

ARTICLES ON GERMANY BY
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JUNE 30—AND WHAT NEXT?

JUNE 30. The Reichswehr and the police on the streets of Berlin as though it were an enemy camp. For the first time since the establishment of the fascist dictatorship, the working class quarters were the scenes of rejuvenated faces, smiles, half-questions, half-answers, and of strong and non-Hitlerite hand-shakes. The signal. . . . The signal of what? The crisis of the fascist dictatorship? The end of it? Or the real "cleansing process" of fascism before its new consolidation?

How long will the fascist dictatorship in Germany continue?

Is it so long since Hitler's Ministers spoke of the permanent character of the fascist regime in Germany? Goebbels hesitated between "permanency" and twenty thousand years or so. Is it so long since the Bauers, Trotskys, Brandlers proclaimed the "epoch of fascism"? And it is only eighteen months ago since the Communist International—Bolsheviks, Marxists, Leninists—stated that the dictatorship of the national-socialists would lead Germany to catastrophe.

We have not long to wait. The beginning of the crisis of the fascist dictatorship is here already. And the Bauers, Trotskys and Brandlers, who do the work of the bourgeoisie, are once more trying to create confusion, by fixing the collapse of the fascist dictatorship to take place in the evening, over their morning coffee, by blathering about its final self-destruction, by offering up prayers to the generals in opposition and the manufacturers and, in view of the "impotence of the proletariat" ("the German worker is incapable of revolution", stated a certain social-democratic leader), advising the working masses to put all their hopes on the oppositional bourgeoisie. They would do everything. . . .

Meanwhile the national-socialist dictatorship in Germany has undoubtedly entered a new phase of its development. The events that have taken place in the ruling circles of the National-Socialist Party merely reflect the profound processes which are going on *below*, among the masses. The fascist dictatorship kept them hidden under a bushel, but on June 30 they broke through into the open. The position of the fascist government is becoming ever more threatening, both internally and externally, with every day that passes. Its economic difficulties are multiplying. Its conflicts with foreign countries are becoming sharper, and after the Austrian events, they have led in fact to fascist Germany becoming still more isolated than was the case when the national-socialists first took power. Every new day

shows that fascism is incapable of fulfilling its demagogic social promises, of providing the masses with a better life, and solving the problems which caused monopolist capital in Germany to entrust the most reactionary and terroristic party of the bourgeoisie with power. Discontent, disillusionment, hatred and bitterness towards the fascist regime are increasing not only in the ranks of the working class, but also among broad strata of the petty bourgeoisie in town and village. The mass basis of national-socialism is contracting. As the bourgeois *Neue Züricher Zeitung*, a paper which but yesterday openly supported German fascism, has keenly remarked:

"As a result . . . of the development of events, Hitler has reached the extremely difficult position of being unable to act now in the way he said he would previously, or to say things now in the way he is compelled to act."

But despite all this, the decisive fact for the revolutionary struggle against fascism is the fact that despite all the hatred of the masses of workers towards the fascist dictatorship, this hatred is nevertheless still turned inwards, and only on rare occasions breaks through to the surface, mainly in the form of passive resistance. The elections of the "trusted people in the factories" were, for instance, cases of this. The fascists deliberately held this electoral campaign to test the real feelings of the workers, and they convinced themselves that the vast majority of the working class are against the fascist dictatorship. These elections frightened the fascists a great deal, and were the starting point for the famous campaign against the "critics". The new feature was that not only did the workers vote against the national-socialists, but so also did the office employees in the factories, etc.—and these employees had previously been the main support of the national-socialist factory cells. The fascist dictatorship scented the footsteps of its grave-digger behind its back and lost itself. The "terror" law, new bouts of violence in the jails and concentration camps (Thaelmann), and the wild slobber of threats uttered by Goering were combined with ingratiating speeches and articles (as for instance, the "softening" in the Hamburg press of Kaufman's speech, which was full of threats against the workers Blom and Foss as a result of the elections), and which disclosed their mortal fear of the working class.

The fascist dictatorship of the German bourgeoisie will not fall of itself, if it is not overthrown by the German proletariat. The conflicts in the camp of the

bourgeoisie *can and must* be utilized by the working class in its struggle for the proletarian revolution, but the *decisive* factor is the *class struggle of the proletariat itself*. Now more than ever before should we remember the words of Lenin that there is no such thing as the bourgeoisie being in an absolutely hopeless situation. The fact that the leaders of social-democracy and the renegade Trotsky base their calculations primarily on the conflicts within the bourgeois camp is not only the expression of an *absence of revolutionary perspective and lack of faith* in the forces of the working class, but also directly *diverts the German proletariat from the only possible path open to it*.

A correct estimate of the *alignment of class forces* is therefore of exceptional importance in preparing the Communist Party and the working class for the decisive battles for the revolutionary overthrow of the fascist dictatorship. This is a question of tremendous *international* significance, because the situation in Germany is the central problem facing the working class movement in the capitalist countries. The relative importance of the German proletariat in the international working class movement is so great, that the victory of fascism in Germany meant not only the temporary defeat of the German proletariat but it also gave courage to reaction on an international scale. It was precisely the advent of the fascist dictatorship in Germany which was the signal for the social-fascist prophesies regarding "a whole epoch of fascism and reaction". Even the heroic struggles of the Austrian Schutzbund, which, for the first time after a year and a half, pointed to the counter-offensive of the working class against fascism, were depicted by the social-democrats as actions which, though self-sacrificing, were doomed in advance to defeat, inasmuch as they took place in the conditions of a "counter-revolutionary situation". In the autumn of last year, at the very time when a new revolutionary upsurge was beginning in Germany, Trotsky "prophetically" saw that "events cannot be understood by anybody if he does not realize that what is happening in Germany is not that the proletarian revolution is maturing but that the counter-revolution is deepening" (*German Perspectives*). The wise scribes of the Right opportunist rabble, the Brandlers and Thalheimers, have thoughtfully established that there is a "general crisis in the working class movement". And so the feature that defines the essence of the present historical epoch is not the deepening of the general crisis of capitalism, not stormy outbursts of the revolutionary resistance of the masses in places least expected by the bourgeoisie, in such stable capitalist centers as Amsterdam, Zurich, San Francisco, etc.; not the tremendous scope of an anti-fascist wave on the part of toilers

in Austria and France, with a gigantic surge towards the united front as the expression of the revolutionary upsurge and the approach of the second round of revolutions, not the world-historic victories of Socialism in the U.S.S.R. and the mighty struggle of the Chinese Soviets; but only the fascist convulsions of a bourgeoisie that is losing its head!

This vile defeatist theory of the "epoch of fascism" is indissolubly intertwined with the entire social-democratic estimate of the nature of the fascist dictatorship as a Bonapartist dictatorship, or as the dictatorship of the petty bourgeoisie, a system different in principle from bourgeois democracy. It may be asked whether it is worth once again raising these old questions as to the nature of the fascist dictatorship, questions which have long since been settled by the Communist International, both in the program of the Comintern and at various plenums of the E.C.C.I. (Eleventh, Twelfth, and Thirteenth). The fact is, however, that at every new sharp turn the whole social-fascist camp adapts its old worn-out slogans, masking them so as to achieve a new split in the working class and to catch the "weaker brethren", the least reliable and opportunist elements in the ranks of the proletarian vanguard. Here, for instance, we have Judas-Trotsky, who after June 30, "renounced" the open propaganda of the "epoch of fascism", declaring that

"Hitherto it was thought that fascism could *only* be overthrown by the proletarian revolution [!]. . . . Hence plans were made for a *lengthy* period. . . ."

And we have some of the "smaller fry" who have got caught on Trotsky's hook declaring that now after June 30 the German fascist government is really turning into a government of monopolist capital, thus frightfully confusing the question of the *class character* of the fascist dictatorship with the question of the *mass basis* of fascism, with the *social structure* of the fascist party. Is it a far cry from this "analysis" to the statement made by Mr. Trotsky who "hitherto thought" that fascism would be overthrown by the proletarian revolution and who therefore postponed his concern about the proletarian revolution until the end of "Bonapartism"? And is it not a continuation and "deepening" of this mistake to state that the Storm Troops "are now becoming a center of attraction for the discontent of the masses of the people in Germany"? It is characteristic, further, that it was Trotsky and no other who mocked at the "Marxist ignorance" of the leaders of the Communist International because the well-known resolution of the Presidium of the E.C.C.I. held on April 1, 1933, pointed, with really Marxist penetration, to the *possibility of a conflict between*

the Storm Troopers and the government, and to the possibility of such a conflict being very near. Of course, the proletariat must at present utilize the conflicts even inside the fascist party itself, and attract all toilers who are in opposition to the fascist government into the united anti-fascist front. But it will only be possible to carry this through successfully if the proletariat first and foremost *organize their own fighting unity.* Remmele and Neumann once made a similar mistake, when they distorted the slogan of the people's revolution, by transferring the center of gravity from the proletariat to the petty bourgeoisie, thereby causing considerable harm to the German Communist Party.

On the other hand, to depict the fascist dictatorship as the dictatorship of the petty bourgeoisie, means at the same time to give up a reserve of the proletarian revolution, which in the present conditions, when the petty-bourgeois masses are growing increasingly disillusioned with national-socialism, would be a fatal political mistake. Hitler came to power on January 30, 1933, because the working class was split by social-democracy, and in the last analysis because this split isolated it from the petty bourgeoisie who had become the prey of fascist demagogy. National-socialism succeeded in inflaming a wild chauvinism among the petty bourgeoisie only because social-democracy *had itself for tens of years bred nationalism* in the ranks of the working class and the petty bourgeoisie. Faced with the fact that fascism had won over enormous masses of the petty bourgeoisie, these wonderful "analyzers" lost their heads; nor did they know how to approach the organization of the reserves of the proletarian revolution *because they did not believe in the revolutionary power of the proletariat itself,* and so they follow Trotsky's footsteps and are prepared "on principle" to hand over the petty bourgeoisie to fascism. What can the proletariat offer to the petty bourgeoisie?—they ask, and they slander. At first, civil war, is their reply, then some kind of a five-year plan of industrialization, and as a final prospect—proletarianization. And this, after the experience of the October Revolution, after collectivization, after the world historic transformation of the Soviet village! It is the old Kautskian song which has been given a masterly exposure by Stalin, in the following words:

"Certain vulgar Marxists led by Kautsky, taking the experience of the European revolutions as their starting point, have drawn the conclusion that the middle classes, and primarily the peasants are almost born enemies of the working class revolution, that hence it is necessary to operate on the basis of a longer period of development, which will result in the proletariat becoming the

majority of the nation, thereby creating real conditions for the victory of the workers' revolution. On the basis of this conclusion, these vulgar Marxists have warned the proletariat against 'premature' revolution. On the basis of this conclusion, and for 'considerations of principle', they have placed the middle classes at the full disposal of capital. On the basis of this conclusion they have prophesied the doom of the Russian October Revolution." (Stalin, *The October Revolution and the Question of the Middle Strata.*)

This is why we need clarity on the question of the character of the fascist dictatorship. Those who did not understand January 30 cannot understand June 30. They cannot point out to the working class of Germany the revolutionary perspectives facing it, nor can they put the weapon of Bolshevism into its hands for the revolutionary overthrow of fascism.

What really did take place on June 30? After eighteen months of bandit rule, the Hitler government led Germany to the brink of economic catastrophe. The national-socialist dictatorship came to power at the moment when the *crisis was passing into depression.* The economic crisis in Germany had reached its lowest point in September 1932. But the national-socialists proved to be even less capable of making use of this favorable circumstance to create the prerequisites for softening down the contradictions within German capitalism, than were the bourgeoisie of Great Britain, U.S.A. or France. In his speech at Essen, Goering openly declared with the captain-like "downrightness" which is a feature of his utterances: "I must admit that we have not fulfilled our economic program because *we were unable to do so.*" In a speech, which from the point of view of fascist demagogy was much more clever, a speech, however, which was more unambiguous, delivered in the Reichstag after June 30, Hitler confirmed this statement made by Goering, when he stated that

"When criticizing our economic successes we must not start from what we have achieved by comparison with January, 1933, but from what Germany would have looked like now if national-socialism had not come to power."

Since the national-socialists came to power, there has been an increase in production in several branches of industry (automobile production, for instance, has been trebled, the output of heavy industry has doubled, and there is a big growth evident in the textile industry). Certain sections of the unemployed have been brought into industry. But all this has been achieved by supplying tremendous subsidies to the employers, through the extreme exploitation of labor power, through wage reductions, through the mass introduction of the short working week, through

forced labor for the youth, and through the feverish arming of fascism. After Japan, the war orders of fascist Germany play the greatest role in increasing output in a number of branches of industry.

When the national-socialists came to power, they at first tried to combine the realization of the policy of monopolist capital with the fulfillment of some parts of their former social demagogy. They had promised land to the peasants, and to liberate them from debt slavery, they had promised work to the unemployed, a better independent life for the "small people" of the towns, they had promised better conditions of labor for the workers in the factories, and liberation from the degenerate trade union bureaucrats. National-socialists tried to give life to the fascist "myth" about the establishment of the "unity of the nation" by simply plundering the State treasury, by robbing the millions of toiling taxpayers at whose expense not only were billions handed out as subsidies to the employers, but sops were thrown to some groups of the petty bourgeoisie. The moratorium on peasant debts, the famous policy of "autarchy" which stimulated an artificial rise in the prices of agricultural products, were intended to bind together the "united village family" for the fascist dictatorship. After Hitler took power, millions of applicants, declassed urban petty bourgeoisie and unemployed workers seeking work and an improvement of their material conditions, swept into the storm detachments.

But the fascist dictatorship could not for very long maintain the role of free distributor of State funds and tax receipts. The policy of "autarchy" deprived the commercial agreements between capitalist Germany and other powers of all meaning, as a result of which Germany's foreign trade fell catastrophically. The unfavorable foreign trade balance for the first quarter of 1934 was almost one fourth of a billion marks. The necessity for buying a large amount of raw material for German industry, and primarily for the war industry, led in fact to the gold and foreign currency fund of the State Bank being completely drained, reaching 1/40 of the 1930 level. The backing for the paper money in circulation is only 1.6 per cent. Although the recent forced instructions of the leaders of the Reichsbank, which limit the issue of foreign currency for import purposes to the amount of foreign currency which at the same time comes into the State Bank, have stopped the last remnants of the gold and currency fund from being drained, nevertheless they are already affecting the further development of the foreign trade of fascist Germany in a most destructive manner. The solvency of German industry has fallen so low that Lancashire, for instance, which only a year ago advanced a short-term credit of £2½ mil-

lion for the purchase of fibre, will not now sell any goods to Germany until the latter pays its debt. The prohibition of purchases of textile raw material, announced as operative until June 30, 1934, has now been prolonged for an unlimited period.

As the result, the 36-hour week has been introduced in the textile industry. It is planned to introduce the 36-hour week throughout the whole of industry, and first of all in those branches of industry where a large amount of imported raw material is required (e.g., the leather industry, where 60 per cent of the raw material used is imported).

The first signs of the new growth of unemployment can be seen. It is officially stated that the number of workers engaged on the widely advertised "public works" has been reduced by over 100,000 in the last month alone. The Finance Minister states that owing to the "catastrophic situation of world economy" the government is compelled to distribute the previously fixed plan for this work for 1934 over a number of years. Schmidt, the Minister of National Economy, has stated that wages will be reduced at all costs. In addition, the unprecedented drought this year is threatening to make it necessary to purchase grain from abroad. According to preliminary figures, the shortage in the harvest this year is about one-fifth of the quantity required to feed the country. Grain reserves are exceedingly small, because in the race for foreign currency the overwhelming majority of grain surpluses from last year's record harvest were exported. The only untouched reserve, the so-called "national fund", i.e., a reserve for a month and a half which the big flour mills are compelled to keep constantly in their warehouses, is strictly guarded by the Reichswehr. The government has already been compelled partly to import agricultural produce from abroad. A shortage of food products can already definitely be noticed in the towns, and this without doubt will cause a sharp rise of prices later on. The urban petty bourgeoisie are thinking with fear and trembling of approaching inflation.

