

July
First

New Review

Ten
Cents

A CRITICAL SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISM

VOL. III. 10c a copy Published on the first and fifteenth of the month. \$1.50 a Year No. 9

CONTENTS

	PAGE		PAGE
A POLICY FOR A NEUTRALS' LEAGUE..... Moses Oppenheimer.	97	THE CASE FOR RUSSIAN VICTORY..... John Spargo.	109
CURRENT AFFAIRS L. B. Boudin.	99	BOOK REVIEWS FABIAN SOCIALISM AND COLLECTIVISM; CASE AGAINST ENGLAND	111
MORGAN'S "ANCIENT SOCIETY" Robert H. Lowie.	101	A SOCIALIST DIGEST ECONOMIC CAUSES OF WAR; A NEW INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST CONGRESS AND TERMS OF PEACE; GERMAN-AMERICAN CRISIS; BRITISH IM- PERIALISM; VORWAERTS AGAINST THE GERMAN PARTY; JAURES ON PROBLEMS OF WAR AND PEACE; HAASE'S VOLTE-FACE.	112
GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY BASED ON HER HOME POLICY? 104 William English Walling.	104	CORRESPONDENCE From Ralph G. Grey; Morris Lunch.	117
A MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE..... Mrs. Chas. Edward Russell.	106		
TO ABOLISH WAR J. William Lloyd.	108		

Copyright, 1915, by the New Review Publishing Ass'n. Reprint permitted if credit is given.

A Policy for a Neutrals' League

By Moses Oppenheimer

THE President has solemnly announced that he purposes to hold Germany to "strict accountability" for the loss of American lives on the Lusitania. As far as public opinion is reflected in our press Mr. Wilson's position is pretty generally approved. We will not tolerate wanton destruction of American lives by outsiders.

As for such destruction at home, that is another story. When war on labor was waged in Colorado and women and babies were murdered in the tent colony at Ludlow, Mr. Wilson, through a confidential spokesman, remonstrated mildly at 26 Broadway. He sent no ultimatum about holding the responsible parties to "strict accountability." John D. Rockefeller Jr.'s brusque refusal to argue the case terminated the campaign of interior diplomacy.

The killing of thousands of colored people under the black flag of Judge Lynch is likewise passed over without the cry of "strict accountability." When strikers or Negroes are killed on American soil, the sacredness of human life does not become an issue of war. For such cases we have a soothing formula: state rights. That ghost of past decades, we know, is never permitted to interfere with Big Business. It is, however, still serviceable as an excuse for overlooking the wrongs of the under dog. Public Opinion

as voiced by the general press accepts this excuse rather gracefully.

Thus the conviction is forced upon us that in the case of the Lusitania the sacredness of human life is not the real issue. Something else is: The safety of peaceable intercourse on the Highway of Civilization, the Seas.

In recognizing the tremendous importance of that issue, the civilized nations have joined hands in putting down piracy as a crime against all mankind. They have agreed in outlawing certain practices in ocean warfare known as privateering. The whole current of international understanding has tended toward keeping the highway of the water safe and secure for peaceable intercourse.

And now the war throws down the gauntlet to all the world in an attempt to destroy all that has been achieved by centuries of struggle. "War necessities" are put in the scale as against all the demands of civilization. Safety of peaceable intercourse on the ocean is sharply challenged.

In maintaining such safety all elements of modern society are vitally interested, Labor as well as Capital. From some viewpoints, the interests of Labor call for particular consideration.

Under modern capitalism the workers are torn

loose from the soil. They have become a homeless, shifting element of society compelled to migrate from place to place in the quest of marketing their only possession, their labor power. The modern migration of workers is a far greater movement than the historical migration at the beginning of the medieval period. The workers must insist that the highways of the world should be kept safe and secure for their peaceful travel. Their interest also requires safety of intercourse for the product of their toil. If such safety is denied, their chance of selling their labor power becomes impaired. Suffering and starvation stare them in the face. So that here, at any rate, their interests are closely allied to the interests of their masters.

This view of the situation must be obvious to the workers of this country, among whom there are many millions from all corners of the earth. In the field of Labor, Capitalism has become a leveller of nationalism and race divisions. It is welding together the masses in a community of interests.

While the European war has made use of the old national and racial feelings in luring the workers to natural slaughter, the community of working class interests will sooner or later again assert itself. The causes that created internationalism in the past have not ceased to operate.

Meanwhile, the American working class faces a situation pregnant with the danger of war. It will be called upon to assist in securing the safety of peaceable international intercourse. Hence it must consider whether war is necessary to achieve that end.

If there remained no other way than war, a great deal might be said in advocating that extreme course. Civilization puts down the highwayman on land. It is a measure of social welfare generally approved. It must also take up the problem of putting down the highwayman on water.

To accomplish that end war seems by no means the only method. There is another. We have lately heard a great deal about the formation of a League of Neutrals in which the United States should and could take the lead. But no definite policy has been outlined by which such a League could make its demands effective. In the background we find always lurking War.

Statesmanship should create such a League at once. It should proclaim as its aim the safety of peaceable intercourse on the waterways of the world. It should serve notice on all those concerned that any government interfering with such safety thereby assumes the part of the unsocial highwayman and places itself in the position of an enemy of mankind, an outlaw. The League of Neutrals, drawing the consequences, could declare such an outlaw cut off from all intercourse with the rest of the peaceful world.

In plain language, the offense should be met with the most rigid excommunication.

Organized religion has frequently resorted to that weapon with most telling results. Organized Labor has used it under the name Boycott.

An international Boycott relentlessly applied could be developed into a weapon of such tremendous power that no offender could long withstand its pressure. The international highwayman could be forced to surrender without firing a shot.

Such a strict boycott on a gigantic scale would obviously act as a two-edged weapon. In modern society the cutting off of all intercourse must inflict losses both ways. But so does war. The boycott declared by a League of Neutrals would in fact be a bloodless war.

Let us assume a concrete case, that of the Teutonic Allies. At present, Scandinavia, Holland and Switzerland still afford opportunities for intercourse. If the countries in question join an effective League of Neutrals, the frontiers could be almost hermetically closed. The pressure would become unbearable. Once before in history, during the wars of the French Revolution, a League of Neutrals was formed to secure more safety on the ocean. The violent and untimely death of Czar Paul I interfered with its development. Still, that is no reason why a similar effort under more enlightened leadership could not successfully secure its highly desirable objects.

What a grim joke of history it would be if the Boycott, so vehemently condemned as weapon in the hands of Labor, should now be recognized as the most useful engine of peace! And yet, rabbis, priests, and parsons anxious to join the procession could quote Holy Writ: "The stone rejected by the builders has become the corner stone"!

BOARD OF EDITORS

Frank Bohn	Paul Kennaday
William E. Bohn	Robert Rives La Monte
Louis B. Boudin	Arthur Livingston
Floyd Dell	Robert H. Lowie
W. E. B. Du Bois	Helen Marot
Max Eastman	Joseph Michael
Louis C. Fraina.	Moses Oppenheimer
Felix Grendon	Herman Simpson
Isaac A. Hourwich	Wm. English Walling

ADVISORY COUNCIL

Arthur Bullard	Gustavus Myers
George Allan England	Mary White Ovington
Charlotte Perkins Gilman	William J. Robinson
Arturo Giovanitti	Charles P. Steinmetz
Reginald W. Kaufmann	J. G. Phelps Stokes
Harry W. Laidler	Horace Traubel
Austin Lewis	John Kenneth Turner
John Macy	Albert Sonnichsen

Published by the New Review Publishing Association
256 BROADWAY, NEW YORK CITY

ALEXANDER FRASER JULIUS HEIMAN LOUIS C. FRAINA
President Treasurer Secretary

Subscription \$1.50 a year in United States and Mexico; six months,
\$0.75. \$1.75 in Canada and \$2.00 in foreign countries. Single
copies, 10 cents.

Entered at the New York post-office as second-class mail matter.

Current Affairs

By L. B. Boudin

Magna Charta—700 Years Later

THE air is full of rejoicing. Seven hundred years ago the English people received *their* "Great Charter" from King John. As sharers in the "great inheritance" of English freedom, we naturally consider the celebration our own, and so let the glad shouts resound in the air.

But the celebration of the great historic event which we share with England does not make us oblivious to the actualities of the present which are all our own. The celebration of Magna Charta obtained by the English people in June, 1215, at Runnymede, is, therefore obscured, outshouted, and relegated to the rear, by the celebration of the Magna Charta obtained by the American people in June, 1915, at Trenton, New Jersey.

On June 3 of this year of Grace, 1915, the United States District Court of Trenton, N. J., handed down its decision in the Steel Trust case, which decision has been greeted with shouts of joy from Maine to California and from the Great Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico, as the "Magna Charta of Good Business"; and these shouts will be heard long after the celebration of the centenary of King John's charter will have been forgotten. And very properly so. King John is dead, and so is his old "Charter." But the Court which handed down the Steel Trust decision is a living power, and it is *its* charter that "Good Business" is going to do good business under.

There are those who claim that old Magna Charta gave everything to the English Barons, and nothing to the English people. And it is barely possible that an inspection of the new Magna Charta may reveal the fact that it gives everything to the American Barons and nothing to the American people. But of this some other time. Just now I am interested not so much in what the new "Charter" contains, as in the manner in which it was obtained; not so much in what *it gives*, but the way *it was given*. And in this connection a comparison with the manner in which the old Charter *was given* is very interesting. It will show some remarkable similarities; but also at least one very striking difference, showing the shifting of the centre of gravity of the body politic, the lodgment of the "sovereign power" of the State.

At the time Magna Charta was asked for and granted, England was an absolute monarchy. Freedom was unknown to the English nation. The King was master. In him all the powers of the State, "the sovereignty of the realm" resided. There was no liberty, but there were "*liberties*," that is, privileges, which some of the English King's subjects en-

joyed as an act of grace from him. When the English Barons felt aggrieved by the actions of King John they did not think of appealing from King John to his *people*, for the monarchical idea was as sacred to them as it was to King John himself. For the same reason they did not dream of taking their Liberty by force, although they were not averse of teaching King John a lesson in "good government" so as to compel him to *grant* them the liberties they asked. So they marched in force to Runnymede, presented their *petition*, and received their grant of "liberties" in the form of the Great Charter, which was simply an enumeration of *privileges* granted the Barons by the King.

Seven hundred years have passed since then. We at least have done away with the monarchy. The sovereignty of our State no longer resides in a King. But we still have no *democracy*. The sovereignty of our State does not, as yet, reside in *the people*, although the people have been fooled by the *form* of our government into the belief that such is the fact. Our Barons no longer apply to a King for their "charter." But neither do they apply to the people—although nominally the people are *sovereign*. The *sovereign power* which was once lodged in the King *is now lodged in the Courts*. An Oligarchy has replaced the monarchy. When the American Barons—Steel, Coal or any other—want "good laws" to do "good business" under, they do not apply to the representatives of the people in Congress assembled, but to the Courts. For it is in the Courts that power resides.

Hence the jubilation over the Magna Charta of Trenton, a jubilation which is not merely a shout of joy, but also a challenge to, and a taunt of, the American people, who are utterly powerless to do anything if they should happen not to like the "Charter" which the Courts have granted to the American Barons. As one of the chief spokesmen of the American Barons put it:

"It would be useless to pass such a law (that is, a law changing the 'Magna Charta of Good Business'). The *Supreme Court* has had its lesson in business economy, and such a law would not survive *its first test*."

The Supreme Court has had its lesson,—that settles it. *The American people don't count.*

Don Quixote and Talcum Powder

MR. BRYAN has managed to raise quite a tempest by his resignation. And if his purpose had been to get again into the limelight, as a preliminary to the next Presidential campaign, he has certainly achieved his purpose. The fact that most of the newspaper comment is adverse is of no particular account, it's the fact of newspaper talk of *some kind that counts*. Mr. Bryan had been quite forgotten during the three years that have elapsed since the Baltimore Convention. Now he is a na-

tional figure again. And we ought to be thankful for it. Things had come to such a dead level, in our political life, that even Mr. Bryan is a relief.

Unfortunately, Mr. Bryan chose to make his re-entry into public life in a manner which not only makes of him a national figure again, but threatens to make of him a Socialist hero. Not that that is a particularly difficult feat. Mr. Hearst managed it several times. So we might be disposed to look upon it with equanimity, if it were not for the fact that these are exceedingly serious times, and mistakes are likely to have particularly grave consequences.

So it is up to us Socialists to consider Mr. Bryan seriously,—and examine his action upon the merits, giving him credit for honesty of purpose and forgetting all about its possible relation to the next Presidential Campaign.

The first impression that one gains from a reading of Mr. Bryan's statement, giving to the American people and the world at large his reasons for resigning the shelf upon which he had been tucked away for more than two years, is that that famous knight Don Quixote de la Mancha had risen from his grave, valiantly riding astride his famous donkey Rosinante. Not the martial knight, indeed, but a pacific Don Quixote; one who has imbibed the doctrine of *non-resistance*, which can accomplish for peace exactly as much as the exploits of Cervantes' hero did for martial ends.

