



THE CLASS STRUGGLE

Devoted to International Socialism

Vol. II

JANUARY—FEBRUARY, 1918

No. 1

LEON TROTZKY
TO
JULES GUESDE

Peace and The International

By ROSA LUXEMBURG

SAMUEL GOMPERS

By ADOLPH GERMER

Proletarian Revolution in Russia

By L. C. FRAINA

PUBLISHED BY

THE SOCIALIST PUBLICATION SOCIETY, 119 LAFAYETTE ST., N. Y. CITY

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VOL. II JANUARY-FEBRUARY, 1918 No. 1

A Letter from Leon Trotzky to Ex-Minister Jules Guesde

Translated by MARIUS.

(This letter was first printed in the French periodical "Demain," of the Zimmerwaldist Guilbeaux, Geneva, August, 1917. It was addressed to Jules Guesde when the Government of the French Republic, in coalition with the Social patriots, ordered the expulsion of one of the most enlightened and self-sacrificing representatives of international Socialism.)

Mr. Minister: Before I leave the soil of France, under the escort of a police officer, who personifies the liberties in whose defense you were appointed to the national ministry, I consider it my duty to express to you a few thoughts, not in the vain hope that they may convince you, but that they may at least be useful and of value against you. When my expulsion from France was decided upon, your colleague, Mr. Malvy, the Minister of Justice, did not have the courage to tell me the reasons for this measure. Nor did that other of your colleagues, the Minister of War, consider it proper to enumerate the causes that led to the suppression of the Russian newspaper "Nashe Slovo" (Our Word), of which I was the editor, and which had, for two long years, suffered continually the trials of censorship, under the watchful eye and special care of that same Minister of War.

Still I need not conceal from you the fact that the reasons that led to my expulsion are no secret to me. You felt the need of adopting repressive measures against an international Socialist, against one of those who refuse to accept the part of defender or voluntary slave of this imperialistic war.

Moreover, even though the reasons for this action against me have not been communicated to me, whom they above all concern, these reasons have been stated by Mr. Briand to the deputies and to the journalists.

In Marseilles last August a number of Russian mutineers killed their colonel. A court investigation is alleged to have disclosed that a number of these soldiers were in possession of several numbers of the "Nashe Slovo." At least this is the explanation given by Mr. Briand in an interview with Deputy Longuet and with the president of the Chamber Committee of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Leygues, who, in turn, transmitted this version to the journalists of the Russian bourgeois press. To be sure, Mr. Briand did not possess the audacity to claim that the "Nashe Slovo," which stood subject to his own censorship, was directly responsible for the killing of the officer.

It is likely that his thoughts were somewhat along the following lines. In view of the presence of Russian soldiers in France, it is necessary to weed out the "Nashe Slovo" and to banish its editors from the soil of the Republic. For a Socialist newspaper that refuses to spread illusions and lies may, according to the memorable doctrine of Mr. Renaudel, open the eyes of the Russian soldiers to hypocrisies and lead them into dangerous paths of reflection and meditation. Unfortunately, however, for Mr. Briand, this explanation of his is based upon a very vexatious anachronism. A year ago Gustav Hervé, at that time still member of the permanent administrative committee of your party, wrote that the forcible removal from France of Russian refugees guilty of revolutionary internationalism would be accepted by public opinion without protest or resistance. Obviously Hervé received the inspiration for this prophecy from ministerial sources.

At the end of July this same Hervé whispered, officiously, that I would be expelled from France; at about the same time—i.e., still before the killing of the colonel in Marseilles—Professor Dürkheim, the President of the Commission for Russian immigrants, established by the Government, informed a representative of these immigrants of the impending suppression of

the 'Nashe Slovo' and the expulsion of its editors (*vide*, "Nashe Slovo," July 30, 1916). Everything had been prearranged, even the public opinion of the slaves of Mr. Hervé. They waited only for a pretext to strike the final blow. And the pretext was found. The unfortunate Russian soldiers killed their colonel at a moment that was most opportune to the interests of certain people. This happy coincidence invites a suspicion that may, I fear, penetrate the invulnerable skin of even your ministerial shame. Russian journalists who made a special investigation of the case in Marseilles have established the fact that in this case, as in so many similar cases, the leading role was played by an agent provocateur. What was his aim, or rather what were the aims of the well-paid rascals who directed this agent is not difficult to comprehend. An excess of some kind among the Russian soldiers was necessary not only to justify the rule of the knout against them, which was still somewhat offensive to the French authorities, but in order to create a pretext for repressive measures against the Russian immigrants, accused of abusing French hospitality by demoralizing Russian soldiers during the war. To their credit we will assume that the instigators of this project did not themselves believe that the matter would assume such a fatal aspect, that they did not intentionally desire what actually occurred from the very beginning. It is probable that they hoped great gains by small sacrifices. But all undertakings of this sort involve an element of business risk. In this case the provocateur himself went unmolested, but Colonel Krause and his assassins were the victims. Even the patriotic Russian journalists, who are openly hostile to the "Nashe Slovo," expressed the suspicion that copies of our paper were given to the soldiers, at the most auspicious moment, by the agent provocateur.

May I beg of you, Mr. Minister, to institute, through the services of Mr. Malvy . . . an investigation of this matter? You do not see that anything could be gained by such an investigation? Neither do I. Because—let us speak openly—agents provocateur are at least as valuable for "national defense" as Socialist ministers. And you, Jules Guesde, having so generously assumed responsibility for the foreign policy of the Third

Republic, for the Franco-Russian alliance and its consequences, for the conquest aims of the Czar, and for all the aims and methods of this war—it remains for you to accept as well the renown for the deeds of these agents provocateur of his Majesty the autocratic ruler of Russia.

At the beginning of the war, when promises were spread with a lavish hand, your partner, Sembat, enchanted the Russian journalists with the perspective of the most beneficial influence to be exerted by the allied democracies upon the internal regime of autocratic Russia. Moreover, this argument was used persistently by the Social patriots of France and Belgium to reconcile the revolutionary Russians with the French Government, but with little success. Twenty-six months of constant military coalition between the generalissimi, between diplomats and parliamentarians, the visits of Viviani and Thomas to Tsarkoe Selo, in short, twenty-six months of incessant influence exerted by the Western democracies upon the Russian regime have only served to strengthen in our land the boldest and most impudent reaction, softened, to a small extent, by the chaos of the administration; have succeeded, moreover, in transforming the internal regime of England and France until they have become very similar to that of Russia.

The generous promises of Mr. Sembat are obviously less expensive than his "coal." The unfortunate fate of the "right of asylum" is but a conspicuous symptom of materialistic and police rule that are becoming more and more predominant on both sides of the Channel. Lloyd George, of Dublin fame, the imperialist incarnate, with the manners of a drunken clergyman, and Mr. Aristide Briand, for whose characterization I beg to refer you, Mr. Jules Guesde, to your own article of earlier days, these two figures represent, in the highest degree, the spirit of the present war, its justification, its morality based upon the appetites of classes and of individuals. Can there be a better and a more deserving partner for Messrs. Lloyd George and Briand than this Mr. Stürmer, the German, who, like a real Russian, has made a career by pinning himself to the Cossacks of the Metropolitans and to the petticoats of bigoted

court damsels? What a splendid, what an incomparable trio! Verily, history could have selected no better colleagues and chieftains for Guesde, the minister.

Is it possible for an honest Socialist not to fight against them? You have transformed the Socialist party into a submissive chorus, that servilely imitates the leaders of capitalist highway robbery, at a historical epoch when bourgeois society—whose deadly enemy you, Jules Guesde, have hitherto been—has revealed and demonstrated its true nature to the core. From the events, prepared in a period of worldwide depredation and robbery, whose awful consequences we have so often predicted, from the rivers of blood, from the awful suffering, and misfortune, from the crimes, from the bloodthirsty ferocity and hypocrisy of the Governments you, Jules Guesde, draw but one lesson for the enlightenment of the French proletariat: that Wilhelm II and Francis Joseph are two criminals, who, contrary to Nicholas II and Mr. Poincaré, refused to respect the rules and regulations of international law.

French Socialism, with its glorious past, with its proud line of thinkers, of fighters and martyrs, has at last found (—and what a disgrace to think that it has found!—) in Renaudel, a translator, during the most tragic period of the world's history, for the elevating thoughts of the yellow book into the language of yellow journalism.

The Socialism of Babeuf, of Saint-Simon, of Fourier, of Blanqui, of the Commune, of Jaurès, and of Jules Guesde—yes, of the Jules Guesde of the days of yore—has found its Albert Thomas, who consults with the Russian tyrant concerning the surest and safest method of capturing Constantinople; has found its Marcel Sembat, to exercise and display dilettante nonchalance over the corpses and the ruins of French civilization; has found its Jules Guesde, to follow the triumphal chariot of the trumpeter Briand. And you believed and you hoped that the French proletariat, that has been bled to the point of exhaustion in this endless war for the crime of the ruling classes, will continue to tolerate quietly, to the end, this shameful union between official Socialism and the worst enemies of the proletariat? You

are mistaken. The opposition is growing. In spite of martial law, in spite of this mania of nationalism which, whatever its form, be it royalistic, radical, or socialistic, always preserves its capitalistic quintessence—revolutionary opposition is marching forward, slowly, but surely. Daily it is gaining ground. "Nashe Slovo," the paper that you have strangled, lived and breathed in the atmosphere of awakening French international Socialism. The group of "Nashe Slovo," expelled from Russia by the counter-revolution, that is gaining in power and strength through the help and support of the French Banking Exchange, the group of the "Nashe Slovo" was privileged to echo, even though it was hindered and hampered by your censor—the voice of the French side of the new International, that raises its head in the midst of the terrors of fratricidal war. In our capacity as "undesirable foreigners" we have identified our cause and our fate with that of the French opposition. We are proud to have received the first blow from the French Government, from *your* government, Jules Guesde!

We have the honor, together with Monatte, Merrheim, Saumoneau, Rosmer, Bourderon, Lorient, Guilbeaut, and so many others, to be accused, all of us, of being pro-German, of friendliness toward Germany.

The weekly Paris organ of your friend Plekchanoff, your partner in honor and glory as well as in your inglorious fall, has denounced us week after week to the police of Mr. Malvy, as being in the service of the German General Staff. Formerly you knew the value of such accusations, for you yourself had the honor of being subjected to similar accusations. But now you put your stamp of approval upon Mr. Malvy by collecting, for the government of "National Defense," the reports of Mr. Malvy's police spies. Moreover, my political correspondence box contains a very recent prison sentence pronounced against me, during the war, by a German court, in continuation—as I was not present—for my pamphlet, "The War and the International."

But besides this brutal fact, that can make an impression even upon the police brain-cells of Mr. Malvy, I should, I be-

lieve, emphasize that we revolutionary internationalists are more dangerous enemies of German reaction than all the Governments of the allies taken together. Their hostility to Germany is, at the bottom, nothing but the hatred of the competitor; our revolutionary hatred of its ruling class is indestructible. Imperialist competition may again unite the rival enemy brethren of today. When the total destruction of Germany has been realized, England and France, after a decade, would again approach the Kaiserdom of the Hohenzollern in the friendliest spirit, to defend themselves against the superiority of Russia. A future Poincaré will exchange telegrams of congratulations with Wilhelm or with his heirs; Lloyd George, in the peculiar language of the priest and the boxer, will curse and condemn Russia, as the defending wall of barbarism and militarism; Albert Thomas, as the French ambassador to the Kaiser, would be showered with flowers cut by the gentle hands of the court madams of Potsdam, as occurred so recently in Tsarskoe Selo.

All the banalities of present-day speeches and articles would again be unpacked. Mr. Renaudel would have to change, in his article, only the proper names, a task for which his mental faculties and abilities would doubtless suffice. But we will remain the outspoken, sworn enemies of Germany's rulers that we are today, for we hate German reaction with the same revolutionary hatred that we have sworn against Czarism and against the French moneyed aristocracy.

When you dare, you and your newspaper lackeys, to applaud a Liebknecht, a Mehring, a Luxemburg, a Zetkin, as the inflexible enemies of the Hohenzollerns dare you deny that they are ours, our faithful comrades, our comrades in battle? We are united with them against you and against your chiefs, with the unalterable unity of revolutionary warfare.

Perhaps you console yourselves with the thought that we are few in number? We are greater in number than the police souls of every grade believe. In your official myopia you do not see the ghost of rebellion that is arising from all the places of suffering and martyrdom; you do not see it spreading through France, through Europe, in the suburbs, in the workmen's dwellings, in the country places, in the shops and in the trenches.

You imprisoned Louise Soumoneau in one of your jails; but have you thereby diminished the despair and the despondency of this land? You can arrest hundreds of Zimmerwaldists, after having ordered your press agents to besmirch them again and again with police suspicions; but can you return the husbands to their grieving wives? Can you restore the sons to their suffering mothers, the fathers to their children, strength and health to the sick and debilitated? Can you return, to a betrayed, exsanguinated people, the trust in those who have deceived them?

Jules Guesde, get out of your military automobile. Abandon the gilded cage in which the capitalist state has imprisoned you. Look about! Perhaps then fate will have pity, for the last time, upon your enfeebled tragical old age, and let you hear once more the dull noise of approaching events. We expect them, we cause them, we prepare them! The fate of France would be too terrible, if the *via dolorosa* of its working masses did not lead to revenge, to our revenge, where there will be no room for you, Jules Guesde, and for yours. Expelled by you, I leave France with the deep certainty of our triumph. Over and above your head I send brotherly greetings to the French proletariat, that is preparing for great actions. Long live, without you and against you, Jules Guesde, Socialist France!

LEON TROTZKY.

Samuel Gompers

By ADOLPH GERMER.

In "Pearson's Magazine" of December, 1914, we find the following from the pen of the erstwhile Socialist and pacifist, Chas. Edward Russell, headed "Inside the European Madhouse":

"Another reason why we must have no more wars in this world of ours is the fact now demonstrated that at the first breath of war everybody goes crazy.

"This is not said flippantly nor casually nor recklessly: it refers to a truth about human life hitherto unregarded but demanding now the thoughtful attention of all of us. I do not mean crazy in the colloquial use of the word, but literally and absolutely insane. As truly insane, for instance, as any patient in any great asylum, utterly irrational, frantic and irresponsible; insane with a kind of primitive, animal-like, wild-eyed and perilous dementia, and forcing upon every observer strange, new suggestions of the race's hidden capacity for reversion."

The above clearly explains why the one-time ultra-radicals of the Russell-Stokes, Walling, Simons variety make common cause with the ultra-reactionary Samuel Gompers.

That Gompers should betray labor into the clutches of American plutocracy is not surprising. He has always been opposed to every measure fostered by the Socialists, and has been a constant political lackey for democratic politicians. But in spite of his political scavenger work, plutocracy has time and again kicked him in the face and his "policies" have been a mockery for those whose boots he kissed.

To say this without reference to specific instances would not only leave the reader without information, but it would make it appear as if I were actuated by unjustified opposition to him.

With the democratic wave in 1912, the labor element in Colorado, under the policy of "reward your friends and punish your enemies," succeeded in booting the republicans out of office and putting the democrats in. In addition to the governor and other state house officials, a large number of so-called labor men were elected to the legislature. Gompers gave out a statement heralding the Colorado elections as an "unprecedented victory."

But when the miners' strike came on in the Fall of 1913,

Gompers' governor "friend" went to greater tyrannical extremes than his republican predecessor, the now dead, but unlamented, James H. Peabody, in the strike of 1903 and 1904. In fact, Gompers' "unprecedented victory" was such a miserable failure that at the very next election the state went back to the republican fold, although ex-United States Senator Patterson, who had befriended labor during the strike, was the democratic candidate for governor. The interesting feature in connection with Gompers' policy is, that the very man who was chiefly responsible for the tragedies of the Colorado strike, John D. Rockefeller, Jr., walked arm in arm with Gompers into a meeting in Washington at the outbreak of the war. They paid the highest tributes to each other. And it is perfectly proper that they should, for their minds run in the same direction—both are opposed to Socialism.

It may not be amiss to mention the fact that at no time during the Colorado strike, where every civil right was banished and where every public agency was in the control of his friend Rockefeller, did Gompers show his face in the state and say a word in defense of the miners who pay more than any other organization into the treasury of the A. F. of L. The same is true of the West Virginia strike in 1912 and the Alabama strike in 1908. True, he or some one in the pay of the A. F. of L. wrote articles in his monthly "Federationist" and he called on officials in Washington asking for a congressional investigation. The investigation asked for took place. The committee was made up of a majority of democrats. I met one member of the committee afterwards and asked him what he thought of Colorado. I may not quote him verbatim, but as nearly as I can recall, this was his answer: "I have heard and read of Colorado and thought I knew the conditions, but I must confess, my trip there was a startling revelation to me. I did not believe that any government would tolerate the violations of law committed by those coal companies."

The committee took 2,940 pages of testimony, but up to this day Gompers' official friends in Washington have failed to act and bring the industrial highbinders to terms. This is likewise

true with respect to the strikes in Michigan and West Virginia.

In the Michigan strike, Gompers sent several of his "organizers" (it cost the A. F. of L. from \$10,000 to \$100,000 per year for "organizers.") to "help" the strikers. Most of their time was consumed in attacking the Socialists. This in spite of the fact that the Socialist Party sent thousands of dollars to aid the victims of the copper trust.

Another instance that shows up the fallacy of Gompers' policy is the Danbury Hatters case. The reader, if not fully informed, knows that the Loewe Hat Company received judgment against the hatters. It seemed for a while as if the members of the Danbury Local of the Hatters' Union would be robbed of everything they had. But funds were collected from all over the country to meet the judgment and save the Union from disaster.

I happened to be in Washington shortly afterwards and a labor official told me that "there will be no more Danbury Hatters cases." I asked him on what he based his assurances and he pulled out the Clayton Amendment to the anti-trust law. "This settles such cases," he said, and I wished him good luck.

The Clayton Amendment became a law. But the Bache-Demmon Coal Company in the Federal Court in Fort Smith, Arkansas, entered suit against the United Mine Workers of America, and secured a judgment of \$220,000. Of course, the case will be appealed and it may be that on account of the political and economic power represented by the Miners' Union, the judgment of the lower court will be reversed. I sincerely hope it will, but, it is perfectly obvious that the much-lauded Clayton Amendment has not ended the costly litigations. If the miners win out in the Supreme Court, the case will nevertheless cost them thousands of dollars in lawyers' fees and other expenses. Why didn't Gompers' friends that he helped to elect to Congress, introduce and pass a law making it clearly unlawful to start suits that have for their purposes first, to rob the unions of their funds, and second, to crush the spirit of the workers involved?

Another case that proved the failure of Gompers' policies is that of the Hinchman Coal and Coke Company of West Virginia against the United Mine Workers of America. That decision is more dangerous to organized labor in its ultimate effect than the Danbury Hatters case.

In this case the United States Supreme Court outlaws the efforts of organized labor to increase its members. Here is the ruling, according to the press reports:

"The Court holds that what the defendants were endeavoring to do was not a bonafide effort to enlarge the membership of the Union, since the new members were not desired or sought except as a means to the end of compelling the owners of the mines to change their methods of operation."

In other words, according to this ruling, whenever a union seeks more members with the object of using its economic solidarity to correct an unjust working condition, such a union is violating the law.

It is almost certain that the ruling will not be enforced against the Miners' Union because of its strategic position. But where does Gompers' successful policy come in? He has styled himself the "apostle of success," but under his "leadership" some branch of organized labor is always in the courts defending itself.

In the course of some correspondence I had with a labor official, I asked what the organized labor movement was doing about the ruling of the court in the case of the Hinchman Coal and Coke Company. His reply was that "Gompers and almost everybody else had taken a 'shot' at it." Gompers is long on taking "shots." He is an excellent soldier at long range. No one has ever revealed the secret where he ventured, when it might mean personal discomfort to him.

That he is a soldier at long range is well known. Time and again he has attacked Eugene V. Debs and time and again he has been challenged to meet the latter. But there are not loco-

motives enough in this country to pull "Sammy," as Mark Hanna used to call him, on to the platform with Debs.

It is far more comfortable for him to draw \$7,500.00 and expenses per year and shoot his vitriol at a distance than to face the man about whom he has so often lied.

Nor is Gompers afflicted with a habit of telling the truth, so far as the Socialists are concerned. Not a convention passes but what he empties the vials of his wrath against the Socialist Party, that has always stood by labor. Anything the Socialists propose in the Convention, that will make the A. F. of L. more democratic and progressive is sure to be opposed by the "grand old lady of labor." And as for scruples in his method—there are none.

In the 'Frisco convention he made the statement that he never attacks the Socialists, unless they attack him. It happened that Comrades Debs, Berger and I, were sent, a committee to West Virginia, to gather what facts we could in connection with that strike, and then proceeded to Washington to see the President and members of Congress in behalf of the Senate resolution calling for the investigation. We went to Charleston and worked in harmony with the miners' officials in charge. At an audience with the Governor, we secured his promise to release every striker in jail. This promise was carried out. We sent long telegrams to Washington officials, urging the passage of the Senate resolution. It passed while we were in Charleston. We were commended for our work by the officials of the Miners' Union. We submitted our report. Not a single unfavorable reference was made to a labor official or a trade union, but in a subsequent number of the "Federationist," Gompers unloaded a tirade of abuse against the committee and the Socialists in general, saying we "stabbed the miners in the back" and a lot of other similar slush.

Gompers made the unfortunate mistake of coming to an international convention of the United Mine Workers. There he did not wield the gavel and, of course, could not lash the delegates into line, as is his customary policy in the A. F. of L. I shall never forget what a sickly looking spectacle he was after Dun-

can McDonald got through with him. I too, wanted to take him to task for his reactionary policy and for his untruthful charges against Comrades Debs and Berger and myself, but Frank Hayes, who presided, came to his rescue by entertaining a motion to "close debate." Gompers excused himself, saying he had to go to New York immediately for an important conference, but he was still in Indianapolis the following day.

I never knew how helpless Gompers is when not surrounded by his retainers. The miners know him, and his methods, employed in the A. F. of L., failed in the Miners' Convention.

The reader may wonder how he is able to dominate the American Federation of Labor. To those who are familiar with the workings of that organization, it is perfectly simple.

First of all, let me point out that there is absolutely no democracy in an A. F. of L. convention or in the organization as such. Whatever democracy prevails, is in some of the affiliated unions.

Time and again the Socialists have tried to change the constitution and elect officers by a referendum vote. This change has always been opposed by Gompers and his immediate associates. In the convention, all committees are made up by Gompers, and if one will examine the records, it will be found that invariably the same men are appointed year after year. The convention is made up largely of officials, most of whom expect some favors from Gompers.

I was the only delegate who went on record against Gompers for president at the 'Frisco Convention. When we adjourned, an official of a small union said to me: "I wish I could do as you did. I hate him just as much as you do, for I know he is a millstone on the labor movement. But if I show any opposition to him, he will send his organizers in and tear my union to pieces. In order to save my union, I have to be a hypocrite."

This is true of others at the head of unions, who apparently support him. With these and the element that is in harmony with his policy, one can readily see how he retains his control over the Federation. In addition to this he has a force of retainers that are carried on the payroll as "organizers." The

chief burden of their efforts is to organize the line up for Gompers rather than the American Federation of Labor.

I am often asked whether I entertain hopes of ever making the A. F. of L. a real labor organization. Yes, I do. But it will not be done at a convention. It will be done by the enlightenment of the rank and file. When the members understand to what misuse the Federation is put, and how the opportunities to make it a valuable weapon for the workers are neglected, a change will take place.

The wartime burdens levied upon labor are causing the rank and file to think. The sealing of lips, the shackling of hands and feet by wartime agreements entered into by officials of the Gompers type, will bring about new thoughts and along with the economic reconstruction after the war, there will also be a reconstruction in the labor movement. If the old "leaders" do not move forward, the enlightened rank and file will brush them aside and get others, with views in harmony with the times, to take their places. We will have not only a more solidified economic movement, but with it we will have a close relation between economic and political movements of the workers. It will not come because of the Gompers variety of labor officials, but in spite of them.

Peace and the International

By ROSA LUXEMBURG.

In spite of military dictatorship and press censorship, in spite of the downfall of the Social democracy, in spite of fratricidal war, the class struggle arises from civil peace with elemental force: from the blood and smoke of the battlefields the solidarity of international labor arises. Not in weak attempts to artificially galvanize the old International, not in pledges rendered now here, now there, to stand together after the war is over. No, here, in the war, out of the war arises, with a new might and intensity, the recognition that the proletarians of all lands have one and the same interest. The world war, itself, utterly disproves the falsehoods it has created.

Victory or defeat? It is the slogan of all-powerful militarism in every belligerent nation, and, like an echo, the social-democratic leaders have adopted it. Victory or defeat has become the highest motive of the workers of Germany, of France, of England and of others, just as for the ruling classes of these nations. When the cannons thunder, all proletarian interests subside before the desire for victory of its own, i. e. for defeat of the other countries. And yet, what can a victory bring to the proletariat?

