

Guinea (B): political and military situation



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THE MILITARY SITUATION

During 1967, enemy activities were essentially the following:

Intensive and daily aerial and naval bombardments of liberated regions, specially the area around Kitafine, Cubucare and Tombali (Southern region), Biambi and Mores (Northern region), and Xitoli, (Eastern).

Attempts to invade and reconquer certain liberated areas, specially in the South (Kitafine, Cubisseco and the surrounding areas), in the North and Centre (Biambi, Mores and Saara), by means of powerful combined operations, involving Army, Navy and Air forces, including troops in helicopters.

Coups de Main operations, carried on

mostly by helicopters landing, aimed at terrorizing the population by burning crops and destroying our bases, (mainly in the area of Biambi, Tombali, and Kafine).

Daily and continuous bombings, during which the enemy used fragmentation and napalm bombs, and for the first time white phosphorous bombs, can be considered by far the most important operations that the Portuguese colonialists had launched during the past year. These savage bombings, which were aimed mostly at the population of villages in the liberated areas, demonstrate the desperate situation of the enemy, and reveal an intentional genocide policy from the government toward our people. The region of Kitafine alone, which is about one sixtieth of all liberated areas, received during last year more than two thousands bombs of all kinds, and the area is still under daily bombardments. If it's true that the bombings have destroyed some tenths of villages, and killed a hundred or so persons among the civilian population, it is also true that the enemy did not achieve its goal, which was to force the population to abandon the country and to paralyze our struggle. Portuguese tactics were frustrated because of the political consciousness of the population, the security measures taken, and the resistance offered by our combatants to aerial attacks.

In spite of our deficiencies in means of fighting aerial attacks, we have fought Portuguese aircrafts, attacking them everywhere, specially in the area of Kitafine, where the action of our troops against Portuguese air force, can be considered heroic. The enemy was forced by our resistance to almost totally discontinue the use of relatively slow bombers, (B-26, Dornier D0-27 and P2V), at low altitudes, to use massively

instead Jet planes adapted for bombings (Fiat 91 and Sabre). By shooting down 3 planes and by damaging about ten others, without the enemy being able to achieve its purpose, we have inflicted a great loss to Portuguese air force. One must also add two other aircrafts destroyed and three others damaged during the recent attack to the airport of Bissalanca, by a commando of our armed forces. If those numbers of destroyed or damaged aircrafts are not great when taken in absolute, it is nevertheless very significant relatively to the number of aircrafts based in our Country; it represents about 40% of Portuguese air effectives in Guinea.

By using every means at its disposal, the enemy has attempted to invade and reconquer certain liberated regions. During those attempts the enemy has used in combined operations, land, air, and naval forces, but nevertheless suffered crushing defeats. In fact with great courage and increasing initiative, our combatants, supported by the armed population, inflicted heavy losses in human lives and war materiel to the enemy. Losses that we have suffered, plus the quantity of burned agricultural produces, and the cattle killed by the enemy during those operations, are by far less than Portuguese losses. Under continous attacks of our forces, the so-called bridge-heads established by our enemy in Naga (Northern part of the Country), and in Ganguia in the region of Cubisseco (Southern part), proved to be graveyards for the colonial troops which were thus denied the strategic advantages they were looking for.

Using mostly troops brought in helicopters, and sometimes supported by the landing of marines, the enemy has carried on *coup de main* operations against liberated

areas, aimed at terrorizing the population, burning our agricultural produces and destroying our bases. Our combatants have faced with determination these coups de main, inflicting the enemy heavier losses than those we have suffered. We have succeeded in destroying three helicopters, damaging many others and we have put out of action great number of enemy soldiers.

Our activities have been mostly characterized by:

Systematic attacks against enemy fortified camps in urban centres, using mortars, recoilless cannons, bazookas and other weapons on every front, but mostly on the Northern and Southern areas of the Country.

Attacks against boats transporting troops and merchandises on the rivers, one of few means of transportation left to the enemy, to supply its intrenched and isolated camps, mostly in the areas near the rivers Farim, Cumbidja, Buba, and the Komo channel.

Vigorous ambushes against enemy attempts to travel on some roads.

Commando operations against urban centres, airports, and dock installations.

Since enemy troops have been paralyzed in their intrenched camps in urban areas, most of our operations are now characterized by systematic attacks on those military camps. During those operations, we have made 143 important attacks against Portuguese camps, and destroyed some of them, (Guidage, S. Domingos, Suzana, Misira, Biambi, Enxale, Guileje, Medjo, Empada, Madina, and other less important camps). We have inflicted 20 to 80% damage to other military instalations, while



inflicting the enemy heavy losses in human lives.

