

Many features of African life can only be understood if the ethnic factor is taken into account. The complex ethnolinguistic structure of most African states besets them with all the problems of a poly-ethnic state and compels them to tackle various aspects linked with the national problem. Owing to a number of characteristics peculiar to Africa and the preservation of many archaic institutions of the tribal system, the ethnic factor exerts an enormous influence on the pace and nature of social and economic processes and the political life of African states, and will apparently continue to do so for a long time to come.

The difficulties of social and economic development, the continuing dominance of foreign monopolies in the economies of most African countries, the absence of political stability, a sharp increase in property differentiation and the dissatisfaction of the bulk of the population with the corrupt and mercenary class of exploiters, whose numbers are growing with the development of capitalist relations, could

only aggravate the economic, social, ethnic and political contradictions.

Unresolved social and economic problems are the root-cause of inter-ethnic friction. Social conflicts are made worse by contradictions arising from the ethnic situation. The sharpness of social contradictions, in its turn, often aggravates the ethnic problems. The clash of interests between exploiting elements belonging to different ethnic groups sometimes causes the ethnic element to come to the fore, while protest that is essentially social takes the form of ethnic contradictions and conflicts. The policies of chauvinistically inclined reactionary forces may cause relations to deteriorate and bring about a crisis situation.

Attainment of political independence has created favourable conditions for resolving ethnic problems. However, the polarisation of forces within African states, resulting mainly from the struggle to select a course of development, has a considerable effect on the implementation of the principles for dealing with ethnic problems proclaimed by the policy statements of African governments and ruling parties. The situation is further complicated by interference from the imperialist powers, by their policy of causing inter-ethnic friction and making use of conflict situations, and by their overt or concealed support for separatist tendencies. In addition, the role and significance of ethnic problems in the reconstruction of society are underestimated in some African states.

The author's talks with statesmen and political leaders in some African countries show that some of them categorically deny the existence of ethnic problems in their countries, others underestimate their importance, while still others who admit the role of the ethnic factor, reduce the whole complex of these complicated problems to mere tribalism, by which they understand inter-tribal enmity.

In most cases ethnic problems are given a very narrow treatment, and their connection with social and economic processes is not brought out. Moreover, in many countries the nature and essence of ethnic conflict are often concealed.

The experience accumulated by most African countries since independence provides a mine of information for the

solution of many problems, including those connected with the processes of ethnic development.

It seemed, for instance, that the cause of many phenomena, and tribal discord in particular, lay mainly in colonialism, and that once independence was achieved, tribalism<sup>1</sup> would be eliminated. The depth of the processes of detribalisation—i.e., the intermixture of tribes and the formation of larger ethnic communities, including nations, had been somewhat exaggerated. African reality amended the situation, sometimes very considerably. Not only did ethnic conflicts in African countries fail to disappear, but in recent years they have even markedly increased. The loosening of tribal ties and the processes of assimilation and national consolidation are very complicated and contradictory; and alongside these processes we can see the phenomenon that has been called supertribalisation: in a number of instances the awareness of belonging to a certain ethnic group has been heightened, and separatist tendencies and nationalism have increased.

#### THE ETHNIC FACTOR IN POLITICAL LIFE

The study of African reality, as well as the author's own observations in thirteen African countries (Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, etc.), show that ethnic problems are of considerable importance in African political life.

The ethnic factor has played, and in a number of cases continues to play, an important part in the activities of certain parties and organisations. In most countries of Tropical Africa, first organisations and, later, political parties were formed on an ethnic basis.

All this has undoubtedly contributed to the strengthening of ethnic particularism and has in some cases led to the aggravation of tribalist sentiments, and hindered the processes of ethnic consolidation.

The ethnic factor plays the greatest part in such countries as Nigeria, Zaire, the Congo, Kenya, the Sudan and some others.

<sup>1</sup> From Latin *tribus*—tribe.

Nigeria is the most densely populated country on the African continent. According to 1973 data, its population amounts to 65 million. It is also one of the most complicated countries in its ethnic structure.<sup>2</sup> Apart from such peoples as the Hausa, Ibo and Yoruba, each of which comprises approximately 10 million, Nigeria is populated by the Fulbe, Kanuri, Tiv, Ibibio and others, numbering from one to five million.<sup>3</sup> In addition, there is a large number of other ethnic groups: according to official data, there are more than 200;<sup>4</sup> according to other information, 230 different peoples live in the region of Adamawa alone;<sup>5</sup> a third source identifies almost 317 peoples in the small Ogoja region to the east of the river Cross.<sup>6</sup>

These numbers are probably rather exaggerated, but there is no doubt about the extreme complexity of the country's ethnic structure.

In the period of British rule some peoples in Nigeria complained of the dictatorship of the Ibo.<sup>7</sup> They were dissatisfied with the fact that the Government of Eastern Nigeria consisted entirely of the Ibo and that the Ibo were generally appointed to the highest positions.

Some frictions existing in relations between the Ibo, Efik and Ibibio, for example, are rooted in the remote past, in the slave-trading period. The territory of the

<sup>2</sup> For more detailed information see: R. Ismagilova, *The Peoples of Nigeria, Ethnic Structure and Brief Ethnographic Description*, Moscow, 1963 (in Russian).

<sup>3</sup> The exact numbers of the different peoples of Nigeria are unknown, since the results of the last census (1962) were found to be incorrect. O. Awolowo, a notable political leader in Nigeria, gives the following figures (in millions): the Hausa and Fulbe 13.6; the Yoruba 13; the Ibo 7.8; the Efik and Ibibio 3.2; the Kanuri 2.9; the Tiv 1.5; the Ijaw 0.9; the Edo 0.9, etc. (See: O. Awolowo, *Thoughts on the Nigerian Constitution*, Ibadan, 1966, p. 24).

<sup>4</sup> *Federal Republic of Nigeria. An Introduction to the Situation in Nigeria*, p. 16.

<sup>5</sup> A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, *Adamawa Past and Present*, London-New York-Toronto, 1958, p. 2.

<sup>6</sup> Colonial Office, *Nigeria. Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Fears of Minorities and Means of Allaying Them*, London, 1959, p. 34.

<sup>7</sup> *Colonial Office, Nigeria*, pp. 47-48.

Ibo, Ekoi and Ukelle was a source of slaves for the Ibibio, Efik and other coastal tribes, who traded with European merchants. At that time the level of development of many of the peoples living in southern regions of Nigeria was much higher than that of the Ibo. They had their city-states that were governed by kings, they traded extensively with European merchants, their handicrafts were highly developed, etc. Consequently, these peoples looked on the Ibo with some contempt. Now the situation has changed: the Ibo are a long way ahead of all the other peoples of Eastern Nigeria in their development. The Ibo have a working class, a national bourgeoisie and an intelligentsia. The Ibo took an active part in the political life of their country. They created a powerful political organisation, the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons, to fight for Nigerian independence. Literacy is higher among the Ibo, they have more specialists and before the coup d'état of January 1966 many Ibo worked in Government offices, on the railways and in various companies in Northern Nigeria. Almost the whole officer corps of the Nigerian army consisted of Ibo.

During the latter years of British rule a strong movement grew up in Eastern Nigeria, calling for the formation of separate states: the Efik and Ibibio, for example, wanted to create a Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers state. But there was no unanimity on this question: some favoured separation from the Ibo, others were against it.

In Western Nigeria, where two-thirds of the population are the Yoruba, the people of the Delta and Benin provinces, where the Edo live, complained to the Minorities Commission (1957-1958) that the Government of Western Nigeria was chiefly concerned with developing those provinces inhabited by the Yoruba, without a thought for the economic development of the Edo regions, or for the other needs of the local population, e.g., the construction of roads, schools, hospitals, etc. The Edo complained that the Government of Western Nigeria consisted of the Yoruba and that it was impossible for other ethnic groups to fill high administrative positions.

For a number of years the Edo had called for separation from Western Nigeria. The dissatisfaction was so great that,

after achieving independence, the Government of Nigeria agreed to create in 1963 a special state out of this region—the Mid-West State.

An enormous variety of peoples live along the middle reaches of the Niger and Benue rivers; they differ in numbers, language and level of development.

In the remote past many Central Nigerian tribes had to flee from slave traders and sought refuge in almost inaccessible mountainous areas. Long isolation naturally led to a preservation of tribal structure and hindered the economic development of these peoples. All the peoples of the Middle Belt were subject to rule from the North administration with its numerous emirs. These peoples expressed grave dissatisfaction with the existing order and resisted Islamisation. The Birom and Tiv were especially active in the drive to break away from Northern Nigeria.