According to the official version of the leaders of the social democracy, that was so readily adopted without criticism, victory of the German forces would mean, for Germany, unhampered, boundless industrial growth; defeat, however, industrial ruin. On the whole, this conception coincides with that generally accepted during the war of 1870. But the period of capitalist growth that followed the war of 1870 was not caused by the war, but resulted rather from the political union of the various German states, even though this union took the form of the crippled figure that Bismarck established as the German empire. Here the industrial impetus came from this union, in spite of the war and the manifold reactionary hindrances that followed in its wake. What the victorious war itself accomplished was to firmly establish the military monarchy and Prussian junkerdom in Germany; the defeat of France led to the liquidation of its Empire

and the establishment of a Republic. But today the situation is different in all of the nations in question. Today war does not function as a dynamic force to provide for rising young capitalism the indispensable political conditions for its "national" development. Modern war appears in this role only in Serbia, and there only as an isolated fragment. Reduced to its objective historic significance, the present world war as a whole is a competitive struggle of a fully developed capitalism for world supremacy, for the exploitation of the last remnant of non-capitalistic world zones. This war gives to the war and its political after effects an entirely new character. The high stages of world industrial development in capitalistic production finds expression in the extraordinary technical development and destructiveness of the instruments of war, as in their practically uniform degree of perfection in all belligerent countries. The international organization of war industries is reflected in the military balance, that persistently brings back the scales, through all partial decisions and variations, to their true balance, and pushes a general decision further and further into the future. The indecision of military results, moreover, has the effect that a constant stream of new reserves, from the belligerent nations as well as from nations hitherto neutral, are sent to the front. Everywhere war finds material enough for imperialist desires and conflicts; itself creates new material to feed the conflagration that spreads out like a prairie fire. But the greater the masses, and the greater the number of nations that are dragged into this world-war, the longer will it rage. All of these things together prove, even before any military decision of victory or defeat can be established, that the result of the war will be: the economic ruin of all participating nations, and, in a steadily growing measure, of the formally neutral nations, a phenomenon entirely distinct from the earlier wars of modern times. Every month of war affirms and augments this effect, and thus takes away, in advance, the expected fruits of military victory for a decade to come. This, in the last analysis, neither victory nor defeat can alter; on the contrary it makes a purely military decision altogether doubtful, and increases the likelihood that the war will finally end because of general and extreme

exhaustion. But even a victorious Germany, under such circumstances, even if its imperialistic war agitators should succeed in carrying on the mass murder to the absolute destruction of their opponents, even if their most daring dreams should be fulfilled—would win but a Pyrrhic victory. A number of annexed territories, impoverished and depopulated, and a grinning ruin under its own roof, would be its trophies. Nothing can hide this once the painted stage properties of financial war-bond transactions, and the Potemkin villages of an “unalterable prosperity” kept up by war orders are pushed aside. The most superficial observer cannot but see that even the most victorious nation cannot count on war indemnities that will stand in any relation to the wounds that the war has struck. Perhaps they may see in the still greater economic ruin of the defeated opponents, England and France, the very countries with which Germany was most closely united by industrial relations, upon whose recuperation its own prosperity so much depends, a substitute and an augmentation for their victory. Such are the circumstances under which the German people, even after a victorious war, would be required to pay, in cold cash, the war bonds that were “voted” on credit by the patriotic parliament; i.e. to take upon its shoulders an immeasurable burden of taxation, and a strengthened military dictatorship as the only permanent tangible fruit of its victory.

Should we now seek to imagine the worst possible effects of a defeat we will find that they resemble, line for line, with the exception of imperialistic annexations, the same picture that presented itself as the irrefutable consequence of victory: the effects of war today are so far reaching, so deeply rooted, that its military outcome can alter but little in its final consequences.

But let us assume, for the moment, that the victorious nation should find itself in the position to avoid the great catastrophe for its own people, should be able to throw the whole burden of the war upon the shoulders of its defeated opponent, should be able to choke off the industrial development of the latter by all sorts of hindrances. Can the German labor movement hope for

successful development, so long as the activity of the French, English, Belgian and Italian laborers is hampered by industrial retrogression? Before 1870 the labor movements of the various nations grew independently of each other. The action of the labor movement of a single city often controlled the destiny of the whole labor movement. On the streets of Paris the battles of the working class were fought out and decided. The modern labor movement, its laborious daily struggle in the industries of the world, its mass organization, are based upon the co-operation of the workers in all capitalistically producing countries. If the truism that the cause of labor can thrive only upon a virile, pulsating industrial life is true, then it is true not only for Germany, but for France, England, Belgium, Russia, and Italy as well. And if the labor movement in all of the capitalist states of Europe becomes stagnant, if industrial conditions there result in low wages, weakened labor unions, and a diminished power of resistance on the part of labor, labor unionism in Germany cannot possibly flourish. From this point of view the loss sustained by the working class in its industrial struggle is in the last analysis identical, whether German capital be strengthened at the expense of the French or English capital at the expense of the German.

But let us investigate the political effects of the war. Here differentiation should be less difficult than upon the economic tended toward the side that defended progress against reaction. Which side, in the present war, represents progress, which side reaction? It is clear that this question cannot be decided according to the outward insignias that mark the political character of the belligerent nations as “democracy” and absolutism. They must be judged solely according to the tendencies of their respective world policies.

Before we can determine what a German victory can win for the German proletariat we must consider its effect upon the general status of political conditions all over Europe. A decisive victory for Germany would mean, in the first place, the annexation of Belgium, as well as of a possible number of territories in the East and West and a part of the French colonies; the

sustaining of the Hapsburg Monarchy and its aggrandizement by a number of new territories; finally the establishment of a fictitious "integrity" of Turkey, under a German protectorate—i.e. the conversion of Asia Minor and Mesopotamia, in one form or another, into German provinces. In the end this would result in the actual military and economic hegemony of Germany in Europe. Not because they are in accord with the desires of imperialist agitators are these consequences of an absolute German military victory to be expected, but because they are the inevitable outgrowth of the world-political position that Germany has adopted, of conflicting interests with England, France, and Russia in which Germany has been involved, and which have grown, during the course of the war, far beyond their original dimensions. It is sufficient to recall these facts to realize that they could under no circumstances establish a permanent world-political equilibrium. Though this war may mean ruin for all of its participants, and worse for its defeated, the preparations for a new world war, under England's leadership, would begin on the day after peace is declared, to shake off the yoke of Prussian-German militarism that would rest upon Europe and Asia. A German victory would be the prelude to an early second world-war, and therefore, for this reason, but the signal for new feverish armaments, for the unleashing of the blackest reaction in every country, but particularly in Germany. On the other hand a victory of England or France would mean, in all likelihood, for Germany the loss of a part of her colonies, as well as Alsace-Lorraine, and certainly the bankruptcy of the world-political position of German militarism. But this would mean the disintegration of Austria-Hungary and the total liquidation of Turkey. Reactionary as both of these states are, and much as their disintegration would be in line with the demands of progressive development, in the present world political milieu, the disintegration of the Hapsburg Monarchy and the liquidation of Turkey would mean the bartering of their peoples to the highest bidder—Russia, England, France, or Italy. This enormous redivision of the world and shifting of the bal-

ance of power in the Balkan states and along the Mediterranean would be followed inevitably by another in Asia: the liquidation of Persia and a redivision of China. This would bring the English-Russian as well as the English-Japanese conflict into the foreground of international politics, and may bring, in direct connection with the liquidation of the present war, a new world war, perhaps for Constantinople, would certainly bring it, unescapably, in the immediate future. So a victory on this side, too, would lead to new, feverish armaments in all nations—the defeated Germany, of course, at the head—and would introduce an era of undivided rule for militarism and reaction all over Europe, with a new war as its final goal.

So the proletariat, should it attempt to cast its influence into the balance on one side or the other for progress or democracy, viewing the world policies in their widest application, would place itself between Scylla and Charybdis. Under the circumstances the question, victory or defeat, becomes, for the European working class, in its political, exactly as in its economic aspects, a choice between two beatings. It is, therefore, nothing short of a dangerous madness for the French Socialists to believe that they can give the death blow to militarism and imperialism, and clear the road for peaceful democracy, by overthrowing Germany. Imperialism, and its servant militarism, will reappear after every victory and after every defeat in this war. There can be but one exception: if the international proletariat, through its intervention, should overthrow all previous calculations.

The important lesson to be derived by the proletariat from this war is the one unchanging fact, that it can and must not become the uncritical echo of the "victory and defeat" slogan, neither in Germany nor in France, neither in England nor in Austria. For it is a slogan that has reality only from the point of view of imperialism, and is identical, in the eyes of every large power, with the question: gain or loss of world-political power, of annexations, of colonies, of military supremacy.

For the European proletariat as a class, victory or defeat of either of the two war groups would be equally disastrous. For

war as such, whatever its military outcome may be, is the greatest conceivable defeat of the cause of the European proletariat. The overthrow of war, and the speedy forcing of peace, by the international revolutionary action of the proletariat, alone can bring to it the only possible victory. And this victory, alone, can truly rescue Belgium, can bring democracy to Europe.

For the class-conscious proletariat to identify its cause with either military camp is an untenable position. Does that mean that the proletarian policies of the present day demand a return to the "status quo," that we have no plan of action beyond the fond hope that everything remain as it was before the war? The existing conditions have never been our ideal, they have never been the expression of the self-determination of the people. And more, the former conditions cannot be reinstated, even if the old national boundaries should remain unchanged. For even before its formal ending this war has brought about enormous changes, in mutual recognition of one another's strength, in alliances, and in conflict. It has sharply revised the relations of countries to one another, of classes within society, has destroyed so many old illusions and portents, has created so many new forces and new problems, that a return to the old Europe that existed before August 4, 1914, is as impossible as the return to pre-revolutionary conditions, even after an unsuccessful revolution. The proletariat knows no going back, can only strive forward and onward, for a goal that lies beyond even the most newly created conditions. In this sense, alone, is it possible for the proletariat to oppose both camps in the imperialistic world war with its policy.

But this policy cannot concern itself with recipes for capitalist diplomacy worked out individually by the social-democratic parties, or even together in international conferences, to determine how capitalism shall declare peace in order to assure future peaceful and democratic development. All demands for complete or gradual disarmament, for the abolition of secret diplomacy, for the dissolution of the great powers into smaller national entities, and all other similar propositions, are absolutely utopian

so long as capitalist class rule remains in power. For capitalism, in its present imperialistic course, to dispense with present-day militarism, with secret diplomacy, with the centralization of many national states, is so impossible that these postulates might, much more consistently, be united into the simple demand "abolition of capitalist class society." The proletarian movement cannot reconquer the place it deserves by means of utopian advice and projects for weakening, taming, or quelling imperialism within capitalism by means of partial reforms. The real problem that the world war has placed before the Socialist parties, upon whose solution the future of the working class movement depends, is the readiness of the proletarian masses to act in the fight against imperialism. The international proletariat suffers, not from a dearth of postulates, programs, and slogans, but from a lack of deeds, of effective resistance, of the power to attack imperialism at the decisive moment, just in times of war. It has been unable to put its old slogan, war against war, into actual practice. Here is the Gordian knot of the proletarian movement and of its future.

Imperialism, with all its brutal policy of force, with the incessant chain of social catastrophe that it itself provokes, is, to be sure, a historic necessity for the ruling classes of the present world. Yet nothing could be more detrimental than that the proletariat should derive, from the present war, the slightest hope or illusion of the possibility of an idyllic and peaceful development of capitalism. There is but one conclusion that the proletariat can draw from the historic necessity of imperialism. To capitulate before imperialism will mean to live forever in its shadow, off the crumbs that fall from the table of its victories.

Historic development move in contradictions, and for every necessity puts its opposite into the world as well. The capitalist state of society is doubtless a historic necessity, but so also is the revolt of the working class against it. Capital is a historic necessity, but in the same measure is its grave digger, the Socialist proletariat. The world rule of imperialism is a historic necessity, but likewise its overthrow by the proletar-

ian international. Side by side the two historic necessities exist, in constant conflict with each other. And ours is the necessity of Socialism. Our necessity receives its justification with the moment when the capitalist class ceases to be the bearer of historic progress, when it becomes a hindrance, a danger, to the future development of society. That capitalism has reached this stage the present world war has revealed.

Capitalist desire for imperialistic expansion, as the expression of its highest maturity in the last period of its life, has the economic tendency to change the whole world into capitalistically producing nations, to sweep away all superannuated, precapitalistic methods of production and of society, to subjugate all the riches of the earth and all means of production to capital, to turn the laboring masses of the peoples of all zones into wage slaves. In Africa and in Asia, from the most northern regions to the southernmost point of South America and in the South Seas, the remnants of old communistic social groups, of feudal society, of patriarchal systems, and of ancient handicraft production are destroyed and stamped out by capitalism. Whole peoples are destroyed, ancient civilizations are leveled to the ground, and in their place profiteering in its most modern forms is being established. This brutal triumphal procession of capitalism through the world, accompanied by all the means of force, of robbery, and of infamy, has one bright phase: It has created the premises for its own final overthrow, it has established the capitalist world rule upon which, alone, the Socialist world revolution can follow. This is the only cultural and progressive aspect of the great so-called works of culture that were brought to the primitive countries. To capitalist economists and politicians railroads, matches, sewerage systems and warehouses are progress and culture. Of themselves such works, grafted upon primitive conditions, are neither culture nor progress, for they are too dearly paid for with the sudden economic and cultural ruin of the peoples who must drink down the bitter cup of misery and horror of two social orders, of traditional agricultural landlordism, of supermodern, superrefined capitalist exploitation

at one and the same time. Only as the material conditions for the destruction of capitalism and the abolition of class society can the works of the capitalist triumphal march through the world bear the stamp of progress in a historical sense. In this sense imperialism, too, is working in our interest.

The present world war is a turning point in the course of imperialism. For the first time the destructive beasts that have been loosed by capitalist Europe over all other parts of the world have sprung, with one awful leap, into the midst of the European nations. A cry of horror went up through the world when Belgium, that priceless small jewel of European culture, when the venerable monuments of art in northern France, fell into fragments before the onslaughts of a blind and destructive force. The "civilized world" that had stood calmly by when this same imperialism doomed tens of thousands of heroes to destruction, when the desert of Kalahari shuddered with the insane cry of the thirsty and the rattling breath of the dying, when in Putumayo, within ten years, forty thousand human beings were tortured to death by a band of European industrial robber-barons, and the remnants of a whole people were beaten into cripples, when in China an ancient civilization was delivered into the hands of destruction and anarchy, under fire and murder, by the European soldiery, when Persia gasped in the noose of the foreign rule of force that closed inexorably about its throat, when in Tripoli the Arabs were bowed down, under fire and sword, under the yoke of capital, while their civilization and their homes were razed to the ground—this civilized world has just begun to know that the fangs of the imperialist beast are deadly, that its breath is frightfulness, that its tearing claws have sunk deep into the breasts of its own mother, European culture. And this belated recognition is coming into the world of Europe in the distorted form of bourgeois hypocrisy, that leads each nation to recognize infamy only when it appears in the uniform of the other. They speak of German barbarism, as if every people that goes out for organized murder did not change into a horde of barbarians! They speak of Cossack horrors, as if war itself

were not the greatest of all horrors, as if the praise of human slaughter in a socialist periodical were not mental Cossackdom in its very essence.

But the horrors of imperialist bestiality in Europe have had another effect, that has brought to the "civilized world" no horror-stricken eyes, no agonized heart. It is the mass destruction of the European proletariat. Never has a war killed off whole nations; never, within the past century, has it swept over all of the great and established lands of civilized Europe. Millions of human lives were destroyed in the Vosges, in the Ardennes, in Belgium, in Poland, in the Carpathians and on the Save millions have been hopelessly crippled. But nine-tenths of these millions come from the ranks of the working class of the cities and the farms. It is our strength, our hope that was mowed down there, day after day, before the scythe of death. They were the best, the most intelligent, the most thoroughly schooled forces of international socialism, the bearers of the holiest traditions, of the highest heroism, the modern labor movement, the vanguard of the whole world proletariat, the workers of England, France, Belgium, Germany and Russia who are being gagged and butchered in masses. Only from Europe, only from the oldest capitalist nations, when the hour is ripe, can the signal come for the social revolution that will free the nations. Only the English, the French, the Belgian, the German, the Russian, the Italian workers, together, can lead the army of the exploited and oppressed. And when the time comes they alone can call capitalism to account for centuries of crime committed against primitive people; they alone can avenge its work of destruction over a whole world. But for the advance and victory of Socialism we need a strong, educated, ready proletariat, masses whose strength lies in knowledge as well as in numbers. And these very masses are being decimated all over the world. The flower of our youthful strength, hundreds of thousands whose socialist education in England, in France, in Belgium, in Germany and in Russia was the product of decades of education and propaganda, other hundreds of thousands who were ready to receive the lessons of socialism,

have fallen, and are rotting upon the battlefields. The fruit of the sacrifices and toil of generations are destroyed in a few short weeks, the choicest troops of the international proletariat are torn out by the life-roots.

The blood-letting of the June battle laid low the French labor movement for a decade and a half. The blood-letting of the Commune massacre again threw it back for more than a decade. What is happening now is a massacre such as the world has never seen before, that is reducing the laboring population in all of the leading nations to the aged, the women and the maimed; a blood-letting that threatens to bleed white the European labor movement.

Another such world war, and the hope of Socialism will be buried under the ruins of imperialistic barbarism. That is more than the ruthless destruction of Liège and of the Rheims Cathedral. That is a blow, not against capitalist civilization of the past, but against socialist civilization of the future, a deadly blow against the force that carries the future of mankind in its womb, that alone can rescue the precious treasures of the past over into a better state of society. Here capitalism reveals its death's head, here it betrays that it has sacrificed its historic right of existence, that its rule is no longer compatible with the progress of humanity.

But here is proof also that the war is not only a grandiose murder, but the suicide of the European working class. The soldiers of Socialism, the workers of England, of France, of Germany, of Italy, of Belgium are murdering each other at the bidding of capitalism, are thrusting cold, murderous irons into each others' breasts, are tottering over their graves, grappling in each other's death-bringing arms.

"Deutschland, Deutschland über alles," "long live democracy," "long live the czar and slavery," "ten thousand tent cloths, guaranteed according to specifications," "hundred thousand pounds of bacon," "coffee substitute, immediate delivery" . . . dividends are rising—proletarians falling; and with each one

there sinks a fighter of the future, a soldier of the revolution, a savior of humanity from the yoke of capitalism, into the grave.

This madness will not stop, and this bloody nightmare of hell will not cease until the workers of Germany, of France, of Russia and of England will wake up out of their drunken sleep; will clasp each other's hands in brotherhood and will drown the bestial chorus of war agitators and the hoarse cry of capitalist hyenas with the mighty cry of labor, "Proletarians of all countries, unite."

The Proletarian Revolution in Russia

By LOUIS C. FRAINA

I.

The Russian Revolution is an incomparably mightier event than any previous revolution; larger in scope and deeper in ultimate meaning than the French Revolution. It is not, as yet, the Social Revolution; but it marks the *start* of the revolution of the proletariat against Capitalism. Internally, the Russian Revolution pursues a class policy in accord with the interests and requirements of the revolutionary proletariat; internationally, in the attitude toward war and peace, it pursues, in the words of Leon Trotzky, "its independent class policy," a policy in accord with the requirements of the international proletariat. In 1914, the Social-Democratic Workers' Party, the Bolsheviki, demanded "the transformation of the imperialistic war into a civil war of the oppressed against the oppressors, and for Socialism." The imperialistic war in Russia has been transformed into a civil war of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie; it may yet become the Social Revolution of the international proletariat; if not immediately, surely ultimately.

The prevailing historic situation, acting through the pressure of events and the existence of a class conscious proletariat, has made of the Russian Revolution a proletarian revolution, to the horror and indignation of the pseudo-Marxists who dogmatically insist that Russia is ripe *only* for a bourgeois revolution. But life itself answers dogma.

The insistence upon Russia being ripe only for the bourgeois revolution ignores a number of factors that completely alter the problem, creating a new historic situation which alone is the determining consideration.

The central factor is the existence of Imperialism, which not only makes a national democratic revolution of the bourgeoisie in itself incompatible with the requirements of modern Capitalism, but which equally makes Europe *as a whole* ripe for the immediate revolutionary struggle for Socialism. Imperialism determines Capitalism in a reactionary policy; but, simultane-

ously, it creates the conditions under which the proletariat may express its revolutionary action for the overthrow of Capitalism.

The bourgeois democratic revolution is not an indispensable necessity at all stages of the development of Capitalism; it occurs at particular stages and under certain conditions, and may be dispensed with, as was the case in Germany. Imperialism negates democracy, projecting a new autocracy necessary to maintain the proletariat in subjection, expressing the requirements of concentrated industry, and indispensable in the armed struggles produced by imperialistic competition. Without a class conscious proletariat in Russia, there would in all probability have been no revolution; the situation, after the abortive revolution of 1905, was shaping itself as in Germany, where the imperialistic bourgeoisie compromises with and accepts autocracy as an instrument for promoting its brutal class interests. The requirements of Imperialism are incompatible with bourgeois democracy, with the paltry democracy of the bourgeoisie in its earlier "liberal" era. What other meaning is there in the international reactionary trend *away from democracy and toward autocracy?*

Imperialism, moreover, means, generally, Capitalism at the climax of its development, Capitalism ripe for the introduction of Socialism. The Western European countries are ripe for the Socialist community: they have that material basis in the maturity of the industrial development of Capitalism which is indispensable for the establishment of Socialism. Russia, geographically and economically, is an integral part of Europe; this being the case, the introduction of Socialism in Europe generally would necessarily, under the historic conditions, mean the Socialist community in Russia. This is precisely what the Bolsheviki meant by "a civil war of the oppressed against the oppressors, and for Socialism." Not in Russia alone, but throughout Europe, the revolutionary proletariat is called to action, Russian revolutionary Socialism using its power and strategic position to arouse that international class struggle which would transform itself into the Social Revolution. Two forces are necessary to establish Socialism—the material, Capitalism in

the fullness of its development of the forces of production; the dynamic, a revolutionary, class conscious proletariat. The material force exists in West Europe, but not in Russia; the dynamic exists in Russia, but, as yet, not in West Europe. Now consider Europe as one great social arena, as it is in fact. The revolutionary energy of the Russian proletariat, uniting with the impulse of a war that is developing intense revolutionary currents, may conceivably arouse the European proletariat for the Social Revolution. The Social Revolution of the proletariat is an international revolution; and it is precisely the international aspirations of the Russian Revolution, in its Bolshevik phase, that is a proof of its proletarian character.

The proletarian revolution in Russia marks a complete break with the traditions and the ideology of the past. To compare it with previous revolutions is to miss the significance of its fundamental character. There are no historic standards by which to measure the proletarian revolution in Russia; it is making its own history, creating the standards by which alone it and subsequent proletarian revolutions may be measured. The circumstance is pivotal in interpreting the course of events in Russia and the meaning of this first general revolution of the proletariat.

In the *Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, Marx declares that bourgeois revolutions hark to the past for inspiration; the old figures and ideology appear as means to intoxicate people with their revolutionary task. At one moment, the French Revolution is cloaked in the forms of the Roman Republic; at another moment, in the forms of Roman Empire. Cromwell and the English people drew from the Old Testament the figures and the ideology for their bourgeois revolution. But, says Marx, "the Social Revolution [of the proletariat] cannot draw its poetry from the past, it can draw that only from the future. It cannot start upon its work before it has stricken off all superstition concerning the past. Former revolutions required historic reminiscences in order to intoxicate themselves with their own issues. The revolution [of the proletariat] must let the dead bury their dead in order to reach its issue. With the

former, the phrase surpasses the substance; with this one, the substance surpasses the phrase."

It is only in appearance, accordingly, that the Russian Revolution and its stages are comparable with previous revolutions. In one stage alone is this comparison actual, and that is the first stage, when, the proletariat having made the revolution, the bourgeoisie seized power for its own class purposes,—as in previous revolutions. But this stage was the initial one: the subsequent stages are stages of a proletarian revolution, creating its own modes of action and its own standards. The Russian Revolution marks the entry of a new character upon the stage of history—*the revolutionary proletariat in action*; it means a new revolution, *the Proletarian Revolution*; it establishes a new reality, the imminence of the Social Revolution, *the transformation of the aspiration for the Social Revolution into a fact of immediate, palpitant importance to all the world.*

Nor can the proletarian revolution in Russia be compared with the Paris Commune. The Parisian proletariat had neither the numbers, the class consciousness, the organized revolutionary spirit of the Russian proletariat; nor did it break completely with the superstitions and ideology of the past. Industrial development in France at that period had not produced a mass of unskilled workers, mere appendages of the machine, that typical proletariat which constitutes the revolutionary class in Capitalism, and which is the bone and sinew of the revolutionary movement in Russia. In spite of Russia being still largely a peasant community, its industry is substantial; and, moreover, is large scale, concentrated industry, producing a large mass of typical and potentially revolutionary proletarians. The Parisian proletariat, again, did not act in conjunction with the rest of France; nor did it operate in a generally revolutionary situation such as prevails in Europe to-day. The conditions of Imperialism develop a revolutionary epoch: and Russia may act as the signal for the *general* proletarian revolution.

The moderate Socialist who considers Socialism a process of gradually transforming Capitalism, of "growing into" Socialism.

will not favorably consider the proletarian revolution in Russia, or will consider it simply in the light of the success or failure of its aspirations on peace. But if the European proletariat does not respond to the revolutionary call to action, then the proletarian revolution in Russia becomes a phase in the development of the general revolution; the struggle will break out anew to-morrow. The Social Revolution may have to become a series of revolutionary struggles, alternately weakening Capitalism and strengthening the proletariat, ending finally in the overthrow of Capitalism. The Social Revolution is a process, not an ultimate act alone: but it is a *revolutionary* process. The value of the revolutionary struggle against Capitalism lies in the development of the consciousness and action of the proletariat; in the intensity of its antagonism to capital; in the moral and physical reserves it acquires for action in the days to come. In this sense, the Russian Revolution means the *start* of the Social Revolution, the emergence of the international proletariat into a new revolutionary era. "The bourgeoisie," says Heinrich Lauffenberg, "born in the Revolution, maintaining itself in a struggle against the Revolution, can only be overcome by the Revolution." The overthrow of Capitalism is accomplished, not through the development of institutions but through the development of proletarian consciousness, action and class power.

