Written: According to the author this piece was
written in the Fall of 1971, but remained unfinished for some time due to his
Source: Wang Ming, Mao's Betrayal, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1979, pages 164-196.
Online Version: Wang Ming Reference Archive, 2014.
Transcription/Markup: Juan Fajardo, March 2014.
In the summer of 1966, under the flag of a "cultural revolution", Mao launched a counter-revolutionary coup directed against the CPC and the people of China, and against the Soviet Union and the world communist movement.
The chief objective of this coup was to substitute the counter-revolutionary "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" for revolutionary Marxism-Leninism and to make them the sole basis for the country's internal and external political guidelines and policies.
In home policy, Mao used military force to smash the great and glorious Communist Party of China and to suppress the talented, hard-working, and revolutionary people of China. Most of the members of the CC CPC Politbureau were maliciously slandered and repressed (Liu Shao-chi, Peng Teh-huai, Tao Chu, Ho Lung, Li Chin-chuan, Peng Chen, Tan Chen-lin, Ulanfu, Chang Wen-tien alias Lo Fu, Lu Ting-i, and Po Yi-po) or harassed (Chu Teh, Chen Yi, Hsu Hsiang-chien, and Nieh Jung-chen). Mao Tse-tung also dealt ruthlessly with almost all the members of the CPC Secretariat—Wang Chia-hsiang, Tan Chien, Huang Ko-cheng, Lo Jui-ching, Hsi Chung-hsun, Wang Jen-chung, Liu Ning-i, Yang Shang-kun, Hu Chiao-mu, and Liu Lan-tao. Harrowing torment was the lot of some 140, or nearly four-fifths, of the 174 members of the CPC Central Committee. Party organisations of all levels—provincial, city, county, district, rural, etc.—were smashed. There was wholesale massacre and persecution of cadres and rank-and-file Party members. Army commanders and political officers, too, were attacked. Government bodies, the YCL, trade union bodies of all levels, and various associations of creative and scientific workers, were broken up. The intellectuals who worked in them, those outside as well as inside the Party, were cruelly treated. Many were physically eliminated. Millions of the foremost workers, peasants, intellectuals, and the revolutionary youth were massacred or jailed.
The losses suffered by the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people were colossal. They were far greater, in fact, than the losses inflicted on Party and people by international imperialists, Peiyang warlords, Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei, and all other counter-revolutionaries combined.
May the memory of all the victims of Mao's crimes live forever. At the 9th CPC Congress (April 1969) Mao substituted a pseudo-party of his own for the real Chinese Communist Party. He is now trying to use it to promote his personal anti-communist and anti-Soviet ends. The Communist Party and the people of China are submerged in a vortex of unheard of calamities.
Mao's extreme crimes have made him a traitor to the Communist Party of China and to the Chinese revolution, and an enemy of the whole Chinese people.
In the field of foreign policy, Mao began an insane struggle against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. His frenzy is directed to subverting and splitting the world socialist system. He has gone to the length of making territorial claims on the Soviet Union, has mounted armed attacks on the Soviet frontier, and has tried to annex the Mongolian People's Republic. He is attacking the Marxist-Leninist communist and workers' parties of all countries, and has publicly proclaimed his intention of "putting an end" to them. He engages in subversive and divisive activity in the world communist movement, and also in the anti-imperialist national liberation movement of the Asian, African and Latin American countries. He is doing his worst to impair their friendship and solidarity with the socialist states and the world communist movement. This is helping imperialist attempts at re-establishing control over these countries and at committing aggressions against them where possible. Mao is hatching intrigues to provoke an American-Soviet armed conflict, which would grow into a world war. He hopes that flames of war will engulf and destroy the socialist countries, as well as the imperialist states and their allies. He hopes that a thermonuclear war will further his maniacal dream of undivided world supremacy. He has broken economic relations with the socialist community and has hitched his country to the capitalist chariot, setting the stage for the restoration of capitalism in China.
Mao's extremely serious crimes on the international scene have made him a traitor to the world communist movement and the anti-imperialist revolutionary movement, and have turned him into an enemy of progressive and peace-loving people throughout the world.
Mao's crimes, committed in his counter-revolutionary coup, confirm the fact that home and foreign policy is indivisible: home policy being the source of foreign policy, and foreign policy being the continuation of home policy. Inside the country Mao uses anti-communism to clear the way for anti-Soviet struggle. At the same time, he tries to consolidate his positions in the anti-communist struggle by means of anti-Sovietism.
On the international scene, he uses anti-Soviet and anti-communist acts as a means of rapprochement with imperialists and reactionaries abroad.
I have given a fairly detailed account of Mao's various crimes inside the country and on the international scene during the early period of the "cultural revolution" in my article, "What Mao Tse-tung Has Started is Not a 'Cultural Revolution' But a Counter-Revolutionary Coup", published in 1969. So, it is needless to repeat the story here.
In the following years the counter-revolutionary coup continued. Its main content consisted in anticommunism, anti-Sovietism, and crimes against the people. Mao acted under such slogans as "for deep criticism of revisionism and for rectification of style", "for a further deepening of struggle, criticism, and reform", "continue the one 'down' and three 'againsts'", and "prepare for sudden attack from the North"; he promoted his line through such campaigns as the "educational campaign in the field of ideology and politics" and "boycott the false Marxists Wang Ming and Liu Shao-chi".
These slogans and campaigns helped Mao to seek out, persecute and exterminate the country's leading Communists, YCLers, revolutionary workers, peasants, intellectuals, and the youth. Dissenters were sought and found in every office, military unit, organisation, school, enterprise, people's commune, and family. Mao's slogan, "remove the old, absorb the new", means that he will con-tinue wiping out his enemies—and not only his own, but also those of his heiress, Chiang Ching, and his son-in-law Yao Wen-yuan. His main target are the Marxists-Leninists and internationalists, those in favour of Chinese-Soviet friendship, and also all opponents of US imperialism. In this way he expects to reach his extreme individualist and selfish aim: "Not to be overthrown during my lifetime, and not to be denounced after my death".
These slogans and campaigns helped Mao in his frenzied attempts at subverting and disrupting the world socialist system, the world communist and anti-imperialist movements, and at establishing closer ties with imperialist elements in the United States and other countries.
As before, Mao aims his attacks against the CPSU and the Soviet Union. This is natural, because:
—The CPSU and the Soviet Union are the living embodiment of scientific communism; they are Marxism-Leninism in action.
—The CPSU is the most advanced, the most experienced, the most prestigious, and the most powerful communist party, a recognised vanguard of the world communist movement, while the Soviet Union has the greatest experience, the greatest achievements, the greatest power and greatest prestige in the socialist community.
—The CPSU and the Soviet Union are the impregnable stronghold of the peoples' struggle against imperialism and reaction, and for peace, democracy, national independence, social progress, and socialism, while the Soviet Communists and Soviet people are the most dependable friends and comrades of the Chinese Communists and the Chinese people in the revolutionary struggle and the building of socialism.
—Under the leadership of the CPSU, fulfilling the historic decisions of the 24th CPSU Congress, the Soviet people are putting into effect the grand plans of building communism and the magnificent programme of world peace.
It was for these reasons that Mao made anti-Sovietism his motto and launched out against Marxism-Leninism, the socialist countries, the communist and workers' parties (including the Communist Party of China), the anti-imperialist movement, and world peace. He also uses anti-Sovietism to earn the approval and appreciation of the imperialist powers, notably the US imperialists, and reactionaries in all countries. He is eager to cooperate with them on an anti-Soviet and anti-communist basis.
