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New Propaganda of Race Hatred By Paul Kennaday

\HE easy and popular business of stirring up hatred and contempt of the Negro has assumed a new and profitable form. D. W. Griffith's "Birth of a Nation," a film play based on Thomas Dixon's outrageous Clansman, has for two months been running to packed houses at the Liberty theatre in New York City. With scarcely an exception, the press has been filled with the usual sort of copy that passes for dramatic criticism and the public twice a day has been giving every indication of pleasure and satisfaction at paying out its money for "history" reeled off before its eyes to the accompaniment of the regulation throb music. The history is a bit askew, to be sure, but with so much precedent for so writing it, it would be hypercritical to object to so picturing it.

But the "Birth of a Nation" is more than the portrayal of Reconstruction from "a point of view," the South's point of view. It is because of its open, deliberate and intended insult to the whole Negro race, because of its portrayal of the Negro race as one of drunkards, of harlots and of rapists; because of its praise of lynching and its glorification of mob vengeance; because of its downright and barefaced appeal to race hatred, that the right to continue the production of the play has been challenged.

It is not yet clear how out of the Board of Censors' "censoring committee" membership of over a hundred, a sub-committee of ten could have been selected that without one dissenting vote could pass the original "Birth of a Nation" film and mark it, "morally, educationally and artistically

excellent," while the general committee itself, upon appeal made to it, insisted by an overwhelming vote upon the cutting out of certain scenes in the first half of the play and the suppression of practically the whole of the second part. But the wisdom of this National Board is inscrutable. Quick upon its wholesale disapproval, it reversed itself again after the cutting out of some few of the vilest portions of that second act, which first had been fulsomely praised and then had been sweepingly condemned. Certainly a board of less weight and position would find it difficult to hold so firmly to its judgment when its decisions against plays have no more immediate effect than the association of producers choose to give to them, and when the secretary and executive force of the board have their salaries and expenses paid wholly by that association.

The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People who have appealed to officials and to the Board of Censors in an endeavor to have the "Birth of a Nation" stopped, have been accused of favoring the suppression of free speech. Free speech is wanted by us, we are told, only so long as speech may be free to us, not while it is exercised by those who do not speak as we do.

But we who have deliberately brought upon us this accusation claim extenuating circumstances of a wholly unique character. We are fighting in the most unpopular and unequal combat in all the world —for the equality of all races. Rich and poor, capital and labor, women and men, are arrayed against us. Courts back up legislatures in depriving Negro citizens of rights guaranteed them by the fundamental law. Outcast and degraded everywhere by race prejudice, because of it, in many places, any one of them-man, woman or child-may be shot, burned and hanged with impunity. This "Birth of a Nation" goes far beyond any mere question of the right to speak against the constituted authorities, to advocate views of industry, government, or morality not accepted by the majority. The play deliberately fans the flame of race hatred, making one man say, "kill the nigger" as for fifteen minutes a little white girl is pursued through bush and woods, up and down hill, until finally from a precipice she jumps to her death. It is a play of which another said, "It makes me feel that I would like to kill every nigger in New York." It is a play that, it is acknowledged by its friends, would cause race riots in the South and which, wherever it is seen, must have the effect which Dixon, Griffith and their backers have spared no pains or money to produce against a race which fifty years after slavery, is years yet from the day when it will know how to protect itself.

Current Affairs

By L. B. Boudin

Peace-At What Price?

▲HE horrors of the present war are such that the idea of "peace at any price" naturally suggests itself to all lovers of mankind. The idea appeals particularly to us Socialists, to whom war is hateful not only because of the endless misery and suffering which it entails upon countless millions of people while it lasts, but also because of the national hatreds which it engenders and the divisions which it brings into the ranks of the proletariat; hatreds and divisions calculated to stand in the way of the emancipation of the working class long after the roar of cannon shall have ceased. It is not, therefore, surprising that the cry for "peace at any price" should be heard at this time and that it should find willing ears in our ranks. We believe, however, this cry to be extremely ill-judged.

It is true that the paramount duty of the hour is the striving for the restoration of peace, and that we must bend all our energies to bring about a cessation of the awful carnage now devastating the greater portion of the civilized world. But it is equally true that even peace may be bought at too dear a price. Our striving towards peace must not be a blind and unreasoning demand for a cessation of hostilities no matter how achieved and no matter what its consequences might be, but an intelligent course of action calculated to bring about a *lasting* peace upon terms that are just and under conditions

that will be conducive to the progress of mankind. Without entering into a detailed discussion as to the proper terms of peace from a Socialist point of view it may be stated here that the cardinal principle upon which the coming peace must be based is: that it should not be a continuation of the war, nor should it bear within itself the germs of future wars.

There is a famous dictum of Clausewitz to the effect that war is but a continuation of international politics by the use of different means. Similarly, it may be said that certain kinds of peace are but the continuation of war by the use of different means, and some times even the means are the same only the method of their application somewhat different. Such is usually the peace which follows in the wake of conquests: it is war in a chronic instead of an acute form. Such a peace is worse than war, and must be avoided.

The Exportation of Arms

S OME three hundred-odd editors and publishers of foreign-language received States have issued an "Appeal to the People of the United States" in which the latter are asked to put an end to the war by stopping the exportation of arms and ammunition to the warring countries. There has been considerable speculation as to the source of the sinews of war which feed this particular campaign for peace. It has been suggested that this source must lie in close proximity to Germany's War Lord. The subject-matter of the "Appeal" deserves, however, to be considered on its merits. For there can be no doubt that there are many well meaning people, and quite a good number of Socialists among them, who share the view that peace could and should be brought about by stopping the exportation of arms and ammunition from this country.

The proposition that the war *could* be stopped by such means is open to very serious doubt. But we shall not discuss this phase of the question, as we believe that even if the war could be stopped in this manner, it shouldn't.

It must be remembered that Germany does not buy any arms from us, for the simple reason that she could not carry them home. The only belligerents who buy arms from us are the Allies. That is the reason why the official and unofficial representatives of the German government in this country are so very anxious to save our souls by keeping us from becoming accessories to the crime of murder. Assuming, therefore, that the Allies' supply of arms and ammunition is so short that the war could be stopped by our refusal to furnish them these supplies, for us to do so would, therefore, simply mean that we would stop the war by helping Germany to win it. This is, of course, very desirable from the point of view of those who want Germany to win. And perhaps, even, from the point of view of those who want peace at any price. But it cannot be desirable from a Socialist point of view. Germany's success in this war means the annexation of Belgium, for one thing. And this alone is too big a price to pay for a peace that could not in its very nature be a lasting one. By which we do not want to indicate that we should be ready to pay this price, if the peace could be made a lasting one.

Besides, by putting a ban on the exportation of arms now we would be putting an additional premium on "preparedness." The advocates of "preparedness" would have a perfect right to say *that the peace-lovers* of the entire world fight on the side of the nation that is always *prepared for war*.

A Noteworthy Debate

N April 2nd the question of armaments was publicly debated in New York City between a representative of Socialism and a conservative Republican. The thing that struck the New York Sun most about this debate was the fact that it was "perfectly polite." Polite it undoubtedly was. But the Sun does this debate an injustice by insinuating that that was its most noteworthy feature. As a matter of fact, it was, in a way, a remarkable debate. For the first time in the history of public debating between Socialists and the representatives of Capitalism have such debaters shown a perfect unanimity of opinion on all essentials. The hearers must, therefore, have been wondering why the speakers had been labelled in the manner they were. By a long association of ideas the appellation "Socialist" suggests to our mind a set of principles and a point of view fundamentally different from those held by representatives of Capitalism. But no such differences could be discovered in this debate.

The position taken by Congressman Gardner, who represented aggressive Capitalism, was that the United States was not properly prepared to fight a serious war, and must therefore prepare to meet such an emergency. To which Mr. Hillquit, who represented Socialism, replied:

"I have been convinced by Mr. Gardner's argument to this extent, that from his point of view, his position is unassailable. If we grant his premise that the United States is in danger of *becoming involved in war* with a first-class foreign power, we must accept his conclusion that the country is woefully unprepared for such an emergency, and that it is the part of wisdom to strengthen our naval and military defences."

After having thus agreed with his opponent on the question of principle, Hillquit proceeded to devote the rest of his speech to the establishment of the proposition that we are not likely to "become involved." How far he succeeded in this respect is of very little importance to us as Socialists. But it seems to us of the greatest importance that we ask ourselves the question: Is it really true, can it be possible, that the only difference of opinion between Socialists and ordinary militarists is that as to whether or not we are likely to *become involved* in war?

Socialists will please note the improvement in the American edition of patriotic Socialism over the European edition of 1914. According to the European version of patriotic Socialism our country had at least to be "attacked" before we turned militarists, but according to the American version we don't even have to be *attacked*—it is sufficient if we *become involved in war*, no matter how.

The Strike in Porto Rico

A CRY of despair from the workers of Porto Rico has again reached this country. The agricultural workers are out on strike, and they are handled by the authorities with an utter disregard of law and decency. Evidently the Constitution does follow the flag,—at least for the purpose of being disregarded and violated. The workers of Porto Rico are treated as if they were actually living in a sovereign state of this great union,—say Colorado or New Jersey,—and not in a mere "dependency."

The correspondent of the New York Call, in reporting on the situation, says that the annual convention of the Free Federation of Workingmen of Porto Rico held recently, that organization "seriously considered" the calling of a general strike in order to compel just treatment of the agricultural strikers. We do not presume to advise the workers of Porto Rico how to conduct their own affairs. But this much may be said even at this great distance: A resolution threatening a general strike which cannot be called is worse than useless; and a call to a general strike when there is no reasonable expectation that it may be generally obeyed is a crime against the labor movement. It seems to us necessary to remind the Free Federation of this truism for the reason that in 1908 the Free Federation, as the same correspondent informs us, adopted the following resolution:

"Resolved, That the Free Federation of the Workingmen of Porto Rico through the agency of its Executive Council shall exercise unlimited authority to proclaim a general strike throughout the whole island, and this said strike shall not be considered as having come to an end, until the said injustice of crime (the motive of the general strike), has been completely removed."

This resolution exhibits a childish belief that you can scare the enemy by resoluting, and a dangerous propensity to call paper strikes. Let us hope that the intervening seven years have brought the Free Federation the power necessary to carry out what it undertakes to do, and taught it not to vainly threaten what it knows it cannot do.

The Future of Belgium

By Hubert Langerock

[In submitting this article Mr. Langerock says: "This is more than a personal view. I have been expressly asked by the minority of the Belgian Socialist Party to write this article because it embodies their views. Communications with Belgium are hard, but dissatisfaction among the rank and file of the conscious workers is at a high pitch. Vandervelde has ceased to be not only an internationalist but also a republican, as his London speeches testify."]

F all the historical events of the present war none has had a deeper influence on public opinion the world over than Germany's invasion and subsequent industrial sabotage of Belgium.

Economic necessity for a German conquest of Belgium existed because—with the possible exception of Russia and Austria—few capitalist nations have poorer means of communication by sea with the outer world. Germany's seacoast has few harbors, and Bremen and Hamburg are located too far north to be really useful to a machine-production largely located in the southern part of the country on the Rhine. The German industrial world has access to the sea through two ports located in foreign territory. Rotterdam is her port of import, Antwerp is used for export. Virtually Germany is in the position of a big farmer compelled to do business through some petty landowner's backyard, which cuts him off from the main road.

To remedy this positive handicap the German government inaugurated its canal policy. The Dortmund-Emden canal was dug to direct freight towards the northern ports. The Kaiser's government, however, overlooked essential economic factors in the matter and learned that economic laws cannot be violated with less impunity than laws of hygiene or chemistry. When the canals were completed they carried more freight southward than northward. More than ever the political conquest of Belgium and Holland became a necessity. Then active preparations for invasion and conquest began and of these there are many positive proofs.