II.

The entry of Russia into the war in August, 1914, decreed by the government of the Czar, was the signal for a great outburst of patriotic enthusiasm among the bourgeoisie, which allied itself with the Czarism all along the line. Instead of using the war in the struggle against the autocratic regime, the bourgeoisie used it to promote Imperialistic interests. The Russian bourgeoisie was no longer revolutionary: it had become imperialistic; and this circumstance was a determining issue in the course of the revolution.

The Revolution of 1905 supplemented the earlier abolition of serfdom in creating the partial conditions for the development of capitalistic industry. The bourgeoisie acquired new powers and

influence, and a new ideology. Industry developed in great proportions, absorbed from without and reproducing all the features of large scale, concentrated industry. The industrial technology, not being developed slowly from within but acquired full-grown from without, did not reproduce normally all stages of the historical development of Capitalism. One consequence of this was that a large industrial middle class never developed in Russia, that class of industrial petty bourgeois which historically is the carrier of democracy and revolution. The Russian bourgeoisie was the bourgeoisie of Big Capital, of trusts and financial capital, in short, of modern Imperialism. You had these two extremes: on the one hand, backward, undeveloped peasant production; and on the other, the typical concentrated industry of imperialistic Capitalism.

The inner conditions of Russian Capitalism required the intensive development and exploitation of the home market. But this would necessarily mean two things: the end of low wages and a revolutionary struggle against the Czarism. The bourgeoisie rejected this policy, mortally afraid of the consequences it might have in arousing the strength and revolutionary class consciousness of the proletariat. The home market was allowed to remain largely undeveloped; and the bourgeoisie embarked upon a policy of export trade, exploiting Asia Minor, Persia and the Far East, and making loans and investments in "dying empires"—in short, Imperialism. This was a policy which had no revolutionary consequences, and that promised, immediately, larger profits than the intensive development of the home market. But it also meant the end of the bourgeoisie as a liberal and revolutionary force, it meant immediately and ultimately a compromise with the Czarism.

The revolution of 1905 marked the turning point of this development. During this revolution, betrayed and maligned by the "liberal" forces, the bourgeoisie beheld the spectre of a proletarian revolution, of a revolution that might not persist within the limits of bourgeois interests, and that might turn against the bourgeoisie,—as has actually been the case. The danger was too palpable: why take risks, particularly when the policy of Imperialism offered an apparently easy way out? But such are the con-

traditions of Capitalism, that the bourgeoisie inevitably digs its own grave no matter which way it may turn. The new policy had momentous consequences. It made the bourgeoisie reactionary; moreover, it assisted in clarifying the class consciousness of the proletariat by constituting it *the* revolutionary force. Prior to the revolution of 1905, the political prisoners were dominantly bourgeois intellectuals; after, they were dominantly proletarians.

The significance of Russian Imperialism in the course of the revolution should not be confused because of the fact that Imperialism generally means the maturity of the industrial development of Capitalism. Events are not interpreted simply by formulas. Japan is imperialistic in its policy, and yet it is not a fully-developed industrial country. The prevailing historical situation and modifying factors are of the first importance. The development of concentrated industry in Russia produced a mass of surplus commodities and of surplus capital, which had to be disposed of; to be sure, this could have been done internally, but that would have required the development of the home market, with revolutionary consequences; the Russian bourgeoisie, accordingly, chose the policy of export trade and Imperialism. The social consequences were identical with those in other countries: the liberals and intellectuals generally became lackeys of Imperialism; democracy and liberal ideas were accepted within the limits of the new autocracy necessary to promote the interests of the imperialistic bourgeoisie. All social groups, on the whole and essentially, except the proletariat, became reactionary and counter-revolutionary.

The imperialistic bourgeoisie, accordingly, enthusiastically accepted the war against Germany and Austria, and for the Dardanelles, Constantinople, Asia Minor, and the promotion of its imperialistic interests generally as against the Imperialism of Germany. But their hopes of a profitable victory lagged, as the corrupt and inefficient beaureaucracy of the Czar bungled the management of the war. Defeat, instead of victory, stared the imperialists in the face. The bourgeoisie tried through extra-parliamentary means to avert the collapse. This was not sufficient. There was no decline in the patriotic enthusiasm of the bour-

geoisie, but their representatives in the Duma began to criticize the policy of the government,—a criticism, mark you, strictly within the limits of legality, parliament and the existing system. Not only was the criticism not at all revolutionary, it was distinctly counter-revolutionary. The bourgeoisie, represented by the Cadets and the Octobrists, did not want a revolution, nor did they want an overthrow of the Czarism; their policy insisted upon an aggressive war against Germany, upon bourgeois representation in the government, upon an international policy in accord with the Imperialism of Britain and France. With the support of British-French capital and the governments of the Entente, the bourgeoisie plotted to compel the abdication of the Czar and to put in his place the Grand Duke Nicholas, after repeated, futile attempts to make the Czar recognize the prevailing situation and accept the guidance of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeois policy was not revolution: it was intrigue, a palace revolt.

III.

While the war was not producing victory for the imperialistic bourgeoisie of Russia, it was producing an increasing and agonizing mass of misery among the workers and peasants. Just prior to the declaration of war, the proletariat was entering upon a new revolutionary phase, consisting of aggressive mass action and general strikes. During the war itself, the workers refused to yield up their independence and action; strike after strike was declared in war industries, bitterly suppressed equally by the Czarism and the bourgeoisie. These strikes, supplemented by the general Socialist opposition to the war, and particularly by the aggressive agitation for a civil war carried on by the Bolshevik groups¹, developed intense revolutionary actions and conscious-

¹There was a vital, a fundamental difference in the oppositional attitude of the Bolsheviks, on the one hand, and the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionists—a difference in policy that persisted into the revolution and determined the antagonisms between the two groups. "The opposition of the bourgeois classes to czarism—upon an imperialistic foundation, however, had, even before the revolution, provided the necessary basis for a *rapprochement* between the opportunist Socialists and the propertied classes. In the Duma, Kerensky and Tscheidse built up their policy as an annex to the progressive *bloc*, and the Gvozdyevs and Bogdanovs merged with the Gutchkovs on the War Industry committees. But the existence of

ness. Each strike, each mass action, was beaten down, but the totality of results was the weakening of the Czarism and the strengthening of the proletariat, which turned to its own activity in revolutionary mass action. Then came that sweeping unity of general means into one mighty, revolutionary mass action of the workers of Petrograd which overthrew the government. The bonds of authority were broken. The soldiers and peasants acted in harmony with the Petrograd workers, and the revolution was on.

The fact must be emphasized that it was the workers of Petrograd that made the revolution; it was their action that acted as a signal for the general uprising of the soldiers and peasants. The bourgeoisie did not participate in the making of the revolution; its contribution was the passive one of not opposing the workers and soldiers. The bourgeoisie was between the devil and the deep sea: its efforts to compromise with the Czarism had failed miserably, and it feared the revolution. It was forced to allow events to take their course. While the workers of Petrograd were fighting in the streets, making the revolution at the cost of their lives, the Cadets and the bourgeoisie generally acted as spectators; and when the fighting was over, they accepted the accomplished fact of revolution and tried to control it in their own class interests. The Czar abdicated in favor of one of the Grand Dukes; this was acceptable to the bourgeois representatives, but the revolution had gotten beyond their control, and they realized the wisdom of abandoning the plan for a "constitutional" monarchy, and temporarily, at least, becoming republicans.

This first stage of the revolution is identical with and yet dissimilar to the earlier, bourgeois revolutions. It is identical in this, that the bourgeoisie does not make the revolution but steps in and tries to control its course and policy; it is dissimilar, in that the

czarism made an open advocacy of the government-patriotism standpoint very difficult. The revolution cleared away all the obstacles of this nature. Capitulating to the capitalist parties was now called "a democratic unity," and the discipline of the bourgeois state suddenly became "revolutionary discipline," and finally, participation in a capitalist war was looked upon as a defense of the revolution from external defeat.—Leon Trotzky, "The Farce of Dual Authority," in the Petrograd *Vperiod* of June 15, 1917.

antagonism of the proletariat to the bourgeois policy is not disorganized, inchoate, unaware of means and purposes: but organized and disciplined, the instincts of the masses unerringly pointing the way to future action, in spite of immediate hesitations, compromises and defeats. The significant fact was the immediate formation of *two* governments: the government of the bourgeoisie, the imperialistic Provisional Government of Milyukov-Gutschkov; and the government of the revolutionary masses, the Council of Soldiers and Workers. Immediate antagonisms developed between these two governments, antagonisms that acted as an educator of the masses and as a means of converting the general revolution into a revolution definitely of the proletariat and proletarian peasantry.

It was a fortunate coincidence of events that the revolution occurred in the midst of an imperialistic war, in which world power was at stake. Under these circumstances, the bourgeoisie could not conceal or compromise its class interests: *the imperialistic war had to be continued*; the masses wanted peace, and it was through the issue of peace, which could not be avoided or compromised, that class antagonisms developed acutely and aroused the revolutionary consciousness of the masses. In the normal times of peace, it would have been much more difficult to drive on the bourgeoisie to the fatal conclusion of its class policy, it would have been much more difficult to deliver the masses from the deceptions and ideology of the bourgeoisie. Moreover, the war developed the potentiality of the European Social Revolution, without which the proletarian revolution in Russia might never develop or become smothered in its own isolation. **The issue of peace** assisted mightily in accomplishing the work of clarification; and while at first peace concealed the sharper class antagonisms, the course of events proved to the masses that *peace itself was a class issue*: the imperialistic bourgeoisie and its democratic sycophants wanted war, the proletarian and peasant masses wanted peace. "Peace, land and liberty" was the slogan of the Revolution; the Milyukov-Gutschkov government promised land and liberty—in the future; while it prepared to wage a new and more aggressive war. This government accepted the Czar's obligations

with the Allies; it differed from the old regime only in this, that instead of the Czarism waging the war, the bourgeoisie was to wage a war in the interests of Imperialism. But the masses acted again, and the government of Gutschkov-Milyukov was overthrown, because of its imperialistic peace policy. The Council of Workers and Soldiers acted as the centre of the great demonstrations which brought the downfall of the first Provisional Government.

The Council constituted itself as the active representative of the revolutionary masses. But it consisted, as yet, of the old revolutionary opposition: it did not express the new revolutionary activity and requirements. The Council dared not assume power, it dared not act aggressively. The split between the masses and their intellectual representatives widens; and this process becomes vital in the revolutionary course of events. The Council realized the immense task it had to perform, but shrank before the immensity of the revolutionary requirements.

The Council appeals to the proletariat to overthrow their imperialistic governments, and allows the imperialistic bourgeoisie to assume power; it calls for the proletarian revolution in Europe and acquiesces in the formation of a new coalition government; moreover, it allows its leaders, Tscheidse, Skobelev, Tseretelli, Tchernov, to participate in this government *together* with representatives of the bourgeoisie. The Council hesitates; and out of hesitancy comes compromise. It imagines that the course of the Revolution may be determined by interminable discussions among the intellectuals: it acts only under pressure of the revolutionary masses. It talks revolution, while the government acts reaction. It takes refuge in proclamations, in discussion, in appeals to a pseudo-theory, in everything save the revolutionary action of the masses directed aggressively to a solution of the pressing problems of the day. They who had always preached Socialism now shelve Socialism as a problem of the future. Where revolutions do not act immediately, particularly the proletarian revolution, reaction appears and controls the situation; and the formerly revolutionary representatives of the masses accept and strengthen this reaction. Once revolutionary ardor cools, the force of bourgeois institu-

tions and control of industry weights the balance in favor of the ruling class. Revolutions march from action to action: action, more action, again action, supplemented by an audacity that shrinks at nothing,—these are the tactics of the proletarian revolution. The revolution seizes power and uses the power aggressively and uncompromisingly; it allows nothing to stand in its way save its own lack of strength. But the Council hesitates and compromises until the day comes when the accomplished fact of reaction stares it in the face. The Council hampers and tries to control the instincts and action of the masses, instead of *directing* them in a way that leaves the initiative to the masses—developing that *action* of the masses out of which class power arises. Acquiring prestige through its criticism of the government, the Council lacks the revolutionary policy and consciousness of assuming full governmental power when the criticism is converted into the necessity of action. Instead of action—phrases; instead of Revolution—a paltering with the revolutionary task.

On May 2 the Council of Workers and Soldiers might have constituted itself the government in place of the overthrown Milyukov-Gutschkov regime. Its failure to act accordingly marked the decline of its power and influence *as then constituted*: the task of the Council now became that of revolutionizing itself, of discarding its old policy and personnel. And this revolutionary process could develop only out of the masses, not out of the Council's intellectual representatives: these representatives had to be thrust aside, brutally and contemptuously.

IV.

The Council of Soldiers and Workers, in its dominant expression and activity, gradually became the representative of a vague democracy. "The unity of all democratic elements!"—this was the slogan of the new coalition government. But democracy under the conditions of Imperialism is an instrument of reaction, useful and necessary in misleading the masses. The government, in alliance with the Council, tried to revive the war spirit of the people by speaking of a "democratic war," of a war "to defend the revolution." But under the conditions every action toward

war was counter-revolutionary, as the war was waged in alliance with French-British Imperialism, strengthening the bourgeoisie of Russia and its imperialistic interests. A war to defend the revolution could be waged only after the bourgeoisie and the social-patriotic "democratic" elements were excluded from the government; only a revolutionary war, waged by a revolutionary government for revolutionary purposes could constitute a war "to defend the Revolution." The moderate Socialists in control of the Council, whose Socialism expressed nothing more than a liberal democracy, developed under the pressure of the situation into a conservative and counter-revolutionary force. The Council was united with the government in its essentially reactionary policy. The influence of the leaders of the Council with the masses was used to mislead the masses and to support the bourgeois policy of the government. The only way out was to break the coalition—and this the Council, at this moderate stage, dared not attempt.

But the revolutionary aspirations of the masses developed increasingly, and the Council was rent in a violent struggle between the revolutionary forces represented by the Bolsheviki (Lenine, Zinovieff, Kameneff, and Trotzky who, although not a Bolshevik, adopted their program) and the moderate forces, represented by the Social-Revolutionists and the Mensheviki (Tscheidse, Skobeleff, Tseretelli, Tchernov).

The Social-Revolutionists represented the peasantry, not the mass of agricultural workers, but largely the middle class peasantry, under the domination of the bourgeois ideology. They represented that conservative middle class which in previous revolutions had always acted against and betrayed the proletariat. The interests of this class of peasants moved within the orbit of the bourgeois regime of property, and its representatives acted accordingly.

The Mensheviki represented the dominant Socialism, that moderate Socialism which directed the International straight to disaster; and which, moreover, had become, in the words of Trotzky, the greatest obstacle to the revolutionary development

of the proletariat. The Mensheviki represented those social elements which everywhere have dominated organized Socialism—the intellectuals, liberal democrats, small traders and the lower bourgeoisie, and above all, skilled labor, which everywhere is a reactionary force in the councils of Socialism. The ideology of this group was a bourgeois ideology; it mistrusted the masses and their action, it tried to limit the revolution within the circle of legality and parliamentary action. It used the masses only when it considered action necessary, which was only when its own petty purposes were in jeopardy: the masses were a tool to be used or discarded at will; any independent action of the masses was discouraged, and suppressed if necessary.

The Bolsheviks, on the contrary, constituted the party of the industrial proletariat; in the words of Nikolai Lenine, the “class conscious workers, day laborers, and the poorer classes of the peasantry, who are classed with them (semi-proletariat).” It was the proletariat of unskilled labor which constituted the strength of the Bolsheviks, that unskilled proletariat which is *the* revolutionary class in modern society. Skilled labor in Russia, as in other countries, was conservative; unskilled labor actually or potentially revolutionary. One of the most interesting chapters of the proletarian revolution in Russia will consist of precisely this struggle between skilled and unskilled: it is a fact of the utmost importance in the action and reconstruction of Socialism. The Bolsheviks were in active and continual contact with the masses, developing that general mass action and power out of which revolutions arise and develop uncompromisingly.

The Bolsheviks constituted an actual revolutionary movement, not a group of intellectuals and mongers of dogmas. They worked out a program, a practical program of action meeting the revolutionary requirements of the situation in Russia. Revolutions do not rally round dogmas, but programs. The sense of reality of the revolutionist is expressed in this, that he translates his revolutionary aspirations into a revolutionary program in accord with the historic conditions, and which can rally and unite the masses for action and the conquest of power. Revolutions make their own laws, their own programs. Revolutions are the great edu-

cator and developer of class consciousness and action. It is the great merit of the Bolsheviks that they were revolutionists *in action*, using the prevailing situation to educate the masses and develop their consciousness and revolutionary struggles.

The great problem of the Revolution was the problem of *state power*. It was a crucial problem, and it split the Council of Workers and Soldiers. The moderate majority wanted a coalition government with the bourgeoisie; the Bolshevik minority adopted as their slogan, “All power to the Councils!” In view of the moderate domination of the Council, it may be asked why should the Bolsheviks wish to turn all power over to an organization in which they were a minority? In a way, this disposes of the slurs and slanders hurled at the Bolsheviks, of the charge that their’s was a “rule or ruin” policy. Anton Pannekoek has answered the question: “This, however, was perfectly logical. A body representing exclusively peasants and workers would be compelled to take such economic measures required for those classes independent of theories, and do what we wish it to do—if only it is separated completely from a coalition with the bourgeoisie in the interests of the latter.” In this, again, the Bolsheviks trusted the masses, placed their faith in that action of the proletariat which in a crisis is instinctively revolutionary. The class struggle and class action, separate and distinct from all other social groups, is the inescapable condition of revolutionary Socialist policy.

The revolutionary solution of the problem of state power, of the exclusion of the bourgeoisie and propertied interests generally from the government, was indispensable for the solution of the other problems of the Revolution: of the division of the land, of the organization of industry, of peace, of converting the revolution in Russia into a proletarian revolution as a preliminary to the Social Revolution in Europe.

Of this problem of state power, Lenine spoke as follows shortly before his departure from Switzerland for Russia:

“As to the *revolutionary organization* and its task, the conquest of the power of the state and militarism: From the praxis of the

French Commune of 1871, Marx shows that the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made machinery of the state as built by the bourgeoisie, and use this machinery for its own purposes. The proletariat must break down this machinery. And this has been either concealed or denied by the opportunists. But that is the most valuable lesson of the Paris Commune and of the Revolution in Russia of 1905. The difference between us and the Anarchists is, that we admit the state is a necessity in the development of our Revolution. The difference with the opportunists and the Kautsky disciples is, that we claim we do not need the bourgeois state machinery as completed in the 'democratic' bourgeois republics but the *direct power of armed and organized workers.*"

The program of the Bolsheviki in its essential features was as follows:

1. The Council of Workers, Soldiers and Peasants constitutes the actual revolutionary government; the dictatorship of the proletariat.
2. Immediate confiscation of landed estates without compensation; the peasants must at once seize the land and organize in Councils of Peasants' Delegates.
3. Measures for the control of production and distribution by this revolutionary government. The nationalization of monopolistic organizations of Capitalism, manufacturing syndicates and the banks. Repudiation of national debts.
4. The workers shall immediately take possession of factories and operate them in conjunction with the technical staffs. Co-operation between the industrial proletariat and the proletarian peasantry.
5. The Council of Soldiers and Workers declares that as a revolutionary government, it does not recognize any treaty of Czarism or the bourgeoisie; it publishes immediately these treaties of exploitation.
6. It proposes at once and publicly a truce to all participants in

the war; peace negotiations should not be carried on by and with bourgeois governments, but with the proletariat in each of the warring countries.

7. Peace terms to be liberation of all oppressed peoples and of all colonies; a revolutionary peace dictated by the proletariat.

8. A declaration of distrust in all bourgeois governments; appeal to the working class to overthrow those governments.

The international character of the Bolshevik program was emphasized by Lenine in these words: "Historic conditions have made the Russians, *perhaps for a short period*, the leaders of the revolutionary world proletariat, but Socialism cannot now prevail in Russia. . . . The main result will have to be the creation of more favorable conditions for further revolutionary development, and to influence the more highly developed European countries into action. . . . When in November, 1914, the Russian party demanded, 'transformation of the imperialistic war into a civil war of the oppressed against the oppressors, and for Socialism,' this demand was considered ridiculous by social patriots, as well as by those who constitute the 'center.' . . . The changing of the imperialistic war into a civil war has already started. Good luck to the proletarian revolution in Europe!" Lenine has, moreover, insisted all along that the Bolsheviki, acting in accord with the class conscious proletariat, would be willing to wage a revolutionary war if necessary for the accomplishment of their program.

This was the policy and action that the Bolsheviki urged upon the Council, and which was rejected by the Mensheviki and moderates generally.

The moderates argued that the proletariat was not strong enough of itself to direct the revolution; that Russia with its mass of peasantry and primitive industrial development was not yet ripe for Socialism, and, accordingly, the bourgeoisie was necessary in the revolution. The Bolsheviki argued against this that the proletarian revolution was a process which might consist of a series of revolutionary struggles; that the decisive factor was

the *power* of the proletariat, and that it was necessary to stir the European proletariat into action. Moreover, the Bolsheviki organized a campaign to split the peasantry, to align the proletarian peasantry with the revolutionary workers. This peasantry was itself divided. It consisted of owners of land, petty proprietors, and an agricultural bourgeoisie created by the agrarian reform program of Stolypin which dissolved the old peasant community—a group obviously realizing its interests in a bourgeois agrarian policy along the lines of capitalist accumulation; but, on the other hand, there was a mass of men expropriated from the soil, agricultural workers and hired laborers, those whom Lenine calls “semi-proletarians.” The Bolsheviki tried to secure the support of the mass of the peasantry in this way: The peasants wanted the land, they wanted the abolition of hired labor. Capital, through the banks, had great financial interests in the lands that were to be expropriated without compensation; in case of a partial division on the basis of capitalist property, the financial interests of capital would inevitably secure control of the land, and all the evils of private ownership would prevail: the peasants could not get the land unless through immediate seizure, the abolition of private ownership and the nationalization of the lands and of private banks. This procedure, however, emphasized the Bolsheviki, means a struggle against capital and the bourgeoisie, a general revolutionary struggle that the peasantry can engage in only with the co-operation of the industrial proletariat. This was a program that split the reactionary *bloc* of the peasantry, and that gradually but surely aligned the mass of agricultural workers with the industrial workers.²

² A short reflection on these demands [of the peasants, for the expropriation of the lands without compensation, and the abolition of private ownership and of hired labor] will show the absolute impossibility of securing the aid of the capitalists in their realization—in fact, the impossibility of avoiding a break with the capitalists, a determined and merciless struggle with the capitalist class, in short, a complete overthrow of their rule. In fact, the confiscation of all private ownership in land means the confiscation of hundreds of millions of bank capital, with which these lands, for the most part, are mortgaged. Is such a measure conceivable unless the revolutionary plan, by the aid of revolutionary methods, shall break down the opposition of the capitalists? Besides, we are here touching the most centralized form of capital, which is bank capital, and which is bound by a million threads with all

The program of the Bolsheviki implied a gigantic task of agitation, organization, and action,—a task before which the Mensheviki and Social-Revolutionists shrank into conservatism. But the Bolsheviki buckled down to the task in earnest and uncompromisingly: unite the proletariat and the proletarian peasantry by means of this practical program of co-operation, and a revolutionary government was feasible, excluding any representation for the bourgeoisie. The Bolsheviki initiated an intensive propaganda in the Councils in an effort to convert the delegates. But that was not all: they did not depend simply upon the delegates, *but upon the action of the masses*, which more and more adopted revolutionary purposes and tactics in spite of their conservative representation in the Councils. As early as June the Bolshevik program was being put into practice by the peasants, who seized the lands and managed them through the control of local Peasants' Councils. In city after city, the Council of Workers, Soldiers and Peasants declared itself the local governmental authority, repudiated the Provisional Government, and recognized the Council in Petrograd as the only national authority.

The course of events now assumed the form of a struggle in the Council between the right and the left, between the Mensheviki and the Bolsheviki. But the Council was still dominated by the moderates: it was allied all along the line with the Provisional Government, which more and more proved its utter incapacity to solve the pressing problems of the Revolution, being converted into an instrument of the reaction. The Council, represented through its leaders in the bourgeois government, was compelled to assume responsibility for the acts of the government.

The government of Kerensky was in an untenable position: a coalition government was an impossibility in operation. Either it honestly tried to represent both the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the revolution and the reaction, in which case it might

the important centers of the capitalist system of this great nation, which can be defeated only by the equally well-organized power of the proletariat of the cities. . . . Only the revolutionary proletariat can actually carry out the plan of the impoverished peasants—Nikolai Lenine, “Workers and Peasants,” in *The New International*, February, 1918.

talk but could not act, because of the antagonism of class interests; or else, under the pressure of events, it might act, but in the interest of one or the other group. It was no accident of history that the head of this government was Kerensky, an orator, a master of words. Only words, only fine phrases and glittering slogans, could be the expression of an actual two-class government in a revolutionary situation. And where the government of Kerensky acted, it fatedly acted against the revolution. Where revolutions do not act, they are submerged in a welter of words. If the revolutionary class shrinks before the task of assuming power and reorganizing society, the ruling class inevitably acts in the interest of reaction. Every day that passed in the making of phrases and without action was a defeat for the Revolution. The policy of phrases makes for reaction. The slogans of the Revolution may be used and assimilated by the time-serving politicians of the bourgeoisie and moderate Socialists: its *action*, never.

