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## The True State of the Russian Proletariat

[The following is an interview with Lozovsky, printed in a September issue of "Die Rote Fahne", in Berlin, in which he ably refutes the exaggerations of internal discomforts in Soviet Russia, emanating from speeches of the German Independent Socialist Delegation to Moscow.]

BERLIN, September 15, 1920.—Comrade Lozovsky, a member of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Council of Trades Unions, and a member of the delegation to bring to the western proletariat information about the true state of the Russian proletariat in the Russian Soviet Republic, has given us the following account of conditions in Soviet Russia:

What role do the Trade Unions play in Soviet Russia?

Although the Russian trade union movement dates back to the beginning of capitalism in Russia, its real organization began with the Revolution of 1905. However, it is only since 1917 that it has become a mass movement. From that time on the development of the trade unions has taken rapid strides. In June, 1917, the trade unions had already a membership of one and a half millions, in January, 1918, two millions and a half, and now there are over five million organized workers. This rapid growth is first of all due to the revolutionary temper of the times, which has stimulated the organizing tendencies of the proletariat to a full and free fruition.

The role of the trade unions has, of course, undergone a change since the November Revolution. They are no longer fighting units, organized to combat the bourgeoisie and the state; for the bourgeoisie exists no more. But wherever it is necessary to fight the bourgeoisie, the battle is being waged weapon in hand on the battlefield. The state is now a state of the workers.

Nevertheless, the trade unions have now other tasks to perform which are no less important. For

instance, they are charged with the duty of fixing the tariffs and wages, as the People's Commissariat of Labor exercises only the right of approval in this respect. The trade unions also play an important role in the direction and management of production. There is no part of the public life of Russia over which the trade unions do not exert a deciding influence. Comrade Lozovsky will give us further details later on of the manifold duties of the trade unions.

Regarding the question of the economic condition of Soviet Russia and the prospects for the coming winter, Comrade Lozovsky spoke as follows:

The economic condition of Soviet Russia is undoubtedly showing a decided improvement. The predictions of the bourgeois press to the effect, that this winter will bring the downfall of the Soviet Republic, are all pure balderdash. Our condition this winter is much better than last. For instance, after the taking of Baku over one hundred million poods of naphtha was shipped to Central Russia. By the first of November, i.e., by the time that shipping on the Volga is closed for the season, we will have transported over 130 million poods of naphtha. That is forty per cent of the amount before the war. If we remember that we received not a single pood of naphtha last year the significance of these facts will be at once apparent. Several railroads are already being operated with naphtha, also some electrical plants. Also we have succeeded in other ways to add to our store of fuel, wood and coal in the cities, and since our winter difficulties are chiefly a question of fuel, it is plain that con-

ditions in Soviet Russia are much better for this coming winter.

As far as the question of food is concerned, it may be said that the crop was moderately good. But the question of food for Soviet Russia is not a question of quantity but of transportation. And transportation facilities are better this year, so far as the war demands permit.

Further, we succeeded in transporting to Central Russia a part of the 10 million poods of cotton which were stored in Turkestan, after the taking of that territory by the Soviet troops. Factories which were not operating from lack of fuel and raw materials are now running again since shipments of materials have begun.

The reconstruction of our national industry in other lines will depend chiefly upon our relations with Western Europe. Russia suffers from an excessive lack of goods. We lack steel mills, machinery of all kinds, especially agricultural machinery. The industrial countries, especially Germany, are interested in trade relations with Soviet Russia in this respect. Trade relations with Russia will now take on an entirely different aspect. Russia will no longer appear as a great mass of individual traders, commission men and speculators, but as a state unit, as one great customer, who will operate with billion ruble orders. The relations with Russia will be especially important to Germany, as these countries complement each other, and Russia represents the natural market for the industrial products of Germany.

The list of goods which Russia will have to import from the outside was determined in a number of sessions between the Trade Unions and the head of the Soviet of National Economy.

Regarding the articles of Dittmann, Comrade Lozovsky remarked:

One needs only to select a few points from the articles of Dittmann, in order to realize that instead of presenting a purely objective viewpoint, they attempt at every turn to paint Russian conditions in the darkest colors. Thus Dittmann quotes party figures. He asserts that the Communist Party of Russia numbers 600,000 members. That of these only 72,000 were engaged in industry, and over 300,000 were in the army. From these figures Dittmann proceeds to the conclusion that the Communist Party of Russia is not a workers' party, but an organization of officials and military men who are at the head of the proletariat. What is the real significance of the fact that 300,000 members of the party are in the army, however? The bourgeois press claims at every turn that the Bolsheviks are making others fight their battles for them. The fact of the matter is, that fifty per cent of the members of the party are fighting in the army, and hence, that all the fighting forces of the party are serving in the Red Army. The Communists form the staff of the Red Army, they are the mortar which holds that army together, which leads them to victory. The Red Army is interspersed everywhere with workers who have

been torn from their industry. These workers are making the Red Army what it is. Now instead of accounting these services in their favor, Dittmann is counting it against them. It is plain to be seen that in this way any phase in the life of Soviet Russia may be perverted and turned to unfavorable account.

The same is true of the reports which Dittmann makes on the industrial condition of Soviet Russia. Every one knows that the condition of the workers of the Soviet Republic is a difficult one. No Communist will deny it. But the conclusions which may be drawn from this fact vary. Firstly, one might conclude that the workers should not have accomplished the social revolution. This conclusion is the one made by the bourgeoisie, and this opinion also animates Dittmann's articles. Every revolutionist, every class-conscious worker knows, however, and will assert that the Russian proletariat has held its own, and is in power now solely by reason of the fact that the entire organization of the state, in spite of enormous difficulties, has been placed at the service of that class which hitherto has been under the heel of bourgeois society.

In conclusion Comrade Lozovsky gives us some information in regard to the peasant situation in Russia:

The peasant is the great trump card of our opponents, but only because they do not know the real facts. The peasant has benefited by the November Revolution beyond a doubt. It is a well-known fact that the small bourgeois landowner maintains an attitude of aloofness toward Communism. But the fact that the same peasant who is more than coldly indifferent to Communism, is nevertheless the greatest enemy of the counter-revolution, is not so well known by every one who attempts to write about Russia. For the small landowner has no choice: either the Soviet or the Restoration; and the small peasants owes his land to the Revolution.

This fundamental paradox in the situation of the Russian peasant has its positive and its negative aspects. The negative side is presented by the effort on the part of the small bourgeois landowner to work the land as a private individual, to strengthen his hold on his property. But on the other hand, the small owner is enabled to hold his private property only with the help of the Soviet power, while the Soviet power is striving ceaselessly to abolish all private ownership of the means of production, and therefore also the private ownership of the small landowner. Whether or not this condition will continue for any length of time is dependent in the main on the development of affairs in Western Europe. However, the Russian peasant has gained enough by the Revolution, and especially by the November Revolution, to know that no government outside of the Soviet government will be able to satisfy him as well.

## Military Review

By LT.-COL. B. ROUSTAM BEK

“THE fall of Moscow and a direct and overwhelming disaster for the Bolsheviki as the climax of the present campaign of General Denikin, was predicted yesterday by Col. K. Shumsky, formerly of the Russian General Staff, and one of the most widely quoted Russian military critics in the days before the collapse of the empire. Col. Shumsky, who now is connected with the Russian Information Bureau, issued an analysis of the Denikin campaign, received directly from the headquarters of the victorious anti-Bolshevik commander.” (The New York Sun, September 29, 1919.)

After the complete debacle of the Denikin adventure, the American Press ceased publishing the statements of this famous Russian strategist and he disappeared from view.

After the retreat of the Red Army from Warsaw, when the “victorious” advance of the Wrangel forces into Russia was advertised to all the world, the name of Col. K. Shumsky suddenly appeared in one of the reactionary Russian newspapers published in Paris. *Posledniye Novosti* (The Latest News) announced that this famous Russian military expert would henceforth describe the military situation on the Russian front.

I have the first article from the pen of Colonel Shumsky under the title, “On the Main Red Front”. This article deserves comment not only because it has been quoted both in France and America. Colonel Shumsky does not like the method of the Soviet strategists. He considers the “new military art”, created by the Revolution, an absolute absurdity, which will bring the Bolsheviki to a complete disaster.

After the defeat at Warsaw, says Col. Shumsky, “the Red Army lost its importance for a long time. It lost also its precious initiative and cannot even resist the advancing Poles by means of more or less effective rearguard actions.” The swampy region of the western part of Russia, according to Col. Shumsky, was the only thing which saved the Red Army from general destruction. The famous expert enjoyed the rapidity with which the Polish army succeeded in capturing such important strategical points as Grodno, Pinsk, Proskurov, and Staro-Konstantinov. “Polish strategy,” he says, “is preparing a new military map for Polish diplomacy, and is establishing its lines of operation directed against Vilna, Minsk, and Baranovichi. By the capture of Proskurov the Poles are reminding the Bolsheviki of the existence of the Ukrainian cause, and of their strategical aim upon Kiev, as well as upon the Dnieper line, so important for Polish strategy.”

Col. Shumsky commiserates with the Soviet diplomatists who are forced by these unfavorable military conditions to negotiate peace in Riga. “Polish strategy,” he says, “can take any place and anything which its diplomacy may require and even more, and therefore the Bolsheviki have either

to capitulate to the Polish demands or undertake a most difficult problem, namely, to organize the fragments of their armies into a new fighting force.” Col. Shumsky does not think that there is any possibility of creating a strong army in Soviet Russia.

Now let us see how correct is Col. Shumsky in his authoritative conclusions. According to a military wireless communique from Moscow, dated October 18 (*The Christian Science Monitor*, October 20), “the Red troops have reoccupied Minsk, which has been abandoned by the Poles,” while in the Sarny direction, “several positions have been occupied by the Bolsheviki, and the enemy has been driven back to his original positions.” This dispatch also informs us that the Reds “have occupied several villages northeast of Novograd-Volynsk,” and that in the Letichev and Shepetovka regions “fierce fighting continues with alternating success,” while in the Novaya-Uzhitsa direction, “the Bolsheviki have reoccupied the town of Bar.”

This is enough to show clearly that the Red Army on the Polish front is far from being a disorganized body which has lost its fighting ability.

I agree with Col. Shumsky that the Polish front was the main front for the Soviet strategy, and that, therefore, it had to be liquidated, as soon as possible, in order that the Red command might concentrate upon the increasingly important Crimean front.

Colonel Shumsky failed to understand one important fact; that the Poles are enjoying the consequences of the only battle won by them, that at Warsaw. He did not realize that Soviet Russia did not lose the war. A lost battle does not mean that the campaign is lost, and even a lost campaign would not signify that the war was a failure. One of the Polish leaders, Daszynski, understood this, and warned the Polish people to conclude peace with the Soviets as soon as possible, because he was informed from very creditable sources, according to *Rosta* of September 13, “that the fresh reserves of the Red Army, which are concentrating behind the Russian battle-front, several times outnumber the whole Polish army.” This matter is overlooked by Col. Shumsky, whose interest it is to keep public opinion in France in confusion, as he kept in some confusion the public opinion of the United States, so long as it was possible. The most interesting part of Shumsky’s article is that in which he embarks upon the philosophy of war, quoting the words of a certain unknown social-philosopher who, I venture to surmise, is no one less than the Colonel himself.

“The course of a military victory,” says this anonymous philosopher, “is equal to the civilian victory, namely to the victory of the progress of humanity. The army and war is that special organ and that special function by means of which one culture—a superior culture—conquers another

culture—an inferior one. In such a struggle the superior will survive at the expense of the inferior." How do Colonel Shumsky's present hosts in Paris like this (to them) peculiar interpretation of the fortune of arms in the Franco-German war of 1870-1871?

"In this," continues the Colonel, "lies the tragedy of Bolshevik strategy and of the Red military organizers . . . The Bolshevik Revolution is a stranger to the principles which guided the revolutionary army of France. Revolutionary France successfully fought all Europe, whereas Red Russia, on the contrary, has already capitulated to numerous republics established round her borders, and once again is ready to lay down her arms at Riga."

Col. Shumsky does not like peace between Soviet Russia and Poland at all. He knows perfectly well, what such peace means to his present chief, Baron Wrangel. He calls a "capitulation" the friendly relations which Bolshevik diplomacy, thanks to the glorious success of the Red Army, has established with the neighboring republics, and which constituted a notable diplomatic victory over the whole imperialistic world.

I already stated in former articles that the Revolutionary Field General Staff, after having succeeded in concluding an armistice with the Poles, would at once undertake a series of serious operations against Wrangel, in order to liquidate the South Russian front before winter. I said that I was confident that the coming Red offensive in that theatre of war would be of a decisive character, and would result in the complete defeat of the Wrangel forces. We must not forget that Wrangel's military strength was due to the Russo-Polish War, and that his successes were the result of the development of the military operations between the Reds and their western enemy. The Crimean White army had only an auxiliary importance, and was never energetically fought by the Soviet troops, which merely barred the way to the advancing southern enemy. As soon as the hostilities on the Polish front lost their military importance and assumed a purely political character, following the signing of the armistice, the Red Army commenced active operations along the Southern front, and put an end to Wrangel's initiative. The Taman peninsula was very quickly cleared of the Wrangel forces, as was also the eastern coast of the Sea of Azov. The Soviet troops, after several long battles on the Alexandrovsk-Orekhov front, successfully defeated the enemy, forcing him back along the whole battle-line. Orekhov and Alexandrovsk fell into the hands of the Reds, while along the Dnieper the Soviet troops were so far victorious that they not only succeeded in crossing this river, but entrenched themselves along its eastern bank, thus holding positions of active defence, ready to resume their offensive as soon as fresh reserves would arrive.