Finally, the tragic events of 1966-1970, culminating in an attempt to separate Eastern Nigeria in May 1967 and the appalling loss of life, are well known. The war against Biafra that had seceded seriously complicated inter-ethnic relations and considerably aggravated the country's economic difficulties and political situation.

In the *Democratic Republic of the Sudan* more than 10 million of the total population of 14,730,000 (1968) are Arabs or Arabified peoples. The Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk (all Negroid peoples and numbering about four million) live in three southern provinces: Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile and Equatorial. They speak Nilotic languages. They differ completely from the Arab North in language, level of development (the lowest in the Sudan) and way of life. In language and culture they resemble the Nilotic peoples, who live in the northern parts of Kenya and Uganda and in the extreme northeast of Zaire. The situation is aggravated by religious differences as well: the Arabs in the north of the country belong to the Islamic faith, the peoples of the Southern Sudan are Christians. They also have their traditional religious beliefs. The Sudan's bitter ethnic contradictions are a legacy from the past.

During British rule in the Sudan the colonial administration followed a deliberate policy of keeping North and South apart,

The law of 1922 decreed that the Darfur, Equatorial and Upper Nile provinces, as well as a part of Northern Kordofan, Gezira and Kassala, were closed areas. The trade law of 1925 allowed trade to be carried on in the south of the Sudan only by members of the native population. This law was directed against Arab merchants from the northern parts of the country. The policy of segregation led to the Government-sponsored resettlement of whole tribes, such as the Banda, Dongo, Niangulgule, Tohoyo and others, who had had close contact with the Muslim Arabic-speaking population of Darfur and Kordofan, to other regions, farther away from Arab influence.<sup>8</sup>

After the conference on linguistic problems in Rejaf in 1928, measures were taken to limit the spread of Arabic in the southern provinces.

The main principles of the segregation policy were laid down in the Memorandum of 1930.<sup>9</sup>

Under this policy, a system of passes for movement from the southern part of the Sudan to the northern part and vice versa was introduced. Tribal chiefs and their retainers were recommended to make no further use of Arab names and Arab clothing. Marriages between Northerners and Southerners were prohibited. Northern officials were recalled from the southern region.

Tribal customs and traditions were strongly encouraged. All this not only helped to preserve the tribal system in the southern region and deepened ethnic isolation but, as time went on, engendered bitter anti-Arab sentiment.

The policy of Arabification, carried through with particular vigour by the military regime that came to power in the Sudan in 1958, aroused deep resentment in the three southern provinces. Some demanded complete secession from the Sudan and the formation of the independent state of Azania. Others wanted autonomy within the Sudan. A movement for a reform in the southern provinces began before independence and greatly influenced the political life of the country. For many years a state of emergency

<sup>8</sup> O. M. Beshir, *The Southern Sudan. Background to Conflict*, London, 1968, p. 50.

<sup>9</sup> "1930 Memorandum on Southern Policy", see: M. O. Beshir, *op. cit.*, pp. 115-18,

existed in these regions, troops were stationed in the south, and soldiers and local people were involved in incidents from time to time. The constitution of 1968 (the first constitution produced during the whole period of independent Sudan's existence) proclaimed the Republic of the Sudan to be a unitary state, having Arabic as its official language and Islam as its official religion. This naturally made relations between the North and South even more complicated and strongly influenced the political situation in the Sudan. The problem of the Southern Sudan called for an immediate solution. The new Government that came to power in May 1969 began to devote serious attention to the problem of the South. The Southern provinces were granted local autonomy, plans were worked out for the democratisation and social and economic development of these areas, the most backward in the whole country. However, the internal political crisis of summer 1971 again caused tension in the South, and prodded the Government into taking more decisive political measures to cope with the situation. The agreement giving regional autonomy to the Southern provinces of the Sudan was signed in Addis Ababa in March 1972. It may be assumed that the conclusion of this agreement will create favourable conditions for resolving the acute problem in the Southern Sudan.

The ethnic factor plays a great part in the political life of *Kenya* too. That this is so is particularly apparent from the actions of the various parties. A case in point is the struggle for power that took place just before independence between the Kenya African National Union (KANU), most of whose members were ethnically Gikuyu and Luo, and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), which united the national minorities—the Nandi, Kipsigis, Masai, Teita, etc. Some years ago the Masai, numbering 155,000 according to the census of 1969,<sup>10</sup> formed the party known as the Masai United Front and demanded the formation of an independent state.

From time to time rumours are circulated about the secession plans of the Luo who live in Nyanza Province in Western Kenya. These rumours have been used in the inter-

<sup>10</sup> *Kenya Population Census, 1969*, Vol. 1, Nairobi, 1970, p. 69,

party struggle. But the crux of the dispute lies not so much in the orienting on various ethnic groups as in the differing approaches to the problem of Kenya's future social and economic development.

For many years the country has been much disturbed by the Somali problem. One part of the Somali people, living in Northern Kenya, has been seeking to join the Somali Republic. But, besides the Somali people, other peoples live in this region: the Turkana, Galla, some of the Meru, etc.—and they do not wish to break away from Kenya. There was no unanimity on the question even among the Somali people themselves. The situation has now been normalised, and the leaders of Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia are finding ways to deal with the Somali problem.

British colonialists played a considerable part in aggravating ethnic relations in Kenya. During the period of the national liberation movement from 1952 to 1955 they used the neighbouring people against the Gikuyu and tried to isolate them from one another. The story was constantly spread, and still is, that the Gikuyu think themselves higher than all the others and try to occupy a dominant position in the country. Every possible encouragement has been given to the formation of narrow tribal parties and organisations: the Political Union of the Kalengin, uniting the peoples of the Nandi group, the Masai United Front, the Kenya African Democratic Union, etc.

There is no doubt that all this does a great deal to aggravate and hinder the solution of ethnic problems in modern Kenya. What is more, these problems are even further complicated by the fact that they include not only relations between different African peoples, but also relations between Africans and Europeans, Africans and Asians, Africans and Arabs, Europeans and Asians, Asians and Arabs.

The ethnic factor plays a considerable role in other countries too. Everybody remembers the events in Congo (Kinshasa), now Zaire. In *Togo*, *Dahomey* and *Ghana* there is conflict between the North, settled by Mossi-Grusi peoples, and the South, inhabited by peoples of the Guinean linguistic group, more developed socially and economically. In recent years reactionary forces in the *People's Republic of Congo* have repeatedly used tribalism as a weapon in the

struggle for power. Events became especially critical in 1958 and 1966. Inter-tribal clashes took place between Bahutu (Hutu) and Watutsi (Tutsi) in *Rwanda* in 1963 and in early 1973.

In *Chad* unrest has continued for several years among the Tedda, and French armed forces have been used to suppress it. The Government published the "White Book" about the events in Chad: serious shortcomings in the tax-collecting system were listed among the reasons for the riots among the nomadic tribes.<sup>11</sup> The "White Book" attributed most of the blame for the existing difficulties to the French colonialists, since they had completely ignored such traditional Chad institutions as the sultanates and the power of tribal chiefs when creating the system of administration.

There was a rising among the Tuaregs in *Mali* in 1963-1964; considerable military and financial resources were used to suppress it.

The Tuaregs in Mali, estimated by different sources to number from 170 thousand to 250 thousand, roam with their herds in the regions bordering on Algeria and Niger, and preserve their traditional way of life and customs. Such features as slavery, for example, continue to exist in Tuareg society and it has a very powerful tribal aristocracy.

As long ago as 1959 the ruling group of the Tuaregs asked France to support their plan for creating an independent Tuareg state. This state would include those areas of Mali, Algeria and Niger that had been settled by the Tuaregs. In subsequent years some political circles have continued to support these separatistic aspirations.

During the Tuareg rebellion in the second half of 1963 leaflets were distributed, calling again for the creation of an autonomous state. For a whole year military action was taken against the Tuaregs. Troops equipped with modern weapons eventually put down the revolt.

When analysing the reasons for this rebellion, we apparently ought to consider not only the separatistic tenden-

<sup>11</sup> *West Africa*, 22.XI. 1969, p. 1424.

cies of a few Tuareg chiefs and the use made of them by certain neo-colonialist circles.