Under the coalition government, industry was demoralized, the bourgeoisie using its ownership of industry to starve the proletariat and paralyze the Revolution by locking out the workers and sabotaging industrial production. Agriculture was demoralized, because the government dared not carry out the revolutionary task of expropriating and distributing the lands, as this task antagonized the interests of the bourgeoisie represented in the government. These bourgeois representatives sabotaged any revolutionary measures of the government, when pressure compelled the government to act, which was rarely. The task of internal reorganization could be undertaken either by a strictly bourgeois government, which would have meant a reorganization dominantly in the interest of the bourgeoisie; or by a strictly revolutionary Socialist government, which would have meant a reorganization in the interest of the proletariat and proletarian peasantry. Where the government paltered on the land question, the Bolsheviki told the peasants, "Seize the lands immediately, and organize agriculture through your Councils." Where the capitalists used industry to strike at the Revolution, the Bolsheviki told the workers, "Seize the work-shops, and organize and manage production through your own efforts and the technical staffs."¹

The Provisional Government wanted the problems of the Revolution settled by the Constituent Assembly, and kept postponing the convening of the Assembly. The Council, dominated by the moderates, acquiesced in this paltering policy designed to cut the ground from under the Revolution. The Bolsheviki insisted upon action—the immediate revolutionary action of the masses.

The test of action, of power, was inescapable. The revolutionary impatience of the masses increased in the measure that the Provisional Government evaded the necessity of action and adopted an international policy that allied new Russia with the Imperialism of Great Britain, France and Italy. The Kerensky government did not simply palter on the issue of peace: it actually repudiated peace, and secretly conspired with the governments of the Allies to continue an imperialistic war. Not only were the secret agreements of the Czarism not published and repudiated², but the Provisional Government itself used secret diplomacy in making arrangements of its own to continue the war with the Allies. Words promised peace, but acts constituted war. The policy of trying to influence the governments of the Allies to revise and re-state their war aims was not only a futile and bourgeois policy, but it was insincere in that secretly the Provisional Government plotted war. The Mensheviki and Social-Revolutionists accepted this policy: they contributed to the delusion of a war for democracy,—a war "to defend the Revolution": but *which* revolution? In the first flush of the Revolution, the moderates in the Council appealed to the proletariat to break with their imperialistic governments; but gradually this revolu-

¹ In the matter of publishing the secret treaty agreements, as in other matters, the Kerensky government took its cue from the Allies. In a secret telegram to the Russian Charge d'Affairs in Paris, dated September 24, 1917, Tereschenko, Kerensky's Foreign Minister, said: ". . . a publication of a treaty which is generally known would be completely misunderstood by public opinion and would only give rise to demands for the publication of the agreements which had been concluded during the war. The publication of these, and especially of the Rumanian and Italian treaties, is regarded by our allies as undesirable. In any case we have no intention of putting difficulties in the way of France or of placing Ribot in a still more painful position . . . no obstacles will be placed in the way of publishing all agreements before or during the war, in the event of the other Allies who are parties to them consenting."

tionary policy was abandoned, and the Council co-operated with the infamous gathering of the social-patriots at Stockholm, against the protests of the Bolsheviki, who insisted on co-operation only with revolutionary Socialism. It required only this to emphasize the non-revolutionary character of the Council as dominated by the moderates, that they joined hands with Schiedemann and the social-patriots of all countries.¹ Moderate Socialism acted as the *comis voyageur* of bourgeois diplomacy.

This was the policy of reaction dominating the Council of Workmen and Soldiers, which had become identified with the government and its willing tool. When on June 23 the masses of Petrograd, aware of the counter-revolutionary trend of events,² decided upon a formidable demonstration, the moderates in the Council declared violently against the proposed action. In the Council itself, Tseretelli accused the Bolsheviki of intentions to overthrow the government by *armed force*. Tseretelli had become counter-revolutionary, had constituted himself the guardian of the authority of a government that betrayed the hopes of the masses and that secretly plotted war with other imperialistic governments. *Overthrow the government by armed force!* Is this not a method of revolution? What an accusation, what a terrible indictment, coming from a man who cloaked himself in the garb of the revolutionist, who had himself applauded the use of that armed force which overthrew the Czarism! The accusation of Tseretelli is an historic one—it is an expression of the complete moral and revolutionary bankruptcy of the moderates in the Council.

The proposed demonstration was abandoned. This apparent victory heartened the government. It yielded to the pressure of

¹One of the secret documents published by the Bolshevik government shows the true character of this Stockholm Conference. It is a telegram dated August 18, 1917, from the Russian Ambassador in Stockholm to the Provisional Government, reporting a conversation with Branting, who declared that he was willing to drop the Conference if Kerensky considered it untimely, and that Branting would use his influence with the Dutch-Scandinavian committee to this end. The telegram concludes by asking secrecy and not compromising Branting, as otherwise a valuable source of information would be lost. A Socialist Conference the willing tool of diplomacy! No wonder the Mensheviki fraternized with Scheidemann and Branting at Stockholm!

the Allies for an offensive, and this offensive was organized and decided upon secretly. It was kept a secret from the Russian people, at a time when the Allied capitals knew about it. On July 1 the offensive was launched, was temporarily victorious, and it was then that the Russian people were informed. But the counter-attacks came, and the offensive, as was natural, was smothered in its own impotence. Under the circumstances, the offensive was sheer murder of the Russian soldiers, who were unprepared. But the Council, in spite of an increased opposition vote, approved of the government and its offensive. Although the government was bent on war, it knew that an offensive was as yet impossible; it launched the premature offensive as a diplomatic trick, under pressure of the Allies and in order to secure their financial assistance. The Bolshevik organ *Pravda* openly asserted this character of the offensive.³ And, to be sure, the Provisional Government under the circumstances was dependent upon the Allies, not alone because of its bourgeois war policy, but because it needed money to carry out the policy. The money could have been secured by expropriating the wealthy, and by taxing industry heavily; but the government was not of a character to adopt this policy. And so the Russian soldiers were sacrificed,—in the interest of imperialism and the counter-revolution.

In spite of its failure, the July offensive had important results. It strengthened the reaction; it aligned the moderates in the Council more firmly with the government: Council and government became more thoroughly one and reactionary. The sinister forces of the imperialistic bourgeoisie indulged openly in counter-revolutionary activity. The Cadets, emboldened, challenged the Revolution on the autonomy granted the Ukraine, and resigned from the government.

But, simultaneously, the masses were aroused, determined upon

³"On June 27 a meeting was held in the Russian headquarters, attended by Brussilov and other Russian generals, Minister Terestchenko, the American Senator Root, the British Ambassador Buchanan and the American General Scott. The decision for an offensive was only taken under strong pressure of President Wilson, who had fixed the as ultimate date July 1, threatening to cut off financial negotiations in case of refusal."—Quoted in *The New Internationalist* of October, 1917.

action to defend the Revolution. A demonstration was organized for July 17 in Petrograd. All parties, including the Bolsheviks, tried to prevent the demonstration, the Bolsheviks because they knew counter-revolutionary gangs had been organized to provoke a clash, which under the conditions they considered premature. But the determination of the masses was inflexible, and in spite of all opposition an armed demonstration was decided upon. The moderates abandoned the revolutionary masses to their fate, but the Bolsheviks, realizing the futility of prevention, resolved to abide by the decision to demonstrate. "It would have been possible," said Trotzky, "to deprive the masses of any political guidance, to decapitate them politically, as it were, and to leave them, by refusing to direct them, to their fate. But we, being the Workers' Party, neither could nor would follow Pilate's tactics: we decided to join in with the masses and to stick to them, in order to introduce into their elemental turmoil the greatest measure of organization attainable under the circumstances, and thus to reduce to a minimum the number of probable victims." The peaceful demonstration was converted into an uprising by the armed interference and provocation of counter-revolutionary forces, and after two days of savage fighting the uprising was crushed; and a counter-revolutionary reign of terror ensued. The Mensheviks and Social-Revolutionists actively co-operated with the government in disarming and imprisoning the Bolsheviks, establishing "revolutionary order," and crushing the left wing of the Revolution. This uprising, however, in spite of its defeat, went far toward preserving the Revolution: its temporary defeat assured ultimate victory, and it paved the way for the overthrow of the moderates in the Council, which occurred completely a few months later.*

*We are at present passing through days of trial. The steadfastness of the masses, their self-control, the fidelity of their "friends," all these things are being put to the acid-test. We also are being subjected to this test, and we shall emerge from it more strengthened, more united, than from any previous trial. Life is with us and fighting for us. . . . We need revolutionary power. The Tseretelli-Kerensky policy is directly intended to disarm and weaken the left wing of the Revolution. If, with the aid of these methods, they succeed in establishing "order," they will be the first—after us, of course—to fall as victims of this "order." But

The uprising crushed, the Bolsheviks disarmed and imprisoned, the counter-revolutionary forces became active. The Kerensky government decided to hold a Conference in Moscow, out of which could be snatched a mandate for its acts. This conference was completely counter-revolutionary. The Bolsheviks, naturally, were excluded from participation.⁷ The delegates were hand-picked, consisting of 400 delegates representing the three Dumas, conservative and reactionary; delegates from industry, science and Zemstvos, and a small minority of Menshevik and Social-Revolutionary representatives of the Councils. Milyukov was active at this Conference, as was General Korniloff, who demanded complete discipline in the army and the re-introduction of the death penalty. The army was again to become an instrument against the Revolution. The Cadets challenged the Councils either to assume full control of the government or else cease their "advisory" function. From the bourgeois as well as from the proletarian standpoint, the coalition government had become an impossibility. But the Mensheviks cravenly avoided the challenge. Tschiedse answered hesitantly: neither a government of the Councils *nor* a dictatorship. Again the moderates avoided action, and again they betrayed the Revolution. The seizure of power was the only way out.

But the masses insisted upon action. The Moscow Conference was a failure from the government's point of view. In his final address to the Conference, Kerensky said: "The Russian Government does not regret having called this Conference, for although it has not secured practical results, it has given an opportunity to all Russian citizens to say openly what they have on

they will not succeed. The contradiction is too profound, the problems are too enormous, to be disposed of by mere police measures. After the days of trial will come the days of progress and victory.—Leon Trotzky, "The July Uprising," in the Petrograd *Vperiod* of July 25, 1917.

⁷In an article in *Pravda*, Zinovieff points out that the Cadets were at first suspicious of the Moscow Conference, considering it a part of Kerensky's Bonapartist policy, the policy of a dictatorship merging both forces in himself. And this was precisely the purpose of the Conference, although the Cadets finally participated.

their minds. And that is essential for the state." These words epitomize the utter failure, immediately, of the Moscow Conference. But reaction had scored.

And then Kerensky returned to Petrograd, and secretly plotted drastic action against the Revolution. The masses of Petrograd were again restive; the Bolsheviki were dominant, and Kerensky secretly agreed that Korniloff should march on Petrograd, the centre of the proletarian revolution, and crush and disarm the workers completely. The agreement was made, and Korniloff started his march upon Petrograd. But the Council, learning of the agreement, intervened, and the weakling Kerensky, broke his agreement with Korniloff, issuing an order for his arrest. Korniloff refused to submit, and continued his march upon Petrograd, determined to overthrow simultaneously Kerensky and the Council. The Provisional Government was alarmed, and issued an order to the Soldiers' Committees in the army, which it had previously ordered to disband, to arrest all officers in sympathy with Korniloff; the work done, a decree was again issued ordering the committees to disband! Moreover, Kerensky released from prison the workers and Bolsheviki imprisoned after the July uprising, who marched out to fight Korniloff and defeated him. Korniloff was beaten, Kerensky and the moderates in the Councils completely discredited. The aftermath was swift and certain. The Bolsheviki everywhere became ascendant. Kerensky tried a last futile move, and convened a Democratic Congress in Petrograd, which was to constitute a Preliminary Parliament prior to the convening of the Constituent Assembly. Trotzky was elected president of the Petrograd Council of Soldiers and Workers. Tschiedse, Skobelev and Tsrettelli resigned from the Council. Trotzky appeared before the Democratic Congress and issued a declaration of civil war in the event the government opposed lodging all power in the Councils. The period of compromise was definitely at an end.

But the moderates, who still dominated the Central Committee of the Councils of All Russia, attempted a last manoeuvre. They adopted a series of peace terms, specifying concretely the meaning of "no indemnities and no annexations," and which included

a demand for the neutralization of the Panama Canal. The Central Committee, which still placed more emphasis on diplomacy than on revolutionary action, delegated Skobelev to present these terms as its delegate to the Conference of the Allies at Paris. But the Provisional Government secretly advised the Allies against Skobelev,* and Jules Cambon, of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, declared that "the Allied governments will absolutely refuse to consent to M. Skobelev's taking part in the deliberations." The rebuff destroyed the influence of the moderates completely. It became clear to the Revolution that the Allies conspired in the interests of Imperialism; that not through diplomatic means, and certainly not through direct and indirect imperialistic conferences at Paris or Stockholm, could a revolutionary peace be assured. The class struggle, nationally and internationally, the struggle against all imperialistic governments and for the Social Revolution, alone is the straight and sure way to a proletarian peace. The use of diplomacy hampers the development of revolutionary action. The allies of revolutionary Russia are not the governments of the Entente, but the proletariat of all nations, united in the uncompromising struggle against Imperialism and for a revolutionary peace. The Bolshevik uprising of November 6, which annihilated the Kerensky government, and organized a *revolutionary proletarian* government of the Councils, with Lenine as Premier and Trotzky as Commissary of Foreign Affairs, was the affirmation of a fact made amply mandatory by the logic of events and of revolutionary Socialism.

* On October 29, Terreschenko, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Kerensky government, sent a secret telegram (published by the Bolshevik government) to the Russian Ambassador in London, reading in part as follows: "With regard to your conversation with Balfour, I deem it important to confirm that in our opinion the forthcoming Allied Conference shall have for its problem an appraisal of the present situation and establishment of full solidarity of the views of the Allies with regard to the same. At the same time the Conference should determine the means of further conduct of the war and mutual assistance which the Allies must show to each other. With regard to the participation at the Conference of a person [Skobelev] having the confidence of our democracy, it is important to bear in mind that this person will be one of the personnel of the Russian government delegation, in whose name only its head will speak officially." This is ample proof that the Provisional Government conspired with imperialistic governments to continue the war and intrigued against the revolutionary democracy.

The rapidity of events should not obscure their developmental character. As a revolutionary process, the proletarian revolution in Russia has developed through all the necessary historical stages. The overthrow of Czarism resulted in the establishment of the imperialistic bourgeois republic of the Milyukov-Gutchkov government. But the frankly imperialistic character of this government was incompatible with the stage on which it operated. Imperialism was undermined by the oncoming proletarian revolution, and Imperialism had to camouflage itself in the colors of radical democracy to promote its purposes and preserve Capitalism. This camouflage assumed the form of the "radical" Kerensky-Menshevist government—the final stage of the bourgeois republic. This is a significant development. That period comes in capitalism when, shaken by the oncoming proletarian revolution, it adopts as a last bulwark of defense the "radical democracy" of the moderate labor and Socialist movement, which is dominantly the movement of skilled labor and the *petite bourgeoisie*. This phenomena assumes the form of "laborism" in Australia, where the "labor" government became the centre of Imperialism and of bourgeois reaction against the oncoming revolution. It seems, apparently, that a similar development may occur in England, where the Labor Party, through its slogan of a "democratic peace," promotes the war, and which, by now allowing all "democratic" social groups within its organization, is rapidly becoming the dominant party to which Lloyd-George may yet relinquish power. The bourgeois *intelligentsia* of England is not only largely complacent about these developments, but actually approves of a potential "labor" government. Democracy serves to promote Imperialism, and democracy may serve to prevent, temporarily, the proletarian revolution. The "radical" bourgeois republic of the Menshevist-Kerensky government was precisely of this character—the final stage of the republic of Capitalism. Pluming itself as revolutionary, it acted against the proletarian revolution; it put pacifism in the service of Imperialism; it incorporated within itself the "radical democracy" of moderate Socialism to mislead the masses and provide Capitalism with a new lease of life. But this final stage of capitalism multiplies the inherent contradictions of Capitalism, and is tempo-

rary. The "Socialism" of a bourgeois government is in the nature of things mere camouflage, and being such it acts as a developer of class consciousness and revolutionary Socialism. The moderates of the Council represented in the government had to acquiesce in a bourgeois policy. The proletarian revolution, passing through a series of defeats which alternately weakened Capitalism and strengthened the Revolution, finally annihilated the Menshevist-bourgeois republic. The proletarian revolution in Russia was not an arbitrary seizure of power, as was the Paris commune; it was the consequence of an historical development characteristic of the proletarian revolution as a process.

V.

There are Socialists, for and against the Bolsheviks, who for motives of their own separate the Bolshevik policy into two phases, the internal and the international, agreeing with one and disagreeing with the other, in accordance with the peculiar considerations dominant in their purposes. This constitutes an absurdity,—it is either a negation of Socialist policy or a result of unclear thinking. The policy of the Bolsheviks, internally and internationally, is equally determined by the requirements of the class struggle and of revolutionary Socialism; of the internal requirements of Russia and of the struggle for peace; of the necessity of the Social Revolution in Europe as the climax of the proletarian revolution in Russia.

A central feature of Bolshevik policy in practice is its emphasis on the *mass action* of the proletariat as the dynamic means of promoting the revolution. The revolution cannot operate within the orbit of legality: legality becomes the expression of the accomplished facts of the revolution, not the mechanics of the revolution. Legality is the ideology of the bourgeois; action the ideology of the proletariat. The first requirement is action that will produce accomplished facts,—revolutionary action, and the seizure of revolutionary power. It is a process of action.* Otherwise, the revolution withers and compromises.

* In a report concerning a unification meeting of Socialist groups, published in 1906, Lenin argued against the confiscation of lands as a demand in the party platform. Lenin favored the *seizure* of the lands

This was why the Bolsheviks did not wait for the Constituent Assembly to convene before pressing their demands. The fact of complete revolution had first to be accomplished; and they overthrew the government of Kerensky through the action of the masses.²⁰ The use of force is not a finality but a process of revolutionary development, of intensifying class antagonisms. The dictatorship of the proletariat is not permanent, but temporary: it is a means, a necessary means of pushing on the Revolution to the point where dictatorship ceases because its function has ceased. Not force alone is used against the counter-revolutionary Cossacks: the non-propertied Cossacks are aroused in a class struggle against the propertied Cossacks through organization of a Cossack Soldiers' and Workers' Council; not force alone is used against the bourgeois Ukrainian Rada, but the development of class antagonisms through organization of an Ukrainian Council of Soldiers and Workers. Revolutions are not stationary: they develop and develop through class antagonisms. The dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in January by the government of the Councils was a *developmental* expression of the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat. The Revolution, declared the Bolshevik decree of dissolution, created the Workers' and Soldiers' Council—the only organization able to direct the

by the peasants; later the constituent assembly would ratify the seizure and "confiscate" the lands. Confiscation is a juridical process, and must be preceded by the *action* of seizure. Plechanov argued against the nationalization of the land, saying this was going back to the Russia of the 17th century. Lenine answered, that nationalization of land under an industrial regime was different from nationalization under an Asiatic form of production. During the Revolution of 1917, the problem of seizure had an immediate importance—the resumption of agricultural production to prevent starvation.

²⁰ Immediately upon its assumption of power, the government issued the following decrees among others: All factories belong to the workers; confiscation of all lands in favor of the peasants, without compensation, all large properties, church and state domains together with all buildings, tools, livestock, etc., being put at the disposal of local councils; confiscation of coal fields, oil and salt mines, forests and canals, partly in the hands of the central government, partly to be organized by local authorities. Undertaken by a bourgeois government, these measures constitute State Capitalism; undertaken by a revolutionary government, as measures of a dictatorship of the proletariat, they are steps toward Socialism *in the process of the Social Revolution*.

struggle of the exploited classes for *complete* political and economic liberation; this Council constituted a revolutionary government through the November Revolution, after perceiving the illusion of an understanding with the bourgeoisie and its deceptive parliamentary organization; the Constituent Assembly, being elected from the old election lists, necessarily became the authority of the bourgeois republic, setting itself against the Revolution of November and the authority of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils; the old bourgeois parliamentarism has had its day and is incompatible with the tasks before Socialism, hence it was necessary and unavoidable that the Constituent Assembly, necessarily counter-revolutionary, should be dissolved. The use of *armed* and *arbitrary* force is a dynamic process in the dictatorship of the proletariat: it completely annihilates the institutions and ideology of the old parliamentary regime in the midst of its task of creating the institutions and ideology of the regime of communist Socialism.

All democracy is relative, is *class* democracy. As an historical category, democracy is the instrument of a class: bourgeois democracy is the form of expression of the tyranny of Capitalism. The democracy of Socialism annihilates the democracy of Capitalism—relative democracy is superseded by the actuality of the full and free democracy of Communist Socialism. The proletarian revolution does not allow the "ethical concepts" of bourgeois democracy to interfere in the course of events: it ruthlessly sweeps aside bourgeois democracy in the process of establishing proletarian democracy. Capitalism hypocritically insists upon a government *of all the classes*; Socialism frankly institutes the government *of one class—the proletariat*—which means the ultimate end of "government" as hitherto constituted. The Constituent Assembly was an expression of government of the classes; it was, accordingly, necessarily and essentially a reaction against the proletarian revolution.

Moreover, the Constituent Assembly was a phase of the parliamentary regime of the bourgeois republic.²¹ The parliamentary

²¹ It is said: if the Bolsheviks are against a Constituent Assembly, why did they press its convening, as one of their immediate demands prior to the November Revolution? A measure may correspond to an earlier

system is not an expression of democracy, but of the ruling class requirements of Capitalism. Parliamentarism, presumably representing all classes, actually represents and promotes the requirements of the ruling class alone. The division of functions in the parliamentary system into legislative and executive has for its direct purpose the indirect smothering of the opposition—the legislature talks, and represents “democracy,” while the executive acts autocratically. The proletarian revolution annihilates the parliamentary system and its division of functions, legislative and executive being democratically united in one body—as in the Russian Councils of Workers and Peasants. Socialism—and this has been either denied or concealed by the moderate Socialist—abolishes the parliamentary system, substituting a system of the “administration of things,” a proletarian “state” functioning through the organized producers.

In the *Communist Manifesto*, Marx and Engels projected a determining phase of the proletarian revolution: “The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie; to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the state—that is, of the proletariat organized as the ruling class; and to increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible. Of course, in the beginning this cannot be effected except by means of *despotic* inroads on the rights of property and on the conditions of bourgeois production; by measures, therefore, which appear economically insufficient and untenable, but which, in the course of the movement, outstrip themselves, necessitate further inroads upon the old social order and are unavoidable as a means of entirely revolutionizing the mode of production.” And in his “Criticism of the Gotha Program” Marx says: “Between the capitalist and the communist systems of society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. This corresponds to a political

stage of the revolution, and not to a later. Proposed measures are dynamic, not static. The November Revolution having organized a revolutionary proletarian government, the Constituent Assembly corresponded to an older set of facts, and was no longer necessary; it had to be dispersed.

transition period, *whose state can be nothing else than the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.*” The theory of Marx is the practice of the proletarian revolution in Russia. The dictatorship of the proletariat ruthlessly annihilates the rights and ideology of the old regime, particularly when these are expressed in the activity of a counter-revolutionary moderate Socialism.

It was not a single issue, but the unity of all issues, internal and international, that produced the ascendancy of the Bolsheviki. The issue of peace was a dominating one, because it expressed in an acute form the antagonisms between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Peace, as well as the fundamental internal problems, constituted a class issue, soluble only through uncompromising class action.

The Bolshevik attitude on peace is fundamental and revolutionary. The slogan of a “democratic peace” is a mockery, if the peace is to be concluded by bourgeois governments; a peace concluded in this way, on no matter what terms, even on the terms of no annexations, no indemnities, and disarmament, is not a democratic peace, is in fact an imperialistic peace fundamentally, if it is not accompanied by the overthrow of Imperialism. A world at peace may still be dominated by Imperialism. A democratic peace means simply a peace on the basis largely of the *status quo ante*, an imperialistic status. Moreover, there are nations, such as Great Britain and the United States, whose imperialistic interests are served by a “democratic peace.” Great Britain’s Imperialism is on the defensive, and its interests would be amply promoted by a democratic peace on the basis of the *status quo ante*, as this would constitute a defeat of German Imperialism. The United States is even more interested in this sort of peace, as American Imperialism is playing the old game of balance of power: neither an aggrandized Germany *nor* an aggrandized Britain, neither a crushed Britain *nor* a crushed Germany. Either eventuality would prove disadvantageous to American Imperialism, hence its slogan of a democratic peace. Socialism, accordingly, aims at a revolutionary peace, *a peace concluded by the proletariat* through its international overthrow

of Imperialism, or through the acquisition of revolutionary reserves for action in the days to come.

A peace of this character means the revolutionary waging of the international class struggle, means the unity of proletarian action against *all* imperialistic governments. The Bolsheviki, accordingly, adopted a policy of appealing to the belligerent proletariat, particularly to the proletariat of Germany. The proposal for an armistice on all belligerent fronts was a means of developing proletarian action, by placing the question of peace before the people, getting the soldiers out of the trenches and encouraging fraternizing. Once an armistice is concluded, and German Imperialism were to hold out for an imperialistic peace, the German soldiers would scarcely return meekly to the trenches, but would turn their guns upon their own ruling class. It is claimed by moderate Socialists and by Socialists whose Marxism and revolutionary spirit have equally atrophied, that the Bolsheviki discarded their policy of discussing peace with the proletariat of Germany by discussing it with German diplomats. Do they imagine for a moment that it is the simplest thing in the world to reach the German workers? Do they imagine that the Bolsheviki expect to make peace with those diplomats, that they are not using the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk as a means of reaching the German workers with the message of revolution? Revolutions are not made in a day; and the resources of the Bolsheviki are equal to using *every* opportunity of reaching the proletariat with their call to revolutionary action. Inflexible in purposes, the Revolution may still, within the limits of these purposes, adopt a flexible policy of action.