The Belgian State Railways were bulldozed into building a cut-off which had a considerable strategic value for Germany's troops.

In interviews and private conversations the German emperor neglected no opportunity to question the right of existence of Belgium as an independent nation. About this time Benjamin Ide Wheeler, president of the University of California, was exchange-professor in Berlin and a report of an interview granted to him by the Kaiser was given to the press.

To any one conversant in the slightest degree with international journalism this interview had a

tremendous meaning. The Kaiser's words were reported *verbatim* except in one or two instances, where paragraphs had been inserted written in indirect discourse and which might thus be taken for the opinion of President Wheeler or anybody else. It was evident that these paragraphs were opinions of the Kaiser so audacious and pregnant with diplomatic complications that some one had deemed it advisable to tone down their expression.

In one of the paragraphs the possession of a colony of the importance of the Congo by Belgium and the advisability of its ownership by Germany were bluntly expressed.

All these incidents pointed to a material departure in the realization of a project which had for years been the secret wish of every advocate of *Kraftpolitik* in the Empire.

The Kraft-ideal had indeed become a common asset of the mentality of the various classes in Germany. The conservative agrarian caste, the Junkers, with their junior scions located in the officers' berths of the army and navy, advocated it both as an historical tradition and an actual class advantage. The industrial capitalists, who were pleading for tolerance, justice, liberty and the other classic creations of bourgeois idealogy during the age of individual competition, had now reached the period of the Kartel. The German Kartel is the equivalent of the American trust. The capitalistic ethics of the trust age are no longer metaphysical, they rely on the Kraft-ideal. German capitalism, although less concentrated than its American analogy, has dared to express its Kraft-ideal with a frankness akin to that of a Diogenes of Laerte or a Machiavelli exposing the moral code of the merchant princes of antiquity or the middle ages. Puritan America has never witnessed such an attempt, the nearest to it that she ever offered was the disgusting sycophancy of a Chancelor Day or the paid advertisements of an Elbert Hubbard.

The German Social-Democracy, so often used without warrant as the umpire of tactical disputes on this side of the Atlantic, made a sad theoretical mistake when it substituted the Kraft-ideal as a crude approximation for the Socialist doctrine of the necessity of an evolutionary political status corelative to the technical development of production, created through the application of the politico-economic force of the proletariat and maintained by the interior equilibrium of its economic component functions.

Thus was produced a trait of national mentality

of which the conquest of Belgium became an immediate and tangible result.

German Socialism was swept off the rock of sound revolutionary tactics, but—although from an entirely different point of view—the organized workers of Belgium committed the same blunder. Conditions in Belgium today are such that we do not positively know whether the rank and file of the party approve the stand taken by Van Der Velde and the other party officials and parliamentarians. There cannot be under the circumstances and there has not been any official expression of opinion, but there are several indications that temporarily at least Van Der Velde will be approved by a small majority of the membership.

It should be noticed here that, contrary to the assertion of the American press, Van Der Velde did not join the cabinet. He was simply made a Minister of State. The title of minister of state is a purely honorary one given to old parliamentarians who are as such consulted by the king in important or delicate occasions. No salary is attached to the dignity, neither is there any assumption of executive responsibility connected with it.

The appointment was an acknowledgment of the nationalistic and patriotic attitude of the Belgian Socialist Party. It has now won its place in the bourgeois sunshine, it is no longer an outlaw, it expects to be given a less prejudiced hearing in the future, to be treated with more consideration, it even candidly intends to use this status to favor the workers and it will realize, after the hour of national danger is over, that the bourgeois who once feared it has now come to despise it.

Imperial Germany discounted the refusal of the Belgian proletarian to fight. The machiavelism of her imperialistic capitalists looked with complacency in Belgium upon what they were ready to term high treason at home and the patriotic and nationalistic attitude of Belgium's workers was for them a bitter disappointment.

So it was for the revolutionary Socialists all over the world, but from a somewhat different point of view. For there was nothing in Belgium that made it worth while for a proletarian to lay down his life and even incorporation as a federated state into the German empire would be for him from many an angle preferable to the autonomous existence of a little state dominated by a combination of Roman Catholic priests, landlords, bondholders and slumproletarians banded in yellow unions under the leadership of the clergy. There is nothing to be envied in the economic status of the Belgian proletarian. Were protective duties levied on a sliding scale basis, according to the standard of life of the workers of the country of production, few imports would have to be taxed as high as Belgium's. Therefore it is impossible to understand why a party created obviously to enable the proletarian to be and

to survive under the economic conditions of machineproduction could become divorced from its primary aim to such an extent as to send this same proletarian to a heroic death in a losing fight with the German military machine.

Besides the common psychological deformation which for the professionals of all groups makes the maintenance of the group superior in importance to the fulfiillement of the group's aim, this fundamental mistake was a logical step in a series of tactical blunders resulting from the tactless use of political action by the Belgian parliamentary Socialists. I am no anti-political maniac. I know that no-politics always leads in practice to some sort of wrong politics. Political action today is a necessity for the working class, but I know of no worse enemy of political action for what it really is: a means to an end, used by necessity but fundamentally bourgeois in its origin and nature.

This fact has been overlooked by the Belgian parliamentary group under Van Der Velde's leadership. It has used political trading, attempted positive legislation by indirection. We Socialists cannot, and therefore must not try to, be legislating until the day we shall be majority. Till then we must do the best we can to secure class-advantages from the bourgeois majority without committing ourselves to them as "Socialist legislation." This rule has been violated in Belgium. A few years ago Van Der Velde and his party headed and brought about a fusion of young Catholics, Liberals and Christian Democrats which made the grasp of militarism stronger under the pretext that charges were more This wrong tendency has since grown equalized. and made the tactical blunder of today both possible and probable.

The ultimate fate of Belgium is yet uncertain. It is doubtful whether, in the present condition of military developments, Germany is not mainly holding the country as a pawn in the diplomatic game, which will start after the conclusion of an armistice. German ultra-imperialism is shouting for annexation, German Socialists have held protest meetings against annexation, but the Kaiser who derives his importance from his status of moderator of opposed economic interests, cannot refuse to heed the counsels of those who point out that there are in Belgium over three million people of Latin origin and that Germany has had all the trouble she cared for with French *irredentism* in Alsace-Lorraine without courting a little more in Belgium.

Further, there are dynastic considerations with a real importance of their own. King Albert is a Sachsen-Coburg-und-Gotha and his queen a Wittelsbach and the Hohenzollerns may think it over twice before openly antagonizing two of the important ruling houses in the Empire. If the worst happens to Belgium, Albert would meekly agree to enter the German Empire as a subordinate prince who has much to atone for. The whole family-history of the Sachsen-Coburgs is full of precedents to that effect.

An allied victory, on the contrary, would lead to a rehabilitation of the little buffer-state, which would probably receive Luxemburg as an increase of territory besides an indemnity. Europe may even once more solemnly proclaim the neutrality and independence of the small wedge-shaped country, in order that some other big power may treat this pledge as a scrap of paper in sparring for a strategic advantage at the beginning of the next war.

But the necessity for such a device as a bufferstate in the center of continental Europe no longer exists in the present state of European politics. Erase Belgium from the map and European equilibrium is no longer threatened. For this much economic changes in production from national to international are responsible. A partition of Belgium on racial lines would therefore be justified, if England could be brought to give up what security she derives from the presence of a neutral state across the British channel.

The problem of Belgium's future becomes at this juncture but a secondary point of a more general problem: the future of the small nation under the economic conditions of the present. Much has been written recently in England on this subject that constitutes only an undue generalization of the emotional outpourings called forth by the plight of Belgium and will be forgotten or recanted when the war is over.

In truth, when all sentimentalism has been dissipated, as it quickly will, there is no longer a future for the small state and we should shed no tears about it. There is nothing worthy of a regret in the pettiness of its civic life. The huge selfishness of its economically ruling class becomes a burlesque, when it is compared to the size of the stage on which it is to be produced. Small countries bring forth narrow minds. The widely heralded buffer-states can no longer exist economically outside of the shelter of some wider geographical unit, in which case they are no longer buffer-states. We are told about their literary and scientific achievements by people who forget that these arose not on account of the size of the country but in spite of it.

Since, with the actual revival of nationalism, country and nationality are again to become synonymous; we may well ask is Belgium a nation?

To this question our answer must be decidedly negative. Historically Belgium is no nationality. All the labors of nearly a century of government fostered and nurtured official historians have not been able to disprove the fact that the component parts of the country had never before formed the same territorial unit. Accidentally they had sometimes, or nearly all of them, been included in a wider geographical aggregate. A nation today is the organization on a basis of economic stability in a political realm of populations united by the common bond of racial origin, language and religion with the object to serve the material existence of its inhabitants.

The presence of the economic substratum to national existence in Belgium may easily be disproved. The country is over-populated. Millions of peasants have carried intensive farming to a high state of perfection and the present emergency has demonstrated once more that it is far preferable for a nation to have a smaller agricultural yield per acre if that smaller yield by maintaining a proportionately smaller population on the land leaves a larger surplus for the non-agricultural element of the population to consume. A large population of intensive farmers means nothing left when the producer has exchanged what commodities he produces for the foodstuffs and the manufactured goods he does not produce. The least unforeseen calamity, a war or an epidemic, will at once-the present war proves ittransform such a population into an army of beggars.

From a capitalistic point of view Belgium lacks a home market of agricultural buyers for its manufactures. The presence of such a preferential dumping ground is everywhere considered the groundwork of economic equilibrium in capitalistic countries.

Aside from a shaky economic foundation, the Belgian pseudo-nationality is one-half Teutonic and one-half Latin, speaking two languages, deriving their livelihood one half from farming, the other half from industry, and religiously split up into one half of Roman Catholics and another half of freethinkers and non-believers. Neither should it be forgotten that all those differences crystallize in the two same groups and that nearly a century of so-called national life has not resulted in any appreciable amalgamation. On the contrary, in many domains the differentiation has become sharper and prevented the creation of a truly national type.

The history of Belgium since 1830 has been a struggle of races every time the racial antagonisms synchronized with the differences of economic interests. During the period of individual competition, the industrial capitalist of Flanders refused to talk the language of his "hands." He aped French manners and French customs. A reaction followed, a few literary men worked for a revival of Flemish nationalism. They never met with any noteworthy success as long as the movement embodied the wishes of a few dilettanti or the impulsive generosity of some uplifters who wanted to be able to talk to the people in its own tongue in order to make themselves understood. Only later. when the rising tide of socialism began to threaten the capitalist did he understand the reactionary value of a minor language, relatively isolating the worker from the great streams of thoughts carried by the world-tongues.

So reactionary and overbearing has the nationalistic movement of Flanders become to-day that it has created in the mind of the Latin element the consciousness of a racial grievance thwarting their economic emancipation. Slowly they realize that the political machinery of the country will not give them social control of production, as long as they are compelled to carry around their necks the millstone of Catholic agrarianism. Out of this condition has arisen a demand for an administrative separation of the country in two halves embodying the linguistic, racial, religious and economic antagonisms of their inhabitants.

All these elements must be taken into consideration as far as the future of Belgium is concerned. They all point to the only solution which would be satisfactory from an internal as well as from an international point of view. Since partition of Belgium would endanger that elusive thing called European equilibrium and the people of Flanders, although Teutonic by origin, have no love for the Prussian destroyers of their homes, Belgium's purpose should be to seek admission into the British Empire as a self-governing dominion. The advantages of this solution of the problem of Belgium's future are many and obvious.

The self-governing dominions of the British Empire are de facto republics. Great Britain's representative, the governor-general, with his suspensive veto for six months, has no real action upon the popular will, which he is unable to check. The British Empire is no longer a national unit. It has assimilated the Canadian French with their terrianisms inspired by the teachings of Thomas Aquinas, as well as the childishly individualistic Dutch of South Africa. Its Indian rule has been such that the Hindu nationalist movement is equally divided on the advisability of severing the imperial bond as a preliminary effort to national emancipation.