In this case, mention must be made of the difficulties that have been caused by an interlacing of social, economic and ethnic factors. The efforts of the Mali Government to change the traditional, historically established way of life of such proud nomadic people as the Tuaregs, with their highly developed sense of independence and dignity, common to both chieftains and commoner in this tribe, have met with determined opposition. The tribal leaders of the Tuaregs are just as fully in command as before and keep their fellow-tribesmen in submission. Any attempt to infringe on the rights of the chieftains attracts a sharp negative reaction.

The events in Mali following the Tuareg rebellion can be seen as a vivid illustration of the necessity to take into consideration the ethnic factor and a knowledge of traditional institutions when drawing up concrete social and economic plans.

The tragic events which led to a rapid deterioration in relations between the Tutsi and the Hutu took place in *Burundi* in the spring and summer of 1972. The bourgeois press attributes the cause simply to the traditional enmity between the farming Hutu and the cattle-breeding Tutsi, and abounds in reports of Tutsi ethno-chauvinism.

It would, however, be inaccurate to see tribalism as the sole cause of the events in *Burundi*, although the ethnic element undoubtedly played a part. The trouble seems to have been sparked off by conservative feudal circles loyal to King Ntare V, reacting against the policies of the Michombero Government. But as always happens when internal political relations deteriorate in a situation in which conflict is already latent, certain political forces played on ethnic contradictions.

Tribalist sentiments and the stirring up of differences between the populations of North and South have always accompanied the *coups d'état* that have taken place in *Dahomey* and *Togo*.

Inter-ethnic contradictions are also complicating the internal political situation in *Zambia*.

## ROOTS OF ETHNIC CONTRADICTIONS

What is the nature of ethnic tensions and what are the reasons for the often complicated relations between different African peoples?

This question cannot be answered without knowing the history of the African peoples, the peculiarities of their culture and the role of surviving traditional institutions which appear not only in the position of authorities, legalised by custom, but also in habits and archaic norms of tribal morality. In order to understand the nature of ethnic prejudice, it is very important to analyse social and economic changes, as well as the many transitional forms in both economic and social structures and ethnic processes. Only the careful study of material about each country and a thorough examination of ethnic situation, ethnic history, the peculiarities of historical development and the forms and methods of colonial rule may help in analysing the essence and social significance of ethnic contradictions and tensions.

Contradictions between peoples belonging to different ethnic groups can be reduced in the final analysis to social and economic causes, but in some countries, usually when there is an internal political crisis and an intensification of the struggle for power between politicians who express the interests of different social strata of the population, subjective factors often come to the fore. Ethnic prejudice, known to be of great vitality, is not the least of them.

The danger of ethnic prejudice is not only that it separates peoples and causes friction between ethnic groups, but also that it actively helps to perpetuate the isolation of national minorities and produces nationalist sentiments and an exaggerated emotional attachment to one's language and culture.

Whenever ethnic prejudice becomes the norm in social conduct, it not only divides people but also distracts them from urgent social problems, thereby helping reactionary politicians to keep the masses in servitude.

History has known examples of the elevation of ethnic prejudice into an officially accepted norm, e.g., anti-

Semitism in Nazi Germany, and racism in the Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia at the present time.

In some cases hostile relations among people of different ethnic origins are to a certain extent the result of the remote period of the slave trade. For instance, the northern regions of Ghana, Dahomey, Nigeria and the southern regions of Sudan were sources of the delivery of slaves for a long time. In other cases peoples who created highly developed state structures in the past look down on their much more backward neighbours. Such relations can be observed, for example, between the Ashanti and the northern peoples of Ghana, between the Baganda and the Nilotic peoples in Uganda, between the Hausa and the peoples of the Middle Belt of Nigeria, etc.

Considerable influence on ethnic problems in African states was exerted by the policies of colonialists before the achievement of independence by the African countries. The policy of indirect rule in the British possessions helped to preserve the tribal system, strengthen traditional authority and foster the tribal separatism that eventually led to nationalism. Examples of this are the nationalistic sentiments of the Ashanti in Ghana, the Baganda in Uganda, etc.

The assimilation policy that was pursued in the French-speaking countries produced a tense situation over the question of native languages and of culture. This has undoubtedly had a bearing on the policies of these now independent countries.

Uneven social and economic development has adversely affected the relations between the peoples. It is known, for instance, that during their colonial rule the French used the more literate Fulbe as colonial administration officers, sending them to backward regions, inhabited by the Gerze, Toma, Coniagi and Bassari peoples. The British colonial administration made the Baganda their district representatives in Uganda, and the Ibo were used for administration service in Northern Nigeria among the Hausa, Fulbe and the peoples of the Middle Belt. That is why the Gerze, Toma and other peoples considered the Fulbe to be colonial lackeys, and the Lango, Acholi and others thought the same about the Baganda people. The unevenness of economic development has led to a situation in which the

rising bourgeoisie of the Ewe or Fanti in Ghana, for instance, wants to seize power. At the same time, the feudal chiefs among the Ashanti in Ghana or the tribal chieftains of the Tuaregs in Mali and the feudal circles of the former kingdoms Buganda, Ankole and Toro in Uganda are trying to preserve their ancient privileges. In all these cases the methods used include the stirring up of tribalist feelings and inter-tribal and religious strife. The colonialist and neo-colonialist policy of setting peoples against each other and encouraging the formation of parties and groups on an ethnic basis played a considerable part in complicating relations among African peoples.

It is necessary to take account of various phenomena that are connected with traditional tribal institutions. The role of traditional morality and various rites and customs is very strong today. There are, for example, tribal unions in towns which control the lives of their tribesmen, and a moral code exists, compelling a man to give every possible help to another from the same ethnic group (e.g., finding jobs for fellow-tribesmen, irrespective of their abilities).

The connection with the past can also be traced in people's psychology. Like many other nomadic peoples, the Masai of Kenya, for instance, pass on from generation to generation their legends about the creation of the world. According to these legends, God once endowed one of his sons with cattle. He was a remote ancestor of the Masai, and from him they trace their origin. That is why the Masai consider themselves to be the owners of all cattle, and if the neighbouring peoples, the Bantu farmers, have cattle too, then, in the eyes of the Masai, they possess them illegally. This explains the frequent raids made by Masai warriors on the Gikuyu and Kamba to drive off their cattle. Clashes over cattle often occur between the Turkana of Kenya and the Karamojo, who live in Uganda. A certain length of time and, above all, a great deal of educational work will be needed in order to change the persistent customs of the remote past.

The custom of taking an oath before joining one of the secret societies existing among many African peoples dates back to the old tribal structure. During the period of the national liberation movement in Kenya (1952-1955), known

to history as the Mau-Mau movement, the oaths played a definite role and were used in the struggle against the colonialists. In 1969 the Kenya press published articles about a wave of ceremonies at which people swore oaths to the gods of the Gikuyu. The newspapers reported that the campaign had a mass character and had spread over the Central, Western and Eastern provinces of the country and a part of the Rift Valley. Members of various ethnic groups, including the Kamba, Baluhya and Embu, sometimes were forced to swear loyalty to the Gikuyu, and this led to a worsening of relations among them and to incidents. The Government of Kenya condemned these actions. The police were ordered to put a stop to such ceremonies.

The role of traditional authorities has often been underestimated. In fact, though, the chiefs continue to play a major role and influence the political life of today. They urge their subjects to vote for one candidate or another or to blackball him, to pay taxes or to refuse to do so, etc. A sufficient indication of the true state of affairs is given by the fact that, according to some data, 300 high chiefs and about 3,000 chiefs of lower rank live in Ghana. It is well known what a great role the numerous obas, emirs and other traditional rulers play in Nigeria. That is why making use of traditional authorities will probably help the official authorities to realise many plans for national and cultural construction.

Usually, however, almost every African country suffers from a complex of factors which leave their mark on relations between various ethnic groups.

The crisis in the Congo or in Nigeria, for example, cannot be explained away by the ethnic factor alone, although the national question became crucial at various stages. Both social and economic factors and the whole complex of the historical legacy, ethnic processes and religious differences form the basis of the Nigerian crisis. Its main elements are the struggle for democratisation of the country, the fight of the national bourgeoisie against the domination of the feudal rulers of the North, and the prolonged political crisis that began soon after the achievement of independence and extremely intensified the intra-party struggle. In order to obtain a deeper understanding of the

political situation in Nigeria, it is necessary to take into consideration the ambitions of individual politicians, their exploiting of nationalistic slogans and the contradictory and ambiguous nature of ethnic processes, when uniting tendencies and a wish for unity are combined with an opposing separatist tendency. The use of tribalism ideology and tribal separatism by neo-colonialist circles, who are interested in strengthening their position, is of considerable importance. It is necessary to take into account the struggle of the imperialist monopolies for Nigeria's oil deposits, as well as the contradictions among the various Western countries.