Anti-Sovietism is a concentrated expression of anticommunism and pro-imperialism. Comrade Janos Kadar, First Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, was absolutely right when he said that there never was and never will be an anti-Soviet communism; it follows that there never was and never will be an anti-Soviet Communist.
It is precisely because Mao's anti-Sovietism is nationalist in form and anti-communist in content that it became the foundation of his reactionary foreign policy and the core of his reactionary home policy.
From the people of China Mao concealed all word of the joint festivities held by the CC CPSU, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet on the 50th anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, held in December 1972 in Moscow, in which representatives of fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties, national-democratic parties, and national liberation movements participated. He also concealed from his people the historic report of the CC CPSU General Secretary, Comrade Brezhnev, at these festivities, which brilliantly summed up the outstanding victories of Lenin's rational policy and the great achievements of the multinational Soviet socialist state in the 50 years of the Union, and elucidated the Leninist home and foreign policy of the CPSU and Soviet Government in modern conditions. Therefore, I consider it useful to quote that part of Comrade Brezhnev's report where he referred to the present relations between China and the Soviet Union, as well as most of the other socialist states, and also examined the substance of the Maoist foreign policy. I do so in order to give the Chinese Communists and the people of China a clear idea and a clear understanding of the hypocritical and incendiary nature of Mao's howls about a "Soviet threat".
Here is what Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said:
"Now, Comrades, a few words about our present relations with China or, rather, about China's attitude towards most of the socialist states.
"It is more than ten years since the leaders of the People's Republic of China took the line of opposing the USSR and, in effect, the entire socialist community, which they continue to regard as the main obstacle to their great-power designs.
"Speaking bluntly, what is Peking's foreign policy today? It consists of absurd claims to Soviet territory and malicious slander of the Soviet social and political system, of our peaceable foreign policy. It consists of outright sabotage of the efforts to limit the arms race, of the efforts to bring about disarmament and a relaxation of international tension. It consists of constant at-tempts to split the socialist camp and the communist movement, to stir up discord among the fighters for national liberation, to range the developing countries against the Soviet Union and the other socialist states. Lastly, it consists of unprincipled alignments on anti-Soviet grounds with any, be they even the most reactionary forces—the most rabid haters of the Soviet Union from among the British Tories or the revenge-seeking elements in the FRG, the Portuguese colonialists or the racists of South Africa.
"In substance, the purpose of doing the greatest possible harm to the USSR, of impairing the interests of the socialist community, is now the sole criterion determining the Chinese leaders' approach to any major international problem.
"What can one say about this policy?
"We hold that it is unnatural for relations between socialist countries, that it runs counter to the interests not only of the Soviet, but also of the Chinese people, that it runs counter to the interests of world socialism, the liberation and anti-imperialist struggle, peace and international security.
"It is therefore understandable why we categorically reject this policy. (Prolonged applause.)
"The Chinese leaders claim to be disturbed about some threat emanating from the Soviet Union. If these statements are not hypocritical, it is impossible to understand why China has not replied to our proposal, repeatedly made since 1969, to assume clear, firm and permanent commitments ruling out an attack by one country or the other. If Peking is really concerned about China's security, why has not the PRC leadership agreed to conclude a special treaty renouncing the use of force, the draft of which was submitted to the Chinese side on January 15, 1971? The draft of this treaty states unequivocally that the sides—and I quote—'shall not use against each other armed forces employing any type of arms, including: (a) conventional, (b) missile, or (c) nuclear'. No, the Chinese leaders' complaints about a mythical 'Soviet threat' quite obviously do not stand up to scrutiny."
We have already pointed out that Mao Tse-tung is using his anti-Soviet and anti-communist counter-revolutionary coup as a means to win the appreciation of, and establish cooperation with the imperialists. The course of events has fully confirmed this. Mao's course, set on a counter-revolutionary coup, was applauded by imperialists and reactionaries, and first of all by the imperialists of the United States. Comrade Gus Hall, General Secretary of the CP USA, speaking at the festivities on the 50th anniversary of the USSR, said rightly that the Mao group follows is therefore natural for the capitalist press to sound the praises of Mao's "cultural revolution". Diplomatic representatives of capitalist countries flock to Peking to shake Mao's hand and express their friendly sentiments. And, certainly, the greatest attention is drawn to the "sudden change" in Chinese-American relations. After Edgar Snow, Mao's bosom friend, had spent many months in Peking and had had many secret conversations with Mao, a US ping-pong team visited China, whereupon, on 16 July 1971, the official Chinese and American press simultaneously published a communique confirming rumours that Henry Kissinger, then a national security adviser to the US President, had secretly visited Peking and held 20 hours of confidential talks with Premier Chou En-lai. Also confirmed were rumours that US President Richard Nixon had accepted the Chinese government's invitation to visit China. Thereupon, both sides reported Kissinger's second trip to Peking to prepare Nixon's visit to China, and announced Nixon's arrival in Peking on 21 February 1972.
In short, Nixon's China visit was not a fortuitous thing, but a far-reaching step by Mao and certain US elements.
It is common knowledge that ever since the inauguration of the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, other socialist countries, and some of the Afro-Asian states have systematically, at all sessions of the UN General Assembly, demanded the ousting of the Chiang Kai-shek representative and the recognition of the legitimate rights of the PRC in the United Nations. Due to the stubborn opposition of the USA and its allies, and due to US insistence that the ultimate decision needed the approval of two-thirds of the UN membership, this issue was dragged out for many years. At the 26th UN General Assembly, however, the United States and its allies "suddenly" voted for letting the PRC representative take the place of the Taiwan emissary in the UN. Obviously, this change of heart followed a preliminary agree-ment reached in confidential American-Chinese negotiations.
News agencies report that Peking is crowded with US "visitors" and that American guests are received in Peking with courtesy and care. It is quite certain that the cooperation of Mao and the US is expanding each day, Mao's delegates use the 26th UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council for anti-Soviet campaigns. They heap malicious insinuations and slanders on the USSR, and stand before the world as faithful helpers of the US imperialists and other reactionaries. They voted against the Soviet proposal for a world disarmament conference. Yet, the UN session adopted a resolution on this score by a majority vote. And Mao stood unveiled before the world as an enemy of peace and a henchman of the forces of war. In the Security Council, Mao's spokesman joined the US spokesman to back the reactionary Pakistani militarist, Yahya Khan, and opposed the liberation movement fighting for the national self-determination, democracy and freedom of the 75 million people of Bangladesh. By so doing, they opposed the USSR and India, which supported the liberation struggle in Bangladesh. The Maoist stand on the Middle East favoured Israel and US reactionaries. The Maoists denied support to the just struggle of the Arab countries and the Arab people of Palestine against the US-backed Israeli aggression, and did not back the UN Security Council resolution requiring Israel to withdraw her troops from overrun Arab lands. At the same time, furthering their nefarious designs, the Maoists tried to undermine the friendship and cooperation between the Arab peoples and the Soviet Union.
In the United Nations Maoist spokesmen act hand in hand with imperialist forces, and this more and more frequently. Comrade Gus Hall, speaking on USSR Central Television on 29 April 1973, said it is almost im-possible to distinguish Maoist policy from imperialist policy. Maoists and imperialists tend to act in concert. There is practically no difference, for example, between the Maoist utterances in the UN and the UN speeches of reactionary imperialist spokesmen. Perhaps the only difference, Hall added, is that the Maoists are more given to the use of coarse and abusive language.