Systematic attacks to enemy camps, are a prelude to the final phase of our struggle, which preconizes the destruction of Portuguese bases, and the taking over of urban centres. These attacks are factors which are essential for the demoralization of colonial troops, who are now understanding that they are in danger all over our country, and that their intrenched camps are progressively being transformed in graveyards.

Attacks against boats on the rivers, are decisive operations which will accelerate and bring about the defeat of the colonialists in our Country. In fact for most of the intrenched camps inland now isolated by our forces, waterways are the only means open to the enemy to receive supplies. This is why we have intensified and will intensify every day those operations, in spite of the difficult conditions of the shores of our rivers, regarding the placement of heavy weapons on the right spot. With courage and initiative, our combatants have sunk 27 boats and damaged many others, causing the enemy heavy losses in materiel and human lives. Those operations were parti-

cularly striking on the Farim river (Northern part of the Country), where our combatants have sunk most part of those boats, being most of them gunboats and petrol boats.

Showing increasing experience, we have mounted deadly ambushes, mostly near intrenched camps. These ambushes have occurred mainly on the roads in contexted areas (Centre-Western and Eastern parts of the Country), and around certain urban areas (Mansoa, Mansaba, Kebo, Guileje, Catio, Empada and Bedanda). Besides, our combatants were also vigilants watching all the enemy attempts to move outside main roads. Whenever they tried they had to face our troops who drew them into engagements, defeated them and forced them to *break* ranks. During the same period we have ambushed and fought the enemy 476 times, without mentioning other less important operations. During those engagements we have destroyed 116 military and civilian vehicles, and damaged many others. We have also captured a very important number of materiel, including at least 86 G.3 Fall machine guns, 397 Mausers, 26

60mm mortars, an important number of light weapons, 16 two-way field radio receivers, and many other materiel.

Related to these operations, we should mention the vigorous attacks carried on by our forces in the region of Gabu, near the town of Gabu. During an ambush, our forces destroyed five trucks, put out of action 32 enemies, captured one enemy soldier, 18 American made machine-guns, and 8 Mausers. During an engagement in the village of Bissassema, in the Southern part of the Country, our forces killed 18 enemy soldiers, captured 3 prisoners, including an officer, and an important number of materiel, among which 8 field radios in good working conditions. In the Northern area of the Country and also in the region of Canchungo and on the route Manco-Mansaba, ambushes mounted by our combatants have resulted in great losses of life and materiel for the enemy.

With commando operations against urban centres, airports and dock installations, our pressure on the enemy has reached a new phase. Those operations proved to be very efficient and very important, specially in increasing demoralization among colonial troops and in discrediting the enemy near the population in urban centres. We have launched 22 important commando operations mainly in the North of the Country (Bula, Canchungo, Mansoa, Binar, and the ports of Binta and Farim), and in the South (Catio, port of Ganjola and Tite). As part of these operations, we have to mention the attack of Bissalanca, the most important enemy airbase located only 10 kms. from the centre of Bissau, the capital. During this attack, which was launched on the 19th of February 1968, we have destroyed the control tower, three paratroop barracks, two planes, and damaged many others. We do not need to make any comment to stress

the political and military importance of this particular operation.

During the same period we have killed 1905 enemy troops, among them a major and many other officers, and wounded a high and undetermined number of them. These statistics are confirmed by declarations made by prisoners and deserters the last deserter admitted that 793 coffins were sent to Portugal during 1967, and many others were awaiting to be sent, as of his desertion. Moreover; Portuguese authorities can not hide the fact that military and civilian hospitals in Guinea and Portugal are filled with thousands of wounded, most of them casualties coming from Guinea. One should not forget that an important number of wounded soldiers are directly sent to the Federal Republic of Germany, (Frankfurt mainly), to be treated.

Our losses during the same period were: 86 combatants and 172 civilians killed, and 583 wounded including casualties resulting from bombings. An increase in those figures relatively to last year's, reflects the intensification of combats and an increase in the development of our struggle.

Considering that almost 80% of those wounded are already back in their units, and the number of dead is almost the same as the yearly number of colonial victims before the war, we have all but a strong reason to multiply our efforts and fight until the total liberation of our people.

The present situation on the three combat fronts shows that we are not only capable of frustrating the desperate enemy efforts during last year, but also of aggravating the situation of Portuguese troops. Trapped behind their fortresses, the morale of colonial troops is getting progressively lower as they are becoming increasingly



good targets for our mortars, cannons and infantry forces. The activities of our enemy is day by day reduced to aerial bombings and to terrorist attacks against the population. Having increased the mobility of our forces, we have denied the enemy the effectiveness of its aircrafts and helicopters operations, causing the enemy increasing insecurity with frequent and coordinated movements of our forces.