In despair, the Crimean Baron launched a counter-offensive against the Soviet army, engaging all the reserves in his possession. Using tanks and

numerous artillery, with gas and the other destructive means of modern warfare so courteously put at his disposal by the Allies, Wrangel fruitlessly tried to arrest the unshaken advance of the Reds. This main counter-stroke was directed on the Karkhovka bridgehead, but without any result. In this battle Wrangel lost one of his important commanders, General Barbovich, with a tremendous number of killed and wounded. Many tanks and guns were captured by the Reds (and they need them badly), and in this sector practically the entire force of the Wrangel "army" was annihilated. Even the news from Sebastopol, of October 19 and 20, clearly showed that the "permanent" front of the Crimean Baron had already collapsed. Furthermore, according to *The Christian Science Monitor* of October 20, the Reds have again captured the town of Aleshki, southeast of Kherson, close to the right bank of the mouth of the Dnieper. Holding in the north the railway parallel Nikolovsk - Apostolovo, Alexandrovsk - Volnovakha, and being masters of Mariupol and Berdiansk in the south, thus controlling the railway lines which connect these two seaports with the above-mentioned railway parallel lines, and controlling Aleshki in the west as well as another railway parallel extending behind the western bank of the Dnieper between Kherson and Yekaterinoslav, the Reds have practically surrounded the Wrangel forces operating north of Crimea, leaving at their disposal only a single railway line, Alexandrovsk-Simferopol, which can easily be cut off from the east and west by the Reds somewhere to the south of Melitopol.

This is the result of the revolutionary struggle of Soviet Russia which, according to Col. Shumsky, is capable only of laying down its arms and capitulating. This is the early result of the peace negotiations with Poland, and the consequence of the armistice, which, however bad, is an armistice at last. Some weeks ago, Baron Wrangel understood his critical position and sent General Mahrov to Warsaw, to persuade the Polish Government to continue the war against Soviet Russia.

Nothing has been heard of the decision reached by the Polish imperialistic leaders after they considered the plea of their former ally, whom they deserted at the most critical moment, but in case the Poles should break the armistice and continue the war against the Soviets, Wrangel will already have been put *hors de combat*, and the Russian Red Army will be able to meet the Poles unaided in the west, on the only front remaining after thirteen fronts have been liquidated by the Red Army, during its three years of constant fighting.

According to Colonel Mahin, a reactionary, whose article appeared in *Volya Rossii*, a Russian newspaper published in Prague, the total of Wrangel's force is not more than two army corps, or only about 100,000 men; and there is no doubt that, without Polish support, he cannot resist the Red pressure. "In spite of French support," says Colonel Mahin, "Baron Wrangel did not succeed

in forming a considerable army. In reality the famous Crimean army represents the remainder of the late volunteer army which partially reached Crimea from the Kuban region, and of some troops lately come from Poland." The attempt of Wrangel to form a strong force in Kuban and win the sympathy of the Kuban Cossacks, according to Colonel Mahin, was a "complete failure."

In a former article dealing with the reactionary insurgent bands, I predicted that the Don Cossacks, except for their bourgeois element, would never cooperate with Wrangel, and that he would be unable to raise the Don Cossack population in the rear of the Bolshevik army. And now, reading the local Russian newspapers I see that I was right, and that in the Don and Donetz regions, the bulk of the population is as hostile to Wrangel as it was to Denikin.

Summing up the strategical and political circumstances in which the Crimean Baron finds himself at the present moment, I come to the following conclusion: having been created by the Allies, and mostly by France, according to the necessities of strategical circumstances on the Polish front, with an idea of later use in the event of a complete Polish victory over the Soviets, and as a Russian reactionary force which should stop the Polish aggression towards the east and might perhaps even swallow Poland entirely, Wrangel could exist only in case Poland had brought the campaign to a victorious end. But this has not happened. In reality, Poland had already recognized her inability to accomplish her original strategical plan and, perforce, has accepted the armistice with the Soviets. In so doing Polish diplomacy condemned Wrangel's adventure to destruction.

Having been born of the Russo-Polish war, Wrangel must perish when the hostility on the Polish front ceases. This is the only logical development of events.

I was rather skeptical in regard to the sincerity of the Polish leaders in establishing a real peace with Moscow. The recent policy of Lloyd George toward Soviet Russia was not very promising, and

the supply of the Polish army through Danzig by the Allies, under Great Britain's protection, suggests that the Polish *szlachta* are keeping a loaded pistol behind their backs while signing an armistice with the Soviets. But events of great importance in England altered this grave situation. The strike of the local miners has put an end to any possibility for Polish imperialism either to threaten Soviet Russia with a renewal of hostilities, or even to be too ambitious during the negotiations of peace with the Soviet delegates.

The Polish army depends entirely on the supplies from the Allies. The coal strike will undoubtedly prevent the Allies from continuing such support of Poland for a considerable period. The expenditure of ammunition in the Polish army is tremendous, the need of coal, especially now with winter at hand, is great. The United States alone cannot support Poland without the cooperation of the guardian of the seas, who was so excited over the alleged appearance of Red submarines in the Gulf of Danzig. There is no doubt that the coal crisis in England may produce a condition in all the industrial countries of the world which will remove all possibility of further anti-Soviet adventures in spite of all their alleged political and economic importance to the future of the interested states.

The Polish statesmen at least must understand the gravity also of their position, and they have to recognize the peril impending upon their strategy, which is already exhausted and soon may be unable to support their ambitious policy any longer.

The general strike in Warsaw, and perhaps in Poland, was it not the first warning of the real situation in that country? There is no room for such strategical blunders as the occupation of Vilna by the Polish "insurgents" at the present critical moment. There is no time for hesitation or delay. Only a sincere peace with Soviet Russia can save Poland from very bitter experiences in the future.

## Moscow in 1920

By DR. ALFONS GOLDSCHMIDT

(Fifth Instalment)

### *A Visit to a Factory*

**I**T IS impossible to get a general view of Russian economy. At least not today, for at present it has no limits. It is a gigantic field with thousands of variations in the character of the work, in the presuppositions of the raw materials, in the possibilities of transportation, climate, and individual psychology.

A capitalistic economy, an incipient Socialist economy, is not capable of being viewed as a whole anyway. No person in Germany knows German economy. If any man claims he knows German economy, he is presumptuous, impudent, a bluffer,

or a jackass. It is impossible to have a complete view of the economy of a single great city. Not even in the statistical departments, although the economic statisticians imagine that they have sounded the last depths of that economy. They suffer, most of them, from pathological systematization. They do not know life.

Individual fields can be controlled. One who has feeling for such things, who can make combinations, who can make figures live, who is able to understand facts, beholds the tendency, the direction, in which an economy is developing. He recognizes it, but, so to say, from samples. Only

a true Socialist economy will be a complete understandable economy, an economy capable of control. But Soviet Russia has not reached that point yet. The work of registration has progressed, has progressed considerably, but has by no means reached its culmination. We know how many factories are lying idle, we know the percentage of recession in production, the number of working and non-working laborers, and the like. But this does not mean having a full view of the economic life.

Visits to factories, inspection journeys, are therefore at most revealers of tendencies. But at the present stage of Russian economy they cannot be taken as obligatory indications even in this direction. They are, so to say, results taken on faith, results due to confidence, which for the tester may, to be sure, have the value of certainty.

Outside the city, on the ring that runs around Moscow, at the end of Karl Marx Street, there is a little factory, the so-called Russian-American factory, run and organized by Russian workers who have become skilled at their tasks in America. It is a factory with 120 laborers. A factory producing machine-tools, with good machines, with good management, and with good workers. I saw instruments of precision, splendid millimeter work, carefully fitted and calipered pieces of steel that were neatly kept; splendid drills and the like. The furnishing of this factory had not yet been completed, but what was ready of it clearly showed the quality nature of this little establishment. For me it was a fine example of crossed breeds: an example of the training of Russian workers in a foreign technology. This is a very important problem for Russian industry, as well as for Russian agriculture.

I am received by a very pleasant, very energetic worker. There is a recess in the work of the factory, a recess for lunch, about half-past twelve. The workmen and workwomen eat together. There is a fish soup, kasha, bread and tea. The food was sufficient and palatable, also quite clean. I was served a portion. I tasted it, although I had no appetite, and found everything clean and well-prepared. The head of the inspection was entirely satisfied with the wages and the food. There were high bonuses in this factory, for work of fine quality was being turned out. I was told of monthly salaries going as high as 15,000 rubles, in addition to good food furnished free, and working clothes and additional foodstuffs at low prices. This pay is by no means high, if we consider the present low purchasing power of money. Most of the workers at Moscow do not attain this pay, certainly not the ordinary clerks, but we cannot speak of a real famine. That would be exaggeration. Germany has had worse war-times; at least in its large cities.

I saw workers here in their normal working clothes. Wide brown suits with somewhat baggy trousers, but of durable material. These are in the nature of overalls, protective clothing. In the future they are to be distributed generally.

They resemble the French miners' costumes and are comfortable, enabling the worker to move inside of them. I remained in the factory about an hour.

Next day I visited the Prokhorov Factory near Moscow, accompanied by one of the managers of the Textile Combine. This is one of the biggest textile factories of Russia. The factory was quiet, for no fuel was available. The workers were repairing and taking care of the technical apparatus. We passed through a control at the entrance to the factory. A member of the factory committee, accompanied by specialists, led us.

Everything was in the best of order. Machines were ready to run, the looms and spindles were neat, spick and span, ready for work. Everything had been carefully laid out, in long rows, the whole length of the hall. The oil was flowing, and was renewed daily. The driving machinery had been cleaned, the lamps illuminating it had been carefully set. Protective devices were in perfect order.

Spinning works, weaving machinery, bleaching establishments, power house, switchboard, everything in order. The guides were proud of the condition of the factory and might well be. Only fuel was needed, and the gigantic apparatus could function perfectly the next day. The feeding wires were in place, the courts were being swept, everything was bright and clean. Fuel was ardently longed for.

We were shown the stocks of cloth. Immense heaps of bales in halls and factory spaces. All precisely registered. The manager of the combine made a test of the registration. The test turned out all right. Nothing had been prepared for us, our visit was not announced until shortly before our automobile set out, there was therefore no deception, we were dealing with facts. I saw good simple cotton cloth in immense quantities. (In the Zundel Factory near Moscow conditions are similar.) I saw colored and printed cloths, handsome patterns; they were the well-known Moscow cloths which had made their appearance in Germany already before the war. The Moscow textile industry is an absolutely modern industry in its fixtures. It has the best machines and the best methods. Then we visited the dining-room and the kitchen, an immense room. Dinner is taken in shifts. The kitchen was scoured, the kettles polished. New kettles are soon to be furnished. In the dining-room there are Soviet inscriptions and announcements of performances; it is evidently a sort of meeting-room.

The Prokhorov Factory is a veritable miniature city, one of the great Russian factories which are cities in themselves. In other words, the workers live in the factory. The owner formerly lived on the factory grounds, in a villa which is now a proletarian children's home. The workers' dwellings are barracks and are called barracks to this day. On the average there are six persons to a room. The workers might live more comfortably; they might have larger dwellings in the city, but they prefer to live on the factory grounds for the sake

of convenience at their work. This is only the transition period. But this transition is already significant, for cleanliness has entered the factories. The floors of the rooms are polished clean, the bedding was not objectionable. The clothing of the men and women was clean. The health pedagogues have done good work here; the health pedagogues in the factory committees will tolerate no dirt. The ovens and great samovars are outside on the landings of the barracks. The working-women are baking and preparing water for tea. Women and men were well nourished. I saw none that were emaciated.

School children (school and playground are on the factory grounds) are sent to the country during the summer to recuperate. The villa of the former landowner is now a home for children and infants, a home with many beds, with happy sisters, with playthings, with playrooms, with visiting children, with everything that a little fellow might desire.

I do not know how many factories in Russia have a model establishment of this kind. The Prokhorov Factory is a model factory in every respect. It is unfortunate that the railroads are overburdened with mobilization demands and are inefficient aside from that. Not a moment should such a factory be allowed to stand idle. Not a moment ought it to stand idle, for the workers of the factory want work, are calling for work, and are hoping every day for work.

After our tour of inspection we were invited to the meeting-room of the factory committee. We were entertained. I must say a few words about this entertainment.

