



THE CLASS STRUGGLE

Devoted to International Socialism

Vol. I

SEPTEMBER—OCTOBER, 1917

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Vol. I SEPTEMBER—OCTOBER, 1917 No. 3

THE NEW LABOR MOVEMENT OF THE WEST

By AUSTIN LEWIS

Wider and more deep grows the industrial agitation in the Far West, bringing into its scope forces which have hitherto been recognized as outside of the pale of organization, and welding the masses of labor into a unified and coherent body. The Industrial Workers of the World, formerly a mere outlaw organization, looked at with contempt by large numbers of members of the American Federation of Labor, "regular" union men, is now in possession in more than one place of an industrial power which will render its future much more secure. With a curious sort of fatuousness the government and the various state officials have advertised this movement as pro-German and anti-war, and have stated that its funds came from German sources, an accusation which they have been obliged publicly to withdraw and have thereby increased both the publicity and the standing of the Industrial Workers. The organizer of one of these unions in a district where hitherto its activities had not been remarkable informed me that their membership had increased sevenfold within a few months as the result of the advertising and the agitation directed against them.

A concrete example of its progress I found in the City of Portland, where the organization had long had a hard fight to maintain itself. To my astonishment I saw an entirely different condition of things than ever before in such a headquarters.

There was a great hall capable of holding a thousand people comfortably. At one end of the hall was a rail and counter which separated the office from the hall, and in the office were seven desks, each of which represented a separate industrial union—construction workers, agricultural workers, and so on. The office was well equipped with files and typewriters. Each desk was occupied by a secretary and the work was going on as smoothly and as efficiently as in any corporation office which I ever visited. It was very evident that a complete change had come over the spirit of the group. The organization which I was observing could hardly be identified with its migratory parent which so few years ago had had the same name. This organization now is composed of men who are actually functioning in industry. They are, as the phrase runs, "on the job," they are workmen, not out of work, but practically engaged in industrial labor. And in that fact lies the secret of the recent conflicts throughout the West. Vast masses are feeling the urge of the new idea. The rise in prices, the shutting down of immigration, the fact that for once the job is hunting the man, have put new energy into that portion of the working class which had formerly little hope and has aroused the aspiration that was formerly crushed under the load of unavoidable and hopeless misery. What was happening at Portland was merely typical. As one of the organizers in that city remarked to me, "If you think this is anything you should see Seattle."

The spirit goes down to the very depths, that is the joy and the hope of it. It is concurrent not only with a demand for higher wages but with demands also for conditions—for better working conditions, for more human satisfaction, and, in a rudimentary form but still vitally there, for shop control and actual dictation of the conditions under which the worker will consent to labor. The cannery workers in California have shown ability to strike and to maintain their demands. The cannery workers! They have actually compelled the appointment of a state committee and have had highly respectable gentlemen before them, pleading almost with tears in their eyes that these nomads, these despised and most contemptible workers up to the present time, may allow the fruit crop of the Golden State to be preserved. If I could

only show you what is involved in a successful movement of the cannery workers and the apparent ludicrousness of the idea that cannery workers could ever have organized and ever have gained the ear of authority you would be able to gain some slight grasp of the scope and possibilities of this new Western labor movement. But I could not; you would have to live here for some years before you could appreciate. Four years ago the first clash came between the hop-pickers and the employers, and a district attorney and a deputy sheriff fell on the field as well as several workers. To-day Ford and Suhr are in jail under life sentences, but the hop-pickers have only to make demands to have them granted, and all through the hopfields the conditions have greatly improved. So that even at the remote extremity of labor organization, such as that of the migratory workers of the harvest fields and canneries, the impetus is felt. Labor is lifting its head and the conflict is proceeding. Its progress is evidenced by the opposition it is meeting and its security is testified to by the fact that in every case of conflict, the other side has been forced to the performance of illegal acts. The enemy is no longer as strong as formerly. Owing to the increasing development of the industrial power of the organization the ordinary legal process cannot so well be trusted and so the capitalist and employing groups are driven more and more to the employment of hired irregular mercenaries as they feel the actual power slipping from their fingers.

In the town from which I write there was an attack made on the I. W. W. headquarters a week or two ago. The furniture was stacked up in the street and burned and the military mob which did the trick was undoubtedly urged on to the task by interests in this community which are counter to that of the industrial unions. But there had been no industrial strife worth while here to provoke the act. The young artillerymen who carried their instructions were probably members of a company which had been organized by a former chief of police. They had no public approval such as had marked the San Diego and Fresno fights. They burned the property, the State will have to pay for it. The Colonel came over at the government's request and took an inventory. And so the matter rests, with a disgusted populace

and an I. W. W. which has gained immeasurably in the public estimation as a result. This is cited because as a single isolated instance it contains all the elements of the present situation throughout the entire West. The stars in their courses appear to fight for the organization and every act adverse to it so far appears to react in its favor.

In a short article it is quite impossible to give anything like a detailed account of the activities on the Pacific Coast; neither can it be attempted. The main facts in the individual conflicts must be sought elsewhere. Here it is only possible to point to the general tendencies which the facts appear to illustrate.

A few weeks ago I was in the district of the lumber strike. This is a matter of great importance to the government as there are certain woods which must be had for the making of aeroplanes. As one of the organizers remarked, the government will be in a difficult position unless terms are made with the workers, for they certainly cannot get the larch while the men are on strike and if they are driven back to work, well, perhaps the larch might not be adaptable to the government purposes. There may be different views as to the reason of the success of the strike so far. I have heard it said that the lumber owners are not averse to the strike as they have stocks on hand and are anxious to keep up prices. But the fact is that there were about fifty-five thousand workers out in the State of Washington, that the lumber industry was working only to about fifteen per cent. of its normal capacity, and that the whole strike was carried on with a discipline and a good order very ominous indeed for the capitalist and employing element. The demands were for an eight-hour day and for certain conditions which appear to include bedrooms with a limited number of beds instead of the dirty, lousy bunks which were formerly supplied. The lumber worker wishes to stop being a migratory with a pack on his back. Shower baths are also demanded as well as decent tables where food can be put on properly instead of presented in the disgusting and savage manner in which the worker is to-day fed.

These demands are unquestionably approved by large numbers of people outside the organization and in the States where woman suffrage prevails acquire a great deal of feminine support. The

notable thing is that the I. W. W. has control in a number of the lumber camps closely approximating to that which the Western Federation of Miners used to exercise. The strike has produced much ability and has been conducted admirably from every point of view as far as appears to an outsider who has had, however, some experience in such matters. What is going to happen? Are the lumber employers going to yield to the I. W. W. and thus admit a defeat in a great industrial conflict? Are they going to treat with the I. W. W., hold conferences and arrive at decisions? If so, the result will be incalculable; the effect upon the whole of the Western labor field will be the most stupendous in the history of modern labor. It will mean no less than the substitution of the syndicalist conception for that of the old trade unions, a complete revolution in working class thought. And suppose the employers do not come to terms, what is to happen? The lumber industry is so vital that the government may, in default of the ability of the present proprietors to settle things, take it over into its own hands. I discussed this matter with strike leaders. The reply was illuminating. The government may take it over, and we should be quite as willing to work for the government as for any other employer, but government or no government we must have our terms or we do not work.

In the lumber districts, owing to the remoteness of the camps and the general conditions, the employers would find it much more difficult to employ those irregular forces of gunmen and provocateurs which they have used in other industries. So far the conditions have been peaceable and the strike, considering its size, the immense amount of territory which it covers, and its duration, has been almost a model.

An examination of the other strikes where violence has been more obvious and where the industrial overlords have resorted to the use of their condottieri shows the same undercurrent, the same general trend. Take Butte, for example, where Frank Little was hanged and the industrial Bashi Bazouks put themselves on record. The older trade unionism had failed, the new industrial unionism was trying to make headway, and the extent to which it was progressing is evidenced by the revenge which the enemy took. It was a cheap revenge and as futile as it was cheap, one

that is bound to react against them in the long run and which has already had the effect of immensely stimulating and increasing the tendency toward the new organization. As far as provoking the workers to resistance of a nature which would lead them to the employment of weapons, the use of which would certainly react upon themselves, the tactics of the employers have failed completely and the reaction against such methods is already finding an expression in the official class itself. This has been made very apparent in the recent car strike in San Francisco. The Chamber of Commerce through its president sent a letter to the Mayor complaining that the law was not upheld by the police force and that the Mayor was not taking proper methods to put down violence in connection with the running of the company cars. To which the Mayor replied in part (and I make no hesitation in quoting so much as it is so significant and will probably not find its way to the Eastern capitalist press):

"Doubtless you are disappointed because the police have not yet turned their machine-guns on crowds in our streets and killed a few dozen strikers, including the customary number of innocent bystanders; but with all respect for your opinion, I think the police do well to keep law and order as far as they have done but without any quick or wanton slaughter of the people. Violent and bloody repression has never maintained law and order so effectually as firmness coupled with moderation and common sense.

"It is unfortunate that so many persons of your type in this country are so incurably stupid about business and industry, the very matters in which you are most concerned and in respect to which you deem yourself most enlightened. The world is changing all around you, and you and your kind do not know it any more than the Czar knew what was happening to him and Russia until it was all over. You still believe in Napoleon's whiff of grapeshot. You still think that industrial discontent can be quelled by the policeman's club. Happily, the rest of us do not need to take you or your law and order committee as seriously as you take yourselves."

The hanging of Frank Little can have no detrimental effect

upon the movement as a whole, and none but a set of besotted idiots in a corporation owned community would ever imagine that a mere lynching could have any preventive influence upon the growth of an industrial movement. The one great danger that it might have provoked a similar kind of reprisal is now past, and there seems every reason to believe that the storm-tossed and tragic labor movement of Butte, with all its grim history and violent hysterias, will at last find itself at one with the new and rational syndicalistic trend.

Bisbee marks another step in the same course. In Bisbee the movement of the irregular forces of capitalism and the industrial overlords has been more dramatic and has received greater public attention than elsewhere. That is because their operations were carried out on a larger scale and the violations of the ordinary conventions of a legal society were more strongly marked than in other less favored places. It is given to few industrial masters to be able to get the command of irregular and illegal forces to the same extent as the corporation did in Bisbee and it must be candidly admitted that they took full advantage of their opportunities. They succeeded in deporting by main force twelve hundred and sixty-four men, separating them from their families, invading their houses, robbing their families, insulting their wives and in short behaving precisely like an irregular Turkish cavalry regiment in an Armenian villayet, with the one exception that they were not plucky enough to murder. These irregular levies of the industrial overlords cannot murder in the plain light of day to be really effective; they must deal with a lame man in the dead of night and be carefully and securely masked. The Sheriff, Harry Wheeler, openly took part in the lawless and indecent exhibition and the tacit approval of the Governor appears to have been bestowed upon it. But it was an irregular and extra-legal movement; the industrial masters do not appear to have been able to rely on their legal and political henchmen, and so far in Bisbee, as in all other places to which attention has been called, the deterioration of the industrial masters appears to be manifest. They are going to pieces in face of the new industrial movement and the economic changes which are undermining their position. They will be fighting with their backs to the wall ere long. What

did they do? The facts are perhaps most concisely stated in the following words:

"Into houses they went, into bedrooms. They dragged men out, many from wives and children, many half dressed and some in pajamas. If a wife protested or asked to be allowed to say farewell, she was struck across the face and insulted. If the man protested, which very few did, he was knocked on the head with the butt of a rifle and marched bleeding down the street. Some were found on streets, others in rooming houses, others in houses they had purchased with their savings. If a gunman was in doubt he took his man. If he met a man he owed a grudge, he took him, striker or not; it made no difference. Several houses were robbed by these gunmen. In some cases money was taken. Gunmen returned later here and there to intimidate wives of the victims of mine oppression. Many families deprived of their husbands and fathers were left practically destitute."

And in this matter the attitude of the strikers was again beyond all praise. They preserved a calm demeanor in the face of the insults and the violence. One movement and they might have precipitated a massacre. They refrained from any demonstration and in their prison camp on the desert have been models of propriety and self-restraint.

The antecedent conditions in Butte have found a counterpart in those of Bisbee as in the lumber camps. In all three cases former labor organizations had failed to do the work and the coming in of the I. W. W. was greeted by a proportion of the workers sufficient at all events to put the organization on its feet and to give it the immediate control. In all three cases the question of wages has been made somewhat subsidiary to those of hours and the camp conditions and working conditions have been more to the fore. Thus in Bisbee the miners demanded that the physical examination should be abolished. They claimed that the examination was used by the company doctors to discriminate against men who were supposed to have union leanings and whom they would disqualify from work by making an adverse physical report. They wished to confine two men to a machine. In this matter they take the same ground as the British

machinists in their disputes with the government over the making of munitions and it is evidently an effort to prevent "dilution" by means of unskilled or semi-skilled labor. They insisted that two men should work together on all "raises," meaning thereby "dangerous declivities where there is abundance of gas." This would seem to be a very reasonable provision for it is obvious that a man alone in a state of semi-asphyxiation would have very small chance to save himself. They also required that there should be no blasting during the shift, which is obviously an elementary precautionary measure. The requirement that there should be no discrimination against organization members is the usual stipulation of trade unions. It is really only noticeable from the fact that it seems obvious that the strikers had no idea that they could control the work and make a closed shop of it. As for wages they demand six dollars a day flat for work underground and five and a half for work at the surface. These wages appear large and have been made the basis of much comment, but under the circumstances they are very reasonable. When the nature of the work is considered and the rate of profits, and the further fact that the wages have always been calculated on a sliding scale proportionate to the price of copper, which price was actually set by the employing corporation, the demand appears to be even extraordinarily conservative.

The purely agricultural unions in the Far West are yet to be heard from. Reports constantly come in of their activities and prophecies of a general rising are rife. So far, however, there has been nothing of great importance. A strike was called, so we are informed, of agricultural workers in the states of Washington, Utah, Idaho and Oregon. According to the reports in the ordinary daily papers, the call was unsuccessful and the strike did not materialize. How far these reports are true does not at the present appear. It seems to be probable that there was no immediate dramatic response to the strike call though there is no doubt that the very threat of the strike will have tended much to improve conditions and to increase the power of the organization in rural communities. Speaking of this part of the world, California, while we have had no great demonstration on the part of organized labor in the agricultural industry,

there has been a constant insistence by the laborers upon conditions, which has very materially improved the status of the worker on the farm. Here and there small groups have been claiming better pay and more human conditions of labor and notch by notch the standard is being raised. It takes much time and patience to accumulate the force necessary to precipitate a strike in the agricultural districts where the work is so scattered and small groups are engaged in the struggle. But the experience of the Middle West last year shows very conclusively that it can be done and there is no doubt that every year will see a broadening of the fighting forces of industrial unionism until they embrace an effective agricultural workers' movement. Indeed, on all grounds, except the most narrow and selfish individualism, it is eminently necessary for the community itself that this should happen.

To sum up, then, the Industrial Workers' movement is marked by a tendency to improve the status of the workers and to seek something more than a mere economic recompense in the shape of wages. It has, however, not yet reached the stage of seeking to make itself a fundamental factor in the conduct and administration of industry. It seems to be on the verge of establishing itself as the dominant labor factor in certain industries and has unquestionably improved its position greatly in the last few months.

Socialist Terms of Peace

By LOUIS B. BOUDIN

Owing to the great confusion attendant upon current discussion of Socialist Terms of Peace, due to the general confusion in the theory and practice of the Socialist movement brought about by the war, any such discussion, in order to be profitable, must begin with a statement of fundamentals.

What are the fundamentals of the Socialist position on peace and war?

To begin with, Socialists are not pacifists pure-and-simple. They do not adhere to the Tolstoyan doctrine of not resisting evil by force. The Socialists are quite ready to resort to force—which includes bloodshed—whenever that becomes necessary and expedient for the attainment of their objects. And that applies not only to the class struggle, but also to that struggle commonly called war.

Socialists are not bloodthirsty, and the most revolutionary among them shrink more from the shedding of blood than those members of our society who adhere to more "conservative" views. But they recognize that in a society founded on force, force may be a revolutionary factor as well as a conservative or reactionary one. The question whether or not force should be used at any time and for any purpose is, therefore, to the Socialist, always a question of expediency: that is, whether or not the use of force is likely to attain the object sought to be attained, and whether or not the object sought to be attained is worth the cost in human suffering which the use of force is likely to entail. War is, therefore, from the Socialist point of view, not objectionable merely because of the suffering which it entails, except in so far as this suffering is useless—that is, expended for an object for which the Socialist does not care or which he does not consider worth the price in human suffering which war entails.

In other words, it is always a question of the nature and character of the war; the aims and objects for which it is fought,

and the results which are likely to follow in its wake. Our Civil War was a proper war on the part of the North, and worth all the sacrifices which it entailed—although all that the South asked was “to be let alone” and “freedom from interference in her domestic affairs.” Karl Marx was therefore one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the North during that war, and his services were highly appreciated by Lincoln. The Spanish-American war was not such a war on the part of America, and the followers of Marx in this country therefore refused to support the Government in that war. It is not a question whether the war is fought in the immediate interest of the working class, for our Civil War was fought in the interest of the capitalist development of this country—in the immediate interest of the capitalist class. Nor is it a question whether the ostensible, or even real object of the war is to free somebody, for the ostensible object of the Spanish-American war was to free Cuba, and Cuba *was* freed after a fashion. The real question is the ultimate interest of the working class, which is the interest of the world at large; and must therefore be approached not from a local but a world-wide point of view.

It follows that Socialists are not peace-at-any-price men. Peace at any price is merely the reverse side of the medal on the obverse side of which is written: “no resistance.” If we are ready to resist evil, we naturally must fight until evil has been successfully resisted; except, of course, when we own ourselves defeated either because resistance is impossible or the cost of resistance too prohibitive to make it worth while, which makes the question of terms a question of expediency. Not being non-resistant pacifists, the Socialists do not consider the mere cessation of bloodshed such an overtowering boon as to make them ready to purchase it at any cost whatever.

In the manifesto issued by the radical Russian Socialists led by Martof and Axelrod shortly after the Russian Revolution they indignantly repudiated any suspicion that they were in favor of a separate peace between Russia and Germany. And when Morris Hillquit, International Secretary of the Socialist Party of this country, was, shortly thereafter, suspected of favoring

such separate peace he issued a similar denial, stating that he did not know of a single Socialist of any importance in this country who favored such a peace. The radical Socialists of Germany have always opposed the efforts of the German Government to obtain a separate peace with Russia, and even the “majority” Socialists have been forced by Socialist public opinion to declare against a separate peace. But why should Socialists be opposed to the cessation of bloodshed at least on part of the European battlefield? Why shouldn't they favor the restoration of peace between Russia on the one hand and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, on the other, which would reduce the war-area by about one-half? Why should Socialists who are opposed “to all war” insist on Russia continuing the war, and treat the suspicion that they are trying to reduce the war-area and “localize” the war as an insult and an aspersion on their Socialist honor?

The answer is: Because being opposed to all war does not imply indifference to the manner in which this war or any other war may terminate. We are in favor of peace only if we can have it upon our own terms. And since a separate peace between Russia and Germany is bound to react unfavorably on the chances of the present war terminating in the manner in which we want it to terminate, and peace concluded upon terms satisfactory to us, we are opposed to such separate peace. In other words: *We are willing to fight for what we consider proper terms of peace.* This makes a discussion of what are proper terms of peace for Socialists to advocate and demand a matter of the very greatest importance. Unfortunately, this phase of the peace agitation is being entirely neglected by the Socialists of this country.

This may startle some of our readers: For, haven't we got the “Socialist” peace-formula announced by the Russian Revolutionary Government?

To which, in reply: The Russian formula is not a statement of terms of peace, and was not intended to be such. Its primary object was to announce the leading principles upon which the

Russian Revolution was willing to construct its peace-program; and its real significance lay in the act of renunciation which it contained—the renunciation by Russia of any designs of conquest, and particularly the waiver of its claim to Constantinople. The principles thus announced by the Russian Revolutionary Government are of universal application; and if adopted by all belligerents and honestly adhered to would make the conclusion of peace much more easy than it is at present. But they certainly are not a peace *program*. For that purpose the Russian formula is neither definite enough in formulation—nor adequate in scope. And the principles therein contained will very often be found to clash with each other in application.

Take the first principle of the Russian peace-formula: "No Annexations." Just what does that mean? Supposing all belligerents were to adopt this principle, would that settle the question of Alsace-Lorraine, which must be settled in the terms of peace? Evidently not. Take, then, the next principle of the formula: "No indemnities." Just what does *that* mean? Will Germany have to make good the damage to Belgium if that principle is adopted, or will she not?

Nor are we helped much by the "amended" formulation of these principles: "forcible annexations" is, if anything, less clear than just "annexations"; and "punitive indemnities" is certainly less definite than mere "indemnities." Suppose this principle were adopted by all the belligerents, what of the damage done by Germany in Northern France? Would Germany have to "learn to say restoration," or would she not? The German "majority" Socialists who are supposed to have accepted the Russian peace-formula evidently think she would not, but our "restorationists" would certainly be justified in claiming that they accepted the principle in reliance on the well-settled legal distinction between actual damages and "punitive damages."

