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A Fascist Trial of Communists

DURING the six days from 28th May to 2nd June there took place the trial of the C.C. of the Italian Communist Party before a special Fascist tribunal in Rome. The accused had been held in arrest for more than eighteen months, while investigations were being made and the enormous quantity of material accumulated which was finally presented by the Fascist secret police in the numerous volumes of which the indictment was composed. That material is to be used not only for the indictment of the leading group, who were on trial in this process, but also against any and every Communist who has fallen or at any future time may happen to fall into the hands of the Fascist secret police. The Fascist prosecutor at the special tribunal himself declared at the "trial" that the process was aimed not only against this or that individual among the accused, but against the Italian C.P. in its entirety. The harsh sentences pronounced by this Fascist tribunal have as their purpose not only the physical elimination of the finest militants of the Italian proletariat, but are also to serve as a menace to every revolutionary worker in Italy.

It is now almost six years that the bloody dictatorship of Mussolini has been strangling the Italian working class; for six years Fascism has been carrying on a ruthless, cruel and bloody war against the Italian C.P. In that struggle Fascism does not hesitate to resort to any method. During that period they have succeeded in eliminating all the opposition parties and organisations, Socialists, Reformists, Liberals, Democrats, "Popularists," and others, but they have been unable to crush and exterminate the Italian C.P., though they have driven it underground.

The Italian C.P. was subjected to a ruthless persecution even before the end of 1926, at a time when it still had a legal existence, when mass arrests, persecution of individual active party and trade union workers, the break-up of party organisations, printing presses and the editorial offices of Communist newspapers never ceased. But these repressions grew heavier at the end of 1926, after the promulgation of the "Law for the

Defence of the State" and the interdiction of the Communist Party. From that day to this Mussolini has taken the course of the physical extermination of all the vital forces of revolution, and to that end confines in prison and sentences to long terms of penal servitude all active Communists who happen to fall into the hands of Fascist "justice."

The Italian C.P. continued, and continues, to exist down to the present time, despite all its persecution. During the periods of most intensive repression and terror it has continued to publish its illegal newspapers, pamphlets and proclamations, and has responded to all the painful and burning questions of the workers' struggle against the oppression of Fascism, has mobilised the masses at all the important moments of the political and economic struggle, and has reconstituted the class trade unions broken up by the Fascists and betrayed by the reformists. And every time that, owing to the growth of unemployment, the opposition put up by the workers to the continual lowering of wages, and the peasant agitation, the internal difficulties of Fascism have been increased, the fresh wave of Fascist terror has been directed first and foremost against the Italian C.P., as being the sole organising force which is always alive and indomitable in the struggle against Fascism.

THE frame-up of this latest trial of the Italian Communists once again coincides with an intensification in Fascism's internal difficulties. Unemployment has now reached an imposing figure for Italy—a million workers, whilst in connection with the lowering of wages and the deterioration in the general standard of living, a workers' and peasants' agitation is breaking out throughout Italy. Undoubtedly the Fascists engineered the provocative attempt on the King in Milan, in order to provide a "diversion." And in the atmosphere of intensified repression, terror, and bloodshed which the Fascists created after the Milan "attempt" Mussolini thought it convenient to arrange a trial of the Central Committee of the Italian C.P.

At first fifty-four persons were to be tried in Rome

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on this indictment, but afterwards the Fascist Government decided to try only those who in its opinion had some relation to the leadership of the Italian C.P., and so selected thirty-seven persons, leaving the others to be brought to trial on other indictments. Of these thirty-seven, four—comrades Molinelli, Charrette, Salvatore and Grieco—were already sentenced to terms of imprisonment amounting in the aggregate to a hundred years of penal servitude, even before this trial, whilst certain of the accused—Taliatti, Germanetto, Raviera, Ravacoli, Grieco, Niudi, Bendini and Buffoni—have managed to escape, and despite the fact that they were given a five-day ultimatum, did not put in an appearance before the special Fascist tribunal.

Thus there were actually twenty-four comrades tried in this process; in the case of two of these—comrades Maffi and Adjario—sentence has not yet been pronounced, for Maffi is lying seriously ill as the result of the prison regime, while Adjario, who was handed over to the Fascist police by the authorities in Panama where he had been arrested, has gone out of his mind, both as the result of the prison regime and also unquestionably owing to the Fascist "method" of obtaining admission of "guilt."

The other accused were sentenced to penal servitude amounting in the aggregate to three hundred years, comrade Terraccini being sentenced to twenty-two years, Rovieda and Scoccimarro to twenty years apiece, Biboletti to eighteen years, Marchiero, Barin and Bibaldi to sixteen years, Nicola, Flecchia, Jamboni, Ferrari, Stefanini, Terramonti and Gidoni to fifteen years and four months, Anita Chustieri to nine years and eight months, Fabrini to five years. After they have served these sentences they are still to be subjected to special surveillance for another three years, and in addition they are to pay fines amounting to from four to eleven thousand lire.

Of the accused, Alfani, Bondini, Buffoni, Gramsci, Grieco, Maffi, Molinelli, Salvatore, Ribaldi and Ferrari belonged to the legal Parliamentary Communist fraction which has now developed. They were arrested (with the exception of Grieco, who succeed in escaping) before Parliament had deprived them of the parliamentary immunity and at the very moment when they appeared in Rome at a session of the chamber, in order to vote against the bill "For the Defence of the State," and the establishment of a special tribunal. But there was no need for them to vote, for Mussolini saw to that with the aid of his Fascist militia, and the same special tribunal against which the Communist deputies were intending to express the indignant protest of all the workers of Italy has now sentenced them to penal servitude.

THE majority of these accused comrades had already been brought to trial in the process instituted against the Communist Party by Mussolini in 1923. At that time Mussolini did not possess such an obedient "legal" instrument for the extermination of Communists as the special tribunal. At that time they were tried by jury and were acquitted. But now almost every one of them is sentenced to what is virtually

penal servitude for life for the very same legal C.P. activity (for the majority have been arrested and charged for Communistic activity during the period of the legal existence of the Italian C.P., and before the promulgation of the law for the defence of the State). Although the law for "Defence of the State" has no retrospective application, the accused were none the less brought to trial on the basis of this law on the ground that while in prison they "continued to maintain relations with the crimes attributed to them," in other words, they continued to be Communists.

The entire "trial" was, of course, a badly disguised frame-up, for the sentences were determined previously, and the president of the tribunal, General Achille Muschara, expressed his regret that anybody should take on "the defence of these accused," for it was "a hopeless task." As the result of this trial Mussolini wished to assure a life imprisonment to the outstanding Communists who have the love of the working class; he strove to have them in chains as his continual hostages. In addition, through this process he hurled a new threat at the working class of Italy, showing them that under a Fascist Government one can "earn" a life sentence even for past legal Communist activity.

The frame-up of this trial was not confined solely to the actual process; it was preceded by a prolonged preparation, and all the upper officials of Mussolini's political police, all these chiefs of departments, the "commandores and the cavaliers," had to set to work not only to collect Party documents, but to study them, so as to make it possible to compose an indictment of many volumes, with quotations, references, arguments and so on, such as is expected of secret police about to sit for their final examination in "political education." In reading the act of indictment one can see with what ardour the investigation commission endeavoured to compose this document, by making itself acquainted with the activities of various sections of the C.P., with the territorial divisions of its zones, sectors, groups and nuclei (previously certain Fascist secret police had thought that a nucleus was some kind of illegal Communist document). And in the course of doing so they even occasionally fortify their case with references to Lenin!

IT is characteristic that the whole document is permeated with a kind of feeling of amazement at this indomitable proletarian organisation. In its desire to display the whole danger of this "criminal organisation" and the incorrigibly revolutionary character of its outstanding members, the act of indictment slips into an involuntary apology for the C.P. and the accused. It is possible that if the Fascist Government were to distribute a mass publication of the act of indictment it would become such a powerful weapon of agitation that the very Fascist commission of investigation itself would have to answer to the special tribunal for the "public commendation of criminal conspiracy."

In the act of indictment the small and illegal Italian C.P., against which Fascism carries on a ruthless and incessant struggle, is represented as a mighty, enormous, dangerous organisation.

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"In order to realise their ultimate aims—the overthrow of the Fascist regime by resort to arms," it says, "the Communists have at their disposal an extensive and superlative organisation with an iron discipline and a maximum of conspiracy."

In the words of the act of indictment and on the ostensible basis of documents long and diligently collected by the Fascist secret police, this organisation has its ramifications throughout the whole of Italy. By means of its Communist nuclei it penetrates everywhere—into the factories, the workshops, the State institutions and private enterprises, into the town and the villages, into the Army and the Fleet. In a word, it is a most dangerous and inapprehensible instrument, it penetrates everywhere, it carries on its "pernicious and criminal Communist work," enrolling adherents to Leninism, disintegrating Fascism, and preparing its overthrow. But that is not all: there exist still other, territorial divisions of the C.P.—zones, sectors, and so on, there exist absolutely conspiratorial regional and local committees, inter-regional secretaries, secret couriers. In the words of the act of indictment, all these organisations work so conspiratorially and so perfectly that there is no possibility of catching them, of unmasking them, of smashing and dispersing them. The meeting places of the committees are continually being changed, the Communists carry on activities under pseudonyms, and even these are frequently changed. All this plunges the Fascist investigators into despair. There also exist two secret sections of the C.P., "Udi" and "Laprem." These are the names of the departments of communications and of anti-militarist activity. In the words of the Fascist document, the first renders useless all the sudden attacks and the dispersals effected by the Fascist secret police, for wherever the link is snapped or the organisation breaks down, "Udi" immediately constructs a new link. And as for "Laprem," it appears that it not only has its anti-militarist nuclei everywhere, but throughout the whole of Italy it has its own equipped army, "preponderantly among workers and peasants," which, in the opinion of the Fascist chiefs of police, presents a direct menace to Fascism.

THE investigators of the special tribunal were particularly charmed with the "Agitprop" of the Communist Party. If one were not to read the act of indictment, it would be difficult to imagine that the agitprop of the Italian C.P. has such magical powers at its command.

In the view of the investigators one of the most dangerous weapons of the agitprop are Leninist ideas; with their aid the agitprop forges its adherents into unshakeable and invulnerable fanatics of the revolution. All the difficulties with which Fascism meets in its course are directly traceable to agitprop. All the growing unemployment is the effect of agitprop, the dumb dissatisfaction and agitation in connection with the lowering of wages, the discontent of the national minorities in the occupied regions, the atmosphere of intense class hatred and hostility, which has particularly developed under Fascism—it is all due to agitprop.

The Fascists have dispersed, annihilated and for-

bidden all the non-Fascist press. None the less the revolutionary workers of Italy do not altogether trust the Fascist sources: they have set up their own illegal press. And it is continually publishing material which is illegally distributed in the factories and workshops. "La Verità," "La Chintillo," "Il Fronte Unique," "Non Mollare" ("Truth," "Spark," "United Front," "No Retreat") and others, as well as all kinds of pamphlets are continually appearing and being distributed in various places. The Fascists boast that they also have collected whole stacks of these illegal newspapers. And in these newspapers apparently many things are written which the Fascists find unpleasant, in them the Fascists and the Fascist bourgeoisie are called bloody exploiters of the working class, in them Mussolini is called a bandit and a treacherous murderer, and in them are many other things which are not usually published in the Fascist press. And in the view of the Fascist tribunal these newspapers, and this genuine form of expression of the Italian revolutionary workers are also laid at the door of the agitprop of the C.P.

The investigating commission gave no less diligent study to the agrarian section of the C.P. of Italy, and to its work among women, among the youth, the work of the Italian section of International Red Aid, and so on. "As for women," says the act of indictment, "in entire harmony with the Leninist ideas the C.P. is not only striving to make political activists of them, but also strives to draw the most backward of peasant women into the same circle of Leninist ideas." The International Red Aid is also an extremely injurious and dangerous institution for Fascism. In the first place it renders assistance to political prisoners, "it incites them to a further continuation of their criminal designs and activities"; secondly, "as the red revolutionary rear" it mobilises the masses in a united front against the bourgeois terror, has care for political prisoners, and even "dares to comment on the sentences of the special tribunal"! Consequently, in the opinion of the Fascist investigators the struggle with the International Red Aid must be just as ruthless as that with the Communist Party.

TURNING to an investigation into the characters of the various accused, the investigators willy-nilly slip into an apologia for the steadfast and courageous Italian Communists. Thus, in dealing with Gramsci, the chief of police, Commandore Lucciani, thus describes him: "This Gramsci led the Party on a sound course in 1926, after he had shattered the Bordigha opposition at the Lyons Congress. This Gramsci is the soul of the whole movement, and indicates its right path. His political past witnesses to his being one of the most beloved leaders of the masses. . . ." In regard to Terracini it says that because of his intense activity and his organisational ability he was bound to occupy an important and central place in the leadership of the C.P. In describing all Adjario's revolutionary activity the Fascist document makes the following conclusion: "All his past clearly demonstrates his capabilities in carrying out political crimes." Of Maffi it says: "Fabriccio Maffi is another first class Communist element, who has split off the Third Internationalists from the Socialist Party of Italy." Of the woman comrade, Raviera, the act of indictment says that all her work

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shows that she has displayed unusual energy and obstinacy in carrying on enormous work both inside the Party and in the organisation of women; she would deserve not less than twenty years of penal servitude, but to the regret of the judges of the special tribunal the court was not favoured with her appearance!

The Fascist investigation commission thus speaks of Scoccimarro: "He is one of the most important figures of the Italian C.P. . . . His wide culture and outstanding abilities completely correspond to the important political post which he could occupy."

The investigators greatly regret that Palmiro Togliatti also made no appearance before the special tribunal, in order to answer for his most active "criminal deeds." "The faithful friend of Gramsci and Terraccini, he has always occupied leading posts in the Party." Another equally faithful friend of Gramsci and Terraccini is Germanetto, called Barbadiramo, who also is a figure of no little importance according to the investigators. But he did not put in an appearance at the trial.

More or less in the same fashion open all the other biographies and estimates of the character of the accused—those whom the special tribunal has just sentenced to three hundred years of penal servitude.

THE Fascist Government with Mussolini at its head counted on dealing a crushing blow at the Italian C.P. through this trial; they hoped to disorganise it, to shatter and strangle it; they also hoped to terrorise all the revolutionary workers sympathetic to it. Of course, these shackled, tested, courageous militants of the Italian proletariat, and those other thousands of prisoners are a great loss to the Italian workers' movement. But the Fascists have made a big mistake in their calculations; neither penal servitude, nor tortures, nor murders inside the prisons, nor death sentences will break or exterminate the revolutionary advance-guard of the Italian proletariat and its iron will for struggle. Of this the Fascists have had ample opportunity to become convinced since the day when the outstanding leading Italian revolutionaries were first imprisoned, and since the harsh extraordinary laws were promulgated and the frantic special tribunal first began its labours. The number of victims of the insane Fascist terror grows continually, the number of martyrs to the ruthless class struggle increases, but the Italian C.P. unswervingly and courageously marches forward. It is marching towards final victory, and with it are all the workers of Italy. The penal sentences of the Fascist tribunal have no terror for it. The revolutionary Italian workers' movement has its own sentences. And only those are of importance for a Communist.

The Lesson of the German Elections

Rudolf Gerber

THE results of the elections of May 20th, 1928, not only serve as a barometer of the prevailing tendencies amongst the masses, but are of far-reaching general interest. For the first time it has become possible on the basis of a prolonged period of observation to define the political effect of the relative stabilisation of European capital after the first post-war dislocation. This has been possible in a country where economic stabilisation and the development of the productive forces have been carried out on a grand scale; where the speedy rehabilitation of its "own" imperialism, together with the re-entry of the conquered and humbled state into the ranks of the powerful capitalist world Powers, would in itself suffice to foster new illusions in the ranks of the workers regarding the possibility of an economic revival under the leadership of the bourgeoisie. Hence the reaction of the German electorate to the "successes" of capitalist stabilisation may be regarded as highly typical also for other countries where the bourgeoisie has not been so successful in its attempts to stabilise.

The German elections, unlike the French and Italian, allow us to make a comparison with previous elections, which took place after the first post-war crises had been overcome, under the first ideological influence of capitalist stabilisation; these elections cannot be termed "inflation elections" in any sense of the word as was the case on the occasion of the 1924 spring elections. The December, 1924, elections undoubtedly showed the reaction of the proletariat and petty bour-

geois masses to the first successes of capitalist stabilisation, the abolition of inflation and the conclusion of the Dawes Plan; they were the expression of the first illusions as to the effect of these bourgeois successes on the exploited masses. Three and a half years have elapsed since that time, during which German imperialism has made considerable progress on its road towards a "place on the sun"; the economic basis of this progress has been created by capitalist stabilisation and intensified exploitation of the workers.

How did the workers react to this development? Is the economic and foreign political stabilisation of German imperialism simultaneously a stabilisation of the masses, an approach towards the internal political conditions of the pre-war period? Have political antagonisms become stronger or weaker? What will be the nature of the internal conditions which the bourgeoisie will encounter on its path in the course of the unavoidable foreign political crises? Since the rise of German imperialism is bound to bring with it an intensification of international differences what will be the attitude of the workers, do they tend towards a new August 4th, or are they aiming directly for a November? These are all questions of the utmost importance, and the election results of May 20th, 1928, will help to find the answers.

Workers' Desertion of the Bourgeois Parties

The first and most striking result of the May elections is the fact that *all* the big bourgeois parties show

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not only a relative, but also an absolute decline, and that not one bourgeois party profited by these losses. This fact alone is quite an adequate proof that the radicalisation and swing to the left of the working masses is no longer a mere assumption, but a tangible reality. The changes that have taken place throughout the Reich are best demonstrated by the following figures :

German Nationalists (together with the "Landbund" and Christian-Nationalist peasants, in as far as these represent nothing more than mantle organisations for German Nationalists)—5.14 millions against 6.62 millions in December, 1924, *i.e.*, a loss of 1.48 million votes, 22 per cent. of the total vote.

Centre and Bavarian People's Party, 1928—4.64 million votes against 5.17 million in December, 1924. A loss of 0.53 million votes or 10 per cent.

People's Party—2.67 against 3.02 millions; a loss of 0.35 million votes or 11 per cent.

Democrats—1.49 against 1.90 million votes; a loss of 0.91 million or 22 per cent.

These parties together represent bourgeois policy, and received only 13.94 million votes in 1928 as compared with 16.71 million in December, 1924, a loss of 2.77 million votes. The Social Democratic Party increased its vote from 7.79 to 9.14 million, an increase of 1.35 million or 16 per cent.. The C.P.G. increased its vote from 2.7 to 3.25 million, an increase of 0.55 million or 20 per cent. Both these parties together increased their vote by 1.90 million votes, although there was only an increase of 0.43 million in the electorate. Thus it is clear that one and a half million votes previously polled by the bourgeois parties were cast in favour of the S.D.P. and the C.P.G.; the remaining five-fourths of a million were divided up amongst the small petty bourgeois groups. The growth of these small parties will be dealt with later on.

Such general figures do not allow a definite estimate of the number of electors who actually left any bourgeois party for the S.D.P. or the C.P.G. This is a matter of indifference as far as the principle of the matter is concerned, but for a correct estimation of the left tendencies of the population it is of importance to know in how far the gains of the S.D.P. and the C.P.G. are to be attributed to a transfer of a previous bourgeois vote, or to a distribution of the vote of a young and newly qualified electorate amongst these parties. The electorate was 38.3 million in December, 1924, and 40.7 in May, 1928, but in this period 1.7 million of the December electorate died. Hence in May, 1928, there were 4.1 million new voters. Let us assume for the sake of convenience, in the absence of any other details, that they voted on the basis of the same percentage as the other electors, then 3.1 million will have gone to the polling booth in place of the 1.3 million that died since the December, 1924, elections. This would mean that there should have been 1.75 million more votes polled in May, 1928, than in December, 1924, but there were actually only 0.45 million. This means that at least 1.3 of the 1924 electorate did not vote, for the percentage of young voters was over the average. There is no reason to suppose that social-democratic electors

abstained in large numbers from voting; amongst the Communist supporters not more than 100,000 abstained from voting, besides the 80,000 votes polled by the "Lenin-Bund") as a result of the Party crisis. This leaves about 1.2 million 1924 bourgeois electors, who did not vote either for the S.D.P., the C.P.G. or their old party, but who *abstained from voting*.

How did the body of young voters, eligible for the first time, vote, what effect had their vote on the change in the poll of the various parties since 1924?

We must assume that of the 1.3 million electors who died since 1924, 150,000 were Communist voters and 350,000 S.D.P. (on account of the greater mortality amongst the proletariat) and about 800,000 bourgeois electors. In view of the general tendencies of the elections it may be assumed that of the 3.1 million new voters in 1928 one-third (450,000) of these votes fell to the Communist Party of Germany and one-sixth million to the S.D.P.; this would leave about 1.55 million voters for the bourgeois parties. From these figures the loss of voters since 1924 should be made good; this would leave the C.P.G. about 300,000 additional voters from the ranks of the young electorate and the S.D.P. and the other bourgeois parties about 750,000. The final results of the elections show that the bourgeois parties lost 1.55 million votes (the S.D.P., C.P.G., the Lenin-Bund and the I.S.P.C. polled about 2 million additional votes, whilst the poll showed only an increase of 430,000). Since the bourgeois parties secured 750,000 votes from the young voters it follows that they lost about 2.3 million votes in all; abstentions amongst bourgeois electors assumed to be 1.2 million, therefore the C.P.G. and the S.D.P. secured 1.1 million votes from ex-bourgeois voters.

Communist Party Gains

For reasons which will be explained later we cannot assume that the C.P.G. secured more than 100,000 votes from the ranks of the bourgeois electors, which leaves a million for the S.D.P. This figure proves what great changes have taken place within the proletarian camp: if the S.D.P. secured one million bourgeois votes and an influx of 750,000 from the new voters it follows, since the total number polled was 1.35 million, that the S.D.P. lost 400,000 votes; 65,000 of these went to the Fascist "old Social-Democratic Party" and the remainder apparently to the Communists. In analysing the Communist vote we get a similar result, since the Party secured 100,000 votes from the bourgeois voters and not more than 300,000 from the young voters, and lost about 200,000 votes through the "Lenin-Bund" and indifferent supporters, the increase in the Communist vote only appears to be about 550,000, when at least a quarter of a million former S.D.P. voters polled for the C.P.G. (Our calculations are much too rough to allow of any exact survey.)

Let us now return to the losses within the bourgeois parties. For this purpose we take the rather inexact tables that were published in the "Berlin Tageblatt," May 24th. There is every evidence to show that the majority of the votes lost by the German Nationalists may be accounted for by abstentions. From amongst the districts where the German Nationalists suffered losses Hessen-Darmstadt takes the lead with 83 per cent. of the December vote (20,000 to 127,000),

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then come Weser-Ems with 50.4 per cent., Upper Bavaria with 49.8 per cent., Lower Bavaria with 37.1 per cent., and Pomerania with 38.7 per cent. (a total loss of 173,000 votes in one constituency). These districts are petty-bourgeois or rural; in the industrial districts, where the German Nationalists had less to lose, there is only one instance of a similar catastrophic result: that is Leipzig, where they lost 62.7 per cent. of the former electorate (84,000 to 134,000 votes). But Leipzig happens to be the only district of all those already mentioned which showed an increase in the poll; in Pomerania there was a falling off of 150,000, in Weser-Ems 90,000, in Hessen-Darmstadt (where all parties with the exception of the Communists suffered heavy losses) 81,000. The chief mass of abstentions are to be found in these agrarian and petty-bourgeois districts, only a small percentage of the German Nationalist losses accrued to the petty-bourgeois Economic Party and the S.D.P. But in Upper Bavaria (Munich) the losses of the German Nationalists were divided up between the Fascists, Economic Party and the People's Party (which gained on account of the candidature of Stresemann) and Social-Democrats. In Leipzig the S.D.P. was the chief gainer by the losses of the German Nationalists. The petty-bourgeois split parties increased their vote from 14,000 to 70,000. In Breslau there was a typical case of the mass transfer of the former German Nationalist vote to the S.D.P.; there was a 50 per cent. increase in the Communist vote, the S.D.P. increased its vote by 55,000 and the German Nationalists lost 62,000 votes. A similar picture is to be found in Magdeburg and Dresden; the Communist vote jumped up by 41 per cent. and 64 per cent. the S.D.P. gained 38,000 and 28,000, whilst the German Nationalists lost 60,000 and 53,000 votes respectively. In centres where the extreme right predominates within the S.D.P. about half the vote lost to the German Nationalists went to the S.D.P. In the industrial district of Halle-Merseburg, where the C.P.G. was able to maintain its position, the S.D.P. gained 35,000 votes from the Right. Berlin is the most definite example of such a development; the German Nationalists lost 190,000 votes, the other bourgeois parties lost 60,000, whilst the S.D.P. gained 118,000, although the C.P.G. gained 236,000 it evidently polled quite a considerable number of former S.D.P. votes. If we were to maintain on the basis of the Berlin results that the correlation of forces in the ranks of the proletariat had remained the same, then we should assume that all the votes which the bourgeois parties lost went directly to the C.P.G. This would be absurd! We must assume that the losses of the German Nationalists in the rural and petty-bourgeois districts must be accounted for mainly through abstentions, but that they accrued to the S.D.P. in centres formerly controlled by the S.D.P.

