are in agreement that the Eisenhower proposal is just the beginning of what they hope will evolve into a policy.

The Democratic-inspired changes in the Middle East Doctrine, from an "authorization" for the president to use U.S. military forces in the Middle East to a general approval of the same actions, do not change its political content.

But in the absence of any political alternative, the Democrats can be depended upon to come up with a "constitutional" issue—the power of the presidency. Stevenson played this one to the hilt in the last election and managed to get nowhere.

At issue is the charge that Eisenhower is weakening the office of the presidency by going to Congress with a request for "authorization" to use military forces in situations which the president interprets to be one of "overt armed aggression

from any nation controlled by international communism."

The Democrats claim that the president already has these powers, and that when he asked Congress for an "authorization" this "created a precedent for a weaker presidency in the future." This was the argument put forth by Senator Lyndon Johnson and repeated in various versions by Senator Fulbright, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Adlai Stevenson.

As a substitute, the following amendment was proposed: "... if the president determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any nation or group of nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism."

The president is empowered to do under the language of the substitute all that the original draft allowed him. Somehow the constitutional lawyers inhabiting the halls of Congress seem to believe that it absolves Congress from responsibility if military action does occur, since they have only given their approval and not their "authorization."

Senator Hubert Humphrey gave the widely accepted interpretation of the changes: "What we are saying is that if the president finds it necessary to take military action, we will support what he does. But the responsibility for the decisions is squarely up to him." (N. Y. Times, Feb. 14.) This is the very model of responsible liberal opposition.

### BIG QUESTION

While the constitutional niceties may be argued back and forth, the exact course of action to be followed by the Eisenhower administration was being left up in the air much the same as before.

The big question still remains: under what conditions will the U. S. militarily intervene in the Middle East? Everyone agrees that there is little possibility of direct Russian military intervention, that is, a Russian army marching into Iran, Syria or Iraq. Therefore what is the specific meaning of the statement that "the U. S. is prepared to use armed forces?"

In this respect the Democratic substitute is more vague, and therefore more sweeping, than the original one. The press generally interpreted the Democratic substitute as curbing the military aspects of the Eisenhower Doctrine.

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## Steelworkers in Upset Vote

McDONALD OPPONENT MAKES SURPRISE SHOW OF STRENGTH, RUNNING 2D

By EMIL MODIC

Pittsburgh, Feb. 17

Donald C. Rarick, rank-and-file candidate against David J. McDonald for president of the United Steelworkers, has made a very strong showing in incomplete returns. At this writing, McDonald has 180,000 votes as opposed to 105,000 votes for Rarick.

Although it appears that McDonald will be re-elected, the huge vote for Rarick, an unknown with virtually no organization behind him, is virtually a vote of "no confidence" in McDonald. McDonald had the treasury and thousand-man staff of the international at his disposal, and used both liberally.

Rarick and his supporters have charged fraudulent vote-counting in the Chicago-Gary area, stronghold of Joseph Germano, a McDonald supporter. Returns from that area so far are running 35 to 1 for McDonald, a ratio very much out of line with other sections.

By and large, McDonald's strength came from fabricating locals and miscellaneous locals not engaged in actual steel-making, such as sheet-metal workers, Great Lakes seamen, and the like. Also, McDonald did well in outlying dis-

tricts which were reached by the staff of the international but not by the opposition Dues Protest Committee. Birmingham and the West Coast went strongly for McDonald.

On the other hand, the basic steel locals in the Pittsburgh and Johnstown area went for Rarick. Since the officers of most of these locals supported McDonald while the rank and file were for Rarick, it may be presumed that the vote count here was fairly accurate.

The local to which McDonald himself belongs for voting purposes, Jones and Laughlin Southside of Pittsburgh, went for Rarick by two to one; J. & L. Aliquippa works went for Rarick by 3 to 1, as did U. S. Steel's Homestead Works. The U. S. Steel National Tube Works at McKeesport was 6 to 1 for Rarick.

The only opposition candidate for district director who managed to get on the ballot, Paul Hilbert, was elected by better than 2 to 1 in the Monongahela Valley, District 15. Other candidates were ruled off on flimsy technicalities.

At the International headquarters, votes are tabulated by the Honest Ballot Association. Counting in the locals is done by local tellers, however, and the

opportunity for fraud exists.

It is apparent now that if any of the district directors who last year opposed McDonald's candidate for vice-president had thrown in their lot with the rebels, McDonald would have been defeated.

Rarick, for his part, has announced that he will keep his opposition organization alive and work toward the next election four years hence. There is talk of a "two-party system" in the union. Four years is a long time; the future will tell whether Rarick lives up to his announcement. It will also be interesting to see whether he extends the rather primitive and limited platform on which he opposed McDonald.

But the election has certainly demonstrated one thing: those who think that the rank and file of the American union movement are docile cattle in the hands of the union bureaucracy have been proved wrong.

The leading exponent of conservative unionism within the CIO has just been repudiated by the oldest and biggest locals in his union. It is a safe assumption that the Homestead Works did not vote against McDonald because he is too conservative.

# Daily Worker Scribe Backs Kadar Decree

By H. W. BENSON

There is no doubt that a wing of the Communist Party is eager to break away from the domination of Stalinism and found a movement which genuinely looks toward the American working class. It was this tendency, led by John Gates, *Daily Worker* editor, that was encouraged, and properly so, by the defeat of Foster at the CP convention and which enthusiastically greeted the convention's declarations for independence and equality.

But as we described last week, the convention's declarations were basically weak and ultimately futile as a means of actually transforming the Communist Party; and those who limit themselves to the convention position will find themselves just as isolated and just as distrusted by labor militants as before.

For, while declaring for independence and the right to criticize other Communist Parties, the convention in fact did not take a stand on a single critical question at issue. Not one word to rebuke those who crushed the Hungarian Revolution; not a phrase of rebuke to the puppet Kadar regime. Not a sentence of moral and political support to the Poles who are fighting to defend the measure of independence they have already wrested from the Kremlin.

While the convention, and therefore the party, evades the issues, not all of its publicists are equally discreet. There is *Daily Worker* writer George Morris who uses his column on February 15 to spring to the defense of the murderous Kadar government and to defend it from the eminently correct attacks directed against it by a prominent trade-union magazine.

Morris provides a typical sample of old-time Stalinist apologetics mitigated only by a clumsy effort to hold out the hand of good-fellowship to two AFL-CIO labor leaders at the very moment when he is revealing himself as the defender of a tyrannical dictatorship in Hungary.

The latest issue of the *Butcher Workman*, published by the AFL-CIO Amalgamated Meat Cutters Union, prints a stinging denunciation of the Kadar puppet government and excoriates its recent decree "legalizing" the execution of strikers. (Its editorial is reprinted in full on this page.) Morris is pained.

What saddens Morris most of all is that the attack emanates from a union whose leadership cannot be described by him as reactionary. In fact, he hails the *Butcher Workman* for its stand on Tito's projected visit to the U. S. When the

AFL-CIO Executive Council issued a statement opposing Tito's visit, Patrick Gorman and Earl Jimerson, the top Amalgamated officers, disagreed and concluded "Let Tito Come." Needless to say, they based their views not on any agreement with Tito's political policies but on pure diplomatic and tactical considerations.

"Jimerson and Gorman," Morris is careful to point out, "...took 'unorthodox' positions on questions including civil liberties for Communists because they weren't guided by hysterical headlines..."

And so Morris is disturbed, if not mystified, to discover that they "are simply swallowing hook, line and sinker what the labor-hating news services had prepared for them on the recent Hungarian decree. The decree has been falsely described in the commercial press as providing a death penalty for 'strikers.'"

A job must be done and Morris does his best. It is necessary to apologize for an anti-working-class dictatorship. One might imagine that after the recent convention, Morris would let well-enough alone, preserve a well-advised if not dignified silence, and talk of other things. But he plunges right in, equipped by the training of a political lifetime.

In sum, he argues that the Kadar regime was acting not against strikers but against saboteurs, wreckers and dynamiters; that the government has the right to defend itself against "so-called 'freedom-fighters.'"

Here is one oozing sample of his work: "Would Jimerson and Gorman favor a union cover-up to wreckers and dynamiters who infiltrate an American union and use it? It is well known how gangsters, racketeers and an assortment of crooks use the American trade-union movement. We're trying to get rid of some of them at least. Surely one can find no fault with a workers' and peasants' government that seeks to flush out saboteurs and wreckers in the midst of a revolutionary situation."

But who are the "gangsters, racketeers,

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# LABOR SCOPE

## Will Labor Clean Its Own House?

By JACK WILSON

The remarkable expansion of trade-unionism in the United States into a vast new socio-economic force has posed many complex issues and fresh problems for study and solution. Largely, the thinking of trade-union experts, political groups and scholars has been concentrated in two general directions: (1) the economic and political impact of the emerging unionism, notably the advent of the CIO in the past decade, and (2) the significance of the political struggle within the union movement to eradicate the influence of the once-powerful and strategically located Communist Party.

Now a third field has become the center of attention. Its name is racketeering.

The recent scandals and exposés, which are bound to get further limelight in the Senate hearings, have brought to the fore an important question: Just how deep and extensive are the abuses and corruption within the union movement whose total size (16,000,000 members) and wealth (at least \$1 billion, not to speak of nearly three-quarters of a billion dollars in annual operating income) are a lucrative field of operation for "fast buck" boys and outright racketeers.

In addition, the fantastic growth of health and welfare funds, without preconceived direction and control, has placed a fund of money totaling billions of dollars within the power of union officials little equipped by training, knowledge or concern to handle such vast sums.