After the war the Empire will more than ever be a League of Nations, in which all those who are convinced that modern economic conditions by internationalizing production call for a super-national political organism, must find the initial step in the realization of their hopes.

From membership in such a league Belgium would derive many considerable advantages. It would be excused from maintaining at its own expense all the costly paraphernalia of a modern nation; a figurehead, a diplomatic corps, a consular service, a navy, etc. All these national ornaments she possesses to-day on a scale which makes them fit for the care of the property man of a vaudeville company. They would be a joke, if they did not crush her people under a burden of useless taxation. Belgian industries would find their place in the

general economic equilibrium of the Eritish Empire while the disposition of the Congo, brought into the amalgamation as a Belgian asset, would remove perplexing international problems of the future.

As far as interior conditions are concerned, the benefits would be still larger. They would include a republican form of government, administrative separation of the two races and a check upon the intellectually suffocating influence of the Catholic Church. Participation in the life of a world-wide empire would widen the national horizon.

To bring about this solution, to work for it and secure the consent of the majority of the nation for it is a unique historical opportunity for the Belgian proletariat.

Announcement

W ITH the appearance of the NEW REVIEW as a bi-weekly we broaden our scope. In addition to the regular material which has made the NEW REVIEW pre-emi-

material which has made the NEW REVIEW pre-eminent in American Socialist and radical journalism, we shall from now on publish regular comments on current affairs; literary articles; widen the range of our articles on international affairs and the practical problems of Socialism; and attempt to deal thoroughly with the non-Socialist aspects of the great changes impending in the wake of the Great War. Since the NEW REVIEW was re-organized one year ago, our

business income has doubled, our expenses materially reduced, and our circulation increased 40 per cent. We have achieved this substantial success in spite of com-

we have achieved this substantial success in spice of comparative lack of funds and the recent general depression in magazine journalism. The new size and form of the magazine allows us to reduce

The new size and form of the magazine allows us to reduce expenses on the printing proportionally; so that a biweekly issue will only slightly increase our total cost of production. There still is a deficit, of course; but while the monthly deficit one year ago was about \$400, the deficit now is only \$200, in spite of the increased expense of the biweekly. This deficit can be wiped out within six months with your co-operation.

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NEW REVIEW

Sex and the Elders

By Elsie Clews Parsons

NCE upon a time I was visiting in the house of an elderly relative when his young daughter-in-law arrived on the scene with her month old baby. The day after her arrival she came to me on the verge of those tears so young a mother easily weeps. What was she to do? Her doctor had told her not to go up and down stairs for the sake of herself and the baby more than once a day for the next two weeks. And now her father-in-law had sent word to her to please not "Although there are nurse the baby downstairs. plenty of rooms where we can be perfectly private," she protested, "he says he would not like it if there were callers." She was not only upset by the practical inconvenience of the request; she felt outraged, it was plain to see, by its nature.

The best I could do for her was to arrange for her to get the air on an upper balcony and to help close the incident. It has always remained in my mind, however, as a striking little illustration of the domination of the patriarch in matters one questions whether he is fitted by nature to understand or control.

Is it not one of the curiosities of society that its affairs of sex have always been controlled by its Elders, i.e., by those who least feel the impulses of sex? That they should prescribe its expression according to ways agreeable to themselves might well be expected; and that they do not disappoint expectation is quite evident in such facts as child marriage or bethrothal, marriage by purchase, the prohibition of marriage without parental consent, the dependence of divorce upon a council or court, a body composed for the most part of the Elders of the community.

But in other ways, perhaps less well known or recognized, is it not true too that the Elders regulate sex to suit their own taste or convenience? Their own impulses being weak, expressions of sex are distasteful or even revolting to them. They therefore tend to suppress them in their juniors or to influence their juniors to conventionalize or conceal them.

Many sex taboos and many of the conceptions of passion as in itself weakening, demoralizing or shameful are, I suspect, expressions of the annoyance felt by the old over the different nature of the young. In such ways the young are bullied into belying themselves. Passion, they are made to feel, is ever to be guarded against and held in check. To yield to it is to be besmirched, befouled. Virginity, girls learn, is a jewel whose loss is irreparable. It is no mere bodily character. It is a fetish for the

soul. Intercourse with women is effeminizing, the youth is cautioned; intimacy dangerous. Furthermore, both sexes are made to feel that passion is objectionable not only in self but in one of the other sex. Aroused in a man, girls learn that he becomes brutal, vicious, selfish, a creature of mere lust and self-regard, one to fly from. As for women, are not men taught that once they yield to passion they are of little account, that only bad women yield, that the more they care for a woman the less should they tempt her?

Not to be suppressed altogether, at least passion is to be concealed. Its expression is in bad taste, "common," unladylike, unworthy a gentleman. To make love in public is the height of ill-breeding. So are all other manifestations of sex, pregnancy, childbearing, lactation—all are functions embarrassing enough to necessitate seclusion.

Practically the Elders control the sex life of their juniors along two lines; they either separate young men from women or they insist on marriage in youth and a "settling down." By either method the Elders preclude encroachment upon their own feelings or point of view as well as disturbance of their own domesticity.

During the month long initiation rites of Australian or African or New Guinea tribes it is taboo to the initiates to touch or address a woman, to look at or be seen of one. The New South Wales initiate could not let a woman's shadow fall upon him until the Elders gave leave. In almost all tribes there is, moreover, a young men's house or club which is taboo to the women. Nor are the young men allowed to frequent the quarters of the married peo-As for the segregation of the women themple. selves from men not of their family it occurs, as we know, under all manner of forms in every society, forms originating with the Elders and enforced by them. Even our own Mrs. Grundy is never represented as a young woman.

Mrs. Grundy, if she is true to herself, always rejoices in a youthful marriage, and many of Mrs. Grundy's elderly colleagues deplore our late marriage rate, a cause, they say, of all kinds of immorality. It is the very same point of view the Elders of many another community seem to have held—and lived up to. Unless a Jew married when he was twenty he was outcasted as a criminal. Unmarried at the same age a Roman was subject to tax, he could not become an heir except to a near relative, and he could not receive a legacy. A New Britain youth is bribed with shell-money into being initiated and consequently qualified for matrimony. How many of the ancient Hebrews preferred ostracism to marriage and how much revenue Rome received from bachelors we do not know, even approximately; but from New Britain practices we may at least surmise that the island youths quite often rebel against marrying. Rebellion is in fact expected of them, for if a boy breaks away from his captors before the coil of money is thrown over his head, he is let off the public initiation. He may still, however, be privately entrapped, his parents being "ashamed" of his bachelorhood. Decoyed and caught, he will vociferate, "What have I done that I should be compelled to marry? Have I ever got you into trouble by immoral conduct? Let me go." And this time if he breaks loose it is etiquette for him to try to kill his pursuers. But if he has indeed been sowing his wild oats a wife is bought and forced on him. There is nothing left for him to do then but to settle down.

The sobering effect of marriage is not the only reliance of the Elders in their protection of the home. They establish as a rule the harshest of penalties for seduction—heavy fines, beating, mutilation, exile, death—and the view that adultery is a public as well as a private offense. Committed by a woman in New Guinea it is believed to bring down misfortune upon the whole Battak *kampong* or settlement; in France it has lately been held to be a disqualification for membership in the *Institut*.

The penalizing of illegitimacy is another safeguard resorted to by the Elders. An illegitimate child is usually killed or neglected or socially disqualified, and the responsibility for such treatment rests with the older people. In the Elema district of New Guinea illegitimate boys are not eligible to the secret society of Kovave and so they never have any social standing.* There are orders in the Catholic Church for which illegitimacy disqualifies and Hester's daughter was not the only child made to suffer for her parentage by the Puritan Fathers and Mothers.

If the Elders were monogamists and had always married within their own age class all these precautions of theirs to protect their habits would seem superfluous. They would need in fact but one of their customary safeguards, the derision falling upon young men attentive to older women. As for the young women, they could be allowed the more or less secret promiscuity before marriage they now enjoy in certain tribes or they could be divided into two classes, the secluded and the prostitute. Incidentally we may note that prostitution is always an arrangement sanctioned by the Elders. "Young men will be young," they say. "Let them sow their wild oats-if only they do it out of sight and in a way not to disturb us." And so as one of the foremost safeguards of the home, i.e., the comfort of

the Elders, prostitution has been accepted or encouraged as "necessary"—until recently.

But the Elders are as a rule polygynists and out of their own age class they do marry, sometimes even when they are monogamists. In almost all societies old men take young wives, and often so many of them that there is none left for the young men—except elderly widows. In societies where brides sell high the young men cannot afford them or, where the expenses of a family are heavy, cannot afford to marry—a celibacy of poverty.

Marriage by purchase, an institution, like other institutions of property, undoubtedly proceeding from the Elders, gives them a great advantage over their juniors. As men of property they have the pick of the women and can afford the luxury of polygyny. It also gives parents control over the marriage of both daughters and sons. Daughters are viewed as assets, ensuring a bride price, a form of capital; sons are dependent on fathers for the wherewithal to mate.

Then when marriage is conceived of as a form of property holding, adultery is readily identified with theft, a conception inhibitory both to women and their "ravishers." The punishment for adultery is very often the same as for theft. In a part of New Guinea it is held that the First Ancestor decided that theft and adultery were identical.

The First Ancestor or the tribal god is frequently called upon by the Elders, in whose control lie magic and religion, to sanction marriage. He is commonly said to have instituted it and to be therefore averse to any violation of it. Rûwé of the Sawu Islands, for example, a deified lawmaker who laid down a rule of monogamy, punishes adultery with "accidental death." In Christianity marriage is also a divine ordinance. In Loango, West Africa, there is a special marriage fetish to punish wives for infidelity.

But a supernatural sanction is attached by the Elders to marriage without the intervention of a spirit. In many places suffering in childbirth or death awaits the unfaithful wife. Sometimes she spoils—practically—her husband's hunt. In Borneo she frustrates his camphor collecting. Among the Basutos it is customary at the birth of a child to rekindle the household fire. It has to be done by a youth, a youth chaste on pain of death. An unchaste youth does not dare light the fire. The occasion is said to have its advantages for anxious or inquisitive fathers.

Upon magic and religion too the Elders depend in enforcing upon the young many of their miscellaneous sex exactions. The Australian initiate among the Lower Murray tribes is told that the sight of a woman for three months after his teeth have been knocked out would bring numberless misfortunes upon him—withering up of limbs, loss of eyesight, general decrepitude. Among the Tshis of the Gold Coast one of the functions of the tutelary

^{*} In China foundlings are not eligible to academic degrees.

family god is to appoint a sassnür or subordinate guardian spirit to shadow girls before puberty. A Navajo once asked what would happen to him if he married a woman of his own clan, answered: "I would fall into the fire . . . the lightning would strike me, the cold would freeze me, or the gun would shoot me—something fearful would happen to me." The consequence of incest to an Aleut woman would be to give birth to a bearded, walrus-tusked monster.

Magic and religion are entering less and less into the conduct of life, less too with us than with many other peoples, and our Elders find them less dependable. This may be one of the reasons that gerontocracy, the government of the old, is passing in so many phases of our life. But over sex its hold is still fairly unshaken, still curiously unquestioned. When this domination of the old over the sex life of the young begins to weaken, one may look for new expressions for sex and new restraints, new kinds of fidelity and devotion—expressions unrestricted to conventions of time and place, irradiations for the whole life, restraints prompted by concern not for the habits of the aged but by love itself, fidelity not to the traditions of those done with love, but to the ideals of lovers, devotion not to the shibboleths set up by the Elders in the name of public example but devotion to the pleas of personality made free and fine by love.

Socialism and Psychology

By Louis C. Fraina

THE study of psychology is revolutionizing modern thought, transforming the relative importance of the various sciences. It is particularly pervasive in sociology, and is becoming indispensable for the adequate analysis of social problems.