All this is natural. It is the effect of the anti-Soviet and anti-communist policy aimed at rapprochement with imperialist forces in the United States, followed by Mao since the "style rectification campaign" for more than 30 years covertly or overtly, with or without interruptions.
To understand the present-day Maoist policy aimed at cooperation with imperialist forces, we must look back at its beginnings.
1. In the autumn of 1936 Edgar Snow had long conversations with Mao in Paoyang (northern part of Shensi province). Though they had met for the first time, Mao and Snow behaved like old friends. Their conversations were frank and thorough, irrespective of whether they concerned public or personal matters, Party and state matters or matters related to the Comintern and the Soviet Union, etc. This is why it did not take them very long to become bosom friends.
Referring to the twenties, Mao Tse-tung said to Edgar Snow, "I was then a strong supporter of America's Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door." This sentence means at least two things: first, Mao wanted to parade as a constant follower of the USA; second, he wanted to express his firm support of the imperialist and expansionist policy of the United States in China and other countries. The experienced US bourgeois journalist, Edgar Snow, was sure to draw the right conclusions.
It is not surprising that the notes of Snow's talks with Mao, when published, alerted Georgi Dimitrov. In November 1937, shortly before my return from Moscow to Yenan, Dimitrov instructed me to explain to the CC CPC and to Mao personally that he had departed from positions expected of a Communist in talks with a US bourgeois journalist.
Snow's impression is said to have been that Mao was at most an agrarian reformer, and certainly no Communist; if Mao were to become top leader of the Communist Party and, in addition, some day hold power in China, he would not build socialism, would be an opponent of the Soviet Union, and an ally of imperialism.
2. At the end of 1937, after my return to Yenan, I learned that Mao had negotiated with Lo Hang, a representative of Chen Tu-hsiu, and had permitted the entire Trotskyite-Chen Tu-hsiuist group to rejoin the Part y (thanks to my return this was prevented). This showed even at that early date that Mao was prepared to join hands with Trotskyites, those active abettors of imperialist reaction.
3. In the summer of 1938 Mao published his article, On a War of Attrition, in which he divided the Sino-Japanese war into three stages: Japanese offensive—equilibrium—Chinese counter-offensive. In the first stage Japan attacked while China retreated. In the second stage neither of the warring sides was able to attack and there was a state of equilibrium. In the third stage China would wait for Japan to attack the Soviet Union, and then mount a counter-offensive.
These views, and especially the idea of waiting for a Japanese attack on the Soviet Union, were at that time consonant with the 'designs of the US, British and French imperialists, and also with those of Chiang Kai-shek. They were waiting for the same thing. Then, "sitting on the mountain and watching the tigers fight", they hoped to reap the maximum advantage. In short, On a War of Attrition let the imperialists know of Mao's anti-Soviet designs.
After the article was published in Yenan, Mao sent it to Wuhan and asked for it to be reprinted in the Hsinhuajihpao (which was under my direction). Chin Panghsien (Po Ku), Hsiang Ying, Kai Feng, other comrades and I were against the article, because it was oriented on passive resistance and on waiting for Japan to attack the USSR. This, would work against the national interests of the Chinese people and contradicted the internationalist duty of the Communist Party of China. The Party's policy was to further the nation's active resistance to the Japanese aggression in order to defend China's independence and territorial integrity, and to prevent the Japanese militarists from starting a war against the USSR. So, we decided not to publish On a War of Attrition in the Hsinhuajihpao. I asked a Soviet comrade who was then in Wuhan to let Stalin and Dimitrov know of our opinion. Dimitrov saw to it that the article should not appear in the journal. Communist International. (Wang Chia-hsiang informed Mao of Dimitrov's decision, and also told me about it when he returned from Moscow to Yenan in the autumn of 1938.)
4. In October 1938 Mao published his report, On the New Stage, to the 6th Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee. Here he said the second of the three stages of the war—that of equilibrium—had begun. This was designed to justify his passiveness in the war of resistance. Mao's concept, was instantly approved by the Japanese invaders and by Chiang Kai-shek. For the Japanese China was a staging area for an attack southward on the United States or northward on the Soviet Union. They could wish for nothing better than a standstill in Sino-Japanese hostilities. Chiang Kai-shek, too, after the fall of Wuhan, was eager to avoid engagements with the Japanese army and to preserve his armed forces for a future war against the Communist Party. He was banking on a Japanese-Soviet or Japanese-American war.
In his report, Mao also advocated "Sinifying" Marxism and rejecting "overseas stereotypes". By this demagogic slogan he was, in fact, trying to fold up the propagation of Marxism-Leninism and the use of Soviet experience, reject the guidance of the Comintern, and crush Leninist internationalists in the Party. The report On the New Stage also let the imperialists see that Mao made free with the national interests of the Chinese people and that his intentions were anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist, anti-Soviet, and anti-communist.
My speech at the 6th Plenum, "On the War Situation after the Loss of Wuhan", was based on Lenin's precept that anti-imperialist national revolutionary wars are progressive wars and are always victorious. I showed that the many millions of Chinese were bound to defeat Japanese imperialism with the aid of the socialist Soviet Union, provided they fought staunchly and strove for victory. This ran counter to Mao's erroneous line, as set forth in his On the War of Attrition and On the New Stage.
4. In the beginning of 1940 Mao published his On New Democracy. Here he openly contradicted Lenin's view of the non-capitalist (i.e. socialist) perspective of the Chinese revolution. In so doing, he defended the interests of the Chinese national bourgeoisie, opposed China's taking the socialist road, and advocated a "new-democratic" way implying a long period of capitalist development. On New Democracy enabled imperialist ideologues to see Mao's ultimate intentions: defence of the bourgeoisie and hostility towards the proletariat; defence of capitalism and hostility towards socialism.
6. In October 1940 Mao publicly came out in favour of an alliance between nazi Germany, fascist Italy, militarist Japan and the Soviet Union, and inside the country an alliance with the Japanese aggressors, which amounted to national treason. Here is how it happened.
One October night a comrade from the Sinchunghwapao (the Yenan newspaper of the CC CPC, which appeared every three days) came to show me the content of the following day's issue (I was then chairman of the CC CPC press commission. and was in charge of the Sinchunghwapao). My attention was drawn to the title of the leading article—"On Alliance Between Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union".
"Where did you get this article?" I asked.
"It was sent in by Comrade Mao Tse-tung," the comrade replied. "This afternoon he held a conference with our editors and comrades from the Central Committee propaganda department. He said that we must set the sights on an alliance between Germany, Italy, Japan and the Soviet Union in international relations, and on a united front with the Japanese and Wang Ching-wei inside the country. He said he had prepared an editorial and told us to publish it in our next issue. The question is a serious one. Hasn't he discussed it with the other members of the Politbureau?"
I said I'd go and talk to him.
Mao admitted that he had held the conference, and added:
"Stalin and Dimitrov suggested an anti-fascist alliance of Britain, the United States, France and the Soviet Union against Germany, Italy and Japan. Events have proved this to be a mistake. What we want is not an alliance between Britain, the United States, France and the Soviet Union, but between Germany, Italy, Japan and the Soviet Union."
"Why?" I asked.
"Germany, Italy and Japan are poor," Mao replied. "We will gain nothing from fighting them. In case we win, we can take nothing from them. Britain, the United States and France are rich, especially Britain. Look at her colonies. If she is crushed, great profits will accrue from just dividing her colonies. You may accuse me of a ,pro-fascist line, but I do not care. In China we want a united front with the Japanese and Wang Ching-wei against Chiang Kai-shek, not the anti-Japanese front suggested by you. In short, you are wrong."