And how about the German colonies? Evidently no statement of peace terms is adequate that does not cover this subject. And the Russian formula doesn't. It is not covered by the "no forcible annexations" formula, for the African natives surely care little

whether they "belong" to the German or British Empire. And it is safe to say that the Russian revolutionary Socialists would not adopt a peace-principle which would raise the return of colonies to their original "allegiance" to the dignity of a Socialist peace-demand. The Socialists of all countries have always opposed the acquisition of colonies by their governments, and it would be utterly absurd to make such "restoration" a Socialist peace demand. Such a policy would be simply monstrous: It would, for instance, require the Socialists of this country to support the government in the event of a war with Japan over the possession of the Philippines.

But there they are the German colonies; conquered by Great Britain, and the German "majority" Socialists say that they must be "restored" before peace can be concluded. We must therefore take definite position in the matter. We cannot evade responsibility by merely shouting "No Annexations."

The same ambiguities and uncertainties are latent in the third term of the Russian peace-formula: The right of all nationalities to determine their own fate. As a principle there is certainly no fault to be found with it. Nor yet as *Russian* peace-term. It was intended to announce to the world that the Russian people, as represented by the Russian Revolutionary Government, are ready to give to the people of Russian Poland absolute freedom to determine their own destiny. But as a *general* peace-term it is clearly too indefinite to be of any use: Does it mean that German and Austrian Poles should also have the right to determine their own destiny, or only the Russian Poles? Does it mean that the Bohemians, South-Slavs, Roumanians, and the other nationalities living within the confines of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and clamoring for independence or "re-patriation," should also have the same right; or only those living within the domain of the Russian Republic? These are burning questions, and cannot be lightly answered. At any rate, they are not answered by the Russian formula. If we attempt to enforce the principle of nationality in accordance with the letter of the formula we shall break up the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and he must be an idiot who thinks that Germany

would consent to it so long as she has any power of resistance left in here. Shall we, then, limit the operation of this principle so as to make it acceptable to Germany? If so, just what shall be included therein, and what excluded therefrom?

The more we examine the question the more the conviction forces itself upon us that the general principles contained in the Russian peace-formula, standing alone, wouldn't do, admirable as they may be as guiding-lines and serviceable as they may be as general principles from which to start a discussion. And there is the grave danger that, believing ourselves in possession of a real peace-program, we may neglect the discussion of the many and serious problems which are involved in the elaboration of a *real peace-program*, thereby crippling our entire peace-propaganda. For at the present juncture, real peace-propaganda means propaganda for certain definite terms of peace. All else is mere talk, or worse. All the peoples want peace, and all the governments want peace. But they do not all want *the same peace*. It is, therefore, up to us to formulate the terms of the peace that we want, and then try to get the peoples to force this peace upon their governments.

In attempting to formulate a peace-program we must remember that we are not endeavoring merely to secure a cessation of hostilities, at *any price* or for *any length of time*; but that we are working for a *just and lasting peace*.

Such a peace cannot be secured by adopting and carrying out a purely negative program. It is really marvelous to behold how the Socialists of this country have pounced upon the couple of don'ts contained in the Russian peace-formula as if the salvation of the world depended on them, forgetting entirely about the affirmative principle contained therein. As if the status quo ante were the acme of perfection, and all that were necessary to redeem the world from all its troubles was to *restore* this same status in all its beauty—whereupon we would all be happy for ever afterward. This status-quo-ante worship is a new development in the Socialist movement. Before the war this same status was denounced as absolutely intolerable

by all Socialists. It was intolerable both because of the military burdens which the then status-quo imposed upon the peoples, and because of the world-war with which it was pregnant and which threatened to break loose any moment. When war broke out Kautsky wrote that we cannot go back to the status quo ante, and all Socialists agreed with him. The two or more additional years of war which we have had since have brought us nothing which should make us more kindly disposed toward the parent of this world cataclysm—the *status quo ante*.

But it is not merely a question of the undesirability of the status quo ante: we could not restore it even if we wanted to. The status quo ante, it must be remembered, is not a question of that province or this, but of power. That is why those who are in favor of a "negotiated peace" as against a peace by conquest speak of compensations to Germany for the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, or such parts of those provinces as may "justly" be awarded to France in the peace negotiations. It is assumed that a just peace requires that no country, or at least none of the Great Powers, should receive any substantial addition of power, or suffer any substantial loss of power, as a result of this war. It is the old idea of the balance of power, supplemented with the idea that the status quo ante represented just the right balance.

It is just this balance, however, that has been damaged beyond repair. The separation of Poland from Russia, which may now be regarded as an accomplished fact, is in itself such a disturbance of the former balance of power to the disadvantage of Russia, and therefore to the advantage of Germany, as to make the restoration of the status quo ante impossible; except, perhaps, by such a dangerous operation as the breaking up of Austria-Hungary, which is certainly not contemplated by the professed worshippers of the "Don't" program. But this is not all: No number of "Don'ts," surely not the present number, can provide against the enormous accession of power to Germany by her *conquest of her allies*, which is also an accomplished fact; an accession of power which is bound to be enormously augmented when that conquest is completed and assumes definite and legal form in the shape of "Middle Europe."

This brings us to a consideration of the question of power generally, as a problem in the elaboration of proper terms of peace. The problem, which is one of fundamental importance, is this:

A peace that would seriously impair Germany's military power could only be obtained under conditions which would be unjust to her people and would leave her future development unsecured. It could be obtained, if at all, only after a crushing defeat inflicted upon her by the Allies; and instead of a lasting peace we would have an armistice which would become the starting-point for a series of future wars, probably even more terrible than the present one. No matter what form such an impairment of German military power takes—whether it takes the monstrously unjust form of a forcible dissolution of the German Empire into its constituent states, or the mild form of an enforced reduction of armaments—it is bound to have direful consequences. A great people marching in the very forefront of civilization cannot be made to smart under the humiliation of such a defeat as would be required in order to make Germany accept such terms without the world paying a frightful penalty therefore. The immediate result of such a peace would be the imperative necessity for the whole world to arm as never before in order to be in a position to enforce its terms, which the German people could be made to observe only by a force similar to that which compelled them to accept them in the first instance. And after the German people shall have had a breathing spell, and shall have recuperated from the economic and financial wounds of the present war, we shall be treated to a "war of liberation" similar in spirit to that which followed Jena, and transcending in severity and barbarism the one which we are now witnessing. In short, we shall have for a while the "armed peace" of the status quo ante on a much enhanced scale, to be followed by the horrors of the present war raised to the nth degree.

But a peace that would leave Germany's military power undiminished, or increased, as it is bound to be if the creation of

Middle Europe is permitted, would be unjust to the world, and would, besides, be merely a prelude to "the next war."

If Germany should come out of this war with her military power unimpaired or increased, as a result of her military victories, it would prove that "preparedness" and militarism "pay." The necessary result would be an era of "preparedness" and militaristic extravagance, spiritual and material, such as the world has never seen before. Conscription would then surely have come to stay in England as well as in this country.

The same or even worse results would follow if Germany's increased or undiminished military power after the war were due not to crushing military defeats inflicted by her upon her enemies, but to the "liberal" attitude of the peoples of the world in staying the hands of their governments in the act of punishing her. Such an attitude would put the stamp of approval on the "scrap of paper" doctrine of international relations, thereby destroying all possibility of ordered international relations in the future. It would put a premium upon aggression; be, in fact, an invitation to aggression to autocratic and militaristic countries like Germany and Japan, by insuring them against the risks which war otherwise entails and which necessarily exert a restraining influence upon their militaristic impetuosity. If this attitude should be adopted as the policy of the liberal warlike elements of the world's population and enforced wherever these elements are in control, war would become a much safer enterprise for those likely to engage in it than it now is, or at least has been hitherto. For the rulers of countries like Germany and Japan war would then hold the allurements of gain and glory without any risk of loss; should the Lord of Hosts bless their enterprise there are "kingdoms," perhaps a world, to gain; for there are no "liberals," the same Lord be praised, in "their" countries to interfere with their terms of peace. But should the "fortunes of war" go against them, there are the liberals of the enemy-countries and of the neutral world to see to it that no harm befall them.

In any event, and whatever the cause, a peace that would leave Germany's military power undiminished or increased would be

merely an armistice between the present and "the next war." Militaristic Germany—and for reasons shown further below most Germany is militaristic—openly speaks even now of "the next war" in which she will obtain *all* her "objects." And this talk is not to be ignored: for there is good sense in it—at least from the militaristic point of view. Given the militaristic logic and the militaristic psychology, the reasoning is, indeed, unanswerable; Germany has proven her superiority in arms to the whole world. She has braved the whole world and has come out victorious. For years the entire world has been arrayed against her, and for all these years she has managed to keep the scourge of war from her own lands—while her armies carried death and destruction into those of her enemies, overrunning whole kingdoms, devastating whole provinces, and generally inflicting upon her enemies such "punishment" as they shall not forget to the end of time. During these years her armies have won victories without number, while her enemies paid her the tribute of shouting "victory" whenever they managed, by frightful sacrifices of men and treasure, to stay the forward march of one of her armies or win back some infinitesimal part of the ground which she had won from them.

And, last but not least, Germany has proven to the world that she can protect her friends and allies from harm, while those who have pinned their faith upon her adversaries are now bewailing their folly. The smaller nations have learned the value of her friendship, and the terrible consequences of her enmity. And some of the big ones, too. The "next war" will, therefore, not see the whole world arrayed against her. And any combination less than the whole world she can easily beat. The "next war" must therefore bring ultimate victory, and establish her unquestioned predominance in the world. Preparations for "the next war" must therefore be begun at once. This will bring the day of ultimate victory so much nearer. It may also perhaps make "the next war" necessary; for if the world realizes the futility of resistance it may acknowledge our supremacy and bend to our will without a fight.

But the world does not give up without a fight. The "next

war" cannot be avoided. And Germany is not the only one that is preparing for it. The "preparedness" epidemic rages all over the world. The Socialists of most countries are affected by it. Conscription is made permanent in the United States, Great Britain, and the self-governing dominions of the British Empire. The world lives in constant fear of "the next war," which overshadows all its interests and dominates all its activities. And the greater the fear, the more feverish the preparations, the surer, the sooner does the holocaust break loose.

We seem to be moving in a vicious circle, with no escape from the nightmare of the "armed peace" which preceded this war followed by the frightfulness of the present war, both raised to the highest degree to which fear, hatred, and human ingenuity, can raise them. Is there no solution to the problem; no escape from the terrible dilemma?

Not if we accept the view of the hide-bound conservatives that wars are due to "human nature"—the innate character of the human animal, who *will* fight just because of his animal spirits. Nor if we accept the view of the pseudo-Marxists who insist that there is bound to be war at least as long as capitalism prevails in the world, because trade competition *must* result in war. Nor yet if we accept that curious compound of pseudo-science and downright nationalistic bigotry presented to the readers of *THE CLASS STRUGGLE* in its last issue by Robert Rives LaMonte, and its variants, according to which the human animal as such has divested itself of its fighting instinct and is in fact as meek as a lamb—outside of Germany, and particularly in Great Britain and these blessed United States of America; but that the German "race" or "nation" is inherently "warlike," and that this "warlike" character of the Germans has brought about the present war and will bring some more unless forcibly prevented by the meeker and more peaceful nations.

If one of these views is accepted we seem to be "in for it" for an unlimited stretch of militarism—unlimited both in time and magnitude—and for quite a series of wars. "Human nature" is, as is well known, eternal and unchangeable—at least

that is the basis of the "human nature" theory of war. Nor is there any possibility of German "nature" undergoing any change in the near future—at least not according to the propounders of the "German nature" theory of war. Nor is there any reasonable expectation of "capitalism" being abolished before or at the end of this war. So there we are: doomed to increased and universal militarism and "the next war."

Fortunately, not one of those theories is true, no matter what the pseudo-scientific apparatus brought up to its support. Even the most cursory study of history will show that there "ain't no such animal" as "human nature"; that the "nature" of the genus Homo is one thing in one place and another thing in another place; one thing at one time, and something else at another time. The changeability of the "nature" of capitalism in this respect is perhaps not so readily seen, and it may require a more intensive study of history in order to discover it; but it is there nevertheless, as I have shown at some length elsewhere. The same is true of "German nature"—the "German character," like all "national" or "racial" character, being one long string of changes in accordance with changing politico-economic conditions. Far from being particularly and consistently "warlike," a fairly plausible case could be made out for the German "character," on the basis of the historical evidence at hand, that it was less so than that of most national or racial "characters." I do not insist that the case would be well-founded, for I confess to utter disbelief in national or racial "character." But there can be no doubt of the fact that the German national "character" is the least consistent of any of the great national "characters" of modern history, in this respect. German history does not show, for instance, such long spells of continuous and consistent "autocratic" and "warlike" "character" as either France or Russia, her neighbors to the West and East. And she could easily stand comparison with some of her other neighbors, friends and enemies.

Now, it is undeniably true that at the present historical juncture Germany is, with the possible exception of Japan, the most militaristic nation of the world. And this fact must, of course, be

reckoned with in discussing terms of peace, and in planning for a peaceful world in the future.

But "German Militarism" not being "a fact of nature," but merely one of the passing phases of human development, it behooves us to look into the matter carefully in order to find out whether the same course of historical development which brought about German Militarism may not also have brought with it the means wherewith it may be killed or cured.

The present war, we are told, was caused by German Militarism, and its insatiable lust of conquest. But what has caused present-day German Militarism? What has turned the peaceful, beer-guzzling, pipe-smoking, speculative, dreamy and romantic German professor of the days of Goethe and Schiller, whom we loved so much, into the terrible monster of a boche or Hun, of the Treitschke-Bernhardi-Hindenburg days-and-persuasion that we hate and detest so much? Is there no way by which we may effect a metamorphosis of German "nature," turning the German hosts now sacrificing themselves and others at the altar of the last-named trinity into worshippers in the temple of Lessing, Goethe and Kant?

In order to be able to answer these questions, we must look at this German Militarism and its lust of conquest a little more closely. It is the fashion nowadays to relate present-day German Militarism to the military systems and purposes of Frederick the Great and his father; as well as to those of the early days of William I, when Bismarck took up the shaping of the modern German Empire, as if they were continuous and essentially the same. But this is far from being historically correct. The going back of Frederick the Great and his stick-plying, tall-grenadier-loving father may be dismissed without further consideration: the hiatus created by that wide chasm in the center of which lies Jena cannot be bridged over even by the most deft historical engineers. There is more historical foundation for relating present-day German Militarism to the Militarism of the Prussia of the sixties of the last century: there is here continuity of organization as well as of method and spirit. It is

nevertheless a great mistake to identify the two without further ado. For the purposes of the two are essentially different. The purposes of German Militarism under Bismarck were, primarily, to create and preserve German Unity under Prussian hegemony; and viewed from the broader point of view of modern history, the wars of 1864, 1866 and 1870 are not essentially different from the many other wars by which other nations, including our own, have achieved or preserved their unity. It is true that the actors involved and the methods used have injected into these wars a poisonous virus the malignity of which is not quite spent even now; and will forever differentiate them from other wars of unification. But they were wars of unification nevertheless.

In this connection, and as proof of the fact that these wars were not mere wars of conquest, and that the older German Militarism was not always actuated by lust of conquest or military glory, it is well to remember that when, in the war of 1866, after Sadowa and Koeniggratz, Austria lay prostrate at Prussia's feet, and the gates of Vienna lay open before Prussia's armies, the latter refrained from taking any territory from her vanquished foe or even humiliating him further by entering his capital. The history of those days is well known: The professional soldiers insisted on "reaping the fruits of their hard-won victories"—after the manner of all professional soldiers. But the author of three wars within seven years, the Iron Chancellor who founded the new German Empire on Blood and Iron, stayed their hands. Not out of moral scruples, of course; for these were quite foreign to the make-up of the author of the Ems despatch. But out of policy: this particular conquest and this particular glory did not fit into the scheme, was not calculated to help the purposes for which the war was conducted. The moral of which is: that "militarism" is not an inborn quality of character, an ebullition of the spirit; but very sober and calculating business. It is in fact a means to an end: the end being the achievement of some purpose or the accomplishment of some task which a nation finds set before it in the course of its historic development. Of course

once the spirit and organization of militarism have been created they have a tendency of becoming an end in themselves and of giving birth to certain by-products which have no direct relation to the historical necessity which called forth the militaristic growth, and may even be harmful to those historical aims and purposes which it was to accomplish. But the real source of life of any "live" militarism is this historic necessity, and as soon as that disappears, it must become decadent and ultimately break down of its own weight like a colossus with feet of clay.

The historic necessity to which the Prussian Militarism of the Eighteen Hundred Sixties was a means, was German Unity. Had German Unity been accomplished and no other historic cause intervened, Prussian Militarism would have entered upon a period of decay, and finally would have broken down and disappeared. Unfortunately, German Unity was not fully accomplished, largely *because* Prussian Militarism played so important a part in the attempt to achieve it. And before this historic purpose was achieved or definitely abandoned, there arose another task for Prussian, now German, Militarism. Nevertheless, there was a certain period of time during which German Militarism had lost its aggressive character, and assumed a "defensive" quality, in so far as militarism *can* be defensive. That was during the period following the Franco-Prussian war and until about the year 1890. During that period Bismarck followed a distinctly "peaceful," non-aggressive policy. Again, not because he had become convinced of the superior moral value of "peaceful" methods as opposed to his previous "war-like" policies, but because there was no useful purpose to be served, from his point of view, by following the methods previously used by him with such marked success.

With the organization of the German Empire, German Unity was achieved in so far as that was possible under Prussian hegemony. Prussian Germany thereupon became a "satiated" nation; and her principal care was to preserve the status quo against violent shocks, to keep what she had, and to make the best of it in a "diplomatic" way. Hence his alliance with Austria and his re-insurance treaty with Russia; his purely "continental"

policy, encouraging France in the acquisition of colonies, while keeping Germany out of colonial "adventures."

It is now commonly said that Germany has been preparing for the present war for forty-four years, that is, since the conclusion of the Franco-Prussian war. This statement is very far from accurate. Far from preparing for a new war, Germany was distinctly peaceful during a period of about fifteen to twenty years immediately following the Franco-Prussian war—in so far as an armed nation can be "peaceful."

At the close of that period there opened up a new era in the history of capitalistic civilization, the era commonly referred to as that of Modern Imperialism. The salient characteristic of that era is the hunt for spheres of exploitation in the form of exclusive privileges for the "development" of undeveloped countries. This transformed Germany from a "satiated" country into a "hungry" one; *hungry for colonies*. This involved the abandonment of Bismarck's "continental" policy and the turning of the German Empire into a World Power. The new policy was officially announced in the present Kaiser's famous declaration that: "the future of the German Empire lies on the sea." This turned Germany upon a new career of militarism and war-like aggression. It was not merely a question of acquiring a few colonies in Africa or elsewhere, for the purpose of colonizing there the "surplus" population of the German Empire as some simple souls imagine; or of getting admittance into the "markets" of these undeveloped countries for the purpose of selling goods, as some other simple souls believe. Germany has no "surplus" population, for one thing. And if she had such a surplus there would be no difficulty in disposing of it: the civilized over-lords or "protectors" of undeveloped countries have a broad "welcome" for all colonists and no questions asked. Nor are there any "trade" difficulties in undeveloped countries to speak of. It so happens that England is the principal colonial power of the world. And that "grasping" nation has followed an undeniably liberal policy in her colonies, keeping their doors open to the trade of the entire world. China keeps her doors

open by international agreement. Turkey's foreign trade is regulated by an international commission, and there are no discriminations as far as ordinary "trade" is concerned.

What was involved was the right to participate in the exploitation of the resources of the "undeveloped" portions of the globe on a scale commensurate with the "greatness" of the nation, otherwise known as obtaining a "proper place in the sun." But that was utterly impossible under the conditions of the status quo ante bellum. Under that status Germany was a "continental" nation—the world overseas being pre-empted by other nations, principally by England. This was not merely a question of colonial possessions or dependencies, but of sea-power. England, by virtue of her position as the leading sea-power of the world, had a predominant influence in all decisions affecting the future of all undeveloped countries, whether they were formally tributary to her or not. Such a condition was neither profitable to those elements of the German nation whose prosperity depended on imperialistic expansion, nor did it comport with the "dignity," "honor," or "station in life" of the "leading nation of the world." It was manifestly "impossible" for the "most civilized nation of the world" to stand idly by while other nations were "civilizing" the "uncivilized" world, and incidentally "pegging out claims" for their own "posterity." This made the future of "the Greatest nation on earth" "insecure." It was being left a *mere* "continental" power in a world of "World-powers." If this great nation was to retain her greatness, and "count" in the world for as much as she counted on her own continent, she evidently had to bestir herself and become in the world what she was on that continent: Bismarck's successors must do for Germany in the world what that great statesman had done for Prussia in Europe.

This meant, in the first place, the building of an enormous navy; a navy, if not exactly as large as the English navy, at least of a size to be *dangerous* to the English navy when alone and sufficient to *beat* the English navy with the assistance of some other navy. But a strong navy does not mean merely a certain number of ships, with their men and armaments: a

real navy, that is, a navy which means sea-power, must have "points of support" commensurate to its size, if its size is to count. It must have a large sea-coast at home, and supply-bases, coaling stations, etc., in all parts of the globe.

In other words, in order that she may be on sea what she was on land, in the world what she was on the European continent, Germany had to pursue an aggressive policy on land as well as on sea. The matter of the possession, or at least control, of her "natural" sea-coast, which extends to the straits of Dover, became to her "a matter of life and death." And as the possession or control of a sea-coast is never "secure," from a military point of view, without the possession or control of the hinterland, the possession of Holland, Belgium and Northern France became absolutely indispensable to the "security" of her "future." So, also, was the control of the Balkan Peninsula, with its road to Asia, and Germany's "natural" eastern sea-coast on the Adriatic and the Mediterranean.