Two heart-affecting episodes, two illuminating episodes I experienced at Moscow. Two truly heart-rending events, events that throw light on much. The conversation with Krzyzanowsky, the electricity director of Russia, the friend of Lenin, and that session with the factory committee of the Prokhorov Factory. The consultation with Krzyzanowsky showed me the economic sense of the Revolution; the session with the factory committee showed me its psychological sense. It was the first time that I had been served a meal in one of the producing centers of the proletariat out of its own resources, out of its own hospitality. There was a completely new world for me in the session room of the factory committee of the Prokhorov Factory. One member of the once very wealthy Prokhorov family of textile princes, had adapted himself to the situation. But he was no longer a private host. The host was the worker and he was host with them. The factory belongs to them. It belongs to them not in the sense of private property, it belongs to them in the sense of Socialism. It was an entirely new hospitality! it was a revolutionary hospitality; it was the hospitality of the new time. We were given fish, tea, small preserved fruits, bread, sugar; and these things were given to us with the authority of the proletariat, by the self-determination of the workers. This I admit was a new world for me.

Modesty, dignified matter-of-factness, was our host. Over the machines in the factory, and in the rooms of the barracks, ikons are hanging, but the workers are no longer humble, no longer down-cast.

The whole factory committee, with its chairman, was assembled. Accounts were heard of the armed defence of the factory against counter-revolutionists, and readiness was evident to defend the factory again, with arms, if the counter-revolutionists should again attack. The working force of this factory has actually conquered the factory, the authority over the factory.

There were questions and answers. We asked about the tasks of the factory committee, about the process of nationalization of the factories, about the influence of the unions on the administration of the factories, about the influence of the Communist fraction in the factory. The answers were clear, very definite, and swiftly formulated. I had absolutely the impression that I was in the presence of workers who were capable of leadership, workers empowered to control. I do not know in how many factories of Russia the workers are capable of such leadership, but those of the Prokhorov Factory near Moscow certainly are. The workers and we together were happy in the green-covered factory; they were happy with us in the entertainment room. They were modest, self-conscious, delighted with their work, and ready for self-defence. I believe that if anyone should attempt to conquer Soviet Russia by military force he would have to capture one factory after the other, after having first annihilated the Red front, and I believe that would be impossible. Lloyd George is quite right: Soviet Russia cannot be conquered by military force.

I heard of deficiencies in the Russian labor system; in fact I saw such deficiencies and shall speak of them later. But the working force of the Prokhorov Factory gave me high hopes for the working future of Russia, hopes in their educational possibilities, hopes in their qualifications. As yet Russia is by no means lost.

Next day we were again guests of the Prokhorov Factory. We were present at a session of the Communist fraction of the factory.

It was a small meeting, a Communist family meeting, as it were. We were made welcome, hopes in us were expressed, we were spoken of as lagging behind, a resolution was passed, and we were again entertained. It was again a friendly entertainment with their own materials.

The Communist fractions, which are often small fractions, control the factories, not by means of terror, but by the cleanness of their aims, by the consciousness of their work, the straightness of their program. They are not fractions who rule by force, they are disciplined fractions, model fractions, that is, fractions of model workers, of Communist Saturday workers. They hold the sceptre in their hands because they are themselves examples. Of course there are weak sisters, but this domination by example, this domination in the

consciousness of their work, through the firmness of their program, is a fact. They are phagocytic fractions. They must absorb the vicious juices, corrode and destroy them. The Russian Revolution was a revolution of phagocytes. In my book, *The Economic Organization of Soviet Russia*,\* I shall emphasize and prove this point.

They spoke, and we spoke. There were speeches and promises, assurances of solidarity from both sides, greetings, affectionate incidents, applauding shouts. Then the official portion of the meeting was over and we were about to go. We wished to go unostentatiously, that is, not through the center of the room, as we did not wish to disturb what was to follow. But we were amiably constrained to pass down the center.

As we thus moved out, the men and women, as we passed them, clapped for us. They clapped loudly and warmly, until we no longer could be seen from the hall.

The black-bearded, neat-limbed chairman of the meeting, with his linguistic talents and his good-natured manner of bossing the meeting, accompanied us to our car, as did also the chairman of the factory. There was waving of hands and off we went. I shall never forget this visit to the Prokhorov Factory. It threw light on the Revolution, more than any theory could. For the first time I understood what I had never before understood—since I had only dimly felt it. I understood what I had once set down in a little periodical, *Kommunismus*, the psychology of the revolution, and also the limitations of Marxism, its finished sections, and that which lies beyond it. By which I do not mean the outliving of Marxism, but the psychology of purposeful Marxism, of the Marxism of the goal, of good old Leninism. This is a new task, a great task, perhaps the greatest task of the coming centuries.

#### *The Explosion*

I was coming home from an economic study with that fine fellow Stunkel (organizer of metal workers), accompanied by the excellent Landa. We crossed the bridge over the Moskva, and the Kremlin, city of cupolas, was aglow; the church of Saint Basil was dying down in many colors.

We were passing over the Red Square. Swift clouds shot up into the heavens; there were sudden reports from afar. A window went to pieces in the building of the Commissariat of Labor. Pieces of glass fell upon the head of a passerby, who coughed and made off. The place immediately emptied. Its exits filled with scurrying people; the Iberian Madonna was deserted; only the candles were still burning before her.

New clouds darted by, unorganized clouds. There was no interval of order in the cannon shots, no measured tempo. There would be a sharp bang, a sulphurous report, then a low rumble, and then a whole family of concussions at once.

People were scurrying across the Theater Place.

\*The German title is "Die Wirtschaftsorganisation Sowjetrusslands"; we have not yet received a copy.

Plateglass was crashing everywhere. A great pressure of air was exerted against the Kremlin Wall, expanded, quickly filled the great place before the Kremlin city, exerted its force into Myasnitzkaya Street, smashed into windows, and scared off the people. The city was quaking and trembling, ground heaving, panes splintering.

What was the matter? There had been a reassuring notice in the newspapers. We had read that in the next few days woods were to be cleared in the vicinity of Moscow, for agronomical purposes, with the use of explosives. That would not have been serious.

We complained among ourselves: Russian lack of organization as always! Perhaps immense quantities of explosives have been set off instead of the smaller amounts needed, and now the explosion is progressing irresistibly. So we thought.

A sulphurous detonation. One explosion after the other, explosions like thunderbolts, explosions like a resounding blow, explosions with air pressure. The panes of our villa bend before the impact and the guests hold the weight of their bodies against the panes. The lilac-bushes in the park around the villa were swept by the moving air. Children crept into corners and listened timidly. This continued until late at night. What had happened?

Next morning I was told by the manager of the textile combine, to whom I have referred before, that a munitions depot near Moscow had blown up. It was a depot of old material, but yet a store of munitions. It was a terrible nuisance. No one knew whether the conflagration had been spontaneous or the result of counter-revolutionary attempt. Nothing had happened in Moscow aside from the smashing of the windows.

But, he said, breathing proudly, by eleven o'clock at night the whole Communist Party of Moscow had been mobilized, although it was a day of rest. Orders by telephone were very rapidly forwarded, and everybody, men and women with guns, with determination to resist, with determination to clean up what was wrong, had made ready to work.

The explosion had therefore caused a sort of general test of vigilance. The manoeuvre thus forced upon the populace had been successful, the party in Moscow appeared to be prepared even on days of rest.

Until then I had not known this state of readiness of the party; I had known nothing of this soldier-like discipline, of this constant readiness to answer the alarm, even in times of quiet. Not a readiness for trouble, with guns cocked, but a readiness with consciousness of purpose, with willingness for sacrifices in any moment of danger. Very few had been lacking.

Toward morning the series of noises had stopped, the smashing panes, the oppressed hearts were calm. Even on the western front I have rarely heard such a cannonade.

But they are ready at Moscow, ready to answer the alarm. They are ready to sacrifice themselves,

to submit to discipline, to jump in and help when danger arises; when swift disordered clouds, discordant clouds, shoot up into the air.

### *The Party*

The Communist Party of Russia (Bolsheviki) is a small party in number. It has not much more than 600,000 members, and the total population of the country is at least 150,000,000.

There are places, for instance, in the north of Russia, pretty big places, that have but few Communists. And yet the Communist Party rules Russia. It does not, to be sure, dominate all the souls of Russia, but the administrative apparatus, the army, is now in the hands of the Bolsheviki. At present the number is even less than 600,000, for many of the party Communists, perhaps the greater portion of them, are at the front. Moscow, for example, is managed by a few Communists. Never before has a Government ruled with the use of such slight human resources.

There must be reasons for this, serious reasons, reasons of weight. A people of 150,000,000 souls will not without serious reasons tolerate for years the domination of such a minority. A people has always the power to eliminate a minority rule if it has the will for such elimination.

The will for such elimination is lacking in Russia, and why? Because nobody knows what could be put in place of the Bolsheviki, who should assume power, and how the power could be exercised in any different manner.

Many people in Moscow spoke of Denikin with enthusiasm. But if you asked them what improvement Denikin could bring, they were silent. They do not know, and they cannot know, for no party, no wielders of power, could bring about anything essentially different or essentially superior to what the Bolsheviki have brought.

I nosed about for the cause, or the causes. For this is a problem of tremendous importance for the whole world. And I questioned, with as little prejudice as possible, in fact with no prejudice. I arrived at the following conclusion:

The assumption of power by the Bolsheviki was nothing else than the affirmation and the further organization of an existing condition. It was nothing more than the extension of an already present organization into a conquest of the immense difficulties of the nation with the aid of the proletariat. Everything else was merely of concomittant nature, was merely incidental, was capable of approval or disapproval, but not of essential importance. In my book *The Economic Organization of Soviet Russia*, I shall make an attempt to explain, to assign causes for this fact. I clearly understood the character of this revolution, which has truly been an ineluctable revolution. To be sure, its inevitableness was constantly guided by energetic men with an eye to the present opportunity.

Such was the cause of the seizure of power and already the first cause of the consolidation of power. Later, the power was solidified by means

of tactics, by means of a program very firm in principle, but very adaptable in situations, concerning which much nonsense is at present again being uttered. It was a program of Communist *Realpolitik*, of Communist diplomacy.

The dictatorship of the proletariat, proclaimed by the Communist Party in Russia, is a real dictatorship of the proletariat, for the overwhelming majority of the Russian proletariat, of the industrial proletariat, and of the small peasantry need the Bolshevik form of administration. Even that great part of the proletariat which does not have membership in the Communist party. On the other hand, it is a dictatorship of the Communist Party of Russia which is simply attempting to evaluate the necessities of evolution, to exploit and organize these necessities. This is in a nutshell all that need be said of the cause of Bolshevik domination.

Russia may not be Communistic in the majority, but it is a Sovietist majority. That is the secret. There is no longer any other system. At least not at this moment, and for many years to come. The system is subject to deviations, to departures for real political reasons—much nonsense is spoken on this point— but the system itself is today ineradicable. Even a Czar could not wipe it out. It would have to be a Soviet Czar, and therefore not a Czar at all. This fact simply must be accepted. Such is the state of affairs, and not otherwise; it is impossible to escape this situation, and Europe and America will only harm themselves if they think they can overcome it.

Perhaps it is possible to push the Communist Party of Russia out of power and to do one or two things in a manner different from its manner. But it is not possible to force back evolution. Evolution has now advanced so far that it is now no longer possible to go back. The only alternative is to make a chaos of the country.

The Communist Party of Russia takes part in all activities, programizes everything, sets up principles for everything, adorns itself perhaps with subsidiary principles and attempts to act accordingly. Like a Jesuit organization, it will not depart from the main principles, but is very elastic in subsidiaries. It is rigid and adaptable; it breeds statesmen, and, without departing from its principles, is ready for all sorts of concessions.

It controls the filling of positions, the political and economic administration. It controls the army with a few people; an army can only be controlled by a few, if these few recognize the needs of the army as the needs of the country. And it is a matter of indifference, at least for the moment, whether soldiers' councils of former competence, or political commissars, are the acting officials.

The Communist Party of Russia attempts to regulate national relations, jurisprudence, popular education, religious conditions, the entire economic life and the social policies of Soviet Russia. For this purpose the party needs a real discipline. It must be an advance guard, a troop of pioneers, a troop that fights to the end against all resistance

that may be still present (and we shall have more to say on these topics in this book).

For that reason the party has very stringent requirements. It will not admit everybody into its front lines. It selects, tests, decides on admission only after cautious examination. For the party might be much larger if it so desired. Many want to enter but are not admitted. For some wish to enter not for the responsibility of the position, but for the position itself.

For membership in the party ultimately means assumption of important positions. It also involves a certain protection. But the party cannot make use of any people in important posts, who do not belong to it with their hearts, and with a complete spirit of sacrifice. Those whom the party accepts, it accepts gladly and protects with all its power.

Of course there probably are, even in the Com-

munist Party of Russia, those whose hearts do not belong to the party, men and women who are eager for positions or who are flatterers or abject yielders. No party is safe against such elements, not even the Communist Party of Russia. At Moscow I heard many complaints that such pathological substances had crept into the party.

The Communist Party of Russia, in the war period, and particularly in the Kerensky period, was the only party that was prepared, even in defence of the Revolution of November, 1917, to assume power in a manner that would not hurl the country into an even greater catastrophe than it was then passing through. Even non-Communists told me that at Moscow.

Such, I judge from my Moscow experiences, is the mission and the essence of the Bolshevik authority.