The Bolshevik rejection of the German terms of peace is an illustration of their resourceful policy. Their preparations for waging a revolutionary war against Germany, if necessary, are as much a part of their international revolutionary policy as the proposal for a general armistice. Should the Bolsheviki wage a revolutionary war against Germany it would be *their own war* waged for *their own purposes*; it would cease the moment the workers of Germany acted; and it is conceivable that the revolutionary proletariat of Russia and Germany might wage together a

war against world Imperialism. This was not the war Kerensky waged, nor is it a war desired by the Allies. Peace is a means to an end: *the Social Revolution* in Europe. The international policy of revolutionary Russia is to arouse this proletarian response. Every move, every expression of this policy is calculated to promote this response. Without this response there cannot be an actual democratic peace, nor can there be a *permanent* revolutionary Russia.

A revolutionary peace is the indispensable condition for the proletarian revolution in Russia. The moderates in the Councils sensed this vital fact, in a vague way; but their policy, in accord with the moderates among all the belligerents, directly hampered the revolutionary action of the proletariat. How could one expect the proletariat of Germany to revolt against its government, when revolutionary Russia was directed by a bourgeois-Menshevik government that secretly plotted war and conspired against the Revolution? In Germany, where bourgeoisie and autocracy are one, a revolution would from the start have to be a proletarian revolution. How could the workers of Germany unite with the proletarian revolution in Russia, seeing that the bourgeoisie was represented in the government, and the revolutionary government pursued essentially a bourgeois policy? It was a psychological and political contradiction. The Menshevik-bourgeois republic could not inspire international proletarian action. This was the crucial problem of revolutionary Russia: either the Social Revolution in Europe, or the collapse of revolutionary hopes in Russia.¹²

¹² This problem was a central one in Bolshevik policy since the Revolution of 1905. In the unification report previously mentioned, Lenine declared that the Russian Revolution has enough power to conquer, but not enough power of itself to maintain its gains and the fruits of its victory. External assistance is necessary from the Socialist proletariat of the West, whom Lenine designated as "revolutionary reserves." In this connection, Lenine placed great faith in the "guarantees" of the German proletariat. The epochal significance of the Bolsheviki policy is that in practically every essential it was formulated during the revolutionary period of 1905, was consistently adhered to in spite of discouragement and the sneers of the right and the centre, and is one reason why its application to Russia to-day is a brilliant performance in applied tactics. In this, as in all other matters, the Bolsheviki are characteristic of revolutionary Socialism, pioneering the Social Revolution.

As the tactics of the proletarian revolution in Russia are synthesized into the general mass action of the proletariat, so its internal and international policy are synthesized into the aspiration and the struggle for the Social Revolution of the international proletariat. The war was precipitated by Imperialism—it must be converted into a struggle against Imperialism; the war was directed against the proletariat—the proletariat must transform it into the Social Revolution.

VI.

The proletarian revolution in Russia marks a recovery from the great collapse of Socialism in 1914, and during the war; but at the same time it emphasizes that collapse. The moderate Socialism that directed the International to disaster and betrayed the proletariat, is again betraying the proletariat through its failure to respond to the revolutionary call to action of the proletariat in Russia. The "moderate" Socialism of Germany, through its infamous Schiedemann, persists in its intrigues to promote the interests of Social-Imperialism, and holds the proletariat in leash. The parliamentary Socialist group in the French Chamber of Deputies issues a long appeal to the workers of Russia, ignoring completely their call to revolutionary action, and imploring them not to make a separate peace—after the Bolsheviks have repeatedly and emphatically declared that they desire a *general* and *revolutionary* peace! The American Socialist Party is silent on the appeal of the Russian proletariat and on the proposal for an armistice; its National Executive Committee meets during the latter part of December, and says *not a word* about solidarity with the Russian revolutionary proletariat and the proposal for an armistice. The American party is allied through its representatives and its policy with bourgeois pacifism as organized in the People's Council, which declares that President Wilson has adopted *its* peace program and which has done mighty effective work to enlist the peace sentiment for the government, and thereby virtually destroyed the peace movement. You say Socialism cannot act as yet? But it could at the least affirm its revolutionary solidarity with the proletariat of Russia. Revolutionary propaganda is itself a process of revolution. The representatives of moderate So-

cialism are either actively against the Bolsheviks, calling them "anarchists" as did recently the editor of the Stockholm *Social-Demokraten*, and as did the New York *Call* some seven months ago, or they confess an "ignorance" of the situation which not only borders on intellectual bankruptcy, but which in many cases is a contemptible subterfuge to palliate inaction. If during three years of war there was any doubt about moderate Socialism being the greatest obstacle to the revolutionary development of the proletariat, the proletarian revolution in Russia destroys every single doubt. For the Russian Revolution, after having overcome the moderates in its own councils, must now overcome moderate Socialism throughout the world.

And by "moderate Socialism" is meant, not simply the Socialism of the right which acquiesced in war, but equally the Socialism of the centre, which either opposed the war from the start or adopted an oppositional attitude after preliminary acquiescence. It was not simply the Socialism of the right, of Plechanov and his group "Yedinstvo," but equally the Socialism of the centre, of Tschidse and Tseretelli, that the revolution in Russia had to overcome. This moderate Socialism in the other belligerent nations refuses to act in solidarity with the revolutionary proletariat of Russia. The collapse of the centre is particularly emphasized—that type of Socialism which is neither fish, flesh, nor yet fowl; the representative of an atrophied Marxism, which is neither revolutionary nor of Marx; in the action of which the phrase surpasses the substance; and which, precisely because it labels itself Marxist and uses revolutionary phrases in its criticism of the right, is peculiarly dangerous. Plechanov was not much of a problem to the revolutionary proletariat of Russia; he was ignominiously cast aside; but it required much more time and energy to cast aside Tseretelli and Tschidse. When the proletariat of Germany acts, it will unceremoniously cast aside the Scheidemanns and the Cunows; but it may be directed into the swamps of compromise by the Kaustkys. The proletarian revolution must discard the miserable masters of the phrase and the poltroons in action, as it did in Russia.

The proletarian revolution in Russia, the climax of the war,

marks the entry of the international proletariat into a new revolutionary epoch. In this epoch the Social Revolution is no longer an aspiration, but a dynamic process of immediate revolutionary struggles.

This is an historic fact of the utmost importance. It means the preparation of the proletariat for the revolutionary struggle; it means the necessity of clear-cut action in the activity of Socialism—it means, in short, *the revolutionary reconstruction of Socialist policy and tactics*, in accord with the ineluctable necessity of the new epoch.

There are two vital stages in the development of Socialism—the stage of its theory, and the stage of its practice.

The Communist Manifesto, roughly, marked the first stage. The Manifesto, supplemented by the general theoretical activity of Marx, provided the proletariat with a theory of its historic mission, and developed the understanding of the conditions necessary for its emancipation. This was an epochal and revolutionary fact. The proletariat, a despised and lowly class, was conceived as a class socially the only necessary class, destined to overthrow Capitalism and realize the dream of the ages—social, economic and individual freedom. Itself an oppressed class, the proletariat, through the expression of its class interests, was to annihilate all oppression. The proletariat, through the theory of Socialism, was intellectually made equal to its historic mission—socially, economically and intellectually, the proletariat was a revolutionary class upon which history imposed a revolutionary mission. The actual practice of the movement, however, was conservative, a conservatism determined by the conditions under which it operated: Socialism was only intellectually an essentially revolutionary thing—in ultimate purpose, but not as yet in immediate practice. The genius of Marx, to be sure, projected a general conception of revolutionary practice; but this part of his ideas played only a secondary role in a movement dominated by conservative policy.

The proletarian revolution in Russia, as determined by the practice and program of the Bolsheviks, marks the second vital

stage in the development of Socialism—the stage of its *revolutionary practice*. The epoch of Marx developed the theory of Socialism, the epoch of Lenine is developing its practice: and this is precisely the great fact in Russia—the fact of *Socialism and the revolutionary proletariat in action*. The left wing of the Socialism of yesterday becomes through the compulsion of events *the* Socialism of revolutionary action in the days to come. As Marx is the source of Socialist theory, so the proletarian revolution in Russia is the source of Socialist practice. Its uncompromising spirit, its sense of reality, its emphasis on the general mass action of the revolutionary proletariat, its realization of the deceptive character of the parliamentary regime and the necessity of annihilating that regime, its use of all means compatible with its purposes in the revolutionary struggle—all this and more marks the proletarian revolution in Russia as peculiarly characteristic of the Social Revolution of the proletariat.

The “Socialist” of the right and the centre maintains that even should the Bolsheviks succeed they will fail; the revolutionary Socialist maintains that even should the Bolsheviks fail they will succeed, as it will prove a temporary failure: the proletarian revolution in Russia prepares the international proletariat for the final revolutionary struggle that will annihilate the rapacious regime of Capitalism.

Armistice on All Fronts

By LUDWIG LORE

Negotiations in Brest Litovsk are still under way. But the last three weeks have been a deadlock and today it is practically certain that they will lead to no settlement between the two parties. As a matter of fact we do not believe that either side has the intention of making peace. The revolutionary government is opposed, in principle, to a separate peace, Germany from egoistic motives. Our comrades in the Russian government know that a separate peace with the Kaiser will enormously strengthen junker reaction, and will bring to the fore German annexationist tendencies. On the other hand capitalist imperialistic circles in Germany know only too well that to secure a separate peace acceptable to the Bolcheviki, they must lay their cards upon the table and play their best trumps.

It is certain that both parties entered upon these negotiations, not because they expected immediate and positive results, but because they hoped to exploit them for their own respective purposes. The German government has played with peace offers too long to dare to refuse negotiations when proposed by the other side. It feared the effect upon its own people, who would have been at a loss to understand a refusal to discuss Russian peace terms. Germany was therefore forced to play the miserable, double-faced game that has been so poignantly illustrated by the speeches of Czernin and von Kuehlmann on the one side and of General Hoffmann on the other. Germany declared herself, "in principle," in sympathy with the Russian peace formula, and in practice attempted to annex the Baltic provinces.

The comrades at the head of the Russian nation know only too well that Russia has ceased to be a military factor. No force from within or from without can galvanize it into war-like activity for some time to come. War on a large scale, with its mass armies of millions of men, whether for capitalistic or for revolutionary aims, is out of the question at the present

time. The soldiers are going home, the people are starving, and above all, the necessity of preserving the Revolution demands an immediate liquidation of the war. But the international situation today is such that an early and a democratic peace can come only if the Russian Revolution is backed up by revolutionary uprisings in other belligerent countries, and receives from them the necessary support. In other words, an uprising of the German and Austrian proletariat is the premise for an early peace, a peace that would be concluded everywhere in the interests of the working classes. Fear of revolt everywhere would force the hand of the ruling classes. The piratical imperialistic desires of the allied nations, as the diplomatic treaties published by Trotzky plainly show, are as egoistically opposed to the interests of the people as are those of the central powers. The revolutionary overthrow of the central powers would inevitably bring in its wake the collapse of allied militaristic and imperialistic aims.

Revolutionary Russia, therefore, recognized the necessity of adopting radical measures to awaken the class conscience of the German people. It was no easy task. In Germany, the traditional land of servility and submissiveness, a revolutionary uprising is conceivable only under the severest pressure. The elements that remain at home are composed mostly of women, children, the aged, infirm and crippled, and the ammunition worker, who has always been difficult to organize for revolutionary action. The majority group of the Socialist movement still plays the role of the imperial lackey, ready, at a word, to perform political somersaults; while the Independent Social Democracy seems still too weak to fulfill the mission that falls to the lot of the German proletariat.

These considerations led the revolutionary government of Russia to adopt the indirect method of influencing the working class of Germany and Austria. It could not reach the proletariat of these two nations directly with its propaganda. There was only one possible way of reaching them—to speak to them over the heads of their own ruling classes. To accomplish this Russia proposed a general armistice of all belligerent

nations. But the Entente refused all participation in the proposed conference and Russia was placed before the alternative—to negotiate with the imperialists of the Entente on plans for further warfare, or to negotiate with the imperialists of the central powers for peace. They chose the latter; there was no other possible choice.

Recent events in Germany and in Austria show how correctly our Russian comrades had diagnosed the situation. In both of these countries a movement has set in that began, just as did the Russian Revolution in 1917, with the cry "Peace and Bread," and will end ultimately, as did the other, in a reconstruction of the whole social fabric of both nations. As yet the dimensions to which this revolutionary movement of the people has grown cannot be adequately measured, nor to what lengths the movement that began with mass meetings against and in spite of police prohibition, that has already passed the stage of political general strikes, will go. But this much seems certain—the unrest in Germany will not subside until the government has submitted to the chief demands of the people and has shown its good intentions by seriously negotiating for a peace without annexation and without indemnities. In Germany and Austria the spell is broken!

The time has come when the people of the other nations must act. "Either war will kill the revolution, or revolution will kill the war!" These words were spoken by a Russian Zimmerwaldist a few days before the Russian Revolution. Shall it be said to the shame of the workers of the West European nations, shall it be admitted for a moment that the English, the French, the Italian masses and the people of the other belligerent countries will be content to play the role of a mere passive onlooker, after the workers of the Central Powers have so plainly shown that they are awakening? World imperialism cannot be crushed by a single people. Its overthrow must be accomplished by the united action of the world proletariat.

It has been generally accepted unconsciously even by the capitalistic world, that peace will and must be brought by the action of the proletariat. But a peace according to the Russian

formula, a peace without annexations and without indemnities, can be brought about only by the general armistice that has been demanded by the Russian government..

Germany and Austria agreed to the armistice for a variety of reasons: they were afraid of their peoples, and they hoped, furthermore, to be able to use an armistice on the Eastern front for their own dark purposes in the West. But they overlooked that every immediate benefit they might derive through the shifting of troops was outweighed by the fact that they were forced to uncover their cards, and to acknowledge before their peoples and the world their imperialistic aims.

The allied governments have thus far refused to discuss the armistice proposal of the Russian government. They could do this the more easily because their own people were content to maintain a state of patient passivity in this respect. Perhaps fear in the allied countries of German militarism and imperialism lent an appearance of justification to this refusal. But the newest phase of events in Germany has deprived even this faulty argument of its basis. The German people are determined to settle accounts with their tormentors, and they are the only power that can accomplish the democratization of Germany. The duty to act now rests upon the peoples of the Entente, and, above all, upon the United States, whose aims in this war, if we are to credit the so often repeated assurances, are entirely disinterested and represent the highest ideals of undiluted democracy.

The United States are in this war not only to fill the breach that Russia's defection has made; they are the factor that is to win the war by a gigantic effort to furnish men, ammunition, food and money to the exhausted allies. America, without whose assistance the struggle against the central powers cannot be continued, is in a position to exert a strong influence upon its allies. If it should raise its voice in favor of a general armistice, the armistice is practically assured.

The last speech of President Wilson intimates that America is ready to conclude a democratic peace. Lloyd

George, and even Clemenceau, have underscored his statements; the people of Germany and Austria are forcing their rulers to recognize the same principles. The nations of the world are practically united upon the aim and end of the war—and still the insane slaughter goes on.

The answer to this question depends alone and entirely upon the degree of passivity, upon the willingness to suffer and to obey, upon the willingness to be led to slaughter of the masses and of their Socialist and union leaders. If they are willing to let their governments bring excuse after excuse, if they are willing to wait until power in Russia is "consolidated," then they will, by their non-resistance, sacrifice the cause of the Russian Revolution and with it the cause of world revolution and world peace. If the proletariat of the world refuses to help the Russian masses in their fateful struggle, then the prospects of a general and democratic peace are gone forever.

There is but one means toward the end—an armistice on all fronts. Only when the armistice is declared, when the soldiers in the trenches realize, for the first time, what peace and safety will mean, when the peoples again will dare to breathe freely, to speak freely, to hope, when the horrible pressure of war upon body and mind will have been partly released, only then will the possibility of revolutionary development be given.

If the allied nations then, are honest in their desire for a democratic peace, if they come out openly and without reservation for the formula of the Russian people, no power on earth can prevent its realization. But if they should refuse, if they should still insist upon the accomplishment of imperialist annexationist demands, then an armistice alone can show to their peoples that they are fighting, not against a militaristic, imperialistic enemy abroad, but for militarism, for imperialism, for autocracy at home. And as the armistice in Germany has aroused the people to demand a general and a democratic peace, so will it force the governments of the allied nations to choose between a democratic international peace or revolt of their own awakened masses.

The Common Enemy

By L. B. Boudin.

In a recent issue of the *New Republic*, Norman Angell, the well-known English radical and pacifist, attempts to solve the riddle of the socialist-pacifist in this war. To him the thing seems utterly inexplicable.

"Why," asks he, "should the radical, the thoroughgoing social reformer, the protagonist of popular rights and democracy, be anti-war at all? Why should these, of all people, be less alive than others to the danger of world domination by a power which is the most anti-popular, anti-radical, and autocratic in the world, and the triumph of which would render the success of the radical millennium impossible? On the face of it, it would seem that it is precisely the revolutionary Socialist who should be most concerned in the destruction of the most anti-revolutionary force of Christendom."

And the thing must seem inexplicable to all those who take political radicalism for granted, so to say; to whom political radicalism and economic radicalism are quite inseparable. For after all allowances are made—and there is no doubt many and large allowances must be made for misconceptions and misrepresentations of all kinds—there is a certain residuum of indifference on the part of some Socialists to the fate of democracy in this war which almost amounts to hostility, at least in so far as it has found expression in the political institutions of the "Western democracies."

The real explanation of this phenomenon seems to me to lie in one of the most fundamental difficulties of the Socialist and Labor Movement—the "common enemy" problem. And the astonishment of such good radicals as Mr. Angell upon encountering this phenomenon is due to the fact that they take a certain solution of that problem for granted. It is therefore worth while to re-examine this question at this time, as it may throw some light upon the attitude of some radicals and socialists toward the great war.

The problem of the common enemy is as old as the Socialist and labor movement itself. And it will last as long as the forces to which the working class is opposed in its struggle do not form one uniform mass, but a composite of social forces. Socialists, when dealing with the subject abstractly, are apt to forget the fact that the society in which we live and work is very rarely, if ever, composed of two classes only—capitalists and workers. But in practice we are never permitted to forget it. Hence, the great and burning questions of tactics which have always divided the Socialist and labor movement.

This was particularly the case during the early stages of the labor movement, when the problems of the class struggle were complicated not only by the presence of other exploited classes, such as farmers, and a class occupying a middle ground between exploiter and exploited, but also by the presence of two upper or exploiting classes—the capitalists and the holdovers from Feudalism.

When the working class first consciously appeared upon the historical arena it found the stage occupied by two upper classes contending for the mastery of the world. The relative power of these two classes was different in different countries: In England the capitalist class had all but established its mastery, having largely succeeded in relegating the remnants of Feudalism to the rear, except in so far as the feudal barons lost their feudal character and themselves became captains of industry. In other countries the process had not yet reached that stage, but was rapidly approaching it. But the battle between these two contending forces was still on everywhere in Europe, and it naturally complicated the situation for the working class which was just beginning to become conscious of its own existence, its power, and its historic mission. How was the working class, intent upon conquering the mastery of the world for itself, or at least upon getting its fair share of the world's good things, to comport itself in the presence of this struggle between capitalism and the survivals of feudalism? What was the correct attitude for it to take with respect to the struggle of these two classes? Was it to be *indifferent* to it, or was it to take sides?

And if the latter, then on which side was the working class to range itself? Which of the two upper classes was the workers' *worst* enemy, so that it behooved them to make *common cause* with the other?

Such was the problem: Did the working class have an enemy in common with one of the two upper classes, so that it could properly make *common cause* with one of them against the other? And if so, with whom did it have a *common cause* and who was the *common enemy*?

Upon the solution of this problem depended the tactics which the working class was to adopt in its own fight for betterment and emancipation. And the search for this solution, more than anything else, divided the labor and Socialist movement into different schools and parties.

To describe the various solutions of this problem that were offered, and their application or attempted application in practice, would mean to write a history of the theory and practice of the labor movement in its broadest aspects. In this article I shall attempt to deal only with one phase of this subject, and that in merest outline only.

In following the developments of Socialist thought on the subject, and the vicissitudes of the labor movement in attempting to apply these results of this thought in practice, two main tendencies may be observed. In the earlier stages of the movement the "Socialists"—that is to say, the theorists-intellectuals—were in the main, inclined to a solution favorable to the old order as against the newer capitalist order. They were inclined to look upon the capitalist class as the working class's worst enemy and upon the capitalist system as *the* system to be fought by the working class; and they were therefore ready to *accept* assistance in this struggle from any source, including the survivals of feudalism, and rather *expected* assistance from that quarter in the struggle against the *common enemy*—the capitalist class. On the other hand, the practical leaders of the working class, particularly those springing from the working class itself, were, on the whole, inclined to make common cause with the

bourgeoisie against the remnants of feudalism in the form of aristocratic and monarchical institutions. Accordingly, the "Socialist" theorists-intellectuals of that epoch put very little value upon political forms, and generally counseled the workers against participation in the struggles of the bourgeoisie for parliamentarism and the extension of the franchise. While the practical leaders of the working class were, on the whole, in favor of such participation, placing great weight upon the workers' obtaining political power, which was, of course, only possible in democratic and parliamentary Governments.

Along with this cleavage between theorists-intellectuals and practical workers there is observable a marked difference between the countries which have attained a higher stage of development and those more backward in the scale of economical and political development. It seems that the tendency to regard the capitalist class as *the* enemy to be fought by the workers, at all costs and no matter in what company, increased in direct proportion to the increase of the power of the capitalist class economically and politically. Which was only natural. In the countries in which the feudal regime was still intact, or at least very powerful, the workers came into collision with it the moment they ventured to take an independent step economically or otherwise. They could not therefore but regard it as the main, or at least the first, enemy to be fought, and would therefore be naturally inclined to make common cause with all the other elements of society that sought the overthrow of aristocratic and monarchical institutions. In those countries, on the other hand, in which the capitalist class had largely supplanted the feudal powers politically, which were also the countries in which the economic exploitation of the workers by the capitalists was at its fiercest, the worker's immediate fight was with the capitalist, and it was that fight which he saw first of all and most of all. It was the capitalist who oppressed him directly and constantly, in the shop, mill, and factory. And the capitalist was also in possession of a very large, perhaps the largest, share of the Government, which was called into requisition whenever he rebelled against the capitalist's economic exploitation. The oppressions

of the feudal institutions—whatever there was left of them—was indirect, and seemed remote, to a certain extent merely reminiscent. While a good many members of the nobility were in these countries at least inclined to side with the workers in their fight against the capitalist class for more human conditions of existence.

There has therefore always been a very respectable body of "public opinion" in the Socialist and labor movement that the working class as the representative of the *future* in the development of society and the feudal and semi-feudal elements as representatives of the *past* had a *common cause* in the struggle against the *present*, and a *common enemy* in the capitalist class, the representative of that present. A survey of the world's literature of the last hundred years or so dealing with social and labor problems will easily reveal the main currents of this body of thought: its rapids, its eddies, and its stagnant pools. For our own purpose it is sufficient to point to such representative men as Roderbertus, in Germany; St. Simon and Fourier, in France; and Owen, Carlyle, and Kingsley, in England. They all belong to the first period of the labor movement, the pre-Marx period. They were all theorists-intellectuals. And their readiness to join hands with the past in the fight against the present for a better future is graded—as to intensity of hatred against the present and readiness to lean upon the past—according to the degree of development of their respective countries, in an ascending scale: Germany, France, England. During the early stages of the labor movement England was the classic land of capitalism, and it was only natural that all tendencies of capitalism as well as the labor movement should there find their classic expression. This is true of the tendency here under consideration, as well as of most others. Its most typical representatives are the three Englishmen named: Thomas Carlyle, the great intellectual rebel against the capitalist system of society with its unbridled and irresponsible individualism; Robert Owen, the great Utopian Socialist theorist, devising schemes for the construction of the social structure of the future; and Charles Kingsley, the "Christian" Socialist, trying to lead the way from the old into the new by preaching the ethics of reconstruction.

To the modern reader the most striking thing about Owen's writings is not so much what he proposed to do in and about the reconstruction of society as the class of people to whom he addressed his proposals. Outwardly he seemed to make no discrimination between the different classes of society: workingmen, capitalists, and nobles all seemed alike to him in their possibilities for the work of social reconstruction—an indifferentism quite foreign to our mode of thinking, used as we are to draw rather sharp distinctions along class lines. But under this apparent indifferentism there *was* hidden a partiality toward one class—the nobility. Whatever Owen may have thought of the role of the working class in the process of social regeneration, one thing is certain—he undoubtedly had great faith in the survivals of the past, kings and nobles, as means and agencies of social reconstruction.

In his propaganda for a new order of things he was continually addressing himself to the purveyors of the old, and his addresses to them seem to be permeated with unbounded faith. One of the four essays contained in his first great work, the "Essays on the Reformation of Character," is dedicated to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of the British Empire, afterward King William IV. of England. And he kept on knocking at the doors of the "great" throughout his active life. The dedication to the Prince Regent was written in 1813, and in 1818 we find him addressing two memorials "On Behalf of the Working Classes"—one to the Governments of Europe and America and one to a Congress of the Allied Powers which was then in session at Aix-la-Chapelle.