From a militaristic point of view, and in a world in which war is not merely a possibility but a probability, the reasoning is unassailable. Just think of the role which the Flanders coast has played and is still playing in Germany's submarine campaign in the present war. But the possession of that coast by her was impossible without the invasion of Belgium.

Germany's hunger for colonies, and "a place in the sun" generally, of necessity leads her to an aggressive militaristic policy on land as well as on sea. It is not necessary to inquire here into the ethics of Germany's demands in this respect; nor into the question of whether or not the German masses would really benefit by their country's achieving these objects. It is sufficient for our purpose, which is the attainment of a lasting peace, that the German masses think they will, and that almost the entire nation stands behind the German Government in the demand for the objects if not exactly in the approval of all the means whereby these may be attained. It is sufficient in this connection to point to the peace program of the "majority" Socialists as propounded by their delegates to Stockholm. It

may, therefore, be taken for granted that we cannot have peace, at least not a lasting peace, until these demands are somehow satisfied.

This is the basis of all the arguments for a "negotiated" peace, as opposed to a "dictated" peace. These arguments are not only sound, but absolutely unanswerable. Unfortunately, the conception of a negotiated peace is a purely negative one, and therefore utterly inadequate. We cannot secure a lasting peace by merely not robbing Germany of her colonies, for she was "hungry" and therefore aggressive under the status quo ante with those colonies in her possession. Nor can we solve the problem by being "generous" with her by giving her some more colonies and a larger "place in the sun" than she had before the war. During the last few years before the war England attempted to conciliate Germany by making her all kinds of concessions—the last one on the very eve of the war. But that did not do any good. For it is not merely a "place in the sun" that Germany demands, but such a place as she is entitled to. What she is "entitled" to is, naturally, a matter of very serious difference of opinion even among "reasonable" people, not to speak of two opposing camps of imperialists. And in a world in which the sword is the ultimate arbiter, we shall not have peace until Germany shall have had *that* place in the sun to which *she* deems herself "entitled."

But even that is not all: Germany does not ask merely for *such* a place in the sun as she deems herself entitled to, but for the ability to hold it by her own power. She seeks not only increased opportunities, but also increased power. That is what she means when she says that her future *growth* must be made "secure."

The element of *growth*, and even more so the element of *security*, makes a *permanent adjustment* between the different nations as to their respective "places in the sun" utterly impossible. Any adjustment that will fix permanently and *securely* the status to be created by the peace settlement which will follow this war will necessarily be so rigid as to exclude any possibility

of *change by growth*; and any arrangement which will leave change possible will not be *secure* either from Germany's point of view or from that of her opponents. Germany surely will not consent to any peace that will not secure to her at least all that she gets, on this settlement. And for the same reason that she has hitherto turned down all of England's overtures for a limitation of armaments, a naval holiday, and other proposals of a similar nature: No place in the sun is really secure unless the holder can keep it by his own power. A place held by any other tenure than the tenure of might is held "on sufferance," which makes the holder an object of charity, a "vassal" of the power on whose sufferance it is held.

Germany answers all suggestions for a renunciation of military power in consideration of "liberal treatment" in the matter of a place in the sun in exactly the same manner which the class-conscious workers answer all overtures from enemies, and well-meant advice from "friends," offering "concessions" if they will but follow the methods of conciliation rather than those of the class-struggle. That answer is: In a world based on force one can get only what his power may obtain for him, and he can retain it only as long as that power lasts.

The whole problem of peace-terms therefore reverts back to the question of power, viewed from the point of view of its application in the domain of Modern Imperialism—colonies and the development of undeveloped regions of the world.

There are three possible solutions:

We may deprive Germany of her "power for evil," that is, to take any other place "in the sun" than that which we will assign to her—treating her in the settlement "generously" or otherwise, as our "wisdom" or "sense of justice" may dictate.

We may give her what she wants by way of "a place in the sun," or at least a large instalment on account, giving her at the same time the power to hold it by her own might—which would mean an enormous increase of her military strength.

Or we may go back to what will essentially amount to the

status quo ante in the matter of power, even if it does not in actual holdings and possessions.

The first alternative has already been rejected by us as not leading to a lasting peace, which is the object we desire to achieve above all.

The second alternative would lead to a series of wars similar to the Napoleonic wars, culminating in some such unstable balance of power as one of those that have preceded this war, or in a complete domination of the world by Germany, establishing a Pax Germanica similar to the Pax Romana which accompanied the final triumph of Rome over the world. It is needless to discuss the desirability or undesirability of a Pax Germanica as the world is evidently not ready to accept it.

And the third alternative, by its very character of a compromise, stamps the peace which it would usher in as an unstable settlement, and, therefore, necessarily short-lived.

For reasons already explained, each of these possible alternatives would usher in an era of increased armaments.

Are we, then, doomed to armaments and war? Is there no escape from the vicious circle?

Not unless we are ready to adopt radical measures and eradicate the root of the evil. This way out does not lie in the "victory" of either of the contending parties; but neither does it lie in "negotiations," "give and take," "adjustment," and the other methods of the compromisers or compromising reformers. The case is not hopeless: It does not require the change of human nature, which is beyond human power; nor the extermination of the Germans—which would seem the only way of forever depriving Germany of her "power for evil"—which is beyond "our" power; nor yet the abolition of the capitalist system, for which the world is not ready. But the case is extremely serious, and requires heroic treatment.

The escape from the vicious circle lies in divorcing international security from armed power. This means: *Complete disarmament, and international organization.*

Nothing less will do. And the thing must be adopted in its entirety, or not at all. At least as far as disarmament is concerned. And it must be done now, at the end of *this war*, if there is to be no *next one*.

The "practical man," particularly of the "negotiator" kind, will object, of course, that the remedy proposed is "visionary," "idealistic," etc., as anything "complete" must be by its nature—according to ingrained compromisers. Limitation of armaments—that he can understand; and, of course, some limitation will have to be placed on armaments either in the peace-settlement itself or soon thereafter. But complete disarmament, impossible! The very idea of, say, militaristic Germany disarming herself is preposterous. And so on, and so forth; to the end of the compromising negotiator's chapter.

Upon careful reflection, however, we shall find that far from being impractical, *complete disarmament is the only practical way out*. It is not only sure of accomplishing the desired result, but has more chances of being accepted by any nation that has no desire or hope of dominating the world than limitation. In fact, there are such insuperable objections to limitation of armaments that Germany at least is sure to refuse to adopt it as one of the terms of peace at the conclusion of this war. The Allies may perhaps be able to force limitation on Germany if they obtain a smashing victory, but then this limitation will have the same fate as the rest of the settlement of a "peace by victory"—it will last just as long as the victorious powers are able to keep the vanquished enemy down. It will vanish as soon as Germany shall have recuperated her powers, when she will simply disregard it; and if the other nations do not acquiesce in the disregard she will go to war in order to remove the "humiliation" thus imposed on her, as well as to avenge the defeat which made her accept it temporarily.

The reason why Germany cannot accept limitation of armaments at the end of this war is the same that prevented her from accepting or even considering it before this war. Germany regards all such proposals as schemes, conscious or unconscious, on the part of her competitors in the international game, to

perpetuate the status quo under which she chafed, and to gain an undue advantage over her. When England proposed a general limitation of armaments, Germany's answer was that the only proper limitation upon a nation's armed force were *her resources and the readiness of her people to make sacrifices*. When analyzed this answer means the following: You gentlemen, Germany said, in effect, to her opponents, are satisfied with the status quo, and are therefore interested to maintain it with as little cost as possible; I am not satisfied with it, and have therefore no such interest. You gentlemen have trouble with your people, who either cannot or will not make the sacrifices necessary to maintain a "limit army"; but my people are rich and growing richer, and as their riches grow so do their obedience and willingness to make any sacrifices for the perfection of my military establishment. The arrangement which you propose, gentlemen, is therefore entirely one-sided; you stand to lose nothing and to gain considerable, while I have nothing to gain from it and considerable to lose.

Germany still feels about it the same way. Unless she gains all her objects in this war, so that she has nothing further to gain from the use of military force, she will look upon limitation of armaments as a curtailment of *her* military power, which she may accept temporarily but to which she will never be reconciled.

And an examination of the question of limitation will show that given a world in which armed force decides—and that world is taken for granted by limitation—Germany is undoubtedly right. An attempt to find a *standard* of armaments under a "limitation" regime will show that we are up against the same problem of power, and the same irreconcilability between the claims of *growth* on the one hand and *security* on the other, that we have encountered in attempting to arrive at a settlement generally. The finding of such a standard is an almost superhuman task, even when attempted by an "impartial" outsider. It becomes absolutely impossible among contending parties who have just concluded one of the bitterest struggles in history. If such a standard is found at all, under such circumstances, it will be, as already stated, either the result of force applied by one side to

the other, or of "diplomatic" negotiations intended to give each side a breathing spell so as to recuperate for a resumption of the struggle.

No such difficulties attend complete disarmament. The peaceful nations cannot possibly be the losers by the disarmament of the disturber of the peace, and therefore they cannot object. And "warlike" Germany stands to gain everything short of world domination. It is not expected that a victorious Germany would embrace disarmament. But a defeated or baffled Germany should gladly take a chance on complete disarmament after perfect armament has proven a failure. In an unarmed world the status quo ante, so objectionable to Germany, will have disappeared of itself. There will be no pre-emption of undeveloped regions against Germany, because there will be no military force to keep anything pre-empted. There will be no difficulty in finding the standard of power in the future society, for that will be given by nature, if the term "power" can at all be applied to an unarmed society. Nor will there be any fear, real or fancied, that the scheme was being "rigged" against any nation, as in the event of the impossible contingency of nations desiring to go to war after disarmament should have removed all causes of war, they will all start from the level in which nature and their own energy and resourcefulness in the pursuits of peace have placed them. Should the impossible transpire and the nations desire to arm again, Germany, if she maintains her present standards of efficiency, would, of course, have an advantage over other nations. But such advantage would simply be that of a more highly civilized nation as against those less civilized; and the fear of such an eventuality, if it should exist, would simply stimulate the pursuits of the arts of civilization.

Of course, complete disarmament must be accompanied by international organization. Not by a League to Enforce Peace, which is even more impractical than the limitation of armaments, and may itself become the center of intrigues leading to war; but by an international administration of international affairs. Just how much should be turned over to such international administration will probably be the subject of heated debate, and here

growth by degrees is possible. Just as the thirteen American colonies at first formed a loose Confederation, only to form soon afterwards a nation; so may the nations of the world form at first an international organization only limited in scope, designed primarily to prevent war, only to see this organization develop in the course of time, and probably by slow degrees, into a United States of the World.

But there is a certain minimum of powers which such international organization must possess, in order to answer the present emergency: The administration of all undeveloped countries, and the protectorate of all semi-developed countries, must be placed in its hands; to be administered primarily in the interests of the natives, and then of the world at large without discrimination between nations; and to remain under such administration until they shall have become ripe for self-government, when they shall be admitted into the community of nations. Once the fear of war, and with it all *strategical* reasons, are abolished, there is absolutely no reason in any enlightened self-interest, even from the capitalist point of view, why the different nations interested should not turn over all of their possessions in Africa, for instance, to the International Administration, just as the American colonies gave up their claims to the Northwestern territory in favor of the Federal Government; and why the entire African continent, with the exception of the self-governing communities of the South-African Federation, should not, thereupon, be administered internationally, and new states carved out therefrom, from time to time, to be admitted into the World-Union, or some integral part of the World-Union, as its Constitution may provide.

The World-Union, and its International Administration, must, of course, have an armed force, in order to be a real power. Such a force would not have to be very large, in an unarmed world. But it should be of sufficient size to be reckoned as a force as against the police forces of the different nations, and to enforce order within its domain. It might also, perhaps, be entrusted with the function of preventing the arming of any nation beyond the necessary police force to maintain order. The International Administration ought to be the only one permitted

to have a navy—the seas being considered international domain along with the undeveloped “territories.” These are matters of detail, however. Important in themselves, but not bearing directly on our problem of securing permanent peace. This will be assured when armed force and national security, whether present or future, have been divorced from each other; the one abolished and the other placed under international protection.

When the Great War broke out, much was said about this being “a war to end war”; and now a whole lot is being said about its being a war “to make the world safe for democracy.” There can be no doubt of the fact that complete disarmament is a sure means, and the only practical means of making an end to war. It is also the best, and probably the quickest means of making the world safe for democracy. Neither the German nor any other autocracy could maintain itself in an unarmed world for the space of a brief winter’s morn.

Nor would there be much trouble in settling the vexing problems of nationality, which now defy all attempts at solution. The fact is that the problem of nationality is now really insoluble, except in very few instances. It is sufficient to read the books of Toynbee, Brailsford, and other liberals and radicals who have attempted to solve the question, to completely despair of the possibility of any solution of the problem under present conditions. But all difficulties disappear the moment the world has disarmed itself—for the real difficulties of the problem are of a military character, and will therefore disappear with the disappearance of military establishments. Even the so-called “economic” difficulties connected with the settlement of the question of nationalities are really military. Take, for instance, the question of Alsace-Lorraine: There are many people who believe that Germany would even now be willing to cede to France the French-speaking parts of Lorraine, if it were not for the iron ore of the district which Germany cannot afford to relinquish. This sounds awfully “economic.” In reality, however, it is a purely military question, and would disappear with the disappearance of the possibility of war. As a matter of fact, Germany never had any trouble of getting all the iron ore she wanted

from any iron ore district in France. What the talk of the iron ore deposits of Lorraine really means is this: *That in case of war* Germany could not rely on the supply of those deposits, either for her munitions or industries. But this difficulty would manifestly disappear with the disappearance of war, and with it the entire problem of Alsace-Lorraine.

The same is true of Northern France and Belgium: In so far as these regions are not desired by Germany for purely military reasons, they are coveted for “economic”—military reasons—for their coal and iron ore deposits, which are absolutely free to Germany in times of peace, but unavailable, or not readily available, in time of war.

The end of war would also mark the end of the Polish problem. To-day, the Polish problem is practically insoluble. A really free and independent Poland is an utter impossibility—that is why the German attempt to create an “independent” Poland was bound to be a failure even if it had not been conceived in fraud and born in iniquity. A really free and independent Poland requires not only the union of all Polish lands, but also an outlet to the sea, which means the possession of the formerly Polish but now German city of Danzig. But Germany would no more think of ceding Posen and Danzig to a free and independent Poland than she would of ceding Schleswig-Holstein and the Kiel Canal to an independent Denmark strengthened by the absorption of Norway and Sweden. The cession of Posen would bring Berlin entirely too near the frontier to make it comfortable from a military point of view; and the cession of Danzig would interfere seriously with Germany’s control of the eastern Baltic. But all these considerations would disappear the moment the spectre of “the next war” would be laid to rest.

The same is true of the question of nationalities in Austria, in the Balkans, in Asiatic Turkey: In each and every one of these cases the real obstacle to a proper solution lies in the military situation; the granting of independence or complete autonomy to a subject nationality means a weakening of the state from a military point of view. No military nation will therefore agree to it willingly, and it presents a grave problem even to non-militaristic nations.

In explanation of Germany's course during the Austro-Serbian crisis which led to the present war, the German Emperor stated that the Serbian nationalist propaganda threatened to so weaken the Austrian Empire (militarily) that she would have been of no use to Germany as an ally. And this was considered by the German people not only a good and sufficient reason for the thwarting of the national aspirations of the Serbs but even for the bringing on of the World War. The logic of war is such that fear of being weaker for war to-morrow requires one to go to war to-day.

But even those who do not accept the full logic of war and militarism must, nevertheless, pay it a certain tribute. The Russian Revolution under the Socialist regime has clearly abjured all warlike designs and militaristic aspirations. And the first consequence was a truly remarkable act of self-abnegation in its pronouncement in favor of the creation of a really free Poland. But even the Russian Revolutionary Government paused before the creation of an absolutely independent Finland which would make Petrograd untenable from a military point of view.

These are, of course, merely illustrations and suggestions. It would take us too far afield to enter upon a detailed discussion of the problem of nationality here. But all those who are familiar with the subject must admit that the crux of the problem is a military one. No doubt, in many cases it is complicated with other considerations; and no doubt, also, the status quo ante may be improved upon without seriously endangering the security of any nation. But, unfortunately, what is needed for a nation's "security" is liable to be a matter of serious difference of opinion between the suppressed nation and the nation that lords it over her. Also, concededly, the principle of nationality cannot have absolute free play so long as we must take strategic and economic-strategic considerations into account.

If, therefore, we are serious in our determination to bring about a peace based upon the right of each nation, whether big or small, to decide upon its own destiny; if we are serious in our efforts to bring about a just and *lasting* peace; above all, if we are really desirous of making this war the last of all wars, there

is only one way open for us: *absolute disarmament and international organization.*

The time when *any* kind of disarmament and *any* kind of international organization was considered a utopian dream of Socialists and other "visionaries" is past. The most "practical" men are now talking about it, proving their great "practical" sense by coming about a generation too late as compared with the "visionaries." But like the good "practical" men that they are, our "practical" men not only come when it is late but they do not see any further than their own noses. They are therefore insisting on half or quarter measures which are worse than useless. It is therefore up to those who have some vision, who can take broad and long-range views of great world-problems, to step into the breach and to demand that the problem be solved once and for all, instead of the present difficulty be merely tided over by some patched-up arrangement, which must necessarily become the starting point for even greater difficulties.

Above all, it is up to the Socialists. The present crisis has shown that as long as the problem of war remains unsolved, the entire fabric of the international socialist movement is as flimsy as a cobweb which the slightest wind will blow away. If the International Socialist Movement is to be built upon secure foundations, we must do away with the possibility of war. We must demand *complete disarmament and international organization.* International organization not to *enforce* peace, but to *secure* peace.

The Russian Revolution and its Problems

By MORRIS KOLCHIN

The failure of the Russian Revolution of 1905 and of the revolutionary movement was brought about by a combination of forces. The bourgeoisie, hoping to obtain a home market and the freedom to organize that market, had praised the creators of the Revolution and the liberators of "Great Russia," the proletariat, but now turned from it, and offered its co-operation to its former foe, the czarist government. The "unreasonable" proletarian demands frightened the bourgeoisie, whose conception of freedom was necessarily limited by its own class interests, preferring a curtailment of its own freedom to the threatening "slavery" under proletarian rule. It was ready to forsake its home market, that the liberation of Russia promised, in favor of a foreign market backed up by a strong government. And in order to create this strong government the bourgeoisie allied itself with the government of the Czar.

To the "enlightened" landlord, the agrarian, the Revolution of 1905 was a gross disappointment from beginning to end. What he wanted and needed was the freedom to organize and develop his estates on a capitalistic basis. Under the feudalistic regime of the czar this had been impossible, and therefore he greeted the Revolution, though somewhat half-heartedly. But the revolutionary proletariat, together with the revolutionary peasantry, demanded not only freedom but land as well. And while the agrarians were willing and ready to sacrifice the estates of the czar and the vast territory belonging to the clergy, they showed a natural unwillingness to commit suicide by parting with their own lands. Hence the agrarians, even more readily than the capitalists, turned to the old government and offered it their support.

Thus this holy alliance of bourgeoisie, agrarians and bureaucracy was formed. The proletariat with the revolutionary part of the peasantry were completely isolated. The defeat of the

Revolution had become inevitable, not because of the weakness of the revolutionary forces but because of the strength of the reactionary alliance. There were other forces at play. Just as to-day American, French and English imperialism are raging against the revolutionary forces of Russia, condemning the Workers' and Soldiers' Council and quite openly regretting the fall of the "liberal" czar, so in 1905 European capitalism was frightened by the possible fall of the "international gendarm" and the rise of the proletariat. But to-day imperialism has its hands full with a "war for democracy" and cannot very well afford to fight against the democracy of Russia. In 1905 the capitalist forces of Europe were free and ready to help the Russian autocracy against the Revolution. The treasuries of republican France, liberal England and autocratic Germany were open to the government of the czar. And the czar made the best use of them. The army, beaten as it was on the battlefield of Manchuria, was still an army raised by selective draft, with several years' military training and, what is more important, commanded by officers of the military and reactionary caste. With the help of the republican and the liberal money the army was perfected, and the salaries of the soldiers and officers raised. The army was with and for the reactionary alliance, and for years reaction reigned supreme. So much so that even within the social-democratic party a movement for reorientation began to grow up. A number of very influential Social-Democrats (Liquidators) were of the opinion that Russia had been germanized, that is, that another revolution in Russia in the near future was improbable, that Russia would follow, in her political development, the steps and form of Germany and that the Russian Social-Democracy must liquidate its revolutionary tactics and adapt itself to this new situation. The revolution of 1917 has shown, however, the utter fallacy of the Liquidators.