Very soon after fascism came to power, it had to moderate its social demagogy, and at the period when illusions were rife about national-socialism being able to put an end to unemployment, the fascist government places the industrial magnates themselves, Krupp and Schmidt, directly at the head of national economy. With all their lack of rights and worsening of their general conditions suffered by all categories of toilers, the main blows were directed *against the working class*. The law of January 20, 1934, on the so-called "regulation of national labor", put an end to all the last vestiges of wage agreements, and of the rights of factory committees, and threw the

working class of Germany almost a half a century backwards in legal respects.

The "Goering plan", which the fascist government is trying to operate with the greatest severity, provides for the "liquidation of unemployment" by driving the unemployed out of the towns and young workers up to the age of 25 (women to the age of 30) out of industry altogether. The unemployed and the working youth are deprived of the right of freely moving from place to place. The political aim of this is to prepare military cadres and to cleanse the factories of the most "restless" elements. The demagoguery with which this robbery of the working masses is carried out is characteristic of the methods of fascism. The builders' section of the fascist *Labor Front*, for example, announced on May 8, 1934, that

"... in a number of cases the wages fixed in the wage agreements are not paid, overtime work is operated as well as the predacious exploitation of the strength and health of the apprentices. . . . Employers and *workers* who are responsible will be mercilessly called to account for this."

The methods of inciting one category of workers against another, which were used by the national-socialists during the first period of their power, especially in the relations between the employed and the unemployed, are now taken *inside the factory itself*. The national-socialist cells in the factories bring ready-made "traveling tickets" to the working youth to attach them to kulak farms or labor service camps, and the young workers have to sign these as "voluntary" expressions of their readiness to set free a place in the factory for the adult unemployed, as an expression of enthusiasm and loyalty to the "Third Empire".

Thus the working class has very soon felt the savage enslavement and oppression brought to it by the fascist dictatorship. The hatred of the working masses towards the national-socialist regime is incalculable. The brute fear of the fascist dictatorship of the working class is no smaller. The campaign against "grumblers" and "critics", announced by the national-socialists with such a fanfare, and their demagoguery regarding "the second revolution" which preceded the throat-cutting of June 30, mainly had in view the purpose of quietening the working class to some extent and tricking them.

But in spite of this it has become ever more clear that the fascist dictatorship which was able to ensure to monopolist capital in Germany the smashing of the workers' mass organizations, the reduction of wages, subsidies and taxation privileges to a whole number of capitalist groups, has nevertheless not been

able to ensure that it could overcome the resistance and discontent of the working class, and especially to ensure the destruction of the Communist Party. The operation of the January law has had to be postponed several times. Heavy industry has *not* been able so far to plunder the working class at the *speed* it would have liked.

The same is happening in the *villages*. Hitler, who declared that Germany would be "a peasant empire or none at all", and who was able to carry enormous masses of peasants and even farm laborers with him, has introduced such social differentiation in the villages as never before existed in Germany. Capitalist politicians very much like to frighten the peasants of capitalist countries with the "horrors of collectivization" in the U.S.S.R., speculating on the individualist instincts of the small peasant owners. The example provided by fascist Germany shows how enslaved the villages become, and what servitude and what real loss of freedom the peasants undergo through the capitalist-fascist way out of the crisis. "We demand of every peasant", stated Darre, Minister of Agriculture, "*unlimited discipline*. We regard him as a *soldier* on duty at the front of the battle for food." By setting up a new strata of "cossacks" in the village through the so-called law of "peasant heirs", by producing a kulak section at the expense of all other strata of peasants and primarily of the village poor, fascism has not only driven hundreds of thousands of peasants from the land, deprived of the right of inheritance, but it has driven the pauperized peasant masses into the dilemma of *starvation in the villages and the prohibition of peasant labor in the industrial centers*. A classic example in this respect is an appeal issued by the ober-president of Westphalia to the "directors of industrial enterprises", in which they are made responsible for ensuring that free places in the factories are occupied only by people who "cannot do agricultural labor". From Upper Silesia, Bavaria, Baden, Spesard, Rene, etc., where the overwhelming majority of the peasants own parceled land, they are being driven into the valleys to the mines and industrial centers under the "philanthropic" plea that the peasants are being moved nearer to the place where they earn "extra money", while the land which they have occupied for centuries is handed over to "strong farmers", the peasant heirs.

The condition of the agricultural laborers who have been deprived of all rights to form independent organizations of any kind whatever, even such as the downtrodden workers in the towns possess, and are deprived of social insurance, is a terrible one. "The agricultural workers are disillusioned", wrote the fascist "leader" of the farm laborers, Guttsmittel, three months ago. The agricultural workers who constitute a considerable section of the Steel Hel-

met organization in the Eastern provinces of Prussia are the main element of unrest in these organizations, used by the "oppositional" part of the Junkers for their own purposes.

But the "peasant heirs" are also beginning to display signs of discontent. They are required to constantly express their loyalty to the regime, under the threat of being removed from the category of "peasant heirs". In connection with the drought, the government demands that not less than 30 per cent of the harvest should be handed in to the State at fixed prices. The government forces them to keep and feed cattle, and prohibits the killing of cattle, in spite of the shortage and extremely high price of fodder.

It follows naturally that the whole burden of all these fascist laws, like that of the complete prohibition of the hauling of products to the market, lies on the *toiling* peasants. The moratorium which was proclaimed after the advent of the fascist dictatorship, and which the peasants at first regarded as the initial step towards their liberation from debt, and which would, they hoped, be followed by a second one, was abolished after April 1, 1934.

Thus, apart from a small handful of agricultural magnates, the villages are the scene of a process of general disillusionment and irritation with fascism.

At the same time the fascist dictatorship, which was able to ensure the Junkers a plunderous rise of agricultural prices, has exempted them from arrears of taxation or considerably reduced them, but has *not*, however, been able to ensure that *the resistance and discontent expressed* (although in a passive form) *by the farm laborers, the poor and middle peasants* have been overcome, and has not destroyed the strivings of the peasants to obtain the land belonging to the landowners.

Fascism also displays the same incapability of solving its basic contradictions on the *international field*. The fascist government has been able to bring about the *arming of Germany* in actual practice. It succeeded at one time in making use of Anglo-French contradictions, and wresting an important link in the shape of fascist Poland out of the system of the French bloc in eastern Europe, not to mention its anti-Soviet conversations with the "Eastern Aryans"—the Japanese imperialists. But it was *not* able even before June 30 to ensure Germany such international solvency, and such a break through its isolation, which as far as the big imperialist powers and primarily British imperialism are concerned would mean that fascist Germany is a *reliable and solvent companion*. But British imperialism would have to pay for the German-Japanese encirclement of the U.S.S.R. and the "balance of power" on the European continent at a cost of very much worsened relations with France and the actual revision of the Versailles Treaty. British imperialism has made use

of the impression created by the abominable assassinations of June 30 to facilitate a turn in the direction of its old ally France and to draw a ring of isolation right around Germany. The national-socialist "onslaught" on Austria on the 25th of July has called forth divergencies with fascist Italy unheard of in their severity, and stimulated in addition by French hints about the possibility of colonial and financial concessions to Italy. After the defeat of the Hitlerites on the 25th of July, Germany is more isolated than it was at the first moment following the establishment of the fascist dictatorship. On June 30, the fascist dictatorship not only shot down the legend of its invincible power inside the country, but also destroyed the conception which some of the imperialists held about fascist Germany as a powerful and reliable ally, an idea which in essence was a reflection of this legend. The murder of Dollfuss and the events in Austria have shown that the fascist animal is wounded, that it is now prepared in its fury to hurl itself into any adventure, and precisely since it has now become weaker, is a great menace to the world, and to the international proletariat.

Thus fascism has not been able, even in the least degree, to *satisfy the wild chauvinism which it bred*, despite the fact that the growing difficulties of its internal position are driving the national-socialist government to ever new adventures in the sphere of foreign policy, if only to achieve some success, no matter how insignificant. It is impossible to endlessly distract the attention of the masses from the frightful results of fascist policy by means of frantic national propaganda, and to depict them as simply the result of the Versailles system!

It is no mere chance that the petty-bourgeois strata who have been most deeply tricked by fascist demagoguery and duped by chauvinism were the *first* to openly mutiny. The national-socialist cells in the factories and the Storm Troopers began to talk louder than everybody else about the fascist government which had deceived them. It was from precisely these circles that the slogan of the "Second Revolution" arose. It was not for nothing that Kerner, one of the leaders of the Labor Front, "leader" of the transport workers, stated that "there are islands of resistance within the national-socialist movement". The demagogic campaign conducted by Goebbels against the "critics", including 160,000 meetings to raise the spirits of the people, did not help. On the contrary, the more this campaign developed, the more numerous the "critics" became. The campaign had to be stopped, just as were the visits of the leaders to the factories. The purging of the ranks of the Storm Troopers was of no avail—and 10,000 members were expelled from the ranks, in Thuringia alone.

Does this mean that the Storm Troops have become transformed into the "center of attraction for

the discontent of the masses of the people"? To reason this way, means to reduce the importance of the working class as the *decisive force* which will overthrow the fascist dictatorship, and in reality to renounce the most intense mobilization of the *working class* which is standing with clenched fists, suppressing its rage, but which has *not yet swung into motion for an open struggle*. To reason this way means to imagine that over the period of eighteen months, it was not Krupp and Thyssen, not Hugenberg and Schmidt who fixed the noose around the neck of the German toilers, but that the petty bourgeoisie brought about their "above class" dictatorship. We should, of course, see that the petty bourgeoisie, who vacillate between the blows delivered by monopolist capital, and fear of proletarian revolution, try in the process of the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie (especially in the transition period) to reach out for power. But it is an elementary truth of Marxism, a truth which has been tested by the whole of historical development, that the petty bourgeoisie cannot independently put their political power into practice, and that up to the present they have merely been utilized as a mass basis for the capitalist dictatorship. The fact is that those who wish to embrace the whole "complex process of historic development", "without over simplification", gradually convert this secondary point into a basic slogan, i.e., *they cease to see that fascism is the most frantic dictatorship of the most reactionary section of monopolist capital*. And this is all the more important since fascism is attempting, at the expense of a reduction of its social demagogy, to intensify its nationalist demagogy, and to sow illusions about "regulating" the fascist regime in order to held back the petty-bourgeois masses. The bourgeoisie is now exerting tremendous efforts to raise the authority of Hitler among the masses and to create a legend around his name to the effect that by the assassination of Roehm and the others the dividing wall between the "people" and "good old Hitler" had been broken down.

But the fascist dictatorship met with opposition from *two sides*, inside the bourgeois camp (not to speak of the proletariat and its Communist Party).

If Roehm, Hines and the others whose throats were cut by Hitler and his colleagues, and over whose death not a single German proletarian will shed a tear, reflected the pressure "from the Left", from the increasing discontent of the duped petty-bourgeois masses, then from the "Right", on the other hand, those who were directly the masters, the industrial magnates and Junkers, demanded that Goebbels cease his demagogy about "socialist construction", and about "the struggle against reaction", thereby expressing their open dissatisfaction at the inordinate claims of "six socialist ministers" who, in order to preserve the petty-bourgeois mass basis for fascism,

were restricting the scope of the employers' appetites.

Thus the conflicts of June 30 arise not only out of the contradictions within capitalist Germany on January 30, but are a further intensification of them. The events of June 30 were not only not unexpected, but, step by step, were carefully and systematically prepared for. The only thing which came as a "surprise" was the criminal form of the "liquidation of the plot" and the smell of the brothel in the government communiques. Four months before the events of June 30, namely, on March 4, 1934, at a secret meeting of ex-leaders of the "unified" nationalist party (the party of the Junkers and industrial barons), at which over thirty persons were present, one of the closest associates of Hugenberg, State Counsellor von Bismarck, literally and in all its details gloated in advance over Hitler's June 30.

"The Reichswehr, [he declared] wants the *dissolution* of the Storm Troops. The *leaders of the Storm Detachments*, who are afraid of losing their positions and who are trying to utilize the Storm Troops as an inner political weapon, *are against this*. . . . These political adventurers, *except Hitler*, are prepared to go to extremes. . . . *Hitler will probably have to hold to the post of chancellor in the future*, but at the same time it will be necessary to *smash the Storm Troops and the handful of their leaders*."

On June 30 this plan was carried out in full. In face of the approaching storm of the onslaught of the proletariat, Hitler, securing the support of the Reichswehr, decided to narrow his petty-bourgeois basis. This basing of his calculations on a *narrower social basis*, which had begun many months previously, now came openly to the surface. "We shall maintain power even if the people no longer understand us", stated the national-socialist State Secretary Wagner. Three days before the events, the central organ of the fascist party, the *Volkischer Beobachter*, wrote: "We shall not leave, for otherwise it will not be the popular conservatives who will replace us but the Communists", and thus disclosed the main idea of the regrouping of forces in the fascist camp, which was directed towards the struggle *against the working class*, the mere potential action of which sends cold shivers down the backs of the fascist dictatorship.

Thus the basic lessons and conclusions to be drawn from the events of June 30, and all the subsequent developments, amount to the following:

(a) We are faced with *the commencement of the crisis* of the fascist dictatorship. This implies that the Party must increase its efforts tenfold to consolidate the Party organizations and to unite all the active anti-fascist forces under its leadership, as well as in the day-to-day preparations for decisive struggle against fascism. The Communist Party of Germany must carry on a decisive struggle against any line

which leaves events to develop themselves and which counts on the fascist dictatorship exhausting itself, an outlook which will now be stimulated by the leaders of social-democracy.

(b) The fascist dictatorship is not only *not* in a position to cope with the *contradictions* within capitalist Germany which it inherited from Weimar, but, though for a time it squeezed these contradictions into the vise of "unification" and fascist terror, it has in practice still further intensified them, and finds itself faced with their open *explosion* in the bourgeois camp. The very ferocity of Hitler's vengeance against his own Storm Troops and his closest associates in the construction of the National-Socialist Party displays the depth of the convulsion.

(c) The *mass basis* of the fascist dictatorship has greatly *contracted*. This does not mean that on June 30 Hitler shot it up entirely. The Hitler government continues to sow splits in the camp of the toiling masses (giving jobs to unemployed "old people" by dismissing young workers, etc.), throws pitiful sops (extremely cheap, it is true, but nevertheless sops) and especially shifts the main center of its demagogy to chauvinist propaganda, and is still, of course, able to carry on certain maneuvers, although the possibility of maneuvers has become much smaller than previously.

(d) The *belief* held by the masses in the *indestructibility* of the fascist regime *has been shaken*. The fear of the fascist whip has been undermined. Significant in this respect is the fact that in the days following June 30, the old officials of social-democracy and the trade unions appeared in the working class quarters, after waiting passively for eighteen months, and, throwing off fear, begin now to approach the revolutionary workers. A new feature is the thirst for activity among many of the former revolutionary elements who temporarily left the movement under the influence of the fascist terror.

(e) The *extreme tension of class relations* in Germany has become still more so. At the present stage the working class has still proved to be unable to transform its hatred towards fascism into open revolutionary activity. It has not yet been able to utilize the fights in the bourgeois camp as an indirect reserve of the revolution.

Thus, we have the beginning of the crisis of the fascist dictatorship, the *growth of the objective prerequisites for revolutionary crisis*. In order to convert these prerequisites into a real proletarian revolution, the Communist vanguard must *unite the proletariat under its leadership, and create the conditions for the every-day mass activity of the proletariat against fascism*, and ensure the transition of the present ferment of the petty bourgeois masses who are disillusioned and rendered desolate by fascist demagogy and fascist trickery, onto the lines of

a joint revolutionary struggle together with the working class.