And it is not only in the classes addressed that we discover his faith in the "privileged orders." It shows itself in the manner of his address, in the content of his *message*, no matter what audience he addresses. So in an address "To the Working Classes," made a few months after his addresses *on behalf* of these classes, we hear him say:

"Let me, however, guard you against a mistake which exists to a great extent among the unprivileged orders. The privileged orders of the present day, throughout Europe, are not, as this

mistake supposes, influenced so much by a desire to keep *you* down, as by an anxiety to retain the means of securing to *themselves* a comfortable and respectable enjoyment of life. Let them distinctly perceive that the ameliorations which you are about to experience are not intended or calculated to inflict any real injury on them or their posterity, but, on the contrary, that the same measures which will improve you must, as they assuredly will, essentially benefit them and raise them in the scale of happiness and intellectual enjoyment—and *you will speedily have their co-operation* to carry the contemplated arrangements into effect. It must be satisfactory to you to learn that *I have had the most evident proofs from many individuals, high in these classes, that they have now a real desire to improve your condition.*"

Owen's allusion to the "most evident proofs" which he had from many individuals, high in the privileged classes, of a real desire to improve the condition of the working class is very interesting. For his propaganda was looked upon rather favorably by the "privileged classes," that is the landed nobility, and particularly in its highest ranks—in marked contrast to the hostile attitude which the out-and-out "captains of industry," "traders," and "shop-keepers" assumed toward it. Judging from the converts which Owen was making in the uppermost social circles, including the Earl of Kent and other members of his "set," it did look as if the ancient nobility, with the King as its recognized leader, were going to make *common cause* with the working class in a *common effort* to free the world from the domination of their *common enemy*—the capitalist class and its cursed and irrational individualism—and for the establishment of a *rational* system of society. It was only natural that Owen should, under these circumstances, and holding these views, frown upon the attempts which were then being made by such practical labor leaders as Francis Place to interest the working class in the fight of the bourgeoisie for the extension of the franchise and the reformation of Parliament. All this "political" turmoil seemed to him not only utterly foreign to the true nature of the struggle of the working class for the amelioration of its condition, but really prejudicial to its best interests.

The same basic ideas—hatred toward unbridled and irresponsible individualism; faith in the God-given or “natural” leaders of the people, the order-loving and “responsible” nobility; and consequent repugnance to parliamentarism and purely political activities on the part of the working class—permeate the work and writings of Charles Kingsley, “Christian” Socialist and novelist of the Chartist movement. The real hero of *Alton Locke*, Kingsley’s great novel of the Chartist movement, is not the workingman-poet after whom it is entitled, but a member of England’s ancient nobility—that nobility which refused to bow to capitalism either in theory or practice. And the whole book is an appeal to the conscience of the English people to do away with the horrible present of English capitalism and return to the peaceful and contented past of English medievalism. Mammon, Competition, is the *common enemy* of the working class and of the *ancient orders*—the nobility and the priesthood. These orders have degenerated under the baneful influence of Mammonism, but they are beginning to show signs of an awakening conscience, of a willingness to return to the past and of doing the work for which they were appointed by the mysterious power which shapes the destinies of mankind.

So it is up to the representatives of these ancient orders who are alive to the situation to take up the cause of labor; and it is up to the working class to join hands with them in a common fight upon the common enemy. The proper relation of the working class to the monarchy is thus stated by Kingsley:

“The nobles had gained their charter from John, the middle classes from William of Orange—was not the time at hand when from a queen, more gentle, charitable, upright, spotless, than had ever sat on the throne of England, the working masses in their turn should gain their Charter?”

The king—in this case the queen—could do no wrong, but only good. If the Charter was granted willingly thanks were due to her. But if it was not given willingly and the workers had to fight for it the fault was not hers, but of those who had taken away from her the power to do good.

If it was given the gift was hers; if it was demanded to the uttermost the demand would be made, not upon her, but on those into whose hands her power had passed, the avowed representatives neither of the Crown nor of the people, but of the very *commercial class which was devouring us.*”

It was this class really and not the nobility—the divine right of money-making more than the divine right of Kings—that kept the English governing power from interfering on behalf of liberty in the revolutionary struggles of the European continent.

“If there had been one word of sympathy,” says Kingsley, “with the deep wrongs of France, Germany, Italy, Hungary, one attempt to discriminate the righteous and God-inspired desire of freedom, from man’s furious and self-willed perversion of it, we would have listened to them. But, instead, what was the first, last, cardinal, crowning argument—“The cost of sedition!” “Revolutions interfered with trade!” and therefore they were damnable. Interfere with the food and labor of millions? The millions would take the responsibility of that upon themselves. If the party of order cares so much for the millions why have they left them what they are? No: it was with the profits of the few that revolutionists interfered; *with the Divine right, not so much of Kings, but of money-making.* They hampered Mammon, the very fiend who is devouring the masses. The one end and aim of existence was the maintenance of order—of peace and room to make money in. And therefore Louis’s spies might make France one great inquisition-hell; German princelets might sell their country piecemeal to French and Russian! The Hungarian constitution, almost the counterpart of our own, might be sacrificed at the will of an idiot or villain; Papal misgovernment might continue to render Rome a worse den of thieves than even Papal superstition could have made it without the addition of tyranny. But Order must be maintained, for else how could the few make money out of the labor of the many?”

But the nobility and the priesthood which is closely allied with it are waking up. They will no longer permit these com-

mercial classes to devour the substance of England, to oppress and exploit the toiling masses, and *use* the nobility and priesthood as a means for cover in this nefarious work.

"There are those who are willing, who are determined, whatever it may cost them, to fraternize with those whom they take shame to themselves for having neglected; to preach and to organize, in concert with them, a Holy War against the Social abuses which are England's shame; and, *first and foremost, against the fiend of competition.*"

Now it is only a question of the workingman joining hands with these good men in the fight on the common enemy—*plutocracy*.

"Will you working brothers co-operate with these men? Are they, do you think, such bigots as to let political differences stand between them and those who fain would treat them as their brothers; or will they fight manfully side by side with them in the battle against Mammon?"

And in order that the workers may not shrink from fighting against Mammon side by side with nobles and priests, a poetic picture is drawn of idyllic old England—feudal England—when everyone had his place and everybody did his duty—particularly nobles and priests.

The greatest poet and philosopher of this cult of the past was Thomas Carlyle, who never tired of painting the beauties of the Middle Ages and of extolling them at the expense of the capitalistic present. Under his pen the two typical products of the Middle Ages, the baron and the mony, became the embodiment of all the virtues; and he never tired of preaching a return to the social order in which the lay aristocracy took care of the bodies of men and the spiritual aristocracy of their souls.

Carlyle hated the theory and practice of Capitalism with such a burning hatred that he was ready to idealize and idolize everything that was its negation. The feudal order was in every way the exact opposite of the bourgeois order, it must therefore have been good and beautiful, and Carlyle could see nothing in it

that was not either good and beautiful. Its very servitudes, the cuffs and kicks which the serf received from his noble master, had a certain beauty in them. On the other hand everything connected with the present order is and must be of the Evil One—even its freedoms and liberties. Carlyle therefore never tires of ridiculing the ballot box as an utterly absurd manner of choosing rulers for the people and of extolling the incomparable superiority of the governmental system of feudal England, where ballot boxes and such-like stupid devices of modern democracy were unknown, but real worth counted.

Samson, the poor man of St. Edmondsbury, is easily recognized by the King to be a true Governor and he is immediately made Lord Abbot of that great monastery and the ruler of the country around.

"Is not this," asks Carlyle exultingly, "at any rate a singular aspect of what political and social capabilities, nay, let us say, what depth and opulence of true social utility, lay in those old barbarous ages, that the fit Governor could be met with under such disguises, could be recognized and laid hold of under such? Here he is discovered with a maximum of two shillings in his pocket, and a leather script round his neck; trudging along the highway, his frock skirts looped over his arm. They think this is he nevertheless, the true Governor; and he proved to be so. Brethren, have we no need of discovering true Governors, but will sham ones forever do for us? These were absurd superstitious blockheads of monks; and we are enlightened Tenpound Franchisers, without taxes on knowledge! Where, I say, are our superior, are our similar or at all comparable discoveries? We also have eyes or ought to have; we have hustings, telescopes; we have lights, link-lights, and rush-lights of an enlightened free Press, burning and dancing everywhere, as in a universal torch-dance; singeing your whiskers as you traverse the public thoroughfares in town and country. Great souls, true Governors, go about in all manner of disguises now as then. Such telescopes, such enlightenment—and such discovery! How comes it, I say; how comes it? Is it not lamentable, is it not even, in some cases, amazing?"

"Alas, the defect, as we must often urge and again urge, is less a defect of telescopes than of some eyesight. Those superstitious blockheads of the Twelfth Century had no telescopes, but they had still an eye; *not ballot boxes, but reverence for Worth, abhorrence of Unworth. It is the way with all barbarians.*"

In a society in which "true Governors" ruled it was only natural that justice should be done, everyone receiving his *due*, according to his station and deserts.

"A Feudal Aristocracy is still alive, in the prime of life; superintending the cultivation of the land, and less consciously the distribution of the produce of the land, the adjustment of the quarrels of the land; judging, soldiering, adjusting; everywhere governing the people—*so that even a Gurth, born thrall of Cedric, lacks not his due parings of the pigs he tends.* . . .

"Gurth, born thrall of Cedric the Saxon, has been greatly pitied by Dryasdust and others. Gurth, with the brass collar round his neck, tending Cedric's pigs in the glades of the woods, is not what I call an exemplar of human felicity; but Gurth, with the sky above him, with the free air and tinted bonage and umbrage round him, and in him at least the certainty of supper and social lodging when he came home; Gurth to me seems happy, in comparison with a Lancashire and Buckinghamshire man of these days, not born thrall of anybody! Gurth's brass collar did not gall him; Cedric *deserved* to be his master. The pigs were Cedric's, but Gurth too would get his parings of them. Gurth had the inexpressible satisfaction of feeling himself related indissolubly, though in a rude brass-collar way, to his fellow mortals in this Earth. He had superiors, inferiors, equals. Gurth is now emancipated long since; has what we call "Liberty." Liberty, I am told, is a divine thing. Liberty when it becomes "Liberty to die by starvation is not so divine."

Carlyle cares very little for such sham Liberty. In fact, he cares very little for liberty altogether. Or, to be more exact, he has his own definition of liberty, a definition which makes it compatible with Despotism, in fact inseparable from it.

"Liberty?" exclaims Carlyle. "The true liberty of a man, you would say, consisted in his finding out, or *being forced* to find

out, the right path, and to walk thereon. To learn, or to be taught, what work he actually was able for, and then by permission, persuasion, and even *compulsion*, to set about doing of the same. . . . O, if thou really art my *Senior*, Seigneur, my *Elder*, Presbyter or Priest, if thou art in very deed my *Wiser*, may a beneficent instinct lead and impel thee to "conquer" me, to command me! If thou do know better than I what is good and right, I conjure thee in the name of God, force me to do it; were it by never such brass collars, whips and handcuffs, leave me not to walk over precipices."

It is therefore well that there are in this world wiser men than we, the monnonakty, are, and who, by their wisdom and courage, keep us from falling over precipices. All glory to them!

"A conscious abhorrence and intolerance of Folly, of Baseness, Stupidity, Poltroonery and that brood of things," says Carlyle, "dwells deep in some men: still deeper in others an *unconscious* abhorrence and intolerance, clothed moreover by the beneficent Supreme Powers in what stout appetites, energies, egoisms so-called, are suitable to it; these latter are your Conquerors, Romans, Normans, Russians, Indo-English; Founders of what we call Aristocracies. Which indeed have they not the most "divine right" to found; being themselves very truly *Aristoi*, Bravest, Best; and conquering generally a confused rabble of Worst, or at lowest, clearly enough, of Worse? I think their divine right tried, with affirmatory verdict, in the greatest Law-Court known to me, was good! A class of men who are dreadfully exclaimed against by Dryasdust, of whom nevertheless beneficent Nature has oftentimes had need; and may, alas, again have need."

During the Middle Ages, under Feudalism, when the truly Brave ruled in England, government had, therefore, almost reached to perfection, notwithstanding the otherwise limited character of that society. "A spiritual Guideship, a practical Governorship, fruit of the grand conscious endeavors, say rather of the immeasurable unconscious instincts and necessities of men, have established themselves; very strange to behold."

"Truly," exclaims Carlyle, "we cannot enough admire in those

Abbott-Samson and William-Conqueror times, the arrangement they had made of their Governing Classes. Highly interesting to observe how the sincere insight on their part, into what did, of prime necessity, behoove to be accomplished, had led them to the way of accomplishing it, and in the course of time to get it accomplished! No imaginary Aristocracy could serve their turn; and accordingly they attained a real one. The bravest men, who, it is ever to be repeated and remembered, are also on the whole the Wisest, Strongest, everyway Best, had here, with a respectable degree of accuracy, been got selected; seated each on his piece of territory, which was lent him, then gradually given him, that he might govern it. These Vice-Kings, each on his portion of the common soil of England, with a Head King over all, were a "Virtuality perfected into an Actuality" really to an astonishing extent.

"Doubtless there was much harshness of operation, much severity; as indeed government and surgery are often somewhat severe. Gurth, born thrall of Cedric, it is like got cuffs as often as pork-parings, if he misdemeaned himself; but Gurth did belong to Cedric: no human creature then went about connected with nobody; left to go his way into Bastilles or worse, under *Laissez-faire*."

Evidently there is only one way of escape from the intolerable present: a return to the past.

"If the convulsive struggles of the past half century," says Carlyle, "have taught poor struggling, convulsed Europe any truth, it may perhaps be this as the essence of innumerable others: That Europe requires a real Aristocracy, a real Priesthood, or it cannot continue to exist. . . . All this may have taught us, that False Aristocracies are insupportable; that No-Aristocracies, Liberty-and-Equalities are impossible; that true Aristocracies are at once indispensable and not easily attained."

The great problem is the combination of real authority with real freedom, which is the essence of all real social order, and which can only be obtained under a true Aristocracy. But we need not despair:

"We must have it, and will have it! To reconcile Despotism

with Freedom: well, is that such a mystery? Do you not already know the way? *It is to make your Despotism just. Rigorous as Destiny; but just, too, as Destiny and its Laws.*"

Such was the reaction against capitalism in the early stages of the Labor Movement, particularly among theorists-intellectuals. With the progress of the movement, along with its growth in power and self-consciousness, this reactionary frame of mind gradually lost its hold. With the development of a really scientific theory of the Labor Movement, the poetising of the past gave way to a real understanding of history and with it of the historic mission of the proletariat. But the harking back to the past in order to join hands with it in a fight against the common enemy—the present—never completely disappeared. A curious illustration of its survival into what might be called scientific-socialism days is furnished by two incidents in the life of H. M. Hyndman and his leadership in the Socialist Movement of England.

In his autobiography Hyndman tells the story of a visit which he paid in 1881 to Lord Beaconsfield in order to enlist his sympathies for Hyndman's Socialist ideas for the reconstruction of society. Writing some thirty years later, Hyndman feels the absurdity of such a mission and the need of an explanation to his latter-day readers and comrades. And here is the explanation:

"I knew I had to deal with a man of imagination, who had conceptions far above the level of the miserable buy-cheap-and-sell-dear school which had so long prevailed over our policy, wholly regardless of the well-being of the people so long as the capitalist and profit-making class gained wealth."

The incident and the explanation are significant. Hyndman would never have thought even in his dreams of approaching Mr. Gladstone, the great liberal statesman of the day, with his project of socializing the world. And for a very good reason: Liberalism meant *laissez-faire*. Its whole philosophy was contained in the "miserable buy-cheap-and-sell-dear" formula. They could therefore neither understand the deficiencies of the present social system, nor rise to the vision of a world with real

order in it, where man rules over commodities instead of commodities over man. But here was Disraeli—Beaconsfield—the great leader of the Conservative Party, who was not satisfied with merely plodding along trying to *conserve* the present, but who had great visions of resuscitating the past glories of the English nobility. A man of insight and imagination; a man who could see the “two nations” struggling within every capitalist nation, and who had visions of a future in which there would be no such strife. What mattered it that he was a representative of the Past, both in his practical politics as well as in his outlook upon the future? Could not the Past and the Future join hands in a fight against the Present?

Had not the English nobility shown themselves willing to come to the assistance of the factory workers and to ameliorate their condition against the strenuous opposition of the votaries of the “buy-cheap-and-sell-dear” philosophy? Wasn't Lord Ashley—whom, by the way, both Carlyle and Kingsley venerated—the great progenitor of Factory Legislation in England, even as the Duke of Kent was an adherent of Robert Owen's communistic teachings?

Hyndman's quixotic mission to Lord Beaconsfield in 1881—or rather the frame of mind which brought it about—bore practical fruit a few years later in what has become known in the history of Socialism in England as the “Tory Gold” incident.

In 1885 the Social Democratic Federation entered the electoral campaign under Hyndman's leadership, running two candidates in London, *the campaign expenses being paid largely, if not principally, by the Conservative Party*. The action of the S. D. F. in accepting “Tory Gold” was strongly condemned at the time by other Socialist organizations, the Fabian Society adopting a resolution declaring:

“That the conduct of the Council of the Social-Democratic Federation in accepting money from the Tory Party in payment of election expenses of Socialist candidates is calculated to disgrace the Socialist movement in England.”

This incident throws a flood of light on the question here under consideration. The Fabian Society was shocked at the ac-

ceptance of Tory money, but would probably have had no objection whatever to Liberal money, because it considered the Tory Party, the remnants of Feudalism in England, as *the enemy*, against whom it was quite proper to make common cause with bourgeois Liberalism. Hyndman affected indifference between Conservatives and Liberals, but in practice he would no more have thought of allying himself with the Liberals than he would have thought of applying to Mr. Gladstone with his schemes for the social reconstruction of the world. Because to him capitalist Liberalism was *the enemy* to be fought, and to be fought by all means possible and in whatsoever company. Neither the Fabian Society nor Hyndman had as yet risen to an understanding of real independent political action by the working class.

II.

The great World-War has again brought to the surface the contending forces, struggling for solution of the great problem of “the common enemy” and the proper working class tactics dictated by it, which were lying dormant for a while within the bosom of the Labor Movement.

When the war broke out the Movement divided on the explanation of the war as a social phenomenon and the causes which have brought it about. One section of the Movement held to the view that the present war was nothing but a family quarrel between two contending groups of the same class—the capitalist class—while another section was of the opinion that it was at bottom a struggle between two classes—Feudalism and Capitalism—for the mastery of the world. The last view was strongly upheld in this country by Joshua Wanhope in a remarkable article published shortly after the beginning of the war in the New York Call. To the upholders of this view the question of “the common enemy” at once became acute. If this war was a class-war—the two contending groups of Powers representing different classes and, therefore, different systems of social order—what was the working class to do? Should it be indifferent? *Could* it be indifferent? Should it “take sides”? If so, which was the proper side for it to take?

Compassless and rudderless in the navigation of the turbulent

seas of the class-struggle they drifted on—finally to find refuge in the opposite camps of pro-Allyism and pro-Germanism. The latter assumed different forms in different countries: in this country it finally assumed the form of pacifism—thus bringing an alien element into the anti-war propaganda of two other Socialist groups: those who believed that this war was a fight between two groups of capitalists and nothing more and those who believed that notwithstanding the fact that there *was* something *more* to it, the exigencies of an independent working-class policy demanded opposition to war at this juncture. The presence of this alien element in the anti-war propaganda of the Socialists of this country has greatly complicated the situation, to the great disadvantage of that propaganda; and has produced some curious manifestations of anti-war feeling—among which may be counted the curious indifference to the fight for democracy of which Norman Angell speaks.

Of course, a considerable part of the seeming indifference which Norman Angell has observed is not really indifference, but a belief that questions of democracy are not involved, since the war is merely a fight between two contending groups of the same capitalist class. But a considerable part of it is not really indifference in quite another sense and for quite another reason: It must be stated frankly and unequivocally, in the interest of veracity and in the interest of a proper working-class policy which should help us tide over the great crisis, that some of this indifference is merely a mask—worn quite unconsciously at times—for a desire that the forces of Feudalism and Autocracy should prevail.

And we needn't be shocked at the idea: Capitalist Liberalism has served the working class so ill that it has hardly any cause for complaint when some workers or their well-wishers—for here, again, it is mostly the case of theorists-intellectuals in the labor movement—are ready to take sides against it in its hour of need. This does not mean that these people love the Kaiser or his Militarism. It is simply a recrudescence of the old idea—more or less consciously present—that the working-class ought to make *common cause* with Feudalism against the *common enemy*—Capitalism. To the unsophisticated among them this idea pre-

sents itself in the form of a variation of the proverb which the Irish have about their relation to England, thus: "Capitalism's difficulty is the worker's opportunity." While the sophisticated and philosophizing glance—with Carlyle—"into the immense Industrial Ages, as yet all inorganic, and in quite pulpy condition, requiring desperately to harden themselves into some organism," and—with Carlyle and many others—believe that Feudalism, or what there remains of it, is destined to bring about order out of the capitalistic chaos, by "hardening" the industrial pulp and fashioning it into some kind of a "Soziales Koenigthum," of which Rodbertus once dreamed and which Bismarck was to bring about.

It would be tedious as well as profitless to follow the windings of this current of thought in our midst with anything like a detailed examination. I thought it important to call attention to his phenomenon in order to help clarify a considerably muddled situation. But there is no necessity for going into details. Nor has the time yet come for a full and comprehensive study of the subject. I shall therefore cite only a few of its expressions, proving its presence, illustrating its way of sizing up the problem in hand, and conclusively demonstrating its close affinity with similar currents which have thwarted the progress of the Labor Movement in the past.

Six months after the great war broke out Dr. Thomas C. Hall wrote an article in the *New Review* in defense of the German Socialists' position in lining up behind the German Government. The key-note of the article is that this is a fight of the principle of *social organization* against *individualism*, and that it is therefore meet and proper that Socialists should be found on the side of the *social* force as against its *individualistic* opponents.

"The German city—Dr. Hall informs us, among other things—is in many respects more democratically governed than is the American city. It has a measure of home-rule only a few of American cities have obtained. It is an experiment in municipal *social organization* of remarkable success, and the German cities are the foremost organizations of the world. Moreover, the

vast socialization of railways as well as of forests, and many national sources of production, *all are a menace to greedy competitive individualism*. The capitalist class in England has been groaning over the measures forced upon the ruling class to insure the producers and *follow the social organization of Germany*."

Like Gurth, thrall of Cedric the Saxon, the German workingman gets his due parings of the pigs he tends for his master.

"The German—Dr. Hall informs us further—walks on Sunday in his own woods, he lights his house with his own electric plant, and generally feels that he is not wholly dependent upon a wealthy class of monopolists. One of the reasons the vulgar rich of America are bitterly anti-German is that this *social organization* is a success and is a menace to private monopoly."

Of course, like Gurth of old, the German workingman gets his kicks and cuffs, and, like as not, more cuffs than pork parings. But, like Gurth in the good old days, whose praises Carlyle sang so well, he, too, feels that he is not an entire stranger to his master's household. His place may not always be a comfortable one, but then he knows that he has a place in Germany's social system, and that, whatever his place, it is at least his own.

"Of course," says Dr. Hall, "this social organization is not socialism, and more especially not democratic socialism; but *it is the highest type of social organization in the general interests of all that the world has seen*; and this distribution of ownership, if not always of control, has been producing as a natural result democratic self-respect. Every German who travels cheaply and comfortably on the third class of a railway, well managed, with fine stations, feels 'this is my railway.'"

Like Gurth, therefore, who loved his master and was ready to lay down his life for him, the German Socialists too are ready to lay down all they have at the feet of their government. Of the love which Gurth bore his master, Carlyle testified in a passage of remarkable eloquence:

"The Feudal Baron had a Man's Soul in him, to which anarchy, mutiny and the other fruits of temporary mercenaries, were intolerable: he had never been a Baron otherwise, but had continued a Chactau and Bucanier. He felt it precious, and at

last it became habitual, and his fruitful enlarged existence included it as a necessity, to have men around him who in heart loved him; whose life he watched over with rigour yet with love; who were prepared to give their life for him, if need come. It was beautiful; it was human!"

Of the German Social Democrats Dr. Hall says with less eloquence but more to the point:

"But Social Democracy counted the cost, and placed its buildings, funds and leaders at the disposal of the Government. And Frank died among the first and was honored by the nation."

A few months later Dr. Hall gave classic expression to this view of the case of Germany vs. Allied Capitalism in a communication to the same *New Review*, in which he said:

"Of course this is a capitalist war, but only because England made it so. It began as a war on the most primitive lines of barbaric territorial ambition on the part of Russia. Her landed aristocracy wanted more land and more peasants and a seaport for grain export. The feudal ambition wanted Constantinople and the sea-way. Industrial capitalism is still an exotic in Russia, and of German, English, Jewish and American Extraction. It would never have at this stage of the game begun a world war. *But England is in the individualistic state of industrial exploitation and found her match in a State Capitalism infinitely more efficient and educated*, and Russia, France and Belgium are England's pawns in her game. England wanted, i.e. England's *Whig plutocracy*, that masquerades under the name of democratic *Liberalism*—*wanted to crush the competition of Germany's State Socialism or Capitalism*. France also has been burning under a sense of injury, not because Alsace and Lorraine were taken, but again because *State Capitalism* was taking her industrial leadership from her, and making her a second rate power. Thus England found willing tools.

"We who are Socialists know that Germany is not a democratic Socialist state. *At the same time it is the most advanced experiment in collectivism ever made, and the way Germany is smashing the individualistic inefficiency of Russia, England and France, is one of the most remarkable arguments in favor of the exten-*

sion of collectivism; and Germany's unity of purpose the most telling argument for democratic control that the world has before it. The war will be worth years of arguments in favor of democratic collectivism. And *Germany's impending triumph is the death knell of individualistic competition as the 'life of trade'* . . . *How any Socialist can wish for the success of feudal Russia and individualistic France and plutocratic England over against the State Socialism of Germany is a riddle I cannot find an answer to."*

And from his point of view—the point of view which looks to the past to bring about the future over the head, so to say, of the present—Dr. Hall has just as much a right to be puzzled at the anti-Germanism of some Socialists as Mr. Angell has to be at the anti-war attitude of some others.