## In Behalf of the Polish People

SPEECH BY KAMENEV

*[Stenographic report of a Joint Meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Moscow Council of Workmen's Delegates, Industrial Unions, and Shop Committees, held on May 5, 1920.]*

Comrade Kamenev, Chairman: The meeting will come to order. Comrades! A regular meeting of the Moscow Council of Workers' Delegates was to have been held yesterday. The questions of the day were the ones on which the whole working class of Russia and we had been centering our attention—the questions of economy and thrift. We had to postpone this meeting so that we might call today's meeting with but one point on the order of business: the situation on the Polish front. The offensive of the Polish nobility pushes aside the problems of the day, problems on which we had been laboring, and draws the attention, will, and energy of the working masses of Russia to the external fronts.

Comrades! The history of imperialistic Russia was a history of national oppression, of people subjugated by Czardom. The history of imperialistic Russia is a history of repeated outrages on the small nationalities that were integral units of the Russian Empire, an empire that was cemented together by Muscovy with blood and violence. And when a really revolutionary party had considered the task of the overthrow of the old Russian regime as an easy one, this party had to consider that the imperialistic government of old Russia was not only founded on the oppression of the masses of the Russian people, above all the millions of peasants, but, also on the indispensable Czaristic system enforced on all the borders of Russia,—a system of oppressing nationalities. That is why this party, which today through the will of the working-masses of Russia holds the power, had to draw up a clear program of national reconstruction; that is why the Communist Party of Russia, not in the year 1920 nor in 1917, not even in 1914, but long before the decision of the powers of the

World War on the question of the emancipation of small nationalities, had to answer and has answered, in an open and above-board manner, the question of its attitude to nationalities, minorities, and to peoples oppressed by Czarism and capitalism. Our answer was given long before the world conflict, and the Communist Party of Russia may boldly declare that, aside from the changing political or military situation, aside from the question of whether a party struggled for power or possessed it, the Communist Party always settled the problem of oppressed nationalities in one way—by giving them the complete right of self-determination. Our policy is not one of opportunism; it does not depend on the diplomatic or military map, but flows from a deep insight into the united interests of all the workers. That is why, when we had taken over the power in 1917, and though we have conducted war for two and a half years, we have ever been proclaiming the watchword of the right of all the nationalities, formerly oppressed in Russia, to separate themselves from Russia and to found their own states. And no lies thrown at Soviet Russia, no slander by bourgeois diplomats and editors, have blinded the masses of the people to the fact that in reference to oppressed nationalities the Communist Party of Russia and the Soviet Government, directed by the same, have without any deviation from this recognized the right of Poland to guide its own destiny. Taking the above position, we have many times submitted to the Polish Government as it is constituted and as it is yet accepted by the working people, peace propositions, either directly or indirectly addressed to the governments standing behind Poland and directing its affairs. These propositions were re-

jected, and that is why the attention of the working-masses of Russia is directed to a new front, and for this reason we have to lay aside those questions which were considered in the order of business at our last Soviet and Party Congresses, and take up a new problem—the problem of the Polish front.

We are confronted by a new situation because the armies of the Polish bourgeoisie are standing at the gates of Kiev, and a new development arises in the Russian Revolution and in the history of the Soviet Republic. We are convinced that we shall withstand the new test in the same manner as we have withstood other critical moments in our struggles. We rely on two factors which have never failed us and which today form the guiding spirit of our victories. The first one is that of the class-consciousness of the working-masses of Poland, who despite all the obstructions raised by the Polish ruling class, know and feel that we are not only fighting for the independence of Soviet Russia, the freedom of the peasants and workers of Russia and Ukraine. Not only are we fighting for the gains made during the two and one-half years of bloody struggle against the counter-revolutionists of different groups and countries. No! The workers and peasants of Poland know that on the battle-fields of the western front we are struggling for their freedom, their emancipation from the yoke of the Polish nobility.

The second is our invincible Red Army. The Polish villages and cities have, more than once, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, seen armies composed of Russian workers and peasants, under the leaderships of the Czar's officials, generals and officers, advancing to crush Poland, to subdue its heroic insurrections. Now Poland will see an army consisting of Russian workers and peasants, led by workers and peasants or those officers who sincerely have taken their stand with the army of workers and peasants and the Soviet Government; she will see that this army is marching under the banner of emancipation and not aiming at conquest or repression; she will see an army which has progressed because the workers and peasants of Russia have directed it to defend the freedom and revolutionary achievements of the Russian people against the attempts of the Polish bourgeoisie. We are convinced that this army will arouse enthusiasm in the Polish peasants and workers, and the spirit in which they, the workers and peasants of Poland, who are thus being liberated from the oppression of Polish landowners and capitalists, will receive this army, will be the best assurance that our arms will triumph in this struggle as they did in all the battles with all the foes of the Soviet power. For the first time we can unfold the banner which was the symbol of all the true Russian revolutionists with regard to the nations in general, in reference to Poland. It bears the inscription: "For our and your freedom; for the fraternal unity of the Russian and Polish workers; for the destruction of those who desire to place a bayonet between the Polish and

Russian workers and to separate us with a wall of national hatred."

Comrades! Convinced are we that the battle will end victoriously, for today as formerly, behind the ranks of the Red Army, stand masses of workers full of sympathy and revolutionary fervor. We believe profoundly that the first units despatched to the western front by the Petrograd and Moscow workers are like the early swallows; that the workers and peasants of Russia will begin to advance to that front in broad masses and will bring there military materials, bread, and all that the Red Army needs. Incidentally, here today, we have among us three hundred happy workers who are on their way to the western front, mobilized in Petrograd. (Loud applause.) With them we can voice the motto, inscribed on their Red banners, glorified in battles and handed on by Petrograd workers to its forward post: "Death to Polish magnates, long live the alliance with the peasants and workers of Poland!" "Long live independent Poland, emancipated from the yoke of capitalists and landowners, and long live its free alliance with Soviet Russia." (Applause.)

Chairman: Comrade Lenin has the floor. (Applause.)

## Three Years

### Soviet Rule

When on November 7, 1917, the Bolsheviks came into power in Russia, the capitalist press predicted that their rule would last only a few weeks. Since then, every now and again, a new capitalist press campaign against Soviet Russia gives the Soviet Government only a short time before it is overthrown. At this very moment, while such a campaign is in progress, the Soviet Government is preparing to celebrate on November 7, 1920, the Third Anniversary of its existence.

We take pleasure in announcing for next week, a special illustrated forty-page issue of SOVIET RUSSIA to commemorate the Third Anniversary of the November Revolution, and to show what Soviet rule has accomplished in Russia in the three years of its existence.

## SOVIET RUSSIA

Official Organ of the

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This weekly will print articles by members of the Russian Soviet Government Bureau as well as by friends and supporters of Soviet Russia. Full responsibility is assumed by the Bureau only for unsigned articles. Manuscripts are not solicited; if sent in, their return is not promised.

**J**OHAN SPARGO hastens to join the chorus of those who predict the imminent fall of the Soviet Government. In a special cable to the *New York Herald*, dated Paris, October 18, Mr. Spargo is declared to have interviewed many persons in Sweden, Germany, and Finland, "who had just come from Russia." Details of Mr. Spargo's prophecy are interesting only as indicating his peculiar mode of thought, which is the mode of thought of all persons who cut themselves off from the world as it is, and dwell in the world as they picture it. His remarks on what would happen if the Soviet Government should fall are particularly illuminating in this connection:

"What kind of regime will succeed the Soviets is a question. From my studies I have reached the conclusion that each little Russian village will for a time have its own independent government, as there is no likelihood of a return of the Czarist regime. Eventually these little independent governments will join hands, forming a strong republic."

This is ideology apart from the fact, with a vengeance. It is characteristic of the student of other than the social sciences to deal with isolated problems, with sharp outlines, ignoring all surrounding conditions that are non-essential. But we did not know Mr. Spargo was a physical scientist. In the field of history and sociology such isolations are very difficult to accomplish. If Russia existed apart from the rest of the world, and should be permitted to pursue her development without any interference from the outside, it might be possible to take Mr. Spargo's predictions seriously, but, as a matter of fact, Mr. Spargo is not acquainted with Russian conditions at all. The history of Europe in the twentieth century has shown that Russia, far from dwelling part from Europe, is intimately connected with the political and economic life of Western Europe. The ententes and alliances preceding the Great War never omitted an attempt to include Russia in their formations, and the present furious hatred of the imperialistic governments toward Soviet Russia is a reflection of the tremendous economic dislocation that is induced in other countries when they cut themselves off from Russia, or rather, cut Russia off from themselves. The life of Russia, even in its present blockaded and sequestered state, is indissolubly

connected, even in the minds of the administrators of the *cordon sanitaire*, with that of Europe. It is because he overlooks this fact that Mr. Spargo still has sufficient "detachment" and "peace of mind" to paint the pretty little idyl which we have quoted above. It is not inconceivable that Russia might develop little independent village communities, such with "its own independent government," if the terror of the imperialists at what has been accomplished in that country did not prevent them from letting Russia alone. How willing foreign governments are to have Russia develop from the point where "each little Russian village will for a time have its own independent government," is shown by their readiness to support every Czarist adventurer that seems disposed—with however little likelihood of success—to attempt the gigantic task of unseating a popular government established out of the blood and suffering of a hundred million persons. No idea is more unpalatable to the foreign governments than that Russia may have to be dealt with as a host of small communities, in fact, some governments are actually refusing to recognize the small border states who are more or less friendly to them, and insisting on the retention of some sort of powerful Russian centralization, so that the "powerful, united Russia" that may later be set up may be more grateful and useful to the powers favoring such centralization.

What "will succeed the Soviets," or rather, what would succeed the Soviets, if they should be overthrown is probably some form of colonial division of Russia among the great powers. Various Soviet leaders have pointed out this possibility since the very earliest days of intervention. But the immediate consequences of the supposed overthrow of the Soviet Government would be such as to make all predictions as to the remote future uncertain and unreliable, in view of the terrible conditions for Russia, and for the rest of the world, that they would involve. Immediately after the fall of the Soviet Government, the counter-revolutionary forces of Wrangel (or of Wrangel's successor, for we cannot believe that France will decline to put a new man in the field after Wrangel has been disposed of) would advance through the impoverished and semi-deserted towns and villages of Soviet Russia—and they would by that time be impoverished and deserted indeed—and inaugurate a system of terror and carnage that would be vastly more cruel and destructive than the deeds of Gallifet after the Paris Commune of 1871 or of the Rumanians and Horthy in Hungary in 1919 and 1920, after the overthrow of the Hungarian Soviet Government. Eye-witnesses have described all these events, beginning with the circumstantial accounts (quoted from bourgeois journalists in Lissagaray's book on the Paris Commune) of Paris bourgeois ladies gouging out the eyes of captive workingmen, and of other amiable acts of vengeance wreaked upon the Paris proletariat after the overthrow of the Commune,—and ending with the all too recent accounts of newspaper correspondents from Hungary and parts of Germany.

What this would mean in Russia is almost too revolting to picture. If there are only 600,000 members of the Russian Communist Party, who are after all the guiding spirits in the march of events in Russia, we cannot imagine that a smaller number of Communists would be murdered (we shall not dwell on the preliminary tortures) by the advancing counter-revolutionary forces. Furthermore, there are a few million Jews in Russia: the resurgent Czarist anti-Semitism surely would not spare them. Then there are the hundreds of thousands of members of the Menshevik and other semi-liberal parties who protested against intervention and the blockade. Every reactionary officer returning to Russia with the victorious counter-revolution would have some such person on his list for proscription. Millions would perish if the Russian Revolution should be choked in blood; but Mr. Spargo pretends blood isn't being shed by the "saviors" of Russia and of course will not admit that much more would be shed if they should really be victorious;—but we do not think that France and England together, with all their Wrangels added, could overthrow the government that has tried against terrible odds to give the Russian people the bread, the land, the liberty they fought for.

PEASANTS are alleged in the newspapers to desire the overthrow of the Soviet Government, and some of their "representations" are even reported to have drawn up a protest (with only twelve points) covering their grievances. It would be ridiculous for this journal, because it is the Official Organ of the Russian Soviet Government Bureau, to deny that its home government has found the peasant problem a difficult one to deal with. The peasants have demands, demands for manufactured products, which it is very hard for the Soviet Government to satisfy. But this does not yet mean—as some New York newspapers would like to have it—that the peasants are ready to aid counter-revolution in substituting another government for that of the Soviets. For they know that while they may have grievances against the Soviet Government, they have nothing to hope for from a restored Czarism or from an occupation by the armies of the colonial powers. And this they know from their own recent experiences—experiences so recent that they will hardly be likely to forget them soon. The facts about the peasants might be briefly stated thus: They do not get from the Soviets as much as they want; they give perhaps more than they like; but when you have said this and amplified and exaggerated it as much as you like, you have yet to show that any other political group in or out of Russia seems likely to be able to provide better conditions for the peasants.