Jacques Loeb, Franz Boas, Louis B. Boudin, Robert H. Lowie and W. E. B. Du Bois recently discussed race antagonism at a dinner of the Socialist Press Club. It was a comprehensive discussion biological, anthropological, economic and social. But I missed the psychologist's interpretation, and my dominant impression of the discussion was the vital necessity of a psychological analysis of race antagonism.

Biologically, races do not differ materially; race prejudice is an acquired tendency and not an inherited trait; anthropology offers no basis for the division of races into "superior" and "inferior"; racial differences are rooted in different stages of social development; and fundamentally race antagonisms are an ideological expression of economic antagonisms. The conclusion is obvious: since adverse social conditions produce race antagonism, change the social conditions. To change these conditions, however, is a matter of *men*; the process through which the social factor acts upon the human factor is psychological; and of pressing importance becomes the problem of the human reaction to the conditions that produce race antagonism and to race antagonism itself. In our efforts to change social conditions we must get the support of men imbued with the spirit of race prejudice; and this presents a psychological problem of great intricacy and importance.

The average Socialist's attitude toward the workers is very simple and very naive: the worker is a wage-slave; his commodity labor-power is bought and sold in the labor-market; exploited and oppressed, his emancipation lies through Socialism, in the class revolt against Capitalism. All of which is very sound, a magnificent formula; but still only a formula, in spite of its social validity. It is largely an expression of the historical imagination, and *alone* lacks the inspiration and driving power necessary to social action.

Socialist theory postulates that a certain stage of social development has produced a Proletariat in bondage to a Capitalist Class, and that proletarian revolt is historically potential. But the vital thing to us as men of action, as seers of a new vision of life, is to analyze and interpret the psychological reaction of the workers to their conditions of existence; the emotional temper produced by modern industry; the new type of mind, of men, of outlook upon life being developed by changing social conditions. These are the important things. They are necessary to our task of organizing the workers. They constitute the only medium through which we can articulate a new expression of life, a new and revolutionary culture.

The literature of Socialism abounds with phrases concerning "proletarian psychology" and "proletarian modes of thought." But these terms are simply convenient phrases with no concrete meaning. This literature deals thoroughly and magnificently with the material existence determining the consciousness of men; but scarcely an effort is being made to analyze that consciousness itself, particularly the changes wrought therein by the changing social existence.

The philosophic system of Marx recognizes the immense power of psychological factors in history. Marx stressed the importance of human effort and

the human factor. In his Poverty of Philosophy Marx scored Proudhon for not understanding that "social relations are as much produced by men as are the cloth, linen, etc. . . . The same men who establish social relations in conformity with their material productivity, produce also the principles, the ideals, the categories, conformably with their social relations." In the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte: "Man makes his own history." In one of his fragmentary notes on Feuerbach, Marx indicates the dynamic *role* of the individual in the revolution: "The materialistic doctrine that men are the products of conditions and education, different men, therefore, the products of other conditions and changed education, forgets that circumstances may be altered by men and that the educator has himself to be educated." The importance Marx attached to the human factor emphasizes itself in Capital. Capitalist production being the subject dealt with, Marx might be expected to under-estimate the human factor; on the contrary, some of Capital's most brilliant and deeply philosophical passages attest Marx's emphasis of this particular factor. Ι shall cite only one passage, a very pertinent one: "By thus acting on the external world and changing it he [man] at the same time changes his own nature. He develops his slumbering powers, and compels them to act in obedience to his sway." (Chapter VII, Section 1.) Man changes his own nature. Are not these changes in the nature of man as important as, perhaps more important than, the social conditions producing the changes? This is an aspect of sociology neglected by Socialists; and it is an aspect of dynamic value to the revolutionary movement.

In spite of Marx's appreciation of the importance of the individual, Socialist propaganda has developed a rigid determinism which minimizes and often totally suppresses the psychological factor. The doctrainaire Socialists act on the belief that the movement has to deal chiefly if not solely with social forces, the individual being of only slight importance. They assume that for all practical purposes it is sufficient to know that the social *milieu* conditions psychology. But that is not sufficient. While socially conditioned, *individual psychology and the psychology of the mass become an independent factor in the social process as a whole*, possessing laws and motives of their own: laws and motives which men dealing with human forces must comprehend if they desire success.

The great task of Marx was the analysis of the fundamental social forces which determine the consciousness of men. He developed the negative aspect of psychology. At a time when the science of psychology was the slave of biology, Marx's social concept marks a tremendous revolution. Strangely enough, the full significance of this revolution was never understood in the Socialist movement; and it is the bourgeois scientist who to-day is transforming psychology by means of the Marxian concept. These scientists are developing a *purposive* social psychology by an intensive analysis of the psychology of the individual. Dr. Felix Krueger, professor of philosophy and psychology at the University of Halle-Wittenberg, and a few years ago Kaiser Wilhelm professor at Columbia University, excellently summarized, in a lecture at the time, the spirit of the new psychology:

"The new psychologist knows that the psychological problem has its social and genetic side; it must be judged as a result of past conditions as well as by present characteristics; it cannot be valued by experiment alone. Emotion and thought are more conditioned by the social *milieu* and the past history than by sensation. The proper aim of psychology is not metaphysical but purely empirical, but its actual experimental discoveries must be complemented by historic and social investigation. Psychology lies, indeed, on the borderland of the natural and humanistic sciences—both. We cannot study a psychological phenomenon without delving into history and sociology."

The reversal of these propositions provides a statement of the concepts which should be emphasized in Socialist theory:

Socialism knows that the social problem has its human and psychological side; it must be judged as the result of emotion and thought as well as economic and social conditions; it cannot be solved by economics alone. The social *mileu* is conditioned psychologically as well as economically. The proper aim of Socialism is not metaphysical, but purely empirical, but its actual activity and volitional expression must be complemented by psychological investigation. We cannot study a social phenomenon without delving into the psychology of human reactions.

But this attitude would still largely remain a negative one. Socialists must not alone recognize the psychological aspects of their philosophy—all genuine Marxists have done that; we must use psychology positively, purposively; we must make a fundamental study of psychology, as fundamental as our study of economics.

The value of psychology is greater than the simple analysis of social problems. As social conditions are transformed, men are transformed; and the supreme utility of psychology lies in the analysis of transformations in the nature of man.

Out of this analysis emerges the potential culture of the new society in which the chief concern of man is man himself.

Culturally, Socialists are notoriously conservative. Their culture is generally the culture of the progressive bougeois, and often the decadent bourgeois. Our radicals seek their cultural inspiration in Pagan Greece and the Renaissance, striving to vitalize anew the ideals of a splendid past. But these ideals of Athens and the Renaissance must be transfused with a new meaning. This meaning can be interpreted and developed only through a psychological study of the new individual being produced by social transformations. The aspirations, the mental modes, the temperament of this new individual must largely determine the new education, the new ethics, the culture of the Social Revolution.

Economics has given us a vision of the new society; psychology will give us a vision of the new humanity.

The Gardner-Hillquit Debate BY ISAAC A. HOURWICH

THE accepted view among Socialists holds the Capitalist Class responsible for war: it is the fight of the capitalists of rival nations for markets, for colonies, for franchises, for fields of exploitation. In the United States, however, the agitation in favor of "preparedness against war" has brought it home to every open-minded observer that—in this country, at least—organized labor is as strong a factor making for militarism as the imperialistic section of the Capitalist Class.

This fact has been forcibly brought out by Congressman Gardner in his debate with Mr. Morris Hillquit on the subject of increased armaments, as appears from the report published in the Sunday *Call* of April 11. Congressman Gardner was evidently unaware of the support he could have drawn for his side of the argument from the paper edited by his former colleague, Hon. Victor L. Berger, which advocates the use of force to sustain the policy of Asiatic exclusion. Said Mr. Gardner:

"Ask any man from the Pacific Coast whether he will vote to arbitrate the question of Mongolian exclusion and risk a decree of an international court admitting into this country hordes of Chinese and Japanese. Just ask him, and see what he says. As to the philosophy of an international government based on the brotherhood of man, that may come in the sweet by and by when Californians have learned to intermarry with Chinese and Mississippians have begun to select Negresses for their brides. . . .

"Supposing that that international court were to decide that the Chinese and the Japanese ought to have equal rights with men of other nationalities to be admitted into this country—which, by the way, is by no means an unlikely decision for an international court to render—do you think that our workingmen would allow us to lie down and permit it? Supposing the international army and international navy were obliged to attack us in order to force the admission of those Chinese and Japanese, would the American division of the international army fight with the rest of the international army or against it? And if it mutinied, what would be the future of that international army?"

Mr. Hillquit's answer to this point is reproduced in full text below:

"But Mr. Gardner has reminded the American people of our Monroe Doctrine and our Asiatic Exclusion laws. He sees visions of attacks on both, and heroically maintains that he would not leave the decisions of such vital questions to the 'machinations of an international court.' I admit that an international court of justice or arbitration may be fallible. But what does my opponent offer by way of substitute as a more reliable instrument of social justice—the decision of weapons, the arbitrament of brute force? If that position is sound, let us speedily disband all courts of justice in the United States and reintroduce the methods of single combat and tribal feuds for the adjustment of our disputes."

It is apparent that Mr. Hillguit has evaded a clear answer to his opponent's question. He admits that an international court "may be fallible,"-he does not mention the substance of the decree wherein the international court might prove to be "fallible," but that has been stated by Congressman Gardner. The international court might "decide that the Chinese and the Japanese ought to have equal rights with men of other nationalities to be admitted into this country," says Mr. Gardner, and he admits that this "is by no means an unlikely decision for an international court to render." He has the candor to confess that he does not believe in "equal rights" and would treat such a decision as a scrap of paper, because "our workingmen" would not "allow us to lie down" and submit to it. If it ever came to that, he would be in favor of a mutiny of the American squad of the International Police Force. What is Mr. Hillquit's answer to that? Not a word.

He sermonizes against "the decision of weapons, the arbitrament of brute force," but the value of this talk has been appraised by his opponent in the following remarks:

"I venture to say that over half of this very audience has applauded frantically when told that Socialists would fight in no more wars, and that the Socialist members of the legislative bodies in Europe, led by their 110 Socialists in the Reichstag, as one man would vote down any war budget that any war lord might demand. What, oh what has Evolution sternly shook the pipe happened? So far as the workingmen of dreams. . . . Europe were concerned, they flew at each other's throats as if they enjoyed it. Every capital of Europe was thronged with gleeful citizens shouting the national anthem, and peace advocates, instead of being greeted with cheers, were greeted with jeers. As to the Socialist representatives of the parliaments of Europe, the 100 odd German Socialists remembered their promise to the Socialists of the world that as one man they would vote down the war budget. They kept their promise, that is exactly what they did, as one man they voted down the war budget. Just one man, and that one man was the Socialist deputy Dr. Liebknecht. It is true that fifteen of the German Socialists are said to have voted against the budget in the party caucus, and now we are told that about thirty of them did not vote at all on the last German war loan. Think of that, my friends. Think of caucuses and voteducking among these anti-warriors. What awful things you would say about us poor mudlark capitalist Congressmen if we were to be bound by party caucuses or were to duck a vote on a question of mighty importance."

It must be admitted that Congressman Gardner has had the better of the argument. He is consistent, whereas Mr. Hillquit is not. Bourgeois pacificism was predicated upon the economic postulate of freedom of international intercourse, *i.e.*, free trade and free migration. The pacificism of the labor International was deduced from the assumption of identity of interests ("solidarity") of the wageworkers of all countries. International capital could easily overcome the disturbing effects of protectionism, without resorting to war, merely by investing in the industries of high-tariff countries. But the working class of one nation cannot hold the position of an aristocracy of labor against the workers of the world, unless it is prepared to defend its hegemony by force of arms. If the Socialists of the United States favor the policy of Asiatic exclusion, they must join with The Milwaukee Leader in endorsing Congressman Hobson's views on the yellow peril. Congressman Gardner's argument for a strong army and a strong navy that could lick the world must accordingly be accepted as the realistic interpretation of the class interests of American labor.