These are some of the most important reasons for the complex ethnic relations in a number of African countries.

#### ETHNIC PROBLEMS IN AFRICAN PARTY AND GOVERNMENT PROGRAMME DOCUMENTS

It is quite clear that a concrete solution of the various ethnic problems depends on the way in which the particular African country develops, on which classes and political parties direct the process of national construction.

It is evident that the objective conditions for nation-building will be probably more favourable in those countries where the task is set of fundamentally reconstructing African society by democratic methods, supported by the broad masses of the people, and where the struggle for economic independence and social progress is being led by national-democratic parties and movements. In these countries the ruling party is regarded as the leading and organising force for economic and social progress.

The Soviet scholar G. B. Starushenko rightly notes that in some cases, peoples who have been living for a long time in an atmosphere of enmity and mutual distrust need much more solid guarantees of their interests than a formal declaration of their equality.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup> G. B. Starushenko, *Nation and State in the Countries on the Way to Freedom*, Moscow, 1967, p. 260 (in Russian).



The main guidelines for solving ethnic problems in African states are primarily reflected in their constitutions. Comparative analysis shows that they proclaim the principle of the equality of all the peoples within their political boundaries. Thus, all racial and ethnic discrimination, as well as separatist propaganda, is prohibited by law.

African governments see it as their task to weld the various ethnic groups together and to forge real national unity.

The Ordonnance N. 4 of the Republic of Mali declares: "Any action of racial or ethnic discrimination, as well as any regionalist propaganda that might undermine the security of the State and the integrity of the Republic's territory are punishable by law."<sup>13</sup>

Article 13 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana declared that "no person should suffer discrimination on grounds of sex, race, tribe, religion or political belief".<sup>14</sup>

"Algeria considers it to be its duty to maintain that the Arab language is the national and official language.... The Republic guarantees respect for everyone's convictions, beliefs and freedom to worship as he pleases."<sup>15</sup>

Article 10 of the Constitution of Algeria includes the following: "The fundamental objectives of the democratic and popular Algerian Republic are:—safeguarding the national independence, territorial integrity and national unity.... The struggle against all discrimination, in particular, discrimination based on race and religion."<sup>16</sup>

The Constitution declared the necessity for struggle against any discrimination, "*in particular* [my italics—*R.I.*] discrimination based on race and religion".<sup>17</sup> This important paragraph of the Constitution refers directly to the country's Berber population.

Every person in Kenya enjoys all rights and freedoms irrespective of race, tribe or origin, place of habitation,

<sup>13</sup> "Ordonnance N. 1 portant organisation provisoire des pouvoirs publics en République du Mali", *L'Essor*, December 24, 1968.

<sup>14</sup> *Constitutions of Nations*, 1965, Vol. 1, The Hague, Netherlands, p. 216.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

political belief, colour, outlook or sex, the Kenyan Constitution declares.<sup>18</sup>

Referring to the draft of the constitution of Cameroon which brought in a unitary form of state system, President Ahijo stressed in his speech broadcast on May 9, 1972, that the preservation of cultural and linguistic diversity was a fundamental principle of the new constitution.

The constitution of the Guinean Republic proclaims the equality of all citizens: "Racial discrimination or regional propaganda is punishable by law" (Article 45).<sup>19</sup>

Prominent African statesmen and politicians condemn tribalism and show conclusively that national unity is essential.

As long ago as December 1958 the first Conference of African peoples in Accra adopted a special resolution on tribalism. The conference called upon African governments to enact the necessary laws and to fight resolutely against tribal enmity and separatism.

A Nigerian Association of Struggle Against Tribalism has been created in Nigeria. At the end of September 1968 it appealed to public opinion in the country to put an end to this dangerous phenomenon.

"If the Congo doesn't kill tribalism, tribalism will kill the Congo", proclaimed placards issued by the Information Ministry in Brazzaville. These placards showed the bodies of Congolese who had perished during the tribal conflicts that took place between November 1958 and February 1959 in Pointe Noire and Brazzaville.

The programme documents and declarations of leading state and party figures in Africa all voice the idea of the struggle against tribalism and the necessity of strengthening national unity.

The programme documents of most political parties in African states do not include special paragraphs dedicated to the nationalities question, where, for instance, the means of eliminating tribal enmity and establishing co-operation among various peoples within the country might be specified

<sup>18</sup> See *Government and Politics in Kenya. A Nation Building*, Nairobi, 1969, p. 138.

<sup>19</sup> *Guinea, The Constitution 1958, 1963*.

and statements made about the policy towards national minorities and the attitudes of the parties towards the problem of self-determination, etc. The only exceptions were the programme of the Sudanese Communist Party, which states the main principles on which a solution to the Southern problem could be based, and the "Maximum Programme" of the National Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).

The main demands made by the Sudanese Communist Party were as follows: the necessity of national democratic revolution; the alliance between the revolutionary forces in the North and the peoples of the South on a democratic and anti-imperialist basis; and the granting of autonomy to the Southern provinces, with power in the hands of the Southerners which had linked their destiny to the revolutionary forces of Northern Sudan.

A special section is dedicated to ethnic problems in the programme of the National Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). The equality of all ethnic groups in Angola is guaranteed by the MPLA programme; the task is set of strengthening their union and fraternal mutual assistance; mention is made of the possibility of giving autonomy to ethnic groups living in a compact and well-defined area; every people is accorded the right to use its own tongue, to devise its own written language and to develop its culture. The programme places special emphasis on the need for solidarity with all the peoples of Africa who are fighting for independence.<sup>20</sup>

As a rule, all the programme documents proceed from one premise: there is a single Guinean, Algerian, etc., nation. Taking into account the danger of the ethnic factor's influence on party activities and the danger to economic and social progress of tribalism and separatistic ideology, many parties have rejected the possibility of forming party organs on an ethnic basis.

Ideological work among the population is considered to be of vital importance, and the recruitment policy should be mainly concerned not with ethnic origin but with practical qualifications, etc.

<sup>20</sup> *MPLA. Angola, exploitation esclavagiste, résistance nationale*, p. 61.

Thus, already in 1962 Amadu Ahidjo called on the party congress of the Cameroon Federal Union "to put an end to the system of creating tribal units in the party". When the inter-party conflicts, where the ethnic factor played a considerable role, had been overcome with great effort and the National Union of Cameroon (UNC) had been created, Amadu Ahidjo saw the main task of his party as being to strengthen and consolidate national unity.<sup>21</sup>

The party Rules of the Progressive Union of Senegal say that membership of the UPS is incompatible with belonging to an ethnic or regional alliance of a political nature.

The Progressive Party of Chad aims to unite all the ethnic groups into one nation and to win recognition for the principles of universal equality.

While promoting anti-imperialist and anti-feudal campaigns, the Unity and National Progress Party of Burundi (UPRONA) considers tribalism to be one of its principal enemies.<sup>22</sup>

The article "Ethnic Groups, the Party and the National Question"<sup>23</sup> by President Sékou Touré of the Guinean Republic is an important document, expressing, as it does, the policy of the Democratic Party of Guinea (DPG) regarding the essence of the national question and the principles to be applied.

Sékou Touré stresses that "the creation of a nation and its future depend fundamentally on the unity of the ethnic groups that comprise it".<sup>24</sup>

"Tribalism, regionalism—in a word, ethnic isolation—is a factor that helped the colonial regime to preserve its domination. Even today it still helps imperialism to divide the African states."<sup>25</sup>

"The future of each of the ethnic communities," the President points out, "is bound up with their participation in the

<sup>21</sup> *A. Ahidjo par lui-même*, p. 44.

<sup>22</sup> *Infor-Burundi*, No. 201, 28.XI-4.XII, 1966, p. 1.