But upon a more careful consideration of Mr. Bryan's pronunciamento, and reading it in the light of the Second Note to Germany, which drew his fire, we must become convinced that our first impression was wrong. We were doing both Tolstoy and Don Quixote an injustice; Tolstoy's blood pulsed too rapidly to admit of his calmly waiting "until the stress of war is over" for the "settlement" of the question whether the German military machine can go on torpedoing Lusitanias. And the Knight of La Mancha was entirely too much the man of action to believe in "continuing negotiations" as a means of solving difficult problems. Besides, we were not accounting for Mr. Bryan. For if Mr. Bryan was really anxious to "continue negotiations" until the war was over, nothing was better calculated to do so than our Second Note, of which it was truly said that it smelled more of *talcum powder* than of gun-powder.

The fact is that Mr. Wilson was backing down. Not because he had re-joined Mr. Bryan in "humbly following the Prince of Peace," but because our really "responsible people" don't want to go to war just now. There are a number of reasons for it, the most important of which is that some of *us* are making much more money by our staying out of war. Even our armament manufacturers could gain nothing, and possibly lose a lot, by our going to war. As it is, they cannot turn out enough arms

to supply the demand. If we are to have a war of our own, *they* would rather have it come when the demand for arms from abroad will become slack. What they, in common with most of our "responsible people," really want is not war, but a war scare. That can best be produced not by drawing the sword but by rattling it a bit and then applying some soft soap and talcum powder, which will make it possible to "continue negotiations" indefinitely. So that if Mr. Bryan wanted further negotiations he could have safely remained on his shelf for another year at least. What made him kick over the traces?

This might have remained a mystery had not Mr. Bryan himself revealed it in his "Appeal to the German-Americans." That document shows that notwithstanding Mr. Bryan's avowed Tolstoyanism and his ostentatious following the Prince of Peace, he is not at all averse to military glory and of showing his "patriotism" in this popular fashion. Here we have "the same old Bill." It will be recalled that in 1898 Mr. Bryan's ardent anti-imperialism did not prevent him from emulating the example of that arch-imperialist, Mr. Roosevelt, in heading a volunteer regiment in as purely an imperialistic war as ever there was. And while he did not participate with Mr. Roosevelt in the actual fighting,—for he seems to have always believed in "continued negotiations," and the smell of *talcum powder* always pleased him more than that of gun-powder,—he at least shared with him the title of "Colonel."

Seventeen years, and the battles of many electoral campaigns, do not seem to have cooled Mr. Bryan's ardor for "doing his duty as a patriot," and earning some glory in the field of international relations. So when Mr. Wilson struck a popular chord in his first Lusitania Note, Mr. Bryan became envious and wanted some patriotic laurels for himself. Then he bethought himself of the time-honored American practice of twisting the British Lion's tail.

If Wilson was to have the glory of making the German Eagle scream, why shouldn't Bryan have the glory of making the British Lion roar? So he insisted on a Note to England. And when he couldn't have his way he resigned. This gave him a chance of issuing the Appeal to German-Americans,—and others;—showing how much he thought of patriotism, how great a patriot he was himself, and what great efforts he was making to take care of American *business and property*.

Incidentally he managed to inject into Mr. Wilson's Second Note the only explosive that it now contains. The outside world, which doesn't know our Mr. Bryan, cannot help thinking that there must be some dynamite in that missive, even if they don't see it—for, otherwise, why should Mr. Bryan resign? And in international relations nothing is so dangerous as the suspicion of danger.

Morgan's "Ancient Society"

By Robert H. Lowie

NO ethnological work has probably reached a larger audience than Lewis H. Morgan's *Ancient Society*. Historians, sociologists, economists, philosophers, have been profoundly influenced in their views of primitive life by Morgan's theories, and the enthusiastic espousal of these doctrines by Engels and Bebel has made his name a household word in Socialistic circles.

Morgan's services to ethnology are assuredly neither few nor slight. He combined the inestimable advantage of an intimate personal knowledge of one primitive people with a lively theoretical interest in the problems of cultural development and a keen *flair* for significant phenomena that had been overlooked or ignored by his predecessors. However, he wrote his most popular book in 1877 when an intensive systematic ethnographical survey of the globe had barely begun, when indeed hardly a single primitive tribe was thoroughly known in all its aspects, and when the rise of Darwinism had given an impetus to the construction of artificial evolutionary schemes. Moreover, Morgan shared with other men of markedly synthetic tendency a certain lack of sobriety and of logical rigor. Under these circumstances it is simply absurd to treat his *Ancient Society* as the last word in ethnology. The one-time groveling before the letter of Morgan's teaching has indeed produced a strong reaction on the part of some recent students, who have been betrayed into quite unwarrantable contempt for his ethnological achievement. The layman who has steeped himself in Morgan's atmosphere is thus likely to lose his bearings when he chances on some such stray gust of criticism. In the following paragraphs I hope to give some first aid to the flounders. I will select for discussion the three points on which Morgan is most frequently quoted as an authority: (1) his general view of cultural development; (2) his conception of the one-sided kin group ("gens"); (3) his views on the development of the family. I hope to make clear in every case what are the elements of permanent value in Morgan's treatment and what elements have become antiquated.

I.

Morgan's least original and least valuable contribution is embodied in his scheme of ethnical periods. He divided the history of human development into three periods labeled savagery, barbarism, and civilization, respectively; and subdivided the first two into a lower, middle, and upper status. Civilization was said to begin with the use of a phonetic alphabet, and barbarism with the practice of pottery; the upper status of savagery commenced with the use of the

bow and arrow, and the other divisions were defined by traits of similar type.

What first strikes us in this outline is the arbitrary character of the criteria used for grading cultures. No ethnologist would now place the Polynesians with their highly developed political communities and their extraordinary artistic ability on a lower level than the rudest North American aborigines simply because the latter used the bow and arrow and the Polynesians did not. By laying stress on arts and customs arbitrarily ignored by Morgan we should have a transvaluation of values that would very largely alter his scheme of evolution. If we chose complexity of social arrangements as a standard, the Australians, whom Morgan places in the middle status of savagery, would have to be rated far above the majority of North American tribes, who are ranked by our author in the upper status of savagery and the lower status of barbarism. Again, if we graded peoples by their skill at basketry rather than by their pottery, some of the otherwise crude Californian natives would suddenly rise to a very high rung in the scale. Judged by their knowledge of the iron technique, the African Negroes would tower immeasurably above all the aborigines of the New World, yet if we substitute architectural achievement as our guide the palm would have to be awarded to the American Indians. There are, to be sure, tribes like the Bushmen which are so obviously deficient in almost every phase of culture as to make a decided impression of inferiority, and these would be rated as culturally low by every ethnologist. But except in the roughest way no grading is possible because marked advancement in one line may be accompanied with obvious backwardness in others, and there is no way of objectively testing to which criterion we should yield precedence.

Owing to the available archæological evidence there can of course be no doubt as to the gradual development and generally increasing complexity of human culture. In this, but only in this very general sense, Morgan was right and did good pioneer service. But he was quite wrong in assuming that cultural evolution, so far as it was not checked by differences in the natural environment, must follow the same course, that the development of human institutions was predetermined, as he put it, "by the natural logic of the human mind and the necessary limitations of its powers." Though the essential psychic unity of mankind is generally admitted, the possibilities of reacting to the same stimuli are not so narrowly limited as Morgan supposed. Nothing, for example, may seem more natural than that cat-

tle-raisers should milk their cows and eat beef. Yet among many Asiatic tribes, the Japanese included, milking is practically tabooed, while among South African Bantu tribes milk forms a staple diet, but the meat of the cattle is only eaten on exceptional occasions.

But even if there were a strong tendency toward the production of similar cultural traits all over the globe, we have to reckon with another factor that has come to be recognized as of greater and ever greater significance during the last two decades and that obscures the tendency toward uniform development,—the fact of cultural borrowing. It has been clearly shown that when alien tribes meet, cultural possessions are freely borrowed from one group to the other. This being so, we can no longer represent the history of any one tribe by a single line purporting to represent a law of cultural growth. If such a tribe should practise the arts of weaving and pottery, for example, the latter may have been introduced from the outside and then we should have no right to say that the tribe had risen to the pottery stage, i. e., to Morgan's lower status of barbarism, by some inherent necessity. We cannot say with any degree of assurance, to turn to another example, that Japan would have developed European civilization if that civilization had not been impressed upon her from without. Whether she would, is a question for the metaphysician rather than the scientist. The ethnologist can only state the fact that all the cultures he studies show evidence of complex origin. This being so, he must in the first place analyze them into their constituents. But, whether a certain people adopt a certain trait from another or not, is in large measure a matter of historical accident, and there seems little prospect of discovering a general law for the innumerable complications that have resulted from accidents of this sort. Accordingly, ethnology has turned aside from the attempt to outline a general scheme of evolution along a single line and seeks instead to reconstruct for every area and tribe its individual history of development.

II.

By a "gens" Morgan understood a social unit composed of a supposed female ancestor and her children, together with the children of her female descendants through females; or of a male ancestor and his children, together with the children of his male descendants through males. In America the term "gens" is now generally restricted to the second type of social unit with patrilineal descent, while a social unit with maternal descent is called a "clan." I will adopt this usage, referring to both clans and gentes as "one-sided kin groups."

Morgan assumed that the human race passed through a stage when brothers and sisters intermarried in a group. At a somewhat higher level, he argued, such marriages were prevented by organizing

society into kin groups of the type defined above and absolutely prohibiting marriage within the groups, i. e., making them exogamous. In other words, Morgan held that the restrictions on what we consider incestuous marriage came in with the one-sided kin group and did not exist at a certain cultural stage of earlier date.

It is impossible even to indicate here all the relevant problems. Suffice it to say that Morgan (1) assumed that the clan preceded the gens because in the early days of society fatherhood was uncertain and descent could be traced only through the mother; and (2) regarded the one-sided exogamous kin group (except in Polynesia, where he merely noted a rudimentary foreshadowing of this unit) as a well-nigh universal institution of human society. To these two points I must at present confine myself.

In regard to the first problem it cannot be said that Morgan's view is antiquated since it is still shared by a great many sociologists and ethnologists. Nevertheless, even adherents of this doctrine now make an important distinction. They still hold that a gens never develops into a clan while there is good evidence of the reverse change; but they no longer insist that every gens must have developed out of an earlier clan. Indeed, there is not the faintest empirical proof that certain tribes in North America which reckon descent through the father ever traced descent in the matrilineal way. Accordingly, American ethnologists such as Swanton, Goldenweiser, and the present writer, deny that Morgan's sequence represents a universal law of development. In fairness it should be stated that most students of Australia continue to regard the clan organization as more primitive than that based on paternal descent and that Rivers makes the same assumption for Melanesia. The belief in the necessary priority of the clan, however, has been seriously shaken.

An even more important question relates to the practical universality of the exogamous kin group at an early stage of civilization. Here again the North American data are especially significant, for among the Indians it is precisely the tribes of crudest culture, the natives of California, the Plateau, and Mackenzie River areas, that lack any trace of the clan or gens while most of the agricultural peoples with highly complex ceremonial activities, such as the Iroquois, Southern Siouan, and Pueblo Indians, also possess a clan or gentile organization. In other parts of the globe there are likewise very backward tribes, for example in New Guinea, among which the exogamous unit has never been observed.

These facts may be fitted into Morgan's scheme by either one of two hypotheses. It may be assumed that the tribes now lacking exogamous divisions formerly had them but lost the organization. However, this is a purely gratuitous supposition, without the slightest evidence and rendered in the highest

degree improbable by the large number of cases that form an exception to Morgan's rule. Secondly, these exceptional cases may be conceived as representing a cultural stage antedating the institution of clans. But on this theory they ought to represent the greatest looseness of marital relations among blood-relatives, while as a matter of fact in each and every one of the tribes in question there are very definite rules against the marriage of closely related kin. Accordingly the facts cannot be squared with Morgan's theory. Tribes of a crude culture exist which have no clans or gentes, yet they are not so low as to lack stringent rules against incestuous unions.

This last-mentioned fact indicates a fatal narrowness in Morgan's view of primitive society. Morgan's was a distinctly monistic type of mind. He naturally tended to conceive all social units of primitive tribes as genetically connected with the exogamous kin group. Thus, he regarded the Australian classes as incipient clans and the moieties or phratries of North America as merely overgrown and subdivided exogamous units. Today we view the Australian class-system as an institution *sui generis*; and we should regard it as possible that moiety (or phratry) and clan or gens were in a number of cases of distinct origin. Moreover, restrictions on marriage occurring where there are no clans or gentes prove the existence of some sort of family concept distinct from the notion of exogamous kin groups, while among the Indians of the North Pacific coast a caste system is found coexisting with exogamous kin groups. Instead of all primitive society being modeled on the one clan pattern, we thus find a much greater variety than Morgan allowed for in his account of primitive social organization.