Change in American Life and Fiction

By Floyd Dell

T is only about a dozen years or so since American writers discovered one of the most interesting things about America—the fact that it is changing, that an old social and industrial and moral life is giving place to a new. Before that they had mainly regarded America as a set of picturesque backgrounds in front of which might be placed a woman and two men and some supers, reciting lines in appropriate dialect, and acting out a carefully censored love-drama. They had not been deficient in observation, nor in ability to deal with the materials which they rather timidly selected from what they found. But they missed what has since come to seem to many writers the best "story" of all, the story of what was happening to America.

It was Robert Herrick, if I am not mistaken, who first discovered that story. In the *Memoirs of an American Citizen* he did more than tell what happened to a man in the way of love and marriage; he told what was happening to a great city, and to America, in the way of industry and politics and law. He told, among other things, of the Haymarket Anarchist Trial and the Pullman strike.

Ever since that time Mr. Herrick's novels have reflected changing America, vividly through the medium of his own temperament. And it is interesting to note what this change meant to him. It meant the upgrowth of a commercialism which left no room or time for art and very little for love; which forced all the energies into the same monotonous channel of predatory acquisition; and which encouraged and rewarded moral weakness. The dominant types of the epoch are to Mr. Herrick the man who has been too morally weak to keep from having a successful business career, and the woman who is too morally weak to keep from making a successful marriage. Against these he sets up in contrast the occasional "unsuccessful" idealist. and the rare woman who will not ruin a man's whole plans of honest life and work in the interests of a successful marriage. He admires the man who will starve rather than play the game of success; and he hates the woman who persuades him to play it for the sake of herself or her children. He cherishes a dream of a future in which such idealists will survive and flourish; but he chronicles with grim truthfulness a present in which they are corrupted or crushed.

It is not a cheerful picture of what is happening in America. It is bound to be discouraging when the revolt against the dominant commercialism is seen only as the action of a few isolated individuals —as in an urban middle class view such revolt must always seem.

It was Frank Norris who first among our novelists grasped the significance of mass revolt. In *The Octopus* he showed a whole community of California farmers fighting side by side against the power of a railroad—in the courts, in the legislature, and in their own fields with guns in their hands. He shows their defeat, it is true; but one feels that it is only a temporary defeat. The dead body of Annixter is a symbol of the tragic quality of the revolt, but not a sign of its hopelessness.

When Frank Norris had turned unaccountably into the cheap and tawdry romanticist of The Pit, it was a discouraging period for those who had hoped for the story of working-class revolt which Norris had seemed so wonderfully equipped to tell. gifted as he was with so rich an appreciation of American character. The appearance of *The Jungle*. by Upton Sinclair, was particularly welcome then as an indication that it would not be left untold. That book did deal magnificently with the condition of working-class misery which creates revolt, but it failed to give any very convincing account of the psychology or incidents of the revolt itself. A writer with experience and understanding of this psychology and these incidents has been found in Ernest Poole, whose novel, The Harbor, has just been published by the Macmillan Company (\$1.50 net).

The Harbor, which not only undertakes this task, but also to present a full-bodied picture of American life, falls short in representative incident of the mark set by Norris, and in flavor is less pungent than the early chapters of that very unequal book, *Comrade Yetta*, by Albert Edwards. It is less intimate as well as less intense in its psychology than *The Jungle*. But it carries on with fine intention and notable achievement the high task of presenting the American Revolt in fiction.*

These books, if one leaves out Jack London's brilliant imaginative picture of the great revolution of the future, in *The Iron Heel*, exhaust the list of distinctive novels dealing with the industrial aspect of the revolt. But there are other aspects, hardly less important in fact and even more interesting, perhaps, in fiction, which have not been overlooked.

These aspects of revolt center about the changing position of woman. There is, to begin with, the change which Mr. Herrick has thrown up in high relief in his novels: the change of status from a pioneer helpmeet to an ornamental proof of her husband's success. This condition, which has given its specific tone to the whole social life of the American middle class and aristocracy, has been frequently satirized, crudely by Joseph Medill Patterson in A Little Brother of the Rich, with feeble sensationalism by Upton Sinclair in The Metropolis. savagely by David Graham Phillips in a dozen books, and most delicately and sympathetically by a writer who was scarcely conscious of its real social significance, Mrs. Edith Wharton. A combination of sympathy with considerable "social" understanding is found in such books as the Idle Wives of James Oppenheim.

Along with this process has come one much more important-the break-up of the home, under industrial pressure, in lower-middle-class and proletarian life. Women, in the formative period of youth, have been called upon to take a new place in the world. They have been subjected to a new strain and given a new freedom. A wholly inadequate account of the results of this release was given by Albert Edwards in Comrade Yetta. But as a matter of fact the change cannot be described as taking place along class lines. The effects of freedom for women in the upper and lower strata are pretty inextricably mixed. All that we can say is that there emerges from the welter of work, play, women's clubs, suffrage propaganda, strikes, radical theory and adventurous experiment in living. a more keen-minded and courageous woman. Her presence in Albert Edwards A Man's World makes that the significantly modern book it is. Mr. Poole does rather less than justice to her in The Harbor. But glimpses and adumbrations of her, even in the distortion of caricature, are the special mark of contemporary fiction. Without especially intending to, our literature has reflected the emergence of a new type.

And with her appearance the marriage-and-prostitution system which she inevitably challenges has been called into question. For she is so obviously human and so obviously free and so obviously daring that it is impossible to make in regard to her the conventional assumptions which have been made, piously or timidly or hypocritically, by our American writers in the past, in the matter of her sexual life. It is impossible, that is to say, to regard her as conventionally "good" or conventionally "bad." And since the whole system of marriage-and-prostitution has been built up on the artificial distinction between "good" and "bad" women, this system has come up for critical examination in American fiction.

It cannot be said that it has been very successfully handled. Reginald Wright Kauffman and Upton Sinclair are the chief exponents of this critical attitude. Mr. Kauffman wrote, in a book with the jarringly journalistic title, Why Girls Go Wrong, a series of delicate and acute and extraordinarily just studies in social and sexual psychol-But his book about prostitution, The House ogy. of Bondage, was muddled by the intention to do good in a hurry, and distorted by the sensationalism which such an intention always seems to involve. And Mr. Sinclair has been so propagandistically unreal in everything he has written about marriage and prostitution, that it is with a surprise amounting almost to incredulity that one comes upon a faithful, humorous, and illuminating study of actual life in his new book, Sylvia's Marriage, (John C. Winston Co., \$1.50). Here he gives a picture of the helpless bewilderment of an old Southern com-

^{*}What may be called the philosophy of this revolt has been presented in a remarkable book, *The Chasm*, by George Cram Cook. Here the contending ideals of democracy and of Nietzschean aristocracy are given vivid and illuminating expression. This is the first appearance in America of the "novel of ideas," a literary form which is best known from the translations of the works of Anatole France.

munity when one of its daughters, after a most disastrous experience in marriage, sets about preventing, by the exercise of an appalling candor, the other young girls of the community from sharing her own fate. It is true, and it is funny, as such an incident, in spite of its tragic aspects, would be. But neither Mr. Sinclair nor Mr. Kauffman seem to be able to escape for long the trammels of propaganda. In the excitement of these missionary activities, there is little opportunity for the production of serious fiction.

Aside, however, from these changes in American life which are being reflected more or less clearly in fiction, there is a change in fiction itself. The author of Jennie Gerhardt, and The Financier, could hardly be adduced as one who consciously portrayed new types. It is part of his philosophy and his method of treatment to regard his Financier and his Jennie as manifestations of the same old lifeforces that have always existed since the beginning of the world. He is not conscious, and he does not make the reader conscious, of anything coming to be in America. But he tells his stories with so complete an indifference to the old-fashioned fictional traditions of what the hero or heroine of a novel should not be allowed to do, and of what moral indignation should be visited upon them if they insist on doing it, that the effect is as if he were portraying new types. They are as old as the

hills, he would say: the man who sets himself egregiously above the laws, and the woman who is too much the creature of feeling to be conscious that laws exist. That is true. But, in itself, the determination to find out what people are like and put them truly into fiction is a new thing in American life-a significant example of the change which Mr. Dreiser declines to see. It is, moreover, in part due to these other changes. The opportunity to tell the truth about the Financier is largely owing to the revolt against commercialism which has uncovered its nakedness in the newspapers. And the opportunity to tell the truth about Jennie is largely owing to the desire to be understood which women in their rebellion have developed to a point where they can without shame let it be known what the truth about them is. The social milieu of this changing period makes it easier to write such books.

This brings us to a statement of what is perhaps the most important, though it is the most intangible change of all. We know that economic changes have created a new opportunity for self-expression; but we know also that the desire for self-expression, the power of self-expression, has increased far beyond these bounds, and chafes against them. It is perhaps due to the influence of historically pagan or non-Protestant races permeating and disintegrating our basic Puritanism. In any case, it is a change to be glad of, in life and in literature.

American Progressivism

H ERBERT CROLY'S Promise of American Life was one of the very first books in which the leading principles of the new progressive movement were at all adequately formulated. It was correspondingly influential, and Roosevelt, as is well known, has given it a most extraordinary appreciation. Mr. Croly's position gains an added importance from the fact that he is now editor-in-chief of The New Republic.

In his new book¹, Croly has not succeeded in presenting the economic basis of the progressive movement; indeed, he has purposely refrained from doing so, but he has succeeded admirably in presenting its present mentality, in showing how the intelligent progressive wishes the public to understand his movement.

In certain chapters of this new book, especially those entitled "The New Economic Nationalism" and "Industrial Democracy," Croly has given a very condensed statement of "progressivism." He first formulates the position of the Republicans and Democrats:

¹Progressive Democracy. By Herbert Croly. New York, The Macmillan Co., \$1.50 net.

By William English Walling

"The Republicans believed that they could stimulate the exercise of all these privileges to an approximately equal extent. The Insurgents and the Democrats rightly object that the accepted policy of stimulation has been operating much more favorably for some classes than for others. The latter propose, consequently, to get rid of this favoritism, but the equality of right which they wish to restore is an equality which can only operate in favor of the small economic producer and the small property owner. They assume, just as much as the Republicans, that no necessary privilege attaches to property as property." (Page 109.)

The argument against the Democratic position, while familiar to all economists, is not as well known to the general public and is not as frequently considered as it should be. Croly outlines it as follows:

"The owners of highly organized industries are usually supposed to be the greatest beneficiaries of the economic changes of the last ten years; but in truth the descendants of the pioneer democracy, just in so far as they remained property-owners, have benefited in much the same way. The value of agricultural land actually doubled from 1900 to 1910; and the increase, so far from being due to more efficient methods of cultivation, was fundamentally speculative." (Page 110.)

"Thus the policy of the territorial democracy in attempting to destroy the privileges enjoyed by organized capital cannot fairly be described as one which seeks to abolish all privilege. Rather is it an attempt to do away with one particular kind of favoritism in order that another particular kind of favoritism, which operates in the interest of a larger class, may be released from inconvenient encumbrances. The attempt to accomplish this result may or may not be justifiable; but certainly it cannot be justified by the rule of equal rights for all and special privileges for none." (Pages 111-112.)

The basis upon which progressivism rests, as Croly says, is private property:

"Democrats, who are firm believers in private property and yet who insist upon the rule of special privileges for none, are the victims of a flagrant selfcontradiction. The Republican rule of special privileges for all is less contradictory and promises much more useful results; but in so far as it implies that privilege can be distributed equally as well as generally, it rests on a baleful illusion. The recognition of a necessary inequality and injustice in the operation of the existing institution of private property, coupled with the recognition that the *immediate abolition* of private property would be both unjust and impracticable, constitutes the foundation of any really national and progressive economic policy." (Pages 112-113.)