Moreover we have carried on a thorough reorganization of our armed forces, by increasing the effectives in our regular army, by modifying the structure of the governing organs of the armed struggle and by arming a great number of the civilian population as enlarge the activities of our regular army on the three fronts, and to improve the security of liberated regions, by an effective participation of armed population in the defense of these regions.

As of now, one of our major problems in the Cape-Verde Islands, is to switch from a political struggle, to a direct armed confrontation. In 1966 we had already made important progresses in our political activities, and in the preparation to enter a

new period of struggle in the Archipelago. The colonialists have reinforced their troops in the Archipelago of Cape-Verde and are making active preparations to spread their colonial war. According to the words of some important Portuguese leaders, the colonialist do not hide the importance that they ascribe to the Cape-Verde Islands as a logistic base for the domination of Guinea and other Portuguese colonies in Africa, as well as for the strategy of the imperialism against the African continent.

We should therefore do all we can to extend as soon as possible the armed struggle to the Cape-Verde Islands. The liberation of Guinea would not have any meaning while the Cape-Verde Islands remain a Portuguese base. We can even state, that because of the strategic importance of these Islands, that their liberation is also indispensable for the struggle of Angolan, Mozambican and South African peoples, (the airfield on the Island of Sal is a South African airbase), and for the consolidation of the security of independent West African States, against the eventuality of an imperialist aggression. In case of aggression

the Archipelago would surely be used as a logistic platform. This is thus the measure of our responsibility regarding this major problem—the development of armed struggle in the Cape-Verde Islands.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION

Due to the success of our armed struggle, Portuguese colonialists have lost political control over most part of the Guinea population, (in liberated areas, and areas still in dispute), and as of now they only exert political control over the population in urban centres, and also through the influence of certain traditional chiefs in areas where our activities are not yet significant, (some sectors in the administrative district of Bafata, Gabu, Canchungo and the Islands of Bissau and Bolama). Even in these sectors the population is every day escaping the control of colonial authorities which usually do not venture outside the limits of administrative centres.

Portuguese political activities are characterized by: *An intense deceitful propaganda*, carried on mostly over the radio, aimed at discrediting the leadership and the ends of our Party; a campaign of spreading confusion among the population, to divide the nationalist forces, to demobilize our fighters and to undermine the unity of our organization. They also have tried to prove the immaturity of Africa to become independent.

Demagogical tactics aimed at convincing our people that it does not need to become independent, since it is already independent within the Portuguese Nation. In order to back up this propaganda, many civil

servants were promoted to higher government jobs in Guinea and Cape-Verde and even in Portugal itself. The authority of traditional chiefs, faithful to the colonialist, was reinforced while young Africans have forcefully been drafted into the colonial army, into the so called militia—to fight “bandits coming from outside”.

Social and psychological campaigns by stressing the necessity of progress, racial equality, and fraternity between colonial troops and the population; the necessity of defending the multi-racial and religious Portuguese Nation against foreign domination, atheist, communism, etc. etc. A campaign of smiles, open arms and sympathies is also carried on and aimed at demobilizing our people. This campaign which took place in sectors which still are under the influence of some traditional chiefs (Bafata, Gabu and Canchungo regions) and in urban centres, is also characterized by the spreading of leaflets by planes over liberated regions.

The success of our struggle which is getting each day more support from our people, is a clear proof of the defeat of Portuguese political tactics and activities. Nevertheless it is worth it to make a brief reference to certain facts which have also contributed to our success:

In 1967 the Party acquired a broadcasting station—Radio Libertação. This new fact upset all the radio propaganda of the colonialists, since they could not prevent our compatriots from listening to our daily broadcasts. Thus, we could not only unmask and neutralize enemy propaganda, but also enlarge our political activities, with vast informative programs about the course of our struggle, the goals of our



Party, crimes perpetrated by Portuguese colonialists, information about African and world events, etc. We have also organized special programs intended for Portuguese soldiers, informing them about the unjust and useless nature of the war they are fighting in our Country. A few month's experience have showed us that our Radio Libertação, whose programs have been improving every day, can play a major role in the evolution of our struggle.

Enemy demagogic tactics suffered this year its first major defeat, with the resignation in December of an African who had been appointed as the Government General Secretary, and his replacement by a European. This resignation was a heavy blow to the hopes of Portuguese colonialist, of progressively establishing a local government, so-called autonomous, integrated with some African personnel, and aimed at undermining our struggle, and bar our way to independence. Also, some of these traditional chiefs who are faithful to the colonialists, confronted with the continuity of our struggle and increasing losses on the colonialists' side, are not hiding anymore

their besitation and defeatist attitude, which gets them sometimes in conflicts with their masters. They have started realizing the difficult situation in which they are involved; each day they are more isolated and abandoned by the population which is joining our ranks, or seeking shelter in the neighbouring territories. With the intensification of our struggle, the African mercenaries who are serving in the Portuguese Army, and receiving 15 Escudos (half dollar) for each engagement, are becoming more realistic, and some of them have decided to join our ranks. During 1967, fifty three African soldiers, two caporals, and an African officer, have joined our troops. These numbers are very important, if one considers the fact that most of the 2,500 Africans who were drafted into the colonial Army, are only employed in auxiliary services.