The Russian Revolution of 1905, like all revolutions, was an expression of the conflict between the ever-growing forces of production on the one hand and the "political superstructure" on the other. The semi-feudal political organization of Russia did not and could not satisfy the needs of the new industrial forces, of the new classes of society. But the revolution had failed

and the conflict remained unsettled, the needs unsatisfied. To be sure, great changes were made, important reforms introduced. The dissolution of the peasant communities, the division of community lands and the sale of a great number of nobility estates through the government (so-called "Peasants' Bank") were by no means unimportant, for this agrarian reform program strengthened economically the agricultural bourgeoisie and intensified the process of proletarianization of the peasantry. The workmen's insurance "reform," with its entire machinery, agitation, etc., was also a feature of no small importance. And the Duma itself, impotent and reactionary as it was, played a very important role in the revolutionary movement as a centre of organization of the various classes and groups and as a platform which had enjoyed freedom of speech to a very great extent. But all these and other reforms did not solve the problem of political reconstruction, they did not solve the labor problem and did not satisfy the peasants' cry for land. The objective conditions have not changed materially, the causes of revolution have not been eliminated. And triumphant as the counter-revolution was, it could not take out the revolutionary soul of the most revolutionary class of Russia—the proletariat. Economical and political strikes were frequent, political demonstrations not unusual. And when in 1912 a "Ludlow massacre" was perpetrated in Lena, Siberia, where the workers of the gold mines struck, entire Russia was shaken by a wave of protests, strikes and demonstrations of the masses of labor. The reactionary forces of the czar could not suppress this outbreak, although cruel measures were taken. The revolutionary movement of the working class grew. So much so that a few days before war was declared a general strike of the Petrograd workers was in progress, one demonstration followed the other, and the existence of the autocratic regime was then seriously threatened.

Even the bourgeoisie realized it and, naturally, turned somewhat to the left. They realized that the "holy trinity alliance" had failed in its purpose. As the reforms did not better the conditions of the people, they could not create the so much needed home market. On the contrary, obstacles were placed in the way of industrial development, strikes were common, frequently bring-

ing disorganization into the entire industrial life. No wonder that the opposition of the bourgeoisie grew, that at the last few conventions of business organizations held before the war political reforms were demanded, the government openly criticized.

But the outbreak of the war put an end to this "frivolity" of the bourgeoisie, whose patriotic fervor compared favorably with that of the capitalistic classes of any other warring nations. In the first place the war opened possibilities for foreign markets which had become more and more important as the hopes for a home market vanished. Subsequent events proved, however, the faultiness of all these calculations, for the war once more showed the utter inability of the Russian autocracy to carry out the imperialistic designs of the bourgeoisie.

On the battlefield defeat after defeat followed, at home an undesirable condition of chaos set in. The production of war munitions was diminishing every day, both because of the inefficiency, graft and thefts of the faithful bureaucracy and because of the wholesale arrests amongst the skilled workers suspected of "a revolutionary mode of thought." The same causes brought the same results in the operation of the "peace" industries and in the production of foodstuffs. There had been an actual shortage of food and other necessities of life, and the prices had been growing daily until they reached almost the same level as in the United States.

The inefficiency of the government of the czar and especially its inability to carry on the war successfully had, quite naturally, revived the opposition of the bourgeoisie. At the "Industrial and Commercial Congresses," at the conventions of the "Union of Zemstvos and Cities," at political party conferences, protests against the government were frequently voiced and demands for a "share in the government" made. To the leaders of the bourgeoisie it was quite clear long before the revolution that with such managers as the government of the czar could furnish, they could get neither a foreign nor a home market. And the "progressive bloc" in the Duma, created by this revival of bourgeois opposition, grew less and less generous in their support of the czar.

True, this opposition of the bourgeoisie was rather of a harmless nature, for it was also in opposition to any "non-parliamentary" steps, but it isolated the autocracy completely. It gave "aid and comfort" to the working class who remained as revolutionary during the war as it had been before the war. Social patriotism had very few adherents among the socialist workers of Russia. The orgies of reaction and the sudden but aggressive "patriotism" of the acknowledged leaders of capitalism were enough to overcome the effect of the manifesto of the "willful group" of social patriots, in which they called upon the workers of Russia to abstain from strikes and to stop their revolutionary activities. The "historic mission" of Russia, as it was seen by the Miljukoffs and Guchkoffs, the leaders of the Russian imperialism, who demanded the conquest of Constantinople and the Dardanelles and the annexation of Galicia, was an effective antidote to the call of the social patriots "to crush German imperialism." The untold sufferings of the masses during the war, the brutality of the servants of czardom in their war upon the working class, poured oil upon the smouldering resentment of the proletariat. The revolutionary movement grew, and it was manifest to everyone that *the hour was near*.

At the beginning of March, 1917, the food situation in Petrograd became serious. The "lines" at the stores and at the bakeries were getting longer every day and the rations shorter. Riots of "liners," mostly wives of workers, were spreading, unorganized though they were; street demonstrations were held in different parts of the city; proclamations of the Petrograd committee of the Social-Democratic Party were widely circulated. The police at once realized the nature of these riots and demonstrations, for all these outbreaks soon developed into one continuous demonstration with banners, speakers and organizers. A call for a general strike was the reply of the social democracy to the brutal treatment of the demonstrators by the police. In two days the entire working population of Petrograd was on strike, industrial and commercial life was at a standstill, no papers came out (with the exception of a "bulletin" distributed free of charge), not a car was running. "Down

with war," "Down with imperialism," "Down with capitalism," "Down with autocracy," "Bread and freedom," "Freedom and peace" were the inscriptions on the banners, the theme of the speeches, the watchword of the proclamations. In vain did the military governor threaten with court martial those who would not obey his command to return to work, in vain did he promise clemency to the "loyal subjects" who would betray their comrades. The strike went on, demonstrations continued day and night. At the call of the Social-Democratic Committee the workers of all the factories, mills, shops, workers' organizations elected delegates to form the now famous and powerful Council of Workers' Deputies, which took charge of the entire situation.

At the same time the Duma was struggling with itself. The members earnestly and seriously debated a bill calling for the transfer of the control of food supplies to local governments (zemstvoes and cities) which the government would not allow. The debate was still in progress when the czar ordered the closing of the session. The Duma was in a state of tumult and affright, the progressive block could find no way out of the situation until from the left someone cried out, "We must refuse to go." They elected an executive committee which found no better occupation than to get into telegraphic communication with the czar and ask him for reforms. For even then the representatives of the bourgeoisie were afraid of the revolution. And their fear was not unjustified. For impossible as a socialist revolution at the present moment is, even to the most extreme, it was clear from the start that the Russian proletariat has been too well trained in the theory and practice of socialist thought to be satisfied with the old type of bourgeois revolution.

But "the street was boiling," battles were being fought between the workers and the police. The garrison of Petrograd, which had been "neutral" in that time of struggle, turned their guns against the forces of the old regime, began to send representatives to the council which had now righteously assumed the name of Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies. This was on the eleventh of March, and on the fourteenth the revolution triumphed, the old regime was overthrown, the council was in control of the situation.

All these days the Duma Committee was irresolute, for the members of the committee realized that the council was the real power, that the council and not the committee had the masses behind it. True, the committee did appoint commissions to look after the various government departments, but no attempt to govern was made. When, therefore, on the evening of the thirteenth of March the Duma Committee invited the representatives of the council to its meeting "for co-operation and advice," the council representatives "advised" the formation of a government. This was done in pursuance of a resolution adopted by the council at a meeting of the same day. That night the Miljukoff cabinet was formed.

This, in short, is the story of the first phase of the second Russian Revolution.

It must be borne in mind that in advising the formation of a government and in promising to support it the council did not give carte blanche to the bourgeois leaders of the "progressive bloc." On the contrary, the council advised the formation of a government only after the Duma Committee agreed to accept as its program almost all the "immediate political demands" of the socialist parties. And only insofar as the carrying out of this program necessitated their assistance had the council promised its support.

The council declined to send its representatives into the cabinet. As Socialists they refused to join the bourgeois government, notwithstanding the urgent demands of the social patriots that they do so. Just as decidedly they refused to form a government of their own as was demanded by a group of the Bolsheviks, for the socialist government can mean but one thing—a government that establishes Socialism—a thing that was manifestly out of the question. This struggle of opinions within the council and the struggle between the council and the Provisional Government formed the second phase of the revolution. It culminated in the now famous formula, "No annexations, no contributions," and was a splendid victory for that current of socialist thought which has of late been known as Zimmerwaldism.

But the immediate problems of the revolution remained un-

solved, for the bourgeois government was unable to carry out the democratic program to which it had agreed, and it could not be entrusted with the realization of the "no annexations and no indemnities" demand of the proletariat. The famous Miljukoff note to the allied governments, which led to the overthrow of the first cabinet, once more showed the treacherous nature of the bourgeoisie,

But the indignation of the council of workmen and sailors found such forcible expression that the Milyukoff cabinet was forced to resign, for the leaders of the bourgeoisie refused "to submit to the dictates of the council."

This brought the council face to face with a most momentous decision. On every hand the demand for a socialist ministry became more and more insistent, even from the reactionary bourgeoisie.

But for a number of reasons, the most important of which has just been mentioned, the council declined to assume this responsibility. There was, moreover, another consideration of extreme importance.

It has already been suggested above that the reason why the council refused to form a socialist government was that a socialist government is a government that establishes socialism. There was, however, another reason.

It must be remembered that the proletariat of Russia found itself forced to sanction the prosecution of an imperialistic war. This was no victory for social patriotism, for the council, the socialist parties, had never been mistaken about the imperialistic character of this "war for democracy." On the contrary, the council had never missed the opportunity to declare itself against this crime of all crimes, but, as Comrade Tseretelli openly stated, "The revolutionary proletariat of Russia must choose between the two evils: continue the war against Germany or be ready for a new war on the side of Germany." The council chose the lesser of the two evils, it sanctioned the continuation of the war against Germany and a coalition cabinet was formed.

The social-patriots of Russia considered the creation of the

coalition cabinet as their victory, and in some socialist quarters of the United States it was considered a victory for socialism. It was of course neither of the two, it was a hard blow to socialism, to the socialist movement of the world. True, one more "coalition cabinet" would hardly add anything to the setback given to socialism by the Burgfrieden orgies that have taken place during the war, were it not for the fact that it was the *Russian Social Democracy* that had entered the bourgeois cabinet. For it had become almost a commonplace to every socialist that Russia had no revisionism. The Social Democracy of Russia had been known as the party of Marxian socialism, as the "orthodox" party. And if the coalition cabinets of Belgium, France and Great Britain and the entire "Burgfrieden" policy of the socialist parties of most of the countries now at war could be explained as the "triumph of opportunism," the Russian coalition cabinet can not be thus explained.

But the situation in Russia at the time of the creation of the coalition cabinet was such that the socialists had no alternative. It must be borne in mind—and this has been said many times—that the Russian revolution came too late. It came at a time when the working class had already become numerically strong and socialistically highly developed. The bourgeoisie, or at least its dominant part, face to face with its grave digger, the proletariat, had long ago lost its revolutionary spirit and could not be entrusted with the problems created by the revolution. It could not and did not have the confidence of the revolutionary forces. In fact, the leaders of the bourgeoisie realized that in a government of their own they would be powerless and compelled to acquiesce in the will of the proletariat. To the bourgeoisie a socialist cabinet appealed much more than a coalition cabinet, for (notwithstanding the joy of a New York socialist paper over the possibility of a majority of socialists in the cabinet) it knew that a socialist government without the objective conditions necessary for the establishment of socialism and with an imperialistic war still in progress, would discredit socialism and the socialist movement for many years to come.

But the Russian revolution had been made by the proletariat,

had been aided by the revolutionary soldiery and supported by the revolutionary peasantry. The socialist parties of Russia, the logical and lawful representatives of these revolutionary forces, were, therefore, responsible for its success. Nay, more, the socialist parties and the masses behind them were the only social forces that are deeply concerned in the bringing of the revolution to its logical conclusion. The council was thus bound—for the sake of the success of the revolution—to enter the cabinet, to form a coalition government.

The object of the coalition cabinet was primarily "to solve the problem of government" created by the revolution, to form a government that would have the confidence of the people. And for a time it seemed as if it had succeeded. The coalition cabinet with its socialist minority was still dominated by the council. And while a part of the bourgeoisie, still interested in democracy and without imperialistic motives, was willing to march together with the revolutionary forces of Russia, another part, the one that dominates the capitalist class of Russia, the imperialists, who fear the rule of the people, started a half concealed, half open campaign against the coalition cabinet the moment it was formed. Imperialists like Milyukoff and Guchkoff naturally could not and would not support a government that propounded a program of "no annexation and no indemnities," forbid the sale of land by the large land-owners, who fearing confiscation were selling their lands to peasants and speculators, and in the midst of war and revolution introduced an eight-hour day. They bitterly and constantly attacked the coalition government which they themselves had promised to support, attacked the revolutionary democracy in general and the council in particular. Following the old Machiavellian strategy—divide et impera—they tried to divide the revolutionary forces, prejudicing the army against the workers and the peasants against the army, although with doubtful success.

The constant counter-revolutionary activities of the imperialistic bourgeoisie, together with the "super-revolutionary" activities of the bolsheviks, of which more will be said further on, have, however, succeeded in intensifying the inevitable proc-

ess of differentiation of social groups and economic interests. Thus ended the spring-days of the revolution. Not only the bourgeoisie and large land-owners but also the well-to-do peasants and later a part of the Cossacks, who were well provided with land even under the government of the czar, formed separate social-economic units and began to organize. And as the Moscow congress has shown, some of these groups are openly counter-revolutionary, most of them are against the council and all of them are against "extremes." They all oppose the idea of confiscation of private estates, they are all against the "unreasonable demands" of the workers and soldiers and are all for the war to a finish.

This, the third period of the revolution, beginning with the differentiation of Russia into separate social-economic classes and groups and ending with the uprising of the Bolsheviks, was the most trying of all. The republic was threatened, not by the activities of the counter-revolutionary elements, but by the activity of the super-revolutionaries, the Bolsheviks. The latter realized, just as did all Russian socialist parties, that Russia is not ripe for socialism. But their activities and their tactics were totally at variance with this realization. The program of action they pursued was a program that presupposed a social revolution but not the revolution that has actually taken place. "The aim and purpose of every political party," said Lenin, the brilliant leader of the Bolsheviks at the All-Russian Congress of Councils, "is the conquest of political power. It is the duty of the council to take affairs into its own hands, to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. . . . Arrest all capitalists. . . . Confiscate the land and hand it over to the local communities, without waiting for the Constituent Assembly. . . . Take over and operate the industries. . . . Immediately terminate the war." This, briefly, is the program of the Bolsheviks, which, of course, was rejected by the council.

Even more dangerous than the demands formulated by the Leninites was the course of action they pursued, threatening ruin and disaster to the Russian Revolution. While they participated in the deliberations of the council, they carried on an inde-

pendent agitation among workers and soldiers, often in direct opposition to the mandates and decisions of the council. Conditions in Russia were such that they met with ready response from a large part of the masses of workers and soldiers. The latter, tired of war, seeing no reason for war, left the trenches at the call of the Bolsheviks and fraternized with the officers of Hindenburg's General Staff. Workmen in Petrograd and in many other localities responded to the call and "expropriated the expropriators." Peasants, longing for land and holding ancient grudges against their landlords, confiscated their estates. This process of anarchy and disintegration of the revolutionary forces steadily grew, and the government was frequently unable to cope with the situation. Not even the council could bring these anarcho-socialists to their senses, for the Bolsheviks had been careful to discredit the council wherever they could.

After the council had rejected the program of the Bolsheviks, the latter secretly planned a revolution, an armed revolt for the 24th of June, when the All-Russian Congress of Councils was to be in session. But on the eve of the 24th, the plot was divulged. The Bolsheviks, members of the council, apologized, but some three weeks later the long-planned and carefully prepared revolution took place. It was planned to capture the bourgeois ministers and to assume full power. The soldiers at the front were to leave the trenches.

For three days the streets of Petrograd were the scene of civil war, soldier fought soldier, worker fought worker. At the same time soldiers at the front were leaving their trenches, allowing Hindenburg to march unobstructed far into Russia.

The "revolution" of the Bolsheviks was suppressed by force. Some of the leaders, among them Trotzky, Lunacharsky, Krylenko, were arrested. The chief organ of the Bolsheviks, "Pravda," and several other papers, were suppressed. For several days meetings were forbidden. The council sanctioned these measures, though in so doing they struck a blow at the socialist movement, for the masses will always remember that the socialists in Russia sanctioned capital punishment, supported a war that they themselves had branded as imperialistic, arrested and im-

prisoned political agitators, suppressed free speech and free press. Whether we agree with the action of the council or not, the circumstances that led to these acts must be understood. The council acted as it did to save the revolution.

The revolutionary democracy emerged much weakened from the third period of the revolution. The counter-revolutionary activities of the imperialistic bourgeoisie, the uprising of the Bolsheviks and its suppression, the separatist movement of the various nationalities, notably Finland and Ukraina, the unfortunate offensive in Galicia and the triumphant march of Hindenburg have weakened the council and have strengthened the counter-revolutionary forces.

Forced as it was to sanction the prosecution of the war, it came out at the very beginning of the revolution with the formula, "No annexations and no indemnities."

To-day the council is still strong enough to control the situation. But every day of war weakens the chances of the revolution. From the beginning of the revolution, Russia has been struggling against a general peace, which no one desires. But Russia cannot go on fighting, for it must be remembered that the revolution itself was a protest against war, that it was fought by men and women who were tired of slaughter and exhausted with bloodshed. To them the end of the revolution means peace. It was clear that the agitation of the Bolsheviks owed its success to this sentiment among the people.

The realization of this fact, and the necessity of carrying on the war led the council to formulate its peace terms at the very beginning of the revolution in the words that have echoed and re-echoed the world over, "No annexations, no indemnities." The council hoped that the Allies would likewise clearly state their war aims and peace terms. It hoped that the Russian formula would force the Allies to abandon the idea of conquest, thus bringing the war to a close, or at least giving the Russian people a reason for fighting.

To-day the Russian knows that he has nothing to fight for. He knows that this is a war of conquest and imperialism and

from day to day the fight of the revolutionary democracy against separate peace grows increasingly difficult.

At the same time economic conditions in Russia are steadily going from bad to worse. The entire industrial system is breaking down, the transportation system has totally collapsed, and, as it seems, not even the American experts can help it during the war. The national debt is growing. Over three billion rubles must be raised annually alone for the payment of interest. Paper money to the value of twenty million rubles is being issued daily in order to meet current expenses. There is a shortage of foodstuffs, and, as a consequence, prices are soaring, people are growing more and more dissatisfied, are ready to blame anybody, respond readily to any call. Under such conditions the dark forces of counter-revolution are trying to lift their heads; the agents of the Kaiser and the agents of the Czar are doing their best to defeat the revolution; the imperialist bourgeoisie and reactionary generals of the "war to the finish" type are working hard to disrupt the unity of the revolutionary democracy and of the council.

At present a success of all these reactionary and counter-revolutionary activities seems doubtful, however. The council is still strong enough to cope with the situation and in suppression of counter-revolutionary outbreaks will have the support of all revolutionary elements of Russia. One cabinet may fall and another may rise, but the revolutionary democracy as represented by the council will still be the dominant factor in the political life of Russia until the meeting of the constituent Assembly, which is to solve the general problems of the revolution.

This does not mean that the meeting of the Constituent Assembly will bring permanent quiet, for the problems of the revolution are not of a nature that produce calmness. The war problem, the form of government and above all the land question cannot be solved to the satisfaction of all classes of society, and are of too great and vital importance to be solved by parliamentary means alone.

Judging by the present co-relation of forces in Russia the Constituent Assembly will have a large socialist majority. The

war problem will therefore be solved (if it can be solved at all without the co-operation of the revolutionary proletariat of the other warring nations) on the basis of the "no annexations, no indemnities" formula. True, the bourgeoisie is imperialistic and on the question of war they may carry with them a part of the social-patriots; true, a part of the bolshevik faction will favor immediate termination of the war (although no other means to terminate the war than fraternization with the enemy-comrades had ever been suggested by them); but neither of these two factions separately will have enough strength to overcome the "no annexation, no indemnities" majority.

But on the question of the form of government the socialist majority will present a solid front. The political programs of both socialist parties, the Social-Democratic and the Social Revolutionist, are the same. In fact, the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, which represents all the socialist factions, has recently issued its political program, which is accepted by all the revolutionary forces of Russia. It proposes, of course, a democratic republic and finds no place for an institution like the United States Supreme Court. Nor have the Russian socialists any admiration for so distinguished an institution as the Senate, for they propose just one House of Representatives elected by universal and equal suffrage of men and women. And what will seem strange even to the American socialists, whose party demands "the election of the President and Vice-President by direct vote of the people," the Russian socialist parties want neither a President nor a Vice-President, for as the Bulletin of the Council has it, "a President elected by the people, although nominally responsible to the people, is practically responsible to nobody."

The bourgeois parties will try their best to secure a republic after the American fashion, with a bicameral system for check and balance, with a President elected by the direct vote of the people and vested with the veto power, etc., but they themselves realize that their case is hopeless.

But the questions of war and the form of government, important and vital as they are to the interests of the bourgeoisie,

do not so much embarrass the capitalist "liberals" and the reactionary forces that have recently joined them as does the land problem. After all the revolution, the liberation of Russia will create the longed for home market. And with a population that is seventy-five per cent. agrarian that home market will be a home-sphere of capitalization for many long years to come. So even failing in their imperialistic designs and solving the war problem on the basis of "no annexation," the bourgeoisie will not be so badly off. The same is true of the form of government. Even under absolute political democracy the exploitation of the working class will go on, for Russia will remain capitalistic, for the time being at least. But the land problem is certainly not very promising to the bourgeoisie.