The fulfillment of these tasks requires that the tactics of the Communist Party be adapted to the new conditions.

What does this mean?

The Communist Party of Germany has during this period obtained enormous political influence among the toiling masses of Germany by its heroic underground struggle, by its rapid passage to underground work when the fascists came to power, despite the fact that the *extent* of the fascist terror was unexpected even by the Communist Party. But the Communist Party has not yet succeeded in moving far beyond the limits of its own Communist boundaries, and especially in attracting the great masses of social-democratic workers to the united revolutionary front. At the same time a *new* feature is the fact that the Communist Party has now *got right to the social-democratic workers*. Not less than one-fifth of the underground organizations of the C.P. of Germany consist of workers who but recently were social-democrats, and who have united in blood and the severities of illegality their brotherhood with the old cadres of the Communist Party. But the Communist Party has only gathered together the first scattered detachments of the former many-millioned social-democratic army, betrayed by their leaders, deceived and handed over to be robbed by the fascist hangmen. To win *them* to the side of the Communists, for the *united front of revolutionary struggle*, means to have a firm foothold in the *factories*, to form *mass trade unions* under revolutionary leadership, *not to allow the decayed influence of social-democracy to be restored*, and to create the real prerequisites for a decisive and victorious battle against fascism.

Social-democracy which placed its faith in *spontaneity*, no longer exists as a *centralized* organization. Its emigrant groups in Prague and Paris, who have created new "revolutionary" programs, are trying to start all over again, but they cannot get contact with the really revolutionary social-democratic groups, which are carrying on the fight inside the country, and who in many cases have only the name of social-democrats. Social-democracy has been exposed to the masses in those cases as well when it led them under the knife of the fascist dictatorship without resistance, and those cases when the masses spontaneously took up arms in defiance of their leaders as was the case in Austria, for example. The destruction of social-democracy in Germany has struck a decisive blow at the Second International, destroying the belief among the working class throughout the world in the possibility of the "democratic path to socialism". The destruction of social-

democracy in Austria has also meant the completion, ideologically, of the destruction of social-democracy in Germany.

The conclusions to be drawn are as follows:

Not to allow social-democracy to be restored, to expose and completely smash the relics of the influence of the decayed ideology of social-democracy among the social-democratic masses in Germany.

And this, in turn, is only possible if:

The sectarian attitude of the Communists themselves is overcome towards the social-democratic workers, towards those revolutionary social-democratic groups in the country who are selflessly fighting against fascism hand in hand with the Communists, and who cannot be classed in the same category as social-fascism, and towards those social-democratic workers who have already found the road to Communism in underground conditions and who cannot be treated as having only half rights as members of the Communist family.

The Communists have not yet learned to make a Bolshevik approach to the social-democratic workers, by setting before them the questions of the every-day concrete struggle in the factories and labor exchanges, and utilizing the struggle against the want and oppression of the masses which links up *all workers*, so as to set up the *united fighting front*.

Communists have not yet learned always to put boldly before the social-democratic workers the *basic questions of principle* which divide the Communists from social-democracy: the question of power, the C.P.G. as the only workers' party—out of fear that they may break the united front of the workers. But this in reality not only does not help to bring about the united front, but on the contrary, really disrupts it, by frequently capitulating to social-democratic ideology instead of breaking it down.

In this connection, there is the question of the *trade union work* of the Communists. Here the C.P. of Germany has lost a great deal of tempo. There must be an immediate sharp change in the *forms* of trade union work and even in *certain tactical methods*. When the old free trade unions were "unified" a year ago, the Communists launched the slogan of "*independent class trade unions*" which were to have united, under anti-fascist leadership, all the workers who supported a class trade union movement. The very name of independent trade unions meant, above all, *independence of the fascist State*. These independent class unions, as the very name itself shows, were only of importance if they were formed on the basis of a *mass movement or of concrete class battles*. But the Communists were unable to get rid of their old sectarian attitude to trade union work, and the independent unions were formed in a purely mechanical way from the top, often by the Communists alone, and, as a result, the few which were formed soon withered away, insofar as the broad masses

of the former members of the free trade unions saw in them only the old Red trade unions, which were far from mass unions. The C.P. of Germany, on the basis of the importance of trade union work as one of the *chief links of the united front*, has now launched the correct slogan of the "*restoration of the free trade unions*", the best pre-war traditions of which are still alive among the masses, disclosing to the masses the causes of the degeneration of the free trade unions, which led to the splitting of the trade union movement and played a tremendous role in the advent of the fascist dictatorship to power.

Only the establishment of such a united front *inside the working class* can guarantee the success of the other tactical task, namely, the formation of the broadest *anti-fascist front of all the toilers*. The narrowing of the mass basis of fascism faces the Communist Party of Germany with the extremely important task of bringing about a rapid and sharp change in its work inside all the mass fascist organizations, putting forward this work far beyond the limits of work by the Party apparatus, as was the case hitherto. The Communist Party of Germany correctly called on the *Storm Troops* not to give up their arms, but to join the ranks of the anti-fascist front, and to prepare, together with all the revolutionary workers, for the overthrow of the hated fascist dictatorship. *Fascism is the enemy*. Such is the slogan under which the Communist Party can and must now bring about the real united front of the workers and all the toilers in Germany. In the Saar this does not mean sectarian voting, apart from real life and the concrete situation, for a "Red Saar", which would simply play into the hands of the national-socialists, but the uniting of all anti-fascist forces, of all who will vote against Hitlerite Germany, so as not to allow of the enslavement of the Saar proletariat by the national-socialist dictatorship. This means a *decisive livening up of the work of the Communist Party in the villages*, which has impermissibly cooled off at a time when the toiling peasants, suffering from the drought, are groaning under the yoke of oppression by the cartels, and are compelled to abandon their cattle to chance because they are forbidden to kill them, and fodder cannot be obtained, while nearby the landlords and kulaks have barns bursting with stores of fodder. The Communists must undertake the initiative in the struggle against the *compulsory delivery* of products by the peasants to the cartels, for the immediate *confiscation* of supplies in the hands of the landowners and big merchants, for the handing over of State stores to feed the toilers, for the import of fodder free of taxation, and against any rise in prices and for a reduction in prices for the consumers at the expense of the profits of the cartels and big middlemen, thus uniting the interests of the working class with those of the toiling peasantry.

This means the organization of *strikes, demonstrations, and every-day resistance*, and the setting in motion of the activity of the toiling masses. For only

such *every-day revolutionary activity* will in turn set in motion the *real popular proletarian revolution in Germany*.

THE RESULTS OF THE PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

THE Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which took place from June 29 to July 1, 1934, discussed the most important central problems, upon the solution of which depend the further successes of Socialism in the Soviet Union at the present moment.

Two questions were discussed at the Plenum of the Central Committee, namely, (1) the fulfillment of the plan for grain and meat deliveries to the State, and (2) the improvement and development of stock-raising. In addition to containing very important statements of principle, the decisions on these questions also contain a program of *practical struggle*, elaborated with remarkable concreteness and business-like approach.

The resolutions of the Plenum, and the character of the discussion of the questions under review, make it possible for us to see once more to what exceptionally great heights the leadership of the Central Committee has reached and how varied is this leadership. The C.C. combined the solution of questions of real world importance with careful instructions as to the proper collection of the ears of grain during the harvesting season, the ridding of barns from vermin, and the increase in the sowing of clover, etc.

The C.C. of the C.P.S.U. and Comrade Stalin from day to day give all the Party organizations ever new examples of how to work, examples of Marxist foresight, of the Bolshevik, Leninist-Stalinist style of doing work, of that combination of Russian revolutionary scope and American business methods of which Comrade Stalin spoke in his lectures *Foundations of Leninism*. Lenin in his time dreamt of the period when, not only politicians and administrators, but also engineers and agronomists would appear on congress and conference platforms. "It will be the beginning of the happiest epoch", said Lenin, "when politics will be spoken about less frequently and not at such great length, but when engineers and agronomists will express themselves more. . . . Convert your congresses and conferences, not into organs for holding public meetings, but into *organs for checking up economic successes, into organs where we could really learn economic construction.*" (Report at the Seventh Congress of Soviets. Our italics—Ed.)

Since that time, the Party has done a great deal to master technique, to produce cadres of business directors, and to prepare proletarian Bolshevik cadres of engineers, agronomists, etc. The Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. was a model of such a setting and discussion of questions as to make it possible to "really learn economic construction". There can be no doubt that the resolutions of the Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. will be read over and studied a dozen times by every Communist, especially in the villages, because they contain real guidance to action, a concrete and widely developed program of practical struggle for the further consolidation and development of Socialist agriculture.

The keynote of the Plenum of the Central Committee was the further mobilization of the attention of the Party to the *backward spots*. To give *concrete leadership*, to know where the weak links are and to *strengthen them* in time, to be able to view behind *average figures* the specific peculiarities of the *backward districts* and collective farms—this was the demand put forward with special force by the Plenum of the C.C. in the decisions adopted.

"The C.C. of the C.P.S.U.," states the Plenum resolution, "especially emphasizes that the chief shortcoming of the regional Party and Soviet organizations in their leadership of the districts, and the chief shortcomings of the districts in their leadership of the collective farms, is their inability to see the specific peculiarities of each district and collective farm behind the average statistical figures, as a result of which, despite the region's favorable average, figures in general districts and collective farms not in good condition remain unnoticed and without the necessary guidance and help."

* * *

The results of the spring sowing, as the decisions of the Plenum correctly indicated, are a clear proof of the *growth, power and discipline of the collective farm system*. The consciousness and labor discipline of the collective farmers have risen to a new level. The plan for spring sowing was completed by a date earlier than in all previous years. The quality of the agricultural work done has considerably improved.

In the spring of this year we underwent a severe

test. In a number of the southern districts not a drop of rain fell for over 50 days. Nevertheless the crops have escaped destruction. They were preserved simply because the sowing in these districts was carried through about a month earlier than previously, because the land had been much better cultivated, and because the discipline of collective farm labor had decidedly improved.

Had not the Party been able to insure all these conditions by its untiring work, the partial drought in the south would have struck a very heavy blow at the economy of the U.S.S.R. But now, in spite of the great variety of the harvest in the various districts and collective farms, and even within the bounds of a single farm or a single field ("the grain grows in layers", as some comrades express it), nevertheless, everything goes to show that on the whole the harvest in the U.S.S.R. will not be worse than it was last year, while in many regions it will be better.

However, it is just this varied character of the harvest, and the possibility that the unfavorable weather conditions existing in the spring of the present year will serve as an excuse, that creates the danger of a certain recurrence of anti-Soviet tendencies. The Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. warns all Party organizations in advance about the danger of these tendencies, warning all the Party organizations against any underestimation of the difficulties of grain and meat deliveries and against relying on spontaneity in this connection:

"The Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. warns the Party and Soviet organizations of the danger that anti-State tendencies may appear this year in various State farms and collective farms, in the shape of delays in fulfilling the tasks set by the State for the delivery of grain or even attempts to directly disrupt them by pointing to the unfavorable weather conditions that existed this spring."

In view of the inviolability of the plans fixed by the Party and the government for the delivery of grain and the return of loans, the Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. made it an obligation of the Party and Soviet organizations, and especially of the political departments of the Machine-Tractor Stations and State farms,

"... to offer energetic resistance to these anti-State tendencies, and to mobilize the forces and the vigilance of the collective farmers and State farm employees to the struggle for complete fulfillment of the plans for grain deliveries and the return of loans in the established period."

The Plenum of the C.C. set the Party and Soviet organizations a most important task in the shape of the struggle against loss both during the harvesting and in storing the grain.

According to the most modest estimates, several hundred million poods* of grain were lost last year in the Ukraine alone, owing to careless harvesting,—the amount forming two-thirds of the quantity of grain delivered to the State. A repetition of such losses this year cannot be permitted. This is why the struggle against losses, especially in the conditions existing this year, is a matter of State importance.

The resolution states:

"To consider it a most important task for the Party and Soviet organizations in the year 1934 to develop concrete measures for struggle against losses at all stages of the work (grain cutting, stacking, transporting, grain storage), for which purpose all the ripe grain must be mown without fail, without allowing the harvesting to drag on, which would lead to grain getting scattered; steps must be taken to carefully carry through the scraping of the ears, grain traps must be attached to all harvesting machines, the grain must be stacked and transported in such a way as to prevent the grain scattering, and to avoid the danger of the ears getting damp in the stacks and ricks, and thereby to safeguard the collective farms and State farms from the loss of grain."

The C.C. specially emphasizes the importance of the struggle for guarding the harvest against theft, and makes it obligatory for all local Party and Soviet organizations, including the political departments of the Soviet farms and Machine-Tractor Stations, to firmly enforce the law of August 7, 1932 regarding the "Protection of Socialist Property". *Definite dates* were fixed for the fulfillment by the Republics, regions and districts of the plans of grain deliveries, of payment in kind (by collective farms) for work done by the Machine-Tractor Stations, of the return of loans to the State, and of grain deliveries to the State by the State farms.

All collective farm or individual-peasant trade in grain, as well as the purchase of grain by consumers' co-operative societies, is discontinued until the respective district, region or Republic as a whole has fulfilled the plan of grain deliveries fixed by the government, and has returned loans received as well as paid in kind for the work done by the Machine-Tractor Stations, and until the collective farms have completely stored seed for the next sowing campaign and minimum supplies of fodder for the cattle.

The Party and the Soviet organizations have to carry through the threshing of grain on the State farms, collective farms and individual farms right from the first days of the harvesting. They must fix a definite quota of grain to be threshed daily by each threshing machine. Horse and automobile transport must be prepared in advance so that all the threshed

* A pood is equal to 36 lbs.

grain may be hauled to the delivery points without delay.

The following are the next most important tasks:

To immediately check up on the entire grain collecting apparatus, to get it into complete working order in advance, and not to allow the repetition of any of the scandalous occurrences which took place last year when grain delivery stations were the scenes of long "queues" of collective farmers who had arrived to deliver their grain, and when, in some places, the grain which had been delivered was left stored in the open air.

With a view to encouraging the collective farmers and the foremost collective farms, there is to be preserved the practice of allocating grain to meet the internal needs of the collective farms (advance payments to collective farmers, cattle fodder, supplies, etc.) to the extent of 10 per cent of the grain actually threshed, the amount being raised to 15 per cent for advanced collective farms which are working well.

The collective farms which completely fulfill their monthly grain delivery plans are to be allowed, while grain deliveries are already in process, to put additional grain aside for the formation of seeding reserves, in order to preserve the best selected grain for seed. This is to be done and will amount in some regions to 15 per cent of the grain threshed and to 10 per cent in others.

The Plenum of the C.C. also directed the attention of all Party and Soviet organizations to the fulfillment of the *meat delivery plan*. This plan is being fulfilled in an unsatisfactory manner in a number of districts, especially in the Middle Volga and Saratov regions, the Voronezh, Kursk and Western provinces, and in the Ukraine and Kazakstan. But even in the districts and regions where the fulfillment of the meat delivery plan is somewhat better, the regional and district organizations content themselves with quoting *average figures* for the region or district which conceal cases of arrears and failures to fulfill obligations to the State, thus upsetting the fulfillment of the plan for meat deliveries to the State.

The National Economy of the U.S.S.R. has suffered considerable losses because the State farms and collective farm ranches have not made sure that cattle delivered to the State were well fattened. Cases are frequent in which all care of the animals intended for delivery to the State has been abandoned, and enormous loss in the weight of the individual cattle has been tolerated, thus making it necessary to slaughter a much larger number of heads of cattle than required by the plan. By this means, meat supplies and cattle breeding have been undermined. Henceforth, before the beginning of each quarter, the directors of State farms and the chairmen of collective farms will have to make a *selection*

of the cattle to be delivered to the State in accordance with the plan of meat supplies, and put these cattle out to fatten so as to ensure that fat cattle will be delivered to the government.