Perhaps one of those innumerable surveys which are the rage of the time may show that there is no more abuse of money and power in the trade-union field than in any of the other strata of society. Certainly some past exposés, like those of the Kefauver committee which uncovered the close connection between big-city machines and racketeers, and which hit both political parties, are going to be hard to beat.

The often expressed statement that "racketeering in the union movement is no greater nor less than in any other strata of American capitalism" is valid and worthwhile provided it is used as an indictment of the society as a whole. When used, however, as an alibi to rationalize corruption within the union movement, it is disgraceful, for it seeks to cover up a new cancer in the labor movement, rather than expose and destroy it.

There are many questions which ought to be answered before one can make a definitive judgment on the issue of racketeering within the union movement. Just how extensive is it, for example?

Last week, a story was leaked to the Detroit press by a "high AFL-CIO official" that the real target of the union movement's own drive against racketeering is the Teamsters Union and Jimmy Hoffa, its virtual dictator. Since the story gave every indication of coming from sources close to Walter P. Reuther UAW president and ardent opponent of racketeering as well as rival of Hoffa for control of the Michigan labor movement, the story merits more than passing attention.

What are some of the forms that racketeering assumes, and which are most prevalent among the following: (1) Extortion; (2) bribery and pay-offs; (3) welfare and health fund manipulations; (4) abuse of union funds for personal use; (5) direct use of union office to conduct bookmaking and numbers rackets.

How much direct tie-up is there between the one-time prohibition racketeers and some union officials? How do racketeers achieve and maintain direct control of some unions? Are craft unions more susceptible to becoming prey to racketeers than industrial unions? (We think so; it is not accidental that a union like the Teamsters developed one way and the UAW another.)

Can labor by itself clean up its own house? Before this can really be answered except by assertions of faith in the working class, a study of the role of federal, state and municipal agencies, from law enforcement to courts, in relation to the problem of racketeering is necessary.

The inevitable tendency of the bourgeois politicians and many labor leaders will be to reduce the whole issue to "good guys versus bad guys"—just eliminate the bad guys and all will be well. Putting it another way, finding and using a few scapegoats in the labor bureaucracy and then declaring the problem of racketeering solved would fit neatly into the hopes of those leaders in American life for whom the status quo is the best of all possible worlds.

The fine moral statements of the AFL-CIO leaders in their ethical code suggest that at least some of them realize the day for oversimplified solutions like scapegoats is not an answer to the problem.

## Beck Case Symbolizes the Racket Issue

If the Board of Regents of the University of Washington held a meeting this week, a somewhat embarrassing situation would take place. The president would not be there to open the meeting.

If the Executive Council of the AFL-CIO went back into session this week a large vacancy would loom. The representative of the largest union in the world would be absent.

In both cases the millionaire involved has gone (to use a crude term) on the lam. Dave Beck is the man. Even his closest cohort and rival, Jimmy Hoffa, referred to Beck as a "lamster" when the news broke that Beck was hightailing it to Europe rather than face a Senate investigating committee immediately.

What kind of university is it that tolerates a social parasite like Beck as president of its Board of Regents? What kind of community uses him as a criterion of success so important that he helps guide the education of the youth of that state—perhaps by example?

And what has happened in the last 20 years in the labor movement that permits this kind of "fast buck" man to be on the top policy-making body of the most powerful union movement in the world?

It wasn't very long ago that the *Reporter* magazine, now printing a critical study of Jimmy Hoffa of the Teamsters Union, had an article describing the successes of Dave Beck. Even the *New York*

*Times* magazine section had a rather favorable portrait of Beck as a new kind of successful American labor leader.

In all these situations Beck served as a symbol of the new American labor bureaucracy, especially that section which seems almost indistinguishable from its business counterparts.

Everything that the code of ethical practices of the AFL-CIO condemns fits the case of Dave Beck perfectly. Does anyone expect him to be expelled from the AFL-CIO council for that reason? Hardly.

While Beck is away, the best legal talent available for money in America will be used to ease the difficulties of Beck when, and if he returns, which is likely since there is a Teamsters convention this fall. Beck's powerful friends in the Republican Party will do their bit to soften the investigation. Remember how Senator Joe McCarthy defended Beck and the Teamsters Union during the preliminary hearings of the McClellan committee.

It would be a welcome surprise if any Senate committee found something illegal in the way Beck achieved his riches. His cruder imitator Jimmy Hoffa has been investigated a few times, both from an income-tax viewpoint and otherwise. In each case nothing happened. Some of his more stupid associates ended up in jail, but not Jimmy, the man whose testimonial dinner attracted the bigwigs

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## "FIRST COUSINS"

Here, in connection with the accompanying article, is the text of the editorial entitled "First Cousins" in the February issue of the *Butcher Workman*, organ of the AFL-CIO Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen.

From Hungary comes word that the administration of Premier Janos Kadar is cracking down on the workers who are still hampering his government by continuing to declare strikes in their fight for freedom. Dictator Kadar, therefore, has declared that labor leaders who advocate strikes can be brought before a special court and sentenced to death by hanging within twenty-four hours.

The decree goes even further, stating that one can be hanged for "disturbing any activity of a factory." If a strike is inaugurated in a plant employing more than 100 people, the sentence of death is practically mandatory.

The significance of the insanity of the present Hungarian Communist regime is history repeating itself in that to destroy liberty, dictators must first destroy labor unions. This is best accomplished by murdering or sending to jail the leaders of the workers.

There are a lot of first cousins to such tyranny roaming all avenues of our own nation. No revolution has occurred in this country, and we pray to God that one never will, but at the same time there are those who represent big business who are miniature Janos Kadar. They never stop their boring from within. They continue to strive for laws that would give to the several states only the power to regulate labor unions. Of course, the idea is that it would be easier to outlaw the union shop in the several states if the government would wash its hands of its traditional obligation to protect the workers in their right to organize.

The insidious program of such employers who desire the destruction of organized labor does not stop with right-to-work laws. Their propaganda mills continue to grind out the filth that labor leaders are dishonest, that they are stealing the millions in the Health and Welfare Funds established as a result of contracts, and that they are racketeers, etc. It is heart-warming that President Meany of the AFL-CIO is now striking out at this in a most vigorous manner.

Hungary's brutal Janos Kadar has a lot of first cousins on this side of the Atlantic, and they don't happen to represent organized labor.

# BUDAPEST TO BERLIN TO BONN

## The Impact of the Storm in East Europe on Germany

By GORDON HASKELL

The Hungarian Revolution shattered many an illusion about the solidity and invulnerability of the Russian Communist system, specially in the satellites. It now appears that it may have also delivered a severe blow at another illusion which has done a great deal of harm since World War II.

**This is the illusion that the Russian rulers are ready to withdraw from East Germany, and permit its reunification with West Germany, if only a sufficiently attractive offer were made them.**

This illusion has been nurtured in different ways, and for the purpose of justifying different policies by Adenauer's government and by its Social Democratic opposition.

From Adenauer's side, the illusion was a pretty transparent bit of political stage-scenery. Since no political party in Germany can be against unification or even appear to be indifferent to it and still hope to gain or keep mass support, Adenauer was "for" it too. His party's argumentation went something like this:

"First we must show the Russians that Germany is a solid part of a powerful political and military coalition bound together in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Once Germany is armed and enjoys the backing of the United States, we will be able to negotiate with the Russians from strength, which is the only language they understand. If they come, in due course, to realize that Western Germany will never be in a position to be gobbled up by them via some proposal for 'unity' which would put all the cards in the hands of their East German puppets, it will be possible to induce them to make a deal which will permit German reunification."

The basic flaw in this reasoning was so apparent that the Social-Democrats had no difficulty in pointing it out. The more solidly West Germany becomes tied to the United States, the less reason the Russians have to permit East Germany to slip out of their grasp, as this simply and inevitably strengthens the forces of the enemy camp. Hence the Social-Democratic leadership opposed rearmament and integration into NATO.

Though their opposition to Adenauer's policy rested on solid ground from a negative point of view, their weakness lay in the alternative analysis which they presented and the policy line which flowed from it. While their views and policies have changed somewhat over the years, in its most recent aspect it goes along the following lines:

"The Russians will never give up East Germany if it is simply to become a part of the armed camp arrayed against them. The Russian rulers are animated by fear of another war, and their primary aim as far as East Germany is concerned is to keep it as a buffer against the capitalist armies led by the United States. The

solution, therefore, lies along the lines of dismantling the two military blocs in exchange for a joint guarantee by Russia and the United States of the peace in Europe, while a united Germany forms the neutral center, or part of a neutral belt separating the potential belligerents. The problem of German reunification and European security must be solved at the same time, and this can be done only within a general European security system guaranteed jointly by Russia and the United States."

### BASIC ILLUSION

This approach had one apparent advantage. From time to time Russian spokesmen had suggested or strongly hinted at the idea that if the United States and Russia were to withdraw their troops to their own borders, some "solution" to the "German problem" might be worked out. Thus the Social-Democrats could claim their proposal ran along lines which already had some support in Russian ruling circles, while the Adenauer position had been flatly and repeatedly rejected by them.

**But far more than the Adenauer position, that of the Social-Democrats has been based on the conception that the Russians are actually willing to relinquish East Germany, if they can be given the proper political price.**

Adenauer's position offered the people of West Germany the immediate advantages which accrued to them from rapid integration into the political and economic structure of Europe and the rest of the capitalist world with American backing. Though it gave lip-service to the idea that this road was also going to lead eventually to German reunification, its real position was to assign unification to the distant and uncertain future.

The appeal of the Social-Democrats' position was based on the claim that it could achieve unity in the immediate future, if only the United States and Russians could be induced to see reason.