The land problem in Russia is so complicated, it has so rich a history and is so full of theoretical splendor that any attempt to describe and analyze it here is impossible. It will have to be dealt with separately, probably in the next issue of the CLASS STRUGGLE. But it must be borne in mind that Russia, the Russian revolution, can be fully understood only after one has studied and understood the land problem. It has become a proverb among Russian socialists that no revolution can be successful without solving the land problem. No wonder that every political party, before and after the revolution, has considered it necessary to have a "land plank" in its platform.

The only great bourgeois political party now in the field, the Cadets, have long ago realized that the peasants will have the land. So the bourgeois promised them the czar's estates, the land of the clergy. They went even so far as to promise to part with their private estates for "just prices." But the socialist parties want the land without any prices, just or unjust, they demand the confiscation of large estates, they intend to socialize the land. To be sure, there are differences in the platforms of the two socialist parties, but the differences are in the forms of collective ownership proposed by them and not in the method of acquirement. The land, if the Constituent Assembly will be controlled by representatives of the revolutionary democracy, as seems probable, will certainly be confiscated. This will be the

greatest economic change made by the Russian revolution. Other economic changes, the entire abolition of private property, the establishment of the co-operative commonwealth will come with the next revolution.

Labor and Democracy

By LOUIS C. FRAINA

The deeds of the government have made an unanswerable answer to the words of the convention of the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy. The Alliance appealed to the government to allow the People's Council to hold their convention, but the government refused. While the "loyal" laborites and "socialists" were patriotically resolute about democracy, the government instituted a series of dastardly raids against the I. W. W. and upon the national office of the Socialist Party. These reactionary acts were emphasized by President Wilson's reply to the Pope's message on peace—a reply that is magnificent in its rhetoric and subterfuges, but which directly promotes a brutal imperialistic war to the finish.

These incidents indicate the yawning gulf that lies between words and deeds. There is, moreover, a grim humor in the statement of John Spargo, in the *New York Evening Post* of September 10, in which Spargo, after pointing out the absurdity of certain charges made against the I. W. W., concluded:

"The stupidity of the policy of repression and suppression is making it increasingly difficult for radicals to support the government in its conduct of the war."

Loyalty was dominant and hysteria rampant at this convention of the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy. The "Red, White and Blue" special was symbolic of the delegates, who in one breath prated of "internationalism," while in the next they slobbered over the flag in approved jingoistic style. Rose Pastor Stokes, in a fit of maudlin sentimentalism, concluded an address by saying that formerly she would not salute the stars and stripes, and read an ode to America, excellent as to its patriotism, perhaps, but perfectly atrocious as a poem. Once a sentimental poseur, always one. A newspaper correspondent aptly, if unwittingly, characterized the convention in saying that it was trying to produce a "star-spangled-banner brand

of Socialism and unionism intermingled." And to cap the climax of absurdity, a resolution demanding for small nationalities "the right to live their own lives on their own soil and to develop their own culture" concluded with a declaration in favor of a Zionist state—"the re-establishment of a national homeland in Palestine on a basis of self-government." The general resolutions of the convention were obviously framed with the intention of getting support from any and all groups, irrespective of whether the things resolved about were attainable or in conformity with a central principle of social action.

But maudlin jingoism was not the only sentiment of the convention. There was a good dash of hypocrisy. Imagine J. P. Holland, president of the New York Federation of Labor, at a convention for "labor and democracy"! It was the patriotic and democratic Mr. Holland who some months ago was responsible for the Federation passing a resolution asking the state government to suspend the labor laws, including the child labor laws, as a measure of war. This was a demand disgusting in its cruelty. It would have meant destroying the meagre safe-guards placed around the unorganized and the unskilled. Secure in their own strength and reeking with smug complacency, Holland and his cohorts were willing to offer up the children and the unorganized workers as a sacrifice on the altar of their country. Labor and democracy! And the hypocrisy was emphasized by a "manifesto" in which the renegade Socialists claimed to be "working hand in hand" with Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg!

In point of delegates and convictions, the convention physically and spiritually was dominated by the American Federation of Labor, a domination emphasized by the selection of Samuel Gompers as president of the Alliance. The reactionary character of the deliberations was an expression and an affirmation of the general attitude of the A. F. of L., an attitude that has made the A. F. of L. the bulwark of reaction in this country.

The Socialist Party, having in the past refused to take an uncompromising attitude against the principles and practice of the A. F. of L., is now reaping what it has sown. It is a matter of

incontrovertible fact that the Socialist representatives in the councils of the A. F. of L. have, as a rule, assisted in strengthening the control of reaction. And that the A. F. of L. is the centre of reaction in this country is indisputable. Its narrow craft-and-caste interests exclude any large consideration of proletarian policy. It refuses to organize the bulk of the workers, limiting its activity to protecting the interests and jobs of an aristocracy of labor. It is seeking to secure a place in the governing system of the nation, to rise to power and caste privilege upon the neglect and betrayal of the great mass of the workers, the unorganized and the unskilled. In short, the A. F. of L. has pursued a policy inimical to the totality of proletarian interests and strengthened capitalist reaction, but instead of declaring war upon this reactionary attitude, the Socialist Party concluded a humiliating peace with the reactionary and generally corrupt representatives of the A. F. of L.

The policy being reactionary during peace, a similar policy during war became a matter of course.

The worst feature of the situation is that the A. F. of L. is using the war and the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy to strengthen its position, not as against the government and capitalism, but as against its radical union competitors. The A. F. of L. has surrendered to the government. It has not secured the recognition as a governmental factor that it aimed for and which the British unions have achieved. But having failed in one direction, the A. F. of L. seeks compensation in another. Accordingly, it is using the war to wage a bitter fight for the destruction of the I. W. W. and of the radical and secession unions represented in the Workmen's Council. The American Alliance Convention did not issue a single murmur of protest at the brutal, worse-than-Prussian assaults made by the government and its representatives upon the I. W. W. Nay, on the floor of the convention of the Alliance a shameful street-gutter attack was made upon the I. W. W. and William D. Haywood by John P. Holland and cheered by the delegates—among whom, incidentally, was a bishop of the Roman Catholic Church.

The renegade Socialists at the convention, among whom were

formerly bitter critics of the A. F. of L., acquiesced in every single reactionary action. The disgusting level to which these renegades stooped may be seen in the pledge which they and every other delegate had to sign:

"The undersigned hereby affirm that it is the duty of all the people of the United States, without regard to class, nationality, politics or religion, faithfully and loyally to support the government of the United States in carrying on the present war for justice, freedom and democracy to a triumphant conclusion, and gives this pledge to uphold every honorable effort for the accomplishment of that purpose, and to support the American Federation of Labor, as well as the declaration of organized labor's representatives, made March 12, 1917, at Washington, D. C., as to 'labor's position in peace or in war,' and agrees that this pledge shall be his right to membership in this conference of the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy."

It is a disgusting pledge. Moreover, it is a complete abandonment of Socialism. It abandons the class struggle. It abandons an independent policy. It abandons the international concept. It is an acceptance of the reactionary A. F. of L. as the mentor of *Socialist* activity during the war.

The single radical action of the convention was its demand for the conscription of wealth. But that in itself is not an independent policy. The demand is being made strongly in Middle Class and even in Imperialistic circles. Moreover, the conscription of wealth is itself a necessity of a definite, organized Imperialism. As a measure of war it has already been introduced in Great Britain. The conscription of wealth is a plank in the platform of the new liberal Imperialism and State Socialism. In their apparently radical demand, accordingly, as well as in their general attitude and deeds, the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy is taking its place as a factor in the new social alignment precipitated by Imperialism—an alignment that distributes the burdens as well as the profits of Imperialism among privileged classes, including the aristocracy of labor.

And it is precisely in this that the American Alliance is sig-

nificant in the larger sense. It is a preliminary step in the formation of a national social reform movement, which, representing the interests of the new Middle Class and the aristocracy of labor, is willing to barter away democracy and independent revolutionary action in return for concessions of social reform from a "liberal" Imperialistic bourgeoisie. This has been the policy of German Socialism, and to a lesser extent of European Socialism generally. An imperialistic social reform party—that is what will surely, in one shape or another, become a reality in the days after the war.

There are many forces working for the consummation of such a party. Certain elements of the Socialist Party, their attitude on the war aside, are fitter elements for a program of national social reform than for Socialism. That, indeed, has been the program of our party bureaucracy, which, prior to the war, was dominated jointly by John Spargo and Morris Hillquit.

The People's Council, moreover, is equally making recruits for such a party of national social reform. The rancors of war don't last forever, and the elements in the two camps now opposed to each other may agree to get together during the days of peace. For the People's Council has unquestionably proven its bourgeois, nationalistic character. Their attitude during the week when they were trying to hold a convention, their craven refusal to go straight to Minneapolis, permission or no permission; their general social policies and peace terms—all these circumstances indicate their character as nationalists and social reformers. Their pacifism is a very sorry thing, and based largely upon the impulse of the moment. The People's Council's praise of President Wilson's reply to the Pope's message on peace is indicative of their bourgeois psychology.

The Socialist Party in its support of the People's Council has again made a tactical error of the first importance. Indeed, the tragedy of the situation is seen in the circumstance that our party has practically lost its identity nationally as a force against the war. All its anti-war activity is virtually centred in the People's Council, an organization that does not

accept revolutionary action, and the conservatism of which, moreover, is strengthened by the party bureaucrats dominant in its management.

The People's Council is being used by the Socialist Party officials to make votes for the party. This may succeed, temporarily, but its ultimate effect will be to make recruits for the Gompers-Spargo party of "practical" social reform.

Our struggle against war is simply an expression of our general struggle against Capitalism. Our action during war must square with our action and purposes during peace. And it is, therefore, mandatory upon us to scrutinize closely all movements against the war, and our own deeds. In our action against the war we should create reserves for action during peace. The People's Council does not square with our general revolutionary aims, nor does it even adopt temporarily radical action against the war. The party should immediately separate itself from this bourgeois concern.

It is easy to sneer at the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy. It is easy to enthusiastically accept the People's Council. The more difficult task, indispensable, is to cleave to fundamentals and express our own independent action in our own revolutionary way as adherents of *international* Socialism.

J'accuse!

Friedrich Adler's Address in Court

II.

I am convinced that the great majority of Social-democrats went into this war only because they believed it to be a war of self-defence, and from the point of view of national defence it is to be understood that the nation should defend its entity. That is still Social-democratic. But then the idea of visiting the defeat that we were trying to avoid, with all its horrors and all its misery, upon others, took possession of us. It was the idea that found expression in the *Arbeiterzeitung* on the 5th of August in the words, "However the die may be cast, we hope, from the depth of our hearts, that it may be cast for the victory of the holy cause of the German people." This word *victory* was emphasized more and more strongly as time went by, and it became the main point of difference between us, for, as Socialists, we must oppose those who seek to profit from this war. Just as the man who is attacked in the forest by robbers and uses all his strength to throw them off, would not think of robbing his attacker when he has him in his power, so should we refuse, in our relations with other nations, to sink down to the level of street robbers. But when I insisted at the national party conference last March that the party executive should demand emphatically of the Central Powers a bid for peace without annexation and without indemnities, I was laughed at and had only sixteen of the 100 delegates on my side. At first I feared that a short victorious war would anchor absolutism firmly for decades to come. But the long months of war, with its horrible ravages and destruction, have awakened in the people a realization of its misery, have inoculated the organism of the people with its anti-toxin.

We have lived through a great historical tragedy and only in the light of this tragedy can I and my motives be understood. The party that was ordained to be the bearer of humanity has become a tool of the government, the instrument of tendencies that should be foreign to its very nature.

I do not attribute this to the ill will of individuals. Individuals have made mistakes. The great tragedy lay in the labor movement itself, lay in the supremacy that the bureaucratic machine of this labor movement has won over the future aims and interests of the proletariat. As faithful servants the leaders of the proletariat strove to save the organization. But in so doing, they have betrayed their real class interests, they have betrayed the International, and the idea of the Social revolution. They have won small benefits for the workers during the war, it is true. I should be the last to refuse to recognize what was accomplished to protect the working class from many a threatening wrong. But they have sold their birthright for a mess of pottage.

This tragedy is not of Austria alone. I have been accused of being a trouble maker, for venting such attacks upon the labor movement of a country whose opponents are clericals and Nationalists.

Nothing has ever been so repugnant to me as these two Austrian capitalist parties. But it was a terrible disappointment for me to discover that the Austrian Social Democracy, which has been the highest thing in my whole existence, was but a blind leader of the blind in Austria. I cannot measure the Socialist party by capitalist standards, but alone by the standard it has set itself in its own glorious history. And it hurt me, that this party should have adopted the evil traits of its opponents. I came into conflict with the Party Executive Committee particularly because it has become more and more a *counter-revolutionary institution*. The conviction has grown upon me that a *revolution in Austria can come only against the will of the Executive Committee* which will always be a hindrance to the revolutionary movement. And for this Executive Committee I had to work as its first secretary and to attend all of its meetings. I realized then more and more clearly: when once matters become serious, my position will bring me into a sharp inner conflict between my duties as secretary and my own personal convictions. I came to the conclusion that our movement can recover only if it is given

an entirely new leadership. Seitz particularly always harped upon responsibility. Violent methods must be persecuted, for the Executive Committee must bear the responsibility for the blood that is shed. But I maintain that this responsibility must be born. The secret of this whole inner conflict lies in the fact that the party, in these long years of peace has developed organizations, writers, political representatives, in short a whole civil staff, but lacks officers; in the fact that nobody in Austria has realized that, under certain circumstances, force must be used. On the contrary, they have always made it their duty to prevent disturbances. Dr. Renner struck the note that dominated this whole attitude of the party regarding the use of forcible measures. I saw that the idea of force was to be discredited in the eyes of the working class. Dr. Renner is a great, a gifted demagogue, and he may believe that heavy volumes might have turned the absolutism of Stürghk into a more enlightened form of absolutism. But he sought to hide, with peculiar skill, that in Austria as in Russia, it is not a question of a social revolution, that first and foremost the bourgeois revolution must close the accounts of the absolute regime.

This opposition drove me to **individual action** because the party and its leadership had lost the revolutionary feeling of the working class. What I wished to prove was that only over the heads and against the will of the party authorities in Austria can a real revolutionary upheaval in Austria come, that only by disregarding them will it be possible to use the force that must be used to overthrow the rule of force upon which our government rests. Now Dr. Renner will prove to you at once that individual action is in opposition to social-democratic principles, that it is anarchistic. I was not so childish as to believe that my deed would abolish absolutism in Austria, or that it would bring peace. I have not become an anarchist. Anarchism attributes such possibilities to individual action. I have never believed it. I stand, as I have always stood, for mass action carried out with all effective means that are in accord with the feeling of right of the masses—in times of peace by parliamentary means, but when ab-

solutism has destroyed all parliamentary means, also by force—to be conducted by the masses. Today, as ever, I maintain that mass action must be, and is, decisive, and that my act has been nothing but a modest individual act, not to take the place of mass action, not even to call forth mass action, as some of my friends, who believed that I hoped for a concerted uprising of the people in answer to my deed, have said. What I wanted was to establish the psychological premise for future mass action, in Austria. I did not hope, by my deed, to call forth a revolution, but I wished to force the party to consider its attitude to a revolution. I have never, I should like to call the attention of the public prosecutor to this fact—during the course of the whole war, said a word in favor of forcible uprising because I knew that, in the atmosphere in which I was condemned to live, in the milieu of this Executive Committee and this party, such words cannot be spoken. They have lost all understanding for the fact that force can only be created by action. They, in their cynicism, would have laughed at me. It was necessary, therefore, to present an avowal to the use of force, an avowal that would force the comrades to say, "This man is serious." He sacrifices his life in order to affirm his convictions. I wanted to force them to take a stand, and they have taken a stand. Today no Renner, no Seitz will dare to say to the workers of Austria that forcible action is impossible in Austria, that forcible measures must not and cannot be used. That was what I desired to accomplish, what seemed to me worth the sacrifice of my life, to force these people to change their attitude.

The argument against individual action is not altogether sound. My act was an individual act against the background of the masses, and I cannot understand how people whose whole action has been individualistic—an individualistic begging for consideration from the ministers—can condemn individual action when it is directed against a minister. Until 1889 the party made active use of the tactic of threatening individual authorities. Again and again individual organs of the government have been individually threatened and exposed.

I will add here that I have never over-estimated my deed, either before or after the first police hearing; I do not wish that my deed be over-estimated, either in its object, or in its effect. I simply wished once more to *give the revolutionary spirit a place in our movement.*

It was an open avowal of the policy of force, but it was a symbolic act, a parable as well. By it I wished to show to the masses what could be accomplished on a large scale, that each and every one must be willing to sacrifice his life, that sacrifices should not be invited, but that one must be ready to sacrifice. You object, that I have committed this deed against the principles of the social democracy. That also is not true. The International has admitted parties which, before the war, stood, in their programs, for individual action, the Social Revolutionists of Russia. I was one of their opponents, and have always carried on a sharp theoretical fight against them. *Mass actions must be supreme.*

It were wrong to value this deed as a coldly, mathematically thought out act, based purely upon theoretical considerations, and unfeeling logic. Feelings have played an extraordinary part, a double part, in my act. Because of the shame that has befallen my party, and because of the shame that Stürghk has brought upon Austria. Both motives have worked constantly upon my feelings. In a party meeting some one once said of me: "No one else has brought forth as many manifestos and resolutions during the war as Fritz Adler." I always felt the need of opposing the activity of the party. I tried everything I could to influence the people. My party did not use the right means against the Shame of Austria. My father shared this feeling of shame, in the same measure, in the same degree. In this matter, in spite of all differences between us, he stood completely on my side. I have tried to voice this indignity again and again. I delivered a speech in Zürich for which I was held for investigation; I published a manifesto; I persuaded my friend Liebknecht to speak in the Prussian House of Representatives of this shame, to the horror of the ruling class. I have tried all possible means to agitate publicly.

Now I will tell you what it was that particularly worked upon me. During the investigation I spoke openly and at some length. Here I may confine my remarks to things that are already proven, occurrences that may be read in the papers, that have become notorious. I will speak only of *political oppression*.

I could not rid myself of the feeling of degradation that preyed upon me.

Are we dogs that we allow ourselves to be beaten? Have we no honor, that we should bear it?

You cannot conceive what it means to live under censorship in Austria. A propaganda newspaper, the "Volk," which I edited at that time was the only German paper to be forbidden. I edited the "Kampf," our scientific magazine, under the greatest difficulties. An article of mine was withheld by the censor for weeks. Then it was returned—one line had been stricken out. Other articles were held back for months. There was method in this madness.

This is an example of the contemptible, and partially inefficient character of Austrian censorship. In my position as secretary of the party I had become familiar with the censorship and its workings. My counsel has attempted to bring witnesses to describe this, but they were not allowed to testify.

Russia and China have their Parliament, we are the only truly degraded nation. We have no popular representation. We are not consulted, when money is needed, nor do our rulers trouble to account for the money they have spent.

During this whole absolutist regime it was Stürghk who played the leading role. He was always violently opposed to election reform, and was its bitterest enemy in the election reform commission. The whole opposition to the extension of a popular franchise grouped about him. This man later became Prime Minister, and from the beginning, he tried to prove the soundness of his opposition, by showing that Parliament was impossible, by proving, ad absurdum, its ineffect-

uality. Stürghk saw, with joy, how Parliament became more and more incapable; and purposely he finally brought about its adjournment.

It was clear to me, even then, that Stürghk had far-reaching plans. That he proposed to set aside Parliament completely was evident. Even though it had navigated successfully through the difficulties of the taxation debate, Stürghk nevertheless succeeded in bringing about its downfall.

When war came, and with it, the most critical period in the history of the Austrian nations, Parliament was not called. Absolutism reigned. And this undiluted absolutism, to which we were subjected, was quite a different thing from the absolutism of peace times. It was an open coup d'état. The whole fate of the country rested upon one man.

I must insert here a point I have forgotten to mention: the attitude of our party to the Stürghk-Hochenberger Ministry.

The relations between our party and the ministry had been broken. No representative associated with Hochenberger. It was impossible to discuss questions of judiciary and of censorship. Nor did the party have the opportunity to renew relations with Stürghk after 1916. Not even those whose patriotic fervor had never failed, who had forgotten everything but their patriotism, not even they could approach Stürghk.

The national conference which voted down my motion, of which I have spoken before, adopted instead a number of very tame proposals to assure their acceptance by the government. Seitz went to Stürghk with copies of the memorandum that was to be submitted two days later—that he might be informed, and ready to answer. Hereupon, in a letter to Seitz, Stürghk declared that he was not inclined to pay any attention to the proposals, which would have been, more properly, submitted by mail. After the rebuff the Social democrats did the least that they could do—they no longer went to Stürghk.

The considerations connected with Count Stürghk were

intensified just at this time by very depressing experiences within the party. Above all, the general political situation, failing as it did to give even the slightest gleam of hope for peace, affected me terribly. Hopelessly I looked forward to the 5th of November to the expected Labor Day. What would happen? I will go there once more, and will move that we demand peace without annexations, and will, perhaps, win two or three new votes in favor of my motion. But the rest will vote, as a body, against it, and so I will once more have failed in my struggle against the ignorance of the masses. I must choose a new method, in order to shock, to arouse them out of their apathy; and in this respect, as in many other respects, this method has been effective. The resolution that was adopted on November 5, was almost identical with the one I had so often proposed, practically the same, as the one that had, until then, met regularly with defeat. Thus my act has had the effect that I had hoped for. I have never regretted it, and am still convinced that it was a useful one—that I have accomplished, what had to be accomplished, to steer the situation out of the deadlock into which it had come.