The resolution of the Plenum of the C.C. on the first point on the agenda demands of all Party and Soviet organizations, including the political departments of the Machine-Tractor Stations and State farms, that they adopt

" . . . a serious attitude to the task of completely and unquestioningly fulfilling the plan for grain and meat deliveries to the State, bearing in mind that the *fulfillment of the grain and meat delivery plans still remains as heretofore the basic condition of the further growth and consolidation of the Soviet Union.*" (Our italics, Ed.)

* * *

Questions concerning the improvement of *stock-raising* were raised very acutely by Comrade Stalin at the Seventeenth Congress of the Party. Comrade Stalin stated that

"*The whole Party, all our workers, Party and non-Party, must take the problem of stock-raising in hand, bearing in mind that today the problem of stock-raising is as urgent as the grain problem—now successfully solved—was yesterday.*"

Cattle-raising has been one of the sectors where the class struggle has been fiercest. It was here that the kulaks directed their chief blows, frequently relying on the private property instincts not as yet outlived by the middle peasants. Wrecking, from primitive to organized, "scientific" methods, was resorted to widely. And it must be acknowledged that especially in some regions and districts the class enemy inflicted very severe damage on the Soviet Union in this regard which will take more than a year or two to overcome.

The victory of the collective farm system, the general process of the consolidation of the collective farms, and the solution of the grain problem, have created favorable conditions for accelerating the development of cattle-raising in the State farms, collective farms and in the economy at the private disposal of each collective farmer. Firm *organizational forms* for the development of Socialist stock-raising have been set up. State cattle ranches and stock-raising sections run by the collective farms have become the main base for the improvement of cattle-raising. The first serious successes have been achieved in the task of ensuring that every collective farmer shall have a cow of his own. Assisted by government rebates and credits, 900,000 collective farmers have already acquired calves.

"Now that the collective farms are firm on their legs, now that the State farms can render great assistance to the development of stock-raising by

improved and pedigree cattle, now, therefore the improvement of stock-raising is in our hands, and primarily in the hands of the collective farmers. Now we can say this with all the greater confidence since the government is able to give substantial assistance to stock-raising undertaken by the collective farms and the collective farmers." (Molotov).

Despite first successes, the Plenum of the C.C. made a severe estimate of the lagging behind evident in this connection, when it stated that "on the whole the condition of stock-raising continues to remain unsatisfactory. It is developing with extreme slowness. The process of decline in horse-breeding has not yet been brought to a standstill."

The total number of cattle in the cattle ranches attached to the collective farms increased very noticeably during the first half of this year (from January 1 to June 1)—in dairy farms controlled by collective farms by 12.9 per cent, in hog farms by 15.8 per cent, and in sheep ranches by 26.2 per cent.

This shows what tremendous possibilities for rapid development are to be found in the organization of cattle-raising sections (ranches) attached to and controlled by the collective farms. The Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. emphasized the "*decisive role of the cattle sections of the collective farms in the development of stock-raising.*"

The resolution adds:

"The organizational and economic consolidation of the existing collective farm sections, and the establishment of such a cattle-raising section (ranch) in each collective farm, must become the primary task of the Party and Soviet organization . . . energetic resistance must be offered to any attempt to undermine the collective farm cattle-raising sections and to sell off the collective farm herd. Such attempts must be regarded as activity on the part of the class enemy directed against the collective farms."

The slogans for practical activity must be:

"Not a single collective farm without its cattle section." At the same time the Party is doing everything necessary to ensure that as soon as possible every collective farmer will have a cow in his or her private possession, so that within the next two years without fail every collective farmer will possess a cow.

The Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. made a decision to apply the method of *State planning of the development of cattle-raising* after the example of the State plan for the sowing of grain. Planned tasks will be set regarding the growth to take place in the number of cattle in the State farms and the stock sections of collective farms. There will be a plan covering the number of young cattle to be bred by the State farms, collective farms, and by each individual collective farmer and individual peasant,

and there will be a plan covering the amount of fodder to be produced. All these plans will be detailed out among the State farms, collective farms and village Soviets. The entire organizational power of the Party and the proletarian State, all the levers of planned influence will be put into operation to bring about a rapid solution of the problem of cattle-raising.

The resolution of the Plenum declares that

"The fulfillment of the State plan for the development of stock-raising must occupy the center of the attention of all Party and Soviet organizations, and must serve as a most important means of rallying State farm employees, collective farmers and individual peasants around the task of developing stock-breeding."

In elaborating the plan of State tasks to be fulfilled in connection with cattle-raising, the task set by the C.C. is to supply this branch of production with all the modern resources of technique. The total number of heads of cattle has not only to be restored to its former level within the next few years, but Socialist cattle-raising must be completely *reconstructed* on a new basis. The fundamental tasks of this reconstruction are to make a radical improvement in the breed of cattle, to place the laws of *genetics* at the service of Socialist cattle-raising, to ensure that cattle are rationally looked after and rationally fed, and to set up a firm *fodder basis* for them. The task is, not only to bring about an enormous increase in the number of heads of cattle, but, what is particularly important, to bring about a sharp increase in the amount of meat obtained per head of cattle. In an article written by Comrade Chernov, examples were given showing the tremendous increase in the amount of meat and milk which can be produced by cross-breeding. For example, common Kirghiz cattle weigh 263.5 kilograms (live weight), while a cross between Kirghiz and Swiss cattle weigh 411.1 kilograms. The milk production of cross-bred cattle increases still more (200 to 250 per cent).

The trouble is that the improvement in the breed of cattle has not yet been properly and widely organized. There has not been a proper selection and utilization of local pedigree stock. There has frequently been a criminally lax attitude in State farms towards the most valuable imported bulls, and full use has not been made of the bulls. The chief task of the *State cattle ranches* is to improve the breed of cattle and increase the produce per head.

In the hog-breeding State farms, 73 per cent of the stock are pure-bred or improved cross-bred animals, whereas only 11 per cent of the herds of horned cattle in the State farms are pure-bred or cross-bred. This shows what tremendous work will have to be done in the milk and meat State farms

to make them into genuine disseminators of pedigree stock. In every State farm a central group of the most valuable bulls and cows must be set aside for breeding purposes, and they must be assured of specially careful and qualified care, treatment, feeding, etc.

The practical lines given by the Plenum of the C.C. for improving the breed and pedigree of the cattle include the following:

District plans to be fixed for the cross breeding of cattle; a census to be taken of all pedigree stock, to be completed by the end of 1934; a centralized pedigree and improved-cattle register to be introduced in each district and a centralized State pedigree register to be introduced to take a record of pure-bred cattle; collective farms and collective farmers who have pedigree cattle to be exempted from meat deliveries to the State, and special State breeding centers to be established in the districts which have the greatest number of pure-bred cattle.

By the decisions of the Plenum of the Central Committee, the State cattle-breeding farms have been given a militant practical program of work. In the first place, they are given the task of fully providing the cattle on the State farms with coarse fodder, fine hay and pastures, and of providing their own concentrated feed to the greatest possible degree. In the State cattle-breeding farms, fodder crop rotation has been introduced based on the wide extension of the sowing area for hay, clover and root crops. Hitherto, a psychology of dependence on outside supplies has prevailed in many State farms. Instead of providing their cattle with fodder of their own cultivation, calculations, especially in the hog State farms, have been made on receiving concentrated feed from State sources. This often led to interruptions in supplies, and to heavy economic losses.

Questions of housing construction in the State farms, the simplification of the system of progressive piece-work pay, and the setting up of a firm business system of accounting—all these points were included in the instructions of the Plenum of the Central Committee regarding the State cattle-breeding farms.

Accepting the point of view that the cattle sections attached to collective farms are the best form of organization of collective farm cattle-breeding, the Plenum of the Central Committee gave instructions that during the year 1934 all the Socialized herds of cattle at the disposal of the collective farms be re-organized into cattle sections [specialized cattle ranches] attached to the collective farms.

The direct material interest of the collective farmer in developing such cattle sections, in increasing their output, is decidedly increased by the Plenum decisions, for the greater the quantity of most prod-

ucts the collective farm gives to the State, the less the collective farmer will have to give from his private subsidiary economy. This is a point which every collective farmer will appreciate. Twenty-five per cent of the amount of meat delivered by the collective farm section to the State, 15 per cent of the milk and 20 per cent of the wool are counted as part of the quantity to be delivered to the State by the collective farmers individually, from their own private allotments, etc., and they will receive a corresponding reduction.

In addition, a most important measure outlined by the Plenum of the Central Committee is the establishment of *permanent cattle-breeding brigades* on the collective farm cattle sections, the establishment of reliable and experienced cattle-breeding *cadres*, for which purpose the term of work of the collective farmers in the cattle-breeding brigades has been fixed at not less than two years.

The Plenum of the Central Committee gave directions for a further extension of State assistance, enabling collective farmers who do not as yet possess a cow, each to acquire a calf and fixing the planned number of calves to be so bought or contracted for, by the end of 1934, at 2,000,000.

The interest of the collective farmers in rearing calves has been greatly increased by the directions given by the Plenum of the Central Committee to the effect that "the collective farmer who rears a cow on his private allotment, and who sells it to the cattle sections controlled by the collective farms at State prices, is exempted from obligatory milk and meat deliveries to the State for two years."

Exceptionally important and concrete instructions were given by the Plenum of the Central Committee on the question of horse breeding. For every foal reared on the collective farm, one half hectare of crops is freed from deliveries to the State; measures are proposed for protecting mares in foal, and for ensuring that all horses be provided with sufficient fodder; prizes are to be awarded to stablemen for rearing foals, etc.

The extension of *fodder supplies* is a most decisive link ensuring the rapid rise of cattle-breeding. Great attention was given to this question in the decisions of the Plenum of the Central Committee. Enormous masses of grain, fodder and potatoes are exempted from delivery to the State so as to form a firm fodder base for cattle and horse-breeding. (2,000,000 hectares of the sown area in 1934 and 5,000,000 hectares of the sown area in 1935 will be exempted.) Until recently the *cultivation of meadows* in the majority of districts has been completely neglected. One of the most *important* tasks which the Plenum of the Central Committee placed before the Party organizations, the branches of the Commissariat of Agriculture, and the leaders of the State farms, Ma-

chine-Tractor Stations and collective farms, is that of *improving meadows and pastures and of increasing their harvest*. Concrete planned tasks have been introduced for sowing hay, root crops, etc., and for the production of concentrated and combined feed.

The C.C. attached enormous importance to securing improvement in veterinary and zootechnical questions. Saboteurs and stupid bureaucrats have done no little damage in this field hitherto. The attention of the Party and the Y.C.L. organizations, of Soviet organizations, of branches of the Commissariat of Agriculture, and of political departments must be focused in this direction so as to put an end to the extremely unsatisfactory and neglected condition of veterinary questions.

In cattle-raising more than in any other branch of economy, we cannot be satisfied with "average figures". Take, for example, such a question as cattle-plague and death among calves. On the average throughout the Soviet Union, the loss of calves on May 1, 1934 was 9.8 per cent as compared with 15.1 per cent on May 1, 1933. In West Siberia, however, the losses of calves amounted to 16.7 per cent. In the Cheliabinsk region, the loss amounted to 13.6 per cent, in the Moscow region to only 6.7 per cent, and in the Northern region to 5.8 per cent. The highest figure is three times the lowest with variations between! The task is to draw the backward regions, districts and collective farms up to the mark, so as to make a decided improvement of the situation in the Soviet Union as a whole.

Among the most important tasks facing Party and Soviet organizations, arising from the decisions of the Plenum of the C.C., are the following: to develop *competition* between regions, districts, and collective farms, for preserving and increasing the number of cattle and for preserving calves; to do everything to develop examples of cultured and intensive cattle farming on a mass scale and to draw the millions of collective farmers and workers on the State farms into the solution of these problems.

The Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. "demands that all Party, Soviet and economic organizations, including the political departments of the Machine-Tractor Stations and State farms, make a real change towards radically improving cattle farming."

The task set by the Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. is to *organize* the fulfillment of the State plans for cattle-rearing, to master the technique of this activity, to deal daily, insistently, and attentively with cattle farming and to draw all the best and active non-Party forces into the solution of the task.

We must remember Comrade Stalin's directions to the effect that "the year 1934 *can and must be a turning point towards improving cattle farming as a whole.*"

Closely connected with the questions discussed at the Plenum of the C.C. were such big questions as the further growth of the collective farms, the conditions of the individual farmers, the subsidiary private allotments of the collective farmers and the backward collective farms. There are many districts where the attention of the Party and Soviet organizations towards collectivization has very much weakened, where collectivization has been left to look after itself and has reached a certain level without going ahead any further. We do not require any mechanical strivings for percentages of collectivization achieved, but we must make sure of a healthy and systematic growth of the collective farm movement, of a certain annual increase in the percentage of households collectivized, even though this percentage be only a small one. This is indissolubly connected with the task of the further organizational and economic consolidation of the collective farms, and with drawing the backward districts and farms up to the mark. We cannot be satisfied with a situation such as when, for example, out of 100 collective farms in a district, 20 work well and give the collective farmers a high income, 60 work moderately well, and 20 work extremely badly. The task is to make a concrete approach to each separate collective farm, to draw these backward farms up to the mark at all costs and to make them profitable.

It is all the more necessary to do this because backward collective farms frequently serve as a clear argument for neighboring individual peasants, who point to these collective farms to explain why they do not join a collective farm. In places where collectivization is left to look after itself, where the political departments of the Soviet farms and Machine-Tractor Stations keep at a distance from the village Soviets, individual peasants frequently try to avoid carrying out their social and State obligations. In places where the village Soviets are without the necessary political leadership, they drop under the influence of individual peasants, and conceal their failure to fulfill the tasks set by the State plan, and sometimes even burden the collective farms with arrears which should have been paid to the State by the individual peasants. An end must definitely be put to such a situation in which the individual peasant turns out to be in a more favored position than the collective farmer, and steps taken to ensure that all the obligations of the individual peasant to the State, under the law, are firmly carried out, while all the advantages and rebates allowed to collective farmers are observed.

The decisions of the Plenum of the C.C. once again stress the fact that the auxiliary private allotment of the collective farmer, (including his cow, etc.) must be really *auxiliary* (the peculiarities of the different districts being taken into account). The

basic path, however, for increasing the income of the collective farmer, is to further consolidate Socialized production, to raise the profitability of the cattle sections of the collective farms and to increase the harvest obtained from the collective farm fields, etc.

Some comrades made a proposal that small workshops and industrial undertakings be organized in connection with the collective farms with a view to increasing their income. It is obvious that this is not correct. It is quite plain that the further increase in the income of collective farms must follow the line of *strict collective farm production*, above all, the

line of consolidating such highly profitable branches as *cattle-raising*, vegetable farming, fruit growing, etc., and the partial manufacture of agricultural raw material (cheese-making, etc.).

The decisions of the Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. are to be distinguished by the tremendous concentration of their contents, and the extreme concreteness of the directions given, and give clear perspectives for the further consolidation of the collective farm system, as well as a further rise of Socialist agriculture.

THE SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U. LAID THE BASIS FOR THE RECENT PLENUM OF ITS CENTRAL COMMITTEE

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THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS IN GERMAN FASCISM AND THE TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF GERMANY*

By V. KNORIN

COMRADES:

The report of Comrade Richter on the situation in Germany and the work of the Communist Party of Germany has faced us with a number of very serious questions. At the Thirteenth Plenum of the E.C.C.I. we emphasized that Germany *was and still is* the weakest link in the chain of imperialist states, that Germany is the country in which class contradictions are most intensified, that Germany is the country in which all the contradictions of the capitalist world are intertwined in the most acute form. On this basis, we said that German problems remain the *basic* problems of the eve of the second round of wars and revolutions. The events of June 30, which signify the *beginning of the crisis of German fascism*, completely confirm this point of view. They indicate that *the prerequisites of a revolutionary crisis are maturing in Germany* and that the basic task facing the German Communists is to *speed up the mobilization of the masses for the overthrow of the fascist dictatorship*.