The Losses of the Catholic Centre Party

The losses of the Centre, though less in number denote a still greater loss politically than the losses of the German Nationalists. It is a political event of the greatest importance that the Catholic workers could free themselves from the leadership of the church and go over

to socialism for they do not regard the S.D.P. as social traitors—and as far as it has been possible to ascertain the mass of the voters left to the Centre consisted of women, as might be expected. Otherwise the Centre losses are analogous to those of the German Nationalists: the larger percentage of losses is in the petty-bourgeois, rural districts (Weser-Ems, 39,000 or 28.2 per cent.; Upper Bavaria, 75,000 or 16.5 per cent.; Hessen-Nassau, 34,000 or 16.7 per cent.; Wurtemberg, 43,000 or 15.5 per cent.), in short, in the same districts as those in which the German Nationalists suffered the greatest losses, where the electorate as a whole showed a falling off and where the S.D.P. gained, though below the average. We must conclude that the Centre losses in those districts where the influence of the church is so strong, that the electorate would not dare to vote for the "parties of the unbelievers" were caused mainly by a group of districts of an industrial character. Breslau, abstentions, but the Centre also suffered severe losses in where the Centre losses were 34,000 (18.3 per cent.), is an example of an industrial district showing such a transition of votes, the general electorate diminished and the S.D.P. poll greatly increased despite the big advance of the Communists, although the social structure here is very mixed. The typical industrial districts where the Centre lost are: Westphalia (over 100,000 votes or 15 per cent.), Cologne-Aachen (a loss of 73,000 or 15 per cent.), East and West Duesseldorf (a loss of 60,000 or 10.5 per cent.). This latter district is the only one where the C.P.G. has the undisputed leadership of the workers, and also on this occasion carried off considerable gains, which from the percentage point of view, however, are inferior to those of the S.D.P. Even here it is very probable that the majority of the radicalised Centre workers went over to the S.D.P. In North Westphalia the C.P.G. increased its vote by 55 per cent., although the S.D.P. vote increased by 23 per cent.; this fact can only be explained by the majority of the Centre electorate voting for the S.D.P., and thus making up for the losses to the C.P.G. There are a few individual instances of Centre workers going over direct to the C.P.G. The most important factor in the election statistics in the industrial centres where the Centre lost votes is that, with the exception of Breslau, all these were districts where there was a great increase in the electorate. Thus there can be doubt that from 100,000 to 200,000 of the Rhenish-Westphalian Centre Party workers voted for the S.D.P. and the C.P.G. (naturally the majority went to the former).

The statistics of the losses of the Democratic and People's Parties are of less importance, for they had only a small number of proletarian supporters. The general statement will suffice that the losses of these parties, unlike the two big reactionary parties, did not contribute to the gains of the S.D.P. and C.P.G., but rather to those of the petty-bourgeois reactionary parties (Fascists and Economic Parties). Berlin is an exception to this; there the democrats lost a third of their vote, apparently to the S.D.P., whilst the petty-bourgeois groups also lost. The People's Party registered an increased vote where there could be no doubt that this was due to the bourgeoisie: the bourgeois suburbs of Berlin, in Koenigsberg, Cologne, Munich, Nuernberg and Hamburg. These gains were doubtlessly attribut-

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able to the foreign policy of the People's Party; they are only a negligible quantity, but they serve as an indication that the People's Party is becoming more and more *the* party of the bourgeoisie instead of the German Nationalist Party, which is being decimated by the exodus of its membership to the S.D.P. and the Economic Party.

The Correlation of Forces within the Proletarian Ranks

The "Vorwaerts" interpreted the results of the elections by affirming that the relative strength of the S.D.P. and C.P.G. gained at the expense of the bourgeois parties, and that neither party surpassed the other as regards the tempo of progress. A similar opinion is also to be found amongst comrades: the C.P.G. gains are due to successes amongst the new electorate, and also to the transfer of bourgeois votes to the C.P.G., the facts which we have here enumerated showing that hundreds of thousands of S.D.P. workers flocked to the revolutionary camp (only a minority of whom are organised politically) are regarded as doubtful.

Both assumptions seem plausible if we only consider the rough data of the election results. The Communist vote in 1924 was 34 per cent. of that of the S.D.P., and at the recent elections rose only to 35 per cent., and since the S.D.P. had a majority in practically all constituencies there is proof only in two instances of a transfer of the S.D.P. vote to the C.P.G.; in Hessen-Nassau, where the S.D.P. lost 11,000 and the C.P.G. gained 28,000 votes, far more than any increase due to young electors would warrant; and in Hessen-Darmstadt, where the S.D.P. lost 30,000 votes, which the C.P.G. could only partially absorb in the increase of 19,000 votes (60 per cent. of the former vote). These figures are not considerable in view of the circumstance that the S.D.P. in both constituencies still retains an electorate of 364,000 and 192,000 respectively, but they are significant because of the non-industrial nature of these districts.

It is only possible to get a real understanding of the relative changes that have taken place in the S.D.P. and the C.P.G. by making a thorough analysis of the increased Communist vote. This increase is put at 550,000; this figure is a balance sheet figure, and contains both the districts where the C.P.G. won votes and where losses took place (these were in all 100,000 votes). These losses may be of varying significance; in parts of Thuringia, and perhaps also in the Palatinate, these were due to ultra-left split manoeuvres; in Bavaria and Wuerttemberg workers who previously voted the Communist ticket went over to the S.D.P. as the defender against reaction there, because our organisations were not politically enlightened; the vote at issue was 50,000; in Thuringia and Braunschweig our policy was apparently not made sufficiently clear to the masses. The migrations of the miners accounted for the big drop in the south Westphalian vote, which was counteracted to a certain extent by the big gains in North Westphalia. In addition to these there were losses definitely due to the ultra-left candidates; 80,000 votes were polled by the "Lenin-Bund," despite the fact that it was in the throes

of a crisis a few days before the elections. The number of those who abstained from voting will not be much less. Taking the local losses as a whole it may be said with certainty that the Party losses were at least 250,000, therefore the total gain cannot be less than 800,000, if we are to get the 550,000 votes shown in the balance-sheet. Then by subtracting 300,000 votes as due to the influx of young voters we get the result of half a million as the grand total of the voters from other political parties who came over to the side of the Communist Party.

The origin of this half million can be traced by examining the vote in the districts where the C.P.G. made the biggest gains. The Communist vote increased in Berlin (Altstadt) by more than half (from 217,000 to 347,000), in Potsdam, the constituencies in the outlying districts (from 105,000 and 109,000 to 172,000 and 168,000 respectively), in Dresden-Bautzen (from 65,000 to 106,000), and in Hessen-Darmstadt and North Westphalia (from 68,000 to 107,000). These are all districts where the S.D.P. had the leadership of the proletariat; only in Westphalia can there be any question of any important gains by such parties as the centre. Another factor of interest is that the increase in the S.D.P. vote was under the average except in North Westphalia: in Greater Berlin 14 per cent. (Old Berlin only 8 per cent.), in Dresden-Bautzen 8 per cent. In Hessen-Darmstadt, where the average increase in the electorate was 16 per cent., the S.D.P. losses were 30 per cent. Amongst those constituencies where the C.P.G. had considerable gains (between 33 and 50 per cent. over their old vote) we find that in Leipzig the S.D.P. gained 7 per cent. (C.P.G. from 90,000 to 121,000), Hessen-Nassau (C.P.G. 64,000 to 93,000), the S.D.P. lost 3 per cent. of its vote, in Magdeburg, an old stronghold of the S.D.P., the S.D.P. gained 10 per cent., whilst the C.P.G. votes increased from 46,000 to 66,000; only in Breslau, where the C.P.G. vote increased from 29,000 to 44,000, was the S.D.P. gain somewhat above the average.

Gains in S.D.P. Strongholds

In all these districts mentioned, districts which were unmistakably S.D.P. strongholds, the C.P.G. gained 430,000 new votes, or far more than half the total number gained. But whilst the C.P.G. had considerable successes in the S.D.P. strongholds, the gains were only average in the typically rural districts, where the C.P.G. might have won votes from the German Nationalists (Pomerania, Mecklenburg), and where there are masses of workers attached to the Centre Party (North Westphalia is the only exception). Given these facts we think it improbable that the Party can have gained more than 100,000 votes from the bourgeoisie, whilst about 400,000 workers, who voted at the last elections for the S.D.P. voted Communist. These successes must be balanced by the loss of about 100,000 workers to the S.D.P. (the half from South Germany).

However, it is not a question of quantity but of quality. Where did we lose and what did we gain? We experienced considerable losses in petty-bourgeois and backward centres: 50,000 in South Germany (in the most backward districts, Bavaria and Wuerttemberg), 10,000 in South Hanover-Braunschweig, the same number in Thuringia—this is the only serious loss in a large industrial centre. We won first of all in Berlin, then in

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Central Germany, Saxony, the Ruhr district, the Rhineland, Hamburg and in the most important industrial districts. On these decisive sections of the front between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat there can be no question that the correlation of forces between the S.D.P. and the C.P.G. remained stationary.

Let us examine the various industrial districts of decisive importance :

	S.D.P.	C.P.G.	C.P.G. per-centage of S.D.P.
Greater Berlin :			
1924	697,000	375,000	50
1928	815,000	511,000	75
Halle-Merseburg :			
1924	133,000	163,000	120
1928	170,000	175,000	103
Saxony :			
1924	936,000	294,000	31
1928	999,000	382,000	38
Hamburg :			
1924	203,000	90,000	45
1928	255,000	116,000	46
Upper Silesia :			
1924	37,000	66,000	180
1928	70,000	72,000	103
Rhine-Ruhr (both Duesseldorf and Westphalian constituencies) :			
1924	817,000	530,000	64
1928	998,000	605,000	61
Total : 1924	2,825,000	1,518,000	54
1928	3,307,000	1,860,000	56

This would not mean very much. It might be termed a local phenomenon in Berlin and Saxony which might be equalised by movements in other no less important districts if—yes, if the S.D.P. votes could be reduced to the same common denominator as the C.P.G. It is quite clear, however, that when the S.D.P. suddenly increases at the expense of the bourgeois parties, the percentage of petty bourgeois votes amongst the S.D.P. electorate must grow. The mere fact of the apparently equal growth in the influence of the S.D.P. and C.P.G. points to a quicker growth of the influence of the C.P.G. amongst the proletarian voters. This can be proved in the case of the most important centre, Berlin. Externally the relation between the S.D.P. and the C.P.G. is 4 to 3—and the S.D.P. no longer possesses a majority here amongst the proletarian electorate.

We must make a thorough examination of this statistical proof, which is disputed in Party circles, in view of the great political significance of the Communist majority amongst the workers in the chief town of the Reich. At the elections held on May 20th out of a total of 2,478,000 votes polled, the S.D.P. received 815,000, the C.P.G. 611,000; all the bourgeois parties together something over a million. The question now at issue is which section of the Communist and which of the S.D.P. votes can be attributed to the non-working-class element?

The Social Composition of Berlin Electorate

This question can only be answered by a survey of the social composition of the Berlin electorate. In 1925,

out of the 4,000,000 inhabitants there were 1.6 million workers, circa 200,000 privately employed, 1.1 million civil servants and employees, 700,000 "independent" and 400,000 "unemployed independent"—that is in receipt of incomes of various kinds, from those in receipt of outdoor relief to millionaires; half of this category must be allotted to the workers (pensioners, war invalids, etc.), a fourth to the semi-proletarians and a fourth to the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie. In the last category must be included 10 per cent. of the civil servants and employees; whilst 200,000 of the 700,000 "independents," i.e., street vendors, "independent" home workers, etc., must be included amongst the semi-proletariat. From this we get the following main groupings of the population: Firstly, 1.8 million workers; secondly, 1.5 million proletarian and semi-proletarian elements of a less pronounced class type (private employees, employees, pensioners, proletarianised petty-bourgeoisie, etc.); thirdly, 700,000 purely bourgeois and petty-bourgeois. This division, naturally, is artificial and only useful as a guide in apportioning the electorate to the various parties. In the distribution of the electors to the different groups we will assume that 62 per cent. of the entire population of Berlin went to the polling booth, that in the proletarian districts the percentage of voters was greater, that on the other hand amongst the proletarians, because of the lower average age, the percentage of minors is greater. Taking all this into consideration we may assume that of the 2.5 million votes polled, 1.1 million fall to the first group, 0.9 million to the second, 0.5 million to the third group.

There will scarcely be two opinions about the fact that the C.P.G. polled a negligible quantity of votes from within the third group, and the S.D.P. not more than 100,000, in the second the C.P.G. will not have secured more than 100,000, so that at least 500,000 proletarian C.P.G. votes remained. Then again, more than 10 per cent. of the first group voted for the bourgeois parties (it should not be forgotten that only a minority of this group is composed of workers employed in large factories), so that for the S.D.P. less workers' votes are available than the C.P.G. must have polled. The following table seems to us to be the likely sub-division of the various groups of electors :

	Group I.	Group II.	Group III.
C.P.G.	520,000	80,000	10,000
S.D.P.	400,000	320,000	100,000
Bourgeois	200,000	400,000	390,000

These are rough estimates, which still help to give a picture of the conditions to be considered.

If we survey the percentage of workers to the total population in the various constituencies it becomes clear that the C.P.G. has the majority of the real worker class elements in Berlin. The data for the districts with the greater number of proletarian inhabitants are as follows :

	Workers percentage	Votes S.D.P.	C.P.G.	C.P.G. per-centage of S.D.P.
Wedding	57.0	76,000	90,000	116
Weissensee	53.3	11,000	11,000	100
Spandau	53.1	29,000	12,000	42
Friedrichshain	32.1	69,000	70,000	101

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Let us now take the four districts that have the lowest percentage of proletarians and we get the following :

	Workers percentage	Votes S.D.P.	C.P.G. C.P.G.	C.P.G. per- centage of S.D.P.
Stegliz ...	23.3	25,000	12,000	47
Western (circa)	20.0	15,000	8,000	53
Zehlendorf ...	19.2	9,000	2,000	20
Wilmersdorf..	16.0	25,000	9,000	35

Of course the individual districts of both groups differ. Workers are not always workers, Zehlendorf is more petty-bourgeois than Wilmersdorf, Friedrichshain is more homogeneously proletarian than Spandau; the Party organisations work differently, the influence of the bourgeoisie is different in the various districts, etc. But on the whole the result is clear : the proletarian citadels (although they have tens of thousands of petty-bourgeois, etc., who vote S.D.P.) have shown a Communist majority over the S.D.P. vote.

There is no reason why this situation should be regarded as purely a Berlin phenomenon, for we have in many instances been able to prove the mass transfer of former bourgeois voters to the S.D.P. camp. This has been the case in such centres as Berlin, Dresden, Magdeburg, Breslau where already in 1924 bourgeois parties secured only a small number of proletarian votes, so that the renegades were for the most part recruited from the petty-bourgeoisie or circles bordering on them. Such a position helps to make up for the fact that although the C.P.G. overtook the S.D.P. in all urban centres, where previously the S.D.P. prevailed, as regards the tempo of increase in the poll, still the contrary is the case in all centres where the Communist vote was highest; there the tempo of the increase in the S.D.P. vote was greater than ours. The following table shows this :

Former S.D.P. Citadels

Magdeburg ...	S.D.P. + 10.8%	C.P.G. + 41.8%
Magdeburg (Stadt)	„ + 11.0%	„ + 80.0%
Breslau ...	„ + 17.8%	„ + 48.5%
Breslau (Stadt)...	„ + 23.0%	„ + 150.0%
Dresden-Bautzen..	„ + 7.8%	„ + 63.6%
Dresden (Stadt)...	„ + 10.0%	„ + 80.0%
Leipzig ...	„ + 7.8%	„ + 33.6%
Frankfurt (Stadt)	„ - 2.0%	„ + 94.0%

As a matter of fact we have become a power of the first order in all urban centres where previously the S.D.P. was the Party of the workers. Unfortunately this victory has also its drawbacks :

Districts Where the S.D.P. is the Strongest Party

Oppeln ...	S.D.P. + 92.6%	C.P.G. + 8.5%
Halle-Merseburg ...	„ + 25.8%	„ + 7.1%
Duesseldorf-Ost ...	„ + 33.8%	„ + 13.5%

The total votes polled by the S.D.P. in these three districts was 115,000, whilst the C.P.G. only polled 45,000 votes, so that its advance in comparison with the S.D.P. is very small (485,000 to 443,000 votes). These investigations lead to the conclusion that the S.D.P. vote was increased mainly by petty-bourgeois elements and workers who previously voted bourgeois. The increase in the Communist vote in all these districts exceeds the

5 per cent. minimum, which was necessary to maintain the 1924 standard; the percentage of young voters was also in accordance with its strength at that time (9 per cent. of all the votes polled—9 per cent. of 3.1 million young voters—280,000 minus 150,000 C.P.G. electors who died in the interval equals 130,000, or exactly 5 per cent. of the December, 1924, vote).

We have, therefore, no reason to suppose that in those districts where the Communist Party was in control the S.D.P. secured the vote of those who previously voted Communist. At the same time more important gains at the expense of the S.D.P., or of the bourgeoisie, are pretty much out of the question (except in the case of Duesseldorf-Ost, where we won about 20,000 votes from the Centre). This does not prove any special strength amongst the proletariat on the part of the main organisations; but it shows that the proletaria which is breaking away from the bourgeois parties—the petty-bourgeoisie still more—is as a general rule going through a social-democratic transition period, and that, therefore, the Communist gains in the various centres were mainly at the expense of the S.D.P.

Separation Tendencies amongst the Petty Bourgeoisie

The losses which the big bourgeois parties suffered were to the advantage of all those bourgeois groups which declare themselves petty-bourgeois or even anti-capitalist organisations.

The Economic Party, with a programme in support of the interests of the artisans, etc., secured the greatest advantage and increased its vote from 707,000 to 1,391,000, almost 100 per cent. in spite of its policy in favour of house owners, which caused losses in various centres. The two Fascist groups together increased their vote from 907,000 to 1,070,000, *i.e.*, 16 per cent. This fact has all the more weight in view of the heavy losses of the “Deutsch-Volkische Freiheitspartei,” the conservative-agrarian fraction of Fascism, which in agrarian constituencies experienced catastrophic losses amounting to 120,000 in all (Mecklenburg, 28,000, or 51.1 per cent.; Thuringia, 20,000, or 40 per cent.; Pomerania, 25,000, or 27.2 per cent.; East Prussia, 14,000, or 22.3 per cent.). It is also apparent that in urban districts workers, formerly supporters of Fascism, went over to the S.D.P. and C.P.G. In Merseburg the Fascists lost 12,000, or 40 per cent., and there is no reason to suppose that in accordance with the general tendency of the elections similar developments prevailed elsewhere in all industrial centres, even where the total vote rose (in Greater Berlin the Fascists lost 7,000 votes or 12 per cent.). The losses were usually made good by the increase in the petty-bourgeois vote, for the general increase in the Fascist vote must be estimated at 400,000, which equalised the 60 per cent. loss in workers’ and peasants’ votes. Not more than 50,000 of these votes can be accounted for by the young electorate, therefore there remains a third of a million petty-bourgeois voters who went over to Fascism from the purely capitalist parties.

We have here an economic protest of the petty-bourgeoisie, for if the revival of the Fascist movement were a reaction of the monarchist-militarist ideology to the “adaptation” of the German Nationalists to the capitalist republic and its foreign policy, then the “Deutsch-

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volkerische" party—the representative of extreme conservative ideology—would have had better results. In reality this party lost, and only the National Socialists, the real petty-bourgeois Fascist group, won. The reactionary petty-bourgeois do not long for the Kaiser now, but for the struggle against the Jews, whom they think are the representatives of trust capital. Another success which goes to the Fascists is that of the "Aufwertungs" Party, a typically bourgeois reactionary protest movement of those who lost their private property through inflation; this party secured 480,000 votes at its first appearance. A total of about 1,500,000 petty-bourgeois voters went over from the big capitalist parties to the petty-bourgeois reactionary parties; this gain more than compensated for the loss of workers' votes to the S.D.P. and C.P.G. (a total of 250,000). With these facts in evidence it is absurd to regard German Fascism as finished. It suffered losses amongst the workers who are going towards the left, but on economic grounds it made very real progress amongst the petty-bourgeoisie, for it is only a step to Fascism from the reactionary petty-bourgeois parties with their parliamentary illusions.

Fascism and the Economic Party are not, as a rule, to be found parallel but regional, relieving one another, as it were, and that regularly at the expense of the bourgeois parties, especially the People's Party and the Democrats, and to a certain extent the German Nationalists also. The following table shows this situation very clearly :

BRESLAU					
Losses		Gains			
In 1,000	%	In 1,000	%		
German Nat....	62	22.5	Economic Party	21	154.0
People's Party	17	23.5			
Democrats ...	17	37.6			
SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN					
German Nat....	69	27.5	Fascists ...	11	55.0
People's Party	4	4.0	Economic Party	38	992.1
Democrats ...	19	28.3			
WESER-EMS					
German Nat....	55	50.0	Economic Party	28	—
People's Party	25	23.0			
Centre ...	39	28.0			
Democrats ...	20	30.0			
HESSEN-NASSAU					
German Nat....	27	12.0	Fascists ...	18	63.0
People's Party	36	24.0	Economic Party	21	80.0
Centre ...	34	17.0	Aufwertungs P.	12	—
Democrats ...	35	35.0			
Otherwise all parties, with the exception of the C.P.G., lost!					
DRESDEN-BAUTZEN					
German Nat....	53	22.5	Fascists ...	6	40.0
People's Party	34	23.0	Economic Party	42	109.0
Democrats ...	19	23.3	Aufwertungs P.	15	—
LEIPZIG					
German Nat....	84	62.7	Economic Party	35	201.0
People's Party	37	27.2	Aufwertungs P.	31	—
Democrats ...	11	19.5			
UPPER BAVARIA					
German Nat....	72	50.0	People's Party	16	75.0
Centre ...	75	16.5	Economic Party	28	324.0
Democrats ...	5	16.5	Fascists ...	16	29.0

These statistics show how in districts of quite different social structure we find an analogous phenomenon, though, of course, to a very different extent. There is not the slightest reason to minimise this phenomenon, especially as there is a similar situation in the countryside, *i.e.*, the 200,000 votes which the German Peasants' Party won, in addition to the 300,000 which the Bavarian Peasants' Bund previously controlled. The fact that this party adopted a platform directed partially against the rich peasantry and the big landowners, not unlike that of the Democrats, shows that the successes of the petty-bourgeois party must be attributed, not so much to a reactionary wave, as to the pronounced opposition to big capital as a result of the reaction against the stabilisation methods. It is nothing unusual that these petty-bourgeois elements should express their opposition to trust capital in an absurd and muddled manner. They, like the workers who previously voted for the S.D.P. have still much to learn.

* * * * *

What has actually taken place? Three and a half years' capitalist stabilisation, during a period of economic and political advance and the feigned opposition of the S.D.P., have had the following result: Over three and a half million former capitalist supporters have left the big capitalist parties, one-third abstained from voting, a third voted for "independent" petty-bourgeois parties (who, of course, also do the work of capitalism, but the electors do not realise it), one-third voted for the S.D.P. and C.P.G.—the majority for the S.D.P.—which these people consider a party fighting big capital. At the same time, in spite of the feigned opposition of the S.D.P. and the serious crisis within the C.P.G., 400,000 Social-Democratic workers found their way to the C.P.G. The Communist Party has become the leading proletarian party in Berlin, it has had such successes in cities where it previously had but a small following that it can stand as a competitor with the S.D.P. as the leader of the working masses; in the industrial districts where it previously held strong positions it has held its ground. Local losses provide important lessons but cannot change the picture as a whole.