I realize that I am speaking to-day for the last time, and I should therefore renew the motives that led me to commit this deed in a few sentences, to explain how it happened that I have come to this place, to show you how I look upon this deed from my own moral viewpoint. If you wish to understand what went on within me, you must understand above all, that I am not the anti-patriot that I have been represented to be, that I have acted rather under the spur of necessity. The necessity lay in the fact that I could not tear myself loose from this Austria, that I could not sever the bonds that bound me to the party, although I was not materially dependent upon it. For that is the root of my tragedy, that I could not break away from the Austrian Social democracy and from the whole Socialist movement. I wish to show to you that the question of the murder was a real moral question to me. I am opposed to all murder, and it was not easy for me to commit murder. I have always believed that the killing of a

human being is something inhuman, but I was convinced that we are living in a barbaric age, that we are forced to kill. The war is, to me, inhuman, as is also revolution, for in it too, human lives are sacrificed. For we hate murder and violent death. It is our moral duty to work according to the words of Marx, to organize a new society that knows no other aim but labor within, and peace without.

Recent Development of Capitalism in Japan

By S. KATAYAMA

Japan is a snug home of modern capitalism. The government of Japan has been very eager to make it so. It helped capitalism to grow, politically and financially, in every possible manner. Originally the government of modern Japan was established by the desperate efforts of the lower ranks of samurai (the hereditary soldiers in feudal Japan), mostly of two clans—Chosiu and Sassiu. When they established the revolutionary government in 1868, after successfully overturning the feudal government at Yedo, now Tokyo, they repealed all laws of the feudal regime, declared freedom of occupation and of movement, and confiscated the land of the feudal lords (36), together with those of their chief—Tokugawa Dynasty. Thus the new government took away legal monopolies that were formerly conferred on private persons by the feudal government. All castes were said to be abolished and religious restrictions were done away with. It gave tenant farmers of feudal lords a full legal title to all the land they cultivated or used, without payment. The thus newly created land owner had only to pay a tax of 3 per cent. on the land value. The valuation of the land all over the country was based on the productive income of rice crop. Rice cost then \$1.75 a koku (1 koku is 4.9629 bushels). In this way the new revolutionary government obtained the confidence of the farmers. The government, moreover, promised the farmers that the land tax of 3 per cent. would soon be reduced to 1 per cent., a promise which was, however, never fulfilled. But the land owners have profited by the natural increase of land values and the increased incomes from the yield of land as a result of the general progress of the country.

Until the revolution of 1868 the farmers had been paying, in a form of rent in rice, 85 per cent. of the entire national expenses, but to-day the land owners pay only slightly over 12 per cent. of

the national budget, although they have been getting larger rice crops. From 24,449,000 koku in 1877 it increased gradually to 58,301,000 koku in 1916, while the price of rice increased in the same period from \$2.75 to \$10.00, an increase of 267 per cent. This being the case, farm lands have been rapidly capitalized and the price of land has been rising by leaps and bounds. An acre of paddy field costs as high as \$3,000. As a result small farmers are being driven into a corner, to sink once more into the class of tenant farmers, under the increasing exploitation of the capitalist land owners. The thirst for land is largely attributable to valuable political rights and privileges bestowed on the land owners.

In 1890 the imperial constitution was promulgated and the national parliament was opened in the same year. The constitution has many inviting provisions, such as freedom of press, thought and assembly, but conditioned by a clause—according to the law or within the law. It gives, however, to the Japanese capitalist class a practical monopoly of political rights and privileges upon which the firm foundation of Japanese capitalism is laid. Parliamentary suffrage rights are restricted by property and educational qualifications, thus practically limiting the franchise to the big land owners and capitalists.

With a population of sixty-five millions, there are in Japan only a million and a half voters. It follows that the two branches of the parliament are completely bourgeois. The lower house is dominated by the land owners and capitalists, the upper house is controlled by hereditary nobles and specially appointed bureaucrats, all conservative and reactionary. Both houses are the faithful servants of bureaucracy and capitalism, so that the ever-increasing national budget has been shifted always onto the shoulders of the working population (\$40,000,000 in 1893 and \$301,000,000 in 1917) by means of indirect taxes. At present nearly two-thirds of the national budget is raised by indirect taxes. In every conceivable way favoritism in legislation has been bestowed upon the rich people, at the expense of the vast toiling masses. The transportation tax is a particularly flagrant example of this fact. There is a tax on one sen ($\frac{1}{2}$ c) on street

car tickets bought singly. If, however, they are bought 100 at a time, an expenditure out of the question for the poor, there is a tax of but 5 sen ($2\frac{1}{2}c$) on the whole. And in the government railroad, discrimination in favor of the rich is still more marked. There is a tax of one sen on every ticket up to 50 miles for every local trip on the railway, electric or steam. But if you buy the same distance in a season ticket of six months or one year you pay only 5 sen as a tax for the whole season. The tickets may cost \$25, \$30 or \$50, but the tax is only $2\frac{1}{2}c$.

Japan has, at present, a national debt of one and a quarter billion dollars, paying interest at 4 and 5 per cent. The government pays annually about sixty million dollars interest on those bonds. The incomes derived from the government bonds are entirely exempted from income taxes, but a worker or a clerk who gets \$20 a month is required to pay a national income tax which amounts to somewhere near \$4.00 or more a year, besides innumerable local taxes. And yet he has no voice in national elections.

Salt is a government monopoly. It was inaugurated with two purposes in view—to get an increased revenue for the government and to protect the owners of the salt fields in the four main islands of Japan. The government gets 74c on every 100 pounds of salt sold; at present the wholesale price of 100 pounds is \$1.25. But if the government gets it from Formosa, where the salt supply is unlimited, it may get 100 pounds of salt at 15c to 20c, while salt may be imported from Manchuria even more cheaply. But the government limits production of Formosan salt to just enough to meet the deficit in the supply produced upon the main islands. This uneconomic policy is obviously for the protection of salt farmers or old salt field owners, whose properties were valued at two or three million dollars before the salt monopoly was enforced. To-day they are worth from ten to fifteen million dollars. Thus, the common people have to pay more for salt. State capitalism in Japan is maintained for the interest of private capitalists. Growth of capitalism in Japan has been even greater under such favorable conditions. To this end all the welfare and happiness of the common people and workers

is sacrificed. From the beginning of the present era Japan helped its capitalists in every way. It has been the policy of the government to start new industries on a capital of taxes, to sell them at a very nominal figure or even to turn them over gratis into the hands of some capitalist high in government favor. Furthermore, very rich subsidies and bonuses are given to many capitalist enterprises without limitations. For instance, in order to build up a cotton industry in Japan, the government made the cotton free of import duty. This, of course, killed the home cotton growing industry, which until then had clothed the entire population of thirty-five millions. The cotton industry is now one of the biggest industries in Japan, working 2,870,000 spindles, importing cotton valued at \$110,000,000 a year. The industry is controlled by big capitalists under the management of 161 companies. There are over 400,000 women workers in the cotton and other textile industries; these poor girls, mostly under 20, some of them 10 or 12 years of age, are mercilessly exploited in the factories. Female cotton spinners work 12 hours a day for 28 or 29 days every month. Half of them are employed at night, for, according to the new factory statutes it has become legal to employ children of 10 for 14 hours a day. These statutes are to be in force for the next fourteen years.

Girls are forced, as a consequence, to leave the factories after a very short time, broken down from overwork and the ravages of infectious diseases. It has become necessary to recruit, annually, a supply of eight hundred to a thousand new girls in some of the larger factories in order to keep up the necessary supply of female labor.

Every year some two hundred thousand girls are newly recruited to supply the factories; of these a few stay more than a year in the factory, eighty thousand return, the rest disappear. Upon such a brutal exploitation system the cotton masters have built up their industry in a short time, capitalized at nearly a hundred million dollars and producing some four hundred million dollars' worth of cotton yarn and goods a year.

But the most extravagantly protected industry in Japan is the Formosan sugar industry. Japan took the island in 1898. Since

then the government and its capitalists have decided to raise the sugar supply for the entire country in Formosa, and proceeded to establish sugar companies under very high protection. In the early stage of the industry the government supplied, freely, seeds, machines for cultivation and refinery, and many other aids. To keep up, or rather, to raise sugar prices the government put up very high protective customs duties on sugar and passed a sugar consumption tax to be used for the payment of direct bounties to the sugar companies. At one time 80 or 90 per cent. of the cost of production was paid to the sugar masters in Formosa either directly or indirectly. Furthermore, the government gives a direct bounty of 50c on every hundred pounds of sugar cane raised. The sugar industry in Formosa is capitalized on a gigantic scale. In a little while its valuation has reached forty-two million dollars and it produced 517,520,000 pounds in 1912 and 681,179,000 pounds in 1917.

Nor is this all. When a group of capitalists start in the production of sugar they buy sugar lands from poor natives at very low prices. The purchase amounts, practically, to the confiscation of the desired lands from the farmers. The lands thus obtained are then tenanted at very high rentals. In this manner the natives are exploited, powerless and rightless, as a conquered people.

At present there are eight or nine sugar companies in Formosa, monopolizing practically the whole sugar territories. This division of the sugar territories is intended to regulate the production of sugar and the price of cane. Each company has a fixed sphere of influence within which this company buys the cane at its own price. The farmers cannot sell to others, so they are the easy prey of the sugar masters. Thus the Formosan sugar industry is built up for the sole interest of certain capitalists at the expense of the people and the natives. The sugar masters, moreover, are combined to sell sugar, in conjunction with the capitalist sugar dealers of the country, and regulate the home supply. Thus they keep up the prices artificially throughout the year. Before the war the Japanese had been paying more than double the price that was paid for sugar in America. The surplus product is

dumped into China and into other markets at less than cost price. This present year they have agreed among themselves to export 3,289,216 piculs, in order to keep up the prices at home at the present abnormal level. This is a typical illustration of the Japanese system of protection for capitalist industries. These sugar capitalists who have been making a vast profit every year by means of legal protection would crash into hopeless bankruptcy if they should be deprived of this protection. They live on government protection at the expense of the people.

In much the same way every big industry is protected by an elaborate legislative scheme. Thus, for instance, all big banks are, in one way or another, protected by special privileges. Yokohama Specie, Kangyo, Kogyo Banks and the Bank of Japan all have legal monopolies by means of which they exploit the people. The Kangyo Bank has the right to gather small funds by means of a lottery. The Kogyo Bank has been empowered to take a commission of \$1 on each \$100 on all imported capital.

There is perhaps no nation on the face of the earth that so generously and so bounteously protects capitalism and its interests as Japan. Indeed, it is the government of the capitalists, by the capitalists, and for the capitalists.

Again, the shipping trade and the ship-building industry are both subsidized for many years. For the last fiscal year the ship-building trades received an aggregate sum of one and one-half million dollars, while the shipping industry drew several millions from the public coffers. The biggest of these companies is the N. Y. K., with a paid-up capital of twenty millions and a reserve fund equally large. This company alone, which paid a dividend of 70 per cent. last year, nevertheless received some one and a half million in subsidies.

Thus modern capitalism in Japan is well protected and aided on the one hand, and tolerated, or rather encouraged, by the government in its exploitation of the workers on the other. To keep the working class in subjection to their greedy and brutal capitalist employers, the government has always put down every form of labor and socialist organization with an iron hand.

In the 90's the former had become comparatively prosperous. To-day there is no labor organization by means of which the workers may resist the brutal exploitation of their master class. Obviously legal protection and favoritism from the government are of little value to the capitalist, unless coupled with the power and the freedom to exploit his workers. And to this end the Japanese government has zealously suppressed the socialist and labor movements from their very beginning.

The so-called factory laws that were passed in 1911, to go into effect in 1916, are, as a matter of fact, in no sense a protection for labor. Under their provisions women and children are permitted to work 12 hours out of 24. Furthermore, for a period of 15 years after the enactment of the law, the work-day may be extended, if necessary, to 14 hours. The family of a worker killed in a factory receives a sum equal to the wages of 170 days. If he is crippled for life while at work he may receive a compensation equal to the wages of from 30 to 170 days altogether. Yet this is the only labor protection law in Japan.

Since the beginning of the European war, Japanese capitalists have been making enormous profits. Factories are running to their utmost capacity. It has been called the Golden Age for Japanese labor. What this really signifies is rather doubtful. An investigation conducted by the Osaka Chamber of Commerce discloses clearly that this prosperity cry in Japan, as everywhere the world over, is a sham and a delusion of capitalist origin. Out of 75 industries investigated, wages increased, during the war, from $\frac{1}{2}c$ to 8c a day in 22 industries. In 53 industries wages decreased from 5c to 18c a day. Among the latter are included the iron workers in the Osaka government ammunition factories, the moulders, machinists and the employees of the government tobacco monopoly. Among the 25 representative industries, the ship-builder is most highly paid. He receives a remuneration of from 15 to 96c a day. The lowest average wage in these 25 trades is 17c, the highest 61 $\frac{1}{2}c$ per day. Prices of necessities are higher by 50 per cent. than before the war. As a result there have been numerous strikes, in spite of government oppression. Many were won, but more frequently they were put

down relentlessly by police force. Although the Japanese worker is a highly capable mechanic, has advanced rapidly in the sphere of technique, and is able to execute highly complicated work on modern machines, he is politically and economically utterly powerless to resist the oppressive bureaucratic ruling class. The frequent strikes and labor uprisings are desperate revolts of ill-treated workers against their oppressors, against unbearable conditions of labor and economic pressure under a steadily rising cost of the necessities of life.

For a number of reasons the Japanese workers cannot, at the present time, assume governmental power by mass revolt or collective organization. The Japanese government rests its power upon a powerful army of well organized bureaucratic followers, its officials numbering over 200,000 men. There are, in the very nature of things, staunch upholders of the bureaucracy, well organized for the work of exploiting the great masses. This almighty bureaucracy of Japan dominates and monopolizes the army and navy. In its capacity as the greatest buyer and contractor of every conceivable kind of merchandise, from shoes to superdreadnaughts, it controls the most powerful capitalist interests. The latter submit to the dictates of this bureaucracy willingly, because it lies in their interest to do so. Riding upon the growing capitalist forces, our bureaucratic government has, in recent years, become bolder and more determined in its attitude, and quite outspoken in matters of foreign policy. It is determined to advance its long cherished ideals of imperialism in the Far East. The past has taught Japanese imperialists the profits to be gained from territorial conquest, that extended influence and power will mean an increased officialdom, an expanding army and navy, creating a widening sphere of influence and activity for the governmental powers.

While the vast army of bureaucratic government supporters profits by every expansion of Japanese capitalist influence, the Japanese working class has done its burdens, the load of armament and national expenditures. The growing influence of the Japanese ruling class in the world means for them ever greater oppression, ever growing burdens.

About five years ago the government increased the salaries of all civil officials and military officers by 25 per cent., and a new increase is again being contemplated. Last year the pensions paid out to the members of this class amounted to an aggregate sum of \$17,930,000. This equals the annual wages of 156,588 workers at 30c a day, a daily wage that considerably exceeds the wage of the average Japanese laborer. Under the present pension system the retired officer of the lowest rank and the police receive a pension amounting to one-half his salary for life, after 15 years of service. This class constitutes the heaviest burden upon the shoulders of the people. It sacrifices every interest and resource of the nation to its own self-aggrandizement, and under its rule capitalism flourishes; the two advance, hand in hand, in their work of exploitation.

I have shown how our government helps the capitalist class of Japan in the financial and economic fields. But in social and other ways, too, the burdens of the country are shifted upon the heads of the workers. In theory every able-bodied young man at 20 is conscripted into the army. But in actual fact the youths of the rich are permitted to escape from this universal duty. Government officials, students in the secondary schools, and young men whose financial status permits them to go abroad are exempted.

Still, the great powers that lie in the hands of the ruling class in Japan would finally arouse the resentment of the laboring masses were it not that the latter have been driven into submission by an incredible surplus of labor power in every field of industry, except in the cotton-spinning industry, where cruelty and overwork rapidly thin out the ranks of the working girls. Japanese workers are not permitted to emigrate to foreign countries, not only to America, with which the Gentlemen's Agreement exists, but to other countries as well. There is, to be sure, a brutal immigration company which supplies contract labor to Brazil. Furthermore, the Japanese laborer is free to go to Manchuria or China. But here even our poorly paid Japanese workers cannot compete with the cheap labor of the natives. Even the Manchurian Railroad and the rich collieries there prefer

Chinese workingmen. Under such conditions the Japanese worker is absolutely powerless at home, under the increasing exploitation of both imperialistic and capitalistic interests.

Japanese imperialist and capitalist classes will emerge from the war vastly strengthened. For the first time in its history Japanese exports have exceeded its imports. Up to 1914 Japan was a borrowing nation, a debtor to Europe. The war has changed this situation. To-day Japan is financing some of the Allies, notably China, Russia, and even England. In July, 1916, the national wealth of Japan was \$135,560,000. But in July of the present year the figures show \$449,000,000, and its wealth is increasing from week to week. This means that capitalism in Japan will have a free hand to develop her industries and her commerce, will mean greater opportunities of exploiting its surplus labor supply. Imperialism, with the support of a strong bureaucracy, will have greater and more intensive powers of oppression, powers hitherto restrained by the necessity of heavily taxing the population to cover the financial straits of a nation drained by large debts and heavy subsidies. To-day money is plentiful, and the army will grow in leaps and bounds. This situation brings Japan face to face with a dangerous future. She will be misdirected and misguided by a war-crazed imperialistic class, by thirsty capitalists and newly created millionaires. Already we see in the utterances of the present Premier, Count Terauchi, whose land-cry policy has evolved out of the Imperial Household itself, a sign of the era that is to come. An imperialistic autocracy, directed by the Mikado, but in reality under the leadership of Prince Yamagata, the very head of the Japanese bureaucracy, will drive the nation onward, utterly irresponsible to the best interests of its people.

It is the irony of fate that Japan's imperialism should join in the battle-cry—to crush Prussian militarism, to make the world safe for democracy—while its own system of militarism is crushing the Formosans, the Koreans, and even the Manchurians, as well as the Japanese workers themselves. As an internationalist, I oppose, therefore, the present imperialistic policy of Japan, that tramples down the rights and liberties of socialists and workers,

and willfully permits the capitalist class to exploit working girls and children heartlessly and cruelly. I want to see the autocratic imperialism destroyed, once and for all time, in Japan, as in Germany, for the liberation of the unhappy toiling millions.

I know that the armed peace that is to come over the Pacific will not bring a real, a democratic and a lasting peace to the workers of America and Japan. On the contrary, it will become the greatest menace and danger to both countries, and to the world.

Militarism built upon the backs of an unorganized working class, with the full support of an ever-growing capitalism, will know neither constraint nor consideration. It can and it will sacrifice everything to satisfy its greedy thirst.

The only true solution of this menace and the avoidance of a possible conflict of the two Monroe Doctrines—that of the Americans and that of the Asiatics on the Pacific—must be sought in the potential power and influence of the working classes of the countries concerned. As I have shown, the Japanese workers are not organized, and consequently are powerless. We must look to and rely on others. But the American workers are organized, are powerful and influential. The future peace of the Pacific largely rests upon them. And we must work to that end!

La Vie des Mots

Mr. Walter Lippmann, now a functionary of the American democracy, formerly a member of the Socialist Party, has a rather considerable philosophic and literary training, which is not all of the conventional order. The articles he used to write for *The New Republic* frequently said things that made you "sense" a profound insight, a refined skepticism, a willingness to stop anywhere in the course of the discussion to overhaul its fundamental definitions. And when, on one of the few rare occasions on which it was my good fortune to meet Mr. Lippmann, he expressed an opinion worthy of the linguistic criticism of Fritz Mauthner, I felt that Lippmann must, indeed, be a remarkable man.

The European War had been in progress for ore than a year, and Mr. Lippmann's connection with *The New Republic* (which was founded, it will be remembered, in November, 1914) was nearly as old as the war. Already he had cast off not only his earlier Socialism, but also his later Progressivism, and a gentle Imperialism possessed his spirit. He was for a large standing army, not for aggression in Europe (as yet), but for the guarantee of peaceful development to Central and South American inferiors, and, as far as the great world was concerned, he was for democracy—for a world league to enforce peace, for universal military training. On the latter subject, his views were rather those of the late William James than of the late Clausewitz.

And here is where his delicate criticism of language comes in: Such words as "universal military training," "conscription," and so on, he said, are now popular shibboleths which it is impossible, or very difficult, to destroy. It behooves the journalist, therefore, to accept the use of such terms, but to inject into them a meaning which will be consonant with the progress of mankind; to permit the masses to continue applying the words the press has taught them, but to impart to the

masses an understanding of those terms that will make them active agents for good in the liberalization of the world.

I am a simple man and always "fall for" a plausible argument. I was enchanted with Lippmann and felt that, in spite of himself, he was still almost a Socialist. And now that he sits in the War Department it seems to me that, in occasional devices of the popular press, I can still see his fine benevolence guiding the injections of associations into current shibboleths. For instance, it interests me to see how the meaning of the term "counter-revolution" is being improved. "Counter-revolution" used to mean a movement to restore a deposed reactionary government, and in this sense the word has been used with respect to the situation in Russia after the Revolution of last winter. But when the newspapers now express a fear of "counter-revolution" in Russia, what do you think they mean? Their fear is that the "counter-revolution," backed by Lenin and Trotzky, may be successful; that the "Pro-German" Maximalists may deprive the "revolutionary" bourgeoisie of the fine fruits of democracy! The power of words to change is great, indeed, and the power of Lippmann to guide their changes is great also.