"Where am I wrong?" I asked.
"We cannot overpower the Japanese," Mao said. "So why fight them? We would do better to fight Chiang Kai-shek with the help of Japan and Wang Ching-wei. Look at the large territories Chiang Kai-shek controls in the southwest and northwest. If he is beaten, we can get a piece of the northwest. This would be a gain. I know you will say that I am pro-Japanese and guilty of national treason, but I do not care. I am not afraid of being a national traitor."
"You have no right to decide anything of such international and internal importance on your own," I said. "Our argument is pointless. I propose normal procedure, namely, sending a telegram with your opinion to Comrades Stalin and Dimitrov, and discussing the matter at a meeting of the Politbureau."
"No such telegram can be sent now," Mao replied. "The two venerable old men may fly into a rage. That would be no joking matter. Neither do I want a Politbureau discussion at the present moment."
"The situation is not yet ripe," he replied. "In six months events will show that I am right. Then I will send a telegram saying that I had long since made these proposals in an article in the Sinchunghwapao. And Comrades Stalin and Dinaitrov will reply: 'Comrade Mao Tse-tung, you were right, and we were wrong'. You, too, Comrade Wang Ming, will then have to admit your mistake, and say: 'Comrade Mao Tse-tung, you were right, and I was wrong.' At the next Politbureau meeting I will ask not to send any telegram to Stalin and Dimitrov, and not to discuss the matter at any Politbureau meet-ing.''
"But what if the next six months prove you wrong? What then?" I asked.
"How can I be wrong? I am certain to be right," Mao replied blandly.
"That you are certain of it is one thing, and how events develop is another. Tell me what you will do if events prove you wrong? Will you send a telegram to Comrades Stalin and Dimitrov admitting your mistake? Will you also admit your mistake to me?"
Mao did not answer.
The course of events, as we know, has proved the folly of Mao's pro-fascist idea of an alliance with Germany, Italy and Japan, and of his treacherous line of alliance with Japan. and Wang Ching-wei. Far from admitting his error to anyone after Hitler attacked the Soviet Union, he launched the "style rectification campaign", making Leninism, the Comintern, the Soviet Union, and the Communist Party of China its chief targets.
Our conversation continued.
"In short," I said, "your article must not be published."
"It must," he said. "I have held a conference, and have sent in the manuscript. ,If we don't publish it, I will lose face. I want the article published, and I declare here and now, and will also declare to all members of the Politbureau, that I alone bear the responsibility for it."
Half pleading amd half demanding, he had the article published in the Sinchunghwapao.
To be sure, Mao could only prattle about the policy of the world communist movement and Soviet foreign policy. Alter them he could not. All the same, events showed that this unprincipled political adventurer and intriguer had a definite purpose in publishing an article advocating alliance with Germany, Italy and Japan. His aim. was to cover up his treasonable pro-Japanese outlook, and to justify the order he had issued to the troops to halt anti-Japanese operations and intensify armed conflicts inside the country. On the international plane, he meant to undermine Soviet prestige among antifascist forces in other countries.
Secretly, without the knowledge of the Politbureau, using the radio-transmitter of the EC CPC Military Council, Mao ordered Jao Shu-shih, Political Commissar of the New 4th Army, to send a spokesman to negotiate cooperation against Chiang Kai-shek with representatives of the Japanese army and Wang Ching-wei. Operations against the enemy were suspended. But at that time neither the Japanese nor Wang Ching-wei would believe that Mao was capable of treason. They suspected a trap. As a result, no concrete accords were reached.
KMT propaganda, however, made the most of Mao's dealing with the enemy. Luckily, the CPC enjoyed tremendous revolutionary prestige among the people as the initiator of the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war and the united national anti-Japanese front. Nobody believed that there could be national traitors like Chin Kuai and Wang Ching-wei among the CPC leaders. Chiang Kai-shek's attempts to use the above-mentioned facts in his anti-communist propaganda proved fruitless. In 1955, on the pretext of combatting a "Kao (Kang)- Jao (Shu-shih) bloc", Mao arrested Jao Shu-shih and had him killed. He also took advantage of the campaign to arrest and execute Pan Han-nien (former chief of the New 4th Army's reconnaissance) whom Jao Shu-shih had sent to negotiate with the Japanese and Wang Chingwei, and Hu Chun-ho, who had represented the Japanese and Wang Ching-wei at the negotiations. (In the past, Hu Chun-ho had betrayed the Communist Party, but during the negotiations Pan Han-nien persuaded him to serve our Party again.) Mao wanted all witnesses of his national betrayal out of the way.
Since Hu Chun-ho was a triple agent (for Chiang Kai-shek, for the Japanese and Wang Ching-wei, and finally, thanks to Pan Han-nien's efforts, also a counterintelligence agent of the New 4th Army in the Japanese and Wang Ching-wei camp, and in Chiang Kai-shek's camp), the content of his negotiations with Pan Hannien was promptly relayed to the US and British secret agents in China through Chiang Kai-shek's spy agencies. In short, the American and British imperialists were given to understand that even though the Japanese had invaded China and the nation had risen to resist the aggressor, Mao was prepared to deal with Japan and become a national traitor; this meant that in a different situation he would seek alliance with imperialism.
Since many people inside and outside the Party have no knowledge of the true implications of the "anti-Party Kao Kang-Jao Shu-shih bloc", it will be appropriate to give a brief account of it here.
The "anti-Party Kao-Jao bloc" case (1954) fabricated by intriguer Mao pursued three aims.
First, he wanted Teng Hsiao-ping and not Liu Shao-chi to be elected General Secretary of the Central Committee, reneging on his "solemn promise" (that Liu Shao-chi would get the post of General Secretary) made when the "Mao-Liu bloc" was formed. At the 1st Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee he had objected to having a General Secretary in charge of all organisational work, and suggested retaining the post of chief of the CC Secretariat, who would manage the affairs of various CC organs and certain current CC business. In 1953, however, Mao began arguing in favour of having a General Secretary. He required his closest entourage—Lo Jung-huan, Lo Jui-ching, and others—to back Kao Kang's open campaign against electing Liu Shao-chi. As a result, Liu Shao-chi was compelled to agree that Teng Hsiao-ping, one of Mao's trusted lieutenants, should be elected General Secretary.
Second, Mao wanted all power in the Party and government agencies and the army in Northeast China, a major administrative region, to pass from Kao Kang to Lo Jung-huan. This is why he suddenly stabbed Kao Kang in the back, declaring that Kao Kang's campaign against Liu Shao-chi was directed against "the emperor's closest associates" or, more plainly, "nominally against Liu Shao-chi but in fact against Mao Tse-tung". Kao Kang was seized (after his execution he was reviled as a "suicide" and "expelled" from the Party), and his posts in Northeast China passed to Lo Junghuan. But the real reason for Kao Kang's elimination was his policy of sincere cooperation with the Soviet Union in defiance of Mao's orders.
Third, Mao wanted to use the "anti-Party Kao-Jao bloc" case to destroy Jao Shu-shih, Pan Han-nien, Hu Chun-ho, and a few others, that is, all witnesses of his treasonable line of "alliance with Japan and Wang Ching-wei against Chiang Kai-shek", dating to 1940.
7. From the autumn of 1941 to the summer of 1945 Mao conducted his "style rectification campaign" against Marxism-Leninism, the Comintern, the Soviet Union, and the Communist Party of China. This convinced the imperialists that anti-Sovietism and anti-communism were ingrained in Mao's outlook.