III.

Morgan's speculations on the evolution of the family have aroused the hottest criticism, yet they are connected with one of the most notable achievements in the history of ethnology,—his discovery of the classificatory system of relationship. Having noted the fact that the Iroquois terms for "father," "mother," etc., do not designate single individuals but whole classes of individuals, such as all the father's brothers and all the mother's sisters as well as the father and mother respectively, Morgan afterwards found that this was not a peculiarity confined to the Iroquois but shared by many North American tribes. Through indefatigable study and correspondence he established the fact that this classificatory system also occurs in Africa, India, Australia, and Oceania. The wide distribution of this form of kinship nomenclature among wholly unrelated peoples remains one of the basic facts of comparative sociology.

Among classificatory systems Morgan recognized two types. In those of Hawaii and other Polynesian groups, which were simpler and therefore seemed

more ancient, no distinction was drawn between the father, the father's brother and the mother's brother; nor between the mother, the mother's sister and the father's sister. In the systems of North America and India no distinction was drawn between father and father's brother, or between mother and mother's sister, but the mother's brother was sharply distinguished from the father, and the father's sister from the mother, through the use of additional terms. Morgan concluded that the Polynesian system was a relic of the hypothetical custom of brother-sister marriage; the Hawaiians, for example, called their father's sister "mother" because at one time a man had exercised marital rights over his sister. In the North American and Indian systems he saw the effect of restrictions on this primitive looseness: when a man no longer cohabited with his sister, his children ceased to class her with the mother; on the other hand, the father's brothers remained "fathers" since they continued to share one another's wives.

Lack of space prevents adequate treatment of this most abstruse of ethnological topics; I can only state a few of the results without entering into the course of the argument. In the first place, Rivers has furnished good evidence for the view that the Hawaiian nomenclature was not primitive but arose through later simplification of a terminology of the more complex North American type. Corroborative testimony from Siberia has been supplied by Sternberg. Secondly, it does not follow necessarily that individuals must have shared wives because they are designated by the same term: this term may simply designate the *status* of a man, his marital *potentialities*. If, for example, a tribe is divided into exogamous moieties, the fact that a person calls his father's brother "father" may simply mean that there is one term in the language to denote any male member of moiety A and the generation of the speaker's mother. It may denote that the person addressed *might* marry the speaker's mother without infringing the exogamous rule, but not that he actually has access to her.

In the most general aspect of the question, however, Morgan was right. Though his particular inferences from kinship terminologies are largely mistaken, the principle that these nomenclatures are connected with social phenomena of some sort, that they are not merely capricious creations of human psychology, is sound. It has only recently been proved from Oceanian material by Rivers, who shows that the classificatory system is probably connected with exogamy,—a theory already suggested by Tylor and even gropingly divined by Morgan himself. I have satisfied myself that this theory holds for North America, that there is in other words a correlation between the classificatory kinship systems and exogamous divisions. Morgan thus de-

serves credit not merely for having unearthed a recondite cultural trait and established its distribution, but also for seeing that this trait was a matter of sociological importance. The precise extent to which the systems of kinship reflect sociological condition is a moot-question. Rivers regards all elements of kinship terminology as sociologically determined, Kroeber once denied any such connection but is said to have altered his views in the light of Rivers' recent investigations, though his change of mind has not yet found printed expression. I incline to the golden middle course,—holding that many terminological features are determined by social causes, such as forms of marriage, while others must be accepted as simply psychologico-linguistic products lacking a sociological foundation.

IV.

It must be clear from the foregoing remarks that this is not an attempt to depreciate Morgan's achievement. His *Ancient Society* remains a land-

mark in the history of ethnology, but it is a work that can nowadays be most profitably read by the specialist. The layman is likely to derive very wrong notions from it, just as he would get a very imperfect conception of modern views of evolution or heredity from Darwin's *Origin of Species*. In the absence of good, popular, up-to-date books on ethnology the general reader must be referred to special papers. I suggest the following for those interested in the problems of exogamy and kinship systems: Heinrich Cunow, "Zur Urgeschichte der Ehe und der Familie" (*Ergänzungshefte zur Neuen Zeit*, No. 14); W. H. R. Rivers, *Kinship and Social Organization* (London, 1914); A. A. Goldenweiser, "The Social Organization of the Indians of North America" (*Journal of American Folk-Lore*, 1914, pp. 411-436); Robert H. Lowie, "Social Organization" (*The American Journal of Sociology*, 1914, pp. 68-97). The modern point of view in regard to cultural stages is presented in Boas's *The Mind of Primitive Man* (New York, 1911, pp. 174-196).

Is Germany's Foreign Policy Based on Her Home Policy?

By William English Walling

BERNHARDI, we were told, does not represent Germany—in spite of the 110,000 copies of his leading works sold in that country. Treitschke, though he was the most influential of historians in a country where history is one of the instruments of government, was opposed by other historians scarcely less influential. Wilhelm II. was inherited by Germany, without any consultation of the nation, and the country has shown on several occasions that he does not always represent it.

Who, then, speaks for Germany? Has anyone a better right than the man who has recently served for nine years as Chancellor of the Empire and who has now been sent on the most momentous mission ever entrusted to a German, that of persuading Italy to remain neutral in order that Germany may have some slight chance of holding her own in the present war? Von Buelow probably voices the views of the German nation. He is certainly responsible in what he writes, and he has expressed himself at length in his "Imperial Germany."*

Von Buelow begins his book with a quotation from Treitschke and refers to him several times—which shows that the cynical historian is after all a living influence. But Von Buelow is undoubtedly more representative of the totality of German opinion. He is

more liberal than Treitschke in political thought and more conservative in utterance. Moreover, while he is a strong believer in the importance of "ideas," he is also a practical statesman and an opportunist, and so deals almost entirely with realities.

With Von Buelow the *first* of realities is war. On his first page we learn that Germany became one of the Great Powers of Europe "after three glorious and successful campaigns," while on the third we are told that the union of the German States was accomplished first of all "by the force of German arms." Commerce and industry have flourished so greatly in Germany only because peace was preserved by the strength of her armaments and they will be able to thrive in the future only if her armaments are maintained "in undiminished strength." Oversea traffic especially has been "growing ever greater under the protection of the German navy."

Similar views to these prevail in Great Britain and even in some quarters in America. But how many Englishmen or Americans would go so far as endorse the celebrated Von Moltke view of war, which Von Buelow quotes and adopts as his own:

"Permanent peace is a dream and not even a beautiful one. But war is an essential element of God's scheme of the world."

And how many responsible public men, outside of

*"Imperial Germany," published by Dodd, Mead & Co.—\$1.50.

Germany, would agree with these other expressions of Von Buelow's:

"In the struggle between nations one nation is the hammer and the other is the anvil; one is the victor and the other the vanquished.

"It is a law of life and development in history, that where two civilizations meet they fight for ascendancy."

The reader may well exclaim: "God help the Alsatians, Danes, Poles, Slavs, and Italians that fall into the power of such men as these! Two civilizations cannot even "meet" amicably! There is no such thing as a genuine peace among nations!

Von Buelow supports his views largely on the practical basis of German national egoism, of Germany's economic and political needs, without reference to those of other nations. But he is also a man of ideas, and for his ideas he appeals to history. As Lowell would say, he tries to "unlock the portals of the future with the bloody *key* of the past." And his historical references give us a *key* to his own underlying thought and motive.

He is not satisfied to appeal to recent times, when the nations have become more or less civilized and democratic. He dwells upon periods centuries past. His opening quotation from Treitschke refers to events of a semi-barbarous period, eight hundred and a thousand years ago. He speaks of "the unflinching purpose of the Hohenzollern dynasty for centuries," and he settles the question of the conquered provinces of France and Poland by similar references. Germany's recent expansion to the west is justified because in the seventh and succeeding centuries the Germans had penetrated into "the heart of France," and these territories were once "in part national German land." Conquest to the east is defended because these territories were long *destined to become* German land, since Germany has moved for "a thousand years" in the direction of Poland!

We are not surprised to hear from such a man that Germany will not give up Alsace-Lorraine, even though the peace of Europe can be secured in no other way, nor to read his bold assertion that France's desire for these provinces is dictated not by sound "national egoism," but by mere "national idealism." He goes back a thousand years to justify German aims, he will now allow the French to go back forty-five years to justify French aims.

Similarly Austrian Italy was to remain indefinitely under German rule in spite of the fact that it would "always remain a sore point." Von Buelow frankly declares that "Austria and Italy can only be either allies or enemies." How does he feel about these war-like statements now? We imagine the Italian war party has not overlooked them.

Von Buelow scarcely claims that his war policy is merely defensive. The purpose of the German navy is to prevent any "interruption" in the development

of Germany's world policy. In the Balkan crisis the German sword was thrown into the scale of European decision only "indirectly for the preservation of European peace" but "directly in support of our Austro-Hungarian ally" and "above all for the sake of German credit and the maintenance of our position in the world."

After the present war had already begun German apologists in America claimed that its main purpose was to abolish British dominion of the sea. Von Buelow makes it clear that the German aim is rather to establish German dominion. He will be satisfied with no other sea power or combination of powers, even if it includes the United States.

But half of Von Buelow's book is given to a study of how to keep the German people in tutelage, how to prevent the rise of the democratic party. And he justifies his aggressive war policy chiefly by its value in "uniting" the German people and keeping their minds on foreign expansion rather than on domestic problems. For these problems, we may point out, include the democratization of Germany and the abolition of the landlord class, represented by Von Buelow, together with the expropriation of the semi-feudal estates upon which this class and the whole system rests—the same measure that was carried out so effectively by the French in 1789.

From the people Buelow asks only one thing politically—submission. He will brook no popular "opposition to the Government and rulers." Instead of political interest in domestic affairs he prescribes for the people "the clash of German pride and sense of honor with the *resistance* and demands of foreign nations" (my italics). In other words, *hostility and aggression towards other nations are the avowed basis of German home policy*—they are indispensable to the "rulers." It is the duty of the government, Von Buelow tells us, not "to concede new political rights to parliament," but to evolve the above "national" policy.

For, like the rest of Germany's ruling class, Von Buelow cynically opposes all political progress: "In my eyes," he says, "the dividing line between the rights of the Crown and of Parliament are *immutably* fixed," and he is, therefore, against "alterations in the sphere of constitutional law."

That is, the German constitution is perfect and its benefits are to be extended by force of arms to the peoples of new territories. This is absolutely essential, for the benefits of this constitution are so ill appreciated at home that aggression abroad is the only means by which the German people can be prevented from demanding a change.

There is only one problem of the first importance Von Buelow overlooks: *What will happen to the Prussian system at home and abroad in case the policy of aggression against other nations fails?* Is it not possible that the German people, in such an event, will turn their attention to home affairs?

A Motion to Substitute

By Mrs. Charles Edward Russell

[The editors of the NEW REVIEW are not in agreement with the proposals advanced in the article. We publish it as an invitation to the discussion of ideas seemingly held by many American radicals and Socialists.]

IN every movement as in every household comes a time to clean house. A time to look over the accumulations of years and see how many of them fit into present needs and how many ought to be cleared out and discarded to make room for new necessities. A movement or a household that resents this sort of occasional examination and renovation is in a bad way. It is in danger of settling down into dust and dogma, of losing its ability to adapt itself to present day conditions and to serve present day needs.

In every household, and in every movement, some members are always cheerfully ready to pitch out upon the dump-heap articles that appear to have outlived their usefulness and other more conservative members oppose, actively or passively, this affront upon their cherished sentiments and possessions.

The combination of Spring Season and Between Elections affords the household of the Socialist Party a period seasonable for house cleaning and I hereby purpose to be that rash member of the family that suggests discarding two of the cherished household possessions.

The articles that I nominate for the dump-heap are Class Struggle and Class Consciousness.

* * *

Having paused for the initial storm of indignation and denunciation to subside and for the Heresy Hunters to snatch for the Articles of the Constitution in order to consider expulsion proceedings, I shall now endeavor to state—(not in Marxian terms with which I am unfamiliar but in common sense household terms with which I am familiar), my reasons for desiring to dispose of the above long cherished articles of faith.

If I desire to bring friendly associates across my threshold I endeavor in every legitimate way to make my household attractive to them. If I open my doors in invitation as a House for the People I do not display upon my doorstep objects repellant to those that I urge to come in.

It is entirely possible that I have no hospitable inclinations toward the world and his wife and prefer rather to maintain a rigidly exclusive attitude. I have a superior brain, I am capable of reading and understanding the Communist Manifesto, I belong to an Exclusive Cult called the Socialist Party. By rigidly shutting my doors in the face of all persons that do not spontaneously think and believe

as I do I am able to maintain intellectual caste and exhibit my mental superiority. Intellectual Snobbery is a possible attitude of mind.