I have placed the words "immediate abolition" in italics, for it at once suggests a valuable basis of comparison. Immediate abolition of private property is, of course, far more impracticable to-day than was immmediate abolition of slavery before the Civil War, but neither is it widely advocated, certainly not among intelligent people. The question is whether we are working towards the "ultimate extinction" of private property as Lincoln was working towards the ultimate extinction of slavery, and if the answer is in the affirmative then we must ask ourselves the practical question whether the progress in this direction is satisfactory; that is, whether it is as fast as practicable. Moreover, it is not a question of the absolute abolition of private property at all, even with Socialists, but of taking away from private property its present predominant role in society.

Croly performs a public service of incalculable value when he abandons the hypocritical claim of Taft, Wilson, Roosevelt, et al., that they expect to abolish privilege and establish equal opportunity. He frankly confesses that privileges "are an essential part of any system of private property," and therefore of progressivism.

In dealing with the working class Croly adopts an attitude of frankness almost identical with that of the German State Socialists, like Schmoller:

"The truth is that the wage-system in its existing form creates a class of essential economic dependents." (Page 382.)

"Ordinary progressive special legislation is intended to improve the operation of the system without touching its essential defect. But if plans of social insurance and minimum-wage boards have any tendency to undermine the independence of the wage-earner, that tendency results from the system itself, not from the attempts to improve it. The social legislative programme cannot give real independence to people whose relation to their employers is one of dependence." (Page 383.)

Croly denies that there is "a substantial coincidence between the propertyacquiring interest and the public interest." Against this assumption Croly savs:

"The aim of the whole programme of modern social legislation is at bottom the creation of new system of special privilege intended for the benefit of a wage-earning rather than a property-owning class." (Page 119.)

Croly does not feel that privileges can be made *even approximately* equal, but that a central point of progressivism is to favor the working-class and to change the distribution of privileges in its favor.

His remedy for privilege is not a radical redistribution, but an appeal to the old aristocratic idea of attaching duties to rights. Croly says:

"If privilege is conceived from a functional point of view, rather as an opportunity of achievement than as a right of possession, it assumes a different significance. Attention is then fastened upon the human performance rather than the material result. A large amount of inequality and essential injustice has to be accepted for an indefinitely prolonged future in the distribution of material opportunity; but in the meantime privileges can be gradually socialized in the manner of their exercise." (Pages 114-115.)

Croly desires to see a measure of democracy introduced in industry, but does not demand this democracy as a means of securing a more equal distribution of income or privilege. His chief motive, apparently, is the fear that after all he cannot rely altogether on the privileged classes to bring about the changes he desires, no matter how much the government may try to force duty or efficiency upon them. And this is why he feels compelled to go to the length of approving a "fertilized" classstruggle. He even goes so far at one point to accept, as a valuable stimulus to the ruling class, the possibility of revolution.

Croly goes further than many sympathetic students of syndicalism, who feel that there is no possibility of the revolution with which he threatens the privileged class, since they know the extension of that system of privilege Croly approves has already reached the upper levels of the working class and separated them from the rest. As an advocate of the extension of privilege, how did Croly fail to see this very important fact, which fits in so well with his system? No doubt partly because he felt the weakness of that system and the need of having it tempered with an effective social democracy. The difficulty is that, having based his system on privilege, he gives us no adequate grounds for expecting the development from it of social or industrial democracy. As soon as Croly proceeds to

formulate fundamental principles he is held back by his general philosophy. For example, he understands that all individualistic reformers of the 19th century relied upon what they believed to be "the wholesome action of automatic economic forces," but his lack of a grasp on economic history and economic conditions leads him to the assertion that they were usually merely tariff reformers and did not go beyond that. He naturally overlooks the fact that the individualists were above all internationalists, a position the importance of which can be fully appreciated at the present moment, and that the further development of internationalism depends largely upon the unrestricted action of these automatic economic forces.

But Croly assumes the nationalist position on other grounds independently of his collectivism. As an avowed opportunist he showed, in his *Promise* of *American Life*, that he felt that the political success of progressivism and social reform could be assured only by entering into partnership with nationalism. Moreover in the same volume he defends nationalism on this double ground; that it forces the nation to become efficient in order to compete effectually with other nations, and that it forces the classes inside of the nation into a certain solidarity.

Croly appreciates that collectivism on a national scale, social reform on a national scale and democracy limited to the more advanced nations or races, would all lead in the direction of imperialism and nationalism, just as he realizes the most successful nation would necessarily be forced into a very large measure of collectivism, social reform, and political democracy.

Here in reality is a very new and momentous thought. For it has long been assumed in America that anything which led in the direction of nationalism and militarism was necessarily purely reactionary. Now we find, on the contrary, that internationalism has its chief stronghold among certain capitalistic elements, while nationalism and imperialism are advocated on the solid ground of immediate economic interests by nearly all the representatives of the masses of the people of the leading nations, including the majority of "Socialists."

The only reason why Croly does not develop this tremendously important point with still more emphasis is that he almost takes it for granted; in fact, it is probably the basic practical assumption in his work.

Up to the present it has scarcely occurred to American economists and sociologists that we can have a "national" science of political economy. The idea is an old one in Germany, and may be popularized in America by this war.

A Socialist Digest

The Conference of the Allied Socialists

THE Socialists of the Allied Powers held an important conference in London in February. The Socialists of Belgium and Great Britain were fully represented, also the Labor Party of Great Britain and the Confederation of Labor Unions of France. Vandervelde and Lafontaine represented the Socialist Party and labor unions of Belgium. From Russia only the Social-Revolutionary party was represented. The larger Socialist organization, the Social Democrats, refused to participate in the conference because the Socialists of Germany and Austria were not invited. Among the English delegates were former opponents of the war such as MacDonald and Anderson and Bruce Glasier. Keir Hardie even presided over the conference. Among the French representatives were all the best-known leaders except Guesde, who was retained in France because of his health and duties as minister. At a special meeting of the French Party to instruct its delegates, Guesde made a brief declaration:

"There could be no talk of peace until German imperialism was crushed. Ears must be stopped to all mutterings of exhaustion. At the London conference it must be declared—and this had not been frequently enough stated—that the fight was not against the German people, but against German imperialism. A new Europe must be created where there was room for the struggle of classes only, but not for the struggle of races. Such a victory of the French would be a victory of Socialism."

At the sessions of the Conference, Vaillant of France declared:

"France was forced into the struggle and will not draw back until Prussian militarism has received its death-blow. We have the following message for the German people: that we are fighting for your emancipation as well as for our own national freedom."

Vandervelde made an appeal to the Socialists of the whole world to use their power for the overthrow of German militarism which had laid waste little Belgium. He said that he felt no animosity whatever against the German or Austrian people, but as long as they were not masters over the militarism of their rulers, there was no way to annihilate this militarism except war.

The conference passed the following resolution: "First, it declared that the

war was a result of the policy of colonial conquests and aggressive imperialism of all the nations engaged, and that all the nations shared the responsibility for this policy. The invasion of Belgium and France by the German armies threatened the independence of all nations and shattered all confidence in international treaties. Under these conditions a victory of German imperialism would mean the defeat and annihilation of democracy and freedom in Europe. The Socialists of the Allied countries are not fighting for the political or economic subjection of Germany. They are not fighting against the people of Germany or Austria, but only against the governments of these countries which oppress their peoples, while they demand that Belgium should be freed and indemnified. They desire that the Polish question should be settled in accord with the wishes of the people of Poland, either by autonomy or by complete independence within another nation. They desire that in all Europe from Alsace-Lorraine to the Balkans, all nations which have been forcefully annexed should be given back the right of disposing of their own freedom.

"While the Socialists are firmly decided to struggle until victory is won in order to accomplish this emancipation, they are not less firmly decided to take a stand against every effort to turn this war of defense into a war of conquest, which would only prepare new conflicts, create new grievances, and deliver the peoples to a doubled burden of armaments and war.

"The victory of the allied powers must be a victory of the people's rights, of the unity, independence, and autonomy of the nations in a peaceful federation of the united states of Europe and the world."

This was the chief resolution. Another declared against secret diplomacy, the private manufacture of arms, and demanded a compulsory international arbitration court. A third resolution protested against the arrest of Socialist members of the Duma and the persecution of Finns, Jews, Poles in Russia, and of the German Poles in Germany. These resolutions were all passed unanimously.

Vorwaerts called attention to the fact that the last-named resolution, together with the demand that the people of Alsace-Lorraine should have the right to decide as to their own future, was received with a storm of protest and abuse from the French press. At the same time *Vorwaerts* criticised editorially the main decision of the conference, mainly, that the victory of the Allies was necessary in order to free the German people. *Vorwaerts* said:

"A defeat of German militarism in war can only take place by a defeat of the German armies, the masses of which consist of German workingmen. And the German workingmen can no more desire a defeat than the French or English."

Vorwaerts went on to point out, in cautious language, that the German Social-Democracy had never justified the invasion of Belgium. It refers to this question purposely in general terms as the "neutrality question."

A Widening Split in Germany?

HE tendency to a split in the German party has already led to a complete division in Wurtemburg. The party in Stuttgart, it will be remembered, endorsed the stand of its own local leaders, Westmeyer and Crispien, and also that of Liebknecht by a vote of more than two to one. The National Executive of the state of Wurtemburg is elected by an unequal system of representation, which gives the Socialists of the country several times as much power as those of the cities. This Executive has now met and expelled its opponents in Stuttgart. The latter organization, however, shows no tendency whatever to pay any attention to its expulsion, so the split is complete.

The trouble in Wurtemburg, as all over the country, centers upon the policy of the party press. The Socialists of Greater Berlin in control of Vorwaerts, have defied the Executive Committee of the party, which asked Vorwaerts to comply to the criticisms of the labor unions. A similar quarrel has now arisen in Frankfort, which with its suburbs is undoubtedly the largest city in Germany, after Berlin and Hamburg. In Hamburg, also, a very sharp quarrel has arisen over the nationalistic attitude of the Socialist paper, and twofifths of the Socialists have shown themselves in favor of the complaints made.

The Frankfort paper is a strong supporter of Scheidemann, of the labor unions, and of the Party Executive. At a recent meeting in the City of Frankfort over a third of the delegates took a stand against the present attitude of the paper, the Frankfort Volkstimme. They were supported by a majority of the Socialists of four Reichstag districts of the suburbs of Frankfort. It remains an open question whether the wish of the majority of Greater Frankfort, which like the majority of Greater Berlin, is radical, will be carried out or not. The majority of Frankfort proper decided at a recent meeting to ignore the decision of the Greater Frankfort Socialists to appoint a second editor in addition to the present one.

It would seem then that a split in Frankfort, precisely like that in Stuttgart, may be expected in the near future, and the process may be extended to Hamburg, Berlin and other leading cities of Germany. The bitterness is growing from day to day as is evidenced by all the Socialist newspapers that reach us from Germany. The resignation of Ledebour from the Executive Committee shows that the tendency to split exists even in the highest organs of the Party.

Evidences of the impending split come not only from Germany, but from some of those best fitted to judge German Socialist conditions. Van Kol, one of the two Socialist senators of Holland, is in close touch with German conditions and has been in thoroughly friendly relations with the German Party. In an interview with the correspondent of the New York Volkszeitung, published on April 15th, he says:

"The peace movement, that is the anti-war movement, is growing rapidly in Germany. Developments after the war will do the rest. As soon as wages begin to fall, and labor conditions begin to deteriorate frightfully, and suffering becomes general, then the change will come — and unfortunately — the split. Unfortunately, because it is a shame that the proud building of the Social Democracy should fall; but the split is inevitable, since the differences in the points of view of the two groups is profound and irreconcilable."