To Mr. Angell, who settled the question of the "common enemy" in the "liberal" sense, that is in favor of the community of interest between the working class and the bourgeoisie as against the remnants of feudalism and autocracy, the idea of Socialists refusing to help the bourgeoisie in any struggle against autocracy is shocking and such an attitude quite incomprehensible. But to Dr. Hall, who evidently settled this question the other way, it is the support by any Socialist of the liberal bourgeoisie that is shocking and incomprehensible. In this connection it is interesting to observe that the England that Dr. Hall particularly detests is the England of the "Whig plutocracy." Evidently to his mind there is no such a thing as a Tory plutocracy; or if there be such a thing it is for some reason or other less objectionable than Whig plutocracy. For which view Dr. Hall may cite illustrious authority, including Carlyle and Hyndman.

I could cite many more illustrations from the public prints and private correspondence. But I consider what has already been pointed out as quite sufficient, I must add, however, that I have the express assurance of a prominent Socialist and pacifist that "*we*" and the Kaiser have, or may have, a common enemy; that it is therefore possible for the Kaiser to be working for a Socialist peace and that he is therefore "uninfluenced" by the fact

that he and the Kaiser are, or may be, working for the same thing.

Needless to say that this good Socialist could not for a moment imagine that "we" and J. Pierpont Morgan could have a common enemy in any social class or institution, or could work side-by-side for a common cause in this war—although Mr. Norman Angell takes that possibility for granted.

At the root of the whole matter lies a dualistic conception of the term *Social Democracy*; to the one school *democracy* is the prime principle, while social organization or *socialization* is a secondary matter; while to the other school social organization or *socialization* is the primate and democracy a subsidiary consideration. This dualism in the conception of Social Democracy is a survival of the pre-Marxian epoch of the Socialist and Labor Movement. The progress of the Movement has steadily forced this dualistic conception to the background, its place being taken by the monistic conception of the proletarian Class Struggle and the policy of true independent working class political action based thereon. But the triumph of the newer conception over the older ones was far from complete when the war broke out. Hence the presence in this "emergency" of the vulgar pro-Allyism of some of our Socialists on the one hand and of the essentially pro-German and no less vulgar pacifism of some others of our Socialists on the other, to confuse and confound the counsels of the working class.

In order that the working class may adopt a correct policy toward the great problems which now confront us, it is therefore necessary that we rise superior to these dualistic conceptions and solve the "common enemy" problem in the light of the Marxian philosophy.

A clear understanding of the true meaning of working class independent political action is therefore imperative at this juncture.

Disarmament

By FABIAN.

The problem of disarmament, by the very nature of the case, presumes the existence of armament. Therefore our task begins with the armed condition of society; it is the tendencies which bring about this condition that we must study and grasp, in order to arrive at an understanding of the possibilities of doing away with armament.

Society arms itself to be able to resort to force. Whenever two or more decide on such a course, it means—WAR. That means that the real starting point of our treatment must be the nature of war, its origin and purposes, for armament and disarmament are only incidental considerations in the problem of war as a whole.

What, then, is war? To begin with, a physical fight by organized masses, a concrete struggle which is the expression or material result of a disagreement between the opposing parties, an antagonism of their interests which is being overcome by physical test.

Going a step further, we find that all parties, whether non-participants or participants, are agreed on the point that this physical test is never a first resort, but always a last resort; that, is to say, they maintain that the object desired could not possibly be arrived at by peaceful means.

The stage of actual combat is reached at the point where both sides demand concessions which they consider absolutely essential and on which they cannot compromise, at the same time that the opposing side or sides, on whom the demands are made, consider their fulfilment an equally absolutely impossibility.

Under such circumstances, with two powers or groups of powers ready to appeal to ordeal by battle, we must ask ourselves, to begin with, whether disarmament can be advocated to prevent the outbreak of hostilities, to prevent bloodshed. And the answer is that it cannot, because the armed combatants would

first have to agree to postpone the question that led to the test of physical force, before they can agree to disarm. And we have assumed that the question at stake is one which each belligerent considers a vital issue—an issue of life or death; and experience shows that the cause of war is always so presented by belligerent powers. Disarmament, in that event, would be the result of previous amicable agreement, and not the means of reaching, not to mention *compelling* such agreement, and the question in contention would already have passed out of the contentious stage, in other words, *there is then no issue really involved*. Under such circumstances, peace is self-evident, for the existing set of postulates.

Incompatibility of interests is the basis of the military situation, that is, previous agreement by other than military methods is admitted to be impossible; whichever way we put it, an appeal to disarmament is futile as a means of preventing the outbreak of war under existing conditions, that is, for example, under conditions such as existed before the outbreak of the present war: and these conditions are the typical conditions of all capitalist society.

Of course, interests that are incompatible may not be unalterably so; they may be changed so that they no longer contain inherent antagonisms. Instead of imperialistic capitalist groups, we may, by the achievement of the Social Revolution, succeed in introducing harmony of industry and production. The new order would have no conflicting interests to be overcome by physical test of armed masses, for two proletariats can have no cause to fight each other.

Then, however, the disarmament theory has become useless, and its discussion is therefore a form of meaningless scholastic trifling. For, if society arrives at a stage where armament serves no purpose, it will not arm itself, and there is no need of recommending disarmament to solve anything. It would be like trying to cure an illness that had already passed. The disarmament theory, being merely academic under Socialism, must therefore, to have any significance at all, be applicable to society

before the Social Revolution—in other words, to present society, to society here and now.

Having seen thus far, that such a theory or policy cannot *prevent war*, we have now to investigate whether it can serve to *bring about peace*. Of course the peace must be real, and not merely an illusory interruption of hostilities.

First, too, we must understand how to go about it. We cannot, for instance, entertain the use of force by the Governments seeking disarmament: that would be disarmament by military preponderance; in other words, rather a case of *armament* than *disarmament*. Verbal protest would not do any good, because it cannot impede the action of bullets and bayonets. There is left only a policy of persuasion, which must be successfully exerted upon those powers that control and authorize the use of weapons and the discharge of guns—namely, on the belligerent ruling Governments.

To get anywhere, however, we must take into account the limitations governing the belligerents, and the necessary character of the response to such an appeal. Perhaps a concrete situation might best serve to illuminate the nature of the matter.

Suppose Germany and France consented to attempt to deal with a proposition of this kind. Then Germany would have to believe in and agree to the elimination of armament, provided France stated and believed the same. After both countries had affirmed and confirmed their attitude, the situation would resolve itself to something like this: Germany, after making her declaration of intention to disarm, would have implicit confidence in her own declaration because, applying as it does within her own borders, she controls its enforcement. As to French disarmament, Germany would believe as much as she could see in the present with her own eyesight, but would be very uncertain about the future, which she could neither see nor control. The attitude of France toward Germany would be exactly similar, for it is self evident that no nation can stake its welfare, and, indeed, its very existence, upon a verbal promise which is not to be enforced by the nation whose existence is jeopardized, but by the Government making the promise.

What is here stated concerning Germany and France is equally true of any number of other selections, e. g., Austria-Hungary and Italy, Germany and Italy, Rumania and Bulgaria, etc., etc. In conclusion we are bound to find, therefore, that it is an absolutely logical necessity, under the capitalist system, for every nation to maintain at its command the maximum of physical power.

If that be correct, our appeal is foredoomed to failure, and with it the entire policy of which it is a part. For it follows that the power that must be maintained, must then be used as a last resort, unless it were possible to prove that no set of conditions can occur or shall be permitted to occur which shall call for physical test as a last resort, all of which has already been proved to be impossible.

Neither can the offensive and defensive alliances of nations be cited as an approach to disarmament and subsequent lasting peace, because these combinations are made to wage successful war when war becomes unavoidable, and serve that purpose solely. All such associations are effective only for the purpose of waging war, and the specific merits by which they answer that purpose cause them to constitute an obstruction to peaceful disarmament. For, in view of what has been already stated, the establishment of a lasting basis for peace, on the present military foundation, must be regarded as impossible, and any attempt to do away with the military factors equally so. An alliance for making war involves no added risk to the contracting parties in their relations to each other, whereas, in a peace-making arrangement, each is obliged to place his destiny in the hands of the other. A similar case would be that of a merchant who would advocate and enter into a trade combination, in which his success and existence would depend on the benevolent action of his competitors. It would be necessary to show that the benevolence of a competitor is to his own interest as well as to the interest of the party he is blessing with his benevolence, and the nature of competitive interests does not permit of such a proof, in personal any more than in international relations.

Capitalist society cannot disarm because it cannot by its very needs and nature consent to do so. On the other hand, disarmament under capitalism, in view of the impossibility of enforcing disarmament by armament, must be voluntary universal self-disarmament. In short, the contradiction is hopeless, for the same thing—in this case self-disarmament—is a condition that is both indispensable and impossible at the same time.

We must finally arrive at the conclusion, therefore, that there will be no disarmament under capitalism, and that it is in and under armed capitalism that the Social Revolution is to be accomplished; harmony of production and consumption must first be installed, so that armament will serve no purpose, and a theory of disarmament will cease to have a meaning. The cutting of the Gordian knot is the task of the militant proletariat—but with arms in its hands.

Bolsheviki—The Masters of the Revolution

By LOUIS BRANDT

The Russian Social Democratic Labor Party was founded in 1898. Its leading elements were thoroughly Marxian, and opportunistic tendencies were apparent only in the elements that maintained a more or less sporadic affiliation with the party.

The first convention of the party, held in the year 1902, was rather private in character, i. e., it resembled a circle of theoreticians, rather than a political convention. The second, that was held a year later, already included practically all of the organizations affiliated with the party. It became the arena of the fight between the orthodox majority, under the leadership of Plechanov and Lenin, the editors of the "Iskra," who sought to establish the policies of this paper as the dominating factor in the organization, and the revisionist minority. The majority controlled the congress, the opposing groups were dissolved, the Bund withdrew from the party, and the Iskra was made the central organ of the movement. The minority thereupon declined all participation in the direction of party affairs, and the majority elected the central committee and the editorial staff of the Iskra from among its own members. Lenin and Plechanov were re-elected as its editors.

But after the convention Plechanov adopted a tactic of conciliation, and approached, more and more, the point of view of the minority. Under these circumstances Lenin left the Iskra and the publication was captured by the minority. A split in the party followed. The Bolsheviki (majority), with Lenin at the head, controlled the Central Committee, the Menshiviki (minority), now under the leadership of Plechanov, remained in possession of the central organ. The differences at first centered not so much upon questions of program or tactics as upon problems of organization. It was at a time when, due to the lack of political activity, the organization question was

unduly important in the discussions of the professional revolutionary circles. And yet the Russian movement stood on the eve of a revolution, both wings of the party were on the brink of the great mass struggle of the proletariat. When, in the winter of 1904, mighty strikes agitated the whole country, both organizations grew tremendously, and the question of tactics superseded that of organization in importance. Both wings were face to face with the realization that the revolution could be won only by an armed uprising, that the overthrown feudal regime could be replaced only by a provisional revolutionary government whose duty it would be to call a constitutional assembly to proclaim the democratic republic. But here, too, opinions differed. The Bolcheviki maintained that the uprising, recognized by all as inevitable, must be propagated and organized. The Mensheviks denied the necessity of preparation, and favored working from within in the hope of creating the guarantees for a successful revolution by electing representatives of the Social Democracy into the provisional government. The Bolsheviks were opposed to participation because they believed that the proletariat should refuse to accept the responsibility for a bourgeois government, even if it bore the stamp of a revolutionary government.

It was in 1905, the year of the revolution. Political strikes and uprisings were occurring in close succession. The working class strove, heroically, to draw the rest of the population, by its mass demonstrations, into the struggle. But the movement among the farmers and in the army was sporadic, and collapsed, without organizing or spreading out. The liberal bourgeoisie stood apart, waiting, ready at any time to effect a cheap compromise with the threatened Czar regime. In October a general strike broke out all over the country. Absolutism was forced to respond to the powerful pressure, and presented the nation with a Prussian constitution and with those liberties that the disorganized government dared not refuse. The soviets of the labor delegates were in complete control of the cities, great popular meetings were held day and night, the banished and the imprisoned were freed,

and for the first time Socialist newspapers were sold on the streets. For two months the Socialist proletariat left reaction to its fate, but the heroic struggle was in vain. No other class of the population came to its support. In the meantime reaction had collected its forces, and in December it struck its decisive blow. The uprising in Moscow was suppressed, and with it the others as well. A state of siege and military justice supplanted the liberties the proletariat had so dearly won. An impotent parliament and a miserable suffrage were the only tangible effects that remained.

The influence of the party increased with every new phase of the Revolution. Driven by the widely organized movement, by the sharp political struggles and by the dangerous isolation of the proletariat, a growing desire for unity took possession of the party. But the resulting unification of the existing organizations could not wipe out the differences between them. On the contrary. The tactical differences had been increased and intensified by the impetus of the movement.

The Bolsheviks believed that the revolutionary movement of the working class is reaching a new and a higher level. They contended that the overthrow in December was only a temporary setback, and conceived it to be the duty of the Socialist movement to oppose the ideals of bourgeois constitutional democracy that have been inoculated into the Russian people, to extend the scope of the revolutionary struggle. And in accordance with this conception the Bolsheviks boycotted the National Duma and concentrated upon the organization of Socialist fighting and militant organizations.

The Mensheviks, at that time, held no definitely established point of view. Plechanov, with a part of the Caucasus, favored participation in the Duma elections and a concentration of the movement upon the election of proletarian representatives. Another group were in accord with the Bolsheviks, while a third group demanded political participation, but opposed participation in the Duma. There were thus three distinct groups, representing varying tactics, within the Mensheviks: (1) favoring practical political work according

to the West European example; (2) demanding a revolutionary mass movement against reaction and against the delusion of peaceful harmony between classes propagated by the liberal bourgeoisie; (3) expressing its activity in a wavering, timid protest on the basis of pseudo-constitutional election meetings, thus hoping to bring the revolution into the bed of an absolutist-proletarian armistice, under police protection.

The boycott tactics were, on the whole, in harmony with the feelings of the working class and carried the day. They were based upon the strong revolutionary sentiment of the working class that not even reaction had succeeded in destroying.

In the meantime an amalgamation of the two organizations had been accomplished, and the united congress met, in the spring of 1906, in Stockholm. The delegates of the Mensheviks were in the majority, and placed their stamp upon the activity of the whole congress. The boycott was disarmed, and the congress called for immediate participation in the elections that were being held in a number of provinces. Mensheviks were elected into the controlling offices of the party. The party representation in the first Duma consisted of a few opportunists and six labor representatives who had been elected without the support of the party (or rather against its will), joining the party group after election in response to the pressure of the masses. This was a period of intense proletarian self-organization. Countless labor unions, educational societies, and co-operative societies were organized. These organizations did not, as in other countries, precede the political class organizations, but were rather an outgrowth of the latter. The labor unions were organized by the party, were socialistic and revolutionary in their conception. They assured their right of existence in the political struggle, and were, more or less, a part of the party organization. The Bolsheviks strove to cement the relations between the two, to preserve a revolutionary spirit, to build up a labor movement on the foundation of class interests, in opposition to craft interests. The Mensheviks opposed this conception.

Their chief aim was the organization of the masses in neutral, non-partisan unions, without distinctly proletarian class tendencies. This conflict was fought out in the Stockholm congress in favor of the Mensheviks.

While the Bolsheviks concentrated their efforts upon carrying out the revolution by a direct struggle of the masses, the Mensheviks made each concrete stage of the revolution the basis of the movement. They were striving, at this time, to make the Duma the center of the revolution, a power that, with the assistance of the masses, would give the death blow to the powers of absolutism. When the first Duma was disrupted by the government, an attempt was made to call a political general strike. But the workers remained indifferent, and the few strikes that did result were the reflection of a general dissatisfaction, rather than a protest.

Meanwhile the organizatory unification of the Social Democracy went on. The London Congress (1907) included, besides the Russian, the Polish, the Lettish, and the Jewish (Bund) parties, and represented 150,000 members. In London the Bolsheviks were again in the majority, and their influence was reflected in each and every motion that was adopted. On every decision the two groups stood on opposing platforms. On the one hand the revolutionary, on the other hand the revisionistic tendency, each attempted to determine the tactics of the movement. The Mensheviks saw in the Duma a conquest of the Revolution that must be guarded and preserved. They supported participation in its legislative work, and supported the demand for a responsible government as a new step in the fight for Russian freedom. In the second Duma elections there was a marked tendency among the Mensheviks to unite the revolution with the liberal opposition for the purpose of eliminating the "Black Danger." After the election (shortly before the Stockholm Congress) which gave the party sixty-four seats in the Duma, the Mensheviks made the Duma the center of party activity.

The Bolsheviks insisted that political freedom cannot be secured by parliamentary action so long as the power of the

state lies in absolutist hands, and maintained that the Duma is incapable of carrying out the principles of the Revolution. Legislative activity was denounced, and the propagandistic and organizatory function of the Duma was underscored. The general character of Duma activity must be subordinated to the proletarian movement that stands behind it. In the **agrarian proletariat** the Bolsheviks saw a powerful ally in its revolutionary struggles, an ally that should be separated from the influence of the liberals, which, together with the army, under the leadership of the proletariat, should be swept into an attack upon reaction and against the traitorous liberal bourgeoisie. They characterized the liberal bourgeoisie as monarchial and counter revolutionary, whose ideal lay in a capitalist state of society, protected against the proletariat by monarchy, police, a dual legislative system and a standing army.

Eleven years have passed since the London Congress of the Social Democracy of Russia. The Bolsheviks have in no wise changed their tactics, just as the general character of the Russian Revolution has undergone no changes. The Mensheviks, on the other hand, have been divided. While a part still upholds international revolutionary traditions, **another**, with Plechanov, has landed in a morass of international social patriotism and civil peace. In the midst of the world war the second tidal wave of the Russian Revolution flooded the country. It washed away the capitalist gentlemen and their opportunistic helpers who strove to master it, and left in its wake the masters of the Revolution, the Bolsheviks.

Plechanov and Breshkovskaya

By V. ALGASSOV in the *Izvestiya* of the Vladivostok Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates.

Here are two names that once were very dear to Russian revolutionists.

And now?

Now these names are pronounced by revolutionists with mingled feelings of indignation, disgust, and regret.

With the name of Plechanov is associated the entire history of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party. With the name of Breshkovskaya is associated the entire history of the Social-Revolutionist Party.

One was wonderful in theory, the other was wonderful in practice.

By many years of struggle for revolutionary socialism they gave evidence of their devotion to the working class.

Who would ever have thought that the time would come when both Plechanov and Breshkovskaya would be fighting against the ideas of revolutionary socialism?

Who would ever have thought that these steadfast champions of liberty would ecstatically applaud landholders, manufacturers, and bankers?

Who would have thought before that the bourgeois papers would lavish their praises on Plechanov and Breshkovskaya?

But the impossible was destined to become possible.

Now Plechanov and Breshkovskaya have not only ceased the labors for the cause which they had served all their lives, they have not only left the revolution, but they have come out against the revolution, against the interests of the workers and peasants. That is why the bourgeois press praises them so highly, that is why the representatives of the bourgeoisie like them so much.

Plechanov edits a paper called "Unity," in which he advocates the harmony of the interests of workers and capitalists.

Breshkovskaya is a contributor to "Volya Naroda," which is edited by the Kornilovites, Savinkov and Lebedeff.

Both papers are carrying on a campaign against the move-

ment for an immediate peace. Both papers are fighting to check the widening and deepening of the revolution.

Because of our feeling of profound respect for the past of Plechanov and Breshkovskaya, we cannot lightly pass over what Plechanov and Breshkovskaya are now doing.

If the former Plechanov and the former Breshkovskaya could arise again, they would condemn, with the greatest of contempt, the present Plechanov and Breshkovskaya, who are working against the revolution.

There is great similarity between the activities of Plechanov and those of Breshkovskaya, so great that the workers and soldiers of Petrograd often speak of E. K. Broshko-Breshkovskaya as "Madame Plechanov."

But there is also a difference between the activities of Plechanov and those of Breshkovskaya.

The role of Plechanov is an active one, that of Breshkovskaya a passive one. Plechanov founded "Unity"; Breshkovskaya was absorbed by "Volya Naroda." Plechanov led on after him the frightened intellectuals among those who had formerly been Social-Democrats. Breshkovskaya is dragged along by the band of frightened intellectuals who were formerly Social-Revolutionists, like ex-Ministers Savinkov and Lebedeff, one of whom was so active in Kornilov's conspiracy. Around Plechanov there revolves the adventurer and counter-revolutionary, Aleksinsky, but he is powerless to dominate Plechanov. Near Breshkovskaya there stands the adventurer and counter-revolutionary Savinkov, and he orders the "grandmother of the revolution" about. Listen to the speeches of Plechanov and Breshkovskaya. In these Breshkovskaya is not always "Madame Plechanov."

Plechanov translates the ideas of the bourgeoisie, its imperialism and its love of conquest, into a language which the proletariat can understand. He serves as a translator for the bourgeoisie, and smuggles into the ranks of the working classes the contraband ideas of the feudal landholders, the manufacturers and the bankers.

Breshkovskaya talks a great deal to the tune of "knowledge is light, and ignorance is darkness," the land for the people, our

great country, rich and fair, but there is no order in the land, etc., etc. Her speeches are harmless. She has simply ceased to be a revolutionist, she has become old, it is time for her to rest, and they go to work and drag her from one end of Russia to the other, and force her to serve the cause of the Savinkovs and Lebedeff. She fails utterly to understand what is going on about her. "The land for the people," she says, but when the question of handing over the land to the agricultural committees is put to a vote in the preliminary parliament she, together with the rest of the "Volya Naroda" crowd, votes against this transfer of the land.

Poor Babushka! To spend thirty-two years in prison, in jail, and in exile, to give all one's life to the struggle for land and for liberty, and then, when the principle of "land and liberty" is about to be fulfilled to come out against that which all her life she has fought for!

But such is the tragedy of life. And there have been many such. Remember Morozov of Schlüsselburg, now safely harbored in the party of the counter-revolutionists, the party of the Cadets. Remember the many leaders of the German-Social-Democrats; up to the war they had fought the German bourgeoisie, and served the interests of the working class, and then, when the war came they deserted from the camp of the champions of the working class and entered that of the opponents and are now exerting all their powers to weaken, to undermine the cause of revolutionary socialism, which for so many years they had faithfully served.

Documents for Future Socialist History

FORWARD!

By LEON TROTZKY

Our paper is to be the organ of revolutionary socialism. Such a declaration would have been sufficient a short time ago. At present these words have lost value. For, both socialism and revolution are now professed by such elements, such classes, as, in their social nature, belong to the camp of the enemy whom we cannot conciliate. The yellow journals call themselves non-partisan socialists. The papers financed by the banks resort to the camouflage colors of "practical socialism," just as the bank buildings themselves hang out, for safety's sake, the red flags of revolution.

This feverish growth of socialism and this camouflage substitute for socialism are all the more unexpected, since it is but a short time ago that, in the earliest phase of the war, the entire capitalist world spoke of a complete breakdown of socialism. And as a matter of fact, in this tremendous cataclysm which war brought in its wake, international socialism underwent a crucial test. The most powerful organizations of the International capitulated before the fetish of the capitalistic state, and, under the completely dishonest banner of "national defence," they gave their blessing to the mutual extermination of the European peoples. The breakdown of socialism, the last hope of humanity, appeared more tragic than all the slaughter and all the destruction of material civilization.

But socialism did not perish. It was merely sloughing off in this terrible internal crisis, its *nationalistic* limitations, its opportunistic illusions. In the crucible of this war the laboring masses have been undergoing a process of purification from the spiritual slavery of the national ideology and of hardening into an irreconcilable hatred of the capitalistic state. In the place of the leaders of the Second International—the Scheidemanns, Guesdes, Vanderveldes, Plekhanoffs, who went bankrupt in the presence of these gigantic happenings—there arise new leaders, who flourish under the onslaughts of the new epoch. Karl Liebknecht, Fritz Adler, Macklin, Höglund and many others—these are the pioneers and the builders of the New, the Third International, which is erected in the storms of war to meet the storms of the Social Revolution.

In this crisis of socialism, the worst is already far behind us. The Russian Revolution is the beginning of the great European tide. The bourgeoisie is attempting with all its might to tame the Russian Revolution and to nationalize it. That is why the bourgeoisie is camouflaging itself behind the defensive minority of socialism. The servants of the bour-

geoisie and its political agents are exerting all their efforts, in the name of "national unity and defence," to castrate the proletariat, to tear it away from the International, and to subjugate it to the discipline of an imperialistic war. We consider this policy to be a mortal foe to the interests of socialism. "The revolutionary defence" is our domestic brand of social-patriotism. Under the mask of populism or of "Marxism," this "revolutionary defence" in reality involves an unalterable desertion of the independent policy of the proletariat, and brings with it the poison of chauvinism and a complete degradation of the proletarian ideology.

The fight against the disintegrating influence of social-patriotism and in defence of the principles of revolutionary internationalism will be the most important task of this paper.

We are issuing the first number of FORWARD at a moment when internationalism has the upper hand over the "national defenders" in the ranks of the Petrograd proletariat. Our paper will, we hope, aid in this salutary process by deepening the formulation of the question more than can be the case in the daily press, and by a stubborn fight for the fusing of all the currents of revolutionary internationalism. Friends! FORWARD counts on your sympathy and your support.