Assuming however that we desire the Socialist movement to become extensive and inclusive (instead of intensive and exclusive) and that we regard it as something other than a cloister in which to preserve our own mental superiority from the barbarian world outside, what steps shall we take to make inviting our House for the People? What articles should we keep for their use and regard and which should we discard?

We should keep all those that serve any purpose or for which they can be induced to have any regard. We should be willing to discard, let us say, an ugly, useless, broken down piece of furniture, that serves no purpose, clutters up space and gives the whole house an inharmonious and unattractive appearance.

Why should we be willing to discard this appurtenance?

Because it is unattractive, it is unsound, it is unnecessary.

Why do I desire to discard Class Struggle and Class Consciousness?

Because they are unattractive, they are unsound, they are unnecessary.

They are unattractive because they do not harmonize with the rest of our mental furnishings,—in other words, our Ideals. We assume to preach the gospel of Universal Brotherhood. Our red flag is symbolic of the red blood common to the veins of all mankind. Then in the next breath we insist upon an unbridgeable "class division" between man and man.

They are unsound because there is scarcely any human being that can be honestly classified in that way. I doubt whether there is in existence one person that can be lined up accurately and entirely on either one side or the other of the imaginary line labelled "class division."

Suppose a wage worker to have but \$5 deposited in a postal savings bank. Then to the extent of \$5 he is a "capitalist," is he not? To the extent of \$5 he is appropriating the product of some other worker's toil and to the extent of \$5 he belongs to the "Capitalist Class." Is he to be excluded from the Socialist Party?

In this case however you say that his economic interests as a laborer outweigh his economic interests as a capitalist. True. Then suppose in time he acquires \$500 or \$1000 in the savings bank. Does he then step over to the other side of the imaginary

line and join the "Capitalist Class"? And if so, when?

The existence of a Middle Class has always been recognized, orthodox Marxians will now remind me, but is a comparatively unimportant and negligible factor in the social structure.

Without stopping to argue whether it is or is not, or to discuss the fact that, notwithstanding our proletarian formulae, it is among the middle class that the Socialist propaganda in America is making its best advance today, let us try to imagine a true, typical "class conscious" proletarian who has not even \$5 at interest in a savings bank.

Such a one takes in hand his \$1.50 in wages and he goes to a shoe store, let us say, to buy one of his children a pair of shoes. What kind of shoes does he buy? He buys the cheapest. Necessarily so. Does he demand a union label? Nine times out of ten he does not. The tenth time he may demand it, but if the union label goods are higher than the non-union label goods he will buy the cheaper.

His "class interests" as a wage worker should have determined him to buy the label goods. But his "class interests" as a potential capitalist, i.e., a consumer, forced him to buy the cheapest goods, although by so doing he betrayed his "class interests" as a wage worker. Is he to be expelled from the Socialist Party?

If not, is there any more reason or logic in the various proposals to exclude from Socialist membership various members of the army and police force for instance, on the ground that their "class interests" are wrong; or to refuse in campaigns offers of sympathetic support and co-operation on the ground that these are not "class-consciously" offered?

And this brings me finally to my basic contention.

Most assuredly there exists between Capital and Labor an uncompromising and irreconcilable conflict. So long as the same product of industry must furnish the interest and dividends of capital and the wages and salaries of labor this essential conflict is bound to endure and Property Rights are bound to clash in bitter hostility against Human Rights.

But this conflict is between the FORCE of Capital and the FORCE of Labor. Not between the CLASS of Capital and the CLASS of Labor.

In the cases that I have instanced above there is all of the essential conflict between Capital and Labor that the most orthodox of Marxians could desire. This is no Civic Federation brief that "the interests of capital and labor are identical." They are not. They are irreconcilably opposed. But the conflict is one of *Forces*, not of *Classes*. Classes denotes aggregations of opposing persons, whereas the conflict may and usually does take place, as I have illustrated above, in the same person.

Therefore, it is not the CLASS of Capital against

which we must wage war, but the FORCE of Capital.

I have endeavored to prove that the doctrine of "Class Conflict" is essentially unsound and I think I have succeeded in proving at the same time that it is unnecessary. By the simple substitution of the word Force for Class (of a Power or Principle instead of an aggregate of persons) we maintain our essential doctrine and avoid the antagonism that reference to the "class struggle" always arouses in an American audience.

This antagonism is based, I have come after much observation to believe, upon the instinctive feeling on the part of the American auditor that "class struggle" is unsound. Whether or not it was sound in the time and land of Marx and Engels I am not enough of an authority upon history to say. But it is unsound in America today. And the average American citizen, though he has no education in economics whatever and has never been trained to think in that field, has an instinctive aversion to cant and an instinctive ability to distinguish between the unsound and the genuine.

If then the Socialist Party of America has not lost its ability to distinguish between formula and fact I therefore move to amend by substitution in its platform, program and propaganda the phrases *Force of Capital* and *Force of Labor* for *Capitalist Class* and *Laboring Class*.

After all I am not insisting upon pitching out the antiquated piece of furniture to which I took exception but am willing to compromise upon remodeling it and bringing it up to date.

A familiar experience in household controversy!

Here are two or three arguments in favor of my motion to substitute.

1.—So long as we insist upon maintaining an arbitrary and imaginary "class division" we alienate support that we might as well have. Either the Socialist movement is a purely proletarian movement or it is not. If it is, let us confine its membership exclusively to pure and simple proletarians (if such persons can be found) and bar out every one that has \$5 or \$2 in a savings bank.

If it is not a purely proletarian movement let us drop the pretence that it is, let us call it a HUMAN struggle instead of a CLASS struggle, stop sneering at "Intellectuals," "Bourgeoisie," "Reformers" and the like and welcome the support of all persons that manifest an honest, decent, altruistic impulse to regard human welfare as of more importance than property welfare, without stopping to probe into and examine their "class consciousness."

2.—If we fail to revise our formulae to square with the facts and insist upon keeping the present misleading terminology we shall alienate not only support that we might get but much that we already have.

Is it not true that if we insist upon lining up

individuals on one side or the other of this arbitrary "class" line we give the true Capitalist, (assuming again that such a person exists) an enormous tactical advantage? The large employer of labor has but to throw out to his employees some such paltry sop as "profit sharing," "opportunity to buy stock in the company" and the like, and to a man they feel that if "class interests" determine a division line their place must be on the side of property.

3.—The "Class Struggle" and "Class Consciousness" formulæ are inconsistent with fundamental Socialist Philosophy. Socialist philosophy asserts that it does not concern itself with persons, that it deals in fundamental, economic principles. Then why waste so much energy in the effort to classify persons?

All of the evil in the world is impersonal. It is a Force, (or an alleged force) not an entity. In the scriptures the spiritual idea of evil was personified by the Devil, just as the spiritual idea of good was personified by God, only because the prophets and apostles were talking to mental children and needed these figures to make their ideas understood.

Then instead of lining up well-disposed persons on opposite sides of an imaginary "class" line to denounce and attack one another, why not wipe out this useless, imaginary division line, re-arrange our formations on the same side and so present a united front in attacking and overcoming the common enemy, Capitalism, (not Capitalists) which is the root and source of all economic evil.

To Abolish War

By J. William Lloyd

THE causes of war are:

Business greed and jealousies—the competitive, profit system.

Monarchical, aristocratic and militaristic ambition and greed.

The doctrine that nations, through their diplomats, representatives and executives, are justified in doing things that would be dishonorable or criminal between individuals.

The absence of democracy—the ignorance and helplessness of citizens in general—the fact that governments are not servants, as they should be, but rulers, and that therefore it is to their interest to deceive, exploit, embroil and wield the people for their own interests.

Religious prejudice.

Color prejudice.

Race and national prejudices—of language, customs, etc.

The lust for conquest, domination.

The defenselessness of certain peoples, tempting the lust of conquest in others.

The love of liberty, rebelling against tyranny.

The masculine love of fighting for its own sake—the sub-conscious survival and unsuspected operation of military psychology in the average man, everywhere.

In brief, the causes of war are greed, ambition, prejudice, tyranny, helplessness and combativeness.

To abolish war:

Business must first be *socialized*, competition abolished, free-trade made universal, the land belong to the people.

Democracy must be made universal, manhood and womanhood suffrage universal, with initiative, referendum and recall. Aristocracies of hereditary nobilities and hereditary rulers abolished.

Military castes abolished.

Education made universal and approximately equal throughout the world.

Every State must be autonomous, constituted what it is by the referendum vote of a majority of its inhabitants, united with others in free federations for mutual advantage, but free to secede.

National ethics made identical with those of the individual by national and international law.

Secret diplomacy, secret treaties, condemned by international law.

Religious hatred abolished.

Color hatred abolished.

Race prejudice abolished.

All nations armed, in the person of all competent individual citizens, for defense purely, on the Swiss plan or some modification of it; it being expressly guaranteed that no citizen shall be required to use his arms against his fellow-citizens, or in offensive foreign war, without his full consent.

All nations confederated on an agreement to submit all disputes between them to decision by international arbitration; all pledging themselves equally to enforce this agreement and such decisions by boycotts (on travel, migration, trade, etc.) first, or by arms if necessary.

The neutralizing of the military psychology by moral education and by woman's influence on public life and ethics.

Internationalism to be made the universal ideal—cultivated in children and in public opinion exactly as nationalism now is, but more especially and effectively by developing the truth that differences and variations in individuals and in nations, races, are desirable, profitable, admirable, in feature, color, dress, taste, customs, language, religion, everything, provided liberty be not thereby invaded.

In brief, to abolish war we must have co-operation, education, international honor, international sympathy, and the liberty, strength and supremacy of the citizen.

The Case for Russian Victory

By John Spargo

I.

THE sentiments and ideals which make it impossible for us to sympathize with Prussianized Germany oblige us to look with suspicion and fear upon Russia, that mighty despotism of Eastern Europe. Our hearts have been lacerated by the stories of infamous brutality—all too well authenticated—which have come from the terrible Empire of the Knout. From Siberia's bleak exile we have heard the cries of the noblest souls of Russia—the Tchernichevskys, Kropotkins, Breshkovskys and Gershunia. From Poland and Finland we have heard the groans of the oppressed victims of remorseless tyranny. The horrors of the cursed "Pale" and of the many *pogroms* at Kishinev and elsewhere have shocked the whole civilized world and made the name of Russia synonymous with brutal despotism and infamous oppression.

The supporters of Germany and Austria have not been slow to capitalize this fear and hatred of Russia and to turn it to good account in the wonderfully organized far-reaching campaign for influencing American public opinion which they have been carrying on. They point to the Russian "menace" and argue that the defeat of Germany and Austria would be of very little advantage to any power except Russia. Any increase of Russian prestige or power, they say, must inevitably mean an increase of Russian despotism, with all that that implies in the way of brutal oppression. "How can you support the Russian barbarians?" we are asked.

II.

It has been my good fortune to know many of the victims of Russian despotism—among them Sergius Stepniak, Nicholas Tchaykovsky, Peter Kropotkin, Leo Deutsch, Maxim Gorky and Catherine Breshkovsky. During the last twenty years it has been my lot to be associated with numerous protests against Tsarism and with numerous efforts to advance the cause of Freedom in Russia.

Moreover, I was born in England and there received my early political education. Because I belonged to the extreme Left of English radicalism, hatred of Russian despotism naturally became part of my very nature. Like all young Englishmen of the radical school, I early learned to hate and fear Russian absolutism, while admiring the Russia of Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy and of Stepniak and the revolutionary spirit. It was part of my intellectual and moral heritage that no democratic government ought to enter into any treaties or alliances with the Empire of the Knout. Since coming to this country I have urged that, to mark our abhorrence of mas-

sacres like that of Kishinev, and the oppression of Poles, Jews and Finns, we ought to withdraw our representatives from the Russian court and refuse to maintain diplomatic relations with a power so barbarous.

It cannot be said, therefore, that I am unaware of, or indifferent to, the terrible indictment of Russia to which the friends of Germany and Austria appeal. Nevertheless, it is my profound belief that the cause of freedom, of enlightenment and democracy will be advanced, and not retarded, as a consequence of Russian victory. Furthermore, I believe that the triumph of democracy in Eastern Europe is wholly dependent upon a decisive victory of Russian arms which will insure her the freedom of the Straits of Constantinople, unjustly and unwisely closed to her by treaties.

III.

By way of passing, let me remark that no candid and intelligent German ought to criticize France or England for making an ally of Russia. There is not a little insincerity in the German protest. I cannot forget that Kaiserdom and Tsardom have always been closely allied. So true is this that it has long been a maxim, both in German and Russian radical circles, that the German government was the main supporter of Russian absolutism. Dr. Liebknecht—heroic son of heroic sire!—did well to remind his colleagues of that fact. During every revolutionary agitation in Russia, when her revolutionary heroes could find asylum in France, Italy, Switzerland and England, the German government invariably denied them that asylum in Germany and handed them over to the Russian authorities whenever they were found on German soil. German Socialists have been imprisoned for speaking ill of the Tsar.