The Russian reaction to the upheaval in Poland and the revolution in Hungary has made one fact of political life as clear as it possibly can be made: Russia has no intention of giving up any of the satellites as long as she has the political and military power to keep them. And if there is any variation in the intensity with which the Russian rulers apply this policy among the various countries of the satellite empire, it is clear that East Germany is regarded as one of the least expendable among them.

### NO ENTHUSIASM

When the Polish and Hungarian events exploded on their doorstep, one might have expected all parties in Western Germany to hail them with enthusiasm, and seek to come to their support with all means at their disposal. Above all, one might have expected them to urge their East German brothers to join the struggle for liberation from the Russian yoke, and to pledge them all support within their means in such a struggle.

One might have expected such a reaction, that is, if one were naïve and really believed what all parties in West Germany have been saying on the hustings for a number of years: that the freedom of their Eastern brothers is the thing for which their hearts burn with a holier and brighter flame than for any other objective in the world.

Actually, it should have come with little surprise that the Adenauer government greeted the Polish and Hungarian revolutions with an absolute minimum of enthusiasm. In fact, they had to work hard to keep from showing that they were as terrified and upset by these developments as they could possibly be.

Adenauer's boldest action in support of the Hungarian and Polish struggles

was to launch an investigation of Radio Free Europe to find out whether it had been urging the peoples of Eastern Europe to rise up against their masters and giving them false promises of the aid they would get if they did so.

This reaction becomes understandable when one recalls that the Adenauer government is one of the most conservative in Europe, and represents a capitalist class which is doing very well as things are going now, and that there is nothing which it wants less than revolutions (anybody's revolutions) anywhere in its vicinity. Its clear bias has always stood above its tepid passion for freedom, and also above its patriotism, so its reaction was understandable.

### TEPID SDs

But how about the Social-Democrats? After all, they are adamant anti-Stalinists, and they are for a democratic socialist society, which is what the Hungarian Revolution is for. Their program calls, if not for the overthrow of capitalism, then for its transformation into a society in which the big private monopolies are controlled by democratic means. They are a party based on the working class, and it was precisely this class which came to the head of the Hungarian Revolution, and sought to lead the nation to socialist democracy and freedom. And above all, the anti-Russian character of the revolution offered a real possibility of liberating the satellites from Russian control, and among them East Germany.

**Hard though it may be, it is necessary to say that the enthusiasm which the leadership of the German Social-Democratic Party displayed for the Hungarian Revolution was only formally greater than that of the Adenauer government.**

With the honorable exception of a few party-controlled and trade-union publications, their press displayed a remarkable self-restraint in its expressions on the revolution.

It was against the Russian intervention; it expressed horror and sadness at the fate of the brave Hungarian fighters for freedom. But almost totally absent was any hint of a mood which might possibly communicate itself to the Hungarians—let alone to the East German workers: "Go to it, brothers, that is the way to throw off the Russian yoke . . . we are with you!"

### DISASTER, THEY THOUGHT

Is this to be explained solely on the basis of the known conservatism of the German Social-Democracy? In part, of course. But the immediate political point was far more important.

The Russian reaction to the Hungarian and Polish events was to pour troops into both countries. East Germany, with its heavy troop concentrations, was held in an iron grip while the Polish and Hungarian events unfolded. As soon as the Gomulka government came to terms, additional troops were poured into East Germany. In Poland, one of the main arguments with which Gomulka sought to dampen and channel the revolutionary upsurge was that since Russia was determined to hold East Germany, she could not be expected to permit Poland to become neutral, as this would cut off her lines of communication and military support to her main European bastion.

The swiftness and brutality with which the Russians put down the Hungarian Revolution, once they were able to bring sufficient numbers of reliable troops into the country, was clearly meant as a warning to the rest of the satellite countries: *You try to free yourself from our empire, and that is what you can expect!*

In truth, to the leadership of the German Social-Democracy the Hungarian Revolution was a disaster rather than an opportunity. In forcing the Russian rulers to display the imperialist character of their rule in the satellites in its most naked and brutal form, the revolution dealt a really stunning blow to all analyses and policies based on the illusion that the Russians regard East Europe, and especially Eastern Germany, as an area which is expendable for a good political price.

The only factors which saved the Russians from complete and irrevocable ex-

posure was their ability to distract attention by pointing to the British-French adventure against Egypt, and the fact that the United States, while showing no signs of an attempt at belligerent intervention, also showed no signs of being able to exploit the situation in any other way.

### DANGER OF WAR?

In their own defense, all who share the point of view of the German Social-Democratic leadership on the Hungarian Revolution point to the danger of general war which, they say, might have been brought about by a spread of the revolution to East Germany and the rest of the satellite countries.

It is not necessary to deny the possibility that a Russian leadership faced with revolution on all sides might seek to "solve" the whole problem by launching an all-out war. But it is necessary to point out that a spreading revolution at home offers the worst possible circumstance in which to start a general war.

**East Germany could be used as a base of Russian operations against Poland and Hungary only as long as East Germany itself remained quiet. If it too had gone up in flames, the Russians would have been paralyzed in the whole of Eastern Europe. And above all, the repercussions in Russia, herself of such a massive revolt would have been incalculable.**

Would there have been grave risks attendant on a German Social-Democratic policy aimed at inspiring the revolution, rather than damping it? Of course there would have been risks. But they are the kind of risks which, if permanently avoided by the European labor movement, doom it to growing paralysis, sterility, and ultimately certain defeat.

Now the German Social-Democrats continue to talk about their idea of a European-wide "security system" guaranteed by Russia and the United States, in which a united Germany would take its place in exchange for giving up West Germany's membership in NATO. Erich Ollenhauer, their leader, is now in this country seeking to sell this idea to the State Department, and thus to buy its neutrality in the German elections due next September.

But after the Russian reaction to the Hungarian Revolution, who will take seriously the idea that they would be prepared to give up their actual imperial power in East Germany and the satellites in exchange for the vast uncertainties of such a deal? Who will believe it, especially when it has become crystal-clear that the only thing which preserves any Russian power in the whole satellite empire is sheer military force in being, or the threat of its immediate application the moment any country in its grip tries to free itself?

### A ROAD FOR SOCIALISM

The German Social-Democracy has missed one great opportunity. It is still trying to play out the part to which it was committed before the Hungarian Revolution's brilliant flames threw into sharp relief the realities of Russia's role in Europe. But as time goes by, the German Social-Democrats will come to understand that along that road no progress whatever is possible.

Will they then have to wait for another explosion in East Europe or in Russia itself to give them another chance? There is much they can do both to make another explosion possible, and to make possible its exploitation to the maximum in the interests of European freedom and progress toward socialism.

Once again the deadlock between Russia and the United States is reviving the idea of a united Western Europe. So far, this talk emanates primarily from the direction of capitalist parties and governments. Whatever their political objectives may be (and it would take us to far afield in this article to discuss them), it is an idea which should be embraced in a different way, and given a really progressive meaning, by the labor and socialist movement in Europe.

Despite the cooling off of the "cold war," the big arrow in the Russian

(Continued on page 4)

## LABORSCOPE

(Continued from page 2)

of labor and industry last year. Beck may well meet the same legal standards.

There is no question, for instance that the Teamsters Union constitution allows Beck to travel abroad with his family at union cost. Very few unions are different. This is partly what makes the Beck case so symbolic of the problem in the union movement.

**The whole point is that the conduct of labor leaders should not be confined to a judgment of the legality or constitutionality of their actions, but should be regarded more fundamentally from labor's moral and ethical standpoint.**

The labor movement is supposed to be a social movement, not a racket. Its leaders should be men motivated fundamentally by goals of brotherhood, justice and the other fine sentiments of mankind, rather than narrow, selfish and mercenary motives. This is the way the union leadership sees itself when it proclaims a code of ethical conduct. The Beck case symbolizes the issue.

## HUNGARIAN REVOLUTIONARY LEADER TALKS:

# Interview with Paul Jonas, Petofi Circle President

By BOB &amp; ANITA MARINO

The following interview was given to two students who met Paul Jonas in Strasbourg, France, where he was attending meetings of the Hungarian Revolutionary Council, a newly formed organization of exiled Hungarian revolutionary leaders.

Jonas is Education and Cultural Director of this Council, which is headed by Anna Kethly. In Budapest Paul Jonas was president of the Petofi Circle and a member of the Revolutionary Council.

Paul Jonas completed his doctorate in political science at Budapest University in 1946 after having been released from Nazi imprisonment. He was president of the Hungarian National Students Union from 1945 to 1947.

In 1948 the totalitarian yoke tightened in Hungary and he was jailed along with many others, including socialists and Titoists. He was released five years later in 1953 after Imre Nagy had become prime minister during the "liberalization" period following Stalin's death. Jonas will always have the physical scars resulting from his treatment in prison.

Jonas was president of the Petofi Circle, which was a group of Budapest intellectuals including journalists, authors, professors and others. This club discussed literary, art and other intellectual themes but every discussion had political content.

The club was one of the concessions given to intellectuals during the liberalization prior to the revolution. The maximum membership of the club was perhaps about 120, but its influence extended far beyond its confines. Politically, the club included both non-Communists and Communist Party members; the Communist Party members were a minority. Jonas was not a member of the Communist Party.

Following are the questions asked of Paul Jonas and his replies.

## INTERVIEW

Q.—What were the major demands of the revolution?

A.—National independence with a neutral status and free elections.

Q.—Who were the leaders of the revolution?

A.—It was spontaneous; there were no leaders. [Another revolutionary leader with whom we spoke termed the Petofi Circle as the spark of the revolution.]

Q.—What type of social system do you believe the revolutionists wanted?

A.—The Hungarians wanted to establish social ownership of large factories and to consolidate the land ownership of peasants endorsed by the agricultural reform of 1945. The people wanted political independence and free elections.