WHILE some political circles see their solution in refusing to allow the old Russia to divide into portions based on self-determination in ethnic units, others, France and England among

them, would prefer to see the process of the colonial parceling out of Russia begin at once. You have only to read through the conditions exacted by the French Government from Wrangel, as published a few weeks ago in the *Nation* (New York) to understand what are the hopes of France from the "South-Russian" Government in exchange "for promise of official recognition by France and diplomatic and military support against Soviet Russia." One of the clauses of this interesting document provides for "French financial and commercial councillors" to be assigned to "Russian financial and industrial ministries," "whose rights are to be determined in a special treaty." Thus Russia, or as much of it as the French Government would include in "Southern Russia", would become a sort of India, ruled by petty tyrants under the advice—actually under the rule—of foreign official advisers.

FOR years before the war Turkey was permitted to live in Europe for the reason that any attempt at handling the Turkish question by the big powers would produce in the so-called *concert of powers* a shrill dissonance not unlike that which was heard in Europe in the year 1914. And although the Sevres Peace Treaty with Turkey, as well as all the various agreements between the victorious nations, with regard to the division of Turkey, might suggest a solution of the Turkish tangle, this is far from true, not only because the national life of Turkey does not yet show any signs of certain dissolution, but also because the agreement of the victors between themselves is only a paper agreement. It has been justly remarked by many correspondents that only the fact of the recent war can keep some of the powers, notably France and England, from coming to blows on account of the former's advantages in the division of the lands (Arabia, Mesopotamia, etc.) that were formerly a part of Turkey. Nor can English domination in Constantinople be over-readily accepted by France. It will be remembered that France had a Monroe doctrine of its own with regard to matters chiefly financial—in Turkey. The doctrine of "protection of Catholics" (despite the fact of separation of church and state in France) and the control of the Ottoman Bank used to be strong cards in her hand, which seem to have lost their value just now.

The character of the treaty with Wrangel leads us to believe that France has come now to regard Russia in the same light as she does Turkey. That she will be badly disappointed, it is unnecessary to prove. But the fact itself strongly suggests the idea that the Soviet Government is a powerful force working for peace in Russia. Were it not for the strength of the Soviet Government, which was able to consolidate and unite Russia under one banner, and to hold by force the too covetous pretenders to Russia's resources, the very notion of peace in Europe would be a travesty. For who would expect the other big powers calmly to look on while France skimmed the cream in Russia?

# The Food Policy of the Soviet Government

By A. SVIDERSEY

(Member of the Board of the People's Food Commissariat)

**T**HE People's Food Commissariat is in charge of the state supply of the population. The leading organ of this Commissariat is, in accordance with the constitution of the R. S. F. S. R., a collegiate (board) appointed by the Council of People's Commissars and is headed by a People's Commissar appointed by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.

In the localities the chief organs of the Food Commissariat are the Gubernia Provision Committees, the Uyezd Provision Committees and the District Provision Committees.\* In regard to organization the local Provision Committee organs are connected with the local Soviets and with the Provision Commissariat. In addition to this an organization connection exists between the provision organs of the producing gubernias and the workers of the consuming gubernias. This is achieved in the following way:

The Uyezd Provision Committees consist of Uyezd Provision Commissars, who are elected by the uyezd councils and confirmed by the Gubernia Food Commissars, and of a collegiate (board) which consists of persons appointed by the Uyezd Food Commissars of the uyezd councils (Soviets). The Gubernia Provision Committees consist of Gubernia Food Commissars who are elected by the gubernia Soviets and are confirmed by the People's Commissariat for Food Supply, and of a collegiate (board), whose members are appointed by the Gubernia Food Commissars and are confirmed by the executive organs of the gubernia Soviets. The District Food Committees are the provision organs supplying a number of volosts\* on the economic principle; these act in some places in lieu of the Uyezd Provision Committees. Their structure is on the same principle of organization as that of the Uyezd Food Committees and the Gubernia Food Committees.

The People's Food Commissariat has the right of delegating authorized persons to all the District, Uyezd, and Gubernia Food committees with a view of suspending decisions which may be contradictory to the decrees and the instructions of the central authorities, or appear inexpedient from the point of view of general state interests. The People's Food Commissariat has the right of including in every Uyezd Food Committee of a given gubernia, supplying grain, from one to one-half of the entire number of members of the Uyezd Provision Committee out of the number of candidates recommended by trade unions of workers, by Soviet organizations, and by various party associations of consuming gubernias who stand on the Soviet platform; in the same manner, representatives of Gubernia Food Committees of consuming gubernias may be delegated to every Gubernia Food

Commissariat; the general understanding is that one representative is sent from the capitals of Moscow and Petrograd, and one representative from the Army and the Navy; the complete number of the representatives of the Food Commissariat and of the consuming gubernias should consist of not less than one-third and not more than one-half of the entire number of the members of the Gubernia Provision Commissariats. The number of representatives of consuming gubernias in the Food organs of the producing gubernias is higher at the present time than the above-mentioned norm, and form approximately 80 per cent of the general number of the members of the Uyezd and Gubernia Boards of the Food Commissariat of the grain producing gubernias.

A special position in the general network of the organization of the food organs is occupied by the worker's food detachments, the provision army, and the organs of labor inspection. The workers' food detachments and the provision army taken together, represent one of the main levers in the activity of the People's Food Commissariat and its local organs, especially with regard to the provision of grain and of forage.

The food detachments are formed by the Military Food Bureau of the All-Russian Council of Trade Unions. The functions of these detachments are as follows: 1) the registration of harvests and surplus grain; 2) operations directly connected with the dispatch of grain to the granaries; 3) propaganda work to get the peasants to deliver all the surplus grain to the state; 4) rendering assistance to the transport and so forth. During the grain campaign of 1918-1919 the People's Food Commissariat had at its disposal 400 food detachments consisting of 13,000 men. For the present food campaign the number of food detachments was increased by another hundred which consisted of nearly 13,000 workers mobilized in the consuming gubernias.

The Food Army is entrusted with the duty of compulsorily obtaining all the surplus of grain in those cases where the owners decline to comply with the grain levy laid upon them. In the majority of cases, however, the Food Army is simply held in preparedness. Generally their mere presence in localities where grain is gathered is sufficient to insure the smooth delivery of all surplus, without recourse to compulsion. This was the prevailing state of things during the last grain campaign; it is also the prevailing state of things at the present moment. During the 1918-1919 season the food army numbered about 45,000 men. The increase of the food army for the current supply campaign is necessitated by the extension of the territory at the disposal of the state provision organs.

The Food Army is recruited from volunteers

\* Gubernia, uyezd and volost are territorial sub-divisions roughly corresponding to a state, county and village.

and those liable to military service, but whose state of health renders them unfit for such. From the point of view of organization the Food Army in its structure is similar to that of the Red Army, being subject to all the decrees applying to the latter and it may be utilized for military purposes should the need for this arise.

The organs of labor inspection are formed of class conscious intelligent workers, recommended by the trade unions. These are formed by the military Food Bureau (of the trade unions) and are under its supervision, but their activity is guided by the People's Food Commissariat. The task of the organs of labor inspection is to carry out class control over the activity of the Food Commissariat's institutions as well as of the local food organizations. Recently the Provision Labor Inspection merged with the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection which took the place of the State Control.

This is the business apparatus of the People's Food Commissariat and of its local organs. This is not a mere technical apparatus which collects grain by way of monetary payment at fixed state prices or by way of exchange of goods, collecting at the same time all other food products and articles of general consumption,—but it is an organ which is in every respect adapted to obtain grain and to carry on an organized and systematic struggle for the supply of food to the starving population.

Until recently the People's Food Commissariat in the center and the Food Committees in the localities, in addition to carrying out the functions of supply, also carried out all the functions of distribution. For this reason as far as their structural organization was concerned the food organs had to take into consideration the execution of tasks connected with all matters of distribution. At the present time, in accordance with a decree of the 20th of March, 1919, the functions of distribution are entirely transferred to the cooperative societies whilst the People's Food Commissariat, as a state organ, retains the right of control over the activity of the newly created distributing organizations.

These problems, the practical solution of which is entrusted by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and by the Council of the People's Commissars to the People's Food Commissariat and its local organizations are fully formulated by a number of decrees published consecutively during the period of almost three years' existence of the Soviet Government. By a decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee dated May 27, 1918, the People's Food Commissariat was instructed to unite into one organ the entire supply of the population with articles of first necessity and of consumption, to organize on a national scale the distribution of these goods, and to prepare the transition to nationalization of Trade and Industry. By a later decree of the Council of the People's Commissars dated November 21, 1918, the Food Commissariat was instructed to organize the supply of all products serving personal and

domestic needs; the aim of this decree was the substitution of the private commercial apparatus by a systematic supply of the population with all necessities out of the Soviet cooperative distributing depots.

The above-mentioned decrees do not by far exhaust all the Soviet legislation by which the activity of the Food Commissariat is defined. But they mark the principal stages in the development of the functions of the food organs. Both decrees emphasize the gradual change of the Food Commissariat from a provision organ in the narrower sense of the word into an organ for the state supply of the population.

As regards the principal instruction which during the last two years were for various reasons and in various forms given to the People's Food Commissariat by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and by the Council of People's Commissars, it must be pointed out that these instructions amounted and continue to amount to the following: 1) the registration of articles of provision and of general consumption; 2) the institution of state monopoly for the chief articles of alimentation, and 3) distribution in accordance with the principle of class distinction: he who does not work neither shall he eat. A certain clarity was introduced in these basic postulates by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee's decree dated January 21, 1919: it was definitely pointed out which particular products constitute the monopoly of the state; these were: grain, forage, sugar, salt and tea; which kind of articles are to be collected on a state scale but not on monopoly principles, these included all meat products, fats, fish and so forth, and which may be obtained by large labor associations and freely brought to town for free sale in the open markets; to these categories belong potatoes and a few other articles.

The decree of January 21 clearly defined the extent of the authority of the food organs by the establishment of the two categories of monopolized and ordinary products. As it happened, this at the same time meant moving a step backward as far as the state supply was concerned. The same decree instructed the People's Food Commissariat with taking measures to improve its supply apparatus for the purpose of extending the state supply also to ordinary products. For the purpose of fulfilling this regulation a decree was issued on August 15, 1919, making the supply of potatoes a state monopoly and prohibiting to any organization, excepting state organs, the purchase of products which have by the decree of January 21 been attributed to ordinary products; this prohibition extended to five gubernias. Thus one of the chief principles of organization of state supply of the population was confirmed afresh.

Our food policy found its clearest expression in the decrees and instructions with regard to the supply of grain. The decree issued by the All-Russian Executive Committee and published on May 13, 1918, the purpose of which was to confirm the hard and fast rule regarding the grain monopoly

and making it incumbent upon every owner to turn over all supplies, excepting the quantity required for sowing and for personal consumption to the state food organs according to the established levy; this decree called upon all the laboring and poor peasants to unite immediately for the purpose of a resolute struggle against the grain profiteering peasants. The same decree endowed the People's Food Commissariat with extraordinary prerogatives including the right of applying armed force in cases where resistance is offered in the collection of corn or other food products. The main idea of the decree of May 13 is still more vividly expressed in the appeal of the Council of the People's Commissars issued to the population towards the end of May, 1918. Not a single step backward should be made with regard to the bread monopoly, was said in this appeal. Not the slightest increase of the fixed prices for grain! No independent storing of grain! All that is disciplined and class conscious—into a united organized food front! Strict execution of all the instructions of the Central Government! No independent activity! Complete revolutionary order all over the country. War to the profiteers! . . .

Not satisfied with the instructions regarding the principal idea of our food policy, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee by a decree dated June 11, 1918, on the organization of the supply of the village poor, has defined the form of organization in which the line of conduct towards the profiteers as well as to the sections of the village population who are guilty of hiding their surplus of grain are to be treated. Although subsequently, by a special regulation of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the established forms of organization have been removed, in its principal features the food supply policy remained as before and is remaining so until the present time. As in the past the policy is now based upon the organization of the proletarian and semi-proletarian elements of the villages against the profiteers, only under a different form, i. e., in so far as the obligatory grain levy applies also to the middle peasantry as long as it has a surplus of grain.

Of special significance in the food policy of the Soviet Government is the system of exchange of goods, which serves as a means of extracting the grain surplus from the villages: this policy by the way was also utilized by the Provisional Government. The policy of exchange of goods was first practically realized when, in accordance with a regulation of the Council of the People's Commissars passed on the 25th of March, 1918, the People's Food Commissariat was financed for that purpose to the extent of one milliard one hundred and sixty millions of rubles; later on, on the 2nd of April of the same year, a special decree was issued regarding exchange of goods; here all articles subject to goods exchange were enumerated and at the same time a special principle was established upon which all goods exchange is to be carried on; this principle consisted in attracting the poorer peasants to the organization of exchange

of commodities and the obligatory transfer of goods sent in exchange for grain to the disposal of the volost or district organizations for the purpose of its further distribution amongst the population in need of these goods. The establishment of this principle was dictated by necessity, as it was proved in practice that the exchange of grain leads to the accumulation of goods in the hands of the profiteers to the great disadvantage of the poor section of the peasantry.