I cannot forget that in the partition and dismemberment of poor Poland Russia and Prussia were allies. Nor that Germany has treated the Poles under her rule as badly as Russia ever did. Nor that it was the powerful friendship of Russia which enabled Prussia to defeat and humiliate France in 1871. Can our German friends have forgotten that Russia, under Alexander II., prevented Austria and Italy from joining in the struggle, and that the Emperor William wrote to the Tsar that he owed to His Majesty "the happy issue of the conflict" and vowing that he would never forget the obligation? Have they forgotten how, in 1875, Bismarck again appealed to Russia to repeat the good offices of 1870-71, promising in return the co-operation of Germany in the furtherance of Russia's designs in the East?

True, within the last twenty years the military

class in Germany has indulged in much criticism and abuse of Russia. Ever since the unscrupulous Bismarck betrayed, in 1878, the Russia to whose Tsar the Prussian ruler had written, signing himself "Your ever grateful friend," Russia had refused to be Germany's catspaw. Hence the abuse of Russia. During the weeks which elapsed between the assassination of the Austrian Crown Prince and the outbreak of war, the war party in Germany played its trump card by appealing to the fear of Russia. The barbarism of the great Russian Empire was depicted as a menace to the integrity of Germany, "Russia is the enemy! Down with Russia! Down with tyranny!" That appeal swept even the Socialists off their feet. At least, all the spokesmen of the German Socialist majority—Scheidemann, Sudekum—have pointed to the Russian "menace" as justification for their support of the government. How poor an excuse! On the very day that the German Socialist majority decided to vote in favor of the war budget, August 3, the great Socialist daily, *Vorwärts*, ridiculed most mercilessly the "patriots" who were howling for a war of "freedom against Russia." *Vorwärts* pointed out that it was not true to say that Russia was a stronghold of reaction; that it had become a stronghold of revolutionary passion and aspiration. And, in any case, the German government, which had constantly punished German Socialists for "insulting the Tsar" had no right to appeal to German workers to war against that Tsar.

What a mocking commentary upon the subsequent action of the Socialist majority that editorial of August 3 makes!

IV.

When, in 1878, Russia, relying upon the Dreikaiserbund, sought, at the Congress of Berlin, the support of Bismarck for her demands that "honest broker" ignored Germany's debt to Russia and left her in the lurch. Consequently, Russia was denied that which she had so long coveted, a free outlet from the Black Sea for her commerce and her immense crops, and a passage for her fleet to the Mediterranean.

Had the result of the Berlin Congress been otherwise, had Russia either been permitted to take Constantinople, the key to the Dardanelles, or guaranteed the freedom of the Straits of Constantinople, her subsequent history must have been very different from that which has made us fear and hate the very name of Russia. Of this much we may be fairly certain. Possession of an outlet from the Black Sea would have inaugurated an industrial revolution in Russia. Her immense natural resources, especially her vast deposits of coal, iron and petroleum, would have been developed, and a large part of her immense peasant class would have been transformed into an industrial proletariat.

There is no reason to believe that these changes

would have been unattended by evil consequences. The economic revolution would not have been an unmixed blessing. Just as the industrial revolution of the 18th Century in England brought about many distressing social evils, so, it is likely, many distressing evils would have accompanied the industrial revolution in Russia.

But one thing is certain, namely, that the necessities of economic development would have shattered the feudalism of the Empire. Absolutism is incompatible with the conditions of modern industry. Freedom of movement is an essential condition of that mobility of labor without which no considerable factory system could be built up. Universal popular education is likewise necessary, as the experience of all industrial countries has shown. Capitalist expansion would have shattered despotism and bureaucracy far more quickly and effectively than all the terrorist dynamite imaginable.

Above all, the persecution of the Jews—in its worst forms, at least, would have been obviated. There would, in all probability, never have been a pogrom and the "Pale" would have ceased to exist long before this. Narrow racial antipathies are melted in the fierce fires of modern industrialism. The enormous demand for labor would have made the restrictions under which the Jews live anomalous and impossible.

When we bear in mind the great revolutionary sentiment in Russia, the spiritual background, it is easy to believe that the growth of political democracy in Russia would have kept pace with the economic advance. By this time, I believe, Russia would have been not only a great industrial nation, but likewise one of the most free and democratic nations in the world. The British government protected Turkey and thwarted Russia. And because of that policy—which now appears so shortsighted and mistaken—Russia has been economically compelled to remain a feudal empire.

Because I believe this, and because I believe, further, that there can never be anything like democracy in Russia except as a corollary of a great economic expansion, I have come to hope that in this war she will achieve a decisive victory and get the outlet to the Mediterranean which she must have in order to become a great capitalist nation. If she acquires Constantinople—even if she takes the whole of European Turkey and forces the Ottoman Empire to keep within the boundaries of Asia, its proper place—that victory will not strengthen the reactionary ruling class of Russia; it will not add new strength and vitality to the despotism of the Romanoffs.

On the contrary, it will strengthen and make invincible the class whose historic role it is to destroy absolutism and to lay the foundations for a generous democracy.

Book Reviews

Fabian Socialism and the Collectivist Trend

IN at least two of its aspects Fabian Socialism is constructive. (1) When it studies existing democratic institutions and projects their probable explanation in the future as in the recent supplements of the *New Statesmen* by Sidney Webb, and (2) when it makes a collection of collectivist data, frankly ignoring democracy, and even politics in general as in the book of Emil Davies.¹

Davies calmly assumes that all modern collectivism is sooner or later democratic in its character. But even to the democratic and radical Socialist, Davies' book and the facts to which he calls attention have the utmost importance.

Davies admits that the inception of collectivism is far from democratic. That it arises chiefly from the "necessity for further revenue on the part of the state or city," which he does not deny is a form of indirect taxation. "For protection against monopoly," which he does not deny is demanded largely by competitive business interests and small traders, and from "the natural extension of existing State or municipally owned undertakings, by the addition of fresh branches of production or services." He does not deny that the present state and cities are in the hands of the business interests, though he seems to assume that they are governed by the people.

However, the Socialist will agree that this tendency towards collectivism is capable of being used sooner or later by the lower classes in their own interests. This is seen very clearly in view of the enormous collectivist strides Davies is able to show in practically every modern country. We shall take only a few points by way of illustration. Undoubtedly the most important industrial function nationalized up to the present has been the railroads. The near future promises not only further railway nationalization in Great Britain and the United States, but also a nationalization of transportation at sea. Before our recent shipping bill Davies predicted steps in this direction, and the pressure of business men who are shippers is greater than ever in this country at the present moment. Davies calls attention to the fact that Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa are already considering such measures. And the enormous subsidies already granted by Great Britain and other

countries, which will doubtless be increased after the war, may bring about partial or complete nationalization in other countries. As transportation is the very basis of modern industry, the importance of this step cannot be overstated.

Equally significant is the tendency towards nationalization and municipalization of land, since such a large part of the increase of wealth takes the shape of a rise in land values. In Germany some of the principal towns, such as Stettin, own more than half the land on which they stand. While still larger places, such as Cologne, Breslau, Strassburg, Aix-la-Chapelle and Wiesbaden, own more than one-third. The value of the land owned by Frankfurt is fifteen million dollars. Some smaller places have gone much further. Ulm in Wurttemberg owns three-fourths of the land on which it stands and pays no taxes. Because of the ownership of land there are 526 districts in Bavaria and 121 in Baden which are absolutely free of local land taxes.

Incidentally we might remark that this fact shows that collectivism in land up to the present time has all gone for the benefit of the tax-paying part of the population. Indeed Davies quotes the remark of the Burgomaster of a small Baden town:

"The enjoyment of the public land also enforces the love of home and is a dam against the tide of social democracy."

The Fabian authority does not make a reply to this argument but seems to consider it a joke. This is very strange in view of the fact that he refers elsewhere in his book, as a high authority, to a pamphlet on Municipalization, by Sidney Webb, in which it is declared that the use of municipal profits for the relief of local taxation means that municipalization is in vain from a democratic standpoint. Of course the Socialist point of view is that municipalization of land or of any public service is of value, because, if taxes on the wealth are first abolished, they may later be restored.

Indeed the municipalization of land shows clearly the nature of the whole movement—under present political conditions. In Klingenberg in Lower Franconia, Freudenstadt in Württemberg, and Hagenau (Alsace), the householders are even given dividends from the municipally owned land. Does this not clearly suggest that no matter how far collectivism goes, it will always be possible to divide its profits among the favored few as long as the many consent to such a dispensation?

The wide extension of municipal land ownership is by no means limited to Germany. In 1912 Paris invested forty million dollars in municipal dwellings to be rented, while Buenos Ayres undertook to build ten thousand workingmen's homes at the rate of two thousand a year. Manchester and Glasgow actually furnished flats to people of limited means.

Besides drawing attention to more or less well-known facts such as the usual governmental ownership of forests, the wide spread governmental operation of coal mines, Davies refers to a number of governmental activities less widely known. For example: the partial governmental ownership of the oil fields of the Argentine Republic; the control of water power on a large scale in Germany, Austria, Norway, Switzerland and other countries; the Japanese and Hungarian steel works; the municipal ownership of drug stores in Russia and Italy.

Davies' enumeration seems to be fairly complete. But it is remarkable that he does not admit even the most reactionary State Socialist policy has taken away anything from the Socialist value of nationalization. He notes the fact, for example, that the State Railways of Prussia have contributed four hundred and fifty million dollars to the national exchequer, and disapproves of it, but he is by no means ready to say that such a policy, if it goes far enough, might rob the people even worse than a system of private ownership—though this is obviously the fact. Davies' book then has a double value—it reviews the tendencies of the present, and it gives us one of the most remarkable illustrations of the Fabian psychology yet recorded.

WILLIAM ENGLISH WALLING.

Case Against England

IN this publication, undoubtedly the most valuable anti-British publication since the outbreak of the war, are collected the statements of twelve British authorities. It is a radical jury; six out of the twelve are Socialists and two or three others are advanced radicals—although the testimony of the *London Times* is also included with good effect. The Socialists are: Bernard Shaw, J. Ramsay MacDonald, Philip Snowden, A. Fenner Brockway, Clifford Allen, and *The Labour Leader*.

Every document in the pamphlet is valuable; every one shows that the mo-

¹ *The Collectivist State in the Making*, London: G. Bell & Sons.

¹ *The Anglo-German Case Tried By a Jury of Englishmen*. The Fatherland. New York.

A Socialist Digest

Eliminating Economic Causes of War

tives and policy of the British government were not as they were officially represented to be. The most valuable from this as well as every other standpoint, is the article from *The Labour Leader*, "How the War Came." Socialists and radical democrats do not question the purely capitalistic motives that move the British government. There is no need for pointing them out here. But the pamphlet has another value. All the Socialist articles and also those by two well known pacifists, C. H. Norman, and E. D. Morel, take what Socialists called before the present war, the bourgeois pacifist point of view—that is the point of view of Norman Angell and Jane Addams. *The Labour Leader* article also contains an excellent brief statement of the Social adaptation of this doctrine. The partisan bitterness of the I. L. P. organ against British Imperialism is so great that it adopts the basic argument of the German militarists, indorses the proposition that the invasion of Europe by Attila and the Huns was inevitable and that the present German need for expansion is similar!

"The enormous expansions in Germany of both industry and population since 1871 compelled her to shape her foreign policy with an eye upon the world and not on Europe alone. She was subject to the same kind of internal pressure which in earlier times led to those eruptions of migration which have given us our present national and racial distributions of population."

The Labour Leader admits that the British were less prepared for war than the Germans. But it concludes that the British were less competent instead of concluding that this unpreparedness is evidence that the British government was less aggressive in bringing on the war than that of Germany.

The Labour Leader praises the German system as being more efficient not only in military, but in civil life. It overlooks entirely all the vast literature of the German Socialists where it is pointed out that this civil efficiency has been secured at the cost of democracy, and asserts that the only respect in which Germany is more militaristic than France is that it is more efficient—thus ignoring completely the military advantages due to autocracy as asserted by the German militarists and freely criticized by all democratic peoples.

Perhaps the most astounding statement of *The Labour Leader* is its conclusion that the "Germanic Alliance and the Entente were respectively dominated by bitterly opposed racial influences," giving this racial antagonism as the principal cause of the war. Here is a definite abandonment of the economic point of view.

J. D.

AT last a common-sense business-like movement has been inaugurated against war. Up to the present we have had nothing but a rehashing of the sentimental bourgeois pacifism of 1850. At last business-men have formed a "Society for the Elimination of the Economic Causes of War." Socialists will not expect the society to end war, but it may succeed in educating "public opinion," and lining-up the middle classes and small-business men in support of the big business policy that is headed in the direction of "a trust of nations," or rather a trust of the ruling financial powers of the leading nations.

The new society absolutely rejects both militarism and pacifism. Pacifism, it contends, is merely "a form of national stand-patism." Pacifism means that the law of nations rests upon present possessions. Against militarism and pacifism the society advocates internationalism.