In 1948 Mao said to me: "After the outbreak of the Pacific war between Japan and America, President Roosevelt has repeatedly suggested through the US liaison officer in Yenan that I should change the name and character of the Communist Party, and break off relations with Moscow. This was to be the price for US military and technical aid to the 8th Route Army. Luckily, we did not agree. We would now be in a pretty fix if we had."
But though formally Mao did not agree to alter the name and character of the CPC, and did not break off relations with Moscow, his anti-Soviet and anti-communist "style rectification campaign" was, in substance, a token of readiness to fulfil these US demands.
During the "style rectification campaign" the White House sent a succession of high-ranking diplomats and generals (including Patrick Hurley, a personal envoy of the US President) to Yenan. Mao spoke to them in an anti-Soviet and anti-communist vein, seeking US aid and US-Mao cooperation. On 23 August, 1944, in a conversation with John Service, political adviser to the US commander of the China-Burma-India war theatre and second secretary of the US Embassy in Chungking, Mao explained in reply to a question why he was so anxious to get US aid and support and why he said nothing of Russia. "We do not expect Russian help," Mao said. "The Russians have suffered greatly in the war and will have their hands full with their own job of rebuilding." He tried to convince Service that "Chinese and American interests are correlated and similar. They fit together, economically and politically... This is why it is so important to us Communists to know what you Americans are thinking and planning. We cannot risk crossing you—cannot risk any conflict with you."
To get US aid and cooperation Mao did not shrink from slandering the policy and programme of the Communist Party of China, describing them as purely bourgeois or purely anti-feudal. He told Service, for example, that "the policies of the Chinese Communist Party are merely liberal", and that "even the most conservative American businessman can find nothing in our program to take exception to". At about the same time Mao told Harrison Forman: "We are not striving for the social and political Communism of Soviet Russia. Rather, we prefer to think of what we are doing as something that Lincoln fought for in your Civil War: the liberation of slaves. In China today we have many millions of slaves, shackled by feudalism." 
Need I say that the policy and programme of the Communist Party of China was neither bourgeois nor liberal, and not exclusively anti-feudal. Mao spoke for himself, reflecting his own ideas, his own policy and programme. What he wanted was that the American imperialists should know him as a mere agrarian reformer, not a Communist, and more hostile to socialism than to capitalism.
There are facts to prove that during his "style rectification campaign" of the forties Mao continuously begged the USA for aid, and looked for the slightest chance to establish Maoist-American cooperation.
How obsessed he was by this idea may be seen from the following episode. One sunny day in the latter half of November 1944, as I lay on a couch outside my house wrapped in a warm quilt, I was suddenly approached by a smiling Mao Tse-tung:
"Comrade Wang Ming," he said, "I have brought good news."
I asked him to be seated. He sat down and pulled a piece of paper out of the pocket of his overcoat. He gave it to me.
"Here, read this".
The paper was about 15 centimetres long and 10 wide, with three lines in English. The first line read: "Mr. Mao Tse-tung," the second, "thanks for your congratulations", and the third, "Roosevelt". In the left corner were four boldly pencilled Chinese characters: "Destroy at once after reading".
"Now that we have this telegram," Mao said, "our relations with America will be much smoother."
"In the past we dealt with Roosevelt's subordinates," Mao replied. "This time he answered personally. Now we can exchange telegrams and letters directly, maintain personal contacts, and negotiate man to man. This makes it easier to settle things."
"Judging by this telegram," I said doubtfully, "it does not look like Roosevelt wants any direct exchanges of telegrams or letters with you, let alone any settling of things."
"Why do you think so?" Mao asked peevishly.
"This does not look like an official telegram. If he had wanted to exchange telegrams directly, his reply should at least have been typed on official stationery of the US army observers in Yenan, if not on an official US Embassy letterhead. What you received is a scrap of paper with a few pencilled English words. Can you prove that this is really a telegram from President Roosevelt? If some day the Americans should say that Roosevelt had never sent you any telegram, you will not be able to prove that he did."
He stared at me. Then he said:
"How can this be possible? A member of the US army group of observers handed it to me personally."
"And what do you think of the four Chinese characters in the left corner?" I asked.
"Roosevelt is probably afraid that Chiang Kai-shek may learn about this telegram, and wants us to burn it after reading," Mao replied.
"If Roosevelt is afraid of Chiang Kai-shek learning about a telegram like this, how can you expect him to exchange telegrams or to settle things with you directly?"
Mao's face darkened. The smile vanished from his lips. After a moment's silence, with a forced grin, he said:
"All the same, I think that after this direct exchange of telegrams things will go more smoothly."
He took back the note and went away.
I recalled that his first talk with me that year was on 1 April. He had come with a definite purpose: to speak his "words from the bottom of the heart". What had been the purpose of his visit this time? Why had he come to show me the telegram? Before this, for several years he had stopped briefing me on his contacts with the Americans. So, I assumed that Mao had wanted to demonstrate his strength: "Look, I have direct telegraphic contact with US President Roosevelt. That is no joking matter."
Since then facts have come to light to bear out my assumption. In September of that year (1944) Dimitrov, who was about to return to Bulgaria after her liberation by the Soviet Army, had written one more letter to me. Like the previous one, it had been intercepted by Mao Tse-tung. He was afraid that I might learn about it. That was why he had come to show me Roosevelt's telegram: "Look, you may have Dimitrov, but I have Roosevelt."
8. In the autumn of 1945, after the Soviet Army entered Northeast China and militarist Japan was crushed, the situation in Asia changed radically. Mao was compelled to demonstrate friendship for the Soviet Union so at the 8th Route Army could enter Northeast China and collect the tremendous Soviet military aid. At the same time, he continued to nurse hopes of American help in uniting and building postwar China. This is why, in the autumn of 1945, on the invitation of Patrick Hurley, the USA Ambassador to China, Mao went to Chungking to negotiate with Chiang Kai-shek, trusting the US Ambassador to be the arbiter. As a result, the conciliatory rightward-leaning October Tenth Agreement was concluded by the Kuomintang and CPC, which looked like a concession to the right forces.
Under this agreement the 8th Route and New 4th armies and all anti-Japanese guerrilla units under their command—nearly 900,000 men in all—were to be reconstituted into not more than nine divisions. And out of these nine, the Communists could independently form only three. The remaining six were to contain Kuomintang units. Besides, we were to relinquish all liberated areas south of the Yangtse. Furthermore, according to an understanding between the USA, Chiang Kai-shek and Mao, the US Army would open military schools in Yenan and Changkiakow (Kalgan) for 8th Route and New 4th Army personnel.
I want to describe the circumstances in which Mao signed this agreement. Since its terms were harsh and humiliating Mao was afraid that the Party and our revolutionary armies would object to them. So, at first, he was reluctant to affix his signature. Then, Chiang Kai-shek resorted to the old method of "demonstrating the execution of a hen to the ape": to intimidate Mao he arrested Lung Yun, military chief of Yunnan province. And Hurley kept saying: "These are the final terms. If you don't sign, there will be no other chance." Mao gave in, and signed. An extreme individualist, he was concerned solely with his selfish interests, and was neglectful of the interests of Party and revolution. Badly intimidated, he all but lost his head. On returning to Yenan, he complained to comrades from the Central Committee: "In Chungking my nerves were strained to the limit. Now, I feel unwell and often have heart palpitations, dizzy spells, and insomnia." He suffered a nervous breakdown, which lasted for more than six months.