THE NATURE OF THE FASCIST DICTATORSHIP

But the discussion in the press of the events of June 30 compels us to return once again to the question of the *character of the fascist dictatorship in Germany*. In some newspaper articles the statement has appeared that only now, after the blow dealt at the Storm Troops, has the fascist dictatorship become the dictatorship of monopolist capital. Such assertions are in direct contradiction to all the basic principles of the Communist International. In the resolution on the report of Comrade Heckert on the situation in Germany adopted on April 1, 1933, the Presidium of the E.C.C.I. declared that:

"In the conditions of the tremendous sharpening of the economic and political situation in Germany, when, on the one hand the Communist Party had already become a tremendous force in the working class and a revolutionary crisis was rapidly maturing, when, on the other hand, the deep contradictions among the ruling classes themselves, had become clear and the fascist dictatorship, in the shape of the Von Papen and Schleicher government, was not in a position to stop the growth of Communism and find any way out of the ever-

intensifying economic crisis, *the German bourgeoisie delegated the establishment of an open fascist dictatorship to the fascist Hitler and his 'National Socialist Party'.*"*

In its thesis on "Fascism, the War Danger, and the Tasks of the Communist Parties", the Thirteenth Plenum of the E.C.C.I. still more definitely gave a similar estimate when it declared that:

"*Fascism is the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinist and most imperialist elements of finance capital.* Fascism tries to secure a mass basis for monopolist capital among the petty bourgeoisie, appealing to the peasantry, artisan, office employees and civil servants who have been thrown out of their normal course of life, and particularly to the declassed elements in the big cities, also trying to penetrate into the working class."

After all this, what does it mean to state that the Hitler government is *only now* becoming the obedient tool of finance capital? It means that Trotzkyist nonsense to the effect that the fascists came to power despite the big bourgeoisie is being accepted as genuine; it means that those who make such statements are falling under the influence of the Trotzkyists and social-democrats.

The authors of such statements have evidently become confused by the fact that fascism really *tries to provide a mass basis for monopolist capital among the petty bourgeoisie*, and that people are drawn into the fascist government who by their social origin belong to the petty bourgeoisie. But ever since the bourgeoisie have been victorious they have never exerted their power by their own hands alone. After 1918, the bourgeoisie began to feel particularly isolated and uncertain. To exert their power they needed the direct assistance and support of social-democracy with its system of mass organizations, led by the labor bureaucracy. But no Communist has ever doubted that so-called bourgeois democracy, wherein the social-democrats participated in the government or wherein they did not directly participate in the government, is the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and not working class power.

When the crisis seriously undermined the influence of the aristocracy of labor, the bourgeoisie decided

* Stenographic report of a speech delivered to the Presidium of the E.C.C.I. on July 9, 1934, on the report of Comrade Richter.

* Reprinted in *Social-Democracy—Stepping Stone to Fascism* by D. Z. Manuilsky. Workers Library Publishers, 1934.

that the help of the social-democratic leaders was not sufficient to enable them to successfully carry out their anti-working class measures. They handed over power to Hitler. The fascist dictatorship of finance capital decided to base itself *primarily* on the most reactionary sections of the frantic petty bourgeoisie in order to smash the working class movement. But the power of the bourgeoisie did not thereby cease for a single minute to be the dictatorship of finance capital; on the contrary, it became the dictatorship of the most reactionary, the most chauvinist, and the most imperialist elements of finance capital. The crisis of June 30 shows that this petty bourgeois mass basis of the power of finance capital is also not sufficiently reliable, and that the fascists have had to use open terror also against the petty bourgeois masses whom they themselves organized. The social basis of the dictatorship of finance capital has become still narrower. The power of finance capital has to rest primarily on the *Reichswehr and the police*.

CAUSES OF THE INCIPIENT CRISIS OF FASCISM

What are the characteristic features of the stage of the economic and political development of Germany which led to the events of June 30, to the beginning of the crisis of the fascist dictatorship?

First, there has been an increase in the country's economic difficulties, despite the general growth of industrial output due to the utilization of the main resources of the country for armaments. This has been expressed in a reduction of foreign trade, a reduction of gold reserves, an increase of difficulties in connection with raw materials and with fodder in the villages, while the first signs of food difficulties can already be discerned. The Presidium of the Communist International foresaw this as early as April 1, 1933, when it stated in its resolution that "*Hitler is leading Germany to economic catastrophe which is becoming more and more inevitable*".

Secondly, there has been a rapid deterioration of the conditions of the broad masses of toilers, owing to the utilization of tremendous resources, constituting a big portion of the national income, for armaments. In spite of the increase in the number of workers employed, the total amount of wages paid and the volume of retail trade have not increased, which is a sign of the rapid absolute impoverishment and pauperization of the already poverty-stricken toiling masses.

Thirdly, there has been a rapid sharpening of the contradictions among the bourgeoisie themselves over the question of the division of profits, and over the question as to the means to be adopted to get out of the exceptional difficulties facing them. That there was such a sharpening of contradictions was proved by Papen's speech at Marburg, and by the

campaign undertaken against the "grumblers". It was also shown by the resignation of certain business leaders who demanded of the government that it take very decisive steps to bring about a reduction of wages and to abolish the relics of collective agreements despite the fact that these measures would affect the condition and moods of fascism's mass basis.

Fourthly, there was a growth of discontent among the petty-bourgeois masses, because the government had no intention of even partially carrying out the promises which it had made to them before coming to power. It could not consolidate petty ownership. It could not provide all the supporters of the national-socialists with posts. It could not give anything either to the peasants, the clerical workers or the urban petty bourgeoisie. On the contrary, the process of the pauperization of these masses received tremendous impetus under fascism, and this was bound to find expression in a growth of dissatisfaction inside the fascist organizations.

This growth of the economic and political difficulties, caused by the *adventurous policy of the government*, gave rise to a sharpening of the contradictions inside the ruling party and laid bare the weakness and instability of the fascist dictatorship. This is the main point. Of course, the sharpness of the events on June 30 also had their cause in reasons of foreign policy, but these did not play the chief role. Of course, these events also had their cause in the inability of the government to destroy Communism, but the working masses were not the decisive factor which gave rise to this crisis, which implies a turn of the petty-bourgeois masses against finance capital.

HOW THE PARTY REACTED TO JUNE 30

The beginning of the crisis of the fascist dictatorship means that new possibilities exist for the revolutionary struggle of the working class. How did the working class make use of June 30, the beginning of the crisis of fascism? What was wanted on June 30 was open activity, demonstrations and strikes, everything whereby the proletariat could show its strength and draw over to its side the petty bourgeoisie who were disillusioned with the fascist dictatorship. But the proletariat as yet proved to be insufficiently strong to make full use of the confusion among the ruling circles, and to extend the mass movement which has begun. The Communist leadership and each district committee, issued manifestos and distributed them in the streets. The masses seized these manifestos with the greatest interest. The estimate of the events given by the Communists was brought to the knowledge of the masses. None the less, this was not enough. Such events demanded *action* from the Communists. The information which we had received from the proletarian districts in

Germany shows that *the Communists as yet proved to be insufficiently strong to organize such actions.*

The contradictions among the bourgeoisie, which even reached a point of extreme sharpness, and were expressed in such a violent form as June 30, of themselves give nothing to the proletariat. The contradictions and conflicts among the non-proletarian classes, and between various groups within those classes, only constitute an indirect reserve for the proletariat, and can only be utilized by the latter.

The international contradictions and difficulties of German imperialism are but an indirect reserve of the proletariat. If the proletariat is strong enough to utilize the contradictions which arise within the ruling classes and the international difficulties facing the bourgeoisie, so as to intensify their own struggle, then these reserves may prove to be of considerable assistance to the proletariat. But if the proletariat is not yet strong enough to utilize these contradictions and difficulties, they cannot bring the proletariat any serious results.

THE MIDDLE STRATA AND THE STORM TROOPS

We must state that on this occasion in June, 1934, the Communists were not yet sufficiently strong to drive a serious wedge into the contradictions in the fascist camp so as to develop an immediate struggle against fascism. All the same they proved to be sufficiently strong to be able to utilize these contradictions for intensifying their work among the masses and drawing those elements to their side who are now breaking with fascism.

The opinion is sometimes still expressed that the Communists cannot seriously attract the petty-bourgeois masses to their side, that there is a deep gulf between the Communists and the petty bourgeoisie. Talk can still be heard to the effect that the Communists can only promise the petty bourgeoisie a number of years of civil war, collectivization and the destruction of petty trade, while the petty bourgeois, according to such people, wants to have his own farm, his own little store or workshop.

The most decisive struggle must be carried on against such an attitude. The fact that the petty bourgeoisie in 1932-1933 supported the fascists and not the Communists was the result *only* of the split in the working class movement, and resulted from the fact that the proletariat was unable to develop a struggle and to attract the masses of the petty bourgeoisie and peasants to its side. But the masses of the petty bourgeoisie and peasantry have become disillusioned with fascism, with all the parties of the bourgeoisie, and it is quite possible now that they will turn in the direction of Communism, or at least will adopt a neutral attitude. The *Volkische Beobachter* had good reason to head its leading article of June 30, "Hitler or Stalin". In an article, "The

October Revolution and the Middle Classes", Comrade Stalin says:

"Undoubtedly the question of the middle strata is one of the basic questions facing the workers' revolution. The middle strata, *i.e.*, the peasants, the small urban laboring people, the oppressed nationalities, nine-tenths of whom consist of middle strata, have to be relegated to this category. The proletariat cannot maintain power without the sympathy and support of the middle strata, and primarily of the peasants, especially in such a country as our Union of Republics. The proletariat cannot even seriously think of taking power if these strata are not at least neutralized. . . . If Christianity was formerly considered to be the anchor of salvation among the oppressed and downtrodden slaves of the extensive Roman Empire, nowadays, on the other hand, we are moving towards a state of things when Socialism can serve (and is already beginning to serve!) as a banner of liberation for the many million masses of the very extensive colonial states dominated by imperialism. If it was difficult formerly for a Socialist to show himself openly among the non-proletarian middle strata, of the oppressed or oppressing countries, now on the other hand he can go openly among them with propaganda of the idea of Socialism in the hope that they will listen to him and probably they will listen because he has behind him such a strong argument as the October Revolution." (Stalin: *Marxism and the National Question*, pages 140-143, Russian Edition).

How do matters stand with regard to attracting these strata to our side in Germany? We must unfortunately admit that in recent times the German Communist Party has practically carried on no work among the petty-bourgeois masses of the cities or among the peasants. On the eve of the fascist dictatorship quite a good beginning was made of work in the villages and among the middle strata in the towns; this was especially true in 1931, but this beginning has almost been forgotten. The present crisis of the fascist dictatorship which is casting the broad masses of the petty bourgeoisie and peasants into the opposition, demands that we should seriously organize this work. Meetings of Storm Troopers are being broken up, many of them have been arrested, they are forbidden to wear their brown shirts. Why? Because the masses of the Storm Troopers have reflected the present discontent of the toiling section of the petty-bourgeois masses, because at one time they seriously believed the fascist demagogy and demanded the fulfillment of the promises given to them. They now see that they have been duped.

What should we do? We must say to them: "You followed the enemies of the people, and together with them you murdered those who wanted to provide a better future for the people. You, in your lack of class consciousness, broke up the organiza-

tions of the working class. Now you see that you committed an evil and disgusting thing. You can make amends for the severe crimes which you committed against the toiling masses by, together with all anti-fascists, carrying on the struggle for the overthrow of the fascist dictatorship. You are still a long way from being real revolutionary fighters. We can, however, unite on the basic point of struggle against Hitler who has dispersed your organizations, of struggle for the overthrow of the fascist dictatorship. Organize illegally, don't hand over your guns, prepare for the *real revolution of the people, for the proletarian revolution.*"

The C.P.G. has now adopted this line, and it seems to us that on the basis of this line considerable masses of Storm Troopers will really come over into the ranks of the revolutionary fighters. The Party must do everything to make it easier for the ex-Storm Troopers to take this path, so as to transform them into a reserve for the proletarian revolution.

Discontent is growing in the villages. The economic crisis is striking with exceptional force at the peasants. In our Party work, hardly anything can be heard of the villages. Of course, this is an exceptionally difficult task. It is plain that until recently the Party should have consolidated itself in the chief industrial centers. It would be impossible to advance unless this was done. But we must now say that we cannot leave the villages out of account, and that we must not neglect work in the villages now.

If we do not do this now, then organizations will be set up in the villages without us. The German comrades quite well remember the peasant movement at one time directed by Claus Heim. What kind of a movement was this? Not long ago I read a detailed description of this movement. It was a spontaneous movement which refused to have anything to do with any parties, and in the long run fell into the hands of the national-socialists.

If we do not make a complete turn in our work we shall have to deal with new organizations of this type. Conditions are favorable for us now. There is no bourgeois party that has not become bankrupt. We are the only force which has not deceived the peasants, the force which can save them, and we must tell this to the peasants. But in order to be able to say this, the first condition is to *extend our Party work* to the peasant districts.

THE CHIEF THING IS TO ORGANIZE THE PROLETARIAT
AND STRENGTHEN THE COMMUNIST PARTY

I have already said that the contradictions among the bourgeoisie, the oppositional sentiments among the non-proletarian classes, the conflicts of these non-proletarian classes with the dictatorship of finance capital, are only an indirect reserve of the proletariat. *This reserve can only be utilized by a strong Party;*

all the forces therefore must be exerted to strengthen the Party.

The German Party has succeeded in going underground and in creating a big illegal mass organization which has at least 60,000 members. It has succeeded in organizing the publication and wide distribution of illegal literature on a scale unprecedented in history. But this is still insufficient. The Party has cells in the factories; a relatively larger number of members of the Party are carrying on work in the factories now than before the fascists took power. But the work of these cells is still weak. Each member of the Party fulfills the duties assigned to him and does so heroically. But the cells do not come together, do not discuss questions dealing with the life of the workers in the factories, etc. Therefore, many questions which are of extreme importance for the working masses pass over the heads of the Communists.

District Committees exist, but they also do not work as a collective body. They do not discuss the questions which interest the masses of the workers in their district, and they do not show sufficient initiative. Of course, it is very difficult and dangerous to call meetings now, but interchanges of opinion between Party members are essential. Without this, there can be no real leadership of the Party organizations; without this, the Party organs will not be up to date in their knowledge of the interests and demands of the broad masses.

In the German Communist Party at the present time, the center of gravity of the leadership has been transferred to the "instructor" apparatus. This is a good thing from the point of view of carrying out centralized decisions from the top, but it introduces a bureaucratic element into Party life and makes the Party less mobile. Therefore, some change must be made here in the direction of increasing self-activity from below.

The situation at present is such that very important events are taking place every day. New fascist laws are issued directed against the workers, the fascist apparatus is changing, mass actions may begin in the factories and in the streets. The Party organizations must be in a position to react rapidly to these actions. *The Party must form the public opinion of the masses* with regard to every new decision taken by the fascists.

This, unfortunately, is still taking place to an insufficient extent. The Party slogans are correct, the formulation of our general aims and the definition of our prospects are correct, but the concrete events in the mills and factories are not analyzed with sufficient concreteness. This situation must be radically changed. The most important task at the present time is to react promptly to every new phenomenon in the life of the workers, to every new measure

adopted by the fascists. Then the Party will have much greater success. With this end in view, we must reconstruct the Party apparatus, and in spite of the terror, make it possible for the masses in the Party organizations to show greater initiative. Everything goes to show that this is possible.