It declares:

"Europe's war is easily analyzed as to its basic causes—it is purely economic. It is sharp, bitter, bloody competition, in a national sense.

"One side stands for militarism—which is simply barbarism carried over into the twentieth century.

"If the world is to be ruled by militarism, it means that every nation must be armed to the teeth, with war always inevitable.

"The other stands for pacificism—which is simply a form of national stand-patism.

"If this policy is to prevail, many nations will be deprived of a fair opportunity—and sooner or later, war is inevitable.

"The United States stands for internationalism, which is firmly opposed both to militarism and pacificism.

"Internationalism tends toward *real world peace*—an end to war, to the preparations for war, and to the looking forward to war.

"Internationalism stands for the principle of democracy applied to international affairs. This means an international commercial alliance, trade routes under joint control, and the 'open-door' policy.

"Internationalism applied to world affairs means international co-operation.

"It can abolish war by accomplishing peaceably the results which war now achieves at such appalling sacrifice and cost.

"This world cannot remain neutral

—it cannot run away from its problems.

"Internationalism is the solution—it provides the *enlightened way* of doing the things which are now sought through war.

The new society is on a sound economic basis. Its peace program which follows is purely economic, and is addressed to 'Business Interests':

"The surest way to prevent war is to remove the temptation to war. This can be done only by providing the means by which nations can secure and retain peacefully, through some representative organization, the ends which they would otherwise seek to secure through war. Although the world cannot remain *in statu quo*, there must be a more efficient means of determining policies and bringing about changes than by resort to war.

"It is generally agreed that the causes of war in modern times are largely matters of commerce and trade. Hence the first step must be the neutralization of the seas. There may, however, be other things to consider. Tariffs, for instance, are virtually contracts which nations make with one another. If, under a certain tariff, the nations build up certain trade, has any one of the nations a moral right to change its tariffs without the consent of at least a majority of the others? The same principle applies to international shipping, banking, immigration, etc. Is it not because nations can now make laws which may ruin competing nations, that these nations are now fighting for more colonies and greater world power?

"The present disturbed condition of the world's trade makes this a favorable moment for the consideration of some plan to eliminate the economic causes of war. The neutralization of trade routes and the prevention of additional legislation by any one nation against the people or trade of any other country, excepting by consent of a representative international commission, supported by international force, presents such a method.

"This plan provides security and opportunity for all, eliminates the necessity for the control of trade routes by any one power and the opposition to such control by any other. It provides what perhaps no other plan does, an incentive to states to combine. Nations will naturally combine to protect the neutrality of trade routes and the joint regulation of the extension of national

barriers—once such neutrality and joint regulation have been secured—as the easiest and cheapest method of protection. Commercial alliance appeals where political alliance does not.

“The plan involves the yielding of some so-called sovereign rights; but

this is more than offset by an ultimate advantage of almost incalculable value. Unless nations are willing to join in a movement for international protection they must continue to compete in expenditures for national defense. There is no half-way ground.”

favor of maintaining Wilson's present policy, but it seems to be a little more positive, since it justifies the exportation of arms. It writes as follows:

“It would be very foolish for the United States, if it can possibly avoid it, to permit itself to be mixed up in the world's war. By keeping out and saving their money, the Americans who do things will be in a most advantageous position in competing for the world's markets. Their competitors will be crippled and burdened with debt. It is for this very reason that there would be great rejoicing in Europe if the United States could be involved. It would equalize competition after the war shall be concluded if Uncle Sam should have a wooden leg.

“The American people are not cowards. There are just as many patriots here as there are in Germany or France or England. It would be no trouble whatever to recruit a volunteer army. Even the terrors of typhoid and embalmed beef are not great enough to keep the American patriot from rallying to his country's defense. But just now it isn't good business. There is more money in selling supplies to the belligerents than in equipping an army to keep the door open in China or to avenge the sinking of a tank steamer in the North Sea.

“Neutrality demands that the Allies shall pay for their ammunition and Germany for what it can get.”

There has also been no demand in *Vorwaerts* or on the part of the German Party that we cease our exportation of arms.

The German Socialists seem to be almost unanimous in condemning the sinking of the *Lusitania*. Bernstein's able and courageous statement in *Vorwaerts*, already mentioned by the cables, has now reached us in full. It contains the following extremely significant passages, all the more valuable in view of the obvious limitations caused by the censorship. Bernstein says:

“The opinions that reach us from those countries which have, *up to the present*, remained out of the world war, leave no doubt that in proportion as one side outbids the other in measures of retaliation, it strengthens the hostility of these countries.” (Our italics.)

Bernstein then says that the time has come when thoughtful persons everywhere fear that the war will lead to the mutual exhaustion of both sides and that it should be stopped before that time arrives:

“But it is to be feared that this will be postponed again and again whenever either side resorts to some new form of retaliation. A glance at the press of *that nation where this retali-*

A New Socialist International Congress and the Terms of Peace

AN international congress of Socialists is to be attempted at The Hague early in July. All the neutral countries will be represented, and delegations have already been selected to represent England and Germany, but it is not yet certain that Russia, France, and Belgium will participate. The Russian Socialist leaders have accepted the invitation subject to certain special conditions.

The Belgian leader, M. Vandervelde, has refused point blank to have anything to do with any conference in which Germany participates. The French Socialists and syndicalists also declined the invitation in the first place. Austria and Hungary will be represented if it is possible for their delegates to get through Germany for this purpose.

The leading German delegates will be Scheidemann and Bernstein. The English delegates, although already chosen, have not been announced. They include, however, representatives of both pro-war and anti-war movements in the British Labor party.

The preliminary organization of the congress is in charge of the Swiss Socialists. The tentative platform, which is understood to have received the approval of committees in Germany, Austria, England, Italy and the Scandinavian countries, contains the following demands relating to the European war:

“Evacuation of Belgian and French territory and indemnity to Belgium.

“Immediate limitation of armaments by all countries, with a view to ultimately abolishing altogether all armed forces of individual states.

“Obligatory arbitration and conciliation in cases of disputes between states.

“Absolute right of *all* small nationalities to decide their future destiny; this decision to be made a matter of referendum in which all adult males and females shall participate.” (Our italics.)

The new conference was originally proposed by the Swiss to be held at The Hague on May 30th. For this conference Grenlich, the Swiss leader, had prepared a most interesting program.

Greulich takes the German as opposed to the French view that the “weaknesses and failures of brother parties are to be forgotten.”

He advocates the participation of neutral nations in the peace negotia-

tions and a very radical and *definite* disarmament program—both extremely important innovations in Socialist peace programs.

The central point of his program is the formation of a United States of Europe in which armies and armaments are to be strictly limited and all fortifications destroyed. This latter proposition—for the first time—proposes an effective counterweight to the otherwise anti-British demand for neutralization of the seas.

The economic program for the new United States of Europe is especially important. There is to be a common control of foreign affairs through a central parliament. All tariffs are to be abolished and all persons and goods given a free access to the sea, which is to be neutralized. To prevent financiers' control all banks are to be nationalized whether operating at home or abroad—thus avoiding financiers' wars. All national debts are to be paid off—which would involve of course heavy graduated income and inheritance taxes. Greulich, strangely, favors the abolition of all land taxes.

German-American Crisis

SINCE President Wilson's second note to Germany, the American Socialist press continues to take the American side of the controversy, while still strenuously opposing war. This applies to the German Socialist press in America also. The *New York Volkszeitung* declared Germany's answer to Wilson's first note as “in no way satisfactory.” It said further at this time:

“The situation created by the German answer is certainly critical. A negative answer from the American Government which absolutely insists upon its rights may create a breach that will lead us into war.”

The *Volkszeitung* expressed its relief at Wilson's second note as follows:

“In view of the moderated form of Wilson's note there can be no question that, while insisting upon the original demands, he is seeking to bring about a peaceful solution of the differences.” The *Volkszeitung* expresses no regret over this repetition of the original demands.

The *Milwaukee Leader* is also in

ation policy has perhaps the warmest and most influential advocates leaves no doubt. A single week has perhaps postponed the chance of success for months. Let all those who have forgotten that an exaggerated patriotism is very dan-

gerous bear this in mind."

The words in italics refer to Germany. The week of which Bernstein speaks is the week of the Lusitania incident and the "ill-advised comments of German newspapers."

A German and an English View of British Imperialism

SINCE the beginning of the war two important studies of British imperialism have reached us from Germany; one is contained in the volumes of Rohrbach, the authority on German imperialism. The other, in a special supplement to *Die Neue Zeit*, published at the end of last July, and written by J. B. Askew, a well-known British Socialist long resident in Berlin. Rohrbach, in *German World Politics*, tells us of England's purposes as they were already shaping themselves in 1912:

"England's purpose was the creation of a solid and unbroken empire from South Africa to Australia, and the division of Turkey. Germany was to have no voice in the necessary rearrangements. If she objected, she was to be deprived of her African possessions, of her fleet, and, if possible, also of Alsace-Lorraine.

"The ultimate aim of England is nothing less than the absorption into the empire of all the countries between the Nile and the Indus."

We need not doubt that these are, indeed, the imperialistic aims of the British government, whether in conservative or liberal hands. Rohrbach, however, aside from his practical admission of the relative inferiority of German to British imperialism—pays an unwilling tribute to the semi-democratic character of the latter—as far as white people are concerned. There is nothing in the German record parallel to the British treatment of their recent enemies, the Boers, and Rohrbach says:

"The more independent the former Boers grow in the administration of their internal affairs, the more readily will they declare themselves willing to be and to remain a powerful member of the great English world empire."

As Rohrbach favors keeping the colored races in permanent subjection, he is unable to attack the British empire at its weak spot, from the democratic standpoint, namely, its treatment of the colored races. Askew fulfills this task perfectly. He says that to call the British empire democratic or semi-democratic is absurd:

"In speaking of the democratic British empire just one little trifle is for-

gotten; that is, the natives, against whom the English are only a small and very thin upper layer. A democratic imperialism would mean that this majority would not only be protected against injustice, but would be given an equal influence in the politics of the empire. The empire then is a democracy only if regarded from the standpoint of the whites. In reality it is an aristocracy of the privileged just as the democracy of Athens was. That it will ever evolve into a real democracy nobody believes. . . .

"And as to the protection of the natives by imperial government at the present time: if the imperial government really set to work to prescribe their conduct in this question to the independent colonies, then the colony concerned would immediately declare itself independent. The imperial government can issue such orders only to a dependent colony, that is, to one in which there is no democracy. And even there it would be possible only in exceptional and extreme cases to accomplish anything important against the will of the white colonists."

It is hardly necessary to mention the evidence Askew brings together in support of these undeniable propositions. But it is worth while to point out that Askew is troubled by the fear that even the Socialists of the British empire are unlikely to demand the application of democracy to the colored races.

"How a Socialist society will regulate the question of civilization in the tropics we cannot say. Only one thing is clear: the most strenuous watchfulness will be necessary if the old slavery is not introduced under every variety of beautiful sounding names [that is, even under Socialism]."

The only practical argument Askew can bring up against the introduction of tropical slavery under Socialism is that if it is introduced in the tropics it may also be applied at home. This is surely possible but it is by no means certain. Assume that a method should be found by which slavery shall be limited strictly to the colored peoples, and that even its indirect results should be avoided as far as the whites are concerned—what then?

Gompers vs. Bryan

CONVENTIONS of the American Federation of Labor have uniformly shown that when Mr. Gompers deliberately takes a position he usually represents from 80 to 90 per cent. of the organized labor of the country. His opposition to Bryan, who also claims to represent labor, is then extremely important.

In the immense amount of literature Mr. Bryan put forth in the week following his resignation, a large part of the public probably failed to note the real issue that rose between him and Mr. Gompers.

At the same meeting at which the Gompers letter was read in which he defined the attitude of American labor unionism on the war, Bryan made two statements which put his position in a nutshell. He is a nationalist and rejects internationalism. He refuses to cede one jot of American sovereignty even for the purpose of forming a federation of nations. He is a pacifist, but he refuses to cede the smallest part of national sovereignty even for the cause of peace. The passages referred to are as follows:

"But even if we were willing to repudiate the advice of Washington and surrender the Doctrine of Monroe, would the people be willing so to amend the Constitution as to transfer from our Congress to European nations the right to declare war? The right to declare war is vested in Congress; the plan proposed by 'the League to Enforce Peace' would vest the power to declare war in a group of nations in which we could not, of course, exercise a controlling influence. To depart from this position and join a group of nations in an agreement, by the terms of which we let them declare war for us and bind ourselves to furnish our quota of men and money for the enforcement of decrees which may not represent the wishes of our people, would not be an ascent to a higher plane; it would be a descent and would impair our influence and jeopardize our moral prestige."

Against this ultra-nationalist position, Gompers claims that American labor would in the last extremity place certain principles for which the international labor movement stands even above peace. He says:

"I am not willing to have either the labor movement or our men and women placed in a false position. The United States will not voluntarily enter into the present European war. Of that I am confident. We shall keep out of it if we possibly can with any degree of faithfulness to the fundamental principles of justice, freedom and safety.