It is evident from Van Kol's interview that he expects Germany's defeat, since he says that France will not demand more than Alsace-Lorraine. He denies absolutely, however, that he or the Dutch party is pro-Allies and assails the Dutch Socialist leader Van Vliegen for taking a pro-Allies stand. He evidently expects the German minority to be very much strengthened by coming German defeats and this is the ground why he thinks a split is inevitable. He clearly does not believe that the Nationalistic faction will relinquish its present control of the Party no matter how strong the minority may become.

The Division in the German Party on the Third War Loan

O^N March 10th, at the time of the discussion of the third war loan, Haase made another speech in behalf of the Group. He made a reference to the Socialist desire for peace. The rest of his speech was given up to two questions: the demand for more extended and efficient governmental control over the food supplies during the war, and the demand for full and equal civil and political rights both during the war and afterwards. We reproduce first his principal statements with regard to the latter question.

It will be noted that Haase claims that the Socialists support the war purely through the one motive of self-Yet in his references to defense. peace, he says that Germany has already proven that its independence is not in danger of destruction in this war. Haase says, in behalf of the Socialists, that they did not support the war with the idea of winning greater civil and political rights at home by this means. But it will be noted that he claims that the government, in order to get the best support of the people, must grant these rights and also that he makes much of the fact that the large sacrifices made by the people will lead them to insist on having these rights and that they will conquer them. The question that will come into the reader's mind is whether the Socialist leaders were not fully aware of these two considerations before they voted for the government in August, December, and March. If so, and if this enlargement of civil and political rights is the chief immediate object of the Socialists of all factions, is it possible that this consideration could fail to have been one of their motives for supporting the government? The reader must judge for himself. from Haase's speech and the surrounding circumstances. The parts in question are as follows:

"The thought which guided the Social-Democratic Group at the outbreak of the war was: It is our duty to do everything to protect our own country. The Social-Democratic Group never thought of demanding any compensation for its votes of August 4th and December 2nd. To it the representation of the people is not a commercial affair. But we cannot justify the government in bringing before the Reichstag in the eighth month of a worldshattering war merely the Budget. The people have made an unheard-of sacrifice and are still making it hour by hour, facing death on the field of battle. With almost superhuman strength they are performing their hard duty, without distinction and in the same way. So the government cannot much longer avoid the task of seeing to it that equal civil rights correspond to equal duties. It is intolerable that all citizens do not yet have the same rights without distinction of class, party, religion, or nationality.

"The organizations of the working people have produced fully twenty army corps from their members. At war and at home, as the government has recognized, they have done great things. And now should a Reichstag session pass by without the repeal of the exceptional clauses of the organization laws which are directed against these workers? We demand equal rights in everything, not as a price for the great sacrifice we have made, but as a fulfillment of a demand which has long been imperative. It has been ceaselessly said that we must take care that the state of mind of our brothers in the field, who are performing wonders in bearing suffering and misery, shall not be depressed. But he who desires this must first of all see to it that when our brothers come home they shall not remain a single day in the empire, state, or town, as second-class citizens. Nothing can wound the masses of our people more severely than the consciousness that they who, as a result of the war, have suffered a loss in their earning capacity on account of their lessened income, will be stamped as citizens of a lower grade.

"For a suffrage based upon classes there is no longer any place in Germany. If the government delays or refuses to act, our brothers coming home from the field of war together with those that have remained at home, will stormily demand their rights. We must have no illusions as to this: that the struggle for popular rights and the democratization of the institutions of our government will be carried on more energetically than ever, when the blood and health of hundreds of thousands will have been given for the protection of our country."

When the vote on the third war loan was taken, the vote of the Socialist Party was cast by Scheidemann in favor of the loan. However, thirty members of the party absented themselves from the session instead of the fifteen as formerly, and not only Liebknecht but also Ruehle voted against it. Scheidemann made the following statement:---

"The reasons which determined our action in voting for the war loans on the fourth of August and the second of December, continue in undiminished strength. Because of the marvelous performances of our troops and of their leaders we have the utmost confidence that we shall succeed in reaching an honorable and lasting peace. To strengthen our determination to reach this goal in inseparable unity with our people, we shall give our consent to the present budget."

—including Bernstein, Haase, and other well known leaders—who refused to vote for this war loan, and the two who voted against it, did not agree that the same reasons existed for granting the loans as on the fourth of August and the second of December. This is true of the seventeen new members who on this occasion joined the previous minorities of fifteen who abstained from the vote on August 4th and December 2d.

Certainly the thirty party members

The Old International and the New

► HE above is the title of a very important pamphlet published by Heinrich Laufenberg and Fritz Wolffheim. Laufenberg, a brilliant young historian, ran against the official Socialist party candidate for the Socialist nomination to fill the Reichstag vacancy created since the war by the death of the sitting member in Hamburg. Although an outspoken partisan of Liebknecht, Laufenberg secured about two-fifths of the vote cast. This not only shows his title to speak for a large number of German Socialists, but also indicates the division of the party in Hamburg. We shall quote quite a few paragraphs from the pamphlet as translated especially for the NEW REVIEW by William E. Bohn.

"A strong organization for the purpose of bringing about unified action of the proletarians of all lands it [the old International] was not, and could not be, as long as capitalism was essentially national in nature, devoted to the development of domestic production.

"Under these circumstances the workers of each separate nation were forced to manage their affairs as advantageously as possible within their national boundaries. Problems of internal policy occupied the foreground of their interest. The conquest of liberal electoral systems, the securing of the right of organization, the passage of measures calculated to increase the physical welfare of the workers-these were the chief objects of their struggles. Their parties went through the stages which tend to mark the development of all human institutions. At first, when they were small, they laid chief stress on the social revolution, on the inauguration of the Socialist commonwealth; in the course of time, as they gained influence, as they came to realize that capitalism could not be immediately abolished, they changed their point of view. A proletarian party which can force reforms within the frame-work of the existing order must exert its strength to this end. A party which can increase its influence on the government must do so. In proportion as the working class organizations gained in power they gained also in the influence which they exerted on the life of the nations. They included within their ranks a constantly increasing part of the nation. At the same time capitalism was developing. As it developed there appeared divisions in its ranks. The small capitalists, as they saw more and more that they were being worsted in their struggle with their more powerful competitors, saw themselves forced to unite with the proletariat on many questions. This situation paved the way, not only for changes in Socialist tactics, but also for modifications of Socialist theory. England produced the Fabian society; France developed ministerialism; the United States exhibited a lack of unity in its Socialist parties; and Germany gave us Revisionism.

"Socialism grew into the state, not into the Socialist state of the future, but into the capitalist state of the present. It became a part of this state. It strengthened its own position, but in doing so it strengthened also the state of which it formed a part. It aided the capitalist governments in so developing their powers that they could finally extend their activities beyond their own boundaries. Indirectly, then, Socialism aided in creating the very forces which have brought on the present war. Social Democracy ceased to be an organization of those without a country and became a party of valued citizens whose constructive co-operation was useful to the government and is now especially essential at a time when this government could hardly achieve its purpose without the help of the Socialists.

"The expectation of peaceful, gradual conquest of political power lost its foundation when capitalism developed into its latest form. With the advent of imperialism there came a change in the function of the government of the individual capitalist country. When imperialism stressed the relations of governments to one another the logical thing for the workers to do was to give chief attention to their international organization.

"In the world of capitalist development individual governments no longer faced each other as representatives of various industrial interests. Political organization had taken the form of great alliances. It was absolutely necessary that the working class should make a corresponding change. A strong international organization of the proletariat had become the crying need of the hour. International tactics on the part of the workers were dictated by the imperialistic form of organization on the part of the capitalists.

"But before the various Socialist parties thoroughly understood the situation, before they had adapted their tactics to the new situation, the war broke out—just on the eve of the international congress which might have taken the first steps with regard to this important problem.

"Under these circumstances what followed was inevitable. The international broke down, the proletarians of the various countries are standing face to face in battle array, and each of the parties is attempting to place the responsibility on the shoulders of Socialists in other countries. Certain irresponsible poseurs wrapped in the mantle of chauvinistic nationalism, increase the chasm which yawns between the proletarians of the warring nations. How irrational is this behavior! When will the workers, and especially their so-called leaders, learn to look historical facts in the face? When will they come to understand that it is not the business of serious statesmanship to toy with history without making any real use of historical knowledge?

"The international is not dead any more than the proletariat is dead. Socialism is alive just as much as imperialism is alive. And after the war, no matter how it terminates, the more imperialism develops its natural tendencies the more Socialism will develop in opposition to it."

A Japanese Monroe Doctrine

THERE is a general feeling that momentous changes are developing in the Far East. The Japanese demands upon China have created a storm of protest in the United States; although Japan's action is fundamentally an Asiatic application of the Monroe Doctrine.

Morgan W. Shuster, who from experience in Persia, knows the chicanery of International High Finance, hails Japan's move as the precursor of an Asiatic Monroe Doctrine. In developing this theme the London New Statesman summarizes Japan's demands:

"(1) In Southern Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia, Japan to have the exclusive right (as against any third Power) of building railways, of ap-

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pointing "advisers" (military, political, or financial) to the Chinese Government, and of negotiating loans on the J security of the taxes, together with practically exclusive mining rights. (2) In Shantung, Japan to be granted all the special rights previously enjoyed by Germany with certain additions. (3) In the Yangtse basin, Japan to have (jointly with the Chinese Government) absolutely exclusive mining rights and to be allowed to construct and control the main trunk railway lines from the center of China (i.e., Hankow) to the coast and to the south. (4) In Fukien, Japan to have exclusive rights to build railways, work mines, and construct harbors. (5) China to purchase at least 50 per cent. of her munitions of war from Japan. (6) The

Chinese Government to employ Japanese advisers, and the police in certain places to be administered jointly by China and Japan; and (7) No ports or islands off the coast of China to be leased to any third Power, Japan, however, retaining the right to demand such leases for herself."

The New Statesman epitomizes the situation in a sentence: "Japan has never made any secret of her desire to exert a paramount influence in China in so far as foreign influence is admitted at all":

"Japan, following European precedents, regards China as her natural 'sphere of influence,' and intends not only to consolidate her own position but definitely to prevent any further expansion of European interests in that country. She will not, because she cannot, exclude European capital, but as far as possible she will prevent the importation of such capital being used as a means of acquiring political influence. Just as no European Power can deal with Mexico or the South American republics without consulting the United States, so in the future no European Power will be able to deal with China without consulting Japan. The 'partition' of China will thus be permanently averted by the simple expedient of a virtual Japanese protectorate. The independence of the Chinese Empire as such will be curtailed, but the independence of the Yellow Races in relation to the rest of the world will be enhanced. That, as far as we are able to judge, is the long and short of the present Japanese demands; and much as we may regret developments which appear to exclude the hope that China might become a strong and independent State we are bound to admit that the manifest weakness of the new Chinese Government seemed to make some extension of foreign influence inevitable."

Premature Peace?

S OCIALISTS are divided on the question as to whether peace can at any time be premature. The resolution passed unanimously by the Socialists of Great Britain and France, quoted elsewhere in this number, shows that they think the time for peace has not yet arrived. On the other hand, Scheidemann, leader of those German Socialists who have supported the war, is reported to have said in the Reichstag on March 20th:

"Now when we are strong and victorious is the time to tell the country through the press that we favor peace on a reasonable basis."

In America Eugene Debs and Charles Edward Russell believe peace can be premature. Debs wrote in *The Ameri*can Socialist (January 9th):

"To end the war prematurely, if that were possible, would mean another and perhaps a bloodier catastrophe."

In a recent number of the New Review Russell expressed himself as follows:

"If you make peace while the principle that absolutism is right, proper, and enduring, has the potent endorsement of success in arms, you nail it upon the world forever."

The April number of *Pearson's Mag*azine thus elaborates the same thought: "The stern cold fact is that peace now would be a greater calamity than the war itself.

"Peace now would be nothing but seven years of armed truce in which all the nations of earth would assiduously prepare for another struggle still more gigantic and still more awful.