THE UNITED FRONT

A most important question facing the C.P.G., as well as the other Parties, is the question of the tactics of the united front. It is true that German social-democracy has been smashed. There is no centralized Social-Democratic Party in Germany just now. Even Staempfer says that until the last few days social-democracy seemed to be dead. But *the local social-democratic organizations have been maintained and in some cases they are mass organizations.* They have no clear program and no centralized leadership. It is just now that discussions are taking place on program questions, on questions of cadres and leadership. This is the most suitable moment for us to approach the social-democratic workers and *help them to find the way to Communism.* Therefore the German Communist Party must widely use the tactics of the united front, must *propose to the local social-democratic organizations to carry on a joint struggle against fascism, and, in proportion as we draw nearer to them, to take a course leading to unity on the basis of the program and tactics of the Communist International.* Here and there this has been done and with great success. But in many cases our Party organizations have taken little interest in attracting ex-social-democrats into the ranks of the Communist Party. In many cases our comrades have been afraid to draw them into the ranks of the Party, on the ground that they still retained many survivals of social-democratic ideas, and that they do not agree with some of our formulations. This, of course, is quite true. One-time social-democrats do not become Communists in an instant. To win the social-democratic workers to the side of the Communist Party, every one of our agitators must seriously think over all his arguments against social-democracy. But it is just in this respect that we meet with the greatest "simplification".

An agitator, for example, demands that the social-democratic workers should recognize our correct formula that social-democracy and fascism are twins, and applies this formula to the present illegal social-democratic workers' circles which have been organized to struggle against the fascist dictatorship. An agitator, for example, demands that the social-democratic workers should accept our correct international formula that social-democracy is the main social support of the bourgeoisie, and at the same time proves that in Germany at the present moment the illegal social-democratic workers' groups, which

have now been organized by the workers to fight the bourgeoisie, belong to this category.

If these agitators were to think seriously over their arguments, they would direct the hatred of the masses against the entire social-democratic policy, and would convince the workers that the Communists were right when they called fascism and social-democracy twins, and called the leaders of social-democracy social-fascists. Super-simplified arguments, however, frequently interfere with the united front and the attraction of these workers to Communism.

Who has any doubts now that Wels, Severing and Loebe are to blame for the agonies being suffered by the German workers? Who has any doubts now that had it not been for these and many other social-democratic leaders, fascism would not have been in existence nor would the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie in general exist now? Fascism could not have been victorious without the aid of social-democracy. But it is also true that monopolist capital passed over to open fascist dictatorship because the social-democratic leaders were no longer in a position to restrain the growth of the revolutionary upsurge among the masses, including that among their own organizations, and to ensure that the measures adopted by finance capital would be carried through. Therefore the bourgeoisie removed Wels, Severing and Co. But the mass organizations of social-democracy were destroyed because the bourgeoisie was afraid of them as workers' organizations which might pass over to the side of revolution, and because they could not make up their minds to use them any longer as a basis.

The fascist dictatorship in Germany does not base itself on social-democracy but on the Reichswehr, the police and the mass fascist organizations. Wels and Severing, of course, are quite agreed to serve the bourgeoisie in the future, and it is for this purpose that Wels is seeking for contacts with the working masses in Germany.

He will try to utilize the social-democratic survivals that exist among the masses. We must, therefore, carry on a struggle against these survivals. He will try to hold back the social-democratic groups from united front action with the Communists, and so we must intensify our struggle for the united front.

The situation in Germany has altered. But even now it is correct to call Wels a social-fascist, and it is true that the fascists and social-democracy led by Wels were twins. But the illegal social-democratic groups which are now carrying on work in Germany are not social-fascists, and do not constitute the social support of the bourgeoisie. They are on the way towards Communism, and must be won for the Communist Party.

If some sectarian mistakes are corrected, our Party

will without question have great successes in utilizing the tactics of the united front. Our tactics of the united front have achieved great successes in a number of countries, especially in connection with the campaign for the liberation of Comrade Thaelmann. *Comrade Thaelmann can only be saved by the struggle of the broad masses for his liberation, above all in Germany itself, in Great Britain, France and the United States.* We must intensify our struggle for the liberation of Thaelmann in every possible way. But besides our direct aim of liberating Comrade Thaelmann, this struggle is also of tremendous general political importance. If the broad masses of social-democratic workers rise to the struggle for the liberation of the leaders of the Communist movement, Comrades Dimitroff and Thaelmann, this means that in the future they will listen to the words of these leaders, and will follow them. The struggle for the liberation of Comrade Thaelmann, like the struggle for the liberation of Comrade Dimitroff, is a *struggle to win over the broad masses of the workers to our side.*

THE SAAR QUESTION

Our Party organization in the Saar occupies a special place in the struggle for the united front. For a long time, in conditions when there are only three possibilities of voting, namely, for Germany, for France, and the status quo, our Party issued the proposal that the struggle should be for a *Red Saar*, i.e., did not give a practical reply to the question as to how to act when voting. Now the Party is calling for votes to be given for the *status quo*. But this is not enough. The Party must carry on the widest struggle against the Saar being incorporated in the hangmen's "Third Empire" by voting for the status quo. *By voting against Hitler in the Saar, the people of the Saar along with the German workers struggle for the overthrow of the fascist dictatorship. The greater the defeat of Hitler in the Saar, the nearer the end of the fascist dictatorship, and the nearer the incorporation of the Saar in a free Germany.*

To achieve success in the electoral struggle in the Saar, we must organize a broad united front without demanding any other conditions from the supporters of this united front than the *vote for the status quo*. Communists must advocate their slogans for the overthrow of capitalism in the Saar. They must put forward their demands for freedom of the press, freedom of assembly and strikes, and for higher wages, but *they must not make these demands an obligatory condition of the united front for voting for the status quo on January 13, 1935.*

TRADE UNION TACTICS

Comrade Richter was unable to tell us about the wide strike movement of the working masses in Ger-

many, although the conditions of the workers have become very much worse and although the fascist dictatorship is carrying through a number of very serious anti-working class laws. What is the essence of the weakness of the activity of the workers? Is it the passivity of the working class? It is true that the results of the defeat in January, 1933, still make themselves felt. It is true that the nationalist intoxication which has not yet completely disappeared makes itself felt. *But the working class wants to carry on a struggle against the capitalist offensive.*

Our Party organizations, it is clear, cannot be broad organizations, cannot embrace the broad masses, because they are Party organizations. They cannot to a sufficient degree be the leaders and organizers of strike struggles. We need a broader organization than our Party, a driving belt to the masses. Only the *trade unions* can form such a broad organization.

The reformist trade unions in Germany have been smashed up. After Hitler came to power, the Communists issued the following slogan—*Carry on an energetic struggle inside the free trade unions, convert them into organs of the class struggle and do not let the fascist dictatorship smash them.* The struggle in this connection was a very weak one and did not produce big results. The free trade unions were destroyed. *The Communists launched the slogan: "Form independent class trade unions."* Successes, however, are for the time being extremely insignificant. What next? What shall we do?

The workers who have been in the reformist trade unions for tens of years maintain some kind of contact among themselves even now. The leaders of the Red Trade Union Opposition in Germany, by the way, bear witness to this. No organizations exist, but the people who were members together of the former free trade unions over a long period of time stick together. No organization exists, but private contacts exist between the former members of these organizations. As this is the case, it is possible to set ourselves the task of basing ourselves on the old seventy years' tradition of the German trade union movement, to restore the free trade unions illegally. The workers always considered these trade unions to be their own organizations. *The restoration of the free trade unions, purged of reformists and traitors, as organs of the class struggle, as mass organizations for struggle against wage cuts, against the suppression of the workers' organizations—is a most important and complicated task.* If the German Party is able to solve this task, then it will have a *much bigger bridge to the masses* than it has had hitherto.

The strike movement is growing. But who is leading this strike movement? We must state that unfortunately the strikes which have taken place in

Germany have at bottom been extremely weak, extremely brief strikes, lasting one or two hours in the factories; in extreme cases the workers have marched out into the factory yard, but nothing more. But there have been a large number of such strikes. Were we always the organizers of these strikes? We were far from being so. In a number of cases evidently, the organizers were the Storm Troopers. And we must create conditions in which we shall be the leaders of the strike movement. This is the most important tactical problem facing us.

The contradictions in the bourgeois camp are growing. We can see that their growth is developing apace. We can see a growth of discontent against the fascist dictatorship not only among the workers but also among the peasants and petty-bourgeois masses. All this is a *sign of the growth of the prerequisites for a revolutionary crisis. But this revolutionary*

crisis by no means implies revolution, by no means implies victory for the proletariat unless we are able to make our Party into the strong and powerful Party of the toiling masses, unless we are able to organize the allies of the working class. It is therefore dangerous to base our calculations on the contradictions in the camp of the bourgeoisie.

These contradictions must be utilized. They weaken the regime. They make it possible for us to breathe in the factories, and in the streets, and to open the eyes of the masses. But it is *precisely now that we must concentrate all our attention on strengthening the Party, on developing the struggle of the proletariat, and on attracting the allies of our Party.*

We must widely popularize the program of Soviet Power in Germany as the only salvation for the toiling masses.

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THE SITUATION IN GERMANY AND SOME QUESTIONS OF THE UNITED FRONT*

By O. PIATNITSKY

PART I

THE EVENTS OF JUNE 30, 1934, AND THE WORK
OF THE C.P. OF GERMANY

SOME writers confuse the question as to what elements constitute the support of this or that government, as to what is the character of the mass basis of such governments, with the question as to the policy which these governments promote. Comrade Knorin was quite right when he pointed to the governments which existed in Germany prior to the fascists coming to power. The social-democratic governments and the Bruening government found their support in the Social-Democratic and Catholic Parties, in the reformist and Catholic trade unions, while the policy they put into operation fully corresponded to what was demanded by the bourgeoisie.

The same has been the case in England on two occasions. When the "Labor" government was in power it carried out in detail the policy of the English bourgeoisie, while deriving its support from the working class, but when conditions changed, the bourgeoisie started a campaign against the Labor government, and the latter was forced to hold new elections. Recall the campaign of the conservatives in England in connection with the Zinoviev letter.

These writers confuse two things. They confuse the mass basis of this or that government, with the policy operated by the government in question. The reason for this confusion lies in the fact that these writers think that since Hitler in Germany operated on the basis of the support he received from the petty bourgeoisie, and not merely from the petty bourgeoisie, nor only from the Storm Troopers, but also from the Reichswehr and the police, therefore, it is their view, until June 30, 1934, the Hitler government was a government of the petty bourgeoisie and not the government of the big bourgeoisie. The question arises, why did the big bourgeoisie after all find it necessary to deal a blow at what constituted the wide petty-bourgeois basis of the fascist government? I explain it partly by the fact that due to their petty-bourgeois base, the fascists were unable to carry into effect the law published on January 20, 1934.

What is the nature of this law? It destroys all the labor legislation that has existed in Germany since the year 1885, a period, that is, of almost

fifty years. And it was naturally impossible to carry this law into effect. Why? I will try to explain.

During the year and a half of their existence, the fascists have done very much for the bourgeoisie: they have supplied them with incredibly large subsidies, have freed them from debts and released them from certain taxes, they have reduced the income tax, supplied war orders, secured wage-cuts amounting to almost 20 per cent, and increased the intensification of labor. In addition, they have smashed up the workers' organizations. But they came up against difficulties in their efforts to wipe out wage agreements, and to make the employers the actual and "real" masters of their enterprises. The united actions of the employed workers, occasionally supported by members of the fascist factory organizations and the Storm Troopers against wage-cuts and the worsening of labor conditions, as demanded by the employers, hindered the fascists and rendered it impossible for them to carry this law into life. The law was published on January 20, and was to come into force on May 1, but was postponed to June 1, and, even before the events of June 30, was postponed for another three months—until September 30. Why? Because the elections of the "trusted representatives", who were to replace the factory and works committees, have proven that the vast majority of workers in the enterprises have spontaneously chosen almost the same method of struggle against the law of January 20, which abolished the factory and works committees, and introduces in their place the Councils of "trusted representatives", in reality appointed by the employers in the enterprises.

Why is it that the petty bourgeoisie passively supported the repulse given in the enterprises to this law by workers of all trends engaged in production, including members of the fascist party and Storm Troopers? Because all the promises made to the petty bourgeoisie by the fascists before they came into power were not fulfilled. They failed to fulfil their promise about releasing the ruined petty bourgeoisie from the taxes, from which the latter suffered before the fascists came to power. Moreover, the consumption tax, the turnover tax, which weighs most heavily mainly upon the petty bourgeoisie, increased in 1933 by 21.3 million marks per month, whereas the income tax on the big bourgeoisie was reduced on the average of 19.2 million marks per

* Speech delivered at a meeting of the Presidium of the E.C.C.I., held on July 9 to 10, 1934.

month. The promisory notes issued to the petty bourgeoisie in 1933 were ruthlessly disowned, and a tremendous number of petty bourgeoisie were left without any means of subsistence. The discontent of the petty bourgeoisie with the fascist regime was a source of pressure on the Storm Troopers. The fascists also introduced differentiation among the peasantry. The increase in prices of agricultural produce introduced by the fascists has in the main been of benefit only to the kulaks and landlords. The small people in the countryside cannot sell their produce as they want, but must deliver them to the agricultural village cooperatives, headed by the landlords and the kulaks, who establish the kind and the quantity of products which may be delivered to the Cooperatives. This measure forces the peasants to sell their products in secret and at a low price, if only to sell them. In addition, the moratorium which the fascists extended until October, 1933, was abolished after April 1, 1934 and it is now possible in the countryside to foreclose on the property of the peasants, with the exception of live stock and the seeds.

The moratorium and high prices, with which the fascists attracted the countryside to their side and directed them against the proletariat, introduced great differentiation into the countryside, while the law regarding hereditary homesteads introduced by the fascists, and which embraces the prosperous peasantry and the kulak farms (of from $7\frac{1}{2}$ to 125 hectares), has introduced demoralization even among these elements in the village, because it is only the eldest son who is entitled to inheritance while the other members of the family must leave the farm as soon as they become of age. The position in Germany is as follows now: the workers, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the basic masses of the peasantry are very much dissatisfied, and it is this dissatisfaction that has prevented the fascist party from carrying into life everything demanded by the bourgeoisie.

What is it that the bourgeoisie demand? Foreign trade is getting worse from month to month. The balance for 1934 is adverse. Over a period of four months, imports exceeded exports. There is an adverse foreign trade balance amounting to 135 millions; gold reserves are exhausted, there are no means wherewith to pay for raw materials; there are difficulties in connection with imports, and there is a squabble in the bourgeois camp over the distribution and purchase of these raw materials. What does the bourgeoisie need so as to improve the situation? It has to compete in the foreign markets against countries which have an inflated currency, on the one hand, and against Japanese dumping on the other. The latter is competing against Germany in all markets which it has flooded with incredibly cheap

goods. But in order to carry on a successful struggle against competitors in foreign markets, what has to be done is to compel each individual worker to meet his employer face to face and to come to an agreement with him about wages, for under the law of January 20, 1934, collective agreements are to be abolished. Up to now they have not as yet been abolished just because the fascists feared the resistance of the working class. Despite the fact that the trade unions no longer exist, the fascists automatically extended wage agreements. And if the agreements are abolished, the workers who still continue to be paid according to the collective agreements will have to negotiate about wages with the employers, who, of course, will make good use of the huge unemployed army to bring about incredible cuts in wages. The bourgeoisie is striving to cut its costs of production at the expense of the working class so as to be in a position to compete on the foreign market. Even the employers who work for the home market are dissatisfied, for in 1933 the consumption of articles of prime necessity was reduced by 6 per cent, and by an additional 2 per cent in the first months of 1934. The home market is shrinking and consumption is declining of several products and articles: butter by 13.5 per cent, clothing and textile goods by 29.8 per cent, furniture and household goods by 23.7 per cent and so forth. Such, in my opinion, are some of the reasons why the fascists had so hastily to deal a blow at their petty-bourgeois base, a blow which led to the latter being narrowed down, and prevented them from exerting stronger pressure, and why they preferred to base themselves primarily upon the other forces of the Reichswehr and the police, in order to put an end to the resistance of the workers and to place them in the position occupied by the Japanese workers.