A few months later it became necessary to introduce one more important addition into the system of goods exchange. It appeared that the decree of the 2nd of April is eluded in various ways by the grain owners; this was largely facilitated by the fact that the profiteers and the richer sections of the rural population were enabled to obtain the necessary goods from private sources and thus were not driven to the necessity of turning over their surplus to the state organs with a view of obtaining goods from them, which goods were in addition given to the disposal of the volost and village organizations. In order to deprive the grain owners of the opportunity of resorting to this dishonest method a decree was published on the 8th of August, 1918, concerning obligatory exchange of goods; the first paragraphs of this decree is to the following effect: For the purpose of facilitating the development of the decree issued on the 2nd of April regarding exchange of goods—in all villages and uyezds established for exchange of goods of the industrial gubernias as well as of all non-agricultural products exclusively for grain and other food products, as well as for hemp, flax, leather and so forth; this established system for the exchange of goods applies to cooperatives as well as to all state, public, and private institutions.

The decree concerning obligatory exchange of goods, which was necessitated by the need of storing all grain in the state granaries has in addition to the grain monopoly, also marked a way for the solution of one of the greatest problems in the transitional period from capitalism to Socialism—the problem of establishing definite economic relations between the industrial workers and the agricultural workers. It became necessary to proceed further along this road the more so that for the last two years the state reserve of goods shrank to a great extent. The next progressive step with regard to goods exchange was made on the 5th of August, 1919. The publication of a decree followed, by virtue of which: for the purpose of furthering and combining the decrees of the 2nd of April and of the 8th of August, 1918, concerning exchange of goods, and for the purpose of storing raw material and fuel for the reestablishment and the supply of the village population of the R. S. F. S. R. by the organs of the People's Food Commissariat and the cooperative societies with the produce of mining and manufacturing industries as well as with bread and other food products, is conducted on the sole condition of the delivery to the state organs of all the agricultural and home industry produce by the rural population.

To sum up all the above, the basis of the Soviet food policy may be defined in the following manner: 1) the introduction of the principle of the State supply of the population with food and articles of general consumption, 2) the establishment of a monopoly for the principal food products, 3) the development of state storing with regard to non-controlled products, 4) the introduction of compulsory collective exchange of goods in the rural districts for all products of agriculture and of home industry, 5) the establishment of a compulsory levy upon the population for the delivery of the surplus of grain and the more important products of agriculture, 6) a war for bread and for other products and articles of general consumption necessary to the town against the profiteering peasant elements, which is waged in alliance with the proletarian and semi-proletarian sections of the villages and, 7) favorable terms of supply to the workers as against the non-working sections of the population.

#### STATEMENT OF THE BUREAU

New York, October 26, 1920.

Confirmation of the report that Washington D. Vanderlip of California, representing a syndicate of Pacific Coast capitalists, has concluded an extensive arrangement with the Russian Soviet Government for the development of natural resources in Northeastern Siberia, was contained in a cable received today by the Soviet Government Bureau in New York from George Chicherin, Commissar for Foreign Affairs at Moscow. Mr. Chicherin's cable is directed to Mr. L. Martens, Representative of the Soviet Government in America, and reads as follows:

"On October 22 there was announced the consummation of the deal proposed by the Vanderlip syndicate, comprising Vanderlip, Barnt, Harry Chandler, Sartori, Le Phillips, Fishburn, Edward L. Doheny, Gibbon, Jayne, Whittier, Stewart and Braun, all Pacific coast capitalists. The syndicate acquires a sixty-year lease of territory east of the one hundred and sixtieth meridian, including Kamchakta, an area of 400,000 square miles, with exclusive rights to exploit coal, oil, and fisheries. Vast oil strata and bituminous coal deposits have been discovered in this territory. The syndicate expects to take possession and commence operations in the spring of 1921. The same syndicate is also acquiring a lease, with the right to purchase, of the Seattle waterfront property purchased by the Czar's Government. Negotiations are proceeding successfully whereby this syndicate will become our fiscal agents in America, financing purchases up to \$500,000,000; all purchases to be made through your office.

(Signed) CHICHERIN."

The consummation of this arrangement with the Vanderlip syndicate marks a notably success-

ful achievement in the long endeavor of the Soviet Government to enter into mutually advantageous relations with American business men. Development of the vast natural resources of Russia in fuel, minerals, timber, and other products, is an undertaking for which American industrial and technical talents are especially suited. Russia greatly needs the skilled services of American technical and industrial specialists in all branches. It may confidently be predicted that the Vanderlip concession is only the first of many similar arrangements whereby the enterprise and ability of Americans will be enlisted in the development of Russia. Although the details of the Vanderlip concession have not reached us, it may be assumed that the contract provides full security and reasonable profits to the American operators, and at the same time, carefully safeguards in every respect the rights of the workers in the territories to be developed. Foreign capitalists, taking up concessions in Soviet Russia, will be required to respect the sovereignty of the Soviet Republic, and to conform to the laws of the Soviet Government respecting the protection of labor and the democratic management of industry. It is evident that Mr. Vanderlip, after a visit to Russia and a thorough discussion of his proposition with the Soviet authorities, decided that it was altogether practical and profitable for foreign capitalists to enter into business relations with the Soviet Government. This has long been the contention of the Soviet Government, which has always insisted that Russia needed the assistance of outside forces, and that, moreover, the rest of the world could not get on without Russia. With the successful conclusion of peace with Poland and with the rapidly approaching dispersal of all counter-revolutionary elements, Soviet Russia is now on the threshold of an era of peaceful organization and productivity.

#### ALLIED CAPITAL IN THE CRIMEA

SEBASTOPOL, August 28.—The united merchant fleet of the Black Sea has been bought up by foreign capital. The greater part of the stock of a large Russian steamship company has been bought by the English. Also the industrial enterprises in the Wrangel territory are being readily taken over by the French and English capitalists.

#### RUSSIA'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS PERSIA

A despatch issued from Moscow under date of August 31 states:

"Chicherin sent a wireless message to Osoffar Khan, the Persian plenipotentiary in London, informing him that the Russian Soviet Government would be glad to receive the Persian envoy in Moscow and that all steps will be taken to facilitate his journey from Tiflis."

## Recent Economic Reports from Russia

### LOCOMOTIVES

*Economic Life* gives the following account of the general number and state of the locomotives of the entire Russian railway system on the 20th of July, 1920:

The daily accounts of 26 lines give 16,608 locomotives. In addition to this at the Turkestan, Southwestern, and evacuated railways there are 2,735 locomotives, making a total of 18,803 locomotives. Out of the 16,068 there are 9,068 or 56.45 of the general number out of repair.

On the 1st of July the percentage of out of repair locomotives was 58.2 per cent, on the 1st of April 60.7 per cent. This shows a slight decrease.

### EXPORT OF PETROLEUM

According to *Economic Life* the export of petroleum products from Grozny is fairly successful. From 200 to 250 cisterns are exported on the railway from Grozny. In addition to this about 80,000 poods are pumped by the petroleum ducts to Petrovsk. Altogether for the period from the 1st of April to the 31st of July inclusive the number of cisterns exported from Grozny by rail amounts to 19,400, holding 14,880,846 poods. From the 12th of June to the 31st of July 3,665,117 poods of petroleum products were sent, making a total of 18,545,963 poods.

According to *Economic Life*, the output of petroleum in the Baku district in all the working-places, with the exception of the South Valakhan-sky district, amounts to 14,100 poods in June, 1920.

The reserve of petroleum in the above mentioned industrial districts on July 1 is 32,638 poods.

### ELECTROTECHNICAL CONSTRUCTION

The Russian proletariat has gained one more victory upon the labor front. A new powerful electric station has recently been opened near the town of Tula. This station is capable of generating a power amounting to 20,000 volts. This new electric transmission has been erected by the Administration of Electrotechnical Constructions of the Committee of State Constructions within six and a half months, from February to July, 1920. This must be considered to be a very short period even for peace time.

The electric transmission at the Sudakov Works, which is within 14 versts of Tula, gives 3,000 kilowatts under a pressure of 17,500 volts, thus enabling the Tula factories to work intensively. The electric station is to be worked by Moscow coal, the collieries of which are situated within four versts of the electric station. The electric transmission is connected with the Tula electric station; the surplus of energy will be given to the town of Tula for municipal and private use.

In view of the fact that the cultural significance of the estate of Yasnaya Poliana, formerly owned by Leo Tolstoy, which is within two to three versts from the station, is universal, a transmission is to be installed both on the estate as well as in the village of Yasnaya Poliana.

### SATURDAYINGS (SUBBOTNIKS)

At the Communist *Subbotniks* at Moscow for the month of April 84,768 persons worked; these include 16,065 communists and 66,963 non-party members.

The great majority of these worked in connection with fuel and transport needs. Besides a number of subsidiary tasks, the following was performed at the *Subbotniks*:

Eight hundred and twenty-eight railway cars were loaded and unloaded, 13 locomotives were repaired, as well as 37 cars and 31 engines. A total of 500,000 poods has been replaced.

### URAL METAL INDUSTRY

The general state of the Ural metal industry may be judged from the principal Ural industry, that of pig-iron smelting. In the first half year of 1920 the smelting of pig iron has been effected to only 50 per cent of the proposed amount. This comparatively low output is to be explained chiefly by the fuel crisis, which has been particularly acute in the Yekaterinburg and Visogorsk districts. At the present time energetic measures are being taken for the improvement of the fuel supply of the Urals and there may be expected in the future an increase in the smelting of pig iron.

### TEXTILE INDUSTRY

In the recent past the Russian textile industry passed through an acute crisis, owing to the lack of raw materials. Turkestan, which is the principle district supplying the textile industry with raw materials, was for a long time cut off from the center of the Republic. In 1918-1919 only about 3,000,000 poods were received from Turkestan, whilst the Russian textile industry required about 20,000,000 poods of cotton. The cessation of military operations in the Turkestan district and the reestablishment of communications between the central industrial districts of the Republic with Turkestan had made possible an increased export of cotton and wool to the Soviet Republic. From the 1st of June to the 5th of August 2,798 carloads of wool had been exported to Russia from Turkestan. It is necessary to point out the gradual monthly increase in the export of cotton. In June, 1920, 869 carloads were sent from Turkestan to the town of Samara. In July, 1,222 carloads, while 242 carloads were sent for the five days of August.

### PRODUCTION OF COAL

The Moscow District Coal Basin is the only one of all the coal basins which, during the process of the development of the civil war, was not cut off from Soviet Russia even for a single day. This was the reason why the Soviet Government had to pay serious attention to this coal basin, and here, more than anywhere else, the achievement of the Soviet Government in the sphere of the organization of the coal industry appears at its clearest and best.

Prior to the November Revolution the Moscow District Coal Basin was in a deplorable state. A general idea of the Moscow Coal Basin at the time of its nationalization is easily obtained when we mention the following conditions prevailing there; these include: primitive exploitation of the mines, looting, a shameless exploitation of the Austrian prisoners of war working in the mines, and an acute housing crisis. Thus, immediately upon its nationalization of the mines, the Soviet Government was faced with the tremendous work of organization of the Moscow basin upon new lines. First of all, the reserve of coal in the district had to be established. For this purpose, for the first time in its existence, extensive investigation of the mines was carried out. The result has proved most favorable. The Bobrikov district may serve as an example. The reserves of this district may be estimated at one billion poods (16,000,000 long tons).

The discovery of rich layers has led to the increase of the output of coal. The technical installation of the Moscow District Basin is being improved with a view to this. The plan for the electrification of the district is being carried out. Two large electric stations are to be erected shortly; one at Tovarkovo and another at Pobedenka. The entire basin is to be covered with a network of small stations. Underground electric lighting is also installed. A wide gauge railway coal-branch is being organized and built. In the last two years 12 branches have been built which are already in working order; the total length of these is about 30 versts. In addition to this about 24 versts are being built and a number of additional branches are to be built shortly.

The technical equipment of the collieries is also being improved. The more neglected collieries are being shut down and new ones opened instead. The actual mining is also improved by the introduction of the latest methods of exploitation. For the first time powder and dynamite are being used in the Moscow District Basin in coal mining; this has of course increased the output.

The enumeration of innovations introduced in the Moscow District would remain incomplete without the mention of the measures taken for the amelioration of the housing crisis. During the building season of 1920, house-construction has been largely extended in every district of the basin. All these measures which had been introduced by the Moscow District Basin of course resulted in an increase of the output of coal. In 1918 the output

of coal amounted to 13.4 million poods; in 1919, 24.2 millions, while for the first half of 1920, it amounted to 16.9 million poods.

The following figures give an idea of the output of coal for the first half year of 1920, as compared with the same interval of time in 1919.

Month:	Output in Poods		Increase Per Cent
	1919	1920	
January .....	1,923,807	2,343,484	21
February .....	2,523,162	3,040,184	21
March .....	2,947,864	3,745,825	26
April .....	1,658,647	2,216,931	34
May .....	1,831,962	2,471,931	35
June .....	1,611,610	3,091,482	92
	12,497,052	16,909,837	35

Thus the average increase of output for the first half-year of 1920 is expressed by the figure of 35 per cent. This is the result of the work of two years by the Soviet Government or its organs in the Moscow District Basin. This gives us full confidence that in the future the output of coal in the Moscow District Basin will be increased and that the intended program of the Moscow District for 1921, to the amount of 60 million poods, will be successfully carried out.

### PUBLIC FEEDING

The Moscow Cooperative Society has published the following comparative figures concerning the state of public feeding for the last three years:

In 1918 there were 204 public eating-houses in Moscow for adults; these fed 112,195 persons daily; in 1919 there were 452 eating-houses, capable of feeding 306,299 persons. In 1920 the number of eating-houses had grown to 617, providing 609,660 persons daily. In 1918 there were no children's eating houses at all; in 1919 there were 98, providing for 106,230 children; in 1920, there were 107, feeding 200,684 children.

### THE FOOD SITUATION

At the plenary session of the Moscow Soviet, the assistant commissar of the Food Commissariat, Comrade Brukhanov, published the following data regarding the food situation in Soviet Russia:

In 1917-1918 the food preparing campaign had passed through the distributing organs of the republic about 30,000,000 poods of grain. In 1918-1919 the preparation of grain was considerably better: the distributing organs passed 109 millions of poods. The 1919-1920 campaign was to provide a reserve of 326 million poods of grain, 307 millions of poods were intended to be obtained in the producing gubernias, and about 20 million in the consuming gubernias. Altogether, in the producing gubernias, 165 millions of poods were obtained, and 15 millions of poods in the consuming gubernias. In addition to this, 27 millions of poods of grain were obtained in Siberia, and about 10 millions of poods in the Northern Caucasus, 16 millions of poods of grain will be obtained. The short-of poods at the various fronts. Thus altogether the past grain campaign resulted in the gathering of 260 millions of poods of grain. For the coming campaign, owing to the bad harvest, only 150 millions of poods of corn will be obtained. The short-

age will be covered by means of outside districts. The People's Commissariat for Food hopes to obtain 110 millions of poods of grain in Siberia, and 120 millions of poods in the Northern Caucasus. Thus a total of 380 millions of poods of grain will be obtained, a figure which approximates the actual requirements of the republic.

## SOVIET RUSSIA'S PEACE OFFENSIVE

By ADOLPH YOFFE

Simultaneously with the military offensive against the Polish Whites, Soviet Russia is successfully unfolding her peace offensive against world imperialism.

A program of peace, the demonstration of her peaceful intentions, proof not only in words, but in deeds of the impossibility of defensive campaigns against Russia, owing to the fact that she has neither threatened nor attacked anyone,—this has always been the strongest, both defensive and offensive, argument of the foreign policy of Soviet Russia against the attack of imperialism.

Our foes have long ago become aware of the fact that the Soviet power has too many friends among those who still form the majority of these foes. They have long ago come to the conclusion that on this account an open struggle against Soviet Russia aiming at her destruction is absolutely impossible. Hence the imperialists have always screened their desire to crush the proletarian revolution with hypocritical and false reasons, alleging that it was necessary to defend the interests of the small nations against Russia. Not so long ago imperialist Europe, with these slogans, succeeded in organizing the bands of Yudenich and of the Esthonian White Guards for a campaign against Petrograd, if not with actual aid, at least with the passive consent and sympathy of the democratic masses and small nations. And it is not without reason that even strongly aggressive Poland until recently included in her imperialist peace program the demand that "Russia recognize the independence of the border states."

To this program of falsehood and calumny Soviet Russia opposed her honest program of peace based on the recognition of the right of all peoples to free self-determination.

And while the Entente, proclaiming itself the defender of small nations, actually violated one small nation after another; while the League of Nations, which was created to serve as a strong drug for weak minds, was ever more revealed as a mere dummy, Russia, persistently unfolding her peace offensive, has been winning over one of her former foes after another. And when, only about a year after the farce of Prince's Islands, England made a new offer to act as mediator between Russia and the border states, in the interests of peace in Eastern Europe, Russia was already in a position to give the proud reply that she did not need the hypocritical mediation of England, for, without this mediation, and despite the intrigues of the

Entente, she had already concluded peace with almost all her small neighbors, and those who have not come to reason she is ready to bring to reason by force of arms, in order to conclude peace with them on the same basis of self-determination of peoples.

After Esthonia—Georgia, after Georgia—Lithuania, after Lithuania—Latvia, then Finland and, lastly, Poland, which if not yet quite reasonable is gradually turning to a more sensible policy. All the nations that surround Russia are becoming convinced that unlike the Entente, which professes to be concerned about their interests and about defending their rights but which actually plunders them, Soviet Russia alone of all the powers actually defends their rights and interests, actually gives them what is their just due.

The Entente has lost the title of defender of the rights of oppressed peoples, and it has been won by Soviet Russia. The small oppressed nations have discovered the fraud of the Entente and have broken away, turning their eyes toward Russia as the oppressed classes have done long ago.

The yarn of Soviet imperialism and Russian aggression has come to an end; no one believes it any longer, no one therefore believes that any defense is needed against Russia. The dullest minds in Europe already clearly understand that the attack on Russia is not for the purpose of defense, that it is the work of hangmen. And democratic Europe does not want to act this part any longer. Even bourgeois democracy, partly perhaps because it no longer believes that it is possible to conquer Soviet Russia, refuses to aid any effort directed against Russia. Aggressive imperialism remains without allies.

The struggle is not over, and bloody battles are still ahead. But the peace policy of Soviet Russia, in conjunction with the successes of the Red Army, will secure her final victory.—*Pravda*, Petrograd, August 22, 1920.

## Volume Two

Volume II of SOVIET RUSSIA (January to June, 1920) has been sent out to all who have ordered it. A few of the bound volumes (cloth, stamped in gold) may still be obtained if ordered at once.

*Price Five Dollars, payment in advance*

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SOVIET RUSSIA

Room 304

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# Documents

## ANGLO-RUSSIAN NOTES

*We print below the full text of the Note addressed to Chicherin by Lord Curzon, dated October 1, and the reply made by M. Krassin on behalf of the Soviet Government.*

### I

*Note addressed to Chicherin by Lord Curzon, October 1, 1920.*

In their Note of July 1 His Majesty's Government laid down certain conditions on which they were prepared to resume trade relations between Great Britain and Russia. These conditions were accepted by the Soviet Government in Monsieur Chicherin's telegram of July 7, and it was on these conditions that Messieurs Kamenev and Krassin were admitted to this country and negotiations were resumed. At their meeting with the Prime Minister on August 4 they made it clear that they were fully aware of this.

By these conditions the Soviet Government undertook both for itself and on behalf of its delegates:

a. To refrain from hostile actions and propaganda, direct or indirect, against the institutions of this country.

b. To refrain from any attempt, by military action or by propaganda, to encourage the peoples of Asia in any form of action hostile to British interests or the British Empire.

c. To permit all British subjects in Russia to return home immediately, Russian subjects in Great Britain or other parts of the British Empire who desire to return to Russia being similarly released.

These conditions have been and are being flagrantly violated. Monsieur Kamenev engaged in almost open propaganda, and attempted to subsidize a campaign in England against the British Constitution and British institutions and for these reasons he could not have been permitted to re-enter this country.

The message which the Prime Minister handed to Monsieur Kamenev when he left London, and in which the question was directly asked of the Soviet Government whether it did or did not intend to desist from propaganda, has received neither acknowledgment nor reply.

The recent meeting at Moscow of the Third Internationale, which was presided over by Monsieur Lenin, and attended by the members of the Soviet Government, openly proclaimed that the intention of the Communist Party, and therefore of the Soviet Government, is to use every means to overthrow existing institutions throughout the world.

In the wireless messages to the world, the Soviet Government, through its individual members and through its press, has never ceased to preach hostility to Great Britain and the British Empire. The Soviet Government recently convened a revolutionary conference of Asiatic peoples at Baku, avowedly aimed at British interests. Its actions in the Caucasus, in Persia, in Central Asia, and in Afghanistan, openly directed against Great Britain, are well known to the British Government. Above all, in spite of long-continued negotiations and of a sincere and steadfast desire on the part of the British Government to carry out the conditions with regard to the mutual repatriation of nationals, British subjects continue to languish in Russian jails, or are refused permission to leave the country.

The persistent violation of these conditions can no longer be permitted. The negotiations for a trading agreement with M. Krassin to which His Majesty's Government looked forward, as the first step, not merely towards the revival of material prosperity in Eastern Europe, but towards the restoration of peace have reached a point at which it is necessary to decide definitely whether the conditions under which alone they

have been authorized are being, and will continue to be, fulfilled, or whether the negotiations must be abandoned on the very threshold of success.

The answer to this question rests with the Soviet Government. It is impossible for His Majesty's Government to carry the agreement to its final stage so long as the three conditions of their Note of July 1 remain unfulfilled.

The Soviet Government must carry out its own undertaking to desist from hostile propaganda and action in this country and in the East. Every British subject now detained in Russia, some of them in circumstances of inexcusable hardship and suffering, must be permitted to return to this country without further delay. His Majesty's Government cannot acquiesce in the continued violation of a solemn undertaking involving grave injury to British subjects.

The negotiations for a full exchange of prisoners, whether naval, military, or civilian, between Russia and Great Britain have now been proceeding with little or no intermission since November of last year.

His Majesty's Government have throughout been ready to repatriate all Russians without distinction and without exception. It was M. Litvinov who insisted on excluding from the exchange persons whom he declined to designate, but who were vaguely described as grave offenders, although the nature of their alleged offence has in no case been proved.

For a time, under the arrangement concluded between M. Litvinov and Mr. O'Grady, the work of repatriation proceeded, and by the end of June of this year 124 British prisoners of war and 727 British civilians had arrived in England, and all the Russian prisoners of war actually in this country, as well as in Switzerland (for the area of operation had been extended), had been returned. Since that date a series of obstacles has been placed by the Soviet authorities in the way of complete repatriation. The majority of the members of the British Military Mission to the number, it is believed, of fifteen, who were captured in Siberia as long ago as December and January, still remain in confinement in Russian territory.

Adequate steps to make known to British subjects the fact that they were at liberty to leave Russia were not taken by the Soviet Government. No announcement on the subject was published locally in Russia, in spite of a positive statement by M. Litvinov that the widest possible publicity had been given to the fact by all local Soviets. When M. Kamenev left London on September 11 there were still in Russia, apart from the Siberian Military Mission already mentioned, a considerable number of British civilians, inquiries regarding eighty-one of whom had been received by me, and a list of whom was handed to M. Kamenev. I have since received further inquiries.

A third and even more painful case is that of the British subjects, about seventy-two in number, who were seized and thrown into prison by the Soviet authorities at Baku, when the Bolshevik revolution took place in that town. They included the British Consular representative at Baku.

Our repeated endeavors to communicate with Baku direct proved fruitless. Monsieur Litvinov then offered to transmit a message to the Azerbaijan Government, and to use the good offices of the Soviet Government of Moscow to obtain the release of these unfortunate and innocent persons, who were reported to us as receiving treatment of the most cruel description.

A message was in fact sent, but the only response has been a proposal to exchange the British subjects for a number of Turks at Malta, who had been convicted of attempting to overthrow the Government of Turkey, or of having committed atrocities against the non-Moslem population of that country.

We have ample evidence to show that the Baku revolution was brought about in consultation with your Government, and mainly through the instrumentality of your troops. The continuance of your responsibility is demonstrated by a telegraphic message received as recently as September 28 from the Georgian Consul at Baku to the effect that though he had obtained permission from the Azerbaijan Soviet a fortnight earlier for the release of the British naval and military prisoners below the rank of officer, this order has been vetoed at Moscow.

Meanwhile, there remain in British hands in different parts of the British Empire—the great bulk having already been repatriated—a very limited number of Russian subjects, of whom, whether they have or have not been guilty of offences against the law of the country, we desire to be rid. In this country there remain M. Babushkin and his companions, five in number, who have been detained here on their repatriation from India solely as a means of inducing the Soviet Government to proceed to the fulfilment of their undertaking.

His Majesty's Government has gone further than negotiate about individual groups or cases. On September 6, I telegraphed a proposal that we should agree upon a common date and places for the simultaneous delivery of all our respective nationals, wherever they might be detained. I have received no reply to this message. This conditions of affairs cannot be permitted to continue.

The negotiations for the actual release of prisoners cannot any longer be suspended or retarded by artificial and heartless delays. Still more, it is impossible for His Majesty's Government to append their signature to a trade agreement with a government that thus treats not only its undertakings, but the subjects of a country with which its representatives are at the time engaged in friendly negotiations.

We have given an undertaking, to which we have scrupulously adhered, that we shall not assist in any hostile action against the Soviet Government, but, unless by October 10 we have definite evidence that the conditions laid down as to the release of British prisoners are being complied with, we shall take whatever action we consider necessary to secure their release.

## II

*Note by Krassin dated October 6, in reply to Lord Curzon.*

Mr. Krassin presents his compliments to the Right Honorable D. Lloyd George, and with reference to Lord Curzon's Note of October 1, begs to make the following statement, at the request of the Russian Government.

A conference of June 29, between the Russian Delegation and the Prime Minister, preceded the handing to the Delegation of the Note of June 30 from the British Government. At this conference the Prime Minister laid down, on behalf of the British Government, the conditions which were afterwards incorporated in the Note of June 30.

