Adam Smith 1759

The Theory of Moral Sentiments

Part I: Of the Propriety of Action

Section I: Of the Sense of Propriety


I: Of Sympathy
II: Of the Pleasure of mutual Sympathy
III: Of the manner in which we judge of the propriety or impropriety of the affections of other men, by their concord or dissonance with out own
IV: The same subject continued
V: Of the amiable and respectable virtues

Section II: Of the Degrees of the different Passions which are consistent with Propriety Introduction


Introduction
I: Of the Passions which take their origin from the body
II: Of those Passions which take their origin from a particular turn or habit of the Imagination
III: Of the unsocial Passions
IV: Of the social Passions
V: Of the selfish Passions

Section III: Of the Effects of Prosperity and Adversity upon the Judgment of Mankind with regard to the Propriety of Action; and why it is more easy to obtain their Aprobation in the one state than in the other


I: That though our sympathy with sorrow is generally a more lively sensation than our sympathy with joy, it commonly falls much more short of the violence of what is naturally felt by the person principally concerned
II: Of the origin of Ambition, and of the distinction of Ranks
III: Of the corruption of our moral sentiments, which is occasioned by this disposition to admire the rich and the great, and to despise or neglect persons of poor and mean condition

Part II: Of Merit and Demerit; or, of the Objects of Reward and Punishment

Section I: Of the Sense of Merit and Demerit


Introduction
1: That whatever appears to be the proper object of gratitude, appears to deserve reward; and that, in the same manner, whatever appears to be the proper object of resentment appears to deserve punishment
II: Of the proper objects of gratitude and resentment
III: That where there is no approbation of the conduct of the person who confers the benefit, there is little sympathy with the gratitude of him who receives it: and that, on the contrary, where there is no disapprobation of the motives of the person who does the mischief, there is no sort of sympathy with the resentment of him who suffers it
IV: Recapitulation of the foregoing chapters
V: The analysis of the sense of Merit and Demerit

Section II: Of Justice and Beneficence


I: Comparison of those two virtues
II: Of the sense of Justice, of Remorse, and of the consciousness of Merit
III: Of the utility of this constitution of Nature

Section III: Of the Influence of Fortune upon the Sentiments of Mankind, with regard to the Merit or Demerit of Actions


Introduction
I: Of the Causes of this Influence of Fortune
II: Of the extent of this Influence of Fortune
III: Of the final cause of this Irregularity of Sentiments

Part III: Of the Foundation of our Judgments concerning our own Sentiments and Conduct, and of the Sense of Duty


I : Of the Principle of Self-approbation and of Self-disapprobation
II : Of the love of Praise, and of that of Praise-worthiness; and of the dread of Blame, and of that of Blame-worthiness
III: Of the Influences and Authority of Conscience
IV: Of the Nature of Self-deceit, and of the Origin and Use of general Rules
V: Of the influence and authority of the general Rules of Morality, and that they are justly regarded as the Laws of the Deity
VI: In what cases the Sense of Duty ought to be the sole of our conduct; and in what cases it ought to concur with other motives

Part IV: Of the Effect of Utility upon the Sentiment of Approbation


I: Of the beauty which the appearance of Utility bestows upon all the productions of art, and of the extensive influence of this species of Beauty
II: Of the beauty which the appearance of Utility bestows upon the characters and actions of men; and how far the perception of this beauty may be regarded as one of the original principles of approbation

Part V: Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon the Sentiments of Moral Approbation and Disapprobation


I: Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon our Notions of Beauty and Deformity
II: Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon Moral Sentiments

Part VI: Of the Character of Virtue

Section I Of the Character of the Individual, so far as it affects his own Happiness; or of Prudence

Introduction

Section II Of the Character of the Individual, so far as it can affect the Happiness of other People


Introduction
I: Of the Order in which Individuals are recommended by Nature to our care and attention
II: Of the order in which Societies are by nature recommended to our Beneficence
III: Of universal Benevolence

Section III Of Self-command


Introduction

PART VII: Of Systems of Moral Philosophy

Section I: Of the Questions which ought to be examined in a Theory of Moral Sentiments

Introduction

Section II: Of the different Accounts which have been given of the Nature of Virtue


Introduction
I: Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Propriety
II: Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Prudence
III: Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Benevolence
IV: Of licentious Systems

Section III: Of the different Systems which have been formed concerning the Principle of Approbation


Introduction
I: Of those Systems which deduce the Principle of Approbation from Self-love
II: Of those Systems which make Reason the Principle of Approbation
III: Of those Systems which make Sentiment the Principle of Approbation

Section IV: Of the Manner in which different Authors have treated of the practical Rules of Morality


Conclusion