<sup>23</sup> A. S. Touré, "Les groupements ethniques, le parti et la question nationale", t. XVI, Conakry, 1969, pp. 5-10.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

founding and development of a community that is broader, in the economical and political sense, more viable—a national community. That is why ever since the attainment of independence the Party has emphasised the need to uphold the complete equality of all the ethnic communities, and has constantly maintained that each of them would disappear as an ethnic group if it were to exclude itself from the national community. The development of a national culture through the revival of our own languages and the devising of writing systems for them testifies to the Party's concern that ethnic communities should prosper, rather than die out. All this can only be achieved within a national framework. To foster a single nation, harmonious and powerful, to create a responsible, free and worthy People—such is the lofty mission that the Guinean revolution must fully accomplish!"<sup>26</sup>

Speaking about ways of overcoming tribal particularism and isolationism, Sékou Touré states that the best means for dealing with ethnic isolation is neither outright denial of the existence of ethnic communities (since they do, in fact, exist) nor (even more emphatically) any form of suppression. In his view, each people must be made to understand that its survival and prosperity depend on the development, consolidation and even greater prosperity of the national community as a whole. "No ethnic group can survive if the nation perishes from the havoc wrought by ethnic particularism."<sup>27</sup>

The Constitution of the DPG passed in 1969 called for a determined struggle against all forms of exploitation of man by man, the creation of "a single nation, strong and flourishing, democratic and socialist" and the building of a socialist society in which social justice, democracy and peace would reign.<sup>28</sup>

Article 4 of the Charter, which defined the obligations of a party member, required him *inter alia* to fight against racism, chauvinism and parochialism; to follow the party line unequivocally in the selection of personnel according

<sup>26</sup> A. S. Touré, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-10.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10.

<sup>28</sup> *Les Statuts du Parti Démocratique du Guinée*, Conakry, 1969, pp. 5-6.

to their political and practical qualities; to do everything possible to strengthen the power of the Guinean Republic, and to wage a tireless struggle for peace and friendship between peoples.<sup>29</sup>

The programme of the Mouvement National de la Révolution (MNR) in the People's Republic of Congo attached great importance to the struggle against tribal separatism and to the strengthening of national unity (this line was continued in 1969 by the Congolese Party of Labour). The MNR Charter (programme) adopted in March 1966 emphatically decreed that the "party has to fight against tribalism, which divides party members into groups, often into antagonistic groups".<sup>30</sup> This policy was to be pursued in all fields, including the selection of personnel, the reorganisation of the army, etc.

"The Congolese nation comprises all Congolese citizens, whether they reside on the territory of the Republic or not. The Congolese nation is one and indivisible."<sup>31</sup>

The MNR Charter especially emphasised the necessity of serious educative work among the population, extensive propagation of revolutionary ideas and education of personnel in the spirit of socialist ideology.

These positions in the MNR Charter were developed and given practical form in subsequent MNR documents, notably in the resolutions of the MNR Central Committee plenary meetings. Thus, in the resolution "About Methods of Control", adopted in 1966, the Central Committee of the MNR condemned the use of "tribalism and regionalism as the means for appointment to responsible positions or for remaining in responsible positions". The resolution also condemned "any narrow-minded nationalism, the purpose of which is to destroy the foundations of proletarian internationalism and which leads to political adventurism and demagoguery".

In the Charter of the Congolese Party of Labour (Parti congolais du travail—PCT), adopted at the end of 1969,

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

<sup>30</sup> *Charte MNR*, Séssion Février-Mars (16.II. 1966-III.1966), Brazzaville, 1966, Thèse 3.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, Annex, "Quelques règles et méthodes de travail", art. 3.

Marxism-Leninism was proclaimed to be the theoretical basis for the ideology and actions of the PCT. Article 6 of the Rules, which defined the obligations of a party member, emphasised that he must "resolutely combat against regionalism, tribalism, liberalism and fractional work in all their forms".<sup>32</sup>

Considerable prominence is given to ethnic problems in policy statements from the Kenya African National Union (KANU), the ruling party. The KANU Constitution, passed in 1966, declared: "KANU shall strive for unity and understanding among all the peoples of Kenya—breaking down tribal, linguistic and racial and cultural barriers. It will be the responsibility of leaders of KANU to educate all the people of Kenya to appreciate the need to build a Nation."<sup>33</sup>

In the preface to the party programme-manifesto (1963) containing the main principles of the party, President Jomo Kenyatta, characterising KANU policies, stressed that "there will be no place in the Kenya we shall create for discrimination by race, tribe, belief or any other manner".<sup>34</sup> Kenyatta said that all the best and valuable elements of traditional society would be used in creating the new Kenya.

The experience of Tanzania is highly relevant to the solution of ethnic problems in the developing countries. The policy of TANU, the Tanganyika African National Union, deserves close study.

The first Constitution of TANU, adopted on July 7, 1954, stated that one of the aims of the party was "the struggle against tribalism and against all isolationist tendencies among Africans".<sup>35</sup> The 1965 Constitution omits this paragraph.<sup>36</sup> The new Constitution reflected the changes that had taken place over eleven years. If the main task of the political organisation of Tanganyika in 1954 was the fight

<sup>32</sup> "Statuts du Parti Congolais du Travail", *Etumba*, 3-10. 1. 1970, p. 3.

<sup>33</sup> *The Constitution of Kenya African National Union*, Nairobi, 1966.

<sup>34</sup> *What a KANU Government Offers You*, Nairobi, 1963, p. 1.

<sup>35</sup> *Constitution of the Tanganyika African National Union*, Dar-es-Salaam, 1955.

<sup>36</sup> *Tanganyika African National Union. TANU. Sheria na madhuni ya Chama.*

for independence and the consequent need to consolidate all the peoples, in 1965, with independence achieved, the Party had to face up to the concrete problems of transforming society socially and economically. The struggle against tribalism had ceased to be one of TANU's principal tasks.

The new Constitution, "The Interim Constitution of Tanzania", was adopted on July 5, 1965.<sup>37</sup> It reflects the principles formulated by the President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, for the Constitutional Commission. The document which Nyerere called "The National Ethic" lists the main rights and duties of citizens and the main principles of his policy:<sup>38</sup>

The fundamental equality of all human beings;

Every Tanganyika citizen is an integral part of the nation and has the right to take an equal part in government at local, regional and national level;

The nation of Tanganyika is unalterably opposed to the exploitation of one man by another, of one nation by another or one group by another;

The aim of the government must be to provide equal opportunities for all citizens;

There must be no discrimination against any Tanganyika citizen, motivated by racial or tribal feeling, colour, sex, convictions or religion;

There must be no rousing of group hatred or any policy that leads to loss of respect through racial, tribal or religious feelings.

In his other speeches, addresses and writings Nyerere often returns to the principles that would help to form new relations between people belonging to different ethnic groups.

"Brotherhood and mutual understanding are the only foundation, on which society can hope to function smoothly and in accordance with its aims," Nyerere says. "If they are not accepted, there will always remain the inherent danger—not always apparent—of division in the society,

<sup>37</sup> *The Interim Constitution of Tanzania, The Gazette of the United Republic of Tanzania*, Dar-es-Salaam, 1965; Bill Supplement No. 5, Vol. 46. Also see: *Constitutions of Nations*.

<sup>38</sup> J. Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity, Uhuru na Ummuja*, A Selection from Writings and Speeches 1952-1965, London, 1967, pp. 262-64.

i.e., a split in the unity of the family, civil war within the nation or wars between nations."<sup>39</sup>

That is why everyone who joins TANU swears an oath that is written into the Constitution and which begins with the words: "I believe in the universal brotherhood of men and the unity of Africa."

Nyerere sees a direct link between the resolving of ethnic problems and the socialist transformation of society. He has repeatedly made the point that only socialism eliminates inequality and the exploitation of man by man, and creates favourable conditions for the flourishing of the individual and society as a whole. In a socialist society the main thing is man, irrespective of sex, colour, education, etc.<sup>40</sup> "The ultimate success," the President points out, "in the work of building socialism in Tanzania—as elsewhere—depends upon the people of this nation ... upon their contribution to it—their work, their co-operation for the common good and their acceptance of each other as equals and brothers."<sup>41</sup>

In the introduction to *Freedom and Socialism*, an anthology of his writings, Julius Nyerere wrote: "The existence of racialism, of tribalism, or of religious intolerance, means that a society is not socialist—regardless of whatever other attributes it may have."<sup>42</sup>

Addressing employees of the national building corporation in March 1973, President Nyerere stressed that the building of a socialist society is the difficult, but noble, task facing TANU and the whole people of Tanzania.

The Federal Government of Nigeria has declared repeatedly that all the peoples should have equal rights and that no single ethnic group should dominate the others. It is stressed that the Government should provide equal opportunities for the economic, political and cultural development of all Nigerian citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origin.

The principles underlying the national policy of the Nigerian Government have been most explicitly stated in

<sup>39</sup> J. Nyerere, op. cit., p. 13.