"If, despite our reserve and self-control, we shall be dragged into it, whether we like it or not, there will be but one position for us to take, and that is, to be true to ourselves, true to our fellows, true to the highest ideals of humanity for which our movement stands.

"Who deplores the struggles which resulted in the wringing from an unwill-

ing King the Magna Charta? Who is there who has one harsh word to utter against the men who were engaged in the Revolution to make the Declaration of Independence and the republic of the United States actualities? Who now condemns Abraham Lincoln in the fight which he and the men of his time contested for the abolition of human slavery and the maintenance of the Union?"

Vorwaerts Against the German Party and Labor Unions

VORWAERTS claims that the next Party congress will show that it represents the majority of the Party. Of course this will depend upon the results of the war. But at the present moment there is little question that the majority of the Party organization stands against *Vorwaerts*. It is equally clear that *Vorwaerts* represents a very large section, perhaps not far from half of the Party.

The monthly organ of the Revisionists, *Die Sozialistische Monatshefte*, has published a very elaborate and bitter attack on *Vorwaerts*, by Winnig, a member of the Reichstag, in which he accuses the Party organ not only of opposing the majority of the Reichstag Group, but also of being cool and indifferent towards the labor unions. To this *Vorwaerts* replies:

"That *Vorwaerts* in the judgment of Socialist politics did not allow itself to be guided by the daily decisions of various Party organs which were governed by the overwhelming power of events, but by the theory which the Party had built up and protected for half a century and followed the well-knit decisions of the official congresses of the German and international Socialist democracy is an entirely normal course."

But by far the most important part of *Vorwaerts'* defense is its treatment of its attitude towards the labor unions. For it reaches the extremely significant conclusion that the Party has to pursue its own course even if the majority of the labor unions oppose it. It is true this was the position of the Party when its present program was prepared at Erfurt in 1891 and for several years afterwards. But for the last fifteen years at least the Party has been almost without exception in thorough accord with the unions. In recent years the labor union leaders have dominated the Party Executive, and since the present war matters have passed entirely into their hands.

Vorwaerts centers its attack mainly against the labor union leaders, but this is the familiar course taken when there is an agreement between the So-

cialist Party and the labor unions. It says:

"Winnig speaks of the labor unions and means the political plans and illusions of certain labor union leaders. Winnig is himself a labor union leader and clearly holds himself as the mouth-piece of the circle of labor union leaders. Now we have already seen from a quotation from one of Winnig's articles that he is striving for a new international Socialist policy with a new spiritual content and new forms. The same is true of his national labor politics. For Winnig the old social-democratic theory has been outgrown—the war has helped a new social reform, nationalistic Socialist labor policy to be born."

After quoting a passage which shows that Winnig, representing the German labor union leaders, is preparing to take a pro-governmental attitude in internal as well as in foreign politics, *Vorwaerts* says:

"These great changes in the labor movement have prepared a new foundation for the spiritual life of the working class. On the surface of the movement outworn forms and conceptions still rule, forms and conceptions which had their historical justification in the time of a heroic struggle against a whole world of enemies.

"With the negation of the state, the representatives of the working class could no longer avoid a feeling of responsibility, in which was included a feeling of citizenship; denied, cursed, and despised at the beginning, it nevertheless grew stronger and continued to spread.

"That resulted in a change in the point of view, which did not at first come to the consciousness and needed a longer time or a great catastrophe to bring it to life. . . ."

Vorwaerts defines its own position on the question of the labor union influence in politics:

"Here we see formulated (in Winnig's article) the conversion of Winnig to a new Socialism of a bourgeois nationalistic social reform stamp, to a trade union politics after the model of British trade unionism.

"And the central organ of the Party [*Vorwaerts*], which regards this Socialism as being nothing else than a fateful and blameworthy retrogression into bourgeois ideas which were formerly despised and attacked without mercy, and therefore rejects it as a matter of duty, is now accused of hostility to the labor unions!

"That is a very simple and polemical trick. For the very simplest member of the labor union knows that the labor unions as such have nothing whatever in common with revisionist illusions and the politics of a part of their leaders. Quite contrary. One can do no better service to the unions than to warn their members against the political aberrations of certain labor union leaders."

Now comes the significant concluding paragraph in which *Vorwaerts* demands that the Party continue its previous course, with the unions if possible, without them if necessary. It says:

"The politics of the Social Democracy is determined by the Party. All other influences, even if they hide behind a supposedly labor union policy, must be decisively rejected, and for the conduct of the organs of the Party the program and resolutions of the Party are authoritative, but not the wishes of certain labor leaders."

This passage seems clearly to indicate that even if the labor unions definitely support their leaders in their present nationalistic social reform and "Labor Party" policy, *Vorwaerts* and the large section of the Socialist Party represented by it will continue on its present course—namely, that which has hitherto been known as the Socialist policy.

Vorwaerts issued a still more explicit declaration of independence on behalf of the Party against labor unions a few days later in answer to an attack by Karl Legien, head of the German Confederation of Labor Unionists. *Vorwaerts* declared.

"In the politics of the Social Democratic Party we do not recognize any labor union leaders, but only Party comrades; therefore we have fully repudiated Winnig's effort to formulate a special kind of labor union politics.

"The conduct of the wage struggle is the business of the unionists. Also in the realm of social legislation the Party will always attach the highest importance to the unionists and desire of the labor unions. But the politics of the Party as a whole can be determined only by the Party itself. The labor union members inside of the Party have a title to vote only as Party comrades, not as representatives of the unions."

A vote taken within the Socialist Reichstag group at the time when it voted in favor of the third war loan

in March, indicates, according to *Vorwaerts*, that the majority faction is preparing to abandon its traditional oppositional tactics permanently—that is even after the war. The Reichstag group refused by a vote of sixty to thirty-four to declare that it was voting for the whole governmental budget on this occasion “exclusively under the pressure of the war loan” or that “nothing was to be regarded as changed as to the principle of rejecting budgets generally.”

It is well known that the principle of rejecting budgets has been the backbone of the Socialist Party policy in Germany, being its method of demonstrating fundamental opposition to the government.

The majority faction of the Party however, gives another interpretation

to the vote above referred to. It declares that on this occasion the majority refused only to say that the vote for the budget was not to be regarded as “a vote of confidence,” or as “a precedent for the future.” Even in this interpretation the action taken is novel and important. It not only suggests that a vote of confidence in the government was probably intended, but also that it was intended to serve as a precedent for support to the government in the future, under other conditions. But the majority went further in their interpretation of this action. They refused to declare that the war was not a precedent only because that this should be taken as a matter of course. *Vorwaerts* however claims that no such explanation of the majority action was given at the time the vote was taken.

rights can vary, just as do the conditions of civilization themselves, as well as the political conditions of the world.

“Democracy is a great new force which furnishes, even for national problems, new solutions. Certainly the Irish, oppressed, expropriated, starved by aristocratic England, have more than once had recourse to violence. In the past they committed more and more “outrages”; but now, with the growth of English democracy, Ireland has no need to have recourse to a national rising or to constitute itself into a separate political State. To obtain Home Rule nothing more has been needed than to exercise a continuous action in the English Parliament. Let the democracy be entirely realized in Russia and Finland’s liberties will be re-established; Finland, having regained its full autonomy in the great common liberty, would ask for nothing better than to remain associated with the immense life of the freed Russian people. Let the democracy be entirely realized in Russia, in Germany, in Austro-Hungary, and the problem of Poland, the problem of Schleswig, of Alsace-Lorraine, of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia are solved without the people having been thrown against one another, without an appeal having been made to the sword. The direction of Socialist effort throughout the world is very distinct. It may be said with certainty that in this effort is the solution of the difficult problems which weigh on Europe, and only in it.

“The most ‘nationalist’ of Frenchmen, the most jingo, recognize this truth since they proclaim that they do not wish in any case to take the initiative in a war, that they do not meditate any ‘revenge,’ and that it was only from considerations of defense that they demanded the three years’ law. Well, now, if it only depends on them, if Germany does not take the initiative in aggression, years will pass, generations and centuries will pass without the problem of Alsace-Lorraine arising. Thus would come about its eternal abandonment if the problem had no other solution than force. The progress of democracy and Socialism opens the one single way to a solution.

“Our second principle, our second rule, is that Europe can and ought to pursue its economic expansion over the world without threatening the independence of States and without committing violence against the peoples. Wisdom and equity alike demand it. To divide up Turkey would be not only to commit an outrage; it would also be to awaken through the whole extent of Asia Minor the bitter rivalries of European governments. To dismember or try to dismember China would be not

The Last Views of Jaurès on Problems of War and Peace

WHERE would Jaurès stand if he had lived after the outbreak of the present war? There is much division of opinion on this question. The French Socialists are unanimous in claiming that he would be a member of the French Cabinet. A posthumous article published in *l’Humanité* is the last important expression from his pen, and gives us all the light we need on the question. Jaurès wrote:

“Solicitude for peace does not in the least exclude, does not in the least diminish, in Socialism, the solicitude for national independence. And it is not, if I may say so, a theoretic solicitude expressing itself in general and inefficacious formulas; it is a solicitude very positive, very precise, and truly organic.

“It may almost be said that what characterizes the present period in France is the interest that the proletariat, that Socialism takes in National Defense. It was an inevitable movement; for it is impossible for a great party to demand from a nation that it should transform its social institutions, if it does not invite it at the same time to insure its independence against all exterior intervention, against all violence or every threat from without.

“In proportion, then, as the Socialist Party grows, it is led to define its views on the Army as an institution, and to propose the form of army which seems to conform the best with a modern democracy in quest of social justice in a Europe still exposed to all risks. The law of three years has had this curious effect; it has quickened in the Socialist Party, in the working class, the study of military problems. The

Party has learned that it is not enough for it to criticise, but that it must, in addition, give to the nation guarantees of security superior to those which exist at present. Thence comes the necessity to analyze the terms of the problem, to define what is to-day the rôle of the forces actually in barracks, what the rôle of the reserves, and what ought to be the rôle of both to-morrow.

“Just as the Socialist Party has a precise plan of military organization, so it has a precise plan for diplomatic conduct, and, if I may say so, for the organization of the world at peace. To affirm the will for peace would be of no use if it were not known on what foundations this peace should rest. To speak of international arbitration for all conflicts would be vain if it were not known what rights and principles should inspire the awards. Such decisions would indeed be both arbitrary and hazardous; that is, they would be violence in another form; and from this judicial disorder the most brutal forms of violence would not be slow to be born again.

“In the judgment which they give on these events, in the conduct which they advise, Socialists are inspired with a triple thought. First they desire that the peoples who have undergone the violences of conquest should be endowed with guarantees of liberty, and with institutions of autonomy which would permit them to develop, to think, to act according to their own genius, without the necessity of rearranging or breaking by force the framework created by force. They do not admit that the rights of nationalities can ever be prescribed; but they think that the means of claiming and of realizing these

only to commit a crime, to arrest the formation of a great organism which is trying to adapt itself to the conditions of life of the modern world; it would also be to start a formidable conflict between the diverse European ambitions. It is true that the apparently most convenient procedure for greedy appetites is to cut up, to conquer, to enslave. It is, or at least it appears, more troublesome to bind oneself to a long and slow economic penetration, and to develop business relations with all the peoples without being brutal to them, without being offensive. But if this task is more difficult, it is also higher and more fruitful.

"It is best, and this is the third rule proposed by the Socialists, to negotiate an entente of European peoples for a free association of industrial, commercial, and financial undertakings which tends towards a better management of this planet. No protective barriers, no monopoly; but a co-operation in which each national group will have an influence proportional to its real effort in the matter of the work which it has decided to put into the enterprise."

Haase's Volte-Face

HAASE and Bernstein are among those who now oppose the German government. Haase, it will be remembered, is one of the two chairmen of the Party and read the famous declaration supporting the Kaiser on the 4th of August. It is said on excellent authority that he was against the action taken at that time. We have given his speech in the Reichstag on March 18th. Far more outspoken was a speech given at a Socialist meeting in Frankfort in April. Then Haase said:

"I take the ground that no credits whatever should be granted to the government. Our programme, which demands that we should not leave the Fatherland unprotected, has nothing to do with this question. In 1870 Bebel, together with Liebknecht, refused to vote on this question in spite of his repeatedly emphasized love of the Fatherland. We do not wish to desert the Fatherland, to declare a general strike, or to do anything whatever. Everybody has to fulfill his duty as a citizen. But it does not follow from this that it was our duty to vote for the credits. That would mean a declaration of bankruptcy of our previous policy. Previously we had refused all credits to the government, in spite of the fact that our sons became soldiers. We are also doing our duty in the war to-day. But if I vote 'yes' in Parliament, I justify the policy of the government and am responsible for it. Is

there not a contradiction between our assent to-day and our previous conduct. We have always insisted that armaments lead to trouble, and when

the trouble came we took the responsibility for it. To be sure, we denied that responsibility in our declaration, but our action was otherwise."