How did the plot come about, how is it that yesterday's friends, Hitler and Roehm, became enemies; what was it that brought them into conflict? I do not believe that there was a plot, I don't believe that Roehm was connected with Schleicher and Schleicher with France; all this is nonsense. As far as the bourgeoisie are concerned, Roehm was no better than Hitler, and no worse than Goering. In all probability, the cause of the strife in the bourgeois camp arises from the question as to which forces the fascist government should primarily rest upon. I think that Roehm and Co. were not averse to purging the Storm Troop detachments, not of "reactionary" elements but of revolutionary elements, of elements who demanded that the fascists should fulfil the promises they made before they came to power. Roehm pointed to the necessity of a "purge", before the events of June 30. Roehm ordered the Storm Troopers to go on furlough before the events of June 30, 1934. The struggle be-

tween the fascist leaders was waged around the question as to whether they should rely mainly on the armed Storm Troopers to prevent the conservative elements coming to power and so forth. On June 27, a few days before the events of June 30, the *Völkischer Beobachter* wrote:

"The National Socialists have no intentions whatever of voluntarily giving up power, for if they did renounce power, it would fall into the hands not of a popular-conservative government, but of the Communists."

That is to say, after Papen's declaration, it was a question of setting up a government composed of conservative elements. And so Roehm and Co., in order to keep the national-socialists in power, and not with a view to satisfying the demands made by the peasants, the workers and petty bourgeoisie, wanted to preserve a base of their own which should serve as a support at the moment when other elements from the bourgeoisie should want to take power. Thyssen and Co. demanded that the government should rely primarily on the Reichswehr. These bourgeois circles demanded that a stop be put to all talk of the "second national revolution". They considered it necessary to limit the influence of the Storm Troopers who were armed with rifles, machine guns and airplanes, and could really take it into their heads in some places to fulfil part of the promises made earlier by the fascists. So Roehm and Co. wanted to arrange "a conference" of leaders just on this question. Hitler and Goering came to agreement with Krupp and Thyssen. That is why they prevented Roehm and the others from calling this conference, by crushing them. This, it seems to me, is what happened, at least these and nothing else are the main features of the matter. There was no question of any plot, or of any foreign power. At any rate, I think that the causes of the events of June 30, which I have indicated, are the basic ones. That this is the case is proved by the fact that the fascists had hardly succeeded in murdering their own people (and these murders are still going on) than they began at the same time to put out of the way some of the German statesmen who might take their place in the seat of power (Schleicher). The fascists only failed to remove Papen, supported as he was by the Reichswehr. The partial disarmament of the Storm Troopers, of course, is not only an inner-German question. France has long insisted on the disbandment of the Storm Troopers, one quarter of whom were kept in barracks, and were trained in military art of all kinds, including chemical warfare and aviation. Therefore, in order to come to agreement with France and England, and England supports France in respect to getting Germany back again into the League of Nations, in order that the fascists should succeed in obtaining

from the victors the right to re-arm, to increase the number of soldiers in the Reichswehr and to obtain loans, the fascists agreed to the partial disbandment of the Storm Troop detachments. The internal and external causes are linked together. When speaking about the dissolution of the Storm Troop detachments you cannot mention only internal or only external causes.

I now pass to the Communist Party of Germany. Comrade Knorin has dwelt on this question in great detail, and I am absolutely in agreement with his speech. I would only like to emphasize some points.

The German Communist Party, which was driven underground so suddenly, with such a noise, with such a "mobilization" of the petty bourgeoisie and with the help of such a provocation as the Reichstag fire, very quickly collected its forces. In spite of the fact that the local organizations themselves suffered most of all from the fascist terror, they quickly re-arranged their ranks and very rapidly developed such a wide activity that on the day after the revocation they demonstrated their staunchness and initiative in struggle. It is no accident that they were in a position, in spite of the provocation, to bring 4,600,000 persons to the ballot boxes. The local organizations began to issue their literature much earlier than did the apparatus of the Central Committee. They became stronger in struggle. They gained the sympathies of wide strata of workers, they created an authority for the Communist Party of Germany such as there never was before. This is a fact. The Communist Party has such cadres at its disposal that they can only excite enthusiasm. All this is true. But the question is, how are these cadres being utilized? This is the question, a fundamental question. Individual workers and Communists risk their lives to distribute the literature, but at the same time they do not as a rule speak at meetings of workers, convened by the fascists. This would call for the same sacrifices, perhaps even for less victims, than when people are shot on the spot for distributing literature. And I am quite convinced that if the cadres who distribute literature had received the requisite line, if they had the necessary leadership, they would have also spoken at meetings of the "labor front" held in the factories, and at gatherings of the "Power in Joy" organizations.

There is still an absence of group or individual agitation, without which no Party can live. Literature is brought either from abroad (which means that it takes a long time) or is delivered illegally from other cities. But events in Germany are taking place with such rapidity, so many laws are being showered down every day, and they are the kind of laws which affect the interests of the widest masses, that we cannot afford to wait until leaflets appear. We must react to events without delay. And who

can do this if not the members of our Party, if not the workers who support us, by oral, individual and group agitation? It is possible that the position in the country is much better than as reflected in the reports of the comrades here.

The Communist Party of Germany is fully in the position to carry on work in the factories, etc., and already has some success in this respect. It is said that 25 per cent of the members of the Communist Party of Germany are now employed in factories, etc. Maybe this is overestimated. But if such a figure has already been mentioned, than it is obvious that the situation has improved. Apparently this is partly to be explained by the fact that 800,000 workers have been drawn into production, among whom there are Communists and social-democrats who have come over to us. But work in the factories, etc., is still being carried on with insufficient planfulness. We know that there are Communists employed at the largest works, such as Siemens, A.E.G. and Krupps. They even receive leaflets which they distribute on the job, though sometimes these leaflets relate to questions which are not quite appropriate for the factory in question. But these Communists are not always linked together on the job—which means that we have not yet taken the most elementary steps, for if the Communists were linked up on the job, and received constant and good leadership from the higher Party Committees, they could issue leaflets dealing with the factories in question, linking up the concrete facts of the life of the factory with politics. This is of great importance. But if each Communist works at his own risk, without any plan, and without organization, he does nothing, or else he works in a way he shouldn't, or works in such a way as to bring no effect.

There are two big fascist organizations, which cover millions of people—"The Labor Front" and the "Power in Joy". It may be that it is impossible to carry on systematic work in the "Labor Front" organization, because while meetings were organized at the beginning, now, as we are told by our German comrades, no meetings are organized, although before the elections took place of the "trusted representatives" at the factories, etc., the "Labor Front" did convene meetings, sometimes even outside the factory. It was the fascists who spoke at these meetings, while the workers kept silent. The workers did not react to all the questions and all the endeavors of the fascists to liven up the meetings. The Communists could have been active in speaking at such meetings. If nothing more, they could have asked questions. But they did not always do so. There is an organization called "Power in Joy", which embraces all the members of the "Labor Front", and everybody has to belong without fail to the "Labor Front", for anybody who does not be-

long to it and does not want to pay membership dues is dismissed. The "Power in Joy" organization has tens of circles at the factories, etc., beginning with chess, draughts and choirs, and ending with military circles. Is it possible to work there or not? It is possible. For seven years the Italian comrades were unable to overcome the resistance in their ranks to make a beginning of work in the fascist mass organizations, in the trade unions and in the "Dopo Lavori". It would be dangerous if our comrades in Germany were to take an example from them. Why not show an example of how it can be done to the Italian comrades, who have not proved able to do such work?

But it seems to me that you are following in their footsteps. We cannot reconcile ourselves to such a situation.

And what about the trade unions? The reformist trade union leadership betrayed the trade unions to the fascists with such lightning rapidity that even the members of the trade unions had no time to think things over. At first the members of the trade unions were paid benefits out of their membership dues, but later this was stopped, then later the trade unions themselves were done away with. At such a time the only thing which the Communist Party of Germany could have done was to organize such elements from the former trade unions who wanted to offer resistance to the fascists, and who were dissatisfied with the actions of their leaders who had sold the interests of the organized workers. Many of the former members of the reformist trade unions wanted to preserve their organizations and to transform them into class trade union organizations. Such trade union organizations could have protected the rights of the workers which had been trampled on and held up the capitalist offensive. Was it possible to organize such trade union organization? Without a doubt it was. And the German comrades quite agreed with this view, they elaborated everything that was necessary for the purpose. But in practice, in the sphere of the organization of the trade union movement, the work has been clearly insufficient.

And what about the Young Communist League? I am of the opinion that the Central Committee of the Party is responsible for the Y.C.L. Why, the Young Communists are still discussing the question as to where it is better to carry on work, whether among the Hitler youth or the Catholic youth, and they cannot say where it is really easier to carry on work, where they have tried to work, what have been the results, and what experiences the Young Communists have gained from work among the Hitler youth, and what negative experiences they have gained from work among the Catholic youth. What has the Young Communist League been doing in

Germany all this time? Here is a comrade from the Young Communist League who has quoted a number of facts, illustrating their achievements in the compulsory labor camps. It is true that individual Young Communists and sympathizers have worked quite well there. But it is hardly likely that they received any leadership. Had they any leadership, we could have made those camps into real schools for the training of good Young Communists capable of working everywhere and anywhere, for the Young Communists could have made good use of the camps for our illegal work. Due to careless work, the camps were dissolved. To prevent this happening, work in the camps should have been carried on more carefully. The camps should have been made the place to produce really good Young Communists capable of conducting work anywhere after leaving the camp. This was not done, because there has not been sufficient leadership, the Young Communists working at their own risk. But it is easier to work now among the youth than before, for even the sons of the petty bourgeoisie can now see the state which their parents have been reduced to, and have come to the conclusion that the fascists have deceived them.

Comrade Knorin has already spoken about the Saar. He has quoted an accepted document. This was "tactics". There are three variations in the Versailles Treaty about the Saar, namely, the "status quo", incorporation in France, or incorporation in Germany, but the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany chose a fourth variation, namely, "Red Saar". The workers were called on to vote for a variation, which is non-admissible as far as the voting is concerned, and the fascists wanted nothing better, for the more votes there were for the "Red Saar", the less there would be for the "status quo", and only the German fascists would gain from it. But when the Central Committee of the C.P.G. changed their tactics, they spoke out very timidly at first. Two-thirds of the space in the article which contained this announcement were devoted to "Red Saar" and only a few lines were written to indicate that the C.P.G. is now in favor of the "status quo". It is only lately that the Communists have bestirred themselves in the Saar.

In regard to the social-democratic workers, the Communist Party of Germany is not recruiting them as successfully as is being done in Austria, and those who have been recruited are very often not admitted

to Party work, but are kept on one side. Let us presume that, say, tomorrow, there will be a change and the fascists find it necessary for the bourgeoisie once more to bring to the surface those social-democrats who, unlike Loebe, will not openly declare that they have gone over to the fascists, but will utter "Left" phrases. It will not be quite so easy for the Communists to work among the social-democratic workers then. It will then be more difficult to establish a united front with them, whereas now it is quite possible to establish a united front with the social-democratic organizations in Germany in different industrial centers. And this is a most important point for the Communist Party of Germany at the present moment. We stated that the fascists would not retain power immediately after their advent to power (in the resolution of the Presidium of April 1, 1933). The resolution of the Presidium has been corroborated, the crisis in the fascist camp is beginning. The fascists have had to narrow their mass basis and they will now have to find support primarily in the naked force of the police and the Reichswehr. The Communists have not yet succeeded in absorbing the best elements from among the Social-Democratic Party into the Communist Party of Germany. The united front with the revolutionary social-democratic workers is the main thing now in Germany. I think that a Bolshevik Party should not confine itself to the adoption of resolutions. There has been a resolution about the trade unions, and one about social-democratic workers. Many resolutions have been passed, and not bad ones at that. But these resolutions are very often not put into practice.

It is easier to carry on work in Germany now than it was at the beginning of 1933. The Party must fully utilize this favorable situation.

Prior to the advent of the fascists to power, we insisted upon new cadres being put forward. In the resolution on the report of Comrade Richter we must declare with vigor that it is imperative that new cadres be brought forward. They are to be found in the country and are working rather well. Not only should they be brought forward, but they must also be given the place they deserve. With these new cadres, the Communist Party of Germany will be able to fulfil more easily and quickly the tasks which confront it.

(Continued in next issue)



THE LOWER FUNCTIONARIES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF GERMANY

By MULLER

THE activity of the Communist Party of Germany after Hitler came to power has confirmed the correctness of the policy of the C.P.G. in respect to cadres, pursued prior to the establishment of the fascist dictatorship. Under the leadership of Comrade Thaelmann and mainly during the last few years prior to the fascist dictatorship, the training of cadres was an important part of the whole of the revolutionary work and policy of the C.P.G. The training of cadres raised the ideological level of the whole Party and especially of the active Party workers. Thanks to its correct policy in regard to cadres, the C.P.G. was able to fill the breaches made by the fascist terror. All attempts to smash up the only revolutionary Party of the proletariat in Germany were defeated, thanks to the revolutionary fighting spirit and ideological firmness of the Communists who were supported by wide masses of workers.

WHAT IS THE STATE OF AFFAIRS OF THE OLD CADRES IN THE LOWER PARTY ORGANIZATIONS?

When the fascists came to power, the greatest losses were suffered by the lower and middle functionaries of the Party. These were the representatives of the C.P.G. in the factories, the villages and dwelling houses, who were known not only by the workers, but who were spied on and persecuted by the enemy. It is true that owing to the mass activity of the workers in defense of these functionaries, it was very often possible to render arrests difficult, and to prevent the murder of prisoners and even to secure their liberation. Very many, however, of the lower functionaries, were torn from the ranks of the revolutionary fighters during the first few days and months of fascist rule. The majority of them have been in the clutches of the fascist murderers for over a year.

The revolutionary spirit, loyalty to the Party and belief in the victory of the working class have contributed to the fact that as soon as any old activists have torn themselves out of the fascist hell, they have again placed themselves without question at the disposal of the Party.

Those lower functionaries who escaped arrest became the source from which the middle and higher leading organs of the Party were reinforced. Some of the functionaries who were liberated after being arrested once again began to carry out leading work. The question of utilizing these functionaries was,

however, settled by the higher leading bodies of the Party after carefully weighing each candidature and checking the conduct of the comrade when in prison, in each individual case.

There were cases, mainly in the first period of illegality, when different Party organizations resisted decisions made by the higher leading organs not to permit one or other ex-functionary who had been in prison to renew his Party work. This happened in very rare cases, but it showed that the Party members had not yet fully mastered the experience of illegal work. In the town of X., our organization was even at the point of splitting when, on the instructions of the sub-district committee, one of the Party workers had to be removed from all Party work, as he was suspected of being a spy, a suspicion which the majority of the organization refused to endorse. It is true that after the most weighty proofs were brought forward to prove that the individual in question was a provocateur, and that he had betrayed 20 activists to the police, the comrades also became convinced of the correctness of the decision.

But it should be stated that as a general rule removal from Party work is not in most cases an expression of distrust in the comrade in question, but is an undoubtedly necessary precautionary measure to ensure the carrying on of Party work. In order to safeguard the Party against repression, it is not only necessary for the Party leaders to remove certain comrades from their work, but it is the duty of every Party member, as soon as he notices that he is being watched by the police, to remove himself from Party work, to let the Party committee know of it, and then to wait for instructions. Such self-removal from work, in cases where it is well founded, is of much more use to the Party than if the comrade continues to work and thus unwittingly assists the police in their task.

Take an example. A comrade was released from jail after being severely beaten up there. The Party used the comrade as district treasurer. He felt quite confident because the Party leaders put him to work again after checking him up. He forgot, however, that the police knew him well, and that he must therefore doubly and trebly hide his movements. He traveled round the district and collected money from various local treasurers, and so the police, who never ceased to keep a watch on him, followed at his heels and arrested about 20 or 30 of the com-

rades whom he met, and in searching them, found still more addresses, as a result of which they succeeded in making still further arrests.

In general, the best thing to do with comrades who have been released after arrest is to give them Party work in other districts in Germany.

Practice shows that there are, on the one hand, lower Party organizations in the C.P.G. which have not yet succeeded in making adequate use of the old cadres. The Party committees explain their failure to do so on the grounds that the latter are too well known, but they do not bear in mind that such forces frequently have very well organized contacts with the masses. For example, in the town of N., a former member of the Red factory committee in a certain big enterprise returned to work there again after being released, as he was a highly skilled worker. Without even receiving support from the Party organization, he was able to get support in the factory. For instance, he headed a delegation of workers to the management which demanded hot water to wash in at the end of the work day. The demand was granted. This led to a fall in the influence of the national-socialist factory committee, and to a very great increase in the trust of the workers in the ex-member of the Red factory committee, who in their eyes was the representative of the C.P.G.

This "former" functionary of the C.P.G. could, of course, have been made still better use of, and the same is true of many other comrades. How many "old" functionaries, frequently with good political training but unable to do Party work for a number of reasons, could be put to work as worker-correspondence, etc. All that is necessary is to suitably distribute the functionaries who have been under arrest, after they have been isolated for a definite period. The lower functionaries must on no account do the same work and in the same sphere as previously, since the police keep a keen watch over the lower activists whom they know—and even at the labor exchanges the possibilities for them to carry on revolutionary work are very limited. These comrades should, as far as possible, therefore, be urged to get a job in a factory in another town or in another part of the town or to look for work on a road repairing job or in the villages, and to continue to carry on revolutionary work there.

* * *

An important factor in the protection of the Party organization was the reduction of the size of the various Party organizations. Due just to this move the enemy has found it difficult in case of provocation and treachery to arrest a large number of Party members and functionaries. The conspiratorial character of the Party organizations as a whole, as well as of each individual Party member, must be com-

plete. The results of neglect in this sphere are clearly shown by the following example: after arresting a certain Party functionary and utilizing his testimony, the police were able to arrest five sub-district committees and some of the lower functionaries, in all about 60 or 70 comrades. One man, who was aware of the contacts with five organizations, and who turned traitor, was able to betray so many contacts and people to the police!

Take another example. The police succeeded in arresting a Party group of "five" while they were distributing leaflets. By discovering the contacts between this "five" and other organizations above and below, two sub-districts were raided and about 60 comrades, chiefly functionaries, were arrested.

Two fundamental mistakes helped the work of the police in the cases above mentioned. Firstly, despite all directives, there were still about 30 comrades in the street cells of these sub-district. Secondly, all the functionaries, from the leader of a cell to the sub-district committee, knew each other, and thanks to the "confessions" made by arrested men, it was easy to make mass arrests. Such examples show the necessity of really reorganizing these organizations in the spirit of strictly fulfilling the decisions of the C.C. of the C.P.G. on methods of carrying on illegal work and the rules of conspiracy. Contacts between different organizations and functionaries must be set up with the greatest caution. Every functionary must perform not more than one job, so that he will not, as a result of horizontal contacts, endanger comrades from other organizational units or mass organizations. The whole system of contacts between lower organizations and between lower functionaries must be frequently reconstructed.

In all cases of arrest, as in the above mentioned cases, the personal conduct of each of the prisoners plays a fundamental role. In the cases quoted, the police were able to make mass arrests, because, among other things, instead of some of the prisoners sacrificing themselves, they sacrificed other comrades. At the beginning of the period of illegality, the C.C. of the C.P.G. decided that anyone who gave anything at all away when under arrest would be expelled from the Party. In some organizations there have been tendencies to weaken this decision, by introducing a distinction between "voluntary" testimonies and "confessions extorted by torture and the threat of death". This manner of approach is impermissible. Treachery cannot be justified in any way. In the same way, it is no excuse at all if a prisoner goes with the police to a rendezvous voluntarily or under threats, because in this way he betrays another comrade. There are sufficient examples to show how comrades, whom the police forcibly compelled to go to a Party rendezvous, were able to prevent arrests. This is how every comrade should act in such a situation.

Two Berlin functionaries were arrested. On one of them materials regarding Party rendezvous were found and, owing to the treachery of the second, the police found the place where comrades met. The first functionary was put in an automobile in order to take him to the rendezvous, but on the way he threw himself out of the car. The police were unable to make any arrests at the rendezvous.

A functionary, Rudi Schwartz, later killed together with Comrade John Scheer, was put in an automobile by the police and brought to a meeting place. When he saw a comrade in the distance coming to the meeting place, he shouted at the top of his voice, "Look out, the dogs are here!" The comrade, who was on his way to the rendezvous, succeeded in escaping.

A responsible comrade was arrested. The police found a note on him about a rendezvous, and they took him there. The comrade spoke to the first person he met in the street. This person was arrested and taken to the police station, where it was found that he was a member of the Storm Troops. The police took the comrade to the meeting place again, as a trap for Party functionaries. But this trick did not succeed either because the comrade made a tremendous noise. "You'll not take me," he shouted, "do your business through other people."

Practice has shown that a definite part of the old active workers sometimes hinder illegal work, partly because they were too well known when the Party was legal and partly because in practice they hinder the training of the new cadres.

For example, quite a number of the members of the district committee in the town of X are comrades who have already been in a concentration camp, and are therefore known to the police. When the proposal was made that comrades who have been tested on revolutionary work, and are unknown to the police, be drawn into the district committee, these functionaries declared that there were no comrades in the town suitable for work in the district committee who have not yet been in a concentration camp.

In the same town there are three big factories. There are no cells there, although Communists are employed in all the factories. Such a state of affairs is explained by the fact that after the members of the old committee had been arrested and subsequently released, they assumed their previous functions. But, fearing to be arrested again, they carried on no work and took no steps to train new functionaries to take their places.

In another place, no systematic Party work is being done. The former leader is afraid of being arrested again, and does not draw in new forces. The mistake made by some organizations is that they have limited themselves to drawing only a narrow circle of members into activity, and have not re-

moved the comrades who hinder the work, even though unconsciously, and do not transfer them to other localities, do not make use of the lessons derived from cases of arrest, whereas these lessons make it possible to put obstacles in the way of the activity of the police.

A decisive struggle must be carried on against such distortions, and every-day leadership over the cadre policy must be given by the higher leading organs.

WHO CONSTITUTE THE NEW FUNCTIONARIES?

A considerable part of the active workers in the C.P.G. consists of Party workers who carried on revolutionary work even before Hitler came to power, but *new functionaries* in the lower Party organizations also constitute a large proportion. The new cadres consist of Party members (of whom not all but only a section carried out special functions in the Party before Hitler came to power), of members of the Y.C.L., and ex-members of the Social-Democratic Party. These are new cadres who have grown up in the every-day struggle against the fascist murderers under the leadership of old experienced and tried functionaries. As was formerly the case with the professional revolutionaries in Czarist Russia, our functionaries in Germany at the present time give up all their strength to revolutionary work, move about from place to place in accordance with instructions received from the Party committees, and frequently live entirely on financial support obtained from revolutionary workers and fearlessly, with the greatest courage, carry out all the tasks set them by the Party.

Many of these Party members were not very noticeable before the period of illegality started. Now they have grown up and have become firmly steeled. The mass of such Party members built up the Party organization locally and developed its work without waiting for instructions from a higher Party committee.

We should especially note the increased attraction of *women* into work as functionaries at all levels of the organization. Whereas in the legal period women were chiefly women's organizers and treasurers, nowadays the political role of women in the C.P.G. has greatly changed. Even at the beginning of the period of illegal Party work, voices could be heard in some of the lower links to the effect that "in view of the danger of Party work, the number of women Party members should be cut down". But practice soon put an end to such feelings, showing that women do not fear danger, and that, on the contrary, the women functionaries are often in a better position to cover up their work, and that in court, before the police and before the Storm Troopers, the women conducted themselves boldly, and, in their practical Party work, carried out their duty bravely.

It is clear that the enemy has also taken advantage of the fact that we are increasingly attracting new cadres into our work, and has pushed into the ranks of the C.P.G. agents of his who have even formed "lower Party organizations", and thus not only discovered the names and addresses of comrades but even tried to penetrate into the middle and higher leading organs of the Party. This fact, however, should not lead to the crushing of the initiative of the Party members. The Party leaders who check and regulate the work of the functionaries in contact with the entire Party, must cleanse the lower cadres of such vermin, and expose them to the whole mass of workers.

Throughout the country, the German Y.C.L. has given the Party good functionaries who fearlessly carry out their duty. Nevertheless the leading Party organs, when obtaining cadres from the Y.C.L., must keep in mind the situation in the Y.C.L. The struggle to win over the majority of the proletarian youth requires that the Party organizations should not only take functionaries from the Y.C.L. of Germany, but that in turn they should help the Y.C.L. to penetrate among the masses and to develop new cadres.

* * *

The fact that in some parts of Germany a considerable number of social-democrats have come over to the C.P.G., and have become functionaries of the C.P.G. due to the revolutionary work they have done shows that the social-democratic workers who come to the Communist Party are also a factor of no small importance in setting up cadres.

Here are some examples.

In one locality, the Communist Party organization had about 200 members before going underground. This place was formerly a stronghold of the "Left" social-democrats. Now, in illegal conditions, the Party organization has 200 members, but the difference is that out of the present 200 members about 50 per cent are former social-democratic workers, and that a former social-democratic worker is even at the head of this Party organization. Here we find completely new Party functionaries with no small number of former social-democratic workers.

In X a worker, about 40 years old, who was a member of the Social-Democratic Party since 1926, came over to the C.P.G. Moreover, he did not come alone, but brought 30 to 40 of his comrades with him. He gathered membership dues from them, saw to the distribution of materials and established new groups in neighboring districts. In addition he supplied a number of his former comrades with materials printed by the C.P.G.

There is an endless number of such cases in other places where former social-democratic workers, together with Communists who have long been members of the C.P.G., form the iron cadres of the

C.P.G. Of course this contains certain dangers. In one of the open letters of the C.C. of the Y.C.L., for example, it was emphasized that as a result of accepting ex-members of the socialist youth organization into the Y.C.L., without making the slightest investigation, it became possible for ex-functionaries of the young socialist organization to set up factional groups in the Y.C.L., and to bring social-democratic ideology in a contraband manner into the ranks of the Y.C.L. This fact, of course, makes it essential for all Communists to display the greatest vigilance. But it should be especially emphasized that frequently, in the lower Party organizations, the social-democratic workers are not sufficiently drawn into the C.P.G. and into the ranks of its functionaries. In 1920, when a large number of the independents came over to the C.P.G., the Party proved that it was not only able to attract these workers, and to re-make them, but that it was able to remove those elements from its ranks which could not belong to the vanguard of the proletariat. But some Party organizations still "ignore" honest social-democratic workers, and still do not "trust" them. Some comrades are even somewhat afraid of the "preponderance" of such elements. This feeling of political weakness and sectarianism towards honest ex-social-democratic workers must be eliminated at all costs. As against this, an energetic struggle must be carried on for every revolutionary social-democratic worker who is capable of fighting, and for the attraction of the most active and tested comrades among these workers into the ranks of the C.P.G. The social-democratic workers on the whole do not leave their past entirely at the threshold of the C.P.G. Very often they have not completely shaken off their former ideology, but with the majority of them this ideology leaks at every seam and it is only necessary to make an energetic effort so as to win them to the flag of Communism.

The social-democratic workers and the former members of the reformist trade unions must also increasingly be won over to the side of the revolutionary struggle, and drawn into the C.P.G., with the help of the revolutionary mass organizations. Through the illegal T.U. organization, the Red Aid, "Red Sporting Unity," and other mass organizations, the best workers must be brought into the C.P.G. A more intense struggle must therefore be carried on among the Party members against any underestimation of the importance of restoring and extending the mass organizations. In the report of a district organization of the I.L.D., the possibility of winning over social-democratic workers is especially stressed. Among other things, this report states that "the chances of winning over former social-democratic workers are favorable. It is precisely owing to the non-Party character of our organization that we can approach ex-social-democratic workers."

When accepting members into the Party, it is necessary to take a particularly strict attitude to elements which *left the C.P.G. as renegades*. In some organizations, the sentiment prevailed that in the present situation all "Communists" should march together. Some of these renegades even succeeded in penetrating into the Party and occupying posts and using them in the interests of their groups. A most determined struggle must be carried on against such sentiments, against the penetration of such elements into the Party. It is precisely in such a situation that the Party must keep such elements at a distance, not only because they try to destroy the unity of the Party but also because there are also those among them who betray Communist functionaries to the police. Here is an example showing the kind of people who sometimes hide behind the mask of "former Party members". In X, during the period from September to December, 1933 one lower Party organization and several mass organizations, etc., were discovered by the police. A comrade who was sent into the district to strengthen the work was also caught. It was found that the cause of the arrest was the work of a renegade group which had penetrated into the Party, and which informed the police of the presence of every new functionary.

It is impossible to fight against such elements merely by the weapons of the ideological struggle. These are police spies and provocateurs, and must be dealt with accordingly. The organized struggle of the whole Party against spies and provocateurs is already being carried on with twofold energy under the constant control of the central leaders. And, what is particularly important, broad strata of workers and toilers have been drawn into this struggle. We have innumerable examples showing that the sentiments of the broad masses against provocateurs, spies and traitors can be used to protect our cadres and organizations. There have been instances when all the workers employed in particular factories have revolted against the arrest of Communist functionaries, while national-socialist elements were boycotted and isolated in the factories and at home. It should be stressed that this struggle should also be broadened and raised to a great height.

PARTY FUNCTIONARIES AND PARTY TRAINING

Closely connected with the task of setting up new cadres of functionaries, and the utilization of old ones for more responsible work, is the important

question of the organization of educational training for functionaries. From the very outset of the transition of the C.P.G. to illegal conditions, the Party has paid great attention to this matter. The fact that besides the central organ of the Party, the *Rote Fahne*, besides the district newspapers and agitational materials, educational material issued by the C.C. and magazines for functionaries have been published, giving theoretical and practical help to the cadres, is of great importance. These materials make it possible for the Party functionaries to find their bearings. By bringing together theoretical literature which has escaped the Hitlerite scoundrels, a large number of organizations have formed portable libraries which are a great success. Courses of political study have been organized, though it is true that the number of students is small. Nevertheless, in the interests of Party work and of the growth of cadres, the necessity for strengthening the theoretical training of the C.P.G. functionaries, and the extension of this study over wider strata of the Party masses, must be stressed. Instead of the former tendencies of some organizations to be content with the publication of instructions and agitational material for the use of functionaries, material which was received by only a few of them, it is necessary to establish the widest possibilities for supplying the Party press regularly to the functionaries and all Party members and sympathizers. The functionaries, together with the members and sympathizers, must thoroughly discuss the Communist press in connection with every day events, must draw conclusions therefrom, and direct their work accordingly. The committees of the higher and middle organizations must pay great attention to the question of training. An energetic struggle must be carried on against the view which exists among some of the functionaries to the effect that it is impossible to organize study inside the country, and that this is a task for those who have had to leave the country. The task facing the committee is so to direct "training" that the really professional revolutionaries, Bolshevik organizers, and leaders of strikes are the first to come within its scope. The old cadres must be given training, and so also the new cadres, to a much greater degree than formerly. Former social-democratic workers must again and again be shown in theory and in practice that the Communist Party is the only Party which has always carried on the struggle and is still struggling to overthrow capitalism and to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat in Germany.

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