But, of course, it may be men of much smaller stature than Lippmann who are passing out the word what to do with the term "counter-revolution."
C. D.

Our Old Masters and Their Modern Substitutes

By FRANZ MEHRING.

The course pursued from the outset of the world war by the party leadership (parliamentary group, National Committee, National Executive Committee, etc.), based on the well meant but nevertheless gratuitous assumption that it was supported by the majority of the rank and file, is characterized by obvious simplicity. War is war; war is a question of national existence; the working class must waive independent action in favor of national existence and without a will of its own must sacrifice class interests to be taken in tow by the ruling class.

But there is one point on which the advocates of this policy are not agreed. Some, like Cunow, etc., set up the claim that they are THE Marxians in contradistinction to us poor souls with our petrified lifeless formalism. The others, however, such as Scheidemann, are quite emphatic in denying the importance of scientific research, thus conveniently disposing of Lassalle, Marx, Engels, etc.

The latter were deluded into believing that learning and knowledge are fundamental to political management. Lassalle said that political conviction was possible only on the rock-solid foundation of scientific realization. Mere sentimental inclination was not sufficient, being by its nature a product of circumstances, temperament, moods, and therefore transitory. Marx wrote in 1850, when the "practical" persons in the Communist Union ridiculed his unpractical system of study: "I usually spend from 9 in the morning to 7 in the evening in the British Museum. Naturally, the democratic simps don't have to go to that much trouble. Why should they worry their heads about this historical and economic material, these favored sons? It is all so self-evident, they always tell me. Simple as can be! in these simple-minded heads." Which shows clearly that whoever

considers study and research a waste of time has disposed of any further relations with Marx and his kind.

But Scheidemann is absolutely consistent in the position he has taken. The "practical" system of politics really has nothing in common with our Old Masters. But the practical politicians have no business to hide this difference in order to be lionized under false colors.

In denying to them this right, we hope no one will consider us guilty of playing unfair, for we merely emphasize thereby the brilliant virtuosity of Scheidemann.

Our Old Masters had historical minds, and therefore never took the unhistorical stand: War is war, and every war is to be measured by the same conventional hand-rule.

To them every war was the outgrowth of certain conditions and purposes, on which depended the stand that the working class was to take. In respect to these concrete circumstances, they may have differed more or less, but always subject to the deciding qualification that the war was to be exploited as thoroughly as possible in the interest of proletarian emancipation. According to their class theory, there was no difference between peace and war unless it be that in war time the working class must look after its interests even more sharply, and must be even more uncompromising in support of them.

In the year 1859 Lassalle had quite a dispute with Marx and Engels on the war that France was then waging with the assistance of Russia against Austria, which, as the controlling power of the German Bund, tried also to drag in the German states into the conflict. The fact is that there developed, particularly in South Germany, a strong sentiment against France which Engels and Marx believed to be a truly national, instinctive expression, and therefore a source of revolutionary action to be used according to their wish, in a war against the Bonapartist regime. Lassalle on the other hand was of the opinion that the sentiment against France was an inherited prejudice of former days and was therefore essentially reactionary; if the German government wants to tackle France let them try their luck,

but such a war must be made repulsive to the masses as a reactionary manufacture of cabinets, so that inevitable eventualities and changes may then be made to serve Revolutionary progress.

This one instance is cited here—there were others as well—because it shows how easily different opinions can arise on the basis of the actual conditions preceding a war, and also how it can lead to opposite deductions. But, as Marx himself affirmed, it was a question only of "contrary conclusions from the same premises"; in their aims and purposes they were entirely agreed, that it was solely and only a question of the revolutionary interests, which, in their estimation, were at the same time national interests. Engels wrote to Lassalle: "Long live war, if the French and Russians attack us both at the same time; if we are nearly drowning, then in such a desperate situation all parties from the ruling class down must exhaust their efforts to the last man, and the Nation to save itself, must finally turn to the most efficient group." Lassalle remarked in this connection: "Very true; and for the last two months I have been wearing myself out to show that if the government goes to war it is simply playing into our hands, and just on that account is hastening the Revolution enormously." "But," he added, "the war sought by the Prince Regent must be made unpopular among the masses in order to be thus converted into a great revolutionary blessing."

The Prince Regent did not risk declaring war on France in 1859, and so this test never materialized. Neither did the Prince earn any diplomatic laurels by not going to war, which didn't make Lassalle feel bad either. "I believe in the principle of nationality as sincerely as anyone," he wrote to Marx, "but what the devil do you and I care for the honor of the Prince of Prussia? As all his aims and interests run directly contrary to the aims and interests of the German people, it is far more in the interest of the people that the power of the Prince in the outside world should be as small as possible. . . . The power of the German people will develop of its own accord. But it can only and will only be achieved when we have a popular government, and not under our dynasties. The greatness

of the German people and the greatness of the German dynasties are two things that to me are as far apart as the north and the south pole."

Neither was this simply stated in the heat of controversy, for it was *a* fundamental, not to say *the* fundamental, principle of Lassalle's national political views. In his carefully studied speech entitled "What Next?" in which he urges the progressive elements to wage an energetic fight against the Bismarck ministry, he calls attention to the need of undermining Bismarck's foreign policy. "Let no one think that this is merely unpatriotic reasoning. Political students like naturalists must take into account all existing forces; there is no telling in what stage of barbarism the world might still be were it not for the fact that the jealousy and antagonism between the governments has been an effective means of making internal progress compulsory. The German nation is not built on sand, so that a defeat of the government would endanger the national existence. If therefore we get into war it might involve the collapse of our various governments, the Saxon, Prussian, Bavarian, etc., but from out of the ashes would arise, like a phoenix, indestructible, the only thing we really care about—the German people."

The petty bourgeois to whom Lasalle explained this relation, greeted it with applause, but permitted themselves a couple of years afterward to be converted by Bismarck to the system of government domination, as a result of which they were the subject of endless ridicule in the party press. To-day, however, they are avenged, and the political management of the Social Patriots reflects clarifying rays on the deserted spheres of former activities. It recalls the motto of the National-Liberals of 1867. If you fail to recognize the psychological moment to discard old values for new ones you betray, as Haenisch puts it, a lack of brains or, as Scheidemann says, an excess of learning.

As in the war of 1859, so in those of 1866 and 1870, there were differences of opinion within the Social Democracy, but they were always limited to the "specific conditions leading up to the war"—there was never any question concerning the fundamental canon, that the working class in each and every war must follow its own independent political course.

After the revolution of 1848 had failed to create a united Germany the German government tried to utilize the growing need of economic unity, for dynastic purposes, to create, not a united Germany, but as the then King William put it, an elongated Prussia. Lassalle and Schweitzer, Marx and Engels, Liebknecht and Bebel agreed absolutely that the German unity which the German proletariat needed could be attained only through national revolution, and they therefore fought uncompromisingly all dynastic aspirations based on a greater Prussia. But they had to concede subsequently on account of the cowardice of the Bourgeoisie and the weakness of the proletariat that a national revolution was utterly impossible, and that the Prussia "of blood and iron" offered more favorable prospects for the proletarian struggle than any futile efforts to put the Bourgeoisie back into power. After Sedan they accepted the Prussian-German Empire, such as it was, as an accomplished fact, furnishing a better basis for the struggle for emancipation than the preceding wretched regime.

There were still traces of a split in the Social Democracy when it came to voting the war credits in July, 1870; all the Social Democratic deputies voted favorably except Liebknecht and Bebel, who abstained from voting. When in December of the same year the second war credit was to be granted, all differences had disappeared, and every single parliamentary deputy voted "No." All the groups of the Social Democracy of that time lined up as a unit against the militarism of the class-controlled government, a stand to which the party has adhered ever since, until the 4th of August, 1914.

Emphatically as Marx and Engels supported the war of 1870 up to Sedan, because the downfall of Napoleon was the supreme interest of the European working class movement, just as decidedly did they oppose the war from that point onward, because it was being waged solely for the annexation of Alsace Lorraine; in other words, for a purpose, whose accomplishment, as they foresaw and foretold, threatened the greatest danger to the working class.

Notwithstanding the severity with which Marx and Engels condemned the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, they never supported the French agitation for revenge, after the annexation had become an accomplished fact. Always and ever, they were guided by the principle: "We must collaborate in securing the freedom of the proletariat of western Europe, and everything else is secondary." Thus, too, they answered the complaints of the oppressed people of Alsace-Lorraine: "If on the eve of Revolution that is visibly approaching, they provoke war between France and Germany by reviving the excitement of the people, so that the Revolution is thereby postponed, I cry: 'Halt! You can afford to be as patient as the European proletariat; if it frees itself, you are freed automatically at the same time; until then you have no right to interfere with the struggling proletariat, so as to divert its efforts into false channels.'" Thus spoke Engels in 1882.

And he was never able to rid himself of a feeling of uneasiness that the French sentiment for Revenge would be the starting point of a new European war. Subsequently he wrote an article in the *Neue Zeit* on this subject, and as the present party leadership has made innumerable references to the statements therein contained for the benefit of the German workers, it will be necessary to spend a little extra time on the matter here.

In the article in question, Engels outlines briefly the history of the German party. He shows the irresistible growth of the German Social Democracy, and predicted victory in about ten years. While revolutionary policy and tactics can never, and will never, be waived, the progress for the time being within legal limits is excellent. If any blood is spilt, and that is entirely up to the Bourgeoisie, then the force of such a counter-revolution might delay the triumph of Socialism a few years, but it would be all the more complete in the end.

However, all this is true, Engels continues, only if Germany can pursue its economic and political development peacefully. A war would alter everything. And war might break out from one day to the next. France and Russia on one side, Germany

and Austria and perhaps Italy on the other. The Socialists of all these countries, pressed into service against their will, would have to fight each other. So Engels asks: In a case like this what would the German Social Democracy do, and what would become of it?

He states, in so many words, what would become of it as follows:

This much is certain: Neither the Czar nor the French Bourgeois republicans, nor the German government itself would let such a grand opportunity pass to smother the only party that is their common enemy. We have seen how Thiers and Bismarck joined hands over the ruins of the Paris Commune; we would also live to see how the Czar, Constans and Caprivi or their respective successors would fall into each other's arms over the corpse of Socialism.

Engels then continues: Over against such a prospect, what is the duty of the German Socialists? Shall they remain passive in the face of developments which threaten them with annihilation, shall they, by a policy of non-resistance, give up their position as pioneers of the international proletariat? To which Engels replies, and we cite verbatim, in view of the circumstance that the present leadership has so often and endlessly referred to this passage, although they always distort it, for good reasons:

By no means. In the interest of the European revolution they are in duty bound to maintain their ground, not to capitulate neither to the enemy within nor without. And this they can do only by fighting Russia to the last inch and all her allies, whoever they may be. Should the French Republic become the servant of his Majesty the Czar and Autocrat of all the Russias, the German Socialists would fight France, regretfully but inevitably. French republicanism may possibly stand for bourgeois political liberty over against imperial Germany. But alongside the republic of Constans, Rouvier and Clemenceau, and particularly a republic which is the servant of the Czar, German Socialism unquestionably is the carrier of the proletarian Revolution.

A war in which Russians and Frenchmen invaded Germany would be to the latter a life and death struggle, in which its national existence could be assured only by the application of the most revolutionary measures. The present government will surely not open up the way to revolution, if not driven by compulsion. But we have a powerful party which can either force the hand of government or can if necessary take its place, the Social-Democratic party.

And we have not forgotten the wonderful example that France set us in 1793. The anniversary of 1793 approaches. If the Czar's lust for conquest and the chauvinistic restlessness of the French bourgeoisie should interrupt the victorious but peaceful advance of the German Socialists, then you may be sure that they are ready to prove to the world that the German proletarian of to-day is not unworthy of the French sans-culottes and that 1893 may be placed alongside of 1793. And if the soldiers of Monsieur Constans set foot on German territory, we will greet them with the refrain from the Marseillaise:

Quoi, ces cohortes étrangères
Feraient la loi dans nos foyers?

In short: Peace insures the victory of the Social Democratic Party in about ten years. War either brings victory in two or three years or total ruin for at least fifteen to twenty years. In the face of this, the German Socialists would have to be crazy to want war, thereby placing everything in jeopardy, instead of waiting for a sure peaceful triumph. What is more, no Socialist, whatever his nationality, can desire the triumph either of the present German government or of the French bourgeois republicans or, least of all, of the Czar, which would mean the oppression of Europe. And therefore the Socialists of all countries are for peace.

Thus spoke Engels.

Strange, how the present leadership, whose representatives, as a rule, could not condemn Engels severely enough "for playing with revolutionary fire" and for his "hasty prophesying" have taken such a fancy to this article of our master. The riddle can

be solved, however, by taking into account that isolated sentences taken disconnectedly are well suited to blind the worker. Sentences, mind you, which are to show, not that the Germans must fight the Russians and Frenchmen when attacked—for the workers will do that without the aid of quoted authority—but sentences which, through the reverence for the writer that attaches to them, shall serve to drive the workers instinctively and blindly into the arms of the ruling class.

The political policy of the present leadership means a complete break with the mental heritage of our old masters, and with the history and principles heretofore, of the Social Democracy. The logical consequence of such a course would be a national social-reform workingmen's party, in harmony with militarism and the monarchy, contenting itself with reforms attainable within the sphere of capitalist society. On the other hand, if the abyss that divides the present from the past were to be covered over by phrases and fine words, it will undermine the vitality of the deluded toiling masses for an indefinite future period.

—Translated by ERIC NIEL.

Current Affairs

The Pope's Proposal and Wilson's Reply

The Pope's peace proposal and President Wilson's reply thereto each present a very clever move in the peace-game now being played as a part of the war-game. As time goes on it becomes increasingly apparent that this war is to be won by civil instead of military strategy. Neither side expects to overwhelm the other by a short and decisive military thrust. The time for that is long since past. The question of winning the war has settled down to a question of endurance. But in a war of endurance the people, as a whole, have considerably more to say than in an old-fashioned military campaign. In a war of endurance it is up to the people to say how long they will endure. The strategy of such a war, therefore, consists in making your own people willing to endure as long as possible, and those of your opponent as little as possible. That side which is sure of the endurance of its own people is sure to win the war. It is the German Government's reliance on the German people's willingness to endure that lies at the foundation of its "Siegesszuversicht." This was well illustrated the other day when the newspapers reported that Germany's scientists have figured out that if Germany can continue the war for two years longer she is sure to win. The argument ran as follows: These scientists have figured out that two years more of war will reduce the entire world to the same shortage of food as now exists in Germany. Then Germany's success will be assured, "*because the countries at war with her will not endure the hardships which the Germans are willing to undergo.*"

But even the German Government is not so sure of the willingness of the German people to undergo hardships indefinitely. Hence the "peace" policy of the German Government—the desire to appear willing to conclude peace on "reasonable" terms, thereby throwing the blame for the continuation of the war on the other side. This has the double advantage of increasing the will-to-endure of the German peo-

ple and of weakening this will in the masses of the people in the Allied countries.

But such a policy requires great diplomatic skill. For it is no easy matter to appear to be reasonable without actually committing one's self to being reasonable—and the German Government has no mind to forego "the due reward of sacrifices made" that is the fruits of successful warfare. The German Government's real terms of peace were announced long ago by Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg. The terms of peace, said the Chancellor in a memorable statement, *will depend on the state of the war-map*. The German Government does not intend to deprive itself of any benefit which the war-map may now or hereafter show in its favor by laying down terms of peace in advance.

Hence, Germany's first direct peace-offer, couched in language which sounded more or less "reasonable," but which bound it to nothing definite. The "moral effect" of this "peace-advance" was sufficient to keep the German people "enduring" for a while. But it could not last forever, particularly with those "traitorous" minority-Socialists doing all in their power to bring the sham of the manoeuvre to the attention of the German people. Some new way had, therefore, to be found—a way of saying something that seemed definite and yet was not binding. And the way *was* found: it consisted in having somebody do the saying under an appearance of authority which could yet be disavowed when necessity arose. The first instrument used for the purpose were the "majority"-Socialists under the leadership of Scheidemann. Accordingly, Scheidemann and his associates went to Stockholm with a peace-program which was reasonable enough for the German Government as an "asking-price." It was known that Scheidemann would not do anything without sanction from his government. The German Government, therefore, got the credit for these peace-terms without actually committing itself to anything. The stupidity of its opponents in not permitting any delegates from their countries to go to Stockholm made

the German Government's job all the easier, and served to increase the moral effect of its manoeuvre.

The remarkable success of that manoeuvre encouraged the German Government to try again. This time the chosen instrument was the Catholic Party. Dr. Spahn, the Centrist leader, was made Prussian Minister of Justice, and the services of the Holy Father were secured. Between Stockholm and Rome there might be endurance enough secured from the German people to last, perhaps, the necessary two years, or at least a considerable part thereof.

It seems, however, that this time Germany's expectations will not be realized. The aid and comfort which the German Government had a right to expect from the stupidity of its opponents, in view of their past performances, has not materialized. For this time the Vatican has found its peer in the American President. As a move in the "diplomatic" game, Mr. Wilson's reply is undoubtedly an unqualified success. Whatever moral advantage the German Government may derive from the third refusal of her adversaries to consider an offer of peace is completely counterbalanced by the knowledge which is brought home to the German people that they may have peace any time they want it bad enough to sacrifice their autocratic rulers for it. In this respect Mr. Wilson has probably said more than he intended to say: For should the German people take their destinies into their own hands, the peace they want so much would not depend upon the grace of Mr. Wilson or any other Allied statesman.

But the adequacy of Mr. Wilson's reply to the Pope, as a move to checkmate a "diplomatic" move on the part of the Central Powers, should not blind us to its real meaning, which is: That Mr. Wilson and his associates do not intend to conclude a peace which would of *itself* assure its continued observance. It is quite evident that Mr. Wilson does not think of a peace the existence of which would not be subject to the whim of any individual or set of individuals, no matter how malevolent or ambitious. Nor of a peace that would of itself do away with autocracy by making it so clearly superfluous as

to become quite untenable. Mr. Wilson evidently thinks of a return to the status quo ante in international organization, in which to engage in war was a "sacred" *right*, and to arm for war an unavoidable necessity.

It also means that Mr. Wilson and his associates are ready to continue the war until peace can be "secured" by imposing upon the German people a form of government which they evidently believe the German people would not otherwise adopt.

The upshot of all of Mr. Wilson's lofty talk about "peace without victory," and international organization, is, therefore, to be: A peace *imposed* upon Germany upon terms *dictated* by its enemies, to be "secured" after the manner in which peace used to be "secured" under the international regime which brought on the present war.

B.

People's Council and National Alliance

The Socialists and Internationalists of this country owe Mr. William Hale Thompson, Mayor of Chicago, a vote of thanks. His courageous action in sticking to his Irish guns in the face of the howl of the "patriotic" press has saved us from the humiliation of having to father the People's Council and its "Constituent Convention" as if they were flesh from our flesh and bone from our bone. "Inter arma silent leges," says the old Latin maxim, which may be freely translated thus: In the face of martyrdom it behooves every critic to hold his tongue. And the People's Council was in a fair way of becoming a "martyr," owing to the incredible stupidity of our "authorities." But the Mayor of Chicago, by the grace of Tammany (or whatever the name of its Chicago equivalent may be), has spoiled this martyrdom and saved the day for the Socialists and Internationalists. Not only was the "Constituent Convention" actually held, but when the Mayor of Chicago welcomes what the Governor of Illinois proscribes, the sanction of "authority" is fairly evenly divided, and we may be permitted to discuss the subject on its merits.

The chief merit of the People's Council's Convention consists in the fact that it proved again and beyond peradventure

of a doubt the incomparable stupidity of our ruling powers and purveyors of public opinion. For weeks the Convention was heralded as a dark conspiracy of "German agents," "dangerous traitors," etc., etc. When the Convention finally met, it turned out to be as tame and insipid an affair as was ever held in such turbulent times, and as loyal as any "opposition" could ever be expected to be, even if it were the Kaiser's own. If there were any pro-Germans there, they must have been of the Henry Weissmann, American-flag-waving variety. As to "disloyalty"—there was not a sign of it. In fact, the chief characteristic of the Convention was its utter character-and-purposelessness.

And how could it be otherwise? Just think of a "near-Socialist" and "near-Internationalist" movement with "gumshoe" Bill Stone of Missouri and Negro-baiting Vardaman of Mississippi among its patron saints and John D. Works of California in its inner council! Not to mention Hardwick of Georgia.

The proceedings of the "Constituent Convention" of this remarkable movement fairly mirrored its "constituent" elements. The quality of its "statesmanship" was exhibited in the principal address of the Convention, delivered by Congressman Mason of Illinois, who referred contemptuously to the question of war-indemnities as a question of "what one European king shall pay another in damages"; which is, of course, a matter of supreme indifference to cracker-barrel statesmen.

And the other war-problems were treated in similar "statesmanlike" fashion. Although the principal object of the Convention was supposed to be the "formulation" of terms of peace, it adjourned without saying anything on the subject beyond approving the peace-terms stated by President Wilson in his reply to the Pope, as behooves good men and true. And in order that there may be no mistake as to just where the organization stands, its Executive Committee issued a manifesto to the American people in which it declares its loyalty in the following significant language:

"We are not discouraging enlistments. We are not obstructing the conduct of the war."