<sup>40</sup> J. Nyerere, *Freedom and Socialism, Uhuru na Ujamaa*, Dar-es-Salaam, Nairobi, London, New York, 1968, p. 4.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., p. 32.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p. 4.

the works of the head of state, Major-General Y. Gowon. He attaches great importance to ethnic problems. The collection of Gowon's speeches published to mark the tenth anniversary of independence is, significantly, entitled *Faith in Unity*.<sup>43</sup> The slogan "One Nigeria" remains the Government's guiding principle in dealing with the national question.

Gowon has repeatedly stated that the Ibo are full and equal citizens and that their return to the Federation is a welcome development. He has pointed to the need for consolidating national unity and pursuing policies that will draw the different peoples of the country closer together. Y. Gowon sees his main task to be that of taking into account the interests of the whole country and all its ethnic groups when he is tackling Nigeria's problems.

In a broadcast on November 30, 1966, Yakubu Gowon said: "We must also discourage any attempt to revive tribal consciousness and worsen regional animosities."<sup>44</sup>

Setting forth the Government's programme for national reconciliation, Yakubu Gowon stated: "While recognising our ethnic differences in the country, the leaders and people of post-war Nigeria should concentrate on actions which will promote national consciousness and the evolution of Nigerian nationhood."<sup>45</sup>

Such are the main principles of the programme documents of African countries that directly concern ethnic problems. As the above shows, these principles are basically the same in all the countries: the equality of all citizens is proclaimed, irrespective of race, tribe, etc., tribalism is condemned, manifestations of racism, regionalism and ethnic discrimination are punished by law, etc. Some policy documents also reflect extremely important policy principles concerning the selection of cadres, and emphasise the need for serious ideological work and raising the political consciousness of the masses. All the parties invariably demand the strengthening of national unity.

But it is one thing to enunciate principles; to put them

<sup>43</sup> Y. Gowon, *Faith in Unity*, Lagos, 1970.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., p. 137.

into effect is quite a different matter. How are these propositions accomplished in practice?

#### FIRST STEPS AND DIFFICULTIES

The governments of African states are putting the basic propositions of the programme documents into practice. Serious attention is paid in particular to reducing the role of the ethnic factor in political life. Besides educational work, laws are issued to combat inter-tribal enmity and separatist ideology, programmes are devised to eliminate inequality in the development level of various regions, the tribal principle in the formation of an army is rejected, special attention is paid to training national cadres and to developing a national culture, etc.

The majority of parties refused to build party organs on an ethnic basis. As stated above, the Constitution of the Progressive Union of Senegal says that membership of it is incompatible with belonging to an ethnic or regional alliance of a political nature. At the end of April a decree was issued in Ghana<sup>46</sup> which had made it illegal, under threat of a heavy fine or imprisonment, to form parties on a tribal or religious basis or to give them names intended to arouse tribal or religious feelings.

In May 1967 the Government of Nigeria banned all parties and organisations (over 80) which had been built on tribal principles.

In a number of countries tribal discord is punished by law. Article 55 of the Mali criminal code says: "Any intention, any action of such a nature that might establish or raise racial or ethnic discrimination, any intention, any action that might provoke or assist regionalist propaganda, any propagation of news aiming at an undermining of the nation's unity or directed against the state, any manifestation directed against freedom of conscience and religious liberty that might set the citizens against each other, will be punished."<sup>47</sup>

<sup>46</sup> "Political Parties Decree", *The Ghanaian Times*, 30.IV.1969; *ibid.*, 1.V.1969.

<sup>47</sup> *République du Mali, Ministère de la Justice, Code Pénal, Loi No. 99 A.N.-R.M. du 3 août 1961, Koulouba*, p. 29.

The criminal code of Guinea says: "Any action of racism or regionalism, as well as any propaganda of racial, tribal or subversive nature" will be punished by imprisonment from one to ten years.<sup>48</sup>

Efforts to foment inter-tribal discord in the People's Republic of Congo and in some other countries are punished severely.

The policy of eliminating real inequality between different peoples that is pursued by the governments of some African states contributes a great deal to the solution of ethnic problems.

The Government of Algeria, for instance, has recently been making great efforts to develop the most backward regions of the country, especially the Great Kabilia. These measures are also of great importance to the plan for strengthening Algeria's national unity. Most of the country's population of thirteen million consists of Arabs, but there are about two million Berbers: Kabils, Shawia, Oasis Berbers and Tuaregs. Most Berbers have now, apparently, been Arabified, but some regions (Kabilia, Shawia, Mzab, Touggourt, etc.) preserve compact Berber settlements where different dialects of the Berber language function as the main language. This fact is used by neo-colonialist circles in an attempt to stir up trouble between the Arabs and Kabils.

In the autumn of 1968 a resolution was passed, allocating 550 million dinars to a three-year plan for developing Kabilia to be used for improving industry and agriculture, and for developing craft skills, health services and education.

The Government of Algeria has also taken steps to develop such backward regions of the country as Saura, Oasis, Tittery, etc.

Thus, the policy of proportional development and the elimination of economic and social differences between various regions of the country, that has been announced by the Government of Algeria, is being put into effect.

The economic and social transformations being carried out in Algeria provide for the industrialisation of the coun-

<sup>48</sup> *République de Guinée, Lois, Code Pénal, Conakry, 1966*, pp. 39-40.

try, radical agrarian reforms and raising the development level of backward areas. They will speed up the collapse of archaic structures and encourage the development of new social relations. Special local development programmes will level out regional, social and economic differences, put an end to outdated institutions inherited from the tribal system which are hindering the country's progress, abolish social inequality and involve the Berber-speaking population in the task of national construction. All this will promote the solution of ethnic problems and the strengthening of ethno-political unity.

The policy of eliminating real inequality in the level of social, economic and cultural development attained by different ethnic groups is being followed in other countries too. Of late great attention is being paid in Senegal to Casamance, the southern part of the country. The new four-year development plan for Senegal (from July 1, 1969) envisages considerable capital investment in the economy of this region—for developing transport and telecommunications, and the output of vegetables and fruit will also be increased.<sup>49</sup>

In Kenya a plan for developing the Northern province, most of whose inhabitants are Somali and Galla cattle-breeders, has been adopted and is now in operation. Guinea is concentrating on the so-called "forest regions", inhabited by Gerze, Toma and other peoples. A special ministry to deal with the nomadic population of the Sahara has been formed in the Republic of Niger.

The "policy of national reconciliation" announced by the Government began to be implemented in the Republic of Chad in January 1971. It aimed to resolve the deep crisis in the country's internal politics that had existed since 1965 and been caused by the actions of the Tedda and Mubi peoples.

Speaking on Republic Day (November 28, 1972), President F. Tombalbai urged the people to heighten their national consciousness, and again emphasised the need to strengthen national unity and weld all the peoples in the country together, in order to promote economic and social develop-

<sup>49</sup> *West Africa*, 22.III.1969, p. 322.

ment. He declared that these aims could only be attained by establishing mutual understanding and eradicating hatred and tribal dissension, as well as by carrying through a cultural revolution to change people's outlook and raise their national consciousness.

There are many difficulties in solving the ethnic problems of Kenya; the Government and President Jomo Kenyatta are devoting great attention to the fight against tribalist ideology. The Government sponsored a wide publicity campaign under the slogan: "There are no tribes—only Kenyans!", to show that in modern Kenya all the peoples participate in running the country as well as in the share-out of material wealth. The author had many talks on these problems with people from various ethnic groups and with different political convictions during her stay in Kenya in May 1969. As a rule, the ordinary people of different ethnic groups do not feel animosity towards each other. Baluhya, Gikuyu, Kamba, Luo and the representatives of other peoples work side by side in the same government offices. Not far from Nairobi, in the Thika region, where about 99 per cent of the population are Gikuyu, a Kamba woman worked as the social department officer, and in Nyeri, also in Gikuyu territory, the same job is performed by a Baluhya woman. As yet they both speak only Swahili but are making progress with the Gikuyu language. They say that the Government of Kenya deliberately sends Baluhya, Luo, etc., to work in Gikuyu, Kamba, etc., areas and vice versa. But some politicians use the ethnic element for inflaming tribalistic feelings. They try to turn the peoples against each other, e.g., the Luo against the Gikuyu (the two most numerous peoples in Kenya). This policy of rousing nationalist hysteria led to conflicts between the Luo and the Gikuyu in the Kisumu region in October 1969 and to a worsening of the situation in the country.