The Prime Minister, after having stated the above conditions, declared during the said conference that, should the Russian Government accept the conditions put forward by the British Government, and should an affirmative reply from the Russian Government be received at Spa by the Prime Minister not later than July 9, the Prime Minister would make a declaration at Spa to the effect that England would resume trade relations with Soviet Russia irrespective of the position taken up by other Allies and particularly by France, in connection with this matter. Further, the Prime Minister declared that a favorable reply from the Russian Government would create conditions equivalent to a truce, and that the British Government would be ready to enter immediately into political negotiations leading to the conclusion of a general peace.

The Russian Government, upon receipt of the Note of the British Government of June 30, decided to accept

all the conditions stated in the above Note, and on July 7 cabled its decision to the British Government.

Thus the reply of the Russian Government, agreeing to the conditions put forward by the British Prime Minister, was given before the stipulated date, and the Delegation appointed by the Soviet Government for this purpose assumed that immediately upon its arrival in England the promised resumption of trade negotiations between Russia and Great Britain would commence.

From the moment of the presentation of this Note of June 30 to the moment of the receipt of the Note of October 1 from Lord Curzon, the British Government has not once reverted in its negotiations with the Soviet Delegation, or in its telegraphic communications with the Russian Government, to the conditions formulated by the British Government itself in the Note of June 30, and to the consequences which were to follow the acceptance of those conditions by the Russian Government.

The actual policy of the British Government towards Soviet Russia, after the presentation of the Note of June 30, has been in direct contradiction to the conditions formulated in the above British Note and accepted without modification by the Russian Government, for the conditions set out in that Note provided for mutual undertakings and entailed, from the moment of their coming into effect, obligations upon the British Government as well as upon the Russian Government.

In spite of the mutual undertakings which the two countries had agreed to give, that they would not participate in any hostile actions against each other, and that they would not support any hostile actions directed against one of the parties, the British Government has, since the beginning of July, taken part in the most energetic diplomatic campaign in support of Poland, which had attacked and remained at war with Soviet Russia.

The British Government, while coordinating the diplomatic assistance to Poland, at war with Russia, with direct military assistance given at the same time by the ally of England, France, also used all its influence, and even threatened to employ armed forces, in order to secure the use of the neutral port of Danzig for the transmission to Poland of ammunition and military equipment. This was against the decision of the High Commissioner of Danzig, who had prohibited the transport through the port of arms for either of the belligerents.

In its diplomatic support of one of the belligerent parties, i.e., Poland versus Soviet Russia, the British Government went so far as to threaten Soviet Russia with war, and mobilized the Baltic Fleet.

Although the British Government has taken no official part in the recognition by France of the Czarist General Wrangel, who is carrying on a civil war against the working and peasant classes of Russia, the Russian Government, nevertheless, has information showing that General Wrangel, who had previously been abundantly furnished with English ammunition and military equipment, has also, during these last months, received direct assistance from England in the shape of ammunition and materials of war, and that General Wrangel was given an official reception on a flagship of the British Fleet in the Black Sea, while his representatives have been given facilities to purchase and send from England all kinds of military supplies, and have also been permitted to use financial resources left in England by the Czarist Government.

As regards the clause dealing with repatriation, it has to be pointed out that a number of Russian subjects detained by the British authorities in Egypt, Persia, Constantinople, Batum, and other places, and who desire to return to Soviet Russia, have not yet received the necessary permit from the British authorities. It must be pointed out also that some of these prisoners—for example, those held at Kantara in Egypt—are being treated in a manner that calls for the strongest protest.

Finally, the questions relating to the resumption of

trade relations between Russia and Great Britain, the raising of the blockade, the sweeping of mines, the organization of trade agencies—points outlined in the Note of June 30—have not received favorable consideration from the British Government, and are still in the same position as they were four months ago, at the very beginning of the negotiations.

In view of all these facts, the Russian Government is led to assume that the agreement resulting from the affirmative reply given by the Russian Government to the British Note of June 30 cannot be considered as being in force up to the present, in view of the fact that its fundamental conditions have been disregarded by the British Government.

Nevertheless, the Russian Government, actuated by the firm conviction that the interests of the working masses of Russia and of Great Britain demand the immediate resumption of economic and trade relations and the conclusion of economic peace between both countries, is ready to give, at any moment, proof of its sincere desire to arrive at a speedy agreement, and to take all the necessary steps to hasten such agreement.

The Russian Government is prepared to return without exception all British war and civil prisoners who are still in Soviet Russia (including convicts and also those who have been taken in Siberia and temporarily detained in connection with the arrest of Mr. Babushkin and others by the British Government), on condition that the British Government will permit the immediate return to Soviet Russia of Mr. Babushkin and his friends, who are in London, and also of Russian citizens recently arrested in Constantinople and at Batumi, and of all other Russian citizens in Great Britain or any other territory under the protectorate or de facto control of the British Government, who are desirous of returning to Soviet Russia.

The Russian Government and the British Government mutually undertake to bring to the notice of the general public the fact that, commencing from a certain date, say October 15, 1920, all the Russians deprived of liberty or detained in the territories of Great Britain, her colonies and her protectorates, and all the Englishmen in the territory of Soviet Russia are proclaimed free and, with the consent of the respective governments, may be repatriated at specially fixed dates and through certain frontier points. The arrangement of the place and time of the exchange of the various groups and of other details has been entrusted by the Russian Government to Mr. Litvinov.

Should the British Government agree with the above proposition, it will be necessary for it to take all the requisite steps in order to secure for Mr. Litvinov, by negotiation with the Norwegian and Danish Governments, the right to prolong his stay in one of those countries for the purpose of reaching a final settlement of the question.

The Russian Government, desirous of meeting the wishes of the Government of Great Britain as far as possible, is prepared to render assistance in the matter of the Englishmen detained at Baku, although the settlement of this question presents great difficulties in view of the fact that this is a matter which must be decided by the Azerbaijan Government.

The Russian Government, being unable to impose any instructions upon the Government of Azerbaijan, can only offer its friendly offices in this matter. It has already entered into negotiations with the Government of Azerbaijan on this subject, and begs to submit the following suggestion:

The Government of Baku will send to Tiflis a special delegate authorized to conduct negotiations for the release of these prisoners. It is proposed that the British Government on its part shall also send to Tiflis a duly authorized representative of its own or shall authorize some person in Tiflis to conduct the negotiations. The Russian Government, on its part, will delegate to Tiflis a special representative, or will authorize the representative of the Russian Republic there to give every as-

sistance in the negotiations, and the Russian Government has reasons to believe that these negotiations in Tiflis would lead to a speedy solution of the question of the detention of Englishmen in Azerbaijan, and that this solution would be one satisfactory to the British Government.

In answering Lord Curzon's statement that the Russian Government vetoed the release of British prisoners in Baku, the Russian Government categorically assures the British Government that it has been misinformed and misled on this matter, as the Russian Government has never vetoed the release of British prisoners in Baku.

The Russian Government declares to the British Government that it is ready, as previously, to accept in full the agreement outlined in the Note of the British Government of June 30, to confirm the assurance given by it in its Note of July 7, and to carry out all the clauses of the above agreement.

This undertaking is, of course, given upon the understanding, and upon condition, that the British Government, as the other party to a mutual agreement, will carry out all its obligations under that agreement; that the agreement will be regarded as a whole, of which the clauses are inseparable and mutually dependent; that there will be no attempt to demand that certain clauses (regarded by one party as particularly advantageous at a given moment) shall be punctually fulfilled, while the fulfillment of others is evaded or indefinitely postponed.

In conclusion, the Russian Government would be glad to be informed as to when the British Government would be prepared to renew trade negotiations.

## RUSSIAN NOTE TO POLAND

*The following is the text of the Russian Note to Poland, read by Yoffe on September 24 to the Polish Delegation at Riga:*

The war between Poland and Russia is still going on—a war caused by an attack against Russia and the Ukraine just at a moment when the working class in Russia had begun the demobilization of its armies and devoted all its energies to peaceful creative labor.

This war, encouraged as it is by the Entente in its imperialist interests, threatens an arduous winter campaign, ruinous, sanguinary, and unprecedentedly cruel, and its continuation can only be desired by the imperialists of the Entente, who are calculating upon the further exhaustion of the life forces of both Poland and Russia.

Should a winter campaign take place, it will involve such suffering for the masses of the people that the Russian Soviet Government and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the supreme legislative organ of the Republic, deem it their duty to take all steps, and even to make heavy sacrifices, in order to attain peace, to put an end to the bloodshed and to stave off a winter campaign, equally trying for both parties.

In the opinion of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee the basis on which a desirable agreement could best be reached in the shortest possible time ought to be the carrying out of the principle of self-determination for all those territories the frontiers of which have been disputed during the war.

Starting from the full recognition of the principle of self-determination, the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic recognized as far back as 1917, and still recognizes absolutely without any reservations, the independence and sovereignty of the Polish Republic, and recognized in 1918 the independence and sovereignty of the Ukraine and White Russia, while in 1920 it signed a peace treaty with the independent and sovereign Lithuanian Republic.

In continuation of the same policy the All-Russian Central Executive Committee is of the opinion that:

1. The immediate solemn confirmation, both by Poland and Russia, of the independence of the Ukraine,

Lithuania, and White Russia, as well as recognition of the independence of Eastern Galicia, ought to be made the basis of peace; (2) that both Poland and Russia must immediately and officially recognize as the particular form of expression of the will of the respective nationalities those representative state institutions, such as diets, congresses, or soviets and parliament, which exist in those countries.

On its part the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic is prepared, in view of the fact that the Soviet regime has not yet been established in Eastern Galicia, to accept a plebiscite there not on the Soviet principle—that is, by a vote of those who work—but on the bourgeois democratic principle.

The All-Russian Central Executive Committee, however, cannot ignore the fact that the standpoint of certain leading Polish groups, political parties, and statesmen, radically differs on questions of self-determination from that of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic.

If the Polish delegation at Riga were to place itself on the standpoint of these parties, groups, and individuals, who, in the face of obvious and incontrovertible facts, deny the self-determination of the Ukraine and White Russia which took place in 1918, it would make an agreement on the basis of self-determination impossible, and render all discussions about the methods of self-determination futile and even mischievous, since they would only serve to camouflage a policy which does not really want any peace, and is only aiming, in the guise of peace, at the annexation of foreign territories.

Hence, being anxious to prevent all ambiguities and all delays on the most momentous question for the laboring masses—that is, the question of a winter campaign—the All-Russian Central Executive Committee instructs hereby its peace delegation to offer to the peace delegation of the Polish Republic, if an immediate agreement on self-determination is not possible, at once to conclude on the following basis an agreement on fundamentals, deferring these controversial questions and divergencies in the interpretation of general principles, by way of which an early attainment of peace would be impossible.

These are the fundamentals of an agreement:

1. Taking note of the declaration of the Polish delegation rejecting the original terms of the Russo-Ukrainian delegation concerning the reduction of the Polish Army, demobilization of its war industries, the surrender of its arms, and the transfer of the complete ownership of the railway line Volkovysk-Grajevo to the Russian Republic, the Russian Republic renounces these terms and expresses its readiness to make a proposal in the same sense to the Allied Ukrainian Republic.

2. The Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic is prepared immediately to sign an armistice and preliminaries of peace on the basis of the recognition of a frontier line between Poland and Russia, passing considerably more to the east than that fixed by the Supreme Allied Council on December 3, 1919, so that Eastern Galicia might remain to the west of the line.

3. The Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic believes it necessary to attain, in the speediest manner possible, peace, and to deliver the Russian, Polish, White Russian, and Ukrainian laboring masses from the trials of a new winter campaign.

The rejection by Poland of this offer would mean that Poland has resolved—probably under the pressure of the imperialists of France and of other Entente Powers—on a winter campaign.

Hence the All-Russian Central Executive Committee is obliged to announce that the said offer is only valid for the space of ten days, and that if the preliminaries of peace are not signed by the time this term expires, that is by October 5, 1920, the Council of People's Commissaries will have the right to alter its terms.

In making such sacrifices for the sake of peace, Soviet Russia does so in the consciousness of its right, and

of the inexhaustible strength of the Russian and Ukrainian laboring masses, who are prepared to stand up resolutely for the defense of the two Soviet republics. Should the Polish Government decide to assume the responsibility, in the face of the whole world, for the continuation of the war and for further bloodshed.

It is for this reason that the All-Russian Central Executive Committee is convinced that the failure to reply satisfactorily, within the above-mentioned period, will practically decide the question of a winter campaign.

(Signed) KALININ, *President.*  
YENUKIDZE, *Secretary of All-Russian*  
*Central Executive Committee.*

### MOBOLIZATION IN RUSSIA

PETROGRAD, August 31.—During the last mobilization 2,508 Communists, the most responsible Soviet workers of Petrograd, have been sent to the Western front.

MOSCOW, September 1.—The Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic decided to carry through the mobilization in the speediest possible manner, and to send the necessary reinforcements to the Wrangel front by September 10.

MOSCOW, August 31.—It has been wired from Armavir that the Congress of the Free Caucasian Nationalities at Yekaterinodar has resolved actively to aid the Soviet power in its struggle against Wrangel, and to defend the Kuban coast.

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