

Interviews in Depth.

MPLA ANGOLA



PAULO JORGE.


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Interviews in Depth MPLA-Angola #4



Interview with Paulo Jorge-Director
of MPLA's Department of
Information and Propaganda (DIP).

INTERVIEWS IN DEPTH

MPLA/ANGOLA

#4

PAULO JORGE

Paulo Jorge has been Director of MPLA's Department of Information and Propaganda (DIP) since the end of 1971. Before that time he worked for nine years in the Department of External Affairs, first as an MPLA representative in several African countries and then as the CONCP representative to OSPAAAL in Havana. Paulo Jorge was interviewed in Lusaka, Zambia - in both English and Portuguese - by the LSM Information Center Director, Don Barnett, in December 1972.

PHOTOS - Paulo Jorge: LSM; others: Augusta Conchiglia

Perhaps to begin with, Comrade Jorge, you could briefly discuss your own background - when and how you joined the MPLA, what positions you have held, and your current responsibilities.

As you know, the MPLA was founded in 1956 at a time when nationalistic ideas were becoming popular - particularly among the youth. It was in 1957, when many of us achieved a greater understanding of the problem of Angolan nationalism, that I began to participate in my first MPLA activities - which, of course, were clandestine. Then I began to gain a greater understanding, together with others, of the magnitude of exploitation, injustice and repression to which the Angolan people were subjected. . . and therefore of the great need to struggle for the liberation of the Angolan people.

I continued in these more-or-less clandestine activities up to the time the armed struggle was launched by MPLA in February 1961. It wasn't, however, til 1962 that I became completely integrated in the MPLA organization. At that time I was, after accomplishing various other missions, selected to represent MPLA in a number of African capitals - Cairo, Algiers and Brazzaville. Then I was chosen to represent the CONCP (the Conference of Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies) in OSPAAAL - the Tri-Continental Organization - which had its headquarters in Havana. Finally, at the end of 1971 our Comité Director made me responsible for the Department of Information and Propaganda, where I've been working up to the present time.

In July 1970 Commander Setta Likambuila described for us in some detail the structure of MPLA. What, if any, changes in the structure and organization of the MPLA have taken place over these past two-and-a-half years?

Since July 1970 there haven't been any significant changes in the structure of the MPLA, though from time to time it has been necessary to set up temporary committees or bodies to carry out special tasks. What we have done during this period is to concentrate our efforts on consolidating our structure and establishing better methods of liaison, more efficient and more effective links between the different levels and component bodies of the MPLA - the Steering Committee, Politico-Military Coordinating Committee (CCPM), military commands, departments and mass organizations. We have succeeded in correcting some mistaken ideas and practices, especially in the area of liaison between the Steering Committee and CCPM on the one hand, and the various regional military commands on the other.

I must also mention another area with which our Steering Committee has been particularly preoccupied over the past two

years. This is the question of having our leaders - the members of the Steering Committee and CCPM - working as much as possible inside Angola together with the guerrillas and villagers so as to orient the various activities and help resolve the problems which arise on a day-to-day basis. It is clear that the presence of our leaders inside the country adds greatly to the confidence and morale of both the guerrillas and population, who are then able to respond much better to the necessities of the armed struggle.

Perhaps you could review for us the various departments and mass organizations within MPLA and discuss the relations between them and the Steering Committee.

Within MPLA we have nine departments. These are in the areas of Information and Propaganda (DIP), External Affairs (DRE), Political Orientation (DOP), Logistics, Education and Culture (DEC), Finance, Communications, Mass Organizations (DOM) and Medical Assistance Services (SAM). The DOM coordinates the activities of four mass organizations. These are UNTA or the National Union of Angolan Workers; OMA, the Angolan Women's Organization; JMPLA, the Youth of MPLA, and the Pioneer Organization for Angolan children. In addition we have the CIR or Center for Revolutionary Instruction, which is responsible for the military and political preparation of our cadres. These are the basic organs, together with military commands, which enable us to deal with the various aspects of our armed struggle.

As regards the Comité Director or Steering Committee, its members are elected by the National Congress and the number varies depending on the needs which exist at different stages of the revolution. It is evident that members of the Comité Director must have considerable political and military preparation in order to deal with the many exigencies of our war. As you know, Angola is a vast country and we are now fighting on five fronts. So, with its members widely separated - some in Cabinda, others in Bié, Lunda and the Eastern Region - the Comité Director is not able to hold regular or frequent meetings. It is only when circumstances permit or when problems of great importance arise which demand consultation among the leaders that meetings are held and difficult or serious decisions taken. This being the case, it was necessary to create an executive organ, the CCPM (Politico-Military Coordinating Committee), to implement the decisions and policies of the Comité Director on a day-to-day basis.

The CCPM still has five members and, in addition, certain members of the Comité Director are selected to carry out special missions or tasks under the direction of the CCPM. Of course, it is not always easy to maintain close contact and cooperation

between such leaders and the departments ... though we do our best to get their points of view and orientation in order to improve our work. I must add that the heads of our departments and mass organizations have the confidence of the Comité Director and this gives them a certain autonomy - a kind of independence and initiative in their particular spheres of work; though of course they remain responsible and accountable to the Comité Director and CCPM.

One problem we have faced and are now solving is that of establishing a good system of communications so that information can be more easily exchanged between leaders far away at the front and department heads or other responsible cadres who are at the rear or outside. The Comité Director has been working hard to make improvements in this area so that we can respond more quickly to the developing necessities of the struggle.

What military advances has the MPLA made since mid-1970 toward achieving its stated objective of "Generalizing the armed struggle throughout Angola"?

In 1970 the MPLA began to develop a new phase of military activities - the transition from small guerrilla detachments and the tactics dictated by the size of these units to larger units which we call *esquadrões* or squadrons capable of employing the tactics of mobile warfare. Because of our success in employing this new formation, the Portuguese were not able to launch an offensive in the dry season of 1971. During this period we launched our own offensive, characterized mainly by large-scale attacks against Portuguese barracks. Our squadrons contain artillery sections and we were able to significantly increase our fire-power by employing such weapons as cannons, rockets, mortars and bazookas. Two enemy barracks had to be abandoned by the Portuguese after heavy MPLA attacks. This is important because both of these barracks, Karipande and Mussuma, occupied strategic positions for the Portuguese in the Eastern Region. Later, between November 1971 and March 1972, fifteen enemy barracks were hit very hard by our squadrons and the Portuguese suffered many casualties and losses of equipment and supplies.