This from the authors of the St. Louis "majority" report!

At the time when this manifesto was being issued at Chicago by the supposedly "disloyal" ones, the approved forces of loyalism were gathering at Minneapolis for a Convention of their own. Of this gathering little need be said—all "patriotic" gatherings look so much alike that when you have seen one you have seen them all. Had this gathering occurred before August, 1914, there would have been something interesting about it: a "patriotic" gathering with well-known socialists as the principal officiators would then have been a novelty, indeed. But during the past three years these things have become too common to deserve any special notice. After the performances abroad, nothing that our own "loyalists" could do at Minneapolis could excite any interest. Compared with such gatherings as that at Minneapolis, even the Chicago "constituent," etc., was interesting. For there was, after all, no way of telling in advance what the nondescript and characterless crowd gathered at Chicago might do. While here, the "loyalty" chains of the participants made any deviation from rule utterly impossible, and one could tell in advance practically every word that would be said and every gesture that would be made there.

There is one thing, however, that is interesting in connection with this Convention—the fact of its being held. The interest is one of surprise: *Why, in view of the performance at Chicago, was it necessary to hold another loyalty convention at Minneapolis?*

In commenting on this subject, the *New York Volkszeitung* asks: Since the People's Council adopted the point of view of the National Alliance, why the continued hatred (of the constituted authorities) towards the People's Council?

To which we might add the query: Since the People's Council and the National Alliance stand for essentially the same things, why the fervent enthusiasm of some Socialists for the one and blind rage against the other?

B.

Meyer London

In the last election the Twelfth Congressional District sent Meyer London for the second time to the House of Representatives. But America's working class is without a representative in Congress.

Rarely is the representative of a revolutionary movement give so splendid an opportunity of bringing before the whole nation its fundamental principles and motives. The war, and particularly the American intervention, have opened up a field for propaganda that is unequalled in the annals of the Socialist movement of America. The whole situation cried out to us to forget small-minded public and party politics, to carry on a class conscious campaign that would open the eyes of the blindest to the difference between Socialist and capitalist politics. It having become almost impossible to detect even a shade of difference between the policies of the Democratic administration and the Republican opposition forces, it was more important than ever to emphasize dramatically the inherent antithesis that exists between bourgeois capitalist and proletarian revolutionary modes of thought and action.

In such times as these the only Socialist could have abstained from the methods of narrow criticism and small mindedness that so often fall to the lot of the single-handed powerless Socialist Representative.

He had merely to take a decided and logical stand upon all the great questions that came up for action within the last six months. It was his duty to portray in broad strokes the basis of Socialist opposition against war. To him was given the priceless opportunity of bringing to those hundreds of thousands who have stubbornly refused hitherto to see our point of view an understanding and acceptance of our ideals.

The opposition to war that was voiced in Congress was for the most part of the lowest type. Bourgeois opponents of administration policies, actuated by a variety of more or less honest motives, sought to explain and justify their opposition by the flimsiest of excuses. It lay in the power of Meyer London to nip in the bud the shameful stigma that has been attached

to the anti-war position of the Socialist Party. He was the one man who could have forced respect and understanding for our opposition to war—he, more than the National Executive Committee or even the National Convention. He could have disproved the accusation of Pro-Germanism, could have shown that our opposition to war was founded upon the principles of the Internationalist Socialist movement.

Instead, he was silent. And when he spoke it was to give voice to words that differed not a whit from the wisdom of the average bourgeois reformer. All of this gave to the falsifications of the capitalist press and slanderous public opinion a certain foundation and appearance of truth.

It is not our purpose here to present a detailed account of London's grave mistakes, if they must not be called by a harsher word. That he voted "present," or abstained from voting altogether, whenever an important measure came up; that he neglected every opportunity of manifesting serious opposition to war—in direct violation of the wording of our St. Louis program and resolution—these are matters that, long ago, have merited decisive action at the hands of the party. After all, these matters are of secondary consideration. A man like London, who cannot understand the Socialist point of view toward war and its problems cannot be held responsible if he sins in individual acts of commission and omission.

London's parliamentary career is a complete fiasco. He is done for—is politically dead. But new Meyer Londons will arise to discredit the Socialist movement, if we do not, once and for all, abandon the unhappy practice of looking for a "popular" candidate, instead of nominating men of recognized principles and integrity who can adequately represent Socialism, particularly in times of crisis. L.

Tom Mooney and Alexander Berkman

The scenery is set for the final act of the play that has been staged by the banditti of San Francisco. Tom Mooney, who committed the unpardonable crime of organizing the street-railway workers of the Golden Gate, is to pay for his temerity at the gallows.

The attitude of American courts of justice toward labor in the past has by no means justified undue optimism. If one can speak of class justice anywhere it is here in America, where its operations have been so shameless that even Samuel Gompers has been forced to take cognizance of its existence. And yet it seemed impossible that the Supreme Court of California should uphold the sentence, should recognize the judicial farce that was conducted against Tom Mooney as a fair and impartial trial. Once more the incredible has happened, and nothing stands in the way of Mooney's execution.

To the working class of America it was clear from the beginning, even before the disclosure of the Oxman perjuries, that Mooney was absolutely innocent of complicity in the bomb explosion. As innocent as his wife, whose recent trial resulted in her complete vindication. To-day even the bourgeois public realizes that the organized capitalist pirates of the western coast jumped at the favorable opportunity to "get" the undesirable organizer and agitator. Everyone knows, provided he does not wilfully close his eyes to the mass of convincing testimony, that the convictions of Mooney and Billings were possible only on the basis of a carefully prepared plot of lies and perjury.

Already the trial of Oxman has begun; and in spite of the overwhelming burden of proof, and his own incriminating letters, he will undoubtedly be acquitted. The judge who is conducting his trial was chosen by Fickert, the criminal district attorney. Fickert, himself, has chosen Oxman's counsel. Oxman must be acquitted, not only to justify the travesty against Billings and Mooney, but because his testimony is necessary as a foundation for the latest move in the fight against the radical labor movement, the implication of the fearless anarchist agitator, Alexander Berkman.

Extradition proceedings against Berkman have already been started in New York. With commendable promptitude the United Hebrew Trades have taken up the cudgels in his behalf and engaged Comrade Morris Hillquit to conduct the fight against the gang of murderous outlaws that threatened the very life of organized labor in the West, with the active and energetic assistance of the whole progressive labor movement of the East.

There can be only one outcome if the radical labor movement will but bring its influence unreservedly to bear in this case. Only united and fearless mass action, an energetic and determined campaign of protest, can save Mooney and Berkman, and inflict upon the exploiters of the West a blow that they are not likely to forget in the near future.

The liberation of these faithful and courageous fighters for the cause of labor is a piece of political action that is not less important than the greatest and most significant electoral victory.
L.

A Savior of his Country

When the history of the war for world democracy is written, the deeds of the Hon. Henry L. Myers, Junior Senator from Montana, will, we sincerely hope, find worthy and adequate appreciation in its pages, that coming generations may derive from them understanding and enthusiasm for the pure aims of our statesmen, for the high ideals and unselfish, self-sacrificing motives that actuate our national leaders. That they may learn, furthermore, how dangerous it is to judge from appearances.

Our friend from Montana so conspicuously embodies these beautiful characteristics that it is well worth while to dwell for a moment upon the activities of this pearl of American statesmanship. The more so, since the capitalist press, for reasons best known to itself, shows a conspicuous lack of appreciation for the greatness of Mr. Myers.

So, for instance, not one of the larger newspapers reported the untrammled, and therefore truly democratic, manner in which the Hon. H. L. M. has striven to suppress every unbridled word and thought, every expression of disrespectful, and therefore traitorous opinion. We will strive to repair this sinful negligence on the part of our respectable press by reprinting, verbatim, the Bill, S. 2789, presented by Senator Myers on August 15, 1917.

A BILL

For the better safety and welfare of the United States and the Government thereof in time of war.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That when the United

States shall be engaged in war it shall be unlawful for any person or persons in the presence or hearing of others to utter any disloyal, threatening, profane, violent, scurrilous, contemptuous, slurring, abusive, or seditious language about the Government of the United States, or the Constitution of the United States, or the President of the United States, or the Army or Navy or soldiers or sailors of the United States, or the flag of the United States, or the uniform of the Army or Navy of the United States, or the good and welfare of the United States, or any other language calculated to bring the United States or the United States Government, or the President of the United States, or the Constitution of the United States, or the Army or Navy or soldiers or sailors of the United States, or the flag of the United States, or the good and welfare of the United States into contempt, scorn, contumely, or disrepute; or any language calculated to incite or inflame resistance to any duly constituted Federal or State authority in connection with the prosecution of war; or to threaten the good or welfare of the United States or the United States Government; or to advise, urge, or incite any curtailment of production in this country of any thing or things, product or products, necessary or essential to the prosecution of the war in which the United States may be engaged, with intent by such curtailment to cripple or hinder the United States in the prosecution of such war.

SEC. 2. That any person duly convicted of any such foregoing offense shall be for each such offense punished by a fine of not less than \$500 nor more than \$5,000 or by imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

Now, Mr. Myers is by no means a negligible figure in American politics. More than twenty years ago he evinced an active interest in the National Senate of which he became a member only four years ago. That was at the time when the multi-millionaire Clark was seized with the ambition to "represent" the state, four-fifths of which he owned. Myers was then a member of the State Senate of Montana. In this capacity, he received from the aforementioned gentleman—as he himself was forced to admit, under oath, before the Montana Supreme Court, in the course of an investigation of the manager of Clark's campaign, Ira B. Welcome, \$10,000 in cold cash as a recompense for his vote in favor of the copper king. When, in 1889, Clark was impeached by the United States Senate, Mr. Myers found himself obliged to travel to Washington, where he was placed under the painful necessity of relating once more, before a committee consisting, among others, of the Senators Chandler, Hoar, McComas, Pritchard, Harris and McCafferty, at how high a figure his vote was

generally valued. Never before has a witness been so mercilessly condemned and discredited or shown to be so absolutely unworthy of trust and responsibility, as was the gentleman who is now the Hon. Henry L. Myers.

How unselfishly patriotic a man must be who is willing, with such a past, to pose as the warning conscience of the whole country!

L.

Germany Stands Pat

Amidst the many changes that the Great War has brought about, changes which follow each other with almost lightning rapidity before our eyes from day to day, there is one resting point for the eye and mind—one thing that seems immovable and unchangeable—*Germany*. In contemplating this firm and immovable "rock of Gibraltar" in the midst of the world of continual flux and change which surrounds it, one gets an uncanny feeling that the Germans were not ordinary human beings like the rest of us. They seem to be set apart from the rest of mankind, and somehow not subject to the psychic laws and influences which govern and influence ordinary humans. One is almost ready to accept the *racial* theory of history.

This was never brought home to us as forcibly as during the recent German "*crisis*." For weeks and months together the thing was brewing, and the world was on edge with expectation. The atmosphere seemed to be surcharged with explosives; the air was pregnant with the great changes that were impending. A good many people hoped or feared that some such catastrophic eruption like that which shook Russia was about to take place. And even the most skeptical felt that something big was going to happen: If not a Revolution, at least a great Reform. The German people were going to say or do something that would startle the world; they were going to take their destiny into their own hands, or at least try to, and their rulers would have to take notice of this change of mood or there would be "something doing."

And then the "*crisis*" came to a head. The German People spoke. And they said:

We stand where we stood on August 4, 1914.

And then the Crown Prince spoke. And he said: My father hath chastised you with whips, but I will chastise you with scorpions. He gave you Bethmann-Hollweg; but I will give you Michaelis.

And the German people accepted Michaelis from the hands of the military clique, headed by the Crown Prince and Ludendorff. Germany, including its Socialists, stand where they stood in the early days of August, 1914. It does seem as if Germany is immovable.

* * * * *

But this is only the surface of things. Below the surface Germany is undergoing a change, corresponding to the change which is taking place in the rest of the world. The change is, perhaps, not rapid enough to suit us, and we are apt to grow impatient, but it is going on all the same, and in the end it is bound to tell.

When the German Reichstag, including the official Socialists, said "*we* stand where we stood in August, 1914," the "*we*" did not mean the same thing that it did in August, 1914. For, besides the official or governmental Socialists, led by the Scheidemann-David-Suedekum combination, there is now the Independent Social-Democratic Party, which refused to stand where the German people and the German Socialists placed themselves on August 4th, 1914. And here we come to the most interesting part of the "German crisis"—its hopeful part. But before discussing it, we must make a digression.

The bureaucratic socialist press of this country considers it its duty to lie about what is going on in Germany. This is done presumably in the honest belief that the interest of the "cause" are better served just now by lying than by telling the truth. We shall not enter upon a general discussion of that subject here. We mention it at all because during the crisis that we are discussing here this lying policy was worked to such an extent that the Socialists of this country, or at least those of them who rely upon the official Socialist press for their information, have quite a perverted idea as to the facts in the

case. Before commenting on them, we are, therefore, compelled to correct some misapprehensions of fact. The two most important facts to remember in this connection are: First, that the Reichstag resolution did *not* accept the Russian peace formula, and, second, that the German Socialists who remained true to their Socialist principles did *not* vote for the resolution. It is this that supplied the ray of hope in an otherwise hopeless situation.

The action of the Independent Soc.-Dem. Party of Germany in refusing to say with the majority of the "nation" and the majority of the Socialists, "we stand where we stood on August 4th, 1914," is an occurrence of the greatest historical importance: it shows that the German people are not immovable, and that the process of change which is destined to bring the German people abreast of its neighbors to the East and West had already begun. It shows that a large portion of the German proletariat has broken the chains which the Scheidemanns have placed upon it on the fateful day of August 4th, 1914, and that, henceforth, it proposes to be really free.

It must be remembered that the minority-Socialists were placed in a particularly difficult position with respect to this resolution. Ostensibly it was a peace-resolution, intended to force the German Government to adopt a moderate peace policy. To vote against this resolution looked like obstructing a move in favor of peace. It also looked like a refusal to help the German people in their fight to obtain a modicum of influence upon their government. And the German Scheidemanns, like our own, know how to utilize such a situation for their own advantage.

Under these circumstances it required an unusual amount of courage, as well as of political wisdom, to vote against the Reichstag "Peace" Revolution. That the Independent Socialists mustered the courage is proof that they have strong backing in the masses of the German working classes. That they possessed the wisdom augurs well for their future career as the spokesmen of the German proletariat. The German proletariat is in a fair way of redeeming itself.

Discussion

Boudin's Policy in Peace and War

More deliberately than in his "Socialism and War," Boudin accentuates his stand on war in a recent article, "Socialist Policy in Peace and War," in the second issue of the "Class Struggle." It is worth while to analyze his stand more closely because it is representative for those groups of Marxian Socialists, Kautsky among them, who continue to represent a passed-by period of economic development. Their influence is the more objectionable because their often keen and sharp analysis and criticism of opportunists tends to secure them a mental leadership among groups of Left-Wing Socialists, not less destructive to proletarian *action* than the leadership of the politicians of the old party machinery in the pre-war socialist parties.

Typical for the above-mentioned article is that not only the word "Imperialism" is not mentioned at all, but that no reference whatever is made to the new developments in capitalist society and capitalist policy the world over. The article of Boudin would have been a clever advocacy of the participation of Germany in a war against Russia fifty years ago, but at present his failure to take into account modern developments makes it decidedly reactionary.

His distinction between a trade-union, a socialist and an anarchist point of view not only is arbitrary, like every distinction of this character, but it plays directly into the hands of those reactionaries who deliberately want to discredit the revolutionary socialists as "anarchists." In fact, the purpose of the classification is to discard on one side the opportunists and reformists and on the other side the extremists, and to keep in the fullest glory of intellectual superiority the socialist "centrum," the "swamp," as it is called by Liebknecht. The struggle becomes a "very complicated one." We need, in the first place, the good advice of the great intellectuals of the Centrum.

To the true socialist, according to Boudin, "nothing that is of human interest is a matter of indifference," and "his interest extends to the internal or family fight of the capitalist class." This interest "becomes a passion" whenever his great enemy, the capitalist class, is battling against the remnants of feudalism and feudal order. Now it goes without saying that nothing human is "indifferent" and that it is no crime to extend our interest as far as we see fit. But the spirit of Boudin's arguments is typical of a bygone period: the emphasis on the family fights and its complicated nature is based upon the political game in a period of development of capitalism, when parliamentary parties representing distinct groups of interests were willing to pay with certain concessions for the support of

labor. And the passion to fight feudalism, together with capitalism, was very appropriate in the French revolution and in Germany until 1848, but since Capitalism rules the modern world undisputed, and since the remnants of feudalism made a pact and became tools of modern capitalism, the passion to fight the feudal order, together with capitalism, is a little out of date. There, is practically speaking, no longer a possibility for a fight together with capitalists against capitalists, and whatever may suggest itself in this line is unimportant and rapidly disappearing. There exist differences in methods of fighting against the working classes, and this certainly prevents our becoming indifferent to the particular acts of our enemies. Certain groups of capitalists would like to use machine guns as the *only* argument; most groups believe in different methods of misleading and making sham concessions, and it is to the interest of proletarian solidarity to expose these methods as different forms of the fundamental class struggle.

The capitalist class may not form one "uniform" reactionary mass, but it certainly becomes more and more "one reactionary mass," against which the organized POWER of the working class alone can gain results. To develop this power and to apply it in the most efficient way requires, of course, study and experience in the methods of fighting your foes. Parliamentarism CAN serve both ends—both the demonstration and the efficient application of proletarian power—and, therefore, deserves our interest, although in a different form than the skilful exploitation of family fights.

Our internal policy is undergoing a fundamental change, and it is no disadvantage that our future practice will be more in harmony with certain other groups of class-conscious workers, the syndicalistic groups in Europe and (more so) the I. W. W. in our country. We even may join hand (and this is all but a disadvantage) with certain groups of communistic anarchists in our practical fighting, and a prospect opens of greater solidarity in broader groups of fighting workers, the surest guarantee for a proletarian victory.

So much for the peace policy, of which the war policy is only another form.

Having lost sight of the new developments in our peace policy, Boudin cannot be expected to give a constructive war policy. Here he fails to such an extent that he is losing his influence even on those who stand behind him in his fight against opportunism in the Socialist party. The trouble in St. Louis was not only that a number of opportunists played a trick in voting for a fairly strong anti-war resolution, knowing that paper would be patient, but as well the failure of Boudin to rally round his minority resolution the enthusiastic support of all the revolutionary forces present at that emergency congress. In his war policy, Boudin again overlooks the fact that the relations between the classes have been influenced

by recent historic developments. In his article, "Socialist Policy in Peace and War," he devotes two pages to what he calls the "Socialistic" stand on war policy, and the shortness of this part makes its inconsistency all the more clear. The Socialist, according to Boudin, does not "take sides" in the sense of favoring one group of warring capitalists against another. But he "desires the success of that group whose policies" etc. Although he "desires" he does not "favor" them even in thought, for the "taking sides" in this connection is evidently only a mental process. He is "never a partisan in the ordinary sense of the word," although his "neutrality" may be "benevolent" to one of the parties in the struggle. And at times, "he may deem it his duty to take a hand in the struggle in order to secure a lasting and a just peace for all concerned." Now mind that this refers to capitalist struggles between one group of nations against another and that these struggles have the character of struggles for world dominion. One might suggest that Boudin means by "taking a hand in the struggle" some revolutionary move of the proletariat. But he specifically states: "When he (the socialist) does that, he must, of course, fight on the side of one capitalist group, his national group." It does, of course, matter very little that he declares this to be "not out of national but international considerations." The same has been declared by Walling, Stokes, Spargo, Slobodin and the rest.

And what is the excuse which Boudin gives for breaking down his own war policy? The absolute independence and freedom of development of all "peoples" is called "one of the cardinal tenets" of Socialism and again "the possibility of a crushing defeat of one of the parties to the struggle is a controlling consideration with the Socialist." And he even goes so far as to construe a socialist policy based on the consideration "that his sympathies in the struggle usually depend on the condition of the *war map*, being usually with whoever may be the underdog FOR THE TIME BEING."

There never was poorer opportunism advocated by a man who so far devoted a great part of his life to fight opportunism in the Socialist party. Once on the way down on account of his losing sight of actual developments, he ends with the same ridiculous suggestions already given in his book on "Socialism and War." If the socialist decides to fight voluntarily on the side of one capitalist group, "he must preserve absolute freedom of action." The working class fighting together with its exploiters in a national life and death struggle "must always be in control of its own forces, so as to constantly direct them towards its chosen goal and be in a position to withdraw them from the enterprise whenever it becomes apparent that it CANNOT CONTROL THE SITUATION and there is danger of its forces being used for aims and purposes not its own."

Here it is suggested to throw an entire working class population voluntarily into a modern capitalist war, delivering the workers to all the

machinations of discipline, censorship, and the entire power of militarism, and then evidently a small group of clever leaders sits watching all the time to see whether the ruling class does not go too far, and if it does, calls the workers back from the trenches.

If this could be done as easily as taking a figure from a chess board, the so weakened national army would most likely become the losing party and it would be necessary to hurl the soldiers back to the battlefield to prevent the "crushing defeat of one of the parties," this being a "controlling consideration" with socialists.

The national standpoint under present-day Imperialistic Capitalism is simply reactionary no matter what the "international considerations." And the only way out is to stick to the fight against capitalism and against the government in peace and in war all over the world.

S. J. RUTGERS.