Our people, who will never forget the evils of colonial domination, have been astonished by the *benefits* of the psychological campaign. This astonishment transforms soon in the acknowledgement of the reality and the fact that this campaign is only a pro-

paganda tactic against our struggle. That is why they say in Bissao, in Bafata and elsewhere, that when a compatriot is the target of politeness, sympathy and favors from the military and civilian authorities, he would say when alone: "Djarama PAIGC," that is, thank you PAIGC.

If the defeat of Portuguese political tactics is a result of the success of our armed activities, it is also none the less the result of the political war carried on by our militants.

In accordance with the decision of superior organs of the Party, *our political activities* were reinforced during 1967, by a permanent work among the popular masses in liberated regions by an increase in the activities of the basic organs of the Party, and as we have said, by daily broadcasts over our Radio of programs in Portuguese, Creolo, and other important vernacular languages, such as (Balanta, Foulah, Mandinguc, Mandjaque, Beafada, Mancanhe and Papel). The task of the "Brigade for Political Work," which was created by the leadership of the Party, operating mostly in liberated regions of North and South, proved to be a very successful initiative, which have contributed for a rise of political consciousness of the population and for better operation of Village Committees.

We have convened six conferences of political cadres and Party militaries, during which all the central problems of our political life and our struggle were discussed at great length, the central problems of our political life and our struggle were discussed at great length, and important decisions were taken about the development of our activities at every level.

Deficiencies and errors among us were

harshly criticized during these conferences, and steps were taken to eliminate those faults and to ameliorate our work and our struggle.

The frequency and enlarged character of Conference of Cadres, have caused the postponement of the Party Congress. The Conference of Cadres, which were all presided by the Secretary General of the Party, deliberated about important problems, and decisions of nation wide and decisive importance were taken, with reference to the Fronts and their respective inter-regions. Preparations for the meeting of the Congress have already been made, and it will take place as soon as possible.

Concerning the problem of information we have made important progress. Broadcasts over our radio station have marked a new step. We have distributed regular information to the international Press., and published the Party newspaper "Liber-tação," intended for our militants; we have also developed informative relationship with other organizations. Movie producers, newspaper reporters from Guinea, Senegal, Italy, Cuba, the United States, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and from many other Nations, were able to visit our Country during that period to make movies and to report on the situation. Eye witness reports which were made by these visitors, and other reports still to be released, represent a great victory for our struggle.

The most important event which took place in Guinea to test the political success of our struggle, was the pretended visit of the Portuguese President to our Country. During this so called visit which lasted 5 days, our people, the Portuguese, the world opinion, and even ourselves, could realize all the irreversible change which has taken

place in Guinea. In fact travelling always by plane and surrounded by security forces, the Portuguese President was only able to visit the towns of Bafata, Gabu and the islands of Bolama and Bubaque. These visits only lasted a few hours. Even Portuguese troops stationed in Mansoa, a town located 60 kms. away from the Capital, with paved roads linking this town to the Capital, didn't have a chance to see the President, because Mansoa had been under bombardment of our artillery, and our combatants were vigilant along the road. The time when it was possible for a visiting President to have a noisy parade on all the roads and in every town of our Country is gone.

Besides the attack to the airbase of Bissau whose political importance is evident, the release of three Portuguese war prisoners, were all great victories for our people, and had a large and deserved repercussion among Portuguese, African and International opinion. Our people have understood and supported this deed, in spite of all the crimes perpetrated by the colonialists against our militants and combatants imprisoned by the colonial troops. By releasing those prisoners, we have shown the great human aspect of our struggle, and have emphasized the fact that in our Country, the true criminals and terrorists are the colonialists.

Argentina: the Task of Liberation Awaits



Argentina enmeshed as it is in a completely decrepit political, economic and social regime, is subjected to the implacable exploitation of imperialism in alliance with the native oligarchic bourgeoisie and oppressed by a servile dictatorship.

The international monopolies, owners of a large part of our natural wealth and of our main industries as well as masters of the country's finances, siphon off the product of our people's work to the imperialist centers.

The armed forces, in collusion with the military strategy of the Pentagon, have subjected national interests to the international interests of the United States. For this reason they are fighting against the Cuban Revolution and the liberation struggle in our country and on the continent.

The oligarchic bourgeoisie, as a junior