Q.—How did the Russian soldiers react to the revolution?

A.—I was present at the big mass demonstrations on October 25 at the Parliament when the Hungarian secret police opened fire on the crowd. I saw three Russian tanks and also Russian armored cars return the fire and join the revolution. In the beginning it was not uncommon for Russian soldiers to join us. Those who joined us were mostly from groups who had been stationed in Hungary for a long time and knew the situation. However, it was different later for fresh Mongolian troops were sent in who thought they were fighting fascists in Egypt or Berlin.

Q.—Which social groups led the revolution?

A.—Almost everyone supported the revolution. However, the large cities were the centers of the revolution and there the Workers Councils and students took the leadership.

Q.—Would you tell us a little about the Workers Councils?

A.—They were most successful. In small factories all the workers got together and freely elected the Workers Councils which ran the factories. In large factories, departments of 20 workers freely elected their representatives to the Workers Councils which ran the

factories. Former management officials who had compromised themselves with Stalinism were simply not elected. Elections were by secret ballot wherever requested (which happened often). Otherwise it was by hand vote.

The spirit of the workers was wonderful during the victorious period between October 29 and November 4 when they had the only opportunity to manage the factories themselves. All factories had been repaired and were scheduled to operate at full scale on November 5.

Q.—What part did fascists or Horthy reactionaries play in the revolution?

A.—None was on the Revolutionary Councils. Some of them could have acted as individuals, but they were insignificant. The revolution was anti-fascist as well as anti-Communist.

Q.—What is your opinion of Radio Free Europe?

A.—Although we are in some respect critical of Radio Free Europe, at the same time we are also fully convinced of the importance of its functions and are very much in favor of such a radio station. Some of its broadcasts were, however, open to criticism before and during the revolution. Several times its reporting was inaccurate. In addition it was static. It commented on events rigidly as if there were no changes at all during the liberalization. Radio Free Europe attacked Imre Nagy while everyone in Hungary, during the revolution, considered him as the only possible solution acceptable to the Russians.

Q.—What do you think of Gomulka and the "Polish Way"?

A.—The Petofi Circle, and I think also the Hungarian people in general, would not be satisfied with Gomulka-type freedom but want complete freedom. Even if the Hungarians had gotten as much freedom as the Polish people did, they would continue to demand more until complete freedom was achieved. This the Kremlin would never permit. I think the Polish people, seeing the complete failure of the West to give any diplomatic support to Hungarians fighting for their freedom, are accepting Gomulka "faute de mieux" [for lack of something better]; nevertheless, I am convinced that in their heart they are fully for the demands put forward by the Hungarian Revolution.

Q.—Could Hungarian freedom have been achieved without a violent uprising, perhaps by a gradual liberalization?

A.—Full freedom, probably not. Partial freedom, such as that Gomulka's Poland has achieved, probably yes if Gero had not prevented it. But in fact he did everything to prevent such a solution.

Q.—If free elections were held in Hungary today, which party would win?

A.—That is difficult to answer. The Communist Party would not get more than 2-3 per cent.

Q.—How do you feel about the British-French military intervention in Egypt?

A.—I think that most Hungarians agree with the free world's condemnation of the Suez intervention. From the purely Hungarian angle, the timing of the enterprise was catastrophic. It is impossible to say with full certainty whether it was in fact the Suez situation which induced the Kremlin to launch their attack on November 4 against Hungary. There will remain, however, the terrible feeling that this action has been a major contributor to the Hungarian tragedy. Similar views have been expressed by many papers, for example the *Manchester Guardian* or *World Today* (published in London by the Royal Institute of International Affairs). For us Hungarians it was particularly distressing to see that while no effort was saved to implement with full effect all UN decisions concerning Suez, in connection with Hungary only resolutions were passed, knowing in advance that they will have no effect and nothing was undertaken to give force to these resolutions.

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## Point 4 in Iran — a Hushed Scandal

Just at the time the Eisenhower Doctrine was announced, with its plans for economic aid to the Middle East, the House International Operations subcommittee released a report on how the U. S. spent \$250 million in Point Four aid in Iran.

The report, which criticized the "cavalier, free-wheeling and casual" way in which the first Point Four program was administered, was heavily censored by bipartisan agreement before it was released, in order not to endanger the "economic aid" parts of the Eisenhower Doctrine.

Referring to the so-called "technical assistance" part in which \$100 million was spent, the report stated that it "was neither technical assistance nor economic development but an *ad hoc* method of keeping the Iranian economy afloat during the years of the oil dispute...."

"Amounts requested [of Congress] for U. S. aid to Iran seem to have been picked out of the air. There is no evidence that they were based on advance study of what the Iran economy needed...."

Iran's participation in sharing the expenses "appears to have been little more than nominal, and it is clear from the Iran standpoint, the program's virtue was that it supplied a source of foreign exchange. It was not U. S. know-how but a bundle of U. S. dollars that was Iran's chief gain.

Another and less diplomatic blast of U. S. economic-aid programs came from Charles Edmundson, a former U. S. Information Agency officer in Seoul who was fired for publicly criticizing the Middle East Doctrine.

He charged that "chiefly due to the policies laid down in Washington, much of the hundreds of millions which we spend in under-developed countries is wasted by being channeled through speculators, profiteers, grafters and politicians while essential agriculture and industry suffer."

## Budapest To Bonn —

(Continued from page 3)

propaganda string is the claim that the United States, through NATO, seeks to restore capitalism throughout the Russian empire, and plans an eventual aggressive war for this purpose. That is the argument, whether much believed any longer or not, which was echoed by Gomulka, and which has been used to try to repair the damage the Hungarian Revolution did to the Communist Parties of the world.

A united Western Europe, pointing to a socialist reorganization of the Continent, would draw the teeth of that argument down to their muzzling gums. It would stand as a hope and a symbol to the peoples in Russia and Eastern Europe.

Such a Europe could demand, without any military threats whatever, that the United States and Russia withdraw their troops to their own borders; and its

safety from attack from any source would lie more in its political and economic power than in the defensive force of its arms. True, the very existence of such a Western Union would be a call to revolution for freedom and socialist democracy to all the peoples of Eastern Europe, with whatever risks such a revolution might bring in its wake.

Impractical as a policy for the powerful German Social Democracy? Well, we have just seen, and we shall see even more clearly in the months to come, how "practical" was and is the policy which led them to reject the Hungarian Revolution in the name of the hope of German reunification as the result of a deal rather than a revolution.

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## Out of the Ferment Among Polish Youth

The following document, which comes out of the ferment in Poland, is reprinted by permission from the current New Leader, which gives its history as follows:

"Leszek Kolakowski, a young philosopher who has written in the Communist theoretical journal *Nowe Drogi*, wrote the following article for the student newspaper *Po Prostu*. Its publication was forbidden (reportedly by Gomulka himself) because it was so clearly anti-Soviet. Circulated privately by the Communist youth of Warsaw University, the article reached the attention of the Young Democratic group, which posted it on their bulletin board. University authorities had it removed, and the Young Democrats have since been dissolved, but a copy of the article was obtained by our contributor Richard C. Hottelet during his recent assignment in Poland for CBS News."

### What Is Socialism?

By LESZEK KOLAKOWSKI

We will tell you what socialism is. But first we must tell you what socialism is not. It is a matter about which we once had a quite different opinion than we have today.

A society in which a person who has committed no crime sits at home waiting for the police.

A society in which it is a crime to be the brother, sister, son or wife of a criminal.

A society in which one person is unhappy because he says what he thinks, and another happy because he does not say what is in his mind.

A society in which a person lives better because he does not think at all.

A society in which a person is unhappy because he is a Jew and another feels better for not being a Jew.

A state whose soldiers move into the territory of another country first.

A state where anyone who praises the national leaders is better off.

A state in which one can be condemned without trial.

A society whose leaders appoint themselves to their posts.

A society in which ten people live in one room.

A society which has illiterates and smallpox epidemics.

A state which does not permit travel abroad.

A state which has more spies than nurses and more people in prison than in hospitals.

A state in which the number of officials increases faster than that of workers.

A state in which one is forced to resort to lies.

A state in which one is compelled to be a thief.

A state in which one is forced to resort to crime.

A state which possesses colonies.

A state whose neighbors curse geography.

A state which produces excellent jet planes and bad shoes.

A state in which cowards live better than the valiant.

A state in which the lawyers in most cases agree with the state prosecutor.

Empire, tyranny, oligarchy, bureaucracy.

A state in which the majority of people seek God in order to find solace in their misery.

A state which awards prizes to pseudo-authors and knows more about painting than the painters.

A nation which oppresses other nations.

A nation which is oppressed by another nation.

A state which wants all its citizens to have the same opinions in philosophy, foreign policy, economics, literature and ethics.

A state whose government defines its citizens' rights, but whose citizens do not define the government's rights.

A state in which one is responsible for one's ancestors.

A state in which one part of the population receives salaries 40 times higher than those of the remainder.

Any system of government toward which most of the governed are hostile.

A single, isolated state.

A group of backward countries.

A state which utilizes nationalistic slogans.

A state whose governments believe that nothing is more important than their power.

A state which makes a pact with crime and then adapts its ideology to this pact.

A state which would like to see its Foreign Ministry determine the political opinion of all mankind.

A state which finds it difficult to dis-

tinguish between enslavement and liberation.

A state in which racist agitators enjoy full freedom.

A state in which there is private ownership of the means of production.

A state which considers itself solidly socialist because it has liquidated private ownership of the means of production.

A state which has difficulty differentiating between social revolution and armed assault.

A state which does not believe that people must be happier under socialism than elsewhere.