[This article appeared in *Vperiod*, a paper edited by Trotzky, on June 2 (N. S. 15th), 1917. *Vperiod* means "Forward"; the number referred to was the first one to appear.]

THE COUP D'ETAT OF OCTOBER 25

A MENSHEVIST VIEW

At the Second Pan-Russian Congress of Councils of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates, L. A. Martov proposed the following resolution:

Whereas, *First*, the coup d'état, which placed all authority in Petrograd in the hands of the Military-Revolutionary Committee but a single day before the opening of the Congress, was accomplished by the action of the Bolshevik Party alone, and by means which were exclusively military in their nature;

And Whereas, *Second*, this coup d'état threatens to produce bloodshed, civil war and a triumph of the counter-revolution which will drown in blood the entire proletarian movement and thereby destroy all the achievements of the revolution;

And Whereas, *Third*, the sole remedy for this situation, which might still prevent the outbreak of civil war, is an agreement between the insurgent section of the democracy and the remaining democratic organizations, concerning the formation of a democratic government that would

be recognized by the whole revolutionary democracy and to whom the Provisional Government could hand over its authority without a struggle;

Therefore, the Menshevik Fraction calls upon the Congress to recognize officially the absolute necessity of an amicable settlement of the crisis thus produced, by forming a government composed of representatives of all the democratic elements; and the Menshevik-Internationalists, with this purpose in view, offer the Congress to appoint a delegation to consult with the other organs of democracy and with all the socialistic parties.

And, until the results of the work of this delegation shall become apparent, the Menshevik-Internationalist Fraction proposes to the Congress that it discontinue its labors.

Current Affairs

The Peace Negotiations

To very many people the course of the peace negotiations at Brest-Litowsk must have come as a complete surprise. This is particularly true of the Socialists of this country. For at least six months before the beginning of these negotiations the "organs of public opinion" representing the dominant faction of the Socialist party of this country have been assuring us that Germany had accepted the peace terms of the Russian Revolution. In these efforts to persuade us that Russia and Germany were in full accord on the subject of peace terms, the spokesmen of the dominant faction of the Socialist party were ably seconded by their antipodes—extremes *do* meet—the pro-war element of the Socialist movement of this country, whose spokesmen, the eminent Mr. Walling in the lead, went the "regulars" one better by assuring all who would listen that the Russian peace terms were in fact "made in Germany." And now come Von Kuehlmann and Trotzky and haggle for weeks over terms about which they had been in agreement all along and threaten to break off negotiations because of differences of opinion which did not exist. Isn't it exasperating?

But the Socialists are not the only ones who have good cause to complain of the unaccountable pig-headedness of the delegates assembled at Brest-Litowsk. There are our so-called "liberals," for instance. For months, and in some cases for years, they have been clamoring for a "negotiated peace"—with the emphasis on "negotiated." To them there was magic in *negotiation*, no matter who negotiated or under what circumstances. *Conference* was therefore their watchword. You just get the representatives of the belligerent countries around "the green table" and a just peace is sure to result. And here are the Germans and Russians assembled at "the green table" for a month and a half with no peace in sight and not a chance in a million for a *just* peace. Truly astounding!

To those, however, who have eyes to see and no axes to grind the negotiations are running their "normal" course. That Von

Kuehlmann and Trotzky should disagree on such fundamental questions as those involved in the settlement of the world war was self-evident to all those who did not care to deceive themselves or others. They did not, therefore, expect any real agreement, no matter what were the protestations of Von Kuehlmann and his associates in the management of the German end of these negotiations.

There is an old German proverb which says that when two men say the same thing it is not the same thing. And when the two men are so fundamentally different as Von Kuehlmann and Trotzky the difference of meaning given to the same words is necessarily fundamental. But in the present instance there was no necessity even to remember this proverb, for, in justice to Mr. Von Kuehlmann and his associates, it must be said that they gave fair notice to the entire world that they were using the words of the Russian peace terms in an entirely different sense from that in which the Russian revolutionists were using them. At the very outset of the negotiations and before the peace conference actually met, Count Czernin, for instance, stated that the Central Powers had all along understood by "no annexations" something quite different from what the Russian radicals understood by that term. It is therefore none of his fault if some people chose to deliberately disregard the meaning in which he and his associates used certain terms, in order to create a fictitious agreement between the statesmen of the Central Powers on the one hand and the Russian radical revolutionists on the other.

The first lesson to be drawn from the peace negotiations at Brest-Litowsk is, therefore, that mere *verbal agreement* on peace terms is worse than useless. For there will always be people who, actuated by all kinds of motives, good, bad and indifferent, will attempt to create confusion by clinging to the purely verbal agreement. An agreement on war aims or terms of peace in order to be of any value, must be an agreement on an actual programme, worked out with as much detail as possible, so that there can be no room for misunderstanding, or any pretense of misunderstanding. When there is no such clear and unmistakable

agreement beforehand the militarists will inevitably get the better of the bargain when the conferees come to agree around "the green table."

And this brings us to the more fundamental problem—that of how peace ought to be concluded. The proceedings at Brest-Litowsk show the fundamental difference which exists between the two contending conceptions as to how peace ought to be made: the old conception of a "negotiated peace," represented by the Central Powers; and the new conception of a peace based on general principles, represented by the Russian Socialists.

According to the old conception a peace treaty ought to be the result of "negotiations" between two contending parties, each striving to get as good a "bargain" as it can, carried on in a spirit of mutual accommodation, or "give and take" as it is commonly called. Evidently the only relation that such a peace has to anything "liberal" is its resemblance to the old fashioned "liberal" economists' notions as to the great role which "the haggling of the market" plays on determining important economic questions. As a matter of fact this is the way in which peace treaties used to be concluded in the good old days, and is the very worst possible way of doing it. The chances of an unjust peace resulting from such "negotiations" are not only fully as great, but actually much greater than the chances that a just peace should result from them. This at least has been the almost uniform experience of the past, and there is every reason to believe that such will be the case in the future.

This principle was represented at Brest-Litowsk by the delegates of the Central Powers, who frankly stated that they came there to make as good a bargain of a peace as they could possibly get. They therefore announced that they were ready to conclude two different kinds of peace: a general peace *without* annexations or a separate peace *with* annexations. To some innocent souls this cynicism with respect to the sacred principle of "no annexations" must have come as a shock. But there is nothing shocking about it from the point of view of the Central Powers. They never pretended that they accepted "no annexations" *as a*

principle. At best they were willing to accept it as a "*basis of negotiations*"—that is, as a means of concluding as advantageous a bargain as they could under the given circumstances. Naturally they were looking to the condition of the market—which in this case meant the state of the "war map," which Germany had long ago declared to be the basis of all peace terms. But the war map—or the peace market—is entirely different with respect to a separate peace from what it is with respect to a general peace. With respect to the former, Russia is in the position of an anxious buyer, with Germany having a corner on all the peace available in the market; while with respect to the latter Germany knows that she is at least as anxious to obtain peace as are her adversaries. On true *business principles*, therefore, which underlie all peace by negotiations, her terms of peace in the two transactions must necessarily be different. For a general peace she is willing to accept one price—the Russian formula *as interpreted by herself*; but for a separate peace she must exact quite a different price—a price which is in open and avowed defiance of that formula. All of which is in true conformity to the spirit of a *negotiated bargain peace*.

Fundamentally opposed to this conception of peace-making is that of the Russian delegates. As against the idea of a peace by bargain-and-sale negotiations they put forward the idea of a peace based on general principles, independent of the condition of the war-map market. No wonder the German negotiators cannot understand them. "These Russians"—they say—"talk as if they were conquerors." What poor Von Kuehlmann and Czernin evidently do not understand is that according to the Trotzky idea of peace-making it makes *no difference*, in discussing peace terms, as to whether one is conqueror or conquered. Trotzky is not out to *buy* peace at the best market price, but to *establish* peace on the basis of democratic principles.

The peace-parleys at Brest-Litowsk are therefore entirely different from any other peace negotiations of which there is any record in history. It is a struggle between two fundamentally opposed principles in peace making. Between the principle of peace by negotiation along bargain-counter war-map lines and the

principle of a democratic peace irrespective and in utter disregard of the laws of negotiation and the commodity market

Which of these two principles will prevail we do not feel called upon to predict. One thing, however, seems to us quite certain and that is this: *It is a case of now or never*—or at least not for a long time to come. If the Russian revolutionary principle in peace making is to prevail it must prevail now at Brest-Litowsk. Should it fail at Brest-Litowsk and the German militarists be permitted to impose their kind of peace upon the Russian Revolution, then the new principle cannot possibly be applied at the conclusion of this great world war, which means that this great catastrophe will not be the last of its kind. But the Russian Revolutionary principle in peace making—which is designed to end *all* war—cannot possibly prevail at Brest-Litowsk without assistance from the democracies of the world. The only way to make that principle prevail now is by turning the separate peace negotiations at Brest Litowsk into *general* peace negotiations, with a generally accepted democratic peace programme in advance of the meeting of the negotiators, and with the unequivocally announced principle that in these peace negotiations there must be no distinction between conqueror and conquered, victor and vanquished.

It is up to the working class of all countries to follow the glorious example set them by the Russian Revolution.

B.

Eleventh Hour Conversions

The allied "peace offensive" which was inaugurated by Lord Lansdowne's celebrated letter and has reached its culmination point, so far, at least, in President Wilson's war-aims message of January 8, must have come as a great surprise to a good many people, and particularly to our "liberals," who for months have been pleading for this very thing in order to save the Kerensky government from its impending doom, and pleading in vain. For six long months our "liberal" war enthusiasts were pleading with

President Wilson, as the English "liberal" supporters of the war were pleading with their rulers, to heed the call of the Kerensky government in distress begging at our doors for a word or sign that would enable it to say to the Russian people that its allies' war aims were consistent with democratic principles and their intentions toward the peoples of the Central Empires in case of allied victory, honorable. And for six long and weary months the "liberal" supporters of the allied war lords met with rebuff after rebuff. In their desperation our "liberals" openly cursed the stupidity of allied "diplomacy," which was playing into the hands of Germany by alienating the sympathies of the Russian people from the allied cause and at the same time strengthening the position of the German war lords with the German people. But suddenly a change has come over allied "diplomacy." The Bourbons who preside over the destinies of the allied nations have suddenly become seers and prophets—harbingers of a new and bright future for the world and the inhabitants thereof. And our "liberals," including some leading Socialists, are transported with joy at the miracle and shout in chorus: Behold, how the blind have seen the Light and the deaf have heard the voice of Reason, and those that were dumb so long have found their voice again. Verily, the Age of Miracles has not passed away.

As is usual with the tribe, our "liberals" live by faith alone. It is not in their nature, therefore, to inquire into the causes of such miraculous conversions, transforming babbling idiots into sages full of wisdom over night. "Their's not to ask the reason why."

To those, however, who are of inquiring turn of mind the incident is full of instruction. For one thing, it teaches a lesson in worldly wisdom: *It proves conclusively that begging doesn't pay.* Trotzky has obtained more by his threatening attitude in two months than Kerensky could have begged in two years, or in two score years for that matter. It also proves that beggars are despised, while independence is ever respected and admired: The Kerensky government, with all that it did to keep the Russian people for the Allies, never elicited from any allied states-

man half the praise which President Wilson so gracefully bestowed upon Trotzky while the latter was busy discussing terms of peace with Baron von Kuehlmann in defiance of the Allies.

There is one drawback, however, upon successes thus won and recognition thus gained: What has been won by force can only be held by force. It would therefore be well for the real friends of a democratic peace not to rest on their oars as if the victory has been won already, but rather to gird their loins and prepare for the fight, so that victory may not be turned into disastrous defeat by over-confidence. Let them take warning from the pitiful fate of the late lamented Reichstag Revolution, which our self-same "liberals" heralded as a great "democratic" victory, and which has since been cast to the dogs at Brest-Litowsk, being even denied a decent burial.

What has happened once may happen again. The allied diplomats who have been "stupid" so long may relapse into "stupidity" again should the miraculous effects of the compelling power be removed. The honey which they now use so lavishly may then turn into gall.

We must not put our faith in the "commitments" of statesmen. Statesmen are notorious for the shortness of their memories, as is proven by the very declarations which our "liberals" are so vociferously acclaiming. Nay, more than that: statesmen are brazen-faced, as is proven by these same declarations. So Mr. Lloyd-George has the effrontery to say, in speaking of the treaties of the European Allies with respect to the division of the war spoils: "We are, and always have been perfectly ready to discuss them with our allies." This in face of the fact that stubborn refusal of Mr. Lloyd-George and his immediate "allies" to listen to Russia's demand for a revision of these treaties was one of the principal reasons for the downfall of the Kerensky government.

Nor must we get so over-enthusiastic about President Wilson's present enthusiasm for the Russian Revolution and its leaders as to forget the cold, hard facts of not so long past. The fact

is that it took a second revolution in Russia to make President Wilson formally acknowledge the peace formula of the first. And it is also a fact which should be borne in mind that when this recognition finally came, it was given not only grudgingly, but in language which almost verged on insult. It was only last December 4 that President Wilson said in his address to Congress:

"It is this thought that has been expressed in the formula, 'No annexations, no contributions, no punitive indemnities.' Just because this *crude formula* expresses the instinctive judgment as to right of plain men everywhere it has been made diligent use of by the masters of German intrigue *to lead the Russian people astray.*"

And his views as to the present regime in Russia President Wilson expressed thus:

"Had they believed these things at the very moment of their revolution, and had they been confirmed in that belief since, *the said reverses which have recently marked the progress of their affairs toward an ordered and stable government of free men might have been avoided. The Russian people have been poisoned by the very same falsehoods that have kept the German people in the dark, and the poison has been administered by the very same hands.*"

We need not therefore be oversanguine because of the eulogistic language now used by President Wilson in speaking of the Russian people and its leaders. It undoubtedly constitutes a great gain. But in order that this gain may be permanent it needs the application of a steadier force than that of a transitory international situation. This, as well as the other gains represented by Mr. Wilson's last message, can only be retained permanently by the application of a "home" power—the organized power of the class-conscious working class of America. B.

Who Speaks?

In his war-aims message to Congress, President Wilson says with reference to Germany:

"It is necessary, and necessary as a preliminary to any intelli-

gent dealings with her on our part, that we should know whom her spokesmen speak for when they speak to us, whether for the Reichstag majority or for the military party and the men whose creed is imperial domination."

This suggests a very interesting question: *For whom does President Wilson speak?*

In this connection, it is well to remember that President Wilson occupies an entirely unique position among the official spokesmen of the contending nations: In the democratic countries comprising the European Entente Allies the official spokesmen—the respective Prime Ministers and their aids, the Secretaries for Foreign Affairs—are the responsible executives representing the majority of parliament, in whose hands lies the power to make war and conclude peace. In the autocracies comprising the Central European Alliance the men who presume to speak in the name of their respective nations are the servants of the autocrats, in whom also is lodged the power to make war and conclude peace on behalf of those nations. But President Wilson is neither an autocrat having the sole power to make war or conclude peace, nor does he represent the war and peace making power of the country which is lodged in the Congress.

President Wilson's views as to the war aims of the country are, of course, of very great interest to this country as well as to the representatives of foreign governments dealing with this country. It is he who will negotiate the peace treaty in the first instance; and it is quite likely that he may be in a position to force the ratification of any peace treaty that may be acceptable to him. Nevertheless, the people of this country as well as our enemies are entitled to ask the question: For whom did Mr. Wilson speak on January 8? Whose war aims did he announce—his own, those of Congress or those of the people at large?

And this is much more than a mere question of constitutional forms. Had Mr. Wilson consulted with the Senate, in whose hands lies the ratification of any peace treaty, or with the House of Representatives as the most direct representative of the people, before he delivered his message, the formal question might be

waived. But according to all accounts President Wilson did nothing of the kind—instead of consulting with the people's representatives as to the war aims of the country and announcing the result to the world, he called those representatives together and announced *to them* what the country's war aims were. After he made the announcement he went back to the White House, while the Senators and members of the House went about their business—some of them to catch their breath from the shock of surprise. None of them have so far expressed any dissent from the President's war aims. But it is quite evident that this is due more to a feeling of delicacy and what is considered Congressional courtesy than to any real assent, and no one can tell what they will say when their time to speak comes. A perusal of what they did say at the time when war was declared as to the motives which actuated this country in entering into this war and our aims and purposes in fighting it are not at all reassuring on the question as to whether or not the President's present war aims are also those of Congress.

The same is true with respect to the country. It is true that the newspapers have almost unanimously approved President Wilson's message. But it is quite evident that in the great majority of cases that was done from what is commonly called "patriotic motives"—that is, from a desire to "stand behind the President" while the fighting is going on. That this seeming assent will only last as long as the special emergency which has called it forth—the actual fighting—is self-evident. In a vast majority of the cases, the newspapers which had approved the message had up to the very moment of its delivery advocated policies quite contrary to those announced by President Wilson in his message. It is therefore only fair to assume that the moment the pressure of the special emergency is lifted they will revert back to their *real* opinions.

And what is true of the newspapers is true of our "public" generally. And signs are not wanting that the public at least is already beginning to fall back into its former attitude, and dissenting voices are already heard here and there. As these lines

are being written we hear so representative a citizen as Mr. John Burroughs stating in the public press that at least with respect to the economic "war after the war," President Wilson will find, when the time comes, that the country is not behind him.

We may, therefore, be pardoned if we press the question:

For whom does Mr. Wilson speak?

Our National Executive Committee

More than nine weeks have passed since the 25th of November, 1917, when the revolutionary Russian proletariat took the power of government into its own determined hands. And the Socialist Party of the United States has not yet taken a stand.

Not for lack of opportunity; on the contrary the situation has fairly clamored for action from our controlling party authorities. On the 16th and 17th of December the National Executive met in Chicago in its regular quarterly session. A more suitable occasion for a declaration can hardly be imagined. It eliminated even the necessity of an initiative by one of the five members of the Executive Committee. Local Kings County (Brooklyn), and, as we have recently learned, Local Boston, Mass., as well, requested the N. E. C. to issue a call to the locals throughout the country for the holding of meetings in support of the demands made by the Lenin-Trotsky cabinet for an immediate armistice and a democratic peace on the basis of no annexations or indemnities, and the self-determination of nations. The report of this session of the Executive Committee that appeared in the December issue of the National Office Review shows how the question was decided: by motion, action was deferred until the question of party policy would be taken up.

In other words, our five national leaders, the comrades Victor L. Berger, Morris Hillquit, Anna Maley, Seymour

Stedman and John M. Work, felt that the time had not yet come to take decisive action on this question, on a matter that in importance overshadowed all other questions a thousand-fold. They preferred to wait for developments in Russia, to see whether or not the Bolcheviki would be maintained in power. After all where is the wisdom of compromising oneself for a course whose "stability" is by no means assured, which tomorrow may have become a "dead" issue?

How very differently the European Socialist parties have acted. The national convention of the Swiss Social Democracy that met at the end of November sent heartiest greetings to the Russian revolutionary government, assured it of its solidarity and indorsed its program. The "British Socialist Party," the Independent Labor Party of Great Britain, the French party, the Social Democratic parties of the three Scandinavian countries, the minority and the majority parties in Germany, the Socialist movement of Austria, the Italian Social Democracy, and even the Labor Party of Great Britain, declared their solidarity, in one way or another, with the Bolshevist government. In a word: all parties formerly affiliated with the International, even those whose social patriotic inclinations made them obviously sympathetic to the overthrown Kerensky government, sent messages of sympathy and solidarity to the courageous comrades in Russia—all, that is, except the Socialist Party and, of course, the hopelessly sterile "Socialist Labor Party." Arm in arm the two American Socialist organizations, or rather their Executives, have sternly called the Socialist world back into its bounds. They prefer to play safe, and, like respectable business concerns, virtuously decline to undertake anything that smacks of adventure.

Now, to be sure, we may expect an official declaration of our "leaders" at any moment. For, in the meantime, the highest official of the United States has uttered words of highest appreciation for the revolutionists of Russia. Under the circumstances it is not likely that the opportunistic politicians that make up our Executive Committee will hesitate much

longer, especially since he party membership is clamoring more and more urgently and unanimously for a declaration of sympathy. Our leading elements recognize this and will draw the consequences.

But it would be a mistake to assume that our National Executive postponed decisive action because it feared the consequences of a declaration of solidarity with our Russian comrades. Though our Executive Committee has never been remarkable for its courage, it could and would have found some way, some "safe" form of expression. What really prevented a declaration was honest distaste for the Bolshevist tactics. These people were so uncompromisingly revolutionary, so little respectable, so ridiculously proletarian. It must be admitted that the Bolshevist government, under the leadership of Lenin, Trotzky, Kameneff, Zinovietz, not only brought its plan of action into the fullest accord with socialist theory, but that they have thought out and planned their activity down to the minutest detail. But the iron consistency with which they have carried out their resolutions, the infallibility with which their plans become action, are so different from the habit of coining high sounding phrases without going out of one's way to carry them out. In a word, our leaders are wholly out of sympathy with the Bolsheviki—it could not be otherwise.

In the new epoch of severe social struggles into which the world is evolving, the Socialist movement of the world, and certainly that of the United States, will sorely need the socialist clearness, the revolutionary determination, the proletarian fearlessness and consistency of the Bolsheviki.

Spirit and tactics of the third International will be permeated with the spirit of the Bolsheviki, or it will cease to be. The new election of the National Executive that is already under way gives to the Socialists of the United States the opportunity to "do their bit" in preparing the Socialist movement to cope with the problems that are awaiting it. L.

As the Magazine goes to press the National Executive Committee is heard from. The declaration comes too late to have the influence that should be exerted by such an important appeal of our Party.

St. Louis and After

In our last issue we called attention to the change of heart and the change of front with respect to the war on the part of Mr. Hillquit and that part of the Socialist Party which follows his leadership. This change has since been accentuated in an open letter to Mr. William Hard, published by Mr. Hillquit in the "New Republic" of December 1st and the New York "Call" of December 5th. In this letter Mr. Hillquit completely repudiates the doctrine of the St. Louis Resolution—or what was thought to be the doctrine of the St. Louis Resolution—that our opposition to war is a matter of principle. According to the new dispensation, the Socialist Party's opposition to American participation in the war is not at all a question of principle in the sense of opposition to all wars, or to all capitalist or ruling class wars, but a question of expediency, based, among other things, upon our judgment as to the condition of the war-map. To the question put to him by Mr. William Hard whether, if he had been a member of Congress, he would have voted in favor of America's declaration of war against Germany, Mr. Hillquit makes the following answer:

"If I had believed that our participation would shorten the duration of the world-war and force a better, more democratic and more durable peace, I should have favored the measure, regardless of the cost and sacrifices of America. My opposition to our entry into the war was based upon the conviction that it would prolong the disastrous conflict without compensating gains to humanity."

We do not care at this time to discuss the meaning of this new position as a matter of principle. But we want to point out some of its consequences. Assuming that Mr. Hillquit correctly represents the present position of the Socialist Party, then every Socialist is necessarily free to take such an attitude toward the war as he chooses without offending against any party principle. For the whole question is taken out of the domain of principle and put upon the plane of expediency and

private judgment. Mr. Hillquit thought that our entry into the war "would prolong the conflict *without compensating gains to humanity*," and he therefore opposed the war. But Frank Bohn, for instance, thought that American participation would shorten the conflict. And John Spargo may have thought that even though it might prolong the conflict, it would bring "compensating gains to humanity" in the shape of a "more democratic and more durable peace," which Mr. Hillquit recognizes as a good ground for *voting* in favor of war.

Whether or not America's entry into the war would prolong the conflict or shorten it is clearly a matter upon which people might differ without offending against any Socialist principle. Frank Bohn may not be as good a military expert as Morris Hillquit, but he is clearly entitled to his own opinion in the matter. Bohn might well say to Hillquit: "Your assertion that America's entry into the war will prolong the conflict is obviously based on the assumption that as matters now stand Germany has the upper hand and if let alone will soon force her opponents to lay down their arms. For if the Allies were having the upper hand any accession to their strength would naturally *speed* the decision in their favor, thereby shortening the war. Also, if there was a stalemate which neither side could break, any accession of power on either side would shorten the war by giving one side the preponderance, thereby preventing the war from continuing indefinitely in fruitless attempts by both sides to break the balance. Now, I don't agree with you in your estimate of the situation. I believe that the Allies are winning, or at least holding their own. America's entry into the war will therefore necessarily have the effect of shortening the war."

And Spargo could say to Hillquit:

"As Bohn has already pointed out, your assertion that American participation will prolong the conflict is based on the assumption that Germany has now the winning hand. I am rather inclined to agree with you. But that is so much more reason why we Socialists ought to be in favor of America's entry into the war. You say yourself that had you 'believed that our

participation would . . . force a better, more democratic and more durable peace' you would favor America's entry into the war. Now, it must be clear to you—at least it is clear to me—that a victorious Germany is not going to give her opponents such terms of peace as to insure a just, lasting and democratic peace. You may be justified in your confidence in Hindenburg as a warrior, but you surely cannot have any confidence in the Kaiser and his clique as democratic statesmen. No matter, therefore, how bad Allied statesmen may be, by trying to prevent a complete German victory, we are necessarily working to secure better terms of peace for the world."

And if Hillquit's new position—or his new "interpretation" of his old position—be correct, it follows that Bohn and Spargo not only had the *right*, but that it was their *duty*, to favor our entry into the war, even to the extent of voting for its declaration if they happened to be members of Congress.

And yet we have been saying some hard things about these men since St. Louis. Must we now apologize to them and invite them back into the party? Or is it time to begin saying things to some other people?
B.

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