Correspondence

England and the War

To the NEW REVIEW:

THE high standard reached by the NEW REVIEW, due to the quality of its articles and editing, will not be maintained if articles like "The War in England" in your April number become typical of the REVIEW. Any critical reader, whatever his bias, can see that this article is simply anti-English, and represents no other principle or opinion whatever.

It is no affair of mine to defend Capitalism or Capitalistic Governments, but I think it is time that some sober-minded Socialist protested against the absurd exaggerations and falsehoods that are often used in the name of Socialism, and against the degradation of the NEW REVIEW by an article as foolish as it is false.

Socialism implies scientific thought and analysis. Many Socialists are trying to make the facts of the great war fit some theory, and are yielding to passion and prejudice as much as any non-Socialists. This violation of scientific methods will inevitably react on the Socialist movement, dulling its vision and stultifying its efforts.

Evidently the writer has a very slight acquaintance with England, the English people and recent English history, and, I assume, on the strength of a short residence in England, he makes the most sweeping assertions and reckless criticisms as to what is going on there. The first misrepresentation is the assertion that England aims at and exerts supremacy on the Continent of Europe. What other nation in Europe would admit this supremacy, now or at any time in history? What the writer says here of England might with equal justice be said of any of the other first-class powers. The aim of the European nations on the whole, England included, has always been to prevent the threatened supremacy of any one of their number, and this war pretty obviously evidences this fact.

The next misrepresentation deals with Belgium and the Congo. The Congo Free State was established and guaranteed by the Concert of Europe, and the late King Leopold of Belgium was made its ruler, but the people of Belgium. As the writer says, "atrocities, either constitutionally or actually, and were no more responsible for its misgovernment than other peoples. England had no more chance of annex-

ing the Congo, and no more desire to attempt it, in opposition to the Concert of Europe, than of attempting to annex Belgium. As Mr. Isay says, "atrocities yarns" were circulated in England about the Congo; and there was very considerable agitation to try to move the English Government to take action to stop the atrocities. But the English Government, "looking slyly around for a chance to seize the Congo," could only and with difficulty be stirred to make mild representations to the Belgian and European governments, which were equally responsible.

"When the war started, England did not expect a protracted struggle." The writer invents as he goes along, making assertions and accusations at random. Nothing could be wilder or less according to the known facts than this statement. In order to picture with effect the "venom and hatred and wild desire for revenge" in England, he has to invent "their sweet sleep of security" and "sudden awakening." One would think that a pro-German would be willing to leave accusations of venom, hatred &c., alone; the contrast in this respect between the utterances of public men in Germany and England being remarkable. Also he might have been better advised to leave the treatment of aliens' question alone, and not invite thereby comparison with Germany. Undoubtedly there was a considerable, and often foolish, agitation in England on the subject, but it was only to be expected in view of Germany's remarkable spy system and the injury it was working to England and the extra difficulty and danger it imposed on English operations. But, if detention in decent conditions can be called "persecution and revenge," what name must be given to the German treatment of enemy civilians, or military prisoners for that matter?

The paragraph on the attitude of English women is characteristic. He wants to abuse them so he guesses his way along, saying what venomous things come to his tongue. The attitude of women in other countries, he assumes, is fairly reasonable, but here in England they are of course of the vilest. No responsible writer would put such silly guesses on paper. It is the very hysterical hatred he accuses the English of. In searching round for more evil allegations against England, he invents, for American consump-

tion, English hatred of the French, "because they have not beaten the Germans," and of the Belgians, because hundreds of thousands of their refugees in England "are an uncomfortable reminder of the plight of Belgium." Could an honest critic pen such stuff? Certainly it can deceive no one who is not wanting to be deceived.

And the paragraph on the treatment of the Belgian refugees! How capacious and deliberately misleading! If they are fed, it is "grudgingly." If they are given work, it is "to transmute Belgian misery into English profit."

Is it not the function of Capitalism everywhere to transmute the misery of the workers into the profits of the master-class? Can hundreds of thousands of refugees be suddenly brought into a foreign country and be made perfectly comfortable, when the majority of the native population are suffering the hard conditions of the war crisis? But any lie is good enough in the name of Socialism and it is against this debauching of Socialism I protest.

The writer has discovered a new "cause of the war," namely to deliver the Liberal Government in England from its awkward position on the Home Rule question! Even the British Socialists are using "venom and hatred" against Germany. He uses these words so frequently, one wonders that it has not occurred to him that he is reading his own German venom and hatred into other people's attitudes.

There is an amazing statement of this new student of English problems:—"The middle-class is very small in comparison with other countries." What! Napoleon's "nation of shopkeepers" with its large mass of population between the aristocracy and the proletariat!

Lastly, he rails against the British Navy, as tho' it were the sole danger in the world. "The British fleet today is the monster that rules the world and strangles other nations in their efforts at competition." A fine sounding accusation, but in what sense is it true? As far as trade goes, free-trade England encourages competition more than any other country. But the navy prevents other countries, that is Germany, from seizing British Colonies. Hence these tears!

"But we need not despair," says our worthy enemy of Britain. "The day will come when the British world-empire will cease." The other nations should cease their internecial strife and unite to destroy the British menace. I suppose that all Socialists hope for the abolition of Capitalism by an international proletarian movement, but this writer, in his ravings about nationalism and inter-nationalism and "nationalistic internationalism," only re-

veals his own bitter nationalism.

If we look to the solidarity of the workers of the world as the hope of escape from the chaos of capitalist industry, it is only to realize the still higher ideal of the solidarity of human society. In this appalling catastrophe that is overwhelming European society, I cannot forget the one-ness of the human race, and I resent the calous sneer, the cheap accusations, the shallow ridicule that are cast, in the name of Socialism, against the greatly suffering peoples of the old countries, because, forsooth, they are under Capitalist governments.

RALPH G. GREY.

Thoburn, B. C., Canada.

An Answer to Debs

To the NEW REVIEW:

It was with some shocking surprise that I read the words of Eugene V. Debs on "The Sinking of the Lusitania"; it shows that not only the comrades of Europe but also some of our best comrades here in America have lost their balance because of the war.

To get excited over the sinking of some "innocents" (as though the soldiers in the fields are more guilty than the women and children passengers) at a time when murder and pillage is the order of the day, when one people are trying to starve another, and each side is bent on destroying the other at any cost, was surely not to be expected of one that saw people cast into hell not only in times of international war, but on every occasion whenever they demanded a little consideration from the ruling classes.

Is the Lusitania incident worse than the one of Ludlow?

Again, if "triumphant Prussian militarism" is a menace to all the world, "the U. S. of A. not excepted," then why would Comrade Debs "not have the U. S. declare war on the Kaiser?" Is it not our duty to help destroy the menace as quickly as possible? Surely Comrade Debs would not shirk in upholding civilization (?) and let others fight his battles! In this cruel game of extermination every one of the belligerents does what seems best to accomplish his end and it is time that we here in America stop getting excited over the cruelties perpetrated abroad, but pay a little more attention to the cruelties perpetrated upon us at home by our own ruling class and try to prevent such massacres as Ludlow, Calumet, Paint Creek and many others from visiting us again.

As for the war, let them fight it out and let us fight for the Co-operative Commonwealth.

MORRIS LUNCH.

Washington, D. C.

Special Literary Number

July 15th

This issue will consist of 32 pages—8 pages more than usual—and will contain literary articles and a splendid array of book reviews.

of the New Review

SPECIAL CUT RATES

	Regular Rate	Club Rate
New Review, (1 year)	1.50	} 2.00
The Masses, "	1.00	
	2.50	
New Review, "	1.50	} 1.90
The Inter. Socialist Review, "	1.00	
	2.50	
The American Magazine, "	1.50	} 2.40
New Review, "	1.50	
	3.00	
New Review, "	1.50	} 1.90
Critic and Guide, "	1.00	
(Wm. J. Robinson, M.D., Editor)	2.50	
New Review, "	1.50	} 3.90
Current Opinion, "	3.00	
	4.50	
New Review, "	1.50	} 3.10
The Survey, "	3.00	
	4.50	
New Review, "	1.50	} 1.70
"Songs of Labor" "	.75	
	2.25	
New Review, "	1.50	} 2.00
"Theoretical System of Karl Marx, "	1.00	
(by L. B. Boudin)	2.50	

Ask us for Combinations on any Magazine

Send all subscriptions to

NEW REVIEW

"The Indispensable Socialist Magazine"

256 BROADWAY, NEW YORK

PEARSON'S

is the only Magazine
of its kind

This is why:—

Three years ago Pearson's decided to be a **free magazine.**

This is what it did:—

ABANDONED FANCY COVERS
CUT OUT COLORED PICTURES
ADOPTED PLAIN PAPER

This was the purpose:—

A plain form would enable the magazine to live on its income from subscriptions and monthly sales. It would not have to consider the effect on advertisers when it wanted to print the truth about any public question.

This was the result:—

Pearson's **now** prints the truth about some question which affects your welfare in every issue. ***It prints facts which no magazine that depends on advertising could "afford" to print.***

And, with all this, Pearsons still prints as much fiction and entertainment articles as other magazines. If you want plain facts instead of pretty pictures buy a copy on the news stand for 15 cents, or subscribe by the year for \$1.50.


By special arrangement with Pearson's we are able to make you the following clubbing offer.

SPECIAL OFFER:

NEW REVIEW, 1Yr. \$1.50	} Our Price \$2.00
PEARSON'S, 1 Yr. \$1.50	
\$3.00	

NEW REVIEW

256 Broadway New York City



A Newspaper of the Labor Movement.

BIG SPECIAL NUMBER

Saturday, July Thirty-first

CELEBRATING

THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY

of the

Industrial Workers of the World

AN issue of sixteen pages of the large magazine style. Illustrated with selected drawings and cartoons. Special articles from the many men and women prominent in our industrial union movement, here, abroad and in jail. Touching past achievements—but more particularly a running narrative of the present, and a vision of the future of labor. An issue you will want to read, to preserve, and have a few more copies to pass on. Single copies five cents each. Orders for quantities will be accepted until July 20th at special rates furnished on application.

BETTER STILL—SEND A DOLLAR BILL TODAY AT OUR RISK AND RECEIVE SOLIDARITY EACH SATURDAY FOR ONE YEAR

ADDRESS

Third Floor---112 Hamilton Av., Cleveland, O.

MAKE YOUR DOLLAR GO FAR

If you are a Canadian comrade support Cotton's Weekly, published at Cowansville, P. Q. Price 50 cents per year. In clubs of 4 or more 25 cents for 40 Weeks. U. S. rates \$1.00 per year.

If you are an American comrade support the Appeal to Reason, Girard, Kansas. Price 50 cents per year. In clubs of 4 or more 25 cents for 40 weeks. Canadian rates \$1.00 per year.

COTTON'S WEEKLY

Reedy's MIRROR

WM. MARION REEDY, Editor & Prop.

THE "DON'T CARE" WEEKLY

Original * Unique * Pungent

\$2.00 PER YEAR SAMPLE SENT

St. Louis, Mo.

Artists' Materials



Picture Frames

Colors and Boards of all makes

S. HALPERN

3 East 30th St., near Fifth Ave.
NEW YORK CITY

The New Manifesto

Dr. Anton Pannekoek writes of this new book
by Dr. Herman Gorter of Holland, on

"Imperialism, World War and Social Democracy"

now being published in Germany, and
which will be off our presses July First:

"This book may be considered the Manifesto of the new revolutionary movement that is arising out of the ruins of the old Social Democracy, as it broke down in the great European crisis.

"This work is not the product of one man but rather of a group, a party. It is the European expression of the Left Wing of the great socialist movement, represented in Holland by the Social Democratic Party.

"Twenty years ago Dr. Gorter was already known as one of the chiefs of the young literary movement in Europe. His poetical works are valued as among the best in Holland.

"Dr. Gorter has written several books for socialist propaganda. His 'Socialism and Anarchism' arose from the older fights with Anarchism; his 'Principles of Socialism' belong to the best of our propagandistic literature; his work on the 'Materialistic Conception of History,' has been translated into German and has been sold there in many thousands of copies because it is the best popular explanation of this Marxian theory."

The S. D. P. of Holland, of which Dr. Gorter is a member, was the special organization of the same tendencies that constituted the Left Wing in Germany. The **NEW MANIFESTO** of the rising revolutionary Socialism originated in Holland.

"IMPERIALISM, WORLD WAR AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY" is the Manifesto of the tendency for which Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg and the Left Wings in the socialist groups all over the world are fighting.

It is the

NEW MANIFESTO OF REAL SOCIALISM!

Price, postpaid, 50 cents; sent with a yearly subscription to the **INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST REVIEW** for \$1.25. Ask to have your subscription start with the first instalment of Prof. J. Howard Moore's course in popular biology, "Savage Survivals".

Address: **CHARLES H. KERR & COMPANY**

341 E. Ohio Street,

CHICAGO, ILL.