A society which is very melancholy.

A caste system.

A state which always knows the will of the people before it asks them.

A state which can mistreat the people with impunity.

A state in which a view of history is important.

A state in which the philosophers and writers always say the same as the generals and ministers, but always after them.

A state in which street maps of cities are state secrets.

A state in which the returns of parliamentary elections are always predictable.

A state in which there is slave labor.

A state in which feudal fetters exist.

A state which has a world monopoly on scientific progress.

A state in which an entire people, through no desire of its own, is moved to a new location.

A state in which the workers have no influence on the government.

A state which believes that it alone can redeem humanity.

A state which considers itself to be always in the right.

A state in which history is a servant of policy.

A state whose citizens may not read the greatest works of contemporary literature, not see the greatest works of contemporary painting and not hear the greatest works of modern music.

A state which is always well pleased

## Liberals Plan New Magazine at U. of Pa.

Phila., Feb. 11

A new magazine, presenting "all ranges of views," is being organized by liberal students at the University of Pennsylvania. Incorporating the latest ideas in news-staff organizing and advertising, it plans to devote itself to the presentation of student opinion on contemporary political and social problems.

A temporary executive board, composed mainly of liberal members and ex-members of the staff of the U. of P. men's newspaper, the *Daily Pennsylvanian*, called a meeting of interested Philadelphia area students Sunday, Feb. 10, for organizational purposes. The board declared that the magazine (name still to be decided) will be published monthly.

The board said that anyone, regardless of political view, may be on the staff provided no attempt is made to "use" the

publication to further one particular point of view.

A Literary Board composed of a broad range of political views from right to left will largely decide the political nature of articles. Other features on academic freedom, federal aid to education, fraternities, as well as stories on sports, literature, and other matters of student interest, will be printed.

The publication is to be modeled on many magazines, such as the *Reporter*, and is to receive nation-wide advertising and circulation. Articles will not be restricted to any one point of view, but the main emphasis is to be balanced between liberalism and conservatism. However, board members indicated that more "extreme" positions will be presented in print, and will be represented on the forthcoming Literary Board.

The first issue is planned for April.

with itself.

A state which asserts that the world is very complicated but actually believes it to be extremely simple.

A state in which one must suffer long before one can get a doctor.

A society that has beggars.

A state which believes everyone to be enamored of it, whereas in truth it is the opposite.

A state which is convinced that nobody in the world can conceive anything better.

A state which does not mind being hated as long as it is feared.

A state which determines who may criticize it and how.

A state in which one must each day refute what one affirmed the day before and always believe it to be the same.

A state which does not like to see its citizens read back numbers of newspapers.

A state in which many ignoramuses rank as scholars.

Well, then, socialism is not:

That was the first part. But now, listen attentively, we will tell you what socialism is: Well, then, socialism is a good thing.

### THE AIM OF THE YSL

The Young Socialist League is a democratic socialist organization striving to aid in the basic transformation of this society into one where the means of production and distribution shall be collectively owned and democratically managed. The YSL attempts to make the young workers and students, who form its arena of activity, conscious of the need for organization directed against capitalism and Stalinism.

The YSL rejects the concept that state ownership without democratic controls represents socialism; or that socialism can be achieved without political democracy, or through undemocratic means, or in short in any way other than the conscious active participation of the people themselves in the building of the new social order. The YSL orients toward the working class, as the class which is capable of leading society to the establishment of socialism.

—From the Constitution of the YSL

### LABOR ACTION

## Russian Line Hard? — —

(Continued from page 1)

this would mean wholesale expulsions, purges, frame-ups, defamations, and the like. In Russia and the satellites it would mean a mass purge in the old style.

But everyone knows: a purge of that kind in the Communist Parties of Europe and America would reduce them from their present state of crisis and paralysis to utterly isolated, hopeless little sects. In Russia, undoubtedly many echelons of the bureaucracy itself have no stomach for a purge in which they would be as much victim as purger. And if such a policy should even be attempted in Poland, no one could answer for the consequences.

So—they are trying to do their best, but it will not be good enough. The strug-

gle for democracy which has begun in one degree or another throughout the Communist-controlled world may be defeated and reversed, but for this a new trend on a world scale would have to develop. The signs of the times are that things are moving historically in the opposite direction.

Though a "hard" policy by the Russian rulers will not return things to the status quo before "relaxation," their attempt to turn the tiller in that direction should have at least one salutary effect. It should make it harder for the prophets of "self-democratization" of Russian society by the bureaucracy to peddle their wares. Not impossible, to be sure, for the old principle enunciated by P. T. Barnum still has its validity.

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# The Triangle of Forces In the Polish Revolution

By HAL DRAPER

The aftermath of the Gomulka election in Poland saw the emboldening of the unreconstructed-Stalinist ("Natolin") wing of the ruling Communist Party, as we explained last week. The youth organ *Sztandar Mlodych* let it be known that the Stalinists were saying it was they who had won. And the press reported the beginning of an obvious and ominous drive by the "Natolinists" to attack the policy of the regime, specifically the agricultural policy. Why did the electoral victory engineered by Gomulka encourage the Stalinist apparatus-men who still control the party machinery?

1

## The S-G-R Pattern

The explanation lies in a classic pattern of political struggle. We can represent it schematically in terms of a simplified physical analogy:

Consider *G* standing between *S* and *R*. The latter two are both pushing hard against the middle man *G*—equally and in opposite directions. The two opposing pressures balance each other. *G* will not fall; indeed the only way for him to maintain his position is to make sure that both *S* and *R* continue to be balanced against each other.

At the same time, in this posture of temporary equilibrium, *S* and *R* both seem to be literally supporting *G*—holding him up. Naturally the appearance is deceptive.

But suppose *R* begins to push too hard, begins to push *G* out of plumb. If *R* continues to press, the first victim of his pressure will be *S*, on the other side, who will have to topple over before *G* goes down. At the same time, middle man *G* is in such position that if he lets *S* go over, he himself will be defenseless before the unbalanced push of *R*. He will be next. In order to keep *R* in place, he must also keep *S* in place. So he pushes back against *R*'s advance, making sure that he is backed up by *S* on the other side.

But let's say *G* (backed by *S*) pushes back so hard as to over-react. *R* is pushed over in turn. In this successful surge, it is *S* who now gets the advantage of momentum and has middle man *G* off-balance...

Post-election Poland is just about at this point. Leader *G* succeeded in stemming the revolutionary line in the election, but it is the Stalinists who are trying to utilize the momentum thus produced.

Among the numerous revolutionary situations where this "S-G-R" pattern provides the key to what happened, it may be enough to mention two for illustration:

(1) The way in which the Bolsheviks "supported" Kerensky against Kornilov, in spite of the fact that they were his open revolutionary enemies and not his critical supporters, and how the kind of success that this "support" had, meant Kerensky's downfall once Kornilov was toppled. Here Kerensky was the middle man, and it is this pattern which gives a meaning to the comparison which inevitably crops up between Gomulka and Kerensky.

(2) Germany 1918: In order to put down the revolutionary danger from the Spartacists, Noske (for the Social-Democratic government) had to revive and reorganize the Junker officers' corps, etc. Insofar as the revolutionary threat from the left weakened, to that same extent the old bourgeois political forces pushed their way back to power, shoving Noske and his Social-Democrats aside when their job of toppling *R* was exhausted.

## MAN IN THE MIDDLE

It is possible to follow the revolutionary dynamics of the Polish situation today only within the framework thus described.

Gomulka is the man in the middle: he does not represent an independent social or political force.

This fact is obscured by a seeming

paradox. Everybody is pro-Gomulka and nobody is really a "Gomulkaist."

The *Christian Science Monitor's* correspondent Joseph C. Harsch, covering the Polish election, cabled back that Gomulka "has no real organized political support in his own right at home, and no visible prospect of getting any," that he has no support of his own "except for a handful of intellectuals." This seems in violent conflict with most other reporters who tell of the mass support and influence which Gomulka enjoys. Yet Harsch and the others are all describing the same phenomena. Both summations are right—or wrong, as you choose. It is the S-G-R pattern that explains the real relationship of forces.

2

## The Third Corner

But the S-G-R pattern does not take care of a big complication in the Polish situation (indeed, in most of the world)—one which has no past parallel in the older struggles of the working class, that is, against the older system of capitalism.

The socialist working class was raised up on the fight against the exploitive system of capitalism, and from the days of the Communist Manifesto it was looked on as essentially a *duel*. There were two contestants in the ring for the main bout. Any blow against capitalism was a blow for socialism, for this was the only alternative; and vice versa.

But this is no longer true in our day. The working class faces two rival exploiting systems, capitalism and Stalinism, which are in turn locked in fierce combat against each other over much of the world. The old duel is now a struggle among a triangle of forces. The struggle for the world is three-sided; it has acquired a new dimension.

The S-G-R pattern describes a straight line: in essence, the working-class revolution versus Stalinism, with the man in the middle. But it is important to fill in the third corner in the Polish triangle of forces; the one that derives from or harks back to the old pre-Stalinist society.

Who represents this in Poland today? There is no bourgeoisie to speak of, of course. Is it represented by the vague references which one gets in the Polish press about anonymous "reactionaries" who yearn for a "capitalist restoration"? There may well be such people about, just as there were such in the nooks and crannies of the Hungarian Revolution, but there is no evidence that they play any significant role in events. Nor is it necessary to look for them, since there ARE two big, powerful, and well-known social forces in Poland which obviously stand outside of both the Stalinist society on the one hand and the working-class struggle against this society, on the other.

These are the peasantry and the Catholic Church.