"Peace now would set back for a century the cause of democracy in Europe; it would abolish the three republics now existing there; it would definitely establish absolutism and militarism in their most detestable forms; it would deal to the principle of arbitration among nations a deadly blow, destroy all validity of and all faith in treaties and international agreements, establish authoritatively the principle that small nations have no rights that larger nations are bound to respect, and apotheosize armies, armaments, brute strength and a readiness to trample upon other people, as the only factors in national success.

"Being entered upon this sickening thing there is no hope for civilization or progress except in going through to the end, whatever the cost may be. This sounds terrible, but it is not onemillionth part so terrrible as the other thing would be."

Germany is giving slight indications of peace. In obedience to the Clausewitz policy, Germany is waging "limited" war; she has achieved all the triumphs

possible, and her General Staff would willingly make peace now. The Allies, on the contrary, are waging "absolute" war; they don't want peace until Germany is thoroughly beaten.

The New York *Evening Sun* editorially discussing peace prospects, said recently:

"Rightly or wrongly, the rest of the world has set itself to wondering whether the Kaiser has become an active seeker of a termination to the war. The French have probably suffered as severely as any member of the Triple Entente: what Premier Viviani said the other day at Gueret was undoubtedly meant to express the views of France on an inconclusive peace such as might be based on the results of the war to the present date. If France wholly declines to consider such a peace at this time, Russia and Britain are unlikely to favor the idea. Even if one side then is ready to end the war, the other is not; and it takes one party to start war but two to end it.

"Opposition to the idea of ending the fighting is legitimate if based on valid reasons. The fear of an ineffectual peace is actually greater among the Allies, it would seem, than that of a war prolonged to the state of exhaustion. An ineffectual peace has too often meant the renewal of war on a greater and far more destructive scale. The Treaty of Ryswick in 1697 gave Europe four years of peace followed by a dozen years of exhausting struggle. At the Peace of Amiens in 1802 Napoleon won a year of truce with Europe, but eleven years of war followed it. These instances explain the fear that Europe has for the kind of peace that is but a breathing spell."

Spanish Opinion on the War

A REMARKABLE historical and psychological discussion of the war is given by George Santayana in an article in the New Republic. It is called "Spanish Opinion on the War," but it is more than that:

"The great line of cleavage which in all Latin countries cuts national life in two also creates divergent sympathies in international affairs, and quite justly, since it separates two opposite moral judgments passed on all European history and two contrary philosophies of life. The liberals wish to reorganize Christian society on a pagan basis. The conservatives wish to prevent that reorganization and to restore, in a modern form, the old moral integrity of Christian nations. It is in obedience to these opposed ideals that they take opposite sides in the present war.

"Moderate Spanish liberals see in England the mother of parliaments. the home of free trade and of religious toleration. Advanced liberals see in France the leader in revolutionary enlightenment and moral freedom. They heartily love all that republican France represents: democracy, non-religious government and education, fearless experiment in art, frank passions and pleasures, untrammeled intelligence, personal security and comfort. That place in the sun which Germany wants for herself collectively, every Latin by instinct claims for himself individually; and he would know how to fill it, being well versed in basking. Odious to such a temperament must be the heavy mind of the Teutons, their pedantry and meddlesomeness, their sentimental idealism, their emphatic pathos, their grotesque taste, all their pompous, pedagogic, arrogant, clumsy ways. The happy natural pagan does not need so much apparatus; it would crush his genius. For the sake of plain truth and liberty, as he thinks, he has given up his Catholic faith, which at least was wise and beautiful in its way; he cannot wish to see the world duped afresh, and himself browbeaten, by a primitive tribal fanaticism. He loves his ease, and he feels that the victory of Germany would increase everywhere that irrational tension from which the modern world is suffering. It is not only the foolish ruinous armaments that he deprecates, but the pressure on everybody of aimless tasks and struggles, the foolish romantic will making so many damnable faces and arousing so many damnable passions. He knows better how to live.

"Spanish clericals and conservatives, on the other hand, feel drawn both by tradition and principle to a Germany which they see so strongly and superbly governed, and allied with Austria, a monarchy closely associated with the great memories of Spain. Even more emphatically they detest the France of Renan, Gambetta, and Combes, of Dreyfus and Madame Caillaux, and every day for years they have been prophesying its ruin. They also heartily dislike England, long the champion of Protestantism and vilifier of Spain; England who holds Gibraltar, a thorn in the Spanish side, and who during the Cuban war smiled on the United States, while Germany frowned and even slightly rattled the sable.

"It might seem that the intervention of Belgium, the only country long and successfully governed by the clerical party, and of Russia, the symbol of autocracy, might cut across and confuse these sympathies; but such is not the case. Spanish Catholics say they are sorry for Belgium, but at heart they do not forgive her for having thrown in her lot with atheistical France. They remember, too, that this is not the first war of "frightfulness" ever waged in Flanders, and who it was that waged it there of old. They suspect that the Belgians also have not forgotten it; for their government, though Catholic, allowed a statue of Ferrer to be set up in Brussels, which the Protestant Kaiser has had decently removed. The clericals can even find a fundamental similarity between the historic task which Germany has now undertaken and that which Spain performed during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with some temporary success, though at the price of her utter ruin, the task of sternly defending and imposing an orthodox *Kultur*, and stemming a rising tide of individualism and license."

Correspondence

The Confusion Between Political and Emotional Internationalism

To the NEW REVIEW:

SOCIALISTS are certainly indebted to the NEW REVIEW for the very interesting discussion it has started on "The Reorganization of the International."

As regards the first question in your January manifesto, "Are Nationalism and Socialism mutually exclusive?" the only Socialist answer must be, it seems to me, Yes. Sans phrase, for the simple reason that the word Nationalism, connotes the regarding of the politically defined nation as the supreme object of solicitude for those included within it, be they citizens or subjects, as against other nations, in short as against the whole human race outside the nationality in question. For Nationalism therefore the nation is No. 1 and humanity outside the nation a quite secondary or tertiary consideration, even if as much, since the tendency is, on an emergency, for the latter to be left out of sight altogether. Now I hold most strongly that any favoring-favoring that is in a practical sense-economical, or political, of one's own nation, or for that matter of any particular nation, at the expense of any other nation or nations is utterly and completely inconsistent with the Liberty, Equality and Fraternity which is of the essence of Socialism as hitherto understood.

The answer to your second question which concerns opposition to Militarism and the refusal of Socialists to vote military appropriations, would I take it be answered in the affirmative by every Socialist worth the name, with perhaps the single exception being made as regards the latter, of an actual invasion of home territory by a foreign army. I do not see that this exception can feasibly be ruled out, so long as separate and independent national states potentially hostile to one another continue to exist-which is probably, as much as to say, so long as the present capitalistic system exists. At the same time, all the military establishment that is necessary for this purely and strictly defensive purpose, would most certainly be met by a free, voluntary and democratic, militia organization.

Attention has lately very properly been called, however, to the ease with which an aggressive government and its satellites in the press and otherwise, can make out a plausible case (for those willing to be deceived) for regarding any war on which it chooses to embark as a defensive war. In England we had crucial experience of this sort of thing in the attempts to justify the infamous British invasion of the Boer republics. All British Socialists and democrats remember the impudent lies circulated by the official and jingo press anent Boer conspiracies to seize Cape Colony and drive the British out of South Africa. The Prusso-German Government has recently been playing the same game with its "fake" of the Russian menace and "Czarismus." It would seem therefore that in any reconstitution of the International, a very exact and strict definition of the term defensive should be formulated. I would suggest that the term should be defined exclusively as implying resistance to a hostile army, actually on the march to invade the home territory, or at least avowedly mobilizing for that distinct purpose-always presupposing that the action of the hostile state is not merely the sequel to warlike operations already begun, i.e., that it is not a defensive counter-move to an agressive action already initiated by the state immediately threatened. Some such strict definition of the term defensive in International relations should effectually "spike the guns," so far at least as Socialists are concerned, of those governments and their supporters, who pretend that their warlike policy has been necessitated in order to forestall an action on the part of the state against whom that policy is directed, of whose evil intentions the government in question has certain (?) knowledge. This fraudulent device to make an aggressive war appear a defensive one

should then be rendered harmless for all who are not willing to be hoodwinked.

Reverting for a moment to the first question of the NEW REVIEW'S manifesto, and the meaning attached to the word Nationalism, I notice that many of the writers on this subject in the NEW REVIEW, seem to take the "Nationalism" meant in the question as something quite different from what I imagine was intended. One writer declares Nationalism and Socialism not to be mutually exclusive because forsooth Socialism aims at allowing free scope for the full development of national culture, science and art. Well, I submit this is altogether beside the point. No one objects to the development of national culture, understanding by this the special aptitudes of national genius in certain directions, in so far as such exist, though the importance of this specialism as accredited to nationalities as such, I take to be often exaggerated. All culture is au fond human and cosmopolitan rather than national.

Again other writers seem to confuse Nationalism, in the sense of the question, with sentimental affection for the place of one's birth and for one's native race with whom one has been intimately associated for probably the greater part of one's life. But this is also purely quite irrelevant. One American may have this sentimental attachment to his native place of Ohio, another may have the same to Massachusetts, just as one Englishman may have an affection for his native Kent and another for Yorkshire, notwithstanding that neither the states of the North American union nor the counties of England are separate and independent political entities like the nationstates of the modern world. The aim of the consistent International Socialist in this question, is I take it, simply to place the national sentiment in question as at present existing among Frenchmen, Germans, Englishmen. Americans, etc., on precisely the same footing as the sentiment also at present existing between the Ohio man and the Massachusetts man, or the Kentish man and the Yorkshire man, in other words to place the national sentiment of the future on the same footing as the provincial sentiment of today. This means of course that just as rival provincial sentiment in the modern world does not interfere in any way with National, (i.e., interprovincial) unity, so in the world of the future national sentiment shall no longer conflict with International unity.

As regards your third question, I would urge most emphatically that the new International should rigidly exclude all but International Socialists. We want no more Südekums, Kosters, Wolfgang Heines, in the party. The man who loves his Country better than Humanity has no part or lot in any Socialist organization. In my opinion, a rigorous insistence on the position that the interests of the proletariat of the world, and those of Socialism, invariably and necessarily override all purely national interests whatsoever, and a uniform policy rigorously based on this conviction, is essential to the future progress of the Socialist movement and the indispensable condition of its success.

E. BELFORT BAX.

Paris, France.

Germany and Ireland

To the New Review:

TERMANY never had, and never can have, any hostile intention upon Ireland, as intimated in the article "The Great Pro-German Illusion," in your April issue. The attempt to Germanize the Alsatians, Lorrainians, Poles and Danes have been such an enormous and largely unsuccessful task that Germany probably would not desire to annex Ireland. The necessity of Ireland is Home Rule, the crushing of a political tyranny worse than anything Germany has imposed upon subject races. Ireland has no love for Germany, but may desire to see a British defeat in order to decrease Britain's power for oppression.

"An Irish Socialist" does not seem to be well acquainted with the internal situation in Russia and Germany; otherwise he could not declare that Germany is more dangerous to Democracy than Russia. The question sums itself up thus: Is Russian despotism less dangerous than German conservatism? Russian despotism is the apotheosis of Cæsarism combined with backward social, economic and cultural conditions. German conservatism is the synthesis of Prussian Junkerism and modern militarism and clericalism. The days of the Junkers are counted; can the same be said of Russian feudal despots?

The militarism of Germany is not the cause of her extraordinary industrial and commercial development. The cause of this development lies in the intensive application of science to industry. The spirit of discipline and efficiency, exemplified in militarism, is itself the effect of the deeper social cause.

Had England any real intention of giving Ireland Home Rule, the war provided a splendid opportunity, and which would have reconciled Ireland with England. England, however, desires in future to continue her domination of Ireland. Sir Roger Casement is to be praised for his courage.

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
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