The peoples of Nigeria are going through a new, momentous stage in their development after the war against Biafra; it is a period of reconstruction and reconciliation, a time for eliminating the consequences of the Nigerian crisis.

The Nigerian Government considers it vital to normalise the situation in East-Central State, which was the nucleus of the former Biafra. To judge from Nigerian press reports,

some success has been achieved in rehabilitating the state's economy and its further development, and attention is now being given to such acute problems as the food supply, unemployment and the resettlement of refugees.

The state's administration, including the police force, is staffed by Ibo.

The rebuilding of old schools and the opening of new ones produced the result that by autumn 1970 school attendance had reached its 1965 level. According to information furnished by the Governor of East-Central State, U. Asika, the number of those attending school has risen by 100 per cent. Fees in state schools have been reduced by 50 per cent and can be paid in instalments. This feature will play a significant part in the progress of education.

The Nigerian Government created an Emergency Relief Volunteers Corps, part of whose job is to send to work and make full use of all specialists who wish to help abolish the consequences of the war.

A Ministry of Community Development and Rehabilitation has been established in the Mid-West State to help the refugees.

Members of staff from universities and other educational establishments in Nigeria took an active part in the reconstruction work. A conference of leading educational workers was held in Lagos to discuss the problem of education in the war-affected areas.

In the University of Ibadan a Committee for War Affected Areas was set up. In January 1970 members of this Committee were sent to Lagos in order to discuss practical measures with the officials there. The Committee appealed to the lecturers and research workers of the university, asking them to collect money, food and clothes.

A delegation from the University of Lagos was sent to the eastern areas to find out exactly what aid was required.

Inter-state assistance is being carried further. For example, the Government of Mid-Western State declared its readiness not only to place some of its civil servants at the disposal of the Government of Benue-Plato State, but also to pay their salaries.<sup>50</sup>

<sup>50</sup> *West Africa*, 25.VI.1971, p. 738.

In December 1971 an agreement was concluded between Kano State and Mid-Western State on mutual help in training staff to run the economy.<sup>51</sup>

The author was able to talk to such outstanding political figures as O. Awolowo and A. Enahoro during her stay in Nigeria in January-February 1969. They agreed unanimously about the need to form a united Nigeria with a strong centralised government. The new administrative division of the country into 12 states, which to a certain extent takes the ethnic factor into account, will undoubtedly remove much of the bitterness from the nationalities question. O. Awolowo and supporters of a federal system think that "...in the peculiar circumstances of Nigeria, only a federal constitution can foster unity with concord among the diverse national groups in the country, as well as promote economy and efficiency in administration". And further: "Since Nigeria is a multi-lingual and multinational country par excellence, the only constitution that is suitable for its peculiar circumstances is a federal constitution."<sup>52</sup> The principles of the state system of Nigeria were worked out in greater detail by O. Awolowo in his book *The People's Republic*.<sup>53</sup>

In the near future a federation is probably the most likely form of state system to be adopted. The attempt to create a unitary state undertaken by Ironsi in 1966 ended in failure.

The extension of economic links between different areas of Nigeria, the development of the home market and the raising of the educational level of the population will inevitably lead to the collapse of pre-capitalist structures and the intensification of ethnic processes. The probable outcome will be a rapid rise in national consciousness and a furthering of integration processes in the sphere of ethnic development.

Tanzania, with a population of more than 12 million, is one of the few countries in Africa where the ethnic factor does not play an important part in the country's political

<sup>51</sup> "Kano and Mid-Western State Governments Sign Pact", *Kano State of Nigeria Today*, No. 4, Vol. I, January 1972, pp. 3-5.

<sup>52</sup> O. Awolowo, *Thoughts on the Nigerian Constitution*, p. 49.

<sup>53</sup> O. Awolowo, *The People's Republic*, Ibadan, 1968.



life. Although Tanzania (i.e., the continental part of it—Tanganyika) comprises 120 peoples according to census returns, relations between them have never been hostile. Of course, there have been conflicts and still are—between, for instance, the Masai and neighbouring Bantu, caused by cattle-stealing episodes or personal quarrels, but they cannot be considered as manifestations of tribal enmity. Such cases may occur in relations between members of the same ethnic group.

There were no large states on the territory of Tanganyika in the past. Consequently, no single tribe ever ruled over another. The level of economic development of the overwhelming majority of peoples is approximately equal. The only exception is the Chagga, among whom capitalist relationships had developed even before independence.

The active trade links forged by Arab and Swahili merchants, including slave-traders, with the interior of the country, as well as the endless stream of the migrants looking for work in the mines and sisal plantations, were of considerable importance to the development of ethnic processes. Contact between different ethnic groups and the ever wider use of Swahili have furthered the integration processes.

The ethnic factor does not play an important role in politics, largely because Tanganyika has never had rival parties, each supported by a specific tribe. From its very beginning the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) was a mass political organisation, uniting in its ranks members of the most varied of the country's ethnic groups. Since January 1963 all the citizens of the country, irrespective of race, have been able to join TANU. Highly important to the solution of ethnic problems are the programme of progressive social and economic transformations adopted by TANU and the principles for a national policy formulated by Julius Nyerere.

In his speeches and articles Nyerere constantly underlines the danger of tribalism and appeals for the consolidation of all the peoples in order to form a united family of peoples—the Tanzanian nation. The author's talks with state and public leaders in Tanzania have convinced her that the Government of the country, when elaborating concrete national policy measures or making appointments,

takes no account of the ethnic factor, but considers that there is a single people, having common aims and tasks.

There is no doubt that the language policy of the Government also helps to consolidate the peoples of Tanzania. Although the population of Tanzania consists of 120 peoples with their own languages, many of them mutually unintelligible, the Government declared the state language (alongside English) to be Swahili. It is to be specially noted that the introduction of Swahili as a common state language met with no opposition from the population and was carried through quite painlessly. This is apparently one of the results of TANU's standing policy of levelling out the ethnic factor and really uniting the country's citizens.

The establishing of equality between workers in state enterprises and the founding of new kinds of co-operatives—so-called ujamaa villages—in Tanzania go straight to the heart of the matter and eliminate the possibility of the exploitation of man by man or of one ethnic group by another. Equal political rights and opportunities for all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic affiliation, i.e., the right to vote and participate in state administrative bodies, freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, are all vitally important to the upbringing of the new man, who will consider the interests of the nation as a whole before any other.

Another country on the African continent where the ethnic factor is insignificant is Senegal.<sup>54</sup> The population of the country, numbering about four million, contains various ethnic groups—Wolof, Serer, Toucouleur, Fulbe, Malinke, Soninke and others. All these peoples speak different languages, belonging to different linguistic families. Nevertheless, both the published data and the author's personal observations in 1961 and 1969 indicate that Senegal does not suffer from the problem of tribalism. At any rate, it is not very strongly pronounced, and there are no cases of bitter inter-tribal enmity and tension. One of the

<sup>54</sup> See also: *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa*, Berkeley-Los Angeles, 1966, p. 30.

most important reasons for this is the policy of the ruling party, the Progressive Union of Senegal (UPS), headed by President L. S. Senghor. It tolerates no tribalist ideology nor any organisation based on the tribal principle.

Academic, state and public leaders in Senegal emphasised in their talks with the author in February 1969 that the ethnic factor does not play a substantial part in determining appointments or evolving economic and social development policies. Thus, for instance, the Governor of an economically important area in St. Louis said that the economic development plan provided for advances in the area's agriculture and that it made absolutely no difference to him what ethnic groups lived there. Aims and tasks were common to all, the Governor said.

Every country has its particular features and its specific nationality problems; it would seem that attempts to solve them should take into consideration the historical past and the peculiarities of ethnic processes.

The governments of African states face great difficulties when they try to deal with ethnic problems. One example is the problem of language. Many aspects of national development depend on it, e.g., the elimination of existing inequality in the economic and cultural level of different peoples and the training of national cadres.

In 1959, one year before many African countries won their independence, at the Second Congress of African Writers and Poets in Rome, the following resolution was adopted: "The independent and federated Africa should adopt neither European nor any other foreign language for its national expression."<sup>55</sup>

The following fourteen years showed the utter impossibility of implementing this resolution. The languages of the former metropolises have now become the official languages of most African states.