The new methods of combat, new tactics, that we are able to employ with the 150-man squadrons were not possible with the small guerrilla detachments. Of course the greater number and more powerful and complex weapons requires a higher level of training and preparation by our guerrillas and cadres as well as much more sophistication in coordinating the action of the different sections within a squadron. Very important among the



new tactics are those aimed at isolating and then destroying Portuguese military barracks. Means of communication are cut, roads and bridges mined or destroyed, and ambushes prepared to prevent incoming supplies and reinforcements. Surprise attacks, sometimes small actions followed by very strong attacks, are carried out against the bases of support for the military barracks, and simultaneous actions are carried out so as to confuse and paralyze the enemy. Obviously, this requires a high level of reconnaissance work, study and planning. Based then on the larger squadrons, with their greater fire-power, mobility and level of preparation, we have been successfully developing the tactics of paralyzing the enemy forces, forcing them into relative passivity, then isolating enemy positions and, finally, carrying out heavy annihilation attacks.

Because of our success with these new units and tactics we were able, particularly up to April of this year, to exercise greater control over our liberated areas, extend them into new regions and establish stronger relations and contacts between our guerrilla forces and the civilian action committees in both the villages and towns.

Of course, as a result of this, the Portuguese started to concentrate their forces in the Eastern Region and to intensify their bombing of the liberated areas and use of helicopters and heli-troop landings. We do not have much difficulty in dealing with the regular Portuguese ground forces and the people are used to the bombardments; so that their dangerous and criminal effects have been considerably reduced. But it is still the case, unfortunately, that we do not have adequate weapons or techniques to fight effectively against the helicopter. It remains a very dangerous enemy weapon, though our guerrillas and even the general population are slowly coming to understand and fight against it better and we are sure that it won't be very long before we are able to effectively combat these Portuguese helicopter tactics.

It is clear that during this period we succeeded in opening new zones of combat, carrying out intensified political work in the villages and towns - an indication of which was the recent popular uprising in Cunene district - and advanced toward our strategic objective of "generalizing the armed struggle throughout the national territory".

Judging from experience in Vietnam and more recently in Mozambique, it seems the most effective way of combating helicopters is to destroy them on the ground. Do you think the MPLA, now that you possess weapons such as mortars and rockets, will begin to employ this tactic and strike directly at air fields, landing strips, hangars, etc.?

I was thinking of this earlier when I said that in the near future we will find ways to fight against the helicopter. We are now studying this problem and developing the technical and material capacity to employ new anti-helicopter tactics. We have two ways of combating helicopters: one is to hit them on the ground with rockets and mortars, as you suggest, and the other is to knock them out of the air by using the technique of concentrated fire. We shall soon be employing both of these tactics.*

In 1970 the Portuguese began using herbicides and defoliants in the Eastern Region. Perhaps you could discuss recent developments in the Portuguese use of chemical warfare, particularly in the context of their 1972 dry-season offensive.

As a response to our successful offensive in 1971, the Portuguese concentrated their forces in Lunda and northern Moxico and launched a very big offensive beginning in April 1972. They employed large numbers of paratroops and intensively bombed the MPLA-controlled areas. But the major weapon used by the enemy was chemical products. Enormous amounts of herbicides and defoliants were sprayed in the northern sectors of the Third Region and, especially, in the Fourth Region, Lunda. This criminal and barbaric action resulted in the large-scale destruction of cultivated areas and famine for our people. Faced with starvation conditions, the population was obviously incapable of continuing to supply food for our guerrilla units. In fact, many villagers were forced to leave Angola in order to seek food in neighboring countries.

The Portuguese also increased their repressive measures against the remaining peasants, using torture, rape and murder to terrorize the people and herding large numbers of villagers into "strategic hamlets" or concentration camps, which the enemy calls "*sanzalas da paz*" ("villages of peace"), but which our people call "*ndandandas*".

*Through recent personal communications we've learned that in late December 1972 a full 150-man squadron attacked the Portuguese barracks of Lutembwe near the Benguela Railroad not far from Luso, capital of Moxico District. Large-scale damage was done to the barracks as heavy artillery and rockets were employed in the heaviest MPLA attack of the war. Two enemy helicopters spotted a section of guerrillas after the attack as they were withdrawing across an open stretch of savannah. Both were shot down by intensive and concentrated ground fire. A short time later, another MPLA unit shot down two more Portuguese helicopters in Zone "D" of the Third Region (Cuando-Cubango District). - LSM

This large-scale enemy offensive was stalled in August and finally stopped in September...mainly by an MPLA counter-offensive directed at the weak point created by the Portuguese offensive. You see, in concentrating their forces in the Fourth and Third Regions, the Portuguese had to weaken their position in the Fifth Region. Advanced MPLA forces were thus able to step-up political and military activities and consolidate our position in Bié district. This district, as you know, is very important for us. It is in the center of the country and the Umbundu people there are densely settled and make up almost a fourth of the Angolan population. The Portuguese tried to build a strong defensive line in Bié using tanks, cavalry, fortified posts, and so on, but our guerrillas have breached this line and are penetrating deep into Bié. We now have several military units operating in the district and the people are giving us strong support. You know that Bié is very far from the border and it sometimes takes several months to carry in supplies. Without implementing our policy of self-reliance and receiving strong support from the people, it would be impossible for us to sustain our forces there.

We have received information that the Portuguese Council of Ministers is very worried about MPLA advances in Bié. Of course, the Fifth Region extends all the way to the coast and our progress in Bié is a serious threat to the vital economic interests of the Portuguese and foreign corporations in Angola. We will now be able to increase our activities in the Cunene district, for example, thus threatening the West German-controlled Cassinga Iron Mines. So the Portuguese regime and its Western allies are worried about the consequences of their "successful" 1972 dry-season offensive.

Do you think the fairly numerous and dispersed settler population in Bié district together with large-scale European farms and plantations will prevent or at least inhibit the Portuguese use of chemical defoliants and herbicides in this area?

I think that the use of defoliants and herbicides by the Portuguese depends very much on the development of our struggle. Once the Portuguese learn that the population in Bié is giving us their full support, thus putting the Portuguese in a very dangerous position, then they will employ chemical warfare in order to starve our people and prevent them from providing food to the guerrillas of MPLA. Perhaps they have not done so as yet because the level of our military activity in Bié has not been as great or strong as in the Third and Fourth Regions. But they will use chemicals in Bié sooner or later...of course taking care not to endanger the Portuguese settlers or their property. They must be careful or they will turn these settlers against the Portuguese authorities and hence into a sort of indirect

ally of the MPLA.

In 1970 the MPLA announced it was moving into and opening a new Sixth Region in the south-western districts of Angola. I wonder if you could comment on developments which have taken place in this Sixth Region over the past couple of years?

As you know, the MPLA has divided our country into six politico-military regions. We are now fighting in five of these regions, but in the sixth, covering the districts of Huila, Cunene and Moçâmedes, we have not yet opened a military front. It is necessary to first consolidate our position in the Fifth Region...and I'm sure you can understand why. It is a question of establishing links and supply lines, and achieving an effective coordination of activities. At this stage, therefore, the military struggle in the Sixth Region is not very advanced. On the political side, however, our cadres are working very effectively underground to set up action committees, politicize and mobilize the people, and provide a correct orientation and guide to popular forms of resistance such as occurred in Cunene earlier this year. As you know, the Cuanhama and Ovambo peoples in Cunene district rose to protest the oppressive taxes, fees, forced labor and outright robbery of the Portuguese authorities. In January and February of this year, cattle vaccination stations and mud schools were destroyed, barbed wire fences along the border were cut and attempts were made by the people - armed only with their primitive weapons - to destroy the administrative posts of Chiedi, Namacunde, Evale, Mongua and Cuamato. A number of Portuguese as well as South African soldiers and puppet African militiamen were killed and wounded and, of course, several villagers were killed and many arrested. Nevertheless, the Portuguese Governor General Rebocho Vaz visited the area and was forced to announce an end to all taxes and fees other than the minimum tax, which he reduced to 75 escudos.

This popular resistance in Cunene is continuing in different ways and the Portuguese are obviously worried. As you know, this area is economically important to the Portuguese as well as to the South African regime and foreign monopolies. There are the Cassinga Mines, which I mentioned earlier, the rail link between the mines and port of Moçâmedes the Cunene dam project, and also plans for increased European settlement and mineral exploitation. It will be very difficult for the Portuguese when we extend the armed struggle into this Sixth Region...and it won't be too long from now.

The MPLA recently held rather prolonged meetings in Angola - Steering Committee Meetings, I believe. Perhaps you could

discuss some of the results of those meetings.

As a matter of fact, the MPLA has held several meetings during the past few months as a result of the large offensive launched by the Portuguese. We had to face this serious situation, to analyse all aspects of it and find counter-measures...new methods and tactics of fighting; improved methods of liaison between the Comité Director and the other MPLA organs, particularly in the military field; better ways of providing support for our people; more efficient logistical systems for supplying our military units, and so on. And, of course, we adopted a number of measures which enabled us to prevent the further development of the enemy offensive and to initiate our own counter-offensive. In addition, we dealt with the problem of refugees - of how to bring our people back into the country, prepare new cultivated areas, rebuild local militias and political structures, improve our work in political education, and so on.

It was clear in 1970 that the MPLA faced a number of serious logistical problems. Have you been able to solve some of these difficulties over the past two years?

Yes. We have succeeded in making considerable progress in the area of logistics. And, as you know, this was necessary... as logistics is a very important aspect in the development of our armed struggle. First, we succeeded in getting more and better means of transport—trucks, river craft, etc. Thus it is now much easier for us to transport supplies to the border. Second, we reorganized and greatly improved our system of supplying the military fronts. Now we are developing a relay system, with one group carrying supplies up to a certain point then transferring them to a second group which takes them to another point, and so on. In addition, we are beginning to employ other means of transport than just by head or back. As you know, supplies are heavy and the distances great.

I should also mention that due to increased international solidarity with our struggle we are now receiving much greater quantities of necessary supplies...Not only weapons and ammunition, but also clothing, medicines and other goods badly needed by the population. Of course, as President Neto has pointed out many times, we can't just sit back and wait for external support in order to advance our struggle. This is why, along with increasing amounts of support from progressive national and international organizations, we are putting greater and greater stress on the principle of self-reliance. Both of these aspects have increased the morale and spirit of the people, helping to consolidate MPLA's base of popular support and, as a result, to make it easier for us to solve the problems of logistics.



These are the reasons I can say with absolute confidence that we have made significant advances in the logistics area. Of course, as with all aspects of the struggle, more remains to be done and not all of our problems in this field have been solved.




The Eastern Region has long been very sparsely populated. The recent heavy Portuguese use of chemical products, together with continued bombing and the forcing of people into *ndandandas* or exile, would seem to have left large areas of the eastern front, particularly those nearest the border, virtually unpopulated. Has this presented MPLA with a particularly serious obstacle in the movement of supplies from the border to zones well inside Angola?

Of course, it constitutes a very great problem - and it is one of the aspects which were stressed during the recent meetings. We had to find ways to solve this logistical difficulty because, as you know, our fighters must sometimes walk several days before reaching a village or temporary encampment of local people. So either they must go hungry or carry food instead of ammunition or some other supplies. Now, with our counter-offensive against the Portuguese, we have been forced to employ more volunteers to carry supplies into these distant new zones of combat. So, we had to carefully study this problem and, as I said, we are now taking important steps forward to solve it.

Has there been any progress over the past few years in solving the problem of shortages in the sphere of middle cadres, or middle leadership, which seems to have plagued the MPLA for such a long time?

This is a huge problem which we haven't succeeded as yet in completely solving. I would say that we have made significant qualitative advances, but there has been no major quantitative leap. As you know the vast majority of people on the Eastern Front are illiterate, never having had any opportunity for education under the Portuguese. And it is not easy to educate these people quickly; not easy to bring them from illiteracy up to the level of secondary instruction...It takes time. Nevertheless, we have succeeded in increasing both the numbers and the quality - the level of preparation or training - of our military and political cadres. As you can easily understand, we are in a war and, with limited means, have had to establish priorities. Training technical cadres takes considerable time and though we do select some of our best students who have an aptitude for technical studies and send them for training abroad, we must at this stage concentrate our efforts on the preparation of military and political cadres.



-  MPLA Semi-liberated areas
-  Recent zones of combat
-  Penetration zones

One of our great difficulties is to find or prepare sufficient teachers to educate our people. At this stage we face a very serious shortage of teachers - which is one of the reasons I said we haven't yet made a quantitative leap in acquiring the necessary cadres. And, of course, without enough teachers it is difficult to increase the number of students. On top of this, there is also a lack of educational materials - textbooks, pencils, pens, writing tablets, blackboards, etc.

Of course the Comité Director and especially our Department of Education and Culture are working on these problems, doing their best to overcome our lack of middle cadres and the related shortages in the field of education. At first, with over 95% of our people illiterate, the Education and Culture Department concentrated on primary education, beginning with a big literacy campaign. The reaction to this was very good, as everybody wanted to learn to read and write. Then they organized a primary school program, which now consists of a one-year "initiation", when the children play and learn simple things, followed by four years of elementary education. Despite all our difficulties, this primary school program and even the textbooks have been prepared by our cadres. One thing I must add is that all aspects of this and other MPLA educational programs, whether in the CIR's, villages, or even outside, are infused with political content. The children must learn that we are fighting a war, and why we are fighting, and the aims of our revolution. They must learn who the friends and, especially, who the enemies of the Angolan people are. They must understand about tribalism, racism, colonialism and imperialism. So in all of their courses, even simple literacy courses, the political aspect is there and is stressed.

The Education and Culture Department has also organized secondary school instruction. Of course, we cannot spend the usual seven years in secondary school. The programs and textbooks, also prepared by our cadres - learning of course from the experience of others who have faced similar circumstances, were designed to accelerate the preparation of our young people. So, instead of seven years, our secondary school program is organized for four years, concentrating attention on the more important subjects. As of now, we have not established secondary schools in many areas - partly because of the problems of lack of teachers, educational materials and so on, and also because of the difficulties imposed by the conditions of our revolution. As you know, the enemy is always looking for our bases and sometimes attacks, launches offensives. So we must move the schools and the students and sometimes suffer losses in time, materials and even lives. It is difficult, therefore, to maintain a great deal of stability in the schools. Nevertheless, in both the Centers of Revolutionary Instruction (CIR) and the *Internato 4 Fevereiro*, near the border of Cabinda, our

secondary schools are pretty well organized.

Let me add that our education is not only for the children; it is also for adults. And to teach literacy to older people we have had to make different texts and employ different systems of education. New methods of teaching have also been devised to teach the children. One of these new techniques involves the use of what we call "social dramas", where the children learn by playing different roles in a drama. For instance, one student might play the part of a boss or plantation owner, another a *chefe do posto*, and others contract laborers, workers and so on. In this way the children quickly start to understand the meaning of colonialism and exploitation and the relations between capitalists and workers, settlers and farm laborers, and so on. We have had very good results with this method; the children like it and learn quite easily.

So, you can see, we are trying to raise the general level of education among our people and prepare increasing numbers of cadres. But it is not possible to go on to higher studies, to technical courses or university, without secondary schooling and we must therefore concentrate on raising the overall level. I must add here that the MPLA has received some support for our educational programs from progressive groups, international organizations and even UNESCO.

In other revolutions this problem has been dealt with in part by urban actions—sabotage, bombings, and so forth—which, in eliciting enemy repression, forces certain sympathetic or progressive petty bourgeois elements into the bush to join the revolutionary forces, thus augmenting the middle cadre range with already educated elements. Perhaps you could comment on this in relation to the MPLA's current level of urban activities.

I alluded to this earlier when discussing the relations between our guerrilla units and the action committees. You remember I mentioned that one type of action committee is made up of compatriots working underground in the towns and villages controlled by the Portuguese. These committees gather information, collect materials needed in the liberated areas and prepare sabotage actions. As I said, these military actions are still at a low level, but with the improved liaison now established between many of these action committees and guerrilla units you should be hearing about some interesting actions in the towns before very long.

Now, to your question. I would say that up to this point most of our urban "sympathizers", especially the educated elements, remain more or less indifferent to the armed struggle

and are afraid to get involved with MPLA activities. Of course, some have already escaped the persecution of FIDE or the police and come to join us in the liberated areas; a few have even been sent abroad for military and/or technical training. At present, however, the number is not great. But, as your question suggests, at a certain stage of our military activity in the towns and cities we are confident that many more of these petty bourgeois elements will become insecure and come over to the revolution, thus helping the MPLA to solve its problem of shortages of middle cadre personnel.

I have a few questions which, though not in your area of specialization, you could perhaps comment briefly on. First, have there been any recent developments or problems in the area of health and medical care?

It isn't easy for me to speak with much confidence about matters in this area. I can discuss, however, some of the problems faced by our Medical Assistance Services (SAM). First of all, we don't have enough doctors or nurses. SAM does train a number of "socorristas" or medical aides in Angola every year with the aim of having one of these medical cadres in every guerrilla unit, among the population in the liberated areas and even for the Angolan refugees in neighboring countries. And in fact, we have succeeded in extending medical services to a large part of the regions controlled by our guerrilla forces. Of course, it takes a long time to train doctors and nurses...though I know that some are now finishing their studies and will soon be returning to Angola to help improve the medical services for our people. As you know, the Portuguese "accomplished" as much in the health field for Angolans as they did in the area of education. Many people in the Eastern Region had *never* seen a doctor...and this in an area where health conditions are inconceivably bad. As for medicines - an area where the SAM is also facing shortages - most of the people knew only about traditional cures—herbs, magic and so on. When SAM started to work in these liberated areas, the population had no confidence in modern medicines. Only by slow educational work and, especially, demonstrations of the greater effectiveness of these new drugs, techniques, etc., have our medical cadres been able to win the confidence of the people.

So, despite many problems and continuing shortages in the field of health services, the SAM has accomplished a great deal over the past few years. I should add that in a short time we will have at least one more-or-less well-equipped hospital where our doctors will be able to handle cases, such as those requiring surgery, which they cannot deal with now.

The Eastern Region of Angola is often referred to as the "Hungry Area" and, as you said, recent Portuguese use of defoliants and herbicides has brought much suffering to the people in MPLA-controlled areas. What has been the MPLA response to this situation in the sphere of agricultural production?

Agricultural production is the responsibility of UNTA (the National Union of Angolan Workers) and, as we are now facing serious problems in getting food for our people, both UNTA and the Comité Director are concentrating special attention on this area. As you know, the people in the various zones of the Eastern Region were organized to work on large collective fields and from these "people's plantations" food was supplied to both the villagers and guerrillas. UNTA cadres were quite successful in instilling this spirit of collective work among the peasants and the results were very good. Unfortunately, the widespread use of chemical products by the Portuguese has destroyed almost everything which had been planted in large parts of the Third and Fourth Regions. Of course, not all the people's plantations were destroyed. After the enemy began spraying herbicides, the UNTA comrades started to reorganize agricultural production. Instead of the large "plantations", small fields were prepared near the forest and more-or-less hidden to avoid detection and destruction by the Portuguese. And in fact this is the reason we can still maintain some of the people and guerrillas in the zones which suffered this criminal chemical attack by the Portuguese.

Let me add that even in the smaller fields a collective spirit and collective work persists. Though individuals and family groups cultivate small parcels of land for their own use, it is interesting to note that even from these private plots the peasants very often take part of the harvest and give it to our freedom fighters or UNTA cadres--which reveals the spirit of common purpose they feel toward the MPLA and our liberation struggle.

But much work needs to be done yet in this area of agricultural production and UNTA is doing its best to experiment with, introduce and develop new and more efficient crops and techniques of production. Now, for example, they are organizing "production brigades" which will work in the fields, harvest the crops and try to teach the people how to improve their agricultural activities.

Have there been any recent developments in the area of trade or exchange? And, more specifically, how have the "people's stores" been functioning?

The people's stores are operating very well because the

people have come to understand the aims and the benefits which they bring them. They can now exchange their agricultural products as well as honey, beeswax, hides, etc., for the other things they need, such as salt, soap, cooking oil, clothing, blankets, and so forth. And this exchange takes place without use of money and in a way that is very fair for the people. For example, when a peasant brings in his maize or cassava to exchange for sugar, matches and so forth, he is sure to receive a just return for his labor...not as under the regime of the Portuguese merchant, where the escudos received for a hard-earned animal hide might be enough to purchase a small box of matches.

So, things are going well and we are able to distribute essential goods to our people through the people's stores. Of course, this kind of trading activity becomes difficult during the periods of enemy offensives, heavy bombings and so forth, because the people must move and the stores become a bit disorganized, supplies more difficult to transport, etc. A problem we always face, moreover, is the general shortage of essential supplies, such as those I mentioned above.

Perhaps you could briefly comment on recent developments in the area of militia formation and village defense.

As you know, our guerrilla units must be on the move...it is not possible for them to remain in one place in order to defend the population. This is the reason why MPLA organized a popular militia, though of course there is close cooperation between our guerrilla detachments or squadrons and the popular militia units. In many cases, when the enemy - in most cases helitroops - attacks, it is the popular militia which takes on the initial defense of the people. Of course, they cannot put up a strong defense at this stage, but they can stall the enemy attack, lead an ordered withdrawal of women and children to safe areas and send word to the nearest guerrilla squadron. We hope in the near future to be able to provide the militia with more training and better weapons so that they can play an even stronger role in defending the local population.

Could you discuss the role that cultural aspects, art, drama, music, poetry, etc., are playing in the struggle and any recent innovations that have occurred in this area?

The comrades who are working in the cultural field are doing very interesting work, especially in the area of music because, as you know, our people like music very much. They are also developing various possibilities in the areas of poetry and drama, such as combining the two or creating and enacting



plays which express the content of poems written by MPLA comrades. I also know that the comrades in charge of education and culture are preparing some materials about these cultural activities in order to develop initiative and creativity in music, poetry, drama, and so on. These publications will be distributed and discussed among our people and guerrillas. At the same time, these comrades are trying to develop new or additional art forms among the people, such as sculpture, carving, etc. Their main objective is to develop a full appreciation of cultural works among our people and, at the same time, to realize all the artistic potentialities of the Angolan people.

Do the people in areas liberated by MPLA forces actively participate, through the action committees, in decisions affecting their lives? And in this context, perhaps you could discuss the degree and nature of the participation of Angolan women in the liberation struggle.

These action committees in the MPLA-controlled areas are playing a very important role in our revolution. And it is important to note that their leaders and members are elected by the local population...They are not appointed or nominated by the Comité Director or any other MPLA leadership body. The people hold meetings and elect those people whom they feel are able to do the work well and properly. This gives a popular character to the action committees...and of course the people can also remove bad leadership; can raise criticisms and insist on new elections at any time.

The action committees have many important responsibilities in the struggle. They must organize the local population, work with UNTA in organizing agricultural production and the people's stores, gain intelligence information about enemy movements, etc., organize local support for the guerrillas—particularly food, oversea village defense and the militia, resolve minor cases, and play an important role in educational and medical programs and political work. Of course, in the latter area they always work with our political cadres, who are responsible for seeing that the correct political line is maintained in their sector, zone or region.

As for Angolan women, they are playing a very great role... and not only on the action committees. In all activities, all aspects of our revolution, women are present. They not only direct the activities of OMA, the Angolan Women's Organization, but are working in the educational field as teachers, in our Medical Assistance Services as doctors and nurses, in logistics and transport as carriers, in the preparation of clothing and uniforms, and in the military field as guerrillas, taking part in attacks and ambushes against the Portuguese forces. We are

even trying to increase the participation of women in the military aspect, as their participation in this area is not yet great enough; and also in the area of leadership, though at present we have several women on the Comité Director. Finally, in OMA they are able to provide leadership to our Angolan women, to mobilize and organize the women in our villages and towns to play an increasing number of important roles in the liberation struggle. Recently the OMA held a number of seminars in order to analyze how the women could participate better and the preparation and training they needed in order to put them on an equal footing with the men--according to the MPLA principle of struggling for the full emancipation of Angolan women.

What are your specific responsibilities in the DIP (Department of Information and Propaganda)? Perhaps you could discuss some of the current plans of the DIP as well as the problems you are facing and how you hope to resolve them?

Being the head of DIP, I am responsible for dealing with two major aspects of information. One is to receive news and information from all parts of Angola, as well as relevant news from other parts of the world, then study and prepare this information and send it out to all of our fronts and external missions. In order to inform our people and militants, to communicate the internal realities of our struggle, we must receive and analyze information about all aspects of our struggle--political, social, medical, educational, cultural, etc., as well as military. Then, in addition to our publications in Portuguese and National languages for internal distribution, we have two bulletins -- *Angola in Arms* in English and *Vitória ou Morte* in French -- which we use to inform the outside world about our struggle...so that they will comprehend and support it.

The other aspect involves the preparation of two radio broadcasts every day, one being transmitted from Brazzaville and the other from Lusaka. These programs are very important, both to inform and to politicize and mobilize our people. These programs reach into every little village and town, in both the national languages and Portuguese, and we receive increasing numbers of reports about the good effects they are having on the Angolan masses of peasants and workers in the Portuguese-controlled areas as well as in the liberated regions. These programs, which we call "*Angola Combatente*", contain news reports, analysis, music and developments of importance in the international situation.

About our problems I can say that it is not easy to quickly inform either our own people or the outside world about developments in our struggle. This is because of the difficulties we face in communicating information from Angola to external

DIP offices. Messages and news are still carried on foot and, as you know, this takes time--sometimes six weeks from the Bié front. We are doing what we can to solve this problem, to receive information more easily so that we can quickly disseminate it to our people and to friends abroad. A related problem we face in informing world opinion is a lack of equipment and technical cadres in the area of printing, so that we can produce more and better publications to attract the attention of international public opinion. We are now developing new forms of collaboration between the DIP and fraternal organizations in various countries in order to solve this problem. For example, we have arranged to receive darkroom and printing equipment as well as training for the necessary technical cadres from the Liberation Support Movement Information Center of Canada and the Angola Medical Committee of Holland. We are very hopeful, therefore, that we will soon be able to produce more information, covering more aspects of our liberation struggle, both for our people and for our friends and potential supporters abroad.

Of course, information activities cover several aspects in addition to radio broadcasting and publications. For example, it is important for us to transmit news of our struggle quickly to the newspapers and international news agencies, and we are now analyzing the possibilities of using some form of telecommunication for this. Then, of course, we are trying and hoping to increase our production of photographs, slides and films, as well as tapes and records, so as to enable people who cannot visit the battlefields to see and hear what we are doing and come to better understand the conditions under which we are making our revolution. We will try to put these things at the disposal of as many as possible of those individuals and groups who are engaged with us in our struggle against Portuguese colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism.

There is considerable confusion among progressive North Americans due to the very sketchy information made available earlier this year regarding a possible merger or politico-military unification of the MPLA and Holden Roberto's FNLA. Perhaps you could clarify or at least throw some light on this very important matter.

Unity among the Angolan patriotic forces has always been one of the principal aims of the MPLA. The very first article of our Minimum Program calls for the union or organic alliance of all Angolan patriotic forces. From 1956, when the MPLA was founded, we repeatedly raised the question of unity and made many appeals aimed at unifying the Angolan forces so as to strengthen our struggle against Portuguese colonialism. Unfortunately, circumstances up to now haven't allowed us to achieve

this long-sought after unity...but it nonetheless remains one of our major aims.

Since the founding of the OAU this matter has been brought up many times by the MPLA but, as you know, in 1963 the GRAE was recognized by the OAU as the Angolan government in exile. Of course, the MPLA has strongly disapproved of this recognition by the OAU and has consistently tried to demonstrate that it was wrong. We brought up the question of unity among Angolan patriotic forces many times at meetings of the OAU over the past eight years. Finally, since the MPLA was the only liberation movement waging a successful armed struggle against the Portuguese in Angola, the OAU decided to recognize it. At the same time, it withdrew its recognition of Holden Roberto's GRAE (Governo Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio) and recognized it as the FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola). And at this same Eighth Meeting of African Heads of State and Government, a Presidential Commission was formed of representatives from Zambia, Tanzania, Zaire and the People's Republic of Congo in order to help in the establishment of an alliance between the MPLA and FNLA...and also to study the modalities of transit for MPLA guerrillas and war material through Zaire to Angola. As you know, Zaire has a very long border with Angola and from the logistical point of view it is very important for us to have access to Angola through Zaire.

In June of this year the Presidential Commission held meetings in Brazzaville. It was the first step, taken to study the ways or methods by which some form of unification might be achieved. I must point out that what we are seeking is an alliance rather than a merger; a military alliance between the forces of MPLA and FNLA in order to advance our armed struggle against the Portuguese. Of course, we can understand the existence of some confusion among our comrades and sympathizers abroad, because everybody knows that great differences exist between the political position, the ideological and tactical conceptions of the MPLA and those of the FNLA. The problem is this: that while it is very important to form a military alliance with the FNLA so as to strengthen our ability to fight against Portuguese colonialism, which is our direct and immediate enemy, it is also extremely important that the MPLA does not abandon its principles or political line. So what we are seeking is a military alliance, arising out of the concrete necessities of our struggle, which will enable us to more rapidly liquidate the Portuguese colonialists and accelerate the liberation of our people, but an alliance which at the same time allows each organization, the MPLA and the FNLA, to retain its structure, its political personality, principles and line.



Nothing has been heard about developments in these negotiations for several months now. Does this mean that there has been a breakdown? Or are the negotiations still going on and moving forward?

The negotiations are still very much in process. We were supposed to have a meeting at the beginning of November (1972) but for some reason this has been postponed. I understand that the Presidential Commission has called another meeting for sometime this month (December) in order to study and discuss further steps toward the formation of an alliance with MPLA and FNLA leaders. Of course, you can understand that it will not be easy to reach our objective because, as I said, there are important differences between the two organizations and some events in the past are not easy to forget. Obviously, each organization will try to defend its political interests and line and so forth; so I think it may be a long process before we achieve our goals.*

How do increasing foreign investments in Angola affect the efforts being made by MPLA and other anti-Portuguese colonial forces to isolate Portugal in the world political arena? And how are these investments affecting the course of the armed struggle itself?

Our efforts to politically isolate the Portuguese regime are, of course, negatively affected by the major investments being made by corporations of the large Western countries. And these investments will also strengthen Portugal's ability to resist the liberation forces in Angola...though not decisively. I must point out, however, that in the political arena Portugal is already, in fact, largely isolated. A very recent resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the UNO, for example, recognized the liberation movements as the legitimate representatives of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guiné (Bissau). But in the economic field the situation is quite different. Many foreign monopolies, particularly those of the United States, United Kingdom, West Germany, France, South Africa and Japan, are making major investments in our country. Perhaps they plan to take advantage of the new investment "opportunities" given to foreign corporations by the Portuguese regime by exploiting our mineral resources as quickly as possible, making huge profits, then leaving when forced to by the success of our liberation struggle. Others may intend to stay, thinking that after

*See appendix A, the "MPLA - FNLA Agreement" which was announced in late December 1972.

independence they can work out a way through discussions with the MPLA of continuing to exploit the mineral wealth of Angola. This we shall see about after independence.

The major aspect and problem of this increase in foreign investments is that it enables Portugal to prolong its colonial rule in Angola, as well as in Mozambique and Guiné. Isolated politically, it is only foreign investments and loans which prevent the very rapid development of our liberation struggles. As you know, there exists a great inequality in financial and material means between the Portuguese regime and the MPLA. The money they receive in loans, taxes, and so forth from the Western powers is transformed into guns and other weapons with which the Portuguese continue to oppress our people and impede the development of our armed struggle.

We try to explain to these foreign corporations and countries that their investments in Angola are helping the Portuguese to oppress our people; that to help the Portuguese is to help the enemy of the Angolan people, to become themselves an enemy of the Angolan people. But I think the only way to really "convince" these foreign investors that they are wrong is to more fully develop and expand our armed struggle. When, in the next stage of the struggle, we begin to attack and destroy these economic interests, the foreign-owned mines, railroads, oil fields, etc., then the Western corporations will begin to lose profits, suffer increasing losses and finally will be forced to change their position. But for now, the oppressive Portuguese regime is the ideal instrument of the foreign monopolies and, in fact, I would say that Portugal herself is becoming a neo-colony of the Western capitalist powers. But we are determined to fight and, as I pointed out, the development of our armed struggle will provide the correct answer for the illusions of the giant corporations and NATO powers.

Given that the giant capitalist corporations may very well plan to remain in Angola indefinitely, how does the MPLA intend to combat what will obviously be very powerful neo-colonialist efforts to prevent the emergence of a socialist Angola, a "Cuba" on the African continent, after Portugal's military defeat and withdrawal as a colonial power?

Just as we have our plans and objectives, we know that the enemy has its own aims. Angola, from the point of view of our enemies, can become "independent" in several ways. One possibility is an "independence" like that of Rhodesia; an "independence" under European settler rule. This, of course, would be very much desired by the Portuguese settlers in Angola, and supported by the South African racist regime. Another possibility, taking account of recent developments in the relationship

between Portugal and Brazil, is an "independence" under the rule of a combination of Portuguese settlers and certain classes or elements within the Angolan population. Both of these possibilities of "independence" for the settlers and continued oppression for the Angolan masses of peasants and workers would be supported by, and in the interest of, the United States, given its close ties to both South Africa and Brazil. Of course, another gambit might be to seek settler "independence" under the umbrella of the European Common Market. In order to maintain its still profitable position of colonial domination, Portugal has been forced, as I said before, to become a neo-colony of the Western powers; a situation which will be exacerbated as Portugal takes up her role as an Associate Member of the European Common Market.

We believe, however, that the development of our armed struggle, led by a vanguard party with a clear and firm political and ideological line and position, will succeed in a revolutionary way in preventing the realization of these neo-colonial possibilities in Angola. We could not accept having fought a long and bitter struggle to rid our country of Portuguese domination and exploitation only to live after "independence" under a neo-colonial puppet regime. We are fighting to liberate our people and our country; to be genuinely independent—politically, culturally and economically. And I have confidence that the MPLA will succeed in achieving this goal. Nevertheless, we are constantly on the watch for, guarding against and preparing to confront the neo-colonial maneuvers which we are sure our enemies will try to make.

Do you think the Western powers, and in particular the U.S., might try to force an increasingly weak and dependent Portugal into negotiating "independence" terms with a wide range of "responsible" parties and elements, including tribal chiefs and puppet "liberation" groups in addition to the MPLA and FNLA? And if the MPLA refused to go along with a neo-colonial accommodation, they would attempt to isolate it, win over the moderate, purely "nationalist" elements and try to create a regime of African anti-socialist forces in Angola which would guarantee the security of foreign investments?

I don't think this is a strong possibility, because if Portugal was forced into a really weak position, the settlers' position would become that much stronger. In Angola, you see, the settlers represent a very strong force with close contact and much support from South Africa. Of course, the U.S. and Portugal may try this gambit, but I don't think they will succeed. The MPLA is very strong in Angola with many people

working underground in the cities and Portuguese-controlled areas, and we are prepared to fight as long as necessary in order to win genuine independence. But even if they try, it will be very difficult for them to find any significant number of Angolans who will be willing to unite against the MPLA so as to form an "African" government in Angola. The settlers too will fight hard against this, because they are not interested only in economic power...No, they want political power as well in order to build a strong and permanent relationship with the white minority regimes of South Africa and so-called Rhodesia (which we call Zimbabwe). This, at any rate, is my opinion regarding the possibility you mentioned.

What do you see as the economic and strategic significance of the Cunene Dam project?

It is our opinion that the Cunene Dam project is designed to strengthen or reinforce the position of South Africa as the White industrial base of a backward Black Africa. In short, this project will help increase South Africa's range of control and influence on the African continent. At the same time, investments in Cunene are aimed at consolidating the position of settler domination in southern Africa—functioning as a link in a cordon the South African regime is trying to fashion against the advance of the national liberation movements, and also representing a permanent threat to the independent African states. Of course, the Cunene Dam project is also designed to strengthen the economic power of the racist regimes in southern Africa as well as to provide rich profits to foreign monopolies through facilitating their exploitation of mineral resources in Angola, Namibia and South Africa.

What military role do you envisage for South Africa in Angola, given its increasing investments in the area and the strategic importance of Angola for the liberation struggles in Namibia and in South Africa itself?

Angola occupies a key position in both South African and world imperialist strategy for southern Africa. It is therefore easy to understand why the South African regime is so anxious to help Portugal maintain its colonial domination. I remember the South African Minister of Defense, Botha, saying that the border of South Africa started at the northern border of Angola. And it is very clear that the independence of Angola, and of Mozambique as well, would constitute a grave danger to the racist/fascist regime of South Africa. As the revolutionary process unfolds and we develop independent states in Angola and Mozambique, it will be very natural--as well as being a revolutionary duty--for us to assist our comrades who

are struggling to liberate Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. This is why we see South Africa investing in Angola and Mozambique; they want to consolidate their position and prevent the military collapse of Portugal in the face of our developing armed struggles.

Militarily, as you know, South African forces are already operating in southern Angola: South African pilots, helitroops and soldiers. They are helping the Portuguese according to their so-called "Mutual Defense Alliance", which includes the Smith regime in Rhodesia as well. We expect this South African involvement to increase along with the successful development of our armed struggle. And we are prepared for this, not only in Angola but also in Mozambique and Zimbabwe, where South African troops are also active. Our victories, and I include here the victories of our comrades in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, will force the South African regime to step up its military involvement in these areas in order to try and prevent the successful development of our armed struggles.

As far back as 1968, at the first Eastern Regional Conference, the MPLA expressed its intention to build a vanguard party. This aim was reaffirmed in LSM interviews with comrades Chipenda in 1969 and Likambuila in 1970. Perhaps you could comment on developments in MPLA's efforts to forge a vanguard party for Angola.

It is true that we passed such a resolution in 1968 and that since then our leaders have been studying and trying to devise the best method of providing the MPLA with a vanguard party structure. But in order to build and consolidate such a structure it is necessary to prepare a sufficient number of cadres, of militants with a strong and high level of political and ideological consciousness. And this is not an easy task, though I can tell you that over the past four years we have succeeded in preparing a fairly good number of such cadres. I think that in the next period, not too long from now, this vanguard structure will emerge more clearly. According to our analysis of the revolutionary process, we believe it will be necessary to carefully and seriously build a vanguard party in order to carry forward the legitimate aspirations of the Angolan people and the basic principles of the MPLA. I am quite confident that at the correct stage in the development of our struggle we will achieve the establishment of such a party.

What kind of society will this vanguard party of Angola attempt to construct?

We intend to build an Angolan society in which there

exists no exploitation of man by man. And, of course, we believe that genuine independence will enable the Angolan people, in particular the super-exploited masses, to develop the very rich resources of our country for the benefit of all. The Angolan people must become the owners of all the potentialities of our country. We cannot forget that for five centuries the Angolan people have been deeply and severely oppressed and exploited by Portuguese colonialists and foreign capitalist monopolies. After independence, it is the Angolan masses who must receive the full benefit of their labor and our collective national wealth. The lives of the masses must be elevated; they must attain the power and ability to build their country according to their wishes and needs, their real aspirations. This is what we intend to struggle for in independent Angola.

You mentioned earlier that an independent Angola would play a revolutionary role in the struggles which still might be raging to liberate Namibia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and South Africa. In relation to that revolutionary internationalist sentiment and sense of duty, do you see a future role for CONCP, perhaps as a means of moving beyond national formations in Africa?

As you know, CONCP was created in order to coordinate the efforts of MPLA, FRELIMO and PAIGC in their armed struggles to liberate Angola, Mozambique and Guiné from Portuguese colonial domination. The three liberation movements face a common enemy and it is natural for us to have an organization like CONCP in order to exchange points of view, mutually benefit from one another's experience, and present a common position in the international arena. And I think that through CONCP we have achieved a very important level of cooperation in all aspects of our struggle.

After independence, though I doubt that the CONCP or a similar organ can play the same role, I am confident that the fraternal spirit which exists in the CONCP will be maintained in future relations between Angola, Mozambique and Guiné. You see, the relationships we have established during this long period of revolutionary armed struggle are so strong that I am sure a high level of cooperation, perhaps through another body which we will create at that time, will continue to exist and to grow when we have achieved independent states.

* * *



APPENDIX A

M.P.L.A. - F.N.L.A. AGREEMENT

PREAMBLE:

CONSIDERING:

- (a) the unity of our people and the common objectives held by our organization;
- (b) the vital necessity of organizing a more effective armed revolutionary struggle so as to attain our objectives;
- (c) the present stage of mass resistance of our people against the colonial apparatus of oppression.

DETERMINED to concretize the Brazzaville declaration of 8 June 1972 and the decision of the Ninth Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (AHG/80/XI), held in Rabat in June 1972.

WE, the leadership of M.P.L.A. and F.N.L.A. have reached the following accord:

- A -

SUPREME COUNCIL FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA (S.C.L.A.)

1. An organ shall be created to be known as the Supreme Council for the Liberation of Angola (S.C.L.A.), whose mandate will be to coordinate at the highest level the policies of the Unified Military Command (U.M.C.) and the Political Council of Angola.
2. The Supreme Council for the Liberation of Angola shall be comprised of:
 - (I) A Chairman, to be provided by F.N.L.A.;
 - (II) A Vice-Chairman, to be provided by M.P.L.A.;
 - (III) All members of the Unified Military Command (U.M.C.);
 - (IV) All members of the Political Council of Angola (P.C.A.).

3. The S.C.L.A. will meet no less than two times a year.
4. The S.C.L.A. will be responsible for providing the general direction as regards problems related to external relations.
5. Decisions of the S.C.L.A. will be by simple majority vote and the Chairman will not have the deciding vote unless this is specifically agreed to by the Chairman of both the U.M.C. and P.C.A.
6. Before any decision is taken, the Chairman of the S.C.L.A. must ensure that both Movements are equally represented. In case some members of a Movement are absent, the leader of this Movement will designate other members to serve as substitutes.
7. The Vice-Chairman of the S.C.L.A. will serve as Secretary of the Supreme Council.
8. The S.C.L.A. may reverse decisions taken by the U.M.C. and P.C.A. if the vote for reversal is adopted by a two-thirds (2/3) majority.

-B-

UNIFIED MILITARY COMMAND (U.M.C.)

1. A Unified Military Command shall be created whose areas of joint action will be:
 - (I) Recruitment and Training;
 - (II) Logistics and Supplies;
 - (III) Operations;
 - (IV) Military Intelligence and Information.
2. The U.M.C. will be composed of:
 - (I) A Chairman to be provided by M.P.L.A.;
 - (II) A Vice-Chairman, to be provided by F.N.L.A.;
 - (III) Six members chosen by M.P.L.A.;
 - (IV) Six members chosen by F.N.L.A.
3. The U.M.C.:

- (I) Will be responsible for planning and conducting the liberation war in all its military aspects;
 - (II) Will arrive at decisions through a simple majority vote.
4. The U.M.C. will as quickly as possible prepare programs of familiarization, recruitment, deployment, training and assessment of military means and combined operations.

-C-

POLITICAL COUNCIL OF ANGOLA (P.C.A.)

1. A Political Council of Angola shall be created whose responsibilities will include:
- (I) Propaganda, Popular Mobilization and Diplomatic Activities;
 - (II) The Well-being of the civilian population;
 - (III) The Administration and Consolidation of the liberated areas.
2. The P.C.A. shall be made up of:
- (I) A Chairman, to be provided by F.N.L.A.;
 - (II) A Vice-Chairman, to be provided by M.P.L.A.;
 - (III) Six members chosen by F.N.L.A.;
 - (IV) Six members chosen by M.P.L.A.
3. Decisions of the P.C.A. will be taken by simple majority vote.
4. The P.C.A. is charged with the responsibility of working out a program of political integration.

-D-

The offices of the S.C.L.A., U.M.C., and P.C.A. shall be located in the Republic of Zaire.

-E-

The M.P.L.A. and F.N.L.A. have agreed to:

1. The establishment of an atmosphere of Peace and Fraternity among their respective forces;
2. The immediate cessation of any acts of hostility and of attacks through the press, radio, television and all other means of communication;
3. The fact that henceforth, with a view toward the step-by-step achievement of unity, their press-releases and other communiques, documents and propaganda will all emphasize the newly created organs (the S.C.L.A., U.M.C. and P.C.A.) so as to make them well known to the Angolan people;
4. The vigorous implementation of the present Agreement.

-F-

COMMISSION OF ARBITRATION

1. A Commission of Arbitration shall be created under the aegis of the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.) composed of representatives of the People's Republic of Congo, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Republic of Zambia and the Republic of Zaire.
2. This Arbitration Commission shall see to it that all commitments undertaken by the two Movements under the present Agreement are respected, and shall arbitrate any differences which may from time to time arise.

THIS AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED IN KINSHASA ON 13 DECEMBER 1972 BY:

Dr. Agostinho Neto of the M.P.L.A. and
Mr. Holden Roberto of the F.N.L.A.

IN THE PRESENCE OF:

1. Hon. Henri Lopes, Minister of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of Congo.
2. Hon. J.S. Malecela, Minister of Foreign Affairs, United Republic of Tanzania.
3. Hon. E.H.K. Mudenda, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Zambia.
4. Hon. Nguza Karl-I-Bond, State Commissioner in Charge of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, of the Republic of Zaire.

5. H.E. Kamanda wa Kamanda, Assistant Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity.

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