We find the period of economic and foreign political stabilisation of German imperialism to be a period of acute internal political differences, of the radicalisation of the working masses, of the rally of the best cadres to the camp of the C.P.G.; a period in which the masses of the petty-bourgeoisie begin to doubt the the blessings of capitalist dictatorship. This situation places the greatest responsibility on the C.P.G. at a time when the S.D.P. feigns opposition it has won a strong basis approaching the zenith of 1924. When the bourgeoisie weighs the consequences of the election results and admits the S.D.P. to a "share in the responsibility," then the Party must take the next step to win the majority of the workers in the ideologically backward districts, and rally the workers to the struggle against capitalist exploitation. The elections of May 20th are a proof of the relative nature of capitalist stabilisation; before us the great historic task is developing which it is our duty to accomplish.

The Transition Period from Capitalism to Socialism

E. Varga

“WAR COMMUNISM” AND “THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY”

IN the discussion on the Draft Programme a difference arose between comrade Bukharin and myself on a point of principle regarding the question of the probability of War-Communism. Comrade Bukharin's opinion was endorsed by the Commission.

The Draft Programme states :

“In view of the possibility of capitalist military intervention and of prolonged counter-revolutionary wars against the dictatorship of the proletariat, the necessity may arise for a War-Communist economic policy (War-Communism).”

This means, that War-Communism will be an exception and that the rule will be a direct transition from capitalism to N.E.P. But my opinion, based on my experiences in the Russian and Hungarian revolutions, is that War-Communism will be the rule and that N.E.P. will be the exception in all ensuing proletarian dictatorships isolated from the U.S.S.R., and I proposed a modification on these lines.

Before I proceed to justify my views it is necessary to determine the essence of these two economic forms. Let me point out first of all that War-Communism and N.E.P. are not absolutely separate economic forms, that each form has elements in common, and that of course N.E.P. is not a definite form, not an aim in itself, but simply one method of the later transition to socialism.

What do we understand by War-Communism? The Draft Programme gives the following definition :

“War-Communism . . . is nothing more nor less than the organisation of rational consumption for the purpose of defence at a time when there has been a sharp decline in the productive forces of the country, and when the individualist stimuli to production of small producers are seriously disturbed (the system of confiscation and requisition). Although this policy undermines the material basis of that strata within the country that is hostile to the working class, secures a rational distribution of available stocks and facilitates the military struggle of the proletarian dictatorship, which gives it its historical justification, nevertheless, it cannot be regarded as the ‘normal’ economic policy of the proletarian dictatorship.”

The Draft Programme gives no definition of N.E.P.,*but the essence of this economic policy may be summarised as follows :

N.E.P. is an economic form of the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat whereby economy is divided into two parts : socialist and private enterprise. The form of economic enterprise in both sectors is that of private property : in the socialist sector merely as a basis of book-keeping, but in the private enterprise sector as real private property. The exchange of goods takes place in the form of commodities and money, but this form of exchange of commodities between the various enterprises in the socialist sector is merely a method of calculation, whereas between the economic enterprises in the private property sector amongst themselves and in their dealings with the socialist sector it is an actual exchange of values. The share of the individual in the value produced takes for the workers the form and content of wages (“to each according to his contribution”); in addition there is in the private economic sector the remnants of ground rents (the rich peasantry) and of profits (the N.E.P. people). The State under the dictatorship of the proletariat recognises private property in the private economy sector and protects it against individual attacks.

The socialist sector controls heavy industry, transport, banking, foreign trade, etc., therefore it possesses the advantage over the private economy sector, an advantage which is rapidly increasing with the development of organisation. Considered from the dynamic-historic point of view the private economy sector is an entity which is approaching zero, although it may develop for a time in the beginning of the N.E.P. The private economy sector is shrinking economically, whilst the socialist economically-planned large industries drive out the small enterprises (just as under capitalism); furthermore, this is accomplished by the utilisation of political economical measures, such as State support of collective agriculture, co-operatives, State production of grain, taxation policy, etc.

Hence the main differences between War-Communism and N.E.P. are :

N.E.P.	WAR-COMMUNISM
Private ownership in the means of production.	Private ownership permitted only in articles of consumption.
Money economy.	Barter.
Only the products of the socialist sector are under the immediate control of the State.	The State controls the entire production.
Freedom to trade and carry on economic activity (apart from State monopoly).	Prohibition of trading.

* “New Economic Policy” is a historical expression, and does not convey the content of the conception. The expression has taken such root that it would be useless to substitute a term that would convey the meaning.

The Transition Period—continued

The problem is now as follows :

Is it possible in an isolated* State under proletarian dictatorship to avoid the phase of War-Communism? Is it possible to permit the existence of private ownership in the means of production and the continuation of the system of free trading simultaneously with the socialist sector after the conquest of power? Or will not the necessity to defend the isolated dictatorship of the proletariat demand the introduction of a partial or complete system of War-Communism for a longer or shorter period? Such is my opinion, and I wish to justify it briefly by arguments mainly taken from experiences during the Hungarian dictatorship.

(1) The conquest of power is only possible in an acute revolutionary situation, when a serious crisis arises within the ranks of the ruling class, which makes it impossible to put up a successful opposition to the onslaught of the proletariat.**

(2) A crisis within the ruling class, the premise of an acute revolutionary situation in which alone the conquest of power is possible, ensues only in consequence of a very fundamental dislocation of the economic system (whether as a result of external wars, civil war, or very prolonged economic struggles of vast dimensions). Hence the proletariat takes over a ruined economy with a diminished productive capacity.

(3) The destruction of the economic system signifies increased want amongst the mass of the proletariat and the impoverishment of the country. The bourgeois State can only be overthrown by the most active support of the vanguard organised in the Communist Party, but never by the vanguard alone. These masses expect an immediate improvement in their position after the conquest of power.

(4) Such an improvement in the material position of the broad masses at the beginning of the dictatorship is impossible by an increase in production! At the beginning of the dictatorship production is bound to decline! The chief causes are † :

* I wish to stress that it is a question of an isolated proletarian State, surrounded by capitalist countries; in a State bordering on the U.S.S.R., which can unite economically with the U.S.S.R. immediately after the establishment of the dictatorship, the situation is different.

** See Lenin, "Left-Wing Communism."

† See the detailed exposition in my book, "The Economic-Political Problems of the Proletarian Dictatorship," chapter on "Deterioration in the Living Conditions of the Industrial Proletariat at the Beginning of the Dictatorship." There are several German editions, one Russian, French, Italian, etc.

- (a) When the bourgeois class rule is overthrown the discipline of the workers in the factories, which is a part of class discipline is undermined: time is needed before the new proletarian discipline develops. Hence a reduction in the production of the individual worker occurs.
- (b) The best class-conscious workers have to be taken from the industrial process for the Red Army, Government work, etc.
- (c) The bourgeoisie in the States surrounding the proletarian State starts an economic boycott of the new dictatorship, supports the armed counter-revolution within the country, and in most cases wages war openly: hence there ensues a state of war which prevents the normal production of peace time.
- (d) The entire actual machinery of production, which the dictatorship inherits from capitalism, is adapted to the production of goods for a social order with an antagonistic, capitalistic method of distribution. A reorganisation of luxury production to meet the requirements of the masses, the general adaptation of the machinery of production to the new conditions of income requires a period of transition during which there is bound to be a still greater decline in production.
- (e) The highly qualified technical staff, bound up with the bourgeoisie by dint of their ideology and high incomes, sabotage proletarian production to a large extent, etc.

These and many other causes bring about a reduction in industrial production at the beginning of the dictatorship; the demands of the proletariat for an improvement in their standard of living cannot be met from current production.

(5) The capitalist crisis which precedes the seizure of power will most probably be expressed by inflation. The dictatorship in its struggle against the enemy, both at home and abroad, will not be able to cope with inflation during the early period. Amongst the peasantry inflation will mean a tendency to return to production for home consumption: the peasant will refuse to sell for money that is deteriorating in value whilst commodities are not available (chronic shortage of conditions peculiar to all inflation.) It will become increasingly more difficult to supply the towns with necessities. The class-conscious elements amongst the rich peasants organise on political grounds a boycott of the towns, which constitute the centres of the proletarian power. The urban proletariat is thus threatened with the danger of starvation.

Where there are large estates, which after confiscation come under the immediate management of the State, the agricultural workers, who under capitalist conditions (in Europe and Asia) never could satisfy their appetites, receive as real wages a large proportion of the food, etc., which previously was destined for the towns and thereby reduce the supplies for the urban population.

In consequence of all this the proletarian power finds itself at the beginning of the dictatorship in the following contradictory position :

The large mass of the proletariat expects and demands from the dictatorship an immediate improvement

*The Weekly Paper for All
Communists*

WORKERS' LIFE

29, Euston Road, London,
N.W.1

The Transition Period—continued

in their material position; the reduction of production, the reduced supply of necessities in the town (from the causes already mentioned), and the increased consumption for war purposes automatically brings about a deterioration in the supplies for the proletariat from current production. Therefore, willy-nilly the proletarian power must proceed to confiscate those possessions still in the hands of the bourgeoisie and the richer peasants in order at least to provide certain necessities for the proletariat. In the towns this means the requisition of houses, clothing—in the country requisition of the necessities of life. Furthermore, the demands of the proletariat for increases in wages must be satisfied, since this increase played a great role in the workers' struggles prior to the seizure of power, in spite of the fact that this increase under the existing conditions simply means a deterioration in the value of money, without making any permanent provision for the workers.

Both measures result in the elements, which still produce on the basis of private enterprise: the peasantry, artisans and the bourgeoisie that has not yet been expropriated, adopting a system of barter instead of money, or reducing production to personal requirements (the peasantry) or ceasing production altogether (the bourgeoisie). As already pointed out, the predominating role in all this is the endeavour on the part of these elements to create as many difficulties as possible for the new regime and thereby bring about its downfall.

In this situation the proletarian power is forced to make a much more comprehensive confiscation of the means of production than is provided for by the existing possibilities of organisation. In practice it is impossible to restrict the expropriation of the means of production to a given limit, for the existing interdependency of productive enterprises expropriated and carried on by the State cannot function if the supply of raw materials, accessories and various semi-manufactured articles is not forthcoming. These requirements were formerly supplied by smaller enterprises which have not yet been expropriated or which have ceased to produce. Therefore if production is to be continued the process of expropriation must proceed still further.

The proletarian State is driven in the same way by the sharp class differences between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The N.E.P. system presupposes a far-reaching entrenchment of the proletarian regime. The bourgeoisie will only collaborate economically with the socialist sector when it has lost all hope of any immediate overthrow of the proletarian regime; when the proletarian regime has attained that stage when no further irregular, individual confiscation takes place, when the socialist sector is able to give a real return in a steady currency, or in goods, for commodities delivered. At the beginning of the dictatorship none of these conditions exist.

The N.E.P. system would encounter just as great difficulties from the workers at the beginning of the dictatorship.* The working class that has conquered the

* In Hungary we limited expropriation mechanically to those enterprises that employed not more than 20 workers. But the workers in factories that employed from 10 to 12 workers undertook to expropriate on their own accord and

bourgeoisie in the course of the most difficult struggles, must be convinced by its own experiences that an immediate transition from capitalism to Communism is impossible, that in the interests of socialism a transition period is necessary during which the remnants of the bourgeoisie can carry on private enterprise, the peasants can control their own production and the bourgeois technician can enjoy an income far superior to that of the workers.

All these conditions together enforce a transition from money exchange to barter, to a far-reaching expropriation of factories and the requisition of daily necessities, and consequently to the prohibition of the free sale of certain vital commodities. In view of the fact that money continues to fall in value, the moneyed class make a rush to buy up whatever commodities are available, and thereby force the Soviet State to make still further restrictions in the freedom of trade.†

Thus we see that circumstances drive us nearer and nearer to the system of War-Communism, whether the leaders of the economic policy of the proletarian State wish it or not.

But this will not say that there will be introduced everywhere a complete system of War-Communism, a complete prohibition of free trade.‡

We may take it for granted that in every isolated proletarian dictatorship, whether we want it or not, the State economy during the first stage of the dictatorship will extend far beyond the boundaries of expediency and approach complete War-Communism. Hence it follows that N.E.P. in the U.S.S.R. is not an exception, but that in every proletarian dictatorship a similar process will take place: when the State sector will have far exceeded the bounds of expediency, a restriction of State economic activity will take place together with a revival of the private economic activity of the peasants, artisans and petty capitalists, and free trading on a restricted basis will be resumed. An actual, undeviating and immediate transition from capitalism to Communism is just as impossible as the gradual development of War-Communism into the final Communist State, or the existence of the N.E.P. system at the beginning of the dictatorship.

drove out the owners, because they usually employed over 20 workers, or had reduced the number when the decree had been promulgated, or because the enterprise was vitally important for the Soviet State. Naturally we could not forcibly reinstate the expelled owners or annul the confiscation.

† In Hungary we left the book trade free for a long time, assuming that no one would buy books who did not require them. But after a few months we discovered that the book-shops were in danger of becoming quite empty, so that there would be no books to be had on the market for the newly instituted workers' libraries, scientific institutes, schools, etc. In observing the book-shops it was quite evident that people who had money bought up books indiscriminately on the assumption that they would have more real value than the money that was rapidly falling in value. We were, therefore, forced to prohibit the free sale of books in order to secure a supply of books for our institutions.

‡ Even in Soviet Russia the prohibition of free trade of necessities could not be fully imposed when War-Communism was at its height. The peasants in the neighbouring villages continued to bring their products to the markets and exchanged them for manufactured articles and second-hand industrial products belonging to the urban population. In view of the inadequate State organisation of distribution in these small districts any prohibition of this local trading would have resulted in famine in these places.

The Transition Period—continued

It might be alleged that all this discussion is of little importance, as the conquest of power is the decisive issue, and that the experiences of the Russian and Hungarian dictatorships are inadequate to allow of any final judgment about the economic system of the transition period. But it must be remembered that the fact of the seizure of power by the proletariat does not ensure the existence of the dictatorship as has already been proved by the examples of the Hungarian, Bavarian and Finnish dictatorships. The problem of the retention of power is therefore just as important as the problem of the seizure of power. If the proletariat of a country were to attempt to introduce the N.E.P. policy immediately after the conquest of power, and thereby neglect the demands of the workers for an improvement in their position and the necessities of national defence, such a policy would lead to the loss of the control of the State. In this connection special consideration must be given to the fact that the expropriation of the bourgeoisie is not only an economic but also a political measure. The wholesale expropriation of all the material resources of the bourgeoisie takes away from them the possibility to finance counter-revolutionary movements: the attempt to adopt the N.E.P. policy

before the bourgeoisie as a class has been beaten by the deprivation of all material resources would be equivalent to the support of the counter-revolutionary movement. Therefore the question of the necessity, probability or evasion of War-Communism is not mere idle talk, but one of the most important problems bearing on the retention of the political power conquered by the proletariat.

The argument that the experiences of the Russian and Hungarian dictatorships are not sufficient to allow of any judgment of this question is, in my opinion, unfounded. The problem here at issue is one which can be decided in a purely theoretical manner since class conditions are more or less the same at the beginning of the dictatorship in every capitalist country. It is quite probable that in those countries where the power of the bourgeoisie will be overthrown last, at a time when in other countries a stage of socialism will have been attained, the transition from capitalism to socialism will be much quicker; but in my opinion it is highly improbable that under any circumstances whatsoever immediately after the overthrow of the bourgeoisie will it be possible to introduce N.E.P., a system of joint work between State economy and private economy in the form of free trade.

The Nature of Modern Militarism

A. M.

1. The Growth of Armaments

THE reality of the war problem for the revolutionary workers' movement arises first and foremost out of the unprecedented development of militarism in the modern capitalistic world. Under the hum of conversations on "disarmament," under the cloak of all kinds of conferences, counsels, and sessions of the representatives of the imperialist countries to deal with the question of the "limitation of armaments," behind the mask of pacifist propaganda and the slogans of "peace in industry," beneath the frenzied roaring of the bourgeois scribblers and social lackeys of the bourgeoisie directed against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Comintern, behind the senile slobbering over the "spirit of Locarno" on the part of the directors of the worthy League of Nations, a frenzied increase of armaments is going on.

Taking the armies of the five largest imperialist powers: the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, in 1913 they amounted in the aggregate to 1,735,000 men, and by 1927 they had grown to 1,896,000, while in 1928 the figure is 1,865,000, or 112,000 beyond the pre-war figure.

The war budgets of the same powers are in the aggregate almost double their pre-war size. The following table shows this in detail.

	1913 or 1912/13	1923/24 or 1923	1926/27 or 1926	1927/28 or 1927
France:				
In nominal millions of francs	1,450	6,889.1	6,478.2	7,722
In million dollars at exchange rate	280	416.7	209.8	302.7

Great Britain:

In million pounds nominal	77.1	131.6	122.8	115.1
In million dollars at exchange rate	375.4	597.7	596.8	559.3

Italy:

In million lire nominal	648.4	3,868.9	4,897.2	5,053.9
In million dollars at exchange rate	125.1	177.5	190.5	260.2

United States:

In million dollars	293.6	674.6	677.8	708.0
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Japan:

In million yens nominal	117.6	499.0	439.8	478.7
In million dollars at exchange rate	58.6	242.0	207.0	226.9

All the great Powers:*

In million dollars at exchange rate	1,132.7	2,108.5	1,881.9	2,057.1
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The foregoing figures include the sum of all the expenditures of each country officially assigned for defence, irrespective of whether these expenditures are included in the budgets of the military authorities or whether they are provided for by the accounts of other departments (one may mention that the latter method of reckoning military expenditures is frequently adopted in many States, in order to mask the actual expenditure on armaments and in order to allay social opinion).

During the post-war period the armed forces of the imperialists have been enriched by a whole series of

* Figures for 1913 taken from "Statesmen's Year Book"; for 1923/26 from the League of Nations Military Year Book; for 1927/28 from the official war budgets. Conversion to dollars was made on average of year's rate.

Modern Militarism—continued

new resources for war technique, of which chemicals and air fleets are especially serious and destructive. Whilst at the beginning of the world war Britain, France, U.S.A., Italy and Japan taken together had an aggregate of about 150 war aeroplanes in service, at the present moment the growth of military air fleets is indicated by the following highly instructive figures.

Number of War-planes in Construction

Country	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927
Gt. Britain	408	599	630	abt. 730	834
U.S.A.	520	560	abt. 600	620	700 abt.
France	1,250	1,400	1,550	abt. 1,580	1,650 abt.
Italy	250	400	665	640	600
Japan	150	200	327	394	434
Germany (only adaptable civil planes)	145	249	324	416	512
Total	2,723	3,408	4,096	4,380	4,730

The table shows that the air forces of the Great Powers grow steadily from year to year, whilst in the period from 1923 to 1927 they almost doubled.

The growth of naval armaments has been occurring on no less gigantic a scale, though it is particularly to be observed in the Anglo-American naval rivalry. The following table illustrates this.

Comparison of the Naval Forces of U.S.A. and Britain at Beginning of 1928

Battleships	16	—	—	18	—	—
Battle cruisers	4	—	—	—	—	—
Cruisers	49	13	5	32	8	25
Minesweepers	1	—	—	—	—	—
Monitors	3	—	—	1	—	—
Aircraft carriers	8	1	1	3	—	5
Flotilla leaders	17	1	2	—	—	9
Squadron						
Torpedo-boats	150	8	18	309	—	12
Submarines	55	12	12	121	3	32
Sloops	28	—	4	—	—	—
Motor-boats for coastal defence	6	—	—	—	—	—
Gunboats and auxiliary craft	—	—	—	—	—	—
River gunboats	19	1	1	7	5	—
Trawlers	31	2	—	42	—	—
Total of units	387	38	43	545	16	83

The above cited facts and figures adequately unmask the hypocrisy of the bourgeois preachers of peace and the "peacemakers" of imperialism, whether they act on behalf of the League of Nations or on their own initiative. Face to face with an undiminishing, indeed, on the contrary, a continually increasing growth of armaments, anyone can see the true value of the babble about "disarmament" that is going on in all the bourgeois organs, and the stir about the problems of disarmament is simply a cloak for world imperialism's preparations for fresh wars. These preparations are taking three directions: (1) preparation for a new imperialist war on the basis of the intensifying struggle for markets, for sources of raw materials and for possibilities of sinking capital; (2) preparations for a military attack on the U.S.S.R., as the sole proletarian government in the world, achieving socialist construction in conditions of the capitalist encirclement and representing the advance-guard and bulwark of the international revolutionary movement; (3) the safeguarding of the military oppression in colonial and semi-colonial countries.

The international proletariat cannot and must not remain indifferent to this very real war danger, to this unprecedented increase in armaments, to the new burdens which are being laid on the backs of all toiling humanity and the imminent menace of a fresh extermination of its best and finest members. Sixty-six millions called to the armies which participated in the world war, nine millions fallen for the pleasure of the imperialist spoliators, no less than 12 millions of wounded in the world war, 150 milliard dollars' worth of human labour expended in the war—(not including the innumerable economic misfortunes which the war brought with it), these fearful figures of the bloody imperialist slaughter must never be forgotten. Modern imperialism, which despite its partial successes in the realm of technique and the organisation of production, is living through a period of incurable disintegration and putrefaction, threatens to hurl the toiling masses into still more disturbing war turmoil. Thus the war problem cannot but interest the revolutionary proletariat, and it cannot but become actual for all the international workers' movement.

2. The Specific Peculiarities of Modern Imperialism

Independently of the very fact of the growth of militarism over the last few years, the importance of the war problem is accentuated also by certain specific peculiarities of modern military science and military construction in imperialist States. Of these there are four: (1) the colossal development of the resources of war technique not only in the sense of the development of their destructive qualities, but even more in the direction of their mass production and application, in their unprecedented wholesale adoption by the armed forces. (2) The extensive material dimensions of war in modern conditions, which evoke the necessity of exploiting all the economic resources of the country to further its end. (3) The mass nature of modern armies, into the ranks of which millions will be drawn previously instructed in military arts, if war breaks out, and the extraordinary concentration of man power at the fronts of the modern war. (4) The special methods of training and instructing the human mass assigned to the army in war time, methods having as their purpose the guaranteeing of their political loyalty towards the bourgeoisie. These four points do not represent any new principle in the science of war during the era of imperialism. All of them were demonstrated clearly and definitely during the world war of 1914-18, and they were observable to a certain extent even before 1914. But the majority of the political leaders and the war specialists (the general staff) of the bourgeoisie did not realise the colossal advances which had taken place in the military art under imperialism until the middle of the world war. And only the world war made rudimentary these elementary bases of the modern military art which we have just enumerated. At the present time these bases dominate the military systems of all the bourgeois States without exception and determine the course and direction of their preparations for war. One may say that the conditions of the future war in great degree arise out of them and are predetermined by them.

For the revolutionary proletariat the elucidation of the peculiarities of the modern military art and a certain prevision of the conditions of the forthcoming war are

Modern Militarism—continued

important in two respects: (1) it is necessary to be acquainted with the mechanics and the system of modern militarism, in order successfully to struggle with its development and to unmask it intelligently; (2) it is necessary to get an orientation in the conditions of modern war, in order adequately and precisely to indicate the course of the struggle with the immediate war danger.

In order to provide an indication of the nature of each of the elements of the modern militarist system we give some definite details illustrating the preparation for war being made by the great imperialist States.

In regard to war technique there is no need to expatiate on the matter of its qualitative improvement. It is a fact of universal knowledge that the development of productive forces and general technical progress inevitably lead to the perfection of the means of destruction. It has only to be noted that it is in this sphere of war technique that bourgeois science and technique is demonstrating particularly extensive "creative dimensions." Whilst in the sphere of production we observe colossal advances in regard to the technical reconstruction of the production apparatus, advances coinciding with a genuine technical revolution, in the realm of the military art we observe no less progress in the development of resources for attack and in part in the development of methods of defence. The most striking fact in this regard is the progress of aviation, which almost every month produces some fresh record in regard to speed, tonnage capacity, radius of activity, the combination of aerial with chemical work, and so on. The scientific and technical forces of various military departments are displaying no less, but so far less public invention in the sphere of the application of new technical resources to the military art. In this category have to be included various kinds of invisible, ultra-violet and infra-red rays, electro-magnetic waves, and the methods of bacteriological war, on the study of which and the possibility of their application in warfare a whole army of bourgeois scientists and technicians are at work, especially in the United States, Britain, Germany and Italy. However, from the military point of view only those resources have real significance which can be given an extensive mass application. Consequently various forms of new technical factors may have in prospect a colossal military significance, but they are still a theme not for to-day but for to-morrow. In order to estimate the real possibilities of modern militarism those war resources, those "instruments of war production" which are at present being applied must have primary consideration.

The distinctive feature of the equipment of modern armies is its mass nature. In this regard one may say without exaggeration that the world war caused a complete revolution in the military art, and entirely changed the conditions of warfare. The most serious factor in the development of mass equipment has been the progress made in the firearms of the infantry and the increase in artillery power. At the beginning of the world war there were only twenty-four machine guns to every war-time division of infantry, but by the end of 1918 there were 513 machine-guns to each French division, and 960 to each American division. As the result of so monstrous an increase of fighting machines

destined for waging automatic fire, the firing power of modern infantry has changed radically by comparison with the period from 1914 to 1916. The modern rifle (infantry) division is equipped to fire about 800 thousand shots in the course of one day of "normal" war, of which 250 thousand are from rifles, and the remainder from machine-guns. In connection with this fact there has been an extraordinary growth in the powers of defence of modern armies, which are able to put up an impenetrable curtain of rifle and machine-gun fire. The majority of modern war regulations allow that a division of infantry can defend a front extending from $2\frac{1}{2}$ to six miles. Along this front one division can put up such a fire that literally into every square yard of space in front of their position there will be poured not one, but more than a dozen bullets.

Artillery

In order to shatter this defensive power modern military art is forced to seek just as powerful means of attack. The chief of these resources supplied by the world war are artillery and tanks, supported by storming aeroplanes. From present-day artillery regulations one can judge of the quantity of such resources needed to overcome modern defence. According to French and West-European war views generally, for every mile of front defended by modern infantry (with artillery support), about eighty pieces of artillery, supplied with an enormous quantity of shells, are required. Only under such conditions can the defensive system of a modern army be broken down. Some idea of the monstrous dimensions to which the mass application of artillery can proceed in modern war conditions may be obtained by the following figures from the actual experience of the world war. In 1917 in the German front around Riga, for every kilometer of front there were 35 batteries of four guns each; for the same area in Picardy in 1918 there were 21 batteries; on the Aisne there were 32 batteries; in Champagne 25 batteries; in 1917 in Flanders the French had 38 batteries, under Verdun 34 batteries; below Malmaison forty batteries, and in the advance of 1918 28 batteries per kilometer of front. In correspondence the expenditure of shells was as follows: (a) below Verdun, from 13th to 27th July, 1917, three million 75 mm. shells and one million large shells were fired, amounting to a total weight of 120,000 tons, or 360 trainloads of thirty trucks per train. (b) Below Malmaison, in seven days 81,000 tons of shells were fired; in 1916 on the Somme, from 24th June to 10th July, 2,013,484 light shells and 519,165 heavy shells were fired. As the result of this monstrous concentration of artillery fire the losses thereby, which in the previous wars of the nineteenth century and in the Russo-Japanese war had amounted to 11 to 13 per cent. of the total losses, rose during the world war to 60 per cent. and during certain operations (Verdun, Malmaison, the Somme) reached 77 to 78 per cent. The specific importance of artillery as compared with other forms of military forces has greatly increased, and we are justified in expecting that in the forthcoming war there will be a similar mass employment of artillery resources.

Tanks

Together with the development of firearms and artillery is going on the perfection of tank, which made its first appearance during the second half of the world

Modern Militarism—continued

war. The basic tendency of the development of this form of technique consists in increasing its speed and radius of action, and in regard to tank development the leading country at the present time is Britain. There even exists a tendency of thought in British military science which is prone to regard the tank as the form of equipment to which, in conjunction with chemical resources, the "future belongs." One of the ardent adherents of tank activity is General Fuller, former second in command of the British Imperial General Staff. In his writings, Fuller gives a picture of battles in the future war in which man will not be visible on the field of battle, but only armoured tanks will move over it. The infantry is carried inside the tank, and in actuality has ceased to be infantry, being transformed into passengers of these fighting tanks and acting mainly with the aid of poison materials. But undoubtedly this view is an unjustifiable exaggeration of the power of the tank, since even in a perfected form they cannot be regarded as an independent form of army, but are only an instrument of advance subsidiary to the infantry and are quite useless in the consolidation of the captured positions and in defence.

In the realm of tactics and the military art generally, the previously mentioned extraordinarily wide development of firearms, artillery and tanks has led to a complete alteration of the methods of fighting. The battle dispositions have been dismembered and rearranged on a much more concentrated basis. The armed front, which at the beginning of the world war consisted of a line, has been transformed into a wide zone, occupied by disconnected army groups. In connection with the increasing range of artillery fire, the movements and manœuvres in the immediate rear and also the supply of the front line have grown extraordinarily complex. Artillery, without which the break-up of a consolidated enemy position is unthinkable, has had the effect of greatly restricting the movements of advancing troops. The auxiliary rear sections and the organs of the active army have grown to enormous dimensions. The problem of transport over the railways and with the aid of motor vehicles has taken on a colossal significance (towards the end of the world war the armies of the Entente had at their disposition about 180,000 motor lorries of various kinds, which were used both for the transport of supplies, and also for transferring large sections of troops from one part of the front to another). Simultaneously the extraordinary inventiveness of the bourgeois military engineers in regard to apply methods of mass destruction of roads and means of communication have led to the necessity of developing the art of destroying railways, and of bridges in particular. None the less, this art has naturally lagged behind the successes in the realm of mass destruction. Consequently, it proved impossible to carry out attacking operations at an adequate speed, and it became necessary to call halts in order to allow for the restoration of means of communication and for bringing the cumbersome rears into order. In all regards the entire machine of war has become extraordinarily complex and cumbersome.

We have deliberately considered the specific military and military-technical conditions of modern war-

fare in such detail in order to demonstrate the mass nature of modern armaments, and to emphasise the extraordinarily extensive material dimensions of warfare. We inevitably meet with the opinion of bourgeois military specialists such as Fuller or the German Zollmann, who endeavour to raise the issue of the renunciation of mass, many-millioned armies and the transfer to small, highly qualified armies, composed of specially chosen dependable Fascist elements. Such ideas naturally enter the heads of the leaders of the armed forces of the bourgeoisie, since they are alarmed by the political consequences of arming great masses of toilers. The inevitability of the transformation of the great armies of imperialism into an instrument for its overthrow, of which Friedrich Engels wrote with such inimitable precision in his time, is now becoming clear even to the bourgeois politicians and military specialists, and the latter would seem to manifest an even clearer class instinct than their diplomatic and ministerial confreres. But a mere superficial acquaintance with the specific features of modern armaments and the modern military system immediately completely dissipates all the utopias of the bourgeois military specialists in the realm of reorganisation of the modern mass armies with a view to their replacement by "ideal," highly qualified armies of Fascist cavaliers. For it is nothing but utopian to attempt to create numerically small armies in our age of mass, "standardised" production of the resources of war, in our age when war, as the rapporteur of the new military law in the French Chamber of Deputies, the notorious "peace-maker" of the League of Nations and "socialist" Paul Boncour, justly remarked, has taken on an all-embracing character, has become a "war of materials."

In order to illustrate the thesis that modern war demands the colossal application of the entire economy of the fighting countries, we confine ourselves to citing a few figures characterising the cost of the world war to the chief States that took part in it (in milliard dollars).

Warring state	National wealth	National income	War expenditure	
			Total	Average per year of war
Britain ...	70.5	11.0	33.4	7.7
France ...	58.5	6.0	31.3	7.2
Germany ...	80.5	10.5	46.3	16.8
Austro-Hungary	40.0	3.8	24.8	5.7
Russia ...	60.0	6.5	26.5	7.6

Thus the average cost per year of the war from 1914 to 1918 for all the chief warring States exceeded their nominal (peacetime) national income, with the exception of Britain. In this connection it has to be emphasised that the world war far from displayed the "voracity" of modern armies in its entirety, since during the stagnant trench-warfare period its active operations were carried on over comparatively insignificant sections and during a comparatively short period of time. Not one of the warring countries was in a condition materially to safeguard its army to such an extent as to enable it to carry on active operations the whole time. In the course of the war the war expenditures swiftly grew, and consequently the cost of the last year of the war, for example, was several times that of its first year. If we compare the dimensions of the measures taken for economic preparation to war at the

Modern Militarism—continued

present time as carried on in the largest States (U.S.A., France and Britain), with the position in regard to this question before the world war, when it hardly entered the heads of anyone of any of the general staffs that such a form of preparation was necessary, the enormous "achievements" in this sphere of preparation for economic mobilisation cannot but arrest the attention. All efforts are directed towards preparing for the transfer to war production of the most important sections of the national industry. To this end special organs have been established, called councils for national defence, which co-ordinate all the work for the preparation of the economy for war purposes of the various ministries, and establish links with the magnates of financial and industrial capital for this end. A mighty war industry has been created to serve in the capacity of basic works for the production of articles of military necessity. Specially organised military institutes are at work, engaged in the discovery and invention of the most perfect types of armaments, with a view to their mass production in the event of war. In a word, in the matter of economic preparation for war modern capitalism has far excelled the pre-war period.

Thus, no doubt is left of the fact that the dimensions of modern militarism, by comparison with which the monstrous militarism of pre-war days is only a child's plaything, arise out of the prospect of a new "great" war. Hence arisen also the wide dimensions of the preparation of man power for war.

Reserves

The position in regard to the preparation of human reserves for the replenishment of the forthcoming armed front is exemplified by the fact that at the present time the percentage of human population embraced by military preparation is considerably higher than that of pre-war days. In 1914 German militarism, the highest developed of all, had at its disposal for replenishing the army in war time only 50 per cent. militarily trained out of the total of men liable to service. At the present time France has 80 per cent. trained for war out of the total number fit for war service, Britain has 75 per cent. and Czecho-Slovakia as much as 85 per cent. It is, indeed, because of the achievement of this aim of increasing the percentage of militarily-trained that the capitalist governments are making such beautiful gestures, by cutting down the period of actual military service. At the present time in most of the countries with conscription an eighteen months' army service has been established instead of the former two or three years' service, and the tendency is to cut it down further to twelve months. In reality this measure is dictated by the endeavour to increase the total number of men who have received training in the army and so heighten the war preparedness of the population.

A study of the military systems of the States of the modern capitalist world speedily reveals a tendency towards preparations for the development of mass, many-millioned armies in the event of war.

In France this tendency has had clear expression in the law "for the preparation of the nation for war" recently passed by the French parliament (the author of the law being the "socialist" Paul Boncour). This law plans for a peace-time army (which in France num-

bers 710,000 men) only as an "army of defence," destined to maintain order in the country and to defend the frontiers during the first days of war; under the cover of this army the whole country will be brought into action on the declaration of war, and all its vital and material forces will be mobilised, so that the army of the war period will in reality be an "armed nation." According to this law, all citizens of France, without distinction of sex, can in the case of necessity be called "to the defence of the fatherland" with arms in hand. It would be difficult to imagine a higher degree of militarisation.

Military Unions

The other bourgeois States are following the same tendency to a greater or less degree, and are preparing for the development of mass armies in war time. Side by side with this there is going on an intensive war preparation of the population and an accumulation of trained human reserves. This preparation goes on both through service in the regular army and by way of non-army military preparation and the militarisation of the population through various kinds of military-social and sports organisations. In certain States both these methods (service in the regular army and preparation through militaristic-social organisations) play almost an identical role. In these States, in addition to the regular army there exist military unions, which numerically exceed the size of the regular army; Poland, which has a regular army of 320,000, has 450,000 thousand members of military unions (of which the organisation *Streletz* (sharpshooters) directed by Pilsudsky adherents numbers 250,000). With a regular army of 32,000 Finland has 95,000 members of the Fascist organisation "*Schultzkorps*." Estonia, with an army of 14,000 has 25,000 members of the bourgeois "League of Defence." Latvia, besides a regular army numbering 20,000, has 35,000 members in the "Organisation of Defence." In the majority of cases the members of these bourgeois organisations consist of selected Fascist elements, who receive the main elements of military training, enjoy the complete support of the government and of bourgeois circles, and also receive financial subsidies, and form a dependable force for the suppression of internal revolutionary outbursts and for the replenishing of the army in wartime with a dependable element in a proportion adequate to prevent any unexpected demonstrations on the part of the "armed nation." In France the military preparation of the population takes place mainly through the regular army, service in which is compulsory on all the male population capable of bearing arms; this preparation is complemented by the work of innumerable pre-service, non-army and physical culture organisations, directed by the military authorities and receiving large subsidies from the State (at the present time there are ten thousand such organisations, and the subsidies annually granted to them reach 8½ million francs, or about 300,000 dollars). In Italy the military preparation of the population is carried on through service in the regular army, whilst the element most dependable from the viewpoint of the present Fascist regime is trained through the "Voluntary militia of national security," which in essence is at the present time a government organisation. Among the bourgeois States "disarmed" Germany stands apart, for its regular army is reduced to

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100,000 men in the Reichswehr, (with a population of 63 million whilst France with a population of not more than forty millions has an army numbering 710,000). The real centre of Germany's military preparations is in the work of the innumerable military unions, of which the most important are "Stahlehelm" and "Jungdo," with about a million militarily-trained members. And finally, in the Anglo-Saxon countries (Britain and the United States), in which universal conscription is not the law and which maintain mercenary professional armies, the military preparation of the population is being carried on with the aid of special institutions, as for example the "organised reserves" in America, the innumerable school O.T.C.'s in Britain and so on; in these organisations rank and file reserves and reserves for the officer personnel are trained very successfully.

It has to be mentioned that the British and American bourgeoisie strive to exploit this peculiarity in their system of military training in order to weaken their rivals who have permanent armies on the basis of universal conscription. Thus, in the work of the "Preparatory Commission for the Conference on Disarmament" set up by the League of Nations in December, 1925, quite fundamental differences between the British and the French delegations were revealed on the question whether only the existing regular armies were to be subject to reduction, or whether the organised reserves, trained by actual military service in the ranks of the army, should be taken into account when carrying out the reduction of armaments; the British point of view was to the effect that not only the regular army but its reserves also should be subject to reduction; in other

words, there was a clear attempt to weaken France's military power and to undermine her possibilities through mobilisation, of developing a many-millioned army, whilst at the same time exploiting Britain's own invulnerability and inaccessibility in order to discount the reserves accumulated by way of non-army training.

The foregoing sketch of the activities of the bourgeois States in the realm of the preparation of trained human masses for military purposes, leads one to the conclusion that in the coming war armies amounting to many millions of man-power will be flung into the field of battle, armies which will not fall behind the armies of the world war in numerical strength. The concentration at the front in the coming war will evidently be on no smaller scale than it was in the world war.

One of the most essential consequences of the unprecedentedly far-reaching dimensions of war preparations is unquestionably the fact that in the forthcoming war it will not be possible immediately, at one blow, to achieve the war aims. The armed fronts of the imperialists, with their regular influx of fresh reinforcements and fresh resources from the rear, cannot be broken at one stroke. After a partial shattering these fronts will still be in a condition to reform with the aid of the succeeding supplementary mobilisations. At the present time there even exists a phrase covering the policy of "permanent mobilisation" in military science, and this expresses all the consequential nature of the efforts that will be made by this or that State in order to achieve the objects of the war. Hence arises the prospect of a protracted war, which will drag on over some months, and possibly years at least, until the political factor begins to play its part, to which factor will belong the last and decisive word in the final account.

The Problems of the Blockade*

The Navy in the Future World War

Eugen Paul

THE world war of 1914-18 was decided to all appearances on the blood-soaked battlefields of France and Italy. The fact that no "decisive battle" took place between the navies of the Central Powers and the Entente Powers helps to foster this belief. But a close examination of the procedure will show that the world war was decided by the superiority of the Entente Navy over that of the Central Powers. The fact that the Central Powers were swept from the high seas and the lines of communication assured between the Entente Powers and their colonies, not to mention America, constituted a factor of primary importance in the world war.

In reality the world war was decided the moment the Central Powers failed to force a decisive issue on land, by means of land forces alone, before the superiority of the Entente sea power could make itself felt. The German march through "neutral" Belgium, this

march by sheer brute force to Paris in the early weeks of the war, was a bid by the Central Powers to force this decision on land. However, when the memorable battle on the Marne in the autumn shattered this hope of the Central Powers, and the Entente was able by dint of its naval superiority to rally the support of the colonies and of America and cut off the Central Powers from world transport, it was then only a matter of time as to when the Central Powers would lay down their arms.

The blockade, that most effective weapon for bringing the enemy to his knees, was not discovered for the first time in the 1914-18 world war. Already in the eighteenth century Great Britain used the naval blockade very effectively in her predatory wars of expansion and forced the neutral States, such as Russia, Prussia, Holland, etc., whose trade was menaced by the blockade, to form a "League of Armed Neutrality," for the purpose of protecting themselves against the most powerful of sea pirates. During the wars between the France of Napoleon and England at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the system of blockade employed was

* The present article deals only with the problem of war between imperialist States. Needless to say war against the U.S.S.R. is a more imminent problem; but that is a question to be dealt with specially.

Problems of the Blockade—continued

specially drastic. In 1806, Napoleon declared a complete boycott of England by forbidding all trade and exchange of letters between the two countries. In 1807 Britain retaliated by issuing an "Order in Council" prohibiting any traffic whatsoever in harbours belonging to France or her allies.

Hence we see that the naval blockade was not employed for the first time in the world war of 1914-18. But neither was it used for the last time. The naval blockade, the isolation of the enemy from all communication with its colonies and the world markets generally, is such an effective method of fighting that no war is conceivable between the Great Powers without it. A few facts about the devastating effects of the blockade on German economic life during the war and the way in which it affected army supplies will suffice to give a correct picture of the significance of naval blockade.

German imports according to "Blockade and Sea Power" by Maurice Parmelee, Ph.D., (publishers, Hutchinson and Co., London, p. 206) were as follows:

	1912/13	1917
	cwts.	cwts.
Oilseed	1,571,925	14,758
Bran	1,744,927	10,174
Oilcake	532,471	1,979
Corn for breweries and malt products ...	202,202	8,916

Given these facts there can be no doubt that the front and rear in Germany and Austria-Hungary must gradually deteriorate, and be made incapable of defence and finally collapse.

If the naval blockade in the 1914-18 world war was able to be such a decisive factor, it will be far greater importance in the next world war, for which all capitalist States are preparing. The last world war was essentially a war between European powers (America joined in only at the end) to decide whether England or Germany should possess the hegemony of Europe and was intended, of course, only to serve as a jumping-off ground for the struggle for world hegemony. The coming war will be primarily an open war for world hegemony, it will take place between powers for whom their colonies, their predominant position in the world market and in the commercial waterways is a question of life and death. This fact alone will necessarily allot a far greater role to naval blockade and the isolation of the enemy from world commerce in the coming world war. In addition to this there is the consideration that the Powers are intent on avoiding decisive battles on sea, for a fleet once destroyed cannot be so quickly replaced, but the sinking of mercantile ships does not involve any such great risk. There is one other decisive factor to be raised in this connection. In the 1914-18 world war the occupation of the enemy's country was a factor of great importance, and was likely even to be decisive as already indicated. The occupation of Paris by the Germans at the beginning of the war, the realisation of the French war cry—Berlin!—both of which were within the bounds of military possibility—would have decided the war. In the coming world war things will be more complicated. In an American-Japanese war, an Anglo-American war, etc., the occupation of the capitals of these countries, or the occupation of these countries themselves, which are protected on all sides by the ocean, will be an im-

possibility. Even the occupation of the most important colonies, as will be seen later, will be impossible with the available military-technical resources, or even if possible, will not be likely to force a decision. A blockade of the enemy, an almost complete isolation from his colonies and world transport, will be necessary on a far larger scale than in the last world war to force a decision. For this reason the fleet will have a far bigger role in the coming war than in the last.

Naval Strength

Under such circumstances it is necessary in reviewing the chances and conditions of the new world war to get clear about the strength of the fleets of the most important Great Powers involved, and the special problems involved in their defence. It is quite apparent that every Great Power will have its own special problems dependent on its geographical position, the position of its colonies, the peculiarities of its economic position, the composition of its fleet, etc.

In accordance with the former course of the development of world imperialism, and taking into consideration the present structure of the world economic relations and the objective imperialist antagonisms, it is possible in respect to the most important Great Powers to determine or foretell an antagonism, which sooner or later must lead to war. These powers are: Great Britain and America; America and Japan; Great Britain and France; France and Italy. These Powers will sooner or later come to blows as a result of their mutual economic and commercial-political interests. They will all encounter special naval problems in the coming war, which even now in "peace" time have a decisive influence on their armament policy and will determine their strategy and tactics in the coming world war. The following dissertation aims at giving a brief survey of these problems and thereby indicating the strategical basis of the coming world war as that of a blockade and naval problem.

The Anglo-American War

The world war of 1914-18 concluded with the stabilisation of the hegemony of Great Britain in Europe: conquered Germany could no longer compete for this hegemony and the endeavours made by France, with the aid of the League of Nations in which she had a dominant position at the beginning, failed, as was demonstrated by the collapse of the Little Entente and the loss of French influence in the majority of the small European States. But that same world war which consolidated the hegemony of Great Britain in Europe, seriously undermined the world hegemony of Great Britain and brought her a very serious and dangerous rival in the United States of America. There is no immediate question of a war between Great Britain and America, nor does it as yet appear on the horizon. At present relations between these two States are "friendly," but it must not be overlooked that this friendship is based on the "voluntary" renunciation on the part of Great Britain of the sole command of the seas. But in any future historical perspective a decisive clash between Great Britain and America has become unavoidable.

The proximity and inevitability of this war grows in proportion to the development of America into a powerful, industrial export State, requiring expansior

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—America, which before the war mainly exported agricultural products—and to the extent in which America encroaches on what has hitherto been the preserve of Great Britain. In actual fact the development of America has assumed great dimensions: in 1926 America produced 45.5 per cent. of the world coal consumption, 71.9 per cent. of oil, 60.2 per cent. of iron, 59.8 per cent. of steel, 70.9 per cent. of rubber, whilst 82.7 per cent. of the world supply of automobiles comes from America. The European consolidated debt, repayable to America in 62 years, is 22 milliard dollars; the export of capital rose from 495 millions in 1923 to 1.6 milliards in 1927. American industry is close on England's heels in all parts of the globe. America is entrenching herself both in Asia and Africa in just those territories where Great Britain held the monopoly for centuries. A characteristic example of this is to be found in Liberia, formerly an independent African negro republic, where America has recently acquired enormous rubber plantations and thereby broken the British world monopoly in rubber (Great Britain had 97 per cent. of the world production under her control). America is systematically increasing her influence in all the British Dominions, primarily in Canada. Whereas British investments in Canada rose from 1,860 million dollars in 1915 only to 1,890 millions in 1923, American investments for the same period rose from 420 to 2,425 million dollars, and now constitute 70 per cent. of all foreign investments in Canada. But America is also rapidly gaining ground in Australia and New Zealand, not to mention the traditional Irish-American "friendship."

This system of rapprochement between America and the British dominions has already assumed such dimensions as to have a decisive influence on the entire foreign policy of Great Britain. For instance, it is responsible for the failure to renew the former alliance between Great Britain and Japan, which was naturally hostile to America, and now there can be no doubt that any renewal of this alliance would automatically coincide with the secession of Canada, Australia and New Zealand from the British Empire. These dominions are beginning to look on America more and more in the role of their "natural" protector against the "yellow danger," which is demonstrated amongst other things by the fact that all these dominions, contrary to the British practice, forbid the immigration of Japanese after the American example.

Let us imagine that the coming world war, the war between America and Great Britain, will be mainly a blockade war, then we will understand what significance should be attached to this stubborn American penetration, this "gaining ground" everywhere where previously Great Britain reigned supreme. It is in reality a prelude to the coming war, which in this instance will be literally a continuation of the "peaceful" commercial war with "other weapons," with arms and the naval blockade.

It is quite clear that America is conscious of the inevitability of such a war to judge from the language American naval circles use when they are indiscreet. Hector C. Bywater in his book "Navies and Nations: A Review of Naval Developments since the War," records extracts from speeches of American Admirals, three of whom are on the list of those in active service.

One of these Admirals speaking in connection with the question of leasing oil fields says:

"It was the possibility of Japan, perhaps in conjunction with Great Britain, invading the Pacific coast of the United States of America, that prompted the Navy Department to arrange with the Doheny interests for the construction of fuel tanks. . . ."

Another of these American Admirals declares:

"I know it will make some of you catch your breath if I say we must have a navy large enough to fight England!" The Admiral, observing that he had just returned from Europe, affirmed that "England to-day was openly discussing what should be needed in the way of a navy in case of trouble with the United States. . . ."

America and Great Britain realise the inevitability of a clash sooner or later and are making the most extensive preparations. The speed of these preparations may be judged from the fact that the American fleet, which in 1914 was only 41 per cent. of the British, was in 1926 already 92 per cent. of the British. The data submitted to the League of Nations in 1926 showed the relative strength then to be as follows:*

	Capital Ships	Cruisers	Destroyers	Submarines	Total Displacement
Great Britain	23	46	193	64	—
Displacement	634,000	231,700	231,300	57,200	1,342,100
America	18	30	295	121	—
Displacement	525,850	245,130	340,880	84,823	1,275,383

Taken as a whole America had already caught up with the British fleet in 1926. Its organisation is also completely in accordance with the British Navy. There is still one difference and that is the mobility. In view of the distance and scattered nature of her colonies and dominions Great Britain has always attached the greatest importance to speed and the British Fleet as a whole consists of swifter ships than does the American, a fact evident from the great superiority in the number of cruisers. Great Britain agreed to the principle of equal strength for the British and American Navies in Washington, but immediately stood out for superiority in respect to cruisers, because of the nature of the British Empire. In London the interruption of British trade by the Emden, Moewe, etc., has not been forgotten). The equality principle refers only to capital ships—the largest type of warship with a tonnage of from 30,000 to 40,000 tons. This arrangement was not made with a view to disarmament or peace, but for quite different reasons.

The pivot around which the entire defence policy of America turns is the Panama Canal, which saves America from keeping a special fleet in the Atlantic Ocean. If it were not for this canal the American navy would be forced to coast round South America in order to go from one ocean to the other. The journey from Washington to San Francisco is shortened by about 5,000 miles through the Panama Canal. But the canal is limited as to width and the conditions of the soil there prevent any further widening. Larger ships than the present capital ship cannot go through the canal; this explains why America is so interested in keeping down the size of the largest ships to the present level; the

* V. Voitinsky: Die Welt in Zahlen. Rudolf Mosse. Berlin, p. 135.

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development of a larger type would, of course, have been unavoidable in the course of still greater armaments. This also explains why America took the lead in the naval "disarmament" movement. Incidentally, another cause of America's sudden love of naval peace was a desire to get control of world policy in this way. Great Britain and Japan are forced to agree to the American proposal for financial reasons.

Naval Disarmament

But we see how little this agreement has to do with a real desire to disarm from the fact that all the Powers have apparently given up the construction of new capital ships, but have scrapped only those that have become out-of-date. Simultaneous with this "disarmament" in respect of capital ships, a mad race in arming in all other categories of ships has begun, in which more stress is laid on the quality than on the quantity. America, which is taking the lead in "naval disarmament," has according to Bywater taken special advantage of the liberal interpretation of the Washington agreement and laid plans for building so-called auxiliary ships (destroyers, flotillas and submarines), which will make the American fleet the largest in the world in a few years. In this race for naval armament, the increase in the strength of the guns, both on the ships in construction and on the old warships, is receiving great attention, as also the introduction of new protective appliances in the form of anti-torpedo bulges. Also in this respect Britain is being outdone by her rich rival America.

America by dint of her geographical, economic and strategic position, will be in a more favourable position than Great Britain. A few examples will suffice to make this clear.

Great Britain is a world power whose existence depends on the control of the sea and her connection with her colonies and other markets. The weekly imports into England comprise six million tons of food-stuffs and twenty million tons of raw materials. For this purpose there is in daily use about 1,400 ships with a tonnage of 3,000, and just as many ships are loading or discharging all over the world. From this some idea may be gained of what the position in England would be if her sea-borne trade were to cease even for a few weeks. England can actually be brought to her knees by the complete stoppage of her sea transport! In the U.S.A. the situation is quite different, for through her domination of the whole American continent she can supply herself with all daily necessities and war requisites.

The British Empire has colonies and dominions in all parts of the world, which necessitate a certain scattering of the British Fleet, and, generally speaking, force the British fleet to adopt a defensive attitude. If the enemy can succeed in keeping England isolated from her colonies and dominions for any length of time, then England is vanquished. The American colonies are not anything like so numerous and scattered as the British; therefore the American fleet can concentrate much more easily and better. But the main point at issue is that any temporary isolation of America from her colonies and world markets, or even the occupation

of her colonies (the occupation of the Philippines which is far from the American continent is possible) would not constitute a definite blow to America, which is well able to wage war without her colonies and world markets. Hence, America, thanks to her situation alone, is in a far better position than Great Britain (1) to concentrate her fleet; (2) to take the initiative in a war with Britain; (3) to take the risk of a sea battle, even a decisive one, or, if it should be more advantageous, to avoid same. Great Britain, too, will endeavour to provoke or accept a decisive sea battle according as she thinks it to her advantage. But in view of her position, she is much more likely to be obliged to declare or accept a naval decision. During the world war, blockaded and strangled Germany provoked the Battle of Jutland in order to get breathing space. And Great Britain was in a most advantageous strategic position, because she was not obliged to accept this challenge.

Decisive Naval Battles

It is very doubtful whether during the next world war any decisive naval battle will take place. Fleets are not the same as land armies, where the heroes driven to the slaughter can be replaced comparatively easily and without any great expense. Fleets are not only dear, they are in a certain degree impossible to replace, because it takes years to build a fleet. Therefore, every Power will in all probability only resort to a decisive struggle at sea as a last resource.

But it is not only a decisive sea encounter, but also the "occupation of the enemy territory" that will be avoided in a decisive war between America and Great Britain. Quite apart from the impossibility, which was proved during the world war at Gallipoli, of any big landing of troops on a coast surrounded by the enemy, the distance between England and America and also between their colonies is so great* that there would scarcely be any question of occupying the enemy's territory, for the sacrifice entailed would be far greater than the effectiveness of this strategy in deciding the war.

The Panama Canal would be the only point of attack that would be "worth while" for the British to concentrate on; because if such an attack should prove successful it would have a great influence on hastening a decision favourable to Great Britain. The possibility of such an attack by the British fleet was made the basis of an American manœuvre held off the Panama Canal, when the actual existence of such a danger was "proved" with a great patriotic flourish. But really such a danger is remote since the distance between the West Indies (Jamaica) and America is about 850 miles and from England 4,000 miles, so that the occupation of the West Indies by the American fleet is much more likely than an attack by the British fleet from Jamaica out on the Panama Canal, with its extremely up-to-date defence.

The future war between America and Great Britain for world hegemony will in all probability be waged on the lines of a blockade, a veritable guerilla war on sea aimed at cutting off the enemy from its colonies and markets and destroying permanently all such contact in order to establish oneself permanently there. In the post-war period the centre of world economy and the

* For this reason also there will probably be less use made of aeroplanes in an Anglo-American war than for instance in a Franco-British war.

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imperialist policy of expansion has gravitated more and more to Asia, i.e., China, which, if it came under capitalist domination, would bring new blood to the worn-out capitalist organism. Since the Pacific will play a decisive role in the struggle for world hegemony any interference in the communications with China, any entrenchment of the control of either belligerent over the Chinese waters and over the Pacific generally will be a decisive factor in the war.

Japan, because of her geographical position, is the dominant power in the Chinese waters; but Japan with its limited economic resources is no serious aspirant for world hegemony. The question of world hegemony will have to be decided between Great Britain and America, and Japan will act either as open or covert ally of one or other of the Powers in question. The former alliance between Great Britain and Japan, although it was originally directed against the expansion policy of Russian imperialism, was in its broader sense directed against America, the age-long enemy of Japan. Even although this open alliance between Great Britain and Japan was severed, for the reasons already mentioned, still there continues to exist a certain Anglo-Japanese community of interests in respect of America, as was seen in the recent events in China. Whatever the situation may be one thing is quite clear, that Great Britain could not possibly remain neutral in a war between America and Japan; the control of the Pacific is a fundamental point in world hegemony and Great Britain could not look on quietly whilst America would gain control of the Pacific in consequence of her eventual victory over Japan.

Looking at matters from this angle the large-scale expansion of the British base at Singapore is of tremendous importance in securing the control of the Pacific. Singapore, with its harbours and docks capable of repairing the largest ships, is also, of course, a menace to Japan (Singapore to Formosa about 1,600 miles), but in the same measure also a menace to the Philippines, which is situated still nearer and which is thereby controlled indirectly by the British fleet. Singapore, for which the new British cruisers that are being built are destined; Singapore, which is to make it possible at last to maintain a powerful British fleet in the Far East (hitherto that was impossible because of the lack of a base suitable for capital ships), and carry out operations there on a large scale. Singapore is the clearest proof that Great Britain is consciously preparing for the inevitable big conflict for world hegemony with America in the Pacific.

The American-Japanese War

Already in the previous chapter we pointed out the peculiar position of Japan in regard to the two chief powers that are fighting for world hegemony. The American-Japanese antagonism is old and is therefore particularly acute, because it arises in connection with the Pacific, the importance of which we have already explained. A war would already have broken out had it not been for the extreme difficulties which are involved in the outcome of such a war. Bywater quotes the speech made by Franklin Roosevelt when he was Assistant Secretary of the American Navy, in which he said that already in 1908 America hovered on the edge of

an ultimatum from Japan. In 1921 America wanted to build an extensive war base on the Island of Guam, and simultaneously in the Philippines; the arsenal was to be fitted up with docks, and in this way a real jumping off ground would be created for America from which she could send her fleet against Japan. The plan remained to a large extent on paper, probably because if America had carried it out, she would have had to be prepared for a declaration of war by Japan. (Guam and the Philippines are situated about 1,500 miles from Japan.)

Japan's exceptionally favourable strategic position in a war against America consists mainly in the fact that Japan can attain its main aim in the war, i.e., the defence of her island kingdom and the maintenance of her connections with the Asiatic Continent (mainly with Korea and Manchuria), the interruption of communication between America and China; without being obliged to go very far from her base. Japan is an island kingdom of strategic importance, separated from Korea and Manchuria only by a comparatively narrow strait. (The entire East—Chinese, Yellow and Japanese Seas, can be made impassable for the American fleet by a Japanese chain of mines.) Japan has no remote colonies or bases to defend, and this facilitates the greatest concentration of the Japanese naval forces.

Naval Bases

America is separated by 8,000 miles of ocean from Japan and, in case of war, would, so to speak, have to beard the enemy in his den. When the distances are so great a naval war must have strong bases, situated as conveniently as possible and built in the most up-to-date fashion. The importance of this fact was proved by the whole attitude of Japan at the Washington Disarmament Conference, when Japan attached more significance to America's renunciation of fortifying her bases than to the limitation of the number of ships. The Japanese delegate, Baron Kato, declared at the beginning that Japan could only consider a limitation of naval armaments if America would renounce the contemplated fortification of Guam and Manila. An agreement was reached by which America renounced the fortification of the aforementioned bases in the vicinity of Japan, but was given a free hand in regard to the Hawaii Islands (about 3,000 miles from America and almost twice as far from Japan). It is true that for her part Japan relinquished the fortification of certain strategical bases (Formosa, Pescadores, etc.), which, however, are already very strongly fortified. The unfavourable strategical position of America as compared with Japan may be seen from the fact that such an important American colony as the Philippines is, when compared with its distance from America, only a stone's throw from Japan, and could be occupied by Japan before a strong American fleet could be on the spot. Bywater relates in his book that a noted Flag Officer of the British Navy made the following remarks about this problem:

"If America ever has to fight Japan before she has secured proper fleet bases across the Pacific, the individual least to be envied in the whole world would be the American Commander-in-Chief. He would have no means of forcing a decision, since the initiative would rest entirely with the

Problems of the Blockade—continued

enemy; yet he would command a fleet sufficiently powerful to justify a public clamour for something to be done with it. And if he yielded to this clamour and engaged in any active operation, the odds against it succeeding would be 99 to 1. Villeneuve, on the eve of Trafalgar, had an easy problem compared with this. If I were an American naval officer, nothing less than the insistent call of duty would persuade me to command the Fleet in a war with Japan, not only on account of the appalling responsibility, but because it would be virtually impossible to make any active move which was not foredoomed to failure."

The tasks of the American fleet are rendered difficult, not only because of the strategic position, but also by the composition of both fleets. In 1926 according to official figures, the strength of the Fleets of both these States was as follows:

	Capital Ships	Cruisers	Destroyers	Submarines	Total Displacement
America	18	30	295	121	—
Displacement	525,850	245,130	340,880	84,823	1,275,383
Japan	10	33	111	69	—
Displacement	301,540	205,639	100,849	58,485	745,492

It is true that the American navy is considerably stronger than the Japanese, and the total number of big guns, according to Bywater, is exactly double that of Japan. But quite apart from the extraordinary concentration of the Japanese fleet, it has also the swiftest cruisers in the world. Japanese destroyers and submarines, both those in existence and being built, are so constructed that they are suitable also for long ocean voyages, and are therefore capable of going a long way to meet that section of the American fleet that ventures into the Pacific, or, if need be, avoid it or pursue it. The Japanese fleet is practically invincible in defence because of its great concentration and the proximity of its bases and can moreover take up the offensive.

In spite of the aforementioned almost hopeless difficulties, the American fleet, if it will deal a severe blow at Japan, must venture into Chinese waters, and attempt to destroy communication between Japan and the Asiatic Continent, for this is the only point where Japan is vulnerable and can be dealt a fatal blow. Japan must carry coal constantly from Korea to maintain the Japanese fleet in condition for manœuvring and fighting, since her supply of oil would not be sufficient to meet peace time requirements. But quite apart from this, certain Japanese import data of 1927 show how Japan is absolutely dependent on her imports. Japan imports:

55 per cent. of her wheat; 50 per cent. beans; 95 per cent. sugar; 75 per cent. fuel oil; 100 per cent. cotton, wool, rubber and nickel; 95 per cent. lead; 80 per cent. zinc; 55 per cent. steel; 75 per cent. chemical requisites; 45 per cent. iron; and 55 per cent. machinery.

By isolating Japan from her sources of supply and only by such isolation can American hope to force Japan to her knees. All these difficulties which have been mentioned give some idea of the sacrifice and devastation such an American-Japanese war would entail.

The Franco-British War

An isolated Franco-British war is scarcely conceivable. It is less probable than an isolated American-

Japanese war. But nevertheless, a Franco-British war is practically unavoidable within the framework of the coming world war. The Franco-British antagonism consists essentially in the rivalry for hegemony in Europe. The key to this hegemony is the Mediterranean, which together with the Atlantic Ocean surrounds the European Continent. The only Great Power that contests British supremacy in the Mediterranean is France. As a matter of fact, this Franco-British antagonism has become intensified since the world war, which brought about the exclusion of Germany from this competition for the hegemony of Europe. The struggle of both powers for a supremacy in the League of Nations is naturally only the reflex, the diplomatic cloak, of the struggle for power, which is going on in the economic, political and military spheres.

We have already pointed out that Great Britain is absolutely dependent on the undisturbed import of food-stuffs and raw material from all parts of the world. The Mediterranean constitutes the shortest road to the British colonies in Asia and North Africa, and is, therefore, indispensable for the safeguarding of these imports. It is evident that France is in the best position to interfere with British imports. France is only separated from England by the narrow English Channel, borders on the Mediterranean, and, therefore, in view of her North African possessions, is well able to hold an important section of the Mediterranean. On the other hand, it is also very important for France to maintain communications with her North African possessions, as was clearly demonstrated during the world war. Hence one may safely say that the imperialist and commercial-political interests both of Great Britain and France centre to a large extent in the Mediterranean.

Control of the Mediterranean

Under such circumstances it is quite clear that both these countries endeavour to gain allies who will be helpful to them in controlling the Mediterranean. The Little Entente, created by France, was directed towards this aim. The British-Italian and British-Greek friendships were also inspired by this intention. The case of Greece is especially glaring since the fleet is staffed almost entirely by British officers.

Both Great Britain and France are openly preparing to wage war with one another at sea.

Before the world war the main law of British naval strategy was to station the most powerful sections of the British fleet in the North Sea. In 1923-24, on the occasion of the naval budget, the British Admiralty advocated for the first time the extension of the Mediterranean Fleet in view of the general strategic situation. This has already been so well carried out that now the main forces of the British fleet are stationed in the Mediterranean. The chief base there is Malta, which unites three continents; it is 2,000 miles from England, and 6,000 miles from Singapore. Until the Singapore base is completed Malta is the only harbour on the road to the East capable of harbouring the largest warships. To secure an entry into the Mediterranean from the Atlantic Ocean, Great Britain is endeavouring to exchange Gibraltar for Ceuta (Africa), with the necessary hinterland, which is situated opposite Gibraltar and borders directly on Tangiers. This exchange would give Great Britain, which now only controls the entry to the Mediterranean, also the western coast of

Problems of the Blockade—continued

Morocco point of Tangiers, and thus protect her against any sudden surprises on the part of France.

It is a well-known fact that the French navy has been strengthened since the world war, or to be more exact, since the Washington "Disarmament Conference." In 1926 the French fleet was constituted as follows:

	Capital Ships	Cruisers	Destroyers	Submarines	Total Displacement
	10	14	60	42	
Displacement	212,770	142,634	45,202	28,917	483,117

Several ships are being built including many modern submarines, and the most important fact about this is that the entire composition of the French fleet appears to be planned for war with Great Britain. It has mainly swift cruisers, excellently armed, seaworthy, flotillas and submarines, a fleet, which Hector C. Bywater describes as follows:

"It is in the writer's judgment no more than a regrettable coincidence that many of the naval craft by which France hopes to guard her vital line of communication with Africa should be precisely of the type that she could employ with maximum effect in a war with Great Britain. . . ."

French Bases

All the French naval bases in the Channel, in the Mediterranean and along the African coast have been reinforced recently, and there can be no doubt that today the French fleet is considerably better prepared for war than in 1914.

Not a few voices have proclaimed openly the inevitability of the Anglo-French clash and the necessity of making the requisite preparations. When in Washington France did not want to consider any limitation in respect to submarines, Balfour declared openly that this attitude was directed exclusively against Great Britain. In French naval circles there has always existed an anti-British tradition which, in the eighties of the last century led to the creation of the so-called "Jeune Ecole" by Admiral Aube, which also aimed at the development of the navy. Aube declared openly that in a war with England France must come down from her lofty sentimentality, and that in such a war the attack on all the sources of British wealth would not only be legitimate but obligatory. In 1921, in the French Parliament, Monsieur Kerguezec, reporter in the Financial Commission, declared: "On that day when France will have a fleet of from 250 to 300 submarines, she will without the slightest doubt be able to look to the future. . . ." It is a question which tendency in France will conquer; that which regards the submarine as a guarantee of victory over Great Britain, or that which will meet the British Dreadnought with an equal number of French Dreadnoughts; in any event both great powers are steering towards war.

The Franco-Italian War

The Franco-Italian antagonism, partly because of opposing interests in Asia Minor and Africa, also centres in the Mediterranean. It is vital for France to secure her lines of communication in the western part of the

Mediterranean, and for Italy to do likewise in the Eastern part of the Mediterranean. Italy, which is surrounded on three sides by the Mediterranean through which the majority of her imports must pass, is particularly well situated for a blockade. In this connection it must be remembered that Italy is extremely poor in iron, coal, timber and phosphates, so that with the exception of Great Britain, no country in Europe is as dependent as Italy on the continuity of her imports. Besides, both France and Italy have colonies in North Africa with which they must maintain communication at all cost. Since, under capitalist rule the only guarantee to ensure these lines of communication is to be found in naval and military preparations or in war itself, both Powers are doing everything to prepare for the next war. The Italian Fleet shows definite signs of overtaking the progress made by France. In 1926 the most important types of ships which Italy possessed were as follows:

	Capital Ships	Cruisers	Destroyers	Submarines	Total Displacement
	5	13	121	41	
Displacement	110,170	74,790	74,289	16,668	307,351

Both fleets are increasing rapidly and it is a well-known pet idea of Mussolini to concentrate special attention on the Italian fleet, because otherwise, to use his words, "Italy cannot attain her aims." According to Bywater the naval position of both countries will be:

	Destroyers	Submarines
France	83	70-90
Italy	71	60

Besides this wild race to increase her fleet, Italy is also preparing for war with France by her alliance policy and the construction of bases. The Anglo-Italian alliance originated long ago. Already in 1887 both countries entered an alliance against France. This alliance has been repeatedly renewed since that time; let it suffice to point to the recent meeting between Mussolini and Chamberlain. Albania, Greece and Spain are also allies of Italy, voluntarily or otherwise. Italy recently built a number of new bases in Sardinia, Sicily, Albania, etc.

In a Franco-Italian war Italy will possess a great advantage because France will be forced to station a considerable section of her fleet in the Atlantic Ocean on account of England, whilst Italy will be perfectly free to concentrate in the Mediterranean. The war aims and strategic methods will develop from the nature of the seat of war and the nature of the fleets of both Powers. The Italian fleet is no less mobile than the French, since the Eastern coast of Italy has few harbours suitable for capital ships. Therefore, Italy must concentrate on building a light fleet. Furthermore, the Mediterranean, as already pointed out, is excellently suited for guerilla war at sea. Although both countries border on one another, and consequently a decision could be forced on the mainland, it is very probable that the decision will be made on the sea by a blockade war for the various reasons already mentioned. Italy will endeavour in case of war to interrupt communications between France and her African colonies, whilst France will endeavour to bring Italy to her knees by strangling her sea-borne trade.

India's Part in World Revolution

Clemens Dutt

I.—INDIA'S PART IN THE WORLD REVOLUTION

THE importance of the role played by the colonial countries in the world proletarian revolution was clearly stated by Lenin and is formulated in the theses of the Communist International. The world-shaking events of the Chinese revolution have afforded a practical demonstration of the correctness of these theses and enable us through an analysis of these experiences to extend, to amplify and to make more concrete the conclusion's already obtained. Next to China, India is the most important colonial country in the world. Taken together, these two countries will play a dominant part in the fate of world imperialism. Hence it is hardly necessary to emphasise the importance of studying to the fullest possible extent the problems presented by the developing situation in India and of applying the lessons derived from our experience in China.

It is true that there can be no mechanical transference of the conclusions arrived at as a result of the experience in China. India has its own problems and its own special characteristics. The complete domination by one imperialist power to the exclusion of the others, the single centralised government, the different social institutions such as the caste system, the part played by the different races, particularly Hindoos and Mohammedans, all these things distinguish the Indian problem from that of China. In certain, wide outstanding features, nevertheless, the national-colonial revolution in India presents the same problems as in China and the development and experience of the one plays its part in affecting the developing and experience of the other. What has happened in China has given a great impetus to the movement for national emancipation in India, an impetus which is still growing and has not yet reached its climax.

The Indian revolution develops as part of the world proletarian revolution and is profoundly influenced by the general world situation. At the same time, as in the case of China, it plays a role which will be of decisive importance for the future of the revolution in the rest of the world. Recent events indicate that India is on the eve of a new phase of mass national struggle. Moreover, it is already clear that this struggle will bear a different character from the abortive revolution of 1921. The new revolutionary upheaval will take place under the leadership of the revolutionary masses and will lead to the possibility of the establishment of a revolutionary government of the workers and peasants. This possibility brings more than ever to the forefront the question, already raised in the Chinese revolution, of the possibility of transition from the national revolution to the social revolution without a long intervening period of capitalist development.

II.—THE ECONOMIC POSITION OF INDIA AND THE POLICY OF BRITISH IMPERIALISM

The outstanding feature of the recent policy of British imperialism in India is its aggressive character. The policy of concessions has given place to the policy of the mailed-fist, to forcible demonstration of the supremacy of the British power.

In examining the economic background for this policy, it should be noted first that in spite of the shocks occasioned by the war and post-war crises, British imperialism has been successful in maintaining all key positions of control in its hands. There has been no decolonisation of India. India remains a classic example of a colonial country exploited to the full by foreign imperialism. Especially the monopolist hold over currency, banking and finance generally, and over foreign trade, with predominance in industrial production and the direction of internal trade, serve to secure the position registered politically in subordination to the British Parliament and control from the India Office in London.

British imperialism has been successful in achieving a temporary stabilisation of its power in India. But it remains to be examined what are the prospects for the continuance of this stabilisation. The new situation arising with the war was met by a fundamental change of policy on the part of the British bourgeoisie. The central feature of the new policy was the industrialisation of India under the control of British finance capital. At the same time political reforms were introduced enfranchising and giving a semblance of power to the upper propertied section of the Indian bourgeoisie.

The work of the Industrial Commission set up in 1916, furthered by the introduction of a protective tariff system laid the foundations for industrialisation. Nevertheless, the new economic policy met with redoubtable obstacles which have made necessary a modification if not a definite alteration of the original course. In the first place it was difficult to grant concessions to the Indian bourgeoisie which would not react to the detriment of British capitalism, and the value of India as a market for British manufactured goods. Especially in the critical period after the General Strike, British industry could not afford to allow the Indian market to be curtailed. Secondly, the severe protracted crisis of British capitalism in the home country, reaching its climax in the period immediately following the General Strike, put great difficulties in the way of providing the necessary means for the carrying out of industrialisation in India. In the slump following the post-war boom, the immature Indian industries faced with intense foreign competition, suffered severely. Further, the existing state of Indian economy was not adequate for intensive industrialisation and for exploitation by British finance capital under the new conditions of British imperialism. In particular, there was necessary a thorough-going overhauling of the financial system and the adoption of

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measures to increase agricultural production and the buying capacity of the peasants.

All these have combined to bring about a modification of the policy of promoting industrialisation with concessions to the Indian bourgeoisie. In the first place, steps were taken to remodel the currency and banking system. The fixing of the rupee exchange at the higher ratio of one shilling and sixpence instead of one shilling and fourpence, in the teeth of the opposition of Indian industrial interests, brought about a deflation crisis comparable to that occurring in England. The bitter fight between the British and Indian bourgeoisie over the Central Reserve Bank scheme is sufficient proof that the scheme is intended to serve the interests of British finance-capital at whatever cost in antagonising the Indian bourgeoisie.

A clear indication of the new attitude towards industrialisation, with refusal of concessions to Indian capitalists, is seen in relation to the tariff question. The recommendations of the special Textile Tariff Board have been ignored. The Indian demand for protection for the glass and chemical industries, largely in Indian hands, has not even received the consideration of the Tariff Board. At the same time a special amendment of the Steel Protection Act was hastily passed last March granting a protective duty against the import of steel railway wagons, and at the instance of the Burma Oil Company (British concern), after propaganda against the import of Russian oil, the question of protection for Indian petroleum has been immediately referred to the Tariff Board. Again, in 1924, the Tariff Board recommended a protective duty on imported wire and wire nails. Since then the chief factory in India, the Wire Products Company, changed hands, being acquired by Indian interests and now the Tariff Board has withdrawn the protection granted in 1924.

This policy of promoting only such industries that are securely in British hands, or essential for war needs, and in any case acting so as not to damage British capitalist interests, became marked on the introduction of a preferential duty for British steel in March, 1927. Owing to the causes mentioned above, there has undoubtedly been a check in the process of industrialisation. It is necessary to examine how far this check implies a deliberate reversal of the previous policy and what are the prospectives of its being removed in the near future. The heavy drop in British capital exports to India, even as a proportion of the total capital exports, indicates that British capitalists are deliberately refraining from making investments in India. The stagnation of the industrial departments of the Provincial Governments in India shows that the British Government has suspended the rapid developments anticipated by the Report of the Industrial Commission. On the other hand, all attention is being rivetted on carrying through the new financial reforms which are intended to make India safe for British investment. The deflation crisis is accompanied by severe industrial depression. The Indian bourgeoisie is bitterly antagonistic to the present financial policy. In April, 1928, the president of the Indian Chamber of Commerce declared that the "present situation is all right for the government, but

all wrong as far as the interests of Indian trade and industry are concerned."

It is clear that not only is there a halt in the process of industrialising India through British capital, but the Indian bourgeoisie also are being definitely discouraged from investing their capital in Indian industries. It is significant that Sir Basil Blackett, who has been in charge of Indian finances during the last five years, at a farewell dinner given to him by the European Association last March, expressed the wish to see more Indian capital invested abroad. He announced that a considerable sum had recently been invested in Brazilian Bonds from Bombay and he considered this "a development of extraordinary importance for India," for nothing would do more to promote racial equality between British and Indians than the "consciousness among Indian capitalists that they are the creditors of European and other debtors."

It is, however, not necessary to conclude that the policy of industrialisation has been abandoned. It may be noted, in passing, that in spite of the general industrial depression, the production of iron and steel in India is still rapidly expanding. It is necessary to look beyond the present deflation crisis to the period when, as in England after deflation, on the new financial basis there will be a renewed outburst of capitalist activity and a renewed impetus to British investment in India and the development of nominally Indian industries. It is in expectation of this period that British imperialism is content to meet with unyielding resistance the economic and political demands of the Indian bourgeoisie. It would be natural to expect that, in the present period of considerable economic difficulties in India, British imperialism would be prepared to make some show of political concessions in order to conciliate at least a section of the Indian bourgeoisie. On the contrary, British imperialism is refusing to give way even in small matters and clearly expects to wear down the Indian resistance in the course of time. In this calculation it is probably looking to the development of a more favourable economic situation when the new financial measures shall have been carried into effect.

III.—THE AGRARIAN PROBLEM

In estimating the possibility of the development of a revolutionary situation in India, the agrarian question will naturally play a very big part. The agrarian problem is created by the penetration of capitalism into agriculture, coming into conflict with feudal elements in village economy, intensifying exploitation and upsetting the previous character of agricultural production and the relations of the classes engaged in it. The progressive undermining of the basis of Indian agriculture is seen, firstly, in the stagnation as regards production, secondly, in the pauperisation and proletarianisation of the peasants together with minute fragmentation of land holdings and the accumulation of a gigantic burden of debts, and thirdly, in the resulting development of revolutionary unrest among the peasants.

The situation has been sufficiently alarming to British imperialism to cause them to send out a special Royal Commission on Agriculture. The latter has been at work for two years and the nature of its conclusions

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is now fairly easily estimated. Since it was specifically precluded from dealing with the root questions of land ownership, it can safely be said that its results will be insignificant as far as the main social problems giving rise to the agricultural revolution are concerned. The proposals of British imperialism to meet the developing agricultural crisis are of two kinds, agricultural and organisational. The first includes schemes for the development and rationalisation of agriculture so as directly to increase the volume of production. The second includes proposals for consolidation of holdings, on the lines of the recent Bill in the Bombay Legislative Council, which will involve the buying out and proletarianisation of peasants cultivating uneconomic holdings and organisational measures such as the development of co-operation and improved methods of marketing produce.

None of these things will affect the root problems. Nor can the situation be met by the reactionary proposals of the Indian petty bourgeoisie who advocate the return to pre-capitalist forms in their propaganda of the "charka" (hand spinning wheel) and of so-called "village reconstruction." The perspective of inevitable agricultural revolution remains and it is not too much to say that the agricultural revolution will be the central axis of the coming mass national revolutionary upheaval.

At the present time, however, although the agrarian problem becomes increasingly more acute, there is as yet no such mass rebellion among the peasants as marked the period immediately following the war. It is true that even now mass movements among the peasants are occurring, as, for instance, the resistance to increased land taxation among the Bombay peasantry, the peasant movement of the Akali Sikhs in the Punjab, and peasant revolts among even some of the most backward peasants of the native States and in Rajputane; but these are not on the same scale as those of previous years. By comparison with the rising ferment among the industrial workers, the peasant movement is at present quiescent. Undoubtedly there are here a number of factors which have to be taken into account. In the first place, the last five years have on the whole been years of comparatively good harvests. In the second place, it should be remembered that the revolutionary wave among the peasants after the world war took place

in circumstances of an unprecedented increase in prices, while under the present deflation policy prices are actually falling. In the case of the industrial workers, this is counter-balanced by the capitalist offensive against wage standards, but the peasants are not so immediately affected. Further, the betrayal of Gandhism disrupted the peasant movement. Nevertheless, the signs of a rising movement are present and with only a slight sharpening of the crisis, and if ideological leadership is provided, the peasant revolution may expand to gigantic dimensions.

IV.—THE RISE OF NEW FORCES IN THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT AND THE ROLE OF THE INDIAN BOURGEOISIE

The last year has been one of marked revival, especially during the last few months, in regard to the national struggle against imperialism. What is the basis and nature of this revival and what light does it throw on the relations of the classes in the impending revolutionary clash?

In 1921, the national struggle took on the appearance of a gigantic mass movement, but it presented certain features which sharply distinguish it from the growing movement of to-day. In 1921, the central role in the movement was played by the Indian bourgeoisie. There was no party representing the independent interests of the toilers, and the movement took place definitely under bourgeois domination and leadership. Even at the climax, the bourgeoisie retained full control as can be judged from the immediate and general obedience to the veto on the movement imposed by the Indian bourgeoisie at Bardoli in 1922. Further movement in 1921 took place during the period characterised internationally by the post-war collapse of the revolutionary tempo. The Bardoli surrender was nearly a year later than the Black Friday betrayal in England.

Since 1921 there has been a period of rapid class differentiation. The Indian bourgeoisie have abandoned the revolutionary national struggle. Their petty-bourgeois agent, Gandhi, has been completely discredited. The pauperisation of the petty bourgeoisie has gone further and further. The Government itself is compelled to make an investigation into the causes of "middle class" unemployment. The working class has grown stronger and more capable of leading an independent political struggle. Internationally, the new struggle is developing in a period of preparations for a new imperialist war, and after the experience of the revolutionary struggle in China and of the betrayal of the revolution by the Chinese bourgeoisie.

Thus, the revival of the national movement takes place under changed circumstances. The new movement that is now gathering strength is of a different character to the old one. Its development is also proceeding more slowly than in the post-war period, but this is compensated for by the more fundamental nature of its social basis.

The basis of the new movement which distinguishes it from the old is the conscious union of a struggle for national emancipation, centred on the fight against imperialism, on the one hand, with the social-economic struggle of the masses against exploitation on the other. This was only partially and then unconsciously and instinctively expressed in the mass movement of 1921.

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India's Part—continued

The grounds for the new revival must be looked for in the causes underlying the development of this twofold struggle. Briefly formulated, the most important of these are: (1) the strengthening of the proletariat and its schooling in the class struggle as a result of industrialisation and increased exploitation; (2) the impoverishment and revolutionisation of wide strata of the petty bourgeoisie and peasantry; (3) the development of the international working class struggle against capitalism and imperialism; and (4) the repercussion of the establishment of working class power in the U.S.S.R., and of the events in China.

It is necessary also to examine the role played by the Indian bourgeoisie in the new movement. An exact estimate is made difficult owing to the operation of several contradictory factors. On the one hand, the demands of the Indian bourgeoisie cannot be satisfied under the conditions of the domination of British imperialism. On the other hand, the bourgeoisie cannot participate in a movement directed towards the overthrow of social exploitation. The whole experience of the action of the Indian bourgeoisie, and of their counterparts in China goes to show that their opposition to the working class is more fundamental than their opposition to foreign imperialism. Not only is it impossible for the Indian bourgeoisie to play a central role in the new movement, but it is demonstrable (?) that their role is a counter-revolutionary one. Nevertheless, particularly under the conditions of the present aggressive drive of British imperialism, the antagonism between the British and the Indian bourgeoisie is by no means liquidated. The check to the policy of industrialisation and economic and political concessions does not convert the Indian bourgeoisie into a revolutionary force but it does involve them in an opposition to British imperialism which must be taken into account in characterising the conditions for the development of the mass revolutionary struggle.

The significance of the boycott movement in reply to the Simon Commission, of the anti-imperialist decisions of the Indian National Congress, and of the series of defeats inflicted on the Government in the Legislatures must be judged from this standpoint, as also from the reciprocal standpoint of their meaning as a barometer of the general leftward pressure from outside the ranks of the bourgeoisie. At the same time that the National Congress at Madras adopted a series of "left" decisions, including the demand for complete national independence and support for the League against imperialism, it received back into its ranks prominent representatives of the reactionary right wing of the nationalist movement. The move towards unity of all the parties of the Indian bourgeoisie involves the rejection of revolutionary struggle and is in itself sufficient to explain the collapse of the hartel and boycott policy advocated at the Madras Congress.

The rise of new forces in the nationalist movement is seen most clearly in the rapid growth in importance of the Workers' and Peasants' Party. Originally deriving its composition mainly from the petty bourgeois left groups in the Nationalist Congress ranks, this party has lacked a mass basis and a clear independent line; but that it is in accord with the new mass national revolu-

tionary impetus is seen in its success as actual leaders of mass activity, both political and economic. The Workers' and Peasants' Party has proved the strongest where it has come out most independently as the leader of strike struggles and anti-imperialist demonstrations. It represents the beginning of a mass national revolutionary party based on the leadership of the proletariat in the national struggle.

V.—THE FORWARD MOVEMENT OF THE PROLETARIAT

The outstanding feature of the present movement in India is the rising wave of strike actions on the part of the industrial workers. This strike wave was slowly developing during 1927, but during the latter part of the year its importance was overshadowed by the attention concentrated on the nationalist campaign against the Simon Commission. Already the bourgeois nationalist campaign has dwindled to small proportions, but the strike movement has continued to grow until it has forced itself into the forefront of attention.

The immediate occasion of the strike movement has evoked a continued capitalist offensive and the attempted carrying through of nationalisation proposals. The railway strikes in the Bengal Nagpur Railway last year and on the East Indian Railway this year arose on the issue of reorganisation and retrenchment proposals involving large-scale dismissals. The general strike in Bombay was provoked by the introduction of speeding-up methods. In many cases, partly as a result of the one and sixpenny rupee, further wage cuts have been introduced following on wage reductions carried out during the last few years. The working class has emerged from the depression of the defeats experienced in 1922-25 and is now coming out in mass resistance to the capitalist attacks. Further, in looking for the immediate causes of the present movement, account must be taken of the influence of the news about the Chinese revolution.

The present strike movement displays several notable characteristics. In the first place it is very widespread, strikes taking place in all parts of India. Secondly, the strikes are of a mass character, all workers whether organised or not taking part, and very frequently being assisted by sympathetic strikes among workers not immediately affected. This is seen also in the persistent threats of a general strike, as in the case of the Madras strikes last year where the Madras workers as a whole threatened to come out in support of the strikers of the Burma Oil Company, etc., and in the threats of a general strike on all the Indian railways. Thirdly, it is very conspicuous that the official trade union organisations play no part in calling or leading strikes, but even betray them openly. The official report of the Executive Committee of the All-Indian Trade Union Congress, made to the Cawnpore session in November, 1927, announces that no strike had been sanctioned by the Executive of the A.I.T.U.C. during the past year, but that, nevertheless, certain strikes took place "in which the officials of the Congress had to interest themselves."

The trade union leaders openly sabotaged and helped to crush the strikes that have occurred, and are actively supporting the proposals for introduction of schemes for industrial arbitration.

The Economic Consequences of the New Technique*

E. Varga

"Almost every age has been marked by economic change, but, with the single exception of the era which saw the introduction of steam, probably none has witnessed a greater industrial revolution than that in progress to-day. Changes are taking place in every direction and many of the conditions under which the great staple industries were built up no longer exist. Electrical energy, generated in many countries by water power hitherto running to waste, has vastly extended the area in which manufacturing can be successfully conducted; it is no longer anchored to accessible coal. Chemical discoveries . . . have altered the relative value of raw materials. The development of many new countries, which has been largely due to modern means of communication, has led to a great change in the relative importance of the world's markets. In the midst of the changing world new industries, not only in this country, have come into being to meet new requirements."—(Times, 17-3-28.)

IN recent years there has been a rapid increase in production. This is based on the greater intensity and productivity of labour.† Increased production is the result of the numerous innovations, which have been introduced in recent years in connection with rationalisation.‡ We cannot dwell on the purely technical side of the question, but will attempt to deduce the economic consequences from technical development.

We shall begin with energy. In this connection the following processes should be taken into consideration:

* A chapter from the work on "World Economy" to be submitted to the Sixth International Congress.

† Since these two conceptions are often confused, let us define them exactly: by productivity of labour we understand that factor of production which is dependent on the means of production. With the same expenditure of labour power and in the same time, the production may be greater or less according to the nature of the means of production employed. The use of a better machine and of a better technique increases the productivity of labour. The intensity of labour is determined by the amount of labour power employed in a given period. ("The expenditure of human muscles, blood, nerves," as Marx says.) In short, it is determined by the number of movements required, the necessary muscles and the degree of nerve tension, etc. The intensity of labour can change whilst employing the same machinery according to the speed at which the machinery is run. As a general rule increase in production and the intensity of labour go parallel; but this need not be the case. There can be a greater intensity employed whilst production remains the same, though scarcely the contrary. The increase in the productivity of labour signifies the production of an increased quantity of commodities with the same expenditure of human labour, hence a decrease in the value per unit produced.

Increased intensity of labour signifies the production of a larger quantity of commodities; but their value is also greater, because the same value can be produced by more intensive labour as by the process of normal intensive labour over a longer period. (See "Capital," Vol. III., chap. 2, p. 32.)

‡ A sharp distinction must be made between the invention and introduction of new machines. Very often years elapse before a new technical invention is so widely used as to cause any change in production; and only in the case of use has it any economic significance.

(a) Improved utilisation of coal.§ The steam turbine in place of the old steam engine;¶ coal dust fuel and liquid coal.

(b) Substitution of coal by oil, peat, water-power, blast furnace gases, etc.

Economic result: international coal crisis!

Stagnation in the coal industry in spite of the great increase in the volume of production and the advance in industrialisation. This is seen most plainly in the United States of America. Production, which may take as equivalent to consumption was as follows:**

Average production in million tons :							
1870	1880	1890	1900	1910	1920	1925	1927
32	62	138	227	455	626	559	601
% increase							
—	94	123	65	100	38	11	7

An absolute decline in consumption follows on the sudden increase in output between 1905-10 and 1915-20!

(c) The steam engine is no longer used directly as a working machine as was the case in the time of Marx, but as producer of electric power. Steam was the emblem of free competitive capital just as electric power is that of the imperialist epoch. Small local generating stations are replaced by giant stations erected at the source of energy (waterfalls, mines), and long distance high pressure current.*

The following are the economic results of the transition to high tension electric power:

(1) Increased liberty for industry in deciding on a centre; decentralisation of large scale industry. The steam age forced numerous industries to be situated near coal districts, otherwise the cost of production would be increased by the transport of coal. (See Weber's book: "Ueber den Standort der Industries," Tuebingen). The introduction of the high tension current makes it possible for industry to be established where raw materials are to be found or where labour is cheap. In the United States of America industry is being transferred from the north-east to the south, in England from the north to the south-east corner. Industry which was mainly carried on near coal centres is becoming

§ In consequence of waste and wrong technique only 4 per cent. of the energy in coal is utilised from the time it is mined till it is used in the steam engine. Statement made in "Waste in Industry," publication of the American Geological Survey and the Bureau of Mines, p. 241.

¶ Various data show the great progress made of late years in the utilisation of coal. According to the report of the general management of the Austrian railways the following tonnage of coal was used per 1,000 kilometres.

1923	1924	1925	1926	1927
157	126	113	107	104

(Boersen Kurier, 20-12-27.)

** "Statistical Abstract" of the U.S.A., 1926, p. 725. Percentages calculated by author.

* Electricity produced in the Alps is brought down to the towns in Lombardy: electricity produced in Switzerland is sold to German centres over 200 miles away.

The New Technique—continued

ing scattered; the economic structure of individual industrial countries is becoming equalised, the division into pure agricultural districts and centralised industrial districts is on the decline. The industrial proletariat as a class is scattered throughout the whole country!

(2) The system of electric high tension provides a basis for the sudden development of individual centres, which could not be developed economically during the steam age for lack of coal. The tremendous development of industry had it not been for the supply of electricity from the Alps. Where lines of communication are bad, the high tension power makes it possible to exploit centres with raw materials situated at great distances away. (Of great importance for Africa and Asia.)‡

(3) Socialisation of the electric supply. The technical development of the generation of power forces the generating stations throughout the country to combine, in order to equalise the vacillations in daily and seasonal consumption. In many districts in Germany and the United States of America all plants are connected with one another. (The small plants are usually closed down and production concentrated in the giant plants.)*

The central electric generating stations constitute definite economic fortresses.†

A stoppage of the supply of electricity in case of a general strike during a revolutionary mass movement would have a far more drastic effect than a strike in any other branch of production!

(4) Greater freedom of movement within the factory. The factory worked directly by steam, such as Marx describes, was a centralised concern.

"An organised system of machines, to which motion is communicated by the transmitting mechanism from a central automaton, is the most developed form of production by machinery. Here we have, in the place of the isolated machine, a mechanical monster whose body fills whole factories, and whose demon power, at first veiled under the slow and measured motions of his giant limbs, at length breaks out into the fast and furious whirl of his countless working organs." ("Capital," Vol. I., p. 377.)

The substitution of electric power for steam has changed the appearance of the factory; (in America about 75 per cent. and in Germany 50 per cent. of all

‡ The significance of electric power will increase if Marconi's attempts to transmit energy on the lines of the radio should succeed; for wires cost large sums.

* In America this development has been expressed by two terms: "Super-Power" and "Giant-Power." Super-power is the system under which the individual electric companies retain their independence and only divide up their surplus energy amongst one another. Giant Power means the combination of the entire production and the entire demand of the country for electric power and its systematic distribution. (See "Giant Power: Special number of the Annals of the American Academy of Social Science," March, 1925.)

† The construction of giant power in the hands of private people "would constitute the most dangerous monopoly that ever existed."—Pinchot, Governor of Pennsylvania, in the special number of the "Annals."

factories are worked by electricity). The "uniform impulse" of the steam engine disappears. The factory as a whole is absolutely dependent upon the supply of power, but once this is ensured it is much more mobile and elastic than the old factory run by steam. Hence the idea of the decentralisation of the factory altogether arises, the creation of rural industry on a modern basis. (See Irving Fischer in "Giant Power.")

Progress in the Mechanisation of Labour

It is extremely difficult to give a uniform picture of progress in this sphere, because of the manifold details that contribute to it. No fundamentally new process has been introduced as far as we can see for the mechanical manipulation of raw materials, although certain fine new machines have been invented that facilitate production. All innovations are on old lines: greater sub-division of the labour process and increase in the number of special machines for details. (A good example is the boot and shoe industry. See E. J. Johnes: "The Trust Problem in the U.S.A.") Supply of machines with raw material by mechanical contrivances, the generalisation of automatic machines, etc. It would seem that the increase in productivity can be attributed less to improvement in machinery than to improvement in the organisation of labour. Above all the intensity of labour has increased and then only that of productivity.

The development of agricultural machinery constitutes a certain exception. The aim here is not the special machine but the universal machine; this is the natural result of the fact that the same process must be gone through once annually. There are universal machines for the cultivation of the soil, worked by tractors on which the necessary implements can be put out of gear when not required: the combined harvest and threshing machine.* The economic results are: increase in the organised concentration of capital in agriculture; reduction in the demand for labour in the country, the transformation of the "latent" unemployment in the country into acute unemployment.

The machine has a special place in office work; it reduces the cost of the capitalist method of production by substituting machines for clerks, statisticians and bookkeepers. There is for instance the Holerith machine, which groups as desired thousands of cards per hour on which calculations have been punched, adds and gives the finished results in figures; the "Human Machine," the latest American invention, which does calculations delivered over the telephone; these point

* Julius Hirsch in the Berlin "Tageblatt," of 28-2-28, gives some interesting facts about the growing importance of machinery in American agriculture. The number of horses in the U.S.A. in millions was: 1915, 21.2; 1920, 19.9; 1925, 16.5; 1927, 15.3; 1932, 12 (estimate). The estimate for 1932 is based on the number of foals. The newest American agricultural machinery of interest comprises: (1) the so-called little "Combine," which does mowing, binding and threshing as one process. It can only be used in dry districts where the corn can be cut quite dry. The machine costs 1,285 dollars. The government calculates that this machine would save 20.37 marks (£1), on every ton. It is being very generally used now. The tractor is being constantly improved, so that it can be used on quite small fields and on hilly, stony and boggy ground. Then there is the mechanical cotton picker; this is still in the experimental stage, the trial showed a quarter of the harvest is left behind; but this will be overcome probably by improvements.

The New Technique—continued

the way to the lines of development. Simultaneously with this there is the reorganisation of labour: the use of filing cards instead of books; the conveyor that carries documents from one employee to another. The economic results here are: the relative superfluity of office workers, which will soon become obsolete as in the case of agriculture and industry.

The Conveyor as Centre of Organisation

The great changes have not taken place in machinery, but in the organisation of labour within the factory. The directing centre of the factory is not machinery, but the conveyor. It is not a case of the object in process of manufacture adapting itself to the machine, or passing from one machine to another, but the reverse. The conveyor constitutes the organisational centre and the machines are placed to meet the requirements of the conveyor. The most varied types of machines are ranged in gay disorder along the conveyor and the necessary implements put ready for the workers, if they should have to change the implements at all. The old order of the factory, the co-ordination of similar machines or systems of machines is disappearing.

The pre-requisite for the successful application of the conveyor is standardised production, the ceaseless repetition of the production of absolutely similar goods. This has always been the case in the staple industries: cotton weaving and spinning, metal, etc. Its extension to the means of production, or sections of same (standardisation, normalisation, etc.), and even to articles of consumption in their final form (motors, houses, shoes, clothes), is new.

The pre-requisite for standardised production is a big market for all these goods. This is created by standardising demand*—most developed in America; by extending the markets for these goods.†

* Formerly a conventional similarity in dress, houses, etc., existed in home industry or handicraft production; the present system of standardised production is forcing a new uniformity. In America millions possess the same type of Ford car, the same type of shoes, the same style of bookstand with the same prescribed 50 or 100 "best" books, etc.

† The lack of an adequate market is the main danger facing German rationalisation. The whole tragedy of German rationalisation is described by a German correspondent in the "Statist," 10-3-38.

"The world's excessive demand for German products . . . gave place to an almost complete lack of orders from abroad after the stabilisation of the mark. German goods seemed to have lost suddenly the ability to compete in external markets, whereas German imports of foreign, mainly American articles, rose steadily. Their lower prices, notwithstanding the far higher earnings of labourers in the United States, led in 1925 to a migration of the captains of trade and industry across the ocean in order to see for themselves. . . ."

"Upon the return of these explorers the rationalisation of production methods became the catchword in Germany. It was said that merely by imitating the American practice of recklessly scrapping out-of-date machinery and of mass production of certain standardised types . . . the foreign demand for German articles could be re-established. . . . the situation would not be dangerous if the goal of rationalisation had been reached. . . . This, however, is apparently not the case. . . ."

"The only positive results of the rationalisation process appear to be an over-expansion of the production capacity

Production by the conveyor system requires not only markets, but a corresponding big outlay of capital: it makes for concentration, centralisation and monopoly.

The economic essence of production by the conveyor system is the attainment of the greatest productivity of labour. To this end internal organisation is undertaken: every superfluous movement is obviated in the process of production and the greatest intensity of labour attained.* Work has been so speeded up that in many enterprises obligatory pauses during work have been introduced, otherwise a section of the workers would collapse during the day. . . .

The Advance of the Chemical Industry

Great progress has been made in the chemical industry; after electricity it has the greatest influence on present-day technique. The outstanding innovations include: nitrogen from the air, liquid coal, artificial silk, restoration of used rubber and artificial rubber, etc.

The age of capitalism as compared with the pre-capitalist epoch—as Sombart correctly observed—was marked by the substitution of organic material by unorganic: the substitution of the products of agriculture and forestry by mining products (iron instead of wood for fuel; petroleum instead of vegetable products for lighting, etc.). The present development is on the lines of substituting rare raw materials by "ubiquitous" materials—as Weber terms it—that is, raw materials that are to be found everywhere. Ferro-concrete takes the place of iron and wood: artificial nitrogen that of saltpetre: fluid coal, natural petroleum; artificial silk, silk, etc.

This development represents the substitution of mechanical labour by chemical. Instead of the transport‡ of coal in its natural state, it is transported as electric energy, gas or petroleum for long distances‡ by means of wires or pipes without mechanical labour. Cement is manufactured instead of hewing timber, mining iron ore, or melting iron. Electrolysis gains increasing significance in metallurgy; quite new metals are gaining importance in industry.

of German industry, and an immense increase of its indebtedness, particularly to foreign countries. . . . Responsible for this failure is the blind imitation of American methods. No attention has been paid to the fact that the United States industry has a far wider domestic market than Germany, and does not beat itself against insurmountable Customs barriers in the nearest vicinity of its headquarters. . . ."

* The importance of the organisation of labour as compared with the development of machinery is shown by the following: According to the Balfour Report, part II: "Further Factors in Industrial Efficiency," p. 11, the increase in the wages section of the cost of production per unit rose between 1907 and 1924 by more than the increase in a full week's wages! (except in heavy industry, shipbuilding, machinery construction). The amount of motor power used in industry has increased to a far greater extent than the per capita production (from 8 million to 13½ million h.p.). The causes are: inadequate utilisation of labour power, widespread short time, high general costs. Since 1924 the results have improved in consequence of the introduction of rationalisation.

† In Germany and in England coal constitutes half the goods transport. Hence the great opposition by the railways to gas transport.

‡ The pre-requisite for the transport of gas is the invention of welded steel pipes, which can stand an atmospheric pressure of 30; rivetted pipes, previously in use, could not stand any such pressure.

The New Technique—continued

Economically this tendency is leading to a scattering of industry over the whole country, instead of the former method of anchoring to the sources of raw material and fuel with the results already indicated.

The substitution of the chemical process for the mechanical in the manufacture of raw materials is simultaneously the encroachment of the apparatus to the detriment of machinery in the entire complex of capitalist production.

“The machine proper is therefore a mechanism that, after being set in motion, performs with its tools the same operations that were formerly done by the workman with similar tools.”
 (“Capital,” Vol. I., p. 368.)

This definition of the machine is not applicable to the method of production in the chemical industry. The means of production in the chemical industry are not machines, but apparatus, suitably constructed vessels and pipes in which the material undergoes a change and the mechanical process of mixing, shaking, turning are merely subsidiary. § Production is automatic: the majority of the plants are practically empty!

Production by means of apparatus signifies a sharp division in labour-power in the enterprises concerned: there are no skilled apparatus-workers. In the chemical industry there are engineers: about one-fifth of the entire staff: the remainder are unskilled workers at very low wages, who do purely mechanical work and understand absolutely nothing about the process of production.*

Progress in the Transport System

In the 19th century the railway was the greatest factor in overcoming crises and opening up new territory for capitalist exploitation as already pointed out in Lenin's “Imperialism.” During the war and the post-war periods there has been a relative cessation in railway building. † The former development is continuing in shipbuilding: in place of the steamer there is the motor boat; in place of coal, oil. New sailing boats for long distances are no longer being built; the attempt to utilise wind in a new manner for sea transport—the Flettner Rotor—does not seem to have any economic importance. In new ships the chief attention is paid to speed, and comfortable and elegant equipment for passenger traffic. Motors and aeroplanes take the lead. The numbers are generally known, so we will therefore deal only with the economic results.

§ Already before the war a Marxist book, which received too little attention, was published dealing with this problem, which has now become much more actual. Mataré: “Machine, Apparatus, Tool.”

* The technique of the chemical industry is always kept secret and is constantly changing! The chief chemists in the I.G. Dye Works receive full salary for three years if they leave, and are not allowed to enter any other chemical concern. I once asked a director of the I.G. what would happen if after three years one of the chemists should go to England or America, and he replied: “In three years our technique will have made such progress that although he may try to compete, he can do us no damage.”

† The length of the railway system on the whole world was: 1,101,653 km. at the end of 1913; 1,221,066 km. at the end of 1924; or an increase of 11 per cent. (“Stat. Jahrbuch fuer das Deutsche Reich,” p. 71.)

The motor brings thinly populated districts within the reach of world traffic, which for economic reasons, would not be possible for railways. There is an auto service from the Mediterranean to Bagdad right through Arabia; traffic across the Sahara, etc.

Motor and air transport provide very speedy contact between all parts of the world. Progress is going still further: Ford is starting the manufacture of a cheap standardised aeroplane: ** across the Atlantic, the motor without fuel, ‡ the rocket-auto and airship. §

Motor and air traffic serve to save time in travelling; the motor mainly for short distances to connect up town and country and serve as a link with big railway lines. It makes it possible for people working in town and who can afford it, to live in the country. For short distances it is also used for the transport of goods and is successfully competing with the railways. (In England there are many complaints about this, with the result that the railway lines are now beginning to organise motor services themselves).

The aeroplane has so far only been used as an exception for the transport of goods and then only for very expensive goods, which would lose interest by long-distance transport, or for very perishable goods. For instance, the transport of gold from Great Britain to the Continent and South Africa; the transport of fresh flowers and fruit from South Africa to London, etc. The real significance of the aeroplane is for long-distance passenger traffic, especially if the land route is not well-constructed. The saving in time in such cases is enormous. It is this desire to save time that has prompted the many attempts to fly the Atlantic Ocean, and there is no doubt that in a few years there will be a regular air service between America and Europe.

The contradiction between the development in traffic technique and the dividing up of the capitalist world into numerous small States, is becoming still more pronounced. Crossing the frontiers and the customs formalities will soon take up more time than the journey itself.

Progress in the Technique of Communication

During the last decade tremendous progress has been made in the technique of communication. The dispatch of letters by motor and aeroplane takes place with hitherto unprecedented speed. The greatest innovation, however, is wireless. The radio connects the most remote territories with the centre; since there is no wire required the number of participants can be increased without any limitation. The fact that it is only possible to receive sounds and not dispatch messages, except from the centre, will soon be remedied. The wireless telephone and television are being perfected.

** The Dornier Works are now building a giant aeroplane with 12 motors of 5,000 H.P. for communication with America. It is to be fitted out with nautical instruments and all the requisites for seafaring. (“Berliner Boersen-Kurier,” 17-5-28.)

‡ Early in 1928 in America, Lindberg, a representative of the War Office, invented and financed the construction of a new motor which runs without fuel, by utilising the electric current in the earth through a magnet motor. The motor made 1,800 revolutions per minute and constitutes a revolution in traffic innovations.

§ The rocket motor car was first used with success in Berlin in May, 1928. The rocket aeroplane can rise to great heights and attain tremendous speed.

The New Technique—continued

(The legal structure lags behind economic developments: recently in America the court decided that a cheque received per wireless was not valid in the eyes of the law.) The transatlantic cable for which the imperialists fought so stubbornly on the conclusion of peace, will soon be worthless.

The progress made in the technique of traffic and communication has greatly facilitated a survey of the world markets. Differences in prices and ensuing speculation caused by ignorance of the position of the market in remote regions have disappeared. So, too, has the possibility of large scale swindling in goods, which in Marx's time greatly intensified crises. (See "Capital," Vol. III., chap. "Credit and Fictitious Capital.") World economy is becoming more closely linked up and the possibility of crises arising from ignorance of the happenings in the sphere of circulation is lessened. Crises more commonly originate from imminent causes and not from chance.

Technique and War Preparations

New technical appliances are introduced because of the drive in capitalist enterprises to increase profits. It would be a mistake to overlook the close connection there is between technique and war preparations. Many new technical appliances were the result of war conditions and receive support from the various governments in the hope of big profits accruing. The production of nitrogen from the air was first attempted in Germany during the war, because she was unable to procure Chili saltpetre; in the same way dye products in England and America for lack of the German dyes. The entire chemical industry is most closely bound up with war preparations. The same holds good for transport. In all countries the air service receives State subsidies; the services in the British Empire do not even cover net costs by their receipts. But everywhere governments subsidise civil aviation, since every aeroplane will be used for military purposes in case of war, and every civil pilot is a potential military pilot. Every technical innovation is immediately tested from the point of view of its value in future wars.* The large industrial countries have a military superiority over agrarian countries and small States, which are incapable of preparing for war out of their own resources, and must therefore become part of an industrial great power if they are to take part in a war.

Technique and Economy

We will attempt to summarise the economic results of the new technique with those reservations imposed

* The American Brown-Boveri Co., together with a big shipbuilding enterprise, asked the assistance of the Government, in 1928, to build six 35,000-ton transatlantic passenger steamers. The ships were to cross the Atlantic in four days from port to port, and be fitted as aircraft carriers. The plan points out that the decisions of the Disarmament Conference of 1922 do not interfere with such ships and that no sea power in the world possesses such ships or is building them. The speed was calculated at 33 knots per hour for a distance of 7,000 knots, without taking extra fuel; the normal equipment to be for 24 aeroplanes for civil purposes, but in case of national necessity provision could be made for 100 aeroplanes. It is pointed out that these ships are especially advantageous because they do not require any naval bases, which is of great importance in view of the fact that the U.S.A. does not possess any naval base west of Hawaii. It is reported that State aid was refused.

by the vastness and extremely scientific nature of the subject. The most general result is that the contradictions within capitalism have become intensified!

(a) The new technique and organisation of labour have so increased the productivity of labour, that the suspension of workers cannot be compensated for by the development of the capitalist method of production. Marx visualised an increase in the number of workers in spite of technical progress, but we to-day see the development of a structural unemployment, a growing army of unemployed, especially in the most advanced capitalist countries. A reduced number of productive workers is working with murderous intensity whilst millions are without work!

(b) The contradiction between possibilities of production and sale become more acute. The reduction of variable capital, i.e., of the workers' part in the production of value, limits the home market and necessitates an increased struggle for markets outside the "national" markets. Simultaneously, a considerable section of the productive apparatus stands idle!

(c) The speed of technical progress increases the significance of the danger of machinery becoming out-of-date. This explains the race to use to their utmost manufacturing centres, but this is held in check by the shortage of markets.

(d) The organic composition of capital is increasing rapidly. This necessitates a concentration of capital, since enormous capital is required to found an enterprise capable of competition. Hence the growth of the monopoly tendency.

(e) The contradiction between social production and private ownership of the means of production becomes more pronounced: technical development drives towards a socialisation of the means of production. This takes place to a certain extent in the form of State capitalism.

(f) The most recent technique intensifies the economic, military and political superiority of the big imperialist industrial countries. The attempted opposition by smaller countries by means of high protective tariffs causes the world market to be split up without succeeding in overcoming the superiority of the big industrial countries. There is also a contrary tendency to weaken the contradictions.

(g) The most recent technique reduces the anchorage of industry to special localities, facilitates the sudden development of hitherto backward territories, reduces the difference between town and country, and increases the combination of all the territory of the globe into the process of world economy.

In a later article we wish to deal in greater detail with certain of these points.

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Organisational Problems in Eastern Countries

(Published for the purposes of discussion.)

AMONG the problems calling for discussion and decision at the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, one of the most difficult, and at the same time of special practical importance, is the problem of organising work in colonial and semi-colonial countries.

Of course, it is no more possible to separate organising problems in colonial and semi-colonial countries from the political problems, the political line by which the Communist Parties should be guided in the developing struggle, than it is in imperialist countries. Just as in imperialist countries, the organisational work of Communist Parties in colonial and semi-colonial countries must consist in the application to every-day life and the consolidation of the political line of those parties. None the less, it is necessary to emphasise the special importance of the organisational work carried on by the Communist Parties of colonial and semi-colonial countries. The experience of the five years which has passed since the Fifth Congress of the Comintern has supplied a number of eloquent objective demonstrations of what a colonial reservoir of potential energy is the oppressed world of the imperialist colonies. One has but to remember China, Indonesia, India, Morocco and Syria. The risings and great revolutionary movements which of recent years have developed in these colonial and semi-colonial countries have not only confirmed the soundness of the Comintern's general analysis indicating the relativity of the processes of stabilisation of capitalism, but have also confirmed the fundamental soundness of the political course taken by the Comintern in relation to each of these countries separately. But the practical application (*i.e.*, chiefly the organisational work of the corresponding Communist Parties) of the sound political directives laid down by the Comintern was very often unsound on the part of the Communist Parties of colonial and semi-colonial countries. Altogether the great revolutionary movements in these countries, which have brought hundreds of millions into the revolutionary struggle, have been very weak on the organisational side, and this organisational weakness has time and again facilitated the successful counter-attacks of the imperialists and the national feudalists, militarists, and various other "national" exploiters and accomplices of the imperialist robbers.

Leaving aside the organisational problems of the Communist Parties in Latin America, which call for special study, the central organisational problems facing the Communist Parties of eastern countries are as follows: (1) The Communist Parties and the revolutionary struggle for independence; and (2) the organisational consolidation of the Communist Parties themselves. These two problems are closely interrelated.

* * * * *

In the realm of the mutual relations existing between the Communist Parties and the national revolutionary movements in Eastern countries practice has led

to the emergence of the following most typical forms: (1) Relations with the Chinese Kuomintang; (2) relations with the workers' and peasants' parties of India; (3) relations with the Sarekat-Rajat and the Sarekat-Islam in Indonesia; (4) the attitude to the Wafd in Egypt; (5) the attitude to Kemalism in Turkey; (6) the attitude to "Istiklal" in the countries of the Arabian peninsula (Syria, Palestine and so on).

Finally, it is necessary to take stock of the situation in the Mongolian and Tuva republics, where, in view of the existence of national revolutionary parties directly connected with the Comintern in the quality of sympathetic parties, no Communist Parties exist.

All these various organisational forms have in large degree been established without taking stock of others' experience, for when they were being created no international experience of Communist Party organisational work in colonial and semi-colonial countries yet existed. This renders it of all the more practical importance that now, on the eve of the Sixth Congress, an attempt should be made to estimate certain results of the organisational work carried on by Communist Parties in the most important eastern countries, and, on the basis of those results, to draw practical conclusions for the future.

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The experience of the mutual relations between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang and the experience of the Chinese revolution generally is the one to which most study has been devoted, and it affords the possibility of drawing a number of concrete organisational deductions, which have the utmost importance for all eastern countries. What are those deductions?

(1) During the first stage of its development the Kuomintang was an organisation of the national Chinese bourgeoisie, and, moreover, an organisation of their upper strata in large degree; during this first stage the Kuomintang possessed neither a formulated political programme nor a concrete organisation. The Kuomintang played with the working class and the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie, but despite the fact that the founder and leader of the Kuomintang, Sun Yat Sen, was indisputably a revolutionary, during this first stage of its development the actual direction of the Kuomintang was in the hands of those who afterwards displayed all the characteristics of the right wing Kuomintangites.

(2) The second stage of the Kuomintang's development is characterised by the entrance of the Communists into the organisation. The Communists brought to the Kuomintang the link with the working class and the peasantry, and together with that link a revolutionary spirit also. Under the influence of the work of the Communists inside the Kuomintang the latter swiftly grew into an organisation enjoying the support of the great masses of workers, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie of the towns. In correspondence with the growth of the influence of the revolutionary worker and peasant elements

Organisational Problems—continued

on the Kuomintang's political line during the second period of its development, the Communists who entered into the composition of the Kuomintang, and the Chinese Communist Party as a whole, aschieved the possibility of raising the issue of the right to leadership of the Kuomintang. The struggle for the leadership of the Kuomintang was carried on by the Chinese Communist Party with varying success from the first day of its decision on work inside the Kuomintang. On isolated occasions (the so-called Hankow period) the Chinese Communist Party succeeded in capturing the machinery of the Kuomintang, but that capture was not accompanied by its organisational consolidation among the masses, and, moreover, was bought at the price of renunciation (or to be more exact, a number of renunciations) of more important political demands, at the price of the crudest of opportunist deviations and the violation of political and organisational independence.

(3) The delay and irresolution in the straightening out of the Chinese Communist Party line and the continuance of the struggle for the leadership of the Kuomintang, and basing their activity on the machinery of the State government, overwhelmed the Chinese Communist Party and all the other Chinese revolutionary workers' and peasants' organisations with repressions, by comparison with which the Kemalists persecution of the Turkish Communist Party might almost be regarded as the work of a liberal and constitutional regime.

(4) When the treacherous role of the national bourgeoisie in the Kuomintang was revealed, the Communist Party put forward the proposal to form a left-wing Kuomintang, at first as a fraction after the style of the Minority Movement and composed of revolutionary workers and peasant elements of the Kuomintang, and afterwards as a new party, in the quality of a genuine Kuomintang in opposition to the former Kuomintang with its right leadership, which had treacherously violated Sun Yat Sen's testament. Both these attempts ended in defeat: both the left Kuomintang as a revolutionary wing, and the left Kuomintang as an independent political party was a fiasco. And, shortly after Chiang Kai Shek's shooting down of the Shanghai workers, the Chinese Communist Party had finally to renounce the idea of using the banner of the Kuomintang for the revolutionary mobilisation of the masses. In this connection one has to notice the following very characteristic phenomenon. The chief argument which the Chinese Communist Party put forward after the Shanghai shootings of 1927 in defence of the necessity to carry on the struggle under the banner of the Kuomintang was based on the opinion that the masses would not enter the struggle under any other banner, and in particular that they would not fight under the banner and the slogans of the Communist Party. None the less, the Wei Ting and Ho Lung advance showed that the exact contrary was the case: the utter coldness and even direct hostility of the masses towards the Kuomintang and their great readiness for direct support to the Chinese Communist Party.

(5) The idea of a left Kuomintang as a genuine Kuomintang raised by the Chinese Communist Party against the right leaders, was in essence borrowed from

those same right wing Kuomintangites. For it was these latter who began the struggle with the Communists' growing influence in the Kuomintang, endeavouring to evoke a split in the Kuomintang against the Communists, violating Sun Yat Sen's testament, and perverting the true nature of the Kuomintang.

(6) In view of the general organisational weakness of the Chinese Communist Party, its organisational consolidation inside the Kuomintang remained unsatisfactory right to the very moment of the split between the Communists and the Kuomintang' despite the numerous indications and warnings given by the Comintern that the Chinese Communist Party's organisational weakness inside the Kuomintang might play a fatal role in the life of the Party.

(7) The crisis in the relations with the Kuomintang brought with it a crisis inside the Communist Party itself, and in particular a splitting away of a part of the right elements with Tang Pin Shan at their head, who in opposition to the revolutionary policy of the Chinese Communist Party set up a workers' and peasants' party. Unfortunately we have no detailed information of this Party whatever, which evidently points to its unpopularity and insignificance in numbers. According to such little information as exists this workers' and peasants' party was organised on the basis of the so-called left Kuomintang principles, and its lack of success thus provides a further proof of the lack of vitality in the idea of a non-Communist mass revolutionary organisation under present conditions in China.

(8) Thus the anti-imperialist struggle for national liberation in China is at present under the direct leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. The attempts to exploit the Kuomintang to these ends, as well as the attempts to set up other, analogical organisations in place of the Kuomintang, have led (a) to the Chinese Communist Party losing some of its political and organisational independence; and (b) to the defeat of the Chinese Communist Party.

(9) It is necessary to analyse yet one further question; whether perhaps the Communists' entry into the Kuomintang was not also a mistake. It was not! The Communists must be everywhere where the masses are to be found. (The line adopted by the C.P. of Indonesia is absolutely unsound. On the plea that the mass national organisation Sarekat Islam has a compromising leadership, this Communist Party refused to work inside that movement and set up a new national-revolutionary party, the Sarekat Rajat, directly subject to the Communist Party). Consequently the Chinese Communist Party necessarily had to be inside the Kuomintang and to struggle from within for a decisive influence with the masses. No matter where an analogical situation might happen to arise, the Communists of that country are bound to enter their own Kuomintang and within it to carry on a most energetic struggle for the masses.

(10) When entering such organisations the Communists should: (a) ensure themselves an unconditional and complete political independence for all their own organisations and in all their actions; (b) should have in view the inevitability of a split, which becomes all the more swift and inevitable in the presence of a speeding up in the tempo of development of the class struggle, with an increase in the political and organisational strength

Organisational Problems—continued

of the Communist Party itself, and the development of the Communist Party's influence among the great masses. The Communist Party must systematically prepare for this split, and that not by way of glossing over the growing dissensions, not by way of renouncing their own principles and position, but by way of the maximum increase of Communist activity among the masses, and, first and foremost, by way of intensifying the work of the Party fractions in the class proletarian and peasant organisations; (c) inside the Kuomintang it is necessary to organise a left wing, having its basis in workers' and peasants' elements. In preparing for the split, the reactionary plans of the right-wing, bourgeois elements must be paralysed and disorganised through the pressure of this left wing, whilst simultaneously the masses must be told of inevitability of explosion at a certain moment, and the fact that this explosion will in essence mean that the Kuomintang has outgrown its usefulness, and that in future the revolutionary struggle may and must develop only against the Kuomintang.

Indian Parties

There is no all-Indian workers' and peasants' party in India, but there are worker-peasant parties in separate provinces. These parties developed spontaneously some two years ago, and have continued to exist till now on a semi-legal basis. In India the worker-peasant parties have not yet succeeded in acquiring any specific ideological and organisational form. So far as can be judged they are constructed on the lines on which the left Kuomintang in China was to have been constructed, according to the proposals put forward in their time by the Chinese Communist Party; a mass organisation based on the workers and peasants with individual and collective membership (the latter for trade unions and peasant unions). The Communist Party must work inside the worker-peasant parties, on a fractional basis. Despite their youth, the worker-peasant parties of India already have influence with fairly large sections of the masses.

Together with the worker-peasant parties a legal Communist Party exists in India, organised in 1925 in Cawnpore, and also various illegal Communist groups.

Thus, at the time of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern there are the following class workers' and peasants' organisations:

(1) Worker-peasant parties in several provinces, striving for union in an all-Indian worker-peasant party.

(2) Trade unions, as a rule under the leadership of national-compromising leaders, constructed as organisations for the upper ranks, without strong independent lower-rank organisations based directly on the proletarian masses.

(3) Innumerable scattered peasants' organisations, very frequently of a political character.

(4) An organisationally and ideologically weak Communist movement.

What basic organisational conclusions can be drawn from this situation for the benefit of the Indian Communists? They are the following:

(1) The fundamental and most important conclusion is the necessity of the ideological and especially of

the organisational consolidation of a genuine Communist Party.

(2) The necessity of work in all the mass organisations, with especial attention being directed to work in the trade unions, with a view to the capture of the trade unions and the expulsion of the present leaders, who are absolutely alien to the working class.

(3) The necessity of work for consolidating the worker-peasant parties, which evidently—just as was the Kuomintang in China in its time—are at the present moment the organisational form fitted to organise the great masses in India and to carry them into the struggle.

(4) The worker-peasant parties are not a repetition of the Kuomintang, which was organised as the political organisation of the national bourgeoisie who pretended to representation of the interests of the entire Chinese people. From their very development the worker-peasant parties of India should bear a definite class and revolutionary character. Such a class character lightens the conditions of Communist work inside them. When working inside the worker-peasant parties the Indian Communists should have in mind the following lessons of the Chinese revolution: (a) simultaneously with carrying on this work the Communists must consolidate to the utmost their own political and organisational position among the masses; (b) in no case may they cede the political and organisational independence of their own organisations; (c) they must carry on incessant work among the masses to explain that the alliance of the working class and the peasantry is stable and enduring only when it is constructed on the basis of the leading role being played by the proletariat, which role is realised through the advance-guard of the proletariat in the form of the Communist Party; (d) they must take stock of the fact that without capturing the leadership of the mass workers' movement and the trade unions, and expelling the present treacherous leaders from the latter, the influence of the Communist Party inside the worker-peasant party cannot be stable and enduring.

Worker-Peasant Parties

Finally, in regard to the worker-peasant parties it is also necessary to foresee the inevitability of dissensions and splits, deviations from the revolutionary struggle on the part of the petty bourgeoisie, together with attempts on their part to organise a "genuine" worker-peasant party which is not polluted with the Communist teachings on force, the class struggle and so on. Such schisms and splits cannot be avoided; they are in the very nature of such organisations as worker-peasant parties. It is necessary to ask what is to be done in order to ensure that these schisms and splits shall take place in a manner as innocuous as possible to the interests of the development of a successful struggle for the complete national liberation of the country. On the basis of the experience of the Chinese revolution the following measures may be regarded as calling for timely consideration:

(a) The introduction of the principles of democratic centralism into the worker-peasant parties (and into the all-India party when it is organised).

(b) The setting up of strong and independent lower organisations, systematically reporting to the directing organs of the Party.

Organisational Problems—continued

(c) Collectively elected leadership from top to bottom.

(d) The insurance that a sufficient number of dependable revolutionary proletarians, enjoying the confidence and support of the wide masses, shall be included in the composition of the governing organs.

(e) The safeguarding of adequate representation to the lower organisations at all congresses, conferences, and also at the Enlarged Plenums of the C.C. of the Party.

(f) Systematic work on the part of Communist fractions, rallying the finest elements of the worker-peasant party under the slogans of the Communist Party.

* * * * *

The Communist movement in Egypt presents a number of distinctive features. A Communist Party has now existed for several years. During the period of 1923-24 the Egyptian Communist Party had quite a marked influence among the proletarian masses and the petty town bourgeoisie and intelligentsia. A frenetic police persecution and provocateur activity, together with a weakness and lack of adaptability in the work of the leading groups, disorganised the Egyptian Communist Party to such an extent that by 1926 it no longer played any noticeable role in the political life of the country. The national movement in Egypt is represented by the Wafd and Watan parties. The Watan is a small and uninfluential, chiefly intellectual, group of a radical tendency. The Wafd is an Egyptian Kuomintang along its own lines, and still in the first stage of its development. Until recently the Wafd was the representative of the national bourgeoisie in its struggle against British domination and for the achievement of national independence. The Wafd heads the present Egypt national government, which is subservient to Britain. The upper group of the Wafd has become closely blended with the machinery of the present-day Egyptian State whilst simultaneously pursuing the compromising policy of "constitutional opposition" to British domination. The Wafd has no rank-and-file organisation. At the last elections to the Egyptian parliament in 1926 the worker and peasant masses of Egypt gave the majority of votes to the Wafd. During the last few months a new rise of the national movement is observable in Egypt. There is a growing dissatisfaction among the worker and peasant masses with the compromising policy of the leaders of the Wafd. The strikes which have recently been occurring in a number of Egyptian enterprises serve as an indication of the growth of a revolutionary mood among the Egyptian proletariat. Another indication is the fact of mass large-scale student agitations. None the less, despite this growth of a revolutionary attitude among the Egyptian proletariat, the Egyptian trade unions continue in the hands of the Wafd leaders, composed of lawyers and writers, who resort to left-wing phrases and express their "love for the workers," but actually put into practice the policy of drawing the working class away from tasks of defending their class interests, and betray those interests at times when the proletariat is making a revolutionary attack.

Assuming that the Wafd leadership does not satisfy

the masses on which the Wafd bases itself, the following possible technical lines of advance are opened up before the Egyptian Communist Party. (1) Basing themselves on the discontent of the masses, they can work for the overthrow of the present leadership of the Wafd and its reorganisation as a national revolutionary political party (an Egyptian left-Kuomintang). (2) Basing themselves on the masses, who are dissatisfied with the present Wafd leadership, they can organise a left Wafd (or in other words an Egyptian left Kuomintang) in addition to the present Wafd. However, one cannot recommend either of these courses to the Egyptian Communist Party. What is the chief obstacle at present hindering the Egyptian Communist Party from penetrating into the proletarian and peasant masses of the country? Of course police persecution plays quite an important role. But a still greater obstacle is the Wafd itself. The leaders of the Wafd are skilful demagogues, who reinforce its position by appeals to the examples of the past, when the Wafd was a more or less revolutionary force, and so blunt the critical perception of the masses, drawing off their revolutionary energy in a false direction, sowing the illusions of the possibility of a peaceful settlement of conflicts with the employers and the State, and finally, assisting the police to persecute worker-Communists and other revolutionaries. Consequently, the first task of the Egyptian Communist Party consists not in subjecting their slogans to the ideology of the Wafd, but in tearing the mask of "friendliness for the workers and implacable hostility to British imperialism" from the Wafd leadership, and in revealing their true physiognomy to all the toilers of the country. This work must be carried on side by side with the work for the consolidation of the Communist Party and for the strengthening of its links with the worker and peasant masses. The attention of the Communist Party must be turned in the first place to work inside the trade unions, for the capture of the trade unions and the expulsion of the present leaders from control of the unions. Without achieving a strong position among the working class, without capturing the trade unions, the Egyptian Communist Party will inevitably remain in the position of a small sectarian group. On the other hand, all the attempts of the weak Communist Party to set up a left Wafd in some form or other before they have forged strong links with the working class must inevitably end in the sacrifice of organisational and political independence to a lesser or greater extent, and in more or less serious opportunist errors, which would render all the further work of the Party difficult to the highest degree.

Can the Egyptian Communist Party put forward the slogan of setting up a revolutionary worker-peasant party of Egypt at the present moment? That also would be an unsound proposal. What basis would there be for such a slogan? It would be only the same attempt to set up a left Kuomintang, only under a different name. The Egyptian Communist Party must not renounce all possibility of throwing out this slogan of a worker-peasant party later on. But at the present moment the chief tasks consist in consolidating the Egyptian Communist Party on the basis of a resolute struggle with the Wafd, the capture of the trade unions, and the expulsion from the latter of the present Wafd nationalist-traitors.

Organisational Problems—continued

Turning to Turkey, here the position in regard to than it is in the case of Egypt. In Turkey the national bourgeoisie are in power, and thus carry entire responsibility for the internal regime of the country. It is true the Kemalists point to the danger of the international situation of the Turkish republic, which situation forces the Turkish Government to introduce a number of restrictions into the life of the country. But these restrictions are such that, for example, the workers are deprived of the right of forming trade unions, and the right to strike, they do not possess their own press, and the Turkish Communist Party is subjected to harsh repression. From the viewpoint of the international dangers threatening Turkey from the imperialist States, the Turkish Government must carry on a ruthless struggle against the vestiges of the old regime which still remain in the country, and which continue their attempts at a restoration of the former Ottoman Empire. But when these arguments are applied against the working class and its organisations the class interests of the national bourgeoisie are displayed quite openly behind these arguments. Under present conditions it is quite obvious that there can be no kind of national revolutionary party of the type of a left Kuomintang, or a worker-peasant party and similar organisations in Turkey.

The case of modern Turkey provides certain supplementary arguments in relation to the Egyptian question: the Wafd as the government of an independent Egypt would merely be an Egyptian edition of Kemalism.

As in the case of the Egyptian Communist Party, the most important immediate tasks facing the Communist Party of Turkey are the unmasking of Kemalism, together with a simultaneous consolidation of its own organisations and the maximum attention to work in trade unions.

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The situation arising in Indonesia after the last

revolt is not sufficiently clear. The following points can however be definitely established.

(1) The view held by the C.P. of Indonesia, that it was not necessary to work inside Sarekat-Islam for the revolutionising of those large masses of workers and peasants which have continued to follow that organisation right down to the present time, was an erroneous one.

(2) The view of the C.C. of the Indonesian Communist Party which consisted in regarding the Sarekat Rajat as a section of the Communist Party was an erroneous one. The Sarekat Rajat should have been constructed on the pattern of the worker-peasant parties, with collective and individual membership, and strong Communist fractions inside it.

(3) The chief tasks of the Indonesian comrades at the present time are: (a) the restoration of the Party, which has been shattered by the Dutch; (b) the restoration of the trade unions and work within them; (c) the rallying of the existing national revolutionary groupings around a definite programme of action, and the achievement of a single national revolutionary front. In the process of thus gathering the national revolutionary forces together it would appear to be sound for the Party to raise the question of the restoration of Sarekat-Rajat, at the same time taking into account its former mistakes in regard to the Sarekat-Rajat and the international experience in regard to a left Kuomintang and worker-peasant parties.

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In the Arabian countries we have a quite distinctive national revolutionary organisation, "Istiklal" (Independence). "Istiklal" is active in the territory of a number of Arabian States, and mainly in Syria and Palestine. It has connections with the Sudan, Egypt, the Hedjaz, the Indian Moslems, etc. It is a sternly secret upper organisation of a strictly conspiratorial type, having as its task the waging of the struggle against the imperialist oppressors of the Arabian peoples. In particular, the active members of "Istiklal" have participated in the Syrian insurrection. "Istiklal" has no

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Organisational Problems—continued

definite political programme. The Comintern has more than once considered its attitude towards "Istiklal." It is obvious that Communist Parties can have only separate militant agreements from time to time with a conspiratorial revolutionary organisation, but cannot go farther, and cannot work with such organisations in a united front. Before it is possible to have a united front with "Istiklal" the latter must be reorganised as a mass national revolutionary organisation. This is the direction in which Communists and sympathisers who have contact with "Istiklal" should work.

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The national revolutionary parties of Outer Mongolia and Tuva are governmental parties in their States. They are built on the principle of the Communist Party and maintain a close contact with the Comintern; in their internal work the national revolutionary parties of these republics are guided by the directives of the Comintern. Under such conditions the question of establishing Communist Parties in Mongolia and Tuva side by side with the national revolutionary parties did not arise until quite recently. But serious changes are to be observed in the life of Mongolia and Tuva of recent months. There is a growth in the national bourgeois elements for whom the directives and the political line laid down by the Comintern obviously are unacceptable. The defeat of the Chinese revolution has stimulated the appetites of the

Chinese militarists, the Japanese imperialists and the other reactionary depredators of the Far East. These are all seeking an alliance with the elements of the national bourgeoisie and the survivors of the feudal and theocratic past, and together with them are carrying on activities for the disintegration of the national revolutionary party. In such a situation the question naturally arises of the organisational consolidation inside the national revolutionary party of the left revolutionary elements, and, in the first place, of the Communist elements, in order to guarantee a more resolute ideological and organisational resistance to the menacing reaction. This consolidation is also dictated in the interests of the further extension of the conquests of the national revolution in the Mongolian and Tuva republics.

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Thus the chief general organisational tasks of the Communist Parties of Eastern countries are :

- (1) The consolidation of the central, and particularly the lower organisations. The creation of independent local organisations and factory nuclei in the largest enterprises of the more important spheres of industry.
- (2) The establishment of a proletarian leading group, both for work in the Party machinery, and for directing work in the trade union and peasant organisations.
- (3) The maximum intensification of the work of the fractions in the trade union and peasant organisations.

Some Remarks on the Draft Programme of the C.I.

Yablonski

THE monumental declaration of the principles of Marxism-Leninism contained in the Draft Programme of the C.I., which has been submitted by the Programme Commission, may be considered from two angles. The document could be examined as a whole, synthetically, having regard to its fundamental thoughts, principles and ideas, or, analytically, by a microscopic scrutiny of the composition of each theme. In our opinion the second method is the only one from the Communist point of view, for we can have no critical views on the basic content of the Draft Programme, nor consider the rejection of even one of the basic thoughts about which there can hardly be any difference of opinion amongst Communists. Here it is rather a question of making certain additions, more definite formulations, and corrections in the sequence of thought and expressions. It is quite possible that these analytical remarks may assume the dimensions of a commentary rather than that of a critical examination and improvement of the Draft. But in any event it will provide an opportunity to ascertain the existing flaws and omissions, and to make a certain study of the train of thought, and at the same time to make a few corrections in style. We shall proceed on the lines of the social economic basis of the Draft, its historic origin and conclusion, the

analysis of capitalism-imperialism on the one hand, and the Communist social order on the other.

Section 1 of the Draft Programme brings us immediately to the theoretical examination of capitalist development and the essence of imperialism. It fulfils the task of providing a fundamental characteristic of capitalism and crystallises the tendencies of its transition to imperialism, its last specific form. As regards the analysis of capitalism it might be well to stress more sharply the basic contradiction in capitalist production, the contrast, which is continuously increasing, between the unlimited capacity for growth of capitalist production and the continual diminution of the basis of consumption; then from here only should the disproportion between the various branches of production be deduced, and followed by a description of the conditions of industry and agriculture under capitalism, with special stress on the continuous exploitation of the country by the town. We attach exceptional significance to the detailed, theoretical exposition in the Programme of the transition from the capitalism of free competition to monopoly capitalism. The dialectic dual nature of this transition is of special importance. On the one hand there is concentration from which monopoly develops ("concentration leads to monopoly" is a phrase which Lenin often

The Draft Programme—continued

repeated), on the one hand the epoch of monopoly capital is divided in its essence from the preceding epoch of free competition, and hence the structure of the new concentration differs entirely in its development from that of the pre-monopolist epoch. Special attention to the "dual nature" of the transition will give us the correct basis for a proper estimation of Luxemburgism, which is a task not to be overlooked in the Programme. The specific form of concentration under imperialism, its monopoly form, which tends towards its highest form of structural expression in trustification, also leads to the new, specifically imperialist forms of the organisation "of world economy on the basis of comprehensive monopoly: the monopoly of the process of production, markets, sources of raw materials, the monopolisation of the colonies, etc. Capitalism in the stage of free competition to a large extent, effects the creation of a uniform world market, by incorporating all pre-capitalist economic forms in the sphere of the circulation of capitalism, whilst imperialism carries this process "to its conclusion" by substituting for the "free world market" its principle of monopolist control, dividing the world market into spheres of influence, into monopolist colonies, in short it accomplishes the "final" division of the world; in so doing, however, it brings out the difference between the tendency to create a uniform world market and a uniform world economy based on the division of labour, and the tendency of the individual States to disintegration and autarchy. The Programme by referring only to the "internationalisation of economic life," makes no mention of the contrary imperialist development and consequently omits the reason why the "final division" of the world must of necessity act as a continual incentive to its re-division, and the law of the unequal tempo of the development of imperialism obtains a new form and a special significance.

We consider it necessary in this connection that the question of the unequal tempo of development be dealt with at the same time as the question of equalising the productive capacity and the kind of production in the most advanced imperialist countries. This equalising the kind of production also involves the tendency to break the natural barriers of production by the artificial manufacture of all the most important raw materials and through the technical process of rationalisation generally, and also the metamorphosis of the home market into an object for the exclusive exploitation of the native bourgeoisie and the struggle for a monopoly of the sources of raw material in general. It is clear that this tendency coincides with the tendency to autarchy and is of special importance for war-time and the organisational activities of State-capitalism in the individual imperialist countries.

In the estimation of the export of capital we think it advisable that the Draft Programme should not only refer to the fact that the export of capital "is becoming the decisive and specific form of economic contact between the various parts of world capitalist economy"; but should also stress the fact that the export of capital is the lever which continually upsets the existing state of equilibrium of the capitalist world order, that thereby the unequal tempo of development is brought about which is finally (during imperialist wars) destined to

lead to the dismemberment of the world economic bonds. These additions to the train of thought developed in the Draft Programme are necessary because they demonstrate the complete dialectic development of the Leninist conception of imperialism.

Furthermore, it would help to expound with adequate clarity the reason why the organisation of economy on an international scale cannot be accomplished by imperialism since the tendency of imperialism to create a uniform "centre of world production" (for the production of profit and the production of proletarians and colonial slaves) is doomed to failure because of its capitalist-monopoly nature (regardless of whether it is private or State monopoly). It is not the impossibility of the realisation of surplus value, as Luxemburgism claims, but the impossible of organising uniform world economy, i.e., the solution of the basic contradictions between the productive forces and conditions of production on a world scale, that must needs bring about the collapse of capitalism. It is a question whether we may speak here of the tendency to create a uniform State-capitalist world trust. We consider the formulation of the Draft Programme too categorical in this instance. In our opinion imperialism will at best succeed in forming several international trusts, cartels, etc., that these formations will by their very nature remain polarised, and therefore since they must form the basis of our polemic against ultra-imperialism, they will not show a tendency to overcome the polarisation of the contradiction, but the tendency to perpetuate this contradiction. The constant decay of these international monopoly combines, —which hardly attain "uniformity" in one branch of industry, not to mention in the multifarious branches of industry and "subdivision" of capitalist production—also points to this development. This phenomenon of specific expression provides the law of the uneven development of capitalism. In our opinion these additions to the programme should serve to complete the polemic against ultra-imperialism.

Section 2: "The General Crisis of Capitalism: The First Phase of World Revolution," tends to be more in the nature of a description of the development of the world revolution since the October revolution and after the termination of the world war. It would seem that in this section the theoretical part is sacrificed to the purely historical. It is true there are special difficulties to be encountered in the theoretical compendium of the development of the problem of post-war imperialism, which coincides with the epoch of the proletarian revolution, since only the most essential facts should be dealt with from amongst the historical course of events, and the episodic, relating to individual countries and specific historic situations, should not be generalised and included in the Programme. Nevertheless, it is necessary to analyse typical phenomena of this post-war period of imperialism, because this is the only way to make a theoretical exposition of the specific tendencies of the pending phase of the struggle between the world proletariat and world bourgeoisie, and simultaneously also, of the tasks of the Communist Parties. In this connection it is important to mention in the Programme the general events in the development of the epoch of the social revolution, the stage of the immediate revolutionary situation in the individual countries, or, in a general way, the stage "Between two Waves of the

The Draft Programme—continued

Revolution," the "historic position" of relative stabilisation and the essential connection between revolution and national wars, etc. Although these questions receive a general formulation later on in the text (see Section IV.) yet it is necessary to give a theoretical exposition and a general analysis of the general capitalist crisis and of the first phase of the world revolution. On the one hand this is essential for the rejection of the reformist principle that the world revolution is buried, and on the other, to establish clarity as to tactics in our own ranks, where frequently it is impossible to ascertain any deep theoretical conception of the stage of relative stabilisation as a transition stage between two revolutionary waves, and where the period of post-war imperialism and the stage of relative stabilisation are often grotesquely confused. For this reason it is of the utmost importance to make an analysis in the Programme of the specific traits of the first revolutionary wave up to 1923 and also of the special characteristics of relative stabilisation. To give the empiric analysis a theoretical formulation, the Programme should concentrate in a systematic manner on questions bearing on the technical-economic transformation of the capitalist process of production (rationalisation, use of raw materials, sources of power, etc.), the permanent army of unemployed, the development of new industrial countries, the transfer of the main economic-political centre from Europe to America, the new form of capital export, the new situation as regards general political relations, as well as the class struggle on a world scale, etc. On this social-economic background a further analysis of the problems of Reformism and Fascism would be opportune.

The question of the relation of the Fascist movement to the imperialist State is a question of considerable theoretical importance. Perhaps it should be stated expressly that Fascism, as Marx already showed, is the tendency, characteristic of the agony of the bourgeois State, of the complete domination of the executive power over parliamentary, law-giving powers and accordingly carries the separation of the powers "to the very end." In this manner what Marx said about the path and tasks of the revolution in regard to the bourgeois State and the separation of the powers may be applied to Fascism. Henceforth, the revolution carries the executive power to the end, reduces it to its purest expression, isolates it, opposes it as the only obstacle in order to concentrate all the forces of destruction against it. (Marx.) This relation of Fascism to the bourgeois State raises the following important deduction: During the decisive attack by the proletariat on the bourgeois State, the bourgeoisie can only keep in power by the aid of Fascism, even the whole development of Reformism tends towards Fascism according to the stage of the proletarian revolution (Noske, Vehme, etc.). This however shows that both Fascism and Reformism, which the bourgeoisie use in turn in the struggle against the proletariat, do not merely announce the general crisis of capitalism and simultaneously slacken the pace of the advancing revolutionary movement, but bring the proletariat face to face with the real historical task of concentrating all its forces against the bourgeoisie. We consider this addition necessary in this section of the programme, because, here the connection between the historical aspect of the problem and the solution of this

problem is clearly demonstrated in a dialectic manner; the methods of struggle employed by the bourgeoisie render the struggle more difficult, but make the final aim of the struggle stand out all the more clearly.

The first section of the Draft Programme systematically states the problems of the historic origin of the proletarian class struggle and the actual premises for the liberation of the proletariat during the imperialist epoch; the third section deals with the ultimate aims of the proletarian revolution: the development of world Communism. The sequence of the exposition in the Draft Programme contains a certain contradiction, for it is not advisable to begin with the second phase, world Communism, and then by way of appendix to deal with the problems of Socialism. This is responsible for both stages not being kept absolutely apart in their actual content, so that their dominant characteristics are intermingled, whilst the first stage of Socialism suffers thereby. We, therefore, propose that the exposition in the Draft Programme, as done by Marx and Lenin, should begin with the "earlier" and avoid the danger of mixing the "earlier" with the "later" stages. The analysis of the development of socialism should not overlook the important question of the decay of democracy, the transformation of the political State into the "unpolitical" (Engels and Lenin)—government over persons is succeeded by the rule of things and the leadership of the processes of production. The public functions of the unpolitical State become purely managerial functions. It is clear that this exposition of socialism as the first stage of Communist society must be linked up directly in the Programme with the idea of the abolition of classes and of private property of the means of production, with the principle of distribution "from each according to his abilities. . . . etc." It is evident that the statement that work is a matter of vital importance does not belong in this chapter, but comes under real "Communism," and there is should be put forward in conjunction with the all-round development of men into a complete individual, and also with the solution of the bourgeois-ideological contradiction between individual and society.

The same minute attention must be given to exact formulations in the development of the train of thought in this section of the Draft Programme as to the mode of expression. As an example of a lapse in style we draw attention to the formulation in connection with the role of Communist society: "simultaneously with the abolition of anarchy in production it will abolish social anarchy." There would be more justification in maintaining, that Communist society realises social anarchy, because the conception and term anarchy has a special meaning in this connection, which is important in polemics against reformists and anarchists.

These few remarks on the Draft Programme may possess a certain significance, but they should on no account be regarded as derogatory to its real value, its historic importance as the programme of the principles of Communism. Marx says in speaking of the importance of the programme of principles, that the heights of the real Party movement are lacking in such programmes: present and future history will measure the heights of the Communist International by the actual, realised programme, which will be worthy of the great historical tasks to be accomplished.

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