The relationship between the three corners of this triangle of forces is, of course, not only one of conflict. There is also a question of forming alliances. Clearly, this triangle of forces involves far more complicated relationships than are visible from the simple S-G-R formula, which helps to describe only one sector of the triangle. For example, the man in the middle—Party Secretary *G*—does not simply stand between Stalinism and the revolution; he is in the middle of the triangle.

This is what explains the fact that the new Stalinist push in Poland has seized

on Gomulka's agricultural policy as the whipping-boy. To see this, we must look at the present relations between Gomulka, the man in the middle, and the third corner of the Polish triangle.

3

## Gomulka's Concessions

One great big fact about Gomulka's policy is this: The major—not the only, but easily the major—concessions that Gomulka has made to the "people" are his concessions to the peasantry and the Catholic Church, i.e., to the third corner. The peasants and the church have virtually gotten what they wanted; nobody else has, certainly not the workers.

The student and worker revolutionaries in the cities are chafing with dissatisfaction over the inadequacy of the "democratization" program; the workers are insistently told by the regime that they cannot and will not get the wage increases they need... But the peasants have gotten virtually free rein for decollectivization of the land (they were partly given it and partly took it); their compulsory crop quotas have been substantially reduced, and even better is promised; rights of private property have been restored. The Catholic Church leadership and institutions have made a sweeping comeback; religious instruction in the public schools at state expense as well as abolition of all police and governmental repressions against church activity and personnel; to the point where the Polish press has carried numerous protests at discrimination against anti-church parents.

There are two things that are not involved here: Firstly, justice. Gomulka is interested in the power relationships these moves confer. (From the socialist point of view, it would be necessary and important to discuss the measures themselves, but not here.)

Secondly, Gomulka has not done all this because he is either "pro-peasant" or "pro-Catholic." He is a national-Communist who is trying to fend off Moscow's Polish stooges on the one hand and the democratic revolution on the other.

So the question on this agenda is: what these concessions mean for Gomulka. It should be clear now that they represent his effort to escape from the S-G-R pattern, where he gets buffeted back and forth like a shuttlecock.

He does this by leaning across from both the party apparatus and the worker-student mavericks to secure points of support on the "third corner," after which he can hope to stand astride the whole triangle.

What is involved is Gomulka's plan of alliance with the two big pre-Stalinist-society social forces in order to extricate himself from the grinding conflict between *S* and *R*.

## ALTERNATIVES

His calculation assumes that neither the peasantry nor the church can dream of any real restoration of the old capitalist world in Poland; and there is no evidence that the Polish church leaders have any such dreams today. So he is not risking an overturn of his system by strengthening these allies. They can get "theirs" only by supporting him. They can be no fundamental danger. By leaning on them, however, he can keep the two immediate dangers in line. So he can figure.

Otherwise, what's the alternative? To be always at the mercy either of the Moscow-Stalinist party apparatus behind his back with a dagger, or of the "imprudent" and "adventurist" worker-student mass whom he can keep in line only as long as he soothes them with hopes of basic democratic transformation.

Even his own personal preferences are not to the point in this dilemma. (That's why speculations on Gomulka's possible personal course in a showdown are not central.) For suppose he wants to move toward more nationalist concessions from Russia? He can accomplish this

against the Natolin-Stalinist resistance, which still controls the party apparatus centers, only by unleashing the revolutionary forces. The revolution, unleashed, will sweep him away, like a Kerensky (if not into itself, bobbing like a cork on its surface, like a Nagy).

Or suppose he wants to, or has to, fall back on the apparatus-men to knock off over-enthusiastic van-detachments of the threatening revolution? This indeed is what is behind his cautious steps in the last period toward rehabilitating and reinspiring the internal police and militia forces. But then he risks alienating his support on the left and winding up as the prisoner of the revolution's executioners.

So either way, he finds himself in the position of Alice down the rabbit-hole, with a bottle in the left hand labeled "Eat me" which will make him grow so tall as to bump his head against the heavens, and in his right another labeled "Drink me" which will shrink him down to Natolin. He can try nibbling alternately at one and then the other... but how long can it go on?

Hence Gomulka's peasant policy and church policy.

4

## The Stalinists' Strategy

From this follows also the Stalinists' line of attack on Gomulka, now that they are raising their heads again after the election. They look for a weak point to insert a jimmy and start prying away.

They have no mass support. Their fortress is the party apparatus, behind whose bastions they form a determined garrison (while Gomulka warns off the turbulent rabble beyond the drawbridge). They can have no hope of mobilizing any Polish movement behind themselves. They can live only by stirring dissension between Gomulka and his allies in such a way as to confuse them all and dominate the scene in the hurlyburly with the power of the apparatus.

Can they afford to make a frontal attack on Gomulka's "democratization" line or on the anti-Russian component of the Gomulka line? This does crop up in the outside-satellite press, as in the Bulgarian and East German point-blank denunciations of the slogans of democratization and liberalization.

But it is not very possible (not so far) inside Poland, where these are holy words, with influence that penetrates well into the ranks of the party itself. This would put the Natolinists in direct collision with the worker-student movement. They do not want a head-on collision with this movement; they want to confuse and deflect it.

Can they afford to make a frontal attack on Gomulka's church policy? The risks are obvious, especially after the election when the church marshaled and exhibited its enormous power in both the cities and on the countryside, often even demonstratively. Besides, it would be difficult to show that the concessions to the church were going to restore capitalism.

At any rate, what the Stalinists did obviously decide to use as the first point at which to pry away at Gomulka's support, was the peasant policy. There followed the demagogic attacks on Gomulka for bringing about or permitting the precipitous destruction of the collectives into which so many of the peasants had been forced by the Stalinist regime.

(In the two months after the October party plenum, about 80 per cent of the Polish collective farms dissolved; only 2000 remained out of 10,000, and mainly the "poor and inefficient ones," as the press complained; and many of these that remained are not remaining collectives but are being transformed into cooperative farms.)

This, to be sure, brings the Stalinists into head-on collision with the peasantry, but they have less to lose here than elsewhere. They can scarcely hope to get any aid and comfort from the peasantry in any case, with their record; and of all of Gomulka's backing, the peasantry is the least active force.

## NATOLIN'S AIMS

What can they hope to accomplish? They can hope to sow confusion in the proletarian centers with their cries about return of private property, invocation of bourgeois-restorationist bogies, violation of "Marxist-Leninist norms," and what-not.

(Continued on next page)

# Arab Socialists and Israel: What Is Their Attitude?

As a third contribution toward an understanding of developments in the Arab Middle East today, particularly in Arab socialism, we present for the information of our readers a number of answers to questions by Brijen K. Gupta. They arose out of the material we have printed in the last two issues, in which Comrade Gupta, on the basis of talks and inquiries made on his tour of the region last summer, included a number of references to the Arab socialists' attitude toward the Israel problem.

We sent a number of questions to Comrade Gupta asking for further information on this latter point, that is, on just what the Arab socialists' attitude is. We're sure his reply will be of general interest from a factual point of view, since there is little or nothing available as far as we know.

The questions we asked of Gupta may be summarized as follows:

(1) Has any Arab socialist party (say, the Baath or the Lebanese party), or has any prominent Arab socialist leader, ever officially or formally or at any rate publicly come out with the statement that it is against any perspective of destroying Israel as a state, wiping it off the map? What has ever been done by Arab socialists—by a party or socialist leader—to combat any notion of destroying Israel *per se*?

(2) You wrote in your article for LA (Feb. 11): "The Baath Socialists made it clear to me that they have repudiated the 1948 war..." Have they repudiated the war in any public statement or in

their press or in any resolution or other quotable document? To what extent does such an attitude enter into their public propaganda and education or documents? Do the people know they hold such a position?

(3) Have any of the Arab socialists ever made an attempt to contact or discuss with any socialist groups in Israel? Is there any contact of any sort between any socialists in Israel and any Arab socialists? Has any such attempt ever been made?

(4) Have any Arab socialists ever spoken up in objection to (a) barring Israeli ships from the Suez Canal; (b) blockading the Gulf of Aqaba; (c) the fedayeen activities?

(5) Do the Baath Socialists have a critical attitude toward the military-dictatorship aspects of Nasser's regime and other Arab regimes? What do they say on the question of demanding a democratic regime? Or do they taken an attitude like that of the pro-Peron socialists in Argentina? In general, to what extent do they evince political opposition to their own ruling class, military-feudal or bourgeois elements? or to what extent, rather, do they take the attitude that their task is to collaborate with these elements and classes while distinguishing themselves by being more nationalistic or more uncompromisingly nationalistic?

Needless to say, Comrade Gupta's answers to these questions give the requested information on the Arab socialists' views, not his own.—Ed.

## A Letter from Gupta

Before answering your questions, I should make it clear that there are five socialist leaders in the Arab world whose statements have special importance. They are Kemal Djumblatt of the Progressive Socialist Party of Lebanon; Akram Hourani, Michele Affak, and Salah el Bitar of the Baath Socialist Party in Syria; and Suleman Nabulsi, secretary general of the National Socialist Party in Jordan.

The Syrian socialists are much to the "left" (in their ideological and economic thinking, e.g., in their ideas about workers' democracy) of Djumblatt and Nabulsi, who are more or less right-wing social-democrats. (To these five we can probably add Kamil Chederjey, Chairman of the National Democratic Congress in Iraq, who is primarily a nationalist.)

I do not believe that any of these five people have made any public statement in the Arabic press on what could be a "socialist" policy toward Israel, but they

have allowed foreign visitors to quote their views. Inside their own countries they have used their energies to describe why they are anti-Zionists, and why they consider Israel as it exists at present to be a threat to Arab nationalism. That is to say that in their own press they have not initiated a discussion on what should be the basis for a socialist settlement in Western Asia.

Given this background, here is an attempt to answer your specific questions:

(1) None of the above mentioned socialist leaders has made any forthright statement saying that Arabs want to destroy the state of Israel, nor has anyone of them made a clear statement that they do not. Whenever this question is brought up to them, they point to the statements of Nasser and Salah el Bitar at the Bandung Conference and other occasions in which they have said that the Arab countries are willing to negotiate a settlement with Israel on the basis of the previous UN resolutions. They agree that these resolutions cannot be implemented completely but that

these should form the basis of negotiations.

(2) I think there have been several editorials in *Al-Baath*, the weekly organ of the Baath party, saying that the Arabs have by far and large repudiated the 1948 war. Naguib in his autobiography makes the point that it was wrong to have gone to war in 1948. Djumblatt has also written about it.

(3) No attempt has been made by the Arab socialists to meet the Israeli socialists. Year after year the Indian socialists have attempted to bring the two together; such an effort was recently made by myself last summer. Unfortunately it has not been possible so far to get an agreement on time and place, participation and issues for such a meeting. In principle the Arab socialists accept the idea, just as the leaders of Mapai and Achdut Avodah and also Mapam do. The time is not propitious enough for me to say why I was unsuccessful.

One ideological difficulty has been that the Arabs think that socialism and Zionism are antithetical creeds, and hence they reject the thesis that Mapai, Achdut Avodah and Mapam are socialist parties.

(4) No; on the contrary they have justified these measures. They consider that economic blockade is the most non-aggressive policy with which to deal with Israel.

The fedayeen activities they consider as being a retaliation against continuous Israeli army attacks; and they point out—with justification—that before 1955 there were no fedayeen activities, and that it was only when Arab security was menaced that such retaliatory tactics began. (As you would notice, the argument has the Israeli flavor.)

(5) No; the Baath Socialists are somewhat like the pro-Peron socialists. They think that while in Iraq, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon conditions are ripe for a parliamentary democracy, such conditions hardly exist in the Arabian peninsula or Egypt.

One may then ask what is the positive element in the Baath's program insofar as it relates to Israel. The Baathists are prepared to have a federalist solution in Western Asia which would require Israel to give up as much sovereignty as any Arab state would yield; which would promise to Israel a provincial and cultural autonomy, and which would require Israel to give up the fields of foreign affairs, defense, immigration and economic development to the central authority. They believe that it is basically the policy of unlimited free Jewish immigration that makes Israel Zionist.

One of the things that the Arab socialists have emphasized over and over

again is that they are prepared to sit down and talk with the Israelis but not with world Jewry. World Jewry to them is an absentee party with no claim on the Middle East. They are prepared to consider Israel as a Jewish country but not a Jewish national home to which any Jew could at any time return.

In a *Realpolitik* settlement they ask for these gestures: Israel's willingness to take as many refugees as would want to go back and as many as could be absorbed inside Israel, provided that Arab repatriation shall have priority over any further Jewish immigration; or Israel's readiness to make territorial concessions in the Negev and Western Galilee; or a combination of these. This position is presented in Naguib's autobiography, and Affak heartily endorses it.

I think one should also see the statement by Zechariah Moheddeine quoted in the book *Who Knows Better Must Say So* (pp. 19-21) by Elmer Berger. The Arabs were very sincere in saying that the presence and retaliatory tactics of Israel take away the Arab governments' attention from social and economic reforms.

Until last October the program of the Baath was threefold: (1) anti-imperialism, (2) Arab unity, (3) solution of the Palestine problem. The fact that the Israeli problem figured last was a hopeful sign. What developments have taken place since last October I do not know.

BRIJEN K. GUPTA

## Triangle — —

(Continued from page 6)

They do not have to kid themselves that they can thus gain the support of any serious revolutionary workers; it is one of the characteristics of the apparatus manipulator that it is enough to muddle and embroil the opposition so that the apparatus can step in to organize the confusion in the absence of any other strong hand.

But that is not all, or perhaps even the main thing, they can accomplish by making their offensive on the peasant policy. Another (possibly the main) objective is also to tear away from Gomulka that section of the Stalinist apparatus which went over to him at the time of the October party plenum. Here the appeal of their line is realistic.

The very arch-representative of these Stalinist apparatus-men who plumped for Gomulka in the October revolutionary crisis is Ochab, the party secretary who was replaced by Gomulka at the October plenum. It is men like Ochab, not Gomulka, who are the incarnation of the non-Natolin section of the party apparatus behind the Gomulka regime.

It is also Ochab who is the minister of Agriculture in charge of the peasant policy.

The Stalinist offensive is calculated to light a fire under Ochab or others like him in the party leadership.

Gomulka, after all, is in the position of titular head of the party, not the government. A cold coup in the party apparatus, reversing October, whether or not accompanied by factitious "mass" demands, could give Gomulka's position a staggering blow, if not the quietus.

Against this threat or attack, Gomulka would have to consider slipping the leash on the restless and seething forces of the Polish Revolution, as started to happen in October, or at least lengthening the leash to begin with in hope of controlling the beast. If the crisis were posed sharply enough, the regime would tend to divide between the Nagys and the Kadars.

This is one prospect evoked by the Stalinist offensive; anything can still happen in the stormy working-out of the Polish Revolution.

There has been, for example, a considerable air of expectation evoked among the revolutionary elements around the session of the newly elected Sejm (parliament). Even before October, the unanimity of the Sejm was broken by nay votes, but a good deal more is hoped for now. Specifically, it is looked to as at least an arena or forum for genuine criticism and pressure on Gomulka. It appears that this is the front on which R can make its push. It will be heartening to see successes on this front. But if a tribune to rally the people is established in the Sejm, it is not inevitable that the seething Polish Revolution will confine itself docilely within its limits.

## DW Scribe Backs Kadar's Decree — —

(Continued from page 2)

teers and crooks" in Hungary? American labor militants are convinced that it is the puppet regime of Kadar that can best be described by such blunt words, even though it masquerades as a "workers' and peasants' government." They are right, absolutely right.

It is clear where Morris stands—the open defender and apologist for a regime of terror. He will attract to the *Daily Worker* and to the Communist Party as much support and sympathy from American unionists and progressives as has the Kadar government!

But since he insists that the Kadar decree is not directed against strikers but only against "wreckers," let us examine his documents for a moment.

We must admit, at the outset, that every fighter for democracy has doubtless been executed by the infamous Kadar regime as a "counter-revolutionary," "wrecker," etc. But that is not to their discredit; it only exposes the regime as a faithful copier of the methods of the Stalin regime in Russia, which in its

time executed individuals and wiped out whole nations on similar charges. History now records, without the possibility of refutation, that it was Stalin and not his victims who was the "wrecker."

Still, it is instructive to see how Morris in convicted by the very document which he quotes. Excerpts from the Kadar decree were printed in the *Daily Worker* on January 28, not by the editorial board but by Herbert Aptheker in a letter to the editor. It is from these excerpts that we quote:

"Sentence in cases tried under this decree may be death. The court under conditions may mete out, instead of the death sentence, life sentence or a sentence ranging from five to 15 years imprisonment."

Who is subject to these penalties? The decree, as translated by Aptheker, covers no less than 10 types of "offenses," including "organizing against the People's Republic or the democratic order." Who can doubt that this section alone is directed against every independent action of the working class?

But the authors of the decree wanted no misunderstanding; the decree covers "any water, gas and electric utility or of any plant which furnishes vital supplies and which has been declared essential for public welfare." That is, it covers virtually every and any factory.

And one of the "crimes" for which it authorizes death is "the purposeful disturbance of the operation of such plants by illegal entry or any other way, or inciting to the commission of such act." [Our emphasis.] Is that clear enough? Death... death for "the disturbance of the operations of such plants" in "any other way."

The *Butcher Workman* is 100 per cent right: "...to destroy liberty, dictators must first destroy labor unions. This is best accomplished by murdering or sending to jail the leaders of the workers."

And Morris uses the pages of the *Daily Worker* to serve as an apologist. In the pre-convention discussion, there were Communist Party members who raised their voices in protest against such blind apologetics. Will they have the right to do so again?

# Dulles-Demo Debate —

(Continued from page 1)

Nothing can be further from their intentions or actions.

The gist of the criticism is that the U. S. should not in any way spell out what possible military intervention is contemplated and under what circumstances. All that Senator Fulbright and Dean Acheson want is a general "sense" congressional resolution, such as the Vandenberg Resolution at the time of the Truman Doctrine for Greece and Turkey, stating U. S. interest in preserving the status quo in the Middle East and a general determination to resist what is vaguely defined as "Communist aggression." Then it would be left up to the president to fill in the content as the situation demanded.

On the other hand there were some Democrats, such as former Air Secretary Thomas Finletter, one of Stevenson's closest advisors in New York State, who wanted to spell out in precise detail that the U. S. is prepared to move against indirect or covert "aggression," whatever that may be intended to mean.

The text of the Democratic substitute manages to come somewhere between these two positions. While the original Eisenhower wording called for U. S. intervention against "overt armed aggression," the substitute called for intervention against just plain "armed aggression."

## EVASIVE ON ISSUES

All the Democrats, in committee, voted for this broadening of the directive while they kept up a steady barrage of criticism that the Eisenhower Doctrine constituted a "blank check" for the president to use military forces.

In a sense this entire Senate debate thus far has been a phony. Great "constitutional" issues have been raised concerning the power of the presidency and some even profess to see a "great foreign-policy debate" in process. But when it comes down to proposals, we discover that the differences are merely tactical.

Now there is an important difference between Dulles' thinking and that of most of the Democrats, as LA pointed out last week. The Democrats want to construct a Middle East policy based on complete support to their imperialist NATO allies, Britain and France, while Dulles recognizes that the only hope for keeping the Middle East in the Western sphere of influence is to do it without these two allies and to build an American overlordship for the Middle East. In this sense the Democrats, especially the liberal Democrats, have the cruder and more short-sighted approach.

If the United States is to take "the leadership of the free world" in the Middle East, that is, set up an American sphere of influence, there ought to be a suitable ideology to cover this job. But try as the past two Washington administrations may, all the talk about the "free world" and about preserving "national independence" comes out as a crusade to "stop Communism" by a series of military alliances.

## 'GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY'

The hinge around which the Eisenhower Doctrine turns is the growing Russian interest in the Middle East and the shipment of arms to Egypt and Syria. How to stop it is the problem.

Leading Democrats (Stevenson, Truman, Acheson, Fulbright) have charged

that Russian intervention is the result of the lack of a Middle East policy; it is due to the lack of initiative and action by the Eisenhower administration that Russian influence and participation in Middle East affairs have grown. All these have stated that strong action should have been taken to prevent it.

But it remained for Harry Truman to give the modern version of "gunboat diplomacy" in his testimony before the Senate.

"When Russia began penetration of the Middle East by sending arms to Egypt more than a year ago, we should have warned the Kremlin that we would not stand for this trouble-making maneuver. All we had to do was to say, 'You can't do that,' and be ready to back it up. All we would have needed to back up this warning was to put a couple of cruisers at the end of the Black Sea straits and a couple of cruisers and air carriers in the Eastern Mediterranean.

"Our past experience—as in the case of the Berlin airlift—showed that the Russians would not dare to risk open war by shooting down our planes, once we had made it clear that we intended to maintain that airlift and that we were not bluffing."

This is about as clear an example of the politics of "brinkmanship" as we are likely to read outside of Dulles' memoirs. It was presented in the midst of a discussion on the necessity to maintain free passage through international waterways.

## MIDEAST MESS

The beginning of Russian influence in the present crisis did not result from Dulles' inaction but dates from the time of the formation of the Baghdad Pact. It was on the initiative of the U. S. that the Middle East Treaty Organization was set up with Britain, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey, but without the U. S.

Reports of Russian shipments of arms to the area coincided with the first meeting of the Baghdad Pact council in November 1955. This was the Stalinist answer to the newest military pact and string of bases along its border. Seeking to disrupt the formation of a Western military bloc in the Middle East, the Russians utilized the fact that while Britain and the U. S. were arming the METO nations, the U. S. announced that it was not going to send arms to the other nations in the area.

Egypt, Syria and Jordan, looking upon the Baghdad Pact as an attempt by Western imperialism to continue domination in the Middle East as well as a pact against Russia, accepted the Russian arms as a counterbalance. It was their opposition to Western imperialism and not friendliness toward Russia which started the ball rolling. From this point the press in the U. S., Britain and France picked it up and snowballed it into one whereby Egypt and Syria are now virtually called Russian satellites on a par with East Europe.

But as Egypt and Syria see it, the national independence of the Middle East states is not threatened by Russia at this time but by Western imperialism, although there can be little doubt that Russia would like to turn this area into its own imperial backyard as it attempted in Iran after the end of the World War II.

However it appears that Russian aims in the Middle East are confined now to disrupting U. S. military and strategic plans, and preventing the re-establish-

ment of Western imperialism on a new basis. Thus it is prepared to do by the most reactionary of means—an arms race which threatens to turn the Middle East into a powder keg—in order to further its own imperialist ambitions.

It is in this situation where the Middle East nations are struggling for real independence against Western domination that the U. S. is proposing to protect their independence against "Communist aggression."

## BRITISH QUERY

The Tory regime in England is the most insistent questioner about the precise circumstances under which American military forces will be used. Their pique over what they regard as the hypocrisy of the Dulles diplomacy on the Suez invasions is evident.

William Stringer in the *Christian Science Monitor* of January 4 reports the typical Tory attitude: "When the caliber of the Guatemalan government threatened the Panama Canal, Washington acted—fast and quietly," argued one Englishman to me. "I do not condemn America for that. International waterways are affected with a public interest."

The London correspondent for the *N. Y. Times* on January 6 gives the following attitude attributed to a "highly qualified source" of "British officialdom" who wants to know how national independence is to be judged:

"If three or four of these bandits [i.e., anti-British nationalists] suddenly announced they are the independent government of a country and they are known to be in the secret pay of the Soviet Union, what happens?"

"In those circumstances, the source said, the key question is whether or not the United States will be willing to use force to overthrow a legal government that has Communist backing."

"To take an extreme view," the source added, "if the United States is not willing to go to such lengths it might just as well kiss the Middle East goodbye."

Secretary of State Dulles was queried on this possibility at the Senate hearings. Senator Fulbright wanted to know whether American intervention would be limited to cases of "overt armed aggression" and whether one could infer that nothing would be done in other cases.

## 'MANY WAYS'

Dulles answered these types of questions in two ways at the Senate hearings.

(1) "... the idea that the only way to deal with these problems is by military invasion of a country is, I think, a false and obsolete idea. There are many, many ways of dealing with that kind of threat other than by resort to open armed forces, which we have renounced by the Charter of the United Nations."

Dulles did not detail the "many, many ways" he had in mind. But we do know that the U. S. engineered two armed coups—Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954—which did not involve a "resort to open armed forces" by the U. S. However Dulles repeatedly stated, in answer to questions about "indirect aggression," "subversion" and "Communist-controlled governments," that the U. S. was prepared to act but "by means other than our being the ones that start attacking some country with armed forces," as he answered Senator H. Alexander Smith of N. J.

(2) The U. S. cannot openly state that it is prepared to start a preventive war, or that it is prepared to send its armed forces into action except in cases where it is attacked first. It just isn't done.

"If you open the door to saying that any country which feels that it is being threatened by subversive activities in another country [can use arms] you are opening the door to a series of wars all over the world, and I am confident that it would lead to a third world war."

And: "I do not suppose we want, for instance in the case of divided countries, to have governments that are free to use armed forces against the portions that are under Communist control. An yet, if we establish the principle that we can do it, how can we urge them not to do it?"

So what Dulles was saying added up to this: "Don't worry—as the situations occur we will act. But there are ways of

acting other than through direct intervention with U. S. armed forces. Don't force me to specify them in public. Besides we can't announce to the world the principle that we are prepared to attack with armed force countries which are Communist or Communist-controlled. If we have that right, so do the Communists—or Syngman Rhee."

Among the other means the Eisenhower administration is prepared to use is the authorization of \$200 million in economic aid. How it is to be spent, or in which countries, is being left up in the air. After Congressional approval of the Middle East Doctrine, former Representative Richards of South Carolina, retired chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, is to tour the Middle East to determine how the money is to be spent.

Several senators have charged that former Rep. Richard is going to be the pay-off man, traveling through the Middle East with \$200 million in his pocket, buying up and bribing support for the Eisenhower Doctrine with promises of "economic aid."

It is difficult to dispute, this idea of how the \$200 million will be disbursed in view of the report released last month by the House International Operations subcommittee investigating economic aid to Iran. (See p. 4.)

## HEAD-ROLLING?

In view of the opaque clarity with which Dulles explained the operation of the Eisenhower Doctrine and his failure to approach the real situation in the Middle East, it is only a question of time before the head-rolling part of the plan goes into operation.

The doctrine's reception in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia has been cool in those cases where outright hostility and denunciation of American imperialism were not expressed. If Egypt and Syria cannot be won over, what then?

Already stories are beginning to appear in the American press about the danger of a "military coup" in Egypt in much the same manner as preceded other American and British efforts in this direction.

The *N. Y. Post* on January 25 prints a dispatch from the British news agency Reuters which in turn quotes from an article appearing in the *London Times*. The headline reads "Sees Nasser Ouster by Pro-Reds." The story is a "prediction" by the *Times* based on "rumors" that there is dissatisfaction in the Egyptian army.

## SIGNALS FLYING

The story, which has all the earmarks of being concocted at the Middle Eastern desk of the British Foreign Office, is worth quoting in part to see how the technique operates.

"His [Nasser's] more intransigent colleagues, runs the argument, are prepared to swing finally into the Soviet camp, both because they believe Russia alone is capable of meeting Egypt's needs, and because they are radical enough to look toward Russia for political guidance.

"If these speculations are correct, it would probably be only a matter of time before Nasser was eased out of the leadership to make room for a more extreme substitute, just as he himself supplanted Gen. Naguib three years ago.

"It would be rash to rule out such a possibility," the influential *Times* said."

A United Press story appearing in the *N. Y. World-Telegram and Sun* on February 16 leaves out the "pro-Red" angles but sets a date for the possible military coup—sometime in May.

"A wave of suspicion has spread over the entire country and the fear of a coup hangs like a dagger over Cairo..."

"Observers who know Egypt well believe that the army will lead any attempt to overthrow Nasser—if such a step is taken.

"They also believe that the conditions for such an attempt exist today—both economically and politically—and set the crisis date around May of this year."

Exactly who the "observers" were we do not know since the UP story does not carry any dateline. Is May the deadline that Washington and London are giving Nasser to fall into line? At any rate the warning signals are up.

This is the context of the Eisenhower Doctrine as Washington flounders along looking to impose an essentially military solution for the economic and social problems of an area in revolution.

## Labor Action FORUM • New York City

Friday, March 1

### GEORGE HOUSER

Executive Secretary, American Committee on Africa  
Author of "The Non-Violent Revolution in Africa"

on

## Treason in South Africa?

Jointly sponsored by ISL and Young Socialist League

8:30 p.m. at LABOR ACTION HALL, 114 West 14 Street, N. Y. C.