Until the day war broke out between the Kuomintang and CPC on a national scale, Mao believed that the United States would force Chiang Kai-shek to agree to a coalition government headed by the KMT and including the CPC and other parties and groups (as Mao had envisioned in his report, On Coalition Government, to the 7th CPC Congress).
Mao expected the United States to help China to unify peacefully. Though after the surrender of Japan the USA was reactivating and arming Chiang Kai-shek's troops for an anti-communist civil war, and though KMT troops had been attacking CPC troops (the 8th Route and New 4th armies) at different points in North and Central China since the latter half of 1946, Mao laboured under the illusion that the "ceasefire teams" with US army arbiters would help to end the KMT-CPC civil war.
In the autumn of 1946, Mao invited General George C. Marshall, President Truman's special envoy, to Yenan, seeking his good offices in negotiating a peace with the KMT. In the winter of 1946, he was still nursing the illusion that the US would assist China's peaceful unification even though Yen Hsi-shan's army had begun large-scale military operations against the 8th Route Army in Shansi and Chiang Kai-shek's troops mounted seven successive offensives against the New 4th Army in northern Kiangsu. The futility of Mao's hopes was obvious. In the beginning of 1947 Fu Tso-yi's cavalry captured Changkiakow (Kalgan) in a surprise raid and Chiang Kai-shek, heartened by this success, officially ordered an "anti-communist extermination campaign" on 14 March, thus precipitating a civil war on the scale of the whole country. Yet, it was not until it May 1947 that Mao finally said, "Down with Chiang Kai-shek", in one of the Mayday slogans.
9. In 1947-1949, during the KMT-CPC civil war, Mao's relations with the USA were marked by mutual hostility, though a search continued on both sides for ways and means of cooperation. Meanwhile, Chiang Kai-shek concluded a Sino-American treaty which, in effect, turned China into a US semi-colony. At that time the KMT still controlled the larger part of China with an army of more than two million men, which the Truman Administration was priming for an anti-communist civil war, for the US imperialists did not believe Mao would succeed in putting the Communist Party of China and the Communist-led People's Liberation Army on the path of anti-Sovietism and rapprochement with the United States. They knew that a victorious Chinese revolution under CPC leadership and with Soviet aid would radically alter the relation of forces in the Far East and the rest of Asia in favour of socialism and against imperialism.
But this did not mean a total break with Mao. In the latter half of 1948, in the final stage of the war, the White House again stretched a hand out to Mao. Chiang Kai-shek had lost the support of his army, the people had turned against him, and he was facing imminent defeat. The White House, on the other hand, did not want US troops to be involved against the CPC, fearing the reaction of the Soviet Union. Besides, it had long since understood Mao's anti-socialist and anti-Soviet essence, and was reluctant to alienate him. Its course of behaviour was clear from the following facts. In North and East China there were then more than 600,000 US i troops—ground, air force, and navy—which withdrew , hastily wherever the People's Liberation Army hove into sight in order to avoid a direct engagement. US Ambassador Stuart in Nanking let Mao know through different channels that the United States was prepared to loan a new Chinese government two billion dollars for five or ten years, provided it did not establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.
Mao was ready to meet the United States half-way. He ordered the People's Liberation Army not to fire on US troops. Politically, he followed a "wide-open door" policy in anticipation of cooperating with the USA.
The above is borne out by the general political line set by Mao in his report to the 2nd Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee in March 1949. This general line and the concomitant home and foreign policy were, of course, above all a projection of his anti-Leninist and anti-socialist "new-democratic" line and policy.
Mao's line was at cross purposes with the Leninist line, according to which the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution would grow into a socialist revolution at the moment of its victory on the scale of the whole country, leading to the building of socialism. Mao maintained that after the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution the sights should be set on a non-socialist "new-democratic" society. His arguments against a socialist revolution and the building of socialism in China were four:
1) "Imperialism continues to exist",
2) "the agrarian revolution has not been completed",
3) "capitalism in China is undeveloped", and
4) "the national bourgeoisie is still involved in the revolution".
Only one out of these four arguments—"the agrarian revolution has not been completed"—had no immediate relation to imperialism. The first argument meant that so long as "imperialism existed" Mao was not going to set the course on socialist revolution and the building of socialism. And the third and fourth showed that he gravitated towards capitalism and did not want to come to grips with the bourgeoisie.
In home policy, he favoured a "policy of four sides and eight directions", which included these four points:
1) "equal concern for public and private interests"
2) "equal concern for the interests of workers and capitalists",
3) "mutual aid of town and village",
4) "commerce between the internal and external markets".
The first two points are clearly non-socialist. The other two do not look objectionable. But if we recall one more passage from Mao's conversation with John Service in 1944, it will be clear that these two points were also chiefly aimed at furthering Maoist-American economic cooperation. Mao said to Service that "America and China complement each other economically: they will not compete. China does not have the requirements of a heavy industry of major size... China needs to build up light industries to supply her own market and raise the living standards of her own people... America is not only the most suitable country to assist this economic devel-opment of China: she is also the only country fully able to participate." We may also recall that Mao had made clear his wish for US manufactured goods to be supplied to China, which would pay the USA with farm produce, and the like. This shows that the latter two points apply not only to home policy, but also to foreign policy. Surely, White House officials and American students of China who followed Mao's every move were pleased with this trend in Maoist policy.
In foreign policy, Mao suggested the following course: "At least in the first few years new China does not need to be recognised by the three great powers—Britain, the USA and USSR—so that they should not interfere in our internal affairs." Here he deliberately placed the socialist Soviet Union on one plane with imperialist Britain and the imperialist USA. The purpose was the same as the one Mao pursues today with his demagogical talk of "two superpowers—the USA and USSR": to mislead the public and slander the Soviet Union, and to disguise his hostility towards the Soviet Union, while seeking rapprochement with the USA and Britain.
But at that time the international situation and the conditions at home did not permit Mao to follow an undisguised anti-Soviet and pro-imperialist policy. The CC CPSU and the Soviet Government followed a Leninist, internationalist policy towards China. The Soviet Union-1 announced its recognition of the People's Republic of China as soon as it was inaugurated. It gave new China -all-round aid and support in the political, diplomatic, economic, financial, scientific, technical, cultural, and educational fields, and in public health. For a time, this z torpedoed Mao's pro-imperialist and anti-Soviet conspiracy.
10. From the autumn of 1950 to the summer of 1953 China helped the people of Korea to repulse the US aggressor. During this period, too, Mao did not abandon hope of friendly relations with the imperialists. This is supported by facts which Liu Shao-chi revealed to me at that time.
At 8 p.m. on 10 November 1952 Liu Shao-chi (who had come to the 19th Congress of the CPSU and was still in Moscow) invited me (in Moscow for medical treatment) for a talk. "When the Anglo-American troops landed in Inchon," he said, "the situation in North Korea became critical. But Chairman Mao hesitated to send Chinese volunteers to repulse the US aggression and help Korea. The Politbureau was in session round the clock for fourteen days, but could not come to a decision. Chairman Mao said: 'The moment our army goes into action, the traditional Sino-American friendship will die. Who can tell how long it will take to restore it? And, supposing we act, what are we going to do if we fail to halt the Americans?' In short, he could not make up his mind. It was not until US troops captured Shingishu and there was only the bridge across the Yalu between them and China that Chairman Mao was forced to come to a decision. He said: 'Now we must act. If our troops begin now, we can still count on glory and gain—the glory of proletarian internationalists and the gain of fighting not on Chinese but on Korean soil. If we wait until the Americans cross the Yalu, we will lose both glory and gain.' When later, after our troops had already gone into action, Chairman Mao learned that Truman had forbidden MacArthur to bomb the Shen-' yang-Manchuria railway, he said ruefully: 'Have we done right to engage our troops?' And still later, when MacArthur insisted on extending the war to Manchuria and staked his job on this (either he does what he wants, or he resigns), and Truman dismissed MacArthur, ' Chairman Mao was deeply upset. He said: 'If we ha known beforehand that the USA does not want to fight against us, we should not have involved ourselves against the Americans by aiding Korea and injuring Sino-American relations. Now, we must see how we can put an end to the matter quickly. Until we do, it 18 no use seeking a gradual restoration of Sino-American friendship.' "
This "friendship", as we see, was more important for Mao than aiding a fraternal socialist country and her people against a US imperialist aggression. Even at the time of the Korean war he was strongly affected by America-mania, as well as America-phobia.
11. The period from 1954 to 1957 was one of continuous negotiations between China and the United States, laying the ground for Maoist-American cooperation. The 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina cleared the way for regular America-Maoist contacts. The Korean war and the American treaty with Chiang Kai-shek on joint "defence" of Taiwan had strained Maoist-American relations for a time. But at the Geneva Conference the Chinese and American representatives consigned these strains to oblivion. The two sides defined methods and stages for subsequent regular contacts. The negotiations between the Chinese and US ambassadors in Warsaw were part of this pattern. Fearing exposure of his unsavoury deals, Mao tried to keep the content of the nego-tiations from the Chinese people and the world. The US State. Department, too, confined itself to saying that though Washington and Peking had no diplomatic relations, the progress made in the Warsaw negotiations was far greater than that of Britain and other countries which did have diplomatic relations with China. The more than a hundred meetings of the Chinese and American spokesmen in W aw did, indeed, pave the way to closer contacts between the Maoists and certain quarters in the United States.
12. In the period from 1957 to 1965 Mao was busy preparing the anti-communist and anti-Soviet "cultural revolution".
The 1957 "campaign against rightist elements" was personally stage-managed by Mao. At first he proclaimed the specious slogan, "may a hundred flowers bloom and may a hundred schools compete". He urged people to "say everything that is on your mind, say everything frankly. Those who talk commit no crime and those who listen get a valuable warning". On his orders people were encouraged at meetings and through the press to speak up without fear. First, Mao wanted to identify those who were still critical of the mistakes he had made in On New. Democracy and in his report to the 2nd Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee, that is, specifically, of his basic political stand against a socialist revolution and the building of socialism in China after the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution; second, he wanted to identify those who approved of the denunciation of the personality cult at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, those who, in one form or another, directly of indirectly, opposed the deification of Mao Tse-tung and his dictatorship. To engineer a pretext for persecuting people critical of his mistakes, he ordered his agents to persuade, even forcibly compel, certain real counter-revolutionaries and pro-KMT elements to slander the Communist Party of China and the Chinese revolution at meetings and in the press. Later, using these "facts", he pounced on. those who criticised him from Marxist-Leninist positions, branding them "counter-revolutionary rightist elements".
Mao admitted that 800,000 people were nailed down in the "campaign against rightist elements". But the number of its victims was much greater. Among them were Party cadres, writers and art workers, and most of the leaders and members of democratic parties and associations.
From 1958 to 1960 Mao conducted his reckless "three red banners" policy under the slogan of outstripping the Soviet economy in a few years. This scheme failed dismally, whereupon, in April 1960, Mao threw off all disguises and began an ideological and political battle against the CPSU and the world communist movement, and charged the Marxist-Leninist parties with "revisionism". At the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties his slanders were condemned by the vast majority of fraternal parties.
In 1962 Mao launched an official campaign against "revisionists" inside the country. At first, he struck against part of the leadership, notably Liu Shao-chi, and then banished a number of writers and artists known since the twenties and thirties to remote villages, describing .this as "going to the masses".
In 1963 Mao launched his notorious 25-point programme, aimed at splitting the socialist community, the world communist movement, and the anti-imperialist national liberation movement. At the same time, using bribery and deceit, he began creating an anti-Soviet, anti-Communist and pro-Maoist fifth column in other countries.
In 1964 and 1965 he conducted a "learn from the Liberation Army" and an "educating successors" campaign, placing the army above Party and people. He also launched other campaigns directed to deifying his person, befuddling the youth and drawing it "into the storm and turmoil together with Chairman Mao". This set the stage for deploying the youth and People's Liberation-Army units in a counter-revolutionary military coup.
These anti-Soviet and anti-communist divisive moves were meant to win sympathy and favour in imperialist quarters. In 1964 and 1965 the White House dispatched Edgar Snow, and then Li Tsung-jen, to contact Mao Tse-tung.
13. The period from 1965 to 1970 saw unprecedented developments in Maoist-American relations. At the beginning of 1965 Mao publicly refused to join the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries in aiding the people of Vietnam in their just war against US aggression, and even obstructed their aid. At the time when the US was escalating its aggression in Vietnam and Mao was preparing for his "cultural revolution" Snow and Li Tsung-jen came to Peking. Snow reported in the British Sunday Times in May 1971 that referring to the war in Vietnam Mao had said to him, "The Chinese will not fight unless the Americans attack them. Is this not clear? The Chinese have their hands full at home." In this way Mao let the White House know where China really stood in the Vietnam war, thus comforting and encouraging the aggressor. Referring to Sino-Soviet relations, Snow reported that Liu Shao-chi had wanted to send a Chinese delegation to the 23rd Congress of the CPSU in 1965 with the aim of reviving the Chinese-Soviet alliance. But Mao had put his foot down. He was in favour of a people's war against both the United States and the Soviet Union.
It is common knowledge that Mao has always been hostile to the Soviet Union, but only pretended hostility towards the USA. By mentioning war against the United States he was merely creating a smokescreen for his preparations for a war against the Soviet Union. Surely, the two old friends—Mao Tse-tung and Edgar Snow—must also have discussed the "cultural revolution", even though Snow does not mention it in his report.
Li Tsung-jen is an old lackey of US imperialism. After the collapse in 1949 of the anti-communist war, in which he had played a prominent part as the so-called Vice-President of the Chinese Republic, Li Tsung-jen emigrated to the United States. There he stayed for 17 years, then suddenly returned to China. In Peking Mao received him as an honoured guest. Banquets and receptions were held for him. Thereupon, he toured the big cities. During his travels he propagated the slogan, "to fight against imperialism it is essential to fight against revisionism", contributing thereby to the preparations for the "cultural revolution". His call for fighting against imperialism was a mere ploy, while his call for fighting against "revisionism" conformed in substance with Mao's own plans. On the international plane, this meant struggle against the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries, and the world communist movement. Inside the country, it meant struggle against the Communist Party. of China, the foremost workers, peasants, intellectuals and youth, and the politically conscious revolutionary section of the People's Liberation Army.
It was an open secret that Snow and Li Tsung-jen represented the White House and expressed the opinion of official US quarters. They had a common objective: to learn more about the preparations for the "cultural revolution" and to express their approval on behalf of the White House.
In the summer of 1966, while waving the flag of a cultural revolution, Mao performed a counter-revolutionary coup. Again, he was seeking to win the confidence of imperialist reaction and to begin cooperating with it on an anti-Soviet and anti-communist basis. His designs bore fruit. US President Lyndon Johnson, State Secretary Dean Rusk, Defence Secretary Robert McNamara, and others, stated that they wanted to improve American-Chinese relations, to cooperate with China in th_g. Far East, and acted accordingly. A conference of US experts declared that the White House looked with favour upon Mao Tse-tung in the belief that "Mao's victory in the 'cultural revolution' is in the interests of the USA". More declarations followed from influential US quarters, saying that they wanted better relations and cooperation with the Maoists. Commercial, diplomatic and political actions were taken to "stimulate mutual understanding".
In short, in the period from 1965 to 1.970 both sides—Mao Tse-tung and the US quarters concerned—took the requisite steps to arrange for cooperation.
14. In the period from the summer of 1970 to the spring of 1971 Mao and Snow held long confidential talks on these issues. It will be recalled that in 1936 Mao and Snow had become bosom friends at first sight. There is evidence that Snow was the first middleman through whom Mao arranged secret contacts with imperialist US quarters. This was why Mao often referred gratefully to Snow, saying: "I owe it mainly to Snow that I have become known all over the world, especially in the USA, and that I am understood by the Amerlicans." In February 1971, as Snow was leaving Peking after many secret conversations with Mao concerning Maoist-American cooperation, they parted close friends who had come to an understanding and whose relations were cordial and frank. This is borne out by a variety of sources and by Snow's own report in Life in April 1971. They had discussed a visit to China by the US President, Mao's continuing struggle against those of his countrymen who favoured friendship with the Soviet Union and opposed a rapprochement with US imperialism, and many other subjects. There is this revealing passage in Snow's report in Life, referring to Mao: "As he courteously escorted me to the door, he said he was not a complicated man, but really very simple. He was, he said, only a lone monk walking the world with a leaky umbrella."
The sense of Mao's sad words was that after the outbreak of the "cultural revolution" he had been abandoned or betrayed by his closest associates; a "purge" was in the offing of his most trusted friends (including his appointed "successor" Lin Piao and intimate Chen Pota). He was conscious of his aloneness and his failing strength, and was in desperate need of help from the United States.
Certainly, the above does not cover all the aspects of Maoist policy, directed to cooperation with imperialist forces. But it is enough to show that Mao's rapprochement with imperialism is neither sudden nor fortuitous, and that it is a deliberately planned aim of Mao's counter-revolutionary activity.
It is beyond question that Mao's disgraceful fall, his betrayal of the revolution, has ideological, theoretical, historical and social roots.
The ideological roots are in his counter-revolutionary ideas of feudal monarchism, anarchism, Trotskyism, militarism, and reactionary pragmatism.
This is why, though Mao did join the revolutionary movement, his ideology drove him ultimately to the ranks of counterrevolutionaries.
The theoretical roots: in philosophy, political economy, and in the question of revolution and socialist construction, Mao was not simply a false Marxist who concealed his true identity behind a "Marxist" mask, but an outright opponent of Marxism. This is why, though he did penetrate the ranks of the Communist Party by pretending to be a follower of Marxism-Leninism, he ultimately substituted his unscientific and counter-revolutionary Maoism for the profoundly scientific and revolutionary teaching of Marxism-Leninism, and became a traitor to Marxism-Leninism.
The historical roots: Mao's lifestory is not only a long history of anti-Party, anti-Marxist and anti-Leninist, anti-Comintern and anti-Soviet activity, not only a history of right- and "left"-opportunist mistakes in questions of policy in all the periods of the Chinese revolution,. and in many cases a history of grave crimes, but also a long history of ideological kowtowing to imperialism. This is why from a pseudo-Communist carrying the Communist banner he ultimately turned into an outright anticommunist using the Communist Party flag as camouflage.
The social roots: in the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal and socialist revolution Mao mainly represented the interests of the national bourgeoisie (as most clearly expressed in his On New Democracy). His style and method smack of the ways and morals of declasse petty proprietors and lumpenproletarians, and in some cases even of rank feudal landlordism. These are the complex social origins of the anti-proletarian character of his ideas and actions. It was inevitable that he should ultimately betray the interests of the proletariat.
The limits of this book prevent me from going into the sources of Mao's disgrace in greater detail.
But to get a better idea of the reasons why Mao turned into a class traitor and national renegade we must, if only briefly, examine one of the important ideological sources that influenced his thinking and behaviour—feudal monarchism. The old Chinese feudal monarchism affected him chiefly in two ways: he was drawn to the egocentric "son of heaven" notion, that is, the deification of one's self in the manner of the Chinese emperors as son of heaven (god, supreme being), a superman who considers no other men his equals and cannot treat them as equals; all other men (foreigners as well as compatriots) are ordained from birth to be his subjects and slaves. This is the ideological source of Mao's disgraceful and ridiculous individualism. He deified himself, called himself "the red sun", the "magic ape Sun Wu-Kung", "the first in the Celestial Empire", "the only great man with no equals either among the ancients or among contemporaries", and the "new emperor". He was also drawn to the feudal monarchistic Sinocentric notions of the Celestial Empire—the autocrat's deification of his dynasty as the embodiment of the divine will and cause, rejecting equal relations with other countries, which are ordained to be its tributaries and vassals. This is the ideological source of Mao's presumptuous and extreme nationalism, yearning day and night for the supremacy of his Maoist dynasty in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and for world hegemony.
It should be remembered, however, that these notions apply exclusively to periods of prosperity. There were also many feudal dynasties in Chinese history which at times of decline paid tribute to stronger foreign dynasties, gave their daughters in wedlock to alien rulers, and swore allegiance to them as faithful vassals. The king humbled himself and called himself "son-emperor" to preserve his tenuous hold on power. At such times, the "sanctity of the son of heaven" and the "impregnability of the Celestial Empire" were forgotten. And this, too, affected Mao's thinking, for did he not advocate a pro-Japanese line of national treason and does he not now follow a pro-imperialist line of national treason?
 The one "down" was the anti-communist and anti-Soviet campaign inside the country under the slogans, "Down with the handful of power-holders and capitalist roaders" and "Down with the counter-revolutionary revisionists". Out of the three "againsts" only one slogan was in actual use—"Against modern revisionism, at the heart of which are the revisionists of the USSR". This Mao used as an excuse for his anti-Soviet and anti-communist acts on the international scene. The other two "againsts" were "Fight against the imperialist group headed by the USA" (nullified by the development of Chinese-American relations), and "Fight against reactionaries of all countries" which Mao belied when, hand in hand with US imperialists he supported the reactionary Pakistan militarist, Yahya Khan, who exterminated three million Bengalis fighting for national liberation, and, for democracy and freedom.
 L. I. Brezhnev, Following Lenin's Course, Progress Publishers, 1975, pp. 84-85.
 Edgar Snow, Red Star over China, New York, 1961, p. 154
 At that time it was the daily newspaper of the CC CPC.
 Later, reluctant to betray to the enemy the existence of fundamental differences in the CPC leadership at so critical a point in the war, it was decided to publish the article as a pamphlet and distribute it as a supplement to the Hsinhuajihpao.
 Most of the Politbureau members in Yenan did, indeed, agree with Mao's proposal because, after the 6th Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee, they were afraid to cross him.
 A national traitor at the time of the Sung dynasty.
 See John S. Service, The Amerasia Papers: Some Problems in the History of US-China Relations, a publication of the University of California Center for Chinese Studies, Berkeley, California, p. 173.
 Harrison Forman, Report from Red China, N. Y., 1945, p. 178.
 Due to the hasty preparations for an anti-communist civil war by the Americans and Chiang Kai-shek, none of the points of this agreement was put into effect.