The supremacy of the European languages will probably remain intact in the near future. Moreover, investigations that have been carried out in a number of countries in recent

<sup>55</sup> "11-ème congrès des écrivains et artistes noirs", *Présence africaine*, Vol. I, Nos. 24-25, Paris, 1959, p. 397.

years, including research by specialists from the GDR, and which were described at the Second Congress of Africanists in Dakar, show that the European languages, especially French, are gaining ground. The policy of francophony is largely responsible. Thus, one of the main tasks of the Agency for co-operation between francophone countries in the fields of culture and technology, established in mid-March 1970 at the Niamey conference, is to do all in its power to spread the use of French.

The linguistic situation in African countries is exceedingly complicated. Besides such widespread languages as Arabic (spoken by more than 83 million), Swahili (according to some data 30 or 40 million), Hausa (probably about 20 million), Malinke (more than eight million), Ibo, Yoruba and Fulfulde (each of which is spoken by no less than 10 million), almost every state in Africa has languages spoken only by a few thousand people.

The problem of language gives rise to fierce argument among African scholars, politicians and statesmen. As a member of a UNESCO mission in 1964, the author had to make a special study of the problem of the development of African languages and the possibility of using them in teaching, adult education, broadcasting, etc., in a special way. As UNESCO consultants, the members of the mission took part in a discussion of these problems at the Educational Planning Conference and the Conference of the Ministers of Education of African States in Abidjan in March 1964. The answers to our questionnaire, as well as talks with heads of state, ministers of education, linguists and public and political figures, reveal vast differences of opinion. Some want the development of African languages, others categorically state that this is impossible and demand the use of only English or French as the state language and the language of the classroom. Still others defend African languages, but at the same time talk about the need to study the European languages as well.

However, the majority of the African leaders and the intelligentsia want to stimulate African languages. They consider that in future the local languages will supersede the European languages. President Sékou Touré of the Republic of Guinea considers it essential that the official

language should be an African tongue, rather than English or French.<sup>56</sup>

Professor Ki-Zerbo is of the opinion that the death of the African languages would mean cultural suicide.<sup>57</sup> The Minister of Community Development and Culture in Uganda, Constantine Katiti, talked to the author in April 1969 in Kampala about the necessity for the development of African languages and their significance for cultural education. In his view, culture can be developed only in the mother tongue, and so it is necessary to preserve and develop the African languages.

But what African languages are to be developed? Every country has a plethora of different languages, to say nothing of dialects. Many of them have no written form. Is it necessary to develop all the languages existing in a country, or only the most important ones? Which languages may be considered the most important? What can serve as a criterion in choosing between languages? The point is that it is necessary not only to create written languages for the peoples who do not possess them, but also to publish educational material, books, newspapers and magazines. To do all this, vast sums of money and a lot of special staff are needed. In practice the idea is more or less a non-starter. One must also bear in mind that the resulting linguistic patchwork would hinder communication between people belonging to different ethnic groups, would further consolidate tribal division and might delay the process of national integration of the African peoples.

Some work in the field of developing the native languages is being carried out in many African states. In some states written languages are being created for the most important languages, unification of alphabets is being undertaken, a new spelling system is being worked out and scientific study of the African languages has begun. It is especially noteworthy that native African specialists are coming to play a greater role in tackling linguistic problems.

After the granting of independence to Ghana the Con-

<sup>56</sup> *West Africa*, 21.IV.1972, p. 500.

<sup>57</sup> Prof. Joseph Ki-Zerbo, "The Content of Education in Africa", Final Report, Conference of African States on the Development of Education in Africa, Addis Ababa, May 15-25, 1961, Annex IV, p. 57.

vention People's Party decided that one of its most important tasks lay in reorganising education, introducing African languages into the school system. The Bureau of Ghana Languages was established with departments of Twi, Fanti, Ewe, etc. It was to activate the preparation, publication and distribution of periodicals and literature in local African languages, including school textbooks.

Work was begun on creating a unified written language for peoples of the Akan and Dagbani groups.<sup>58</sup>

The language problem was debated by the Ghanaian Parliament in May 1971. It was proposed that there should be a single official language for the whole country. Attention was drawn to the increasing use of Akan. However, opinions differed, some members suggesting that the introduction of a single national language might bring about a negative reaction.<sup>59</sup>

Written forms for the most important local languages of Mali and Guinea were introduced in 1967, but it is still too early to assess the results.

As stated above, in the continental part of Tanzania the Government introduced Swahili as the official language. This interesting experiment deserves close study.

Swahili is beginning to play a greater role in Kenya. The Kenya African National Union (KANU) announced the beginning of a broad campaign to make Swahili the official language.

The Somali language was introduced in written form in Somalia in January 1973, and was declared to be the national language of the republic.

In Uganda the Conference of the Linguistic Society that took place in April 1970 urged the Government to make Swahili the official language. At the same time the Conference recommended the development of the Luganda and Lwo languages.

The Local Languages Society of Nigeria, under the auspices of the University of Ibadan, was established as long ago as 1958. This Society urged the development of the three main languages of Nigeria: Hausa, Yoruba and Ibo.<sup>60</sup>

<sup>58</sup> *Ghana. An Official Handbook*, Accra, 1962.

<sup>59</sup> *West Africa*, 11.VI.1971, p. 655.

<sup>60</sup> *The Case for Nigerian Languages*, No. 1, 1961, p. 8.

The idea of spreading the Hausa language over the next few years was suggested, and in 1964 a special committee was even formed to study the question. There was also a suggestion about using Hausa as an official language in other countries of West Africa.

The Wolof language is gaining more recognition in Senegal, where several ethnic groups exist. I remember the heated arguments that took place in the lobby of the Conference of the Ministers of Education in Abidjan in March 1964. Some insisted that language policy ought to favour French, others tried to prove the need to develop Wolof in order to make it the state language of the future. Some were opposed to this and pointed to the danger of "Wolofisation", which threatened to arouse tribal feelings. Eight years have passed since the author's first visit to Senegal in April 1961 and great changes have taken place: Wolof is gaining ground. In 1971 a decree was issued introducing the Wolof language in written form.

The Conference of African States on the Development of Education in Africa, that took place in May 1961 in Addis Ababa, made a detailed examination of the problem of national languages. "The plan for educational development in Africa", adopted by African states at the Addis Ababa Conference, requires the introduction of African languages into teaching.<sup>61</sup>

Conference members consider that the mother tongue should necessarily be used to combat illiteracy and in adult education.<sup>62</sup>

The Conference on Educational Planning and the Conference of the Ministers of Education of African States, which took place in Abidjan in March 1964, supported the development of African languages and the need to use them in the drive against illiteracy among adults. In some countries the local languages are already used for this purpose; in Kenya Lwo, Kamba, Gikuyu, Luhya, Masai, Swahili, etc.,

<sup>61</sup> "Conférence d'états africains sur le développement de l'éducation en Afrique", Addis Ababa, May 15-25, 1961; "Rapport final. Aperçu d'un plan de développement de l'éducation en Afrique", Addis Ababa, 1961, p. 51.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 57-58.

are used; and in Nigeria—Ibo, Yoruba, Hausa, Nupe, Tiv, Efik and other languages. Eight African languages are used in the fight against illiteracy in Guinea and nineteen in Uganda.

It is natural that every country will display its own peculiarities and its own specific features in laying down its language policy. Some countries may accept only one language as official, other countries, e.g., Nigeria, Ghana, Zaire, etc., may have two or three languages.

Only a policy of equality for all languages and peoples (irrespective of their economic and ethnic development level) will help to solve the language problem in states that are as ethnically heterogeneous and complex as most of the African countries are. Any departure from this principle is capable of aggravating relations between individual peoples, strengthening tribalist tendencies and impeding integration processes.

Language policy might play an important role in the consolidation of various African peoples, in the struggle against the ideology of tribal particularism and separatism. It would seem that in defining the language policy one must bear in mind the extreme complexity of the ethnic problems in most African states. One of the main features of the language policy must be the overcoming of tribal isolation and tribalistic sentiments and promotion of a common national self-awareness.

The problem of the self-determination of peoples and of the formation of their own states is very acute in some countries.

For many long years the rising bourgeoisie of the Ewe fought for the removal of the existing political frontiers and for reunion in one state. The aim of creating their own state was also announced by the ruling circles of the Bakongo, living in the Congo, Zaire, Gabon and Angola. Before the declaration of independence in Ghana the feudal chiefs of the Ashanti demanded the creation of an Ashanti state. From time to time the tribal leadership of the Tuaregs advanced plans for setting up an independent state for the Tuaregs, who live in a number of countries in West and North Africa. Plans for secession from Uganda have been long cherished by the feudals of Buganda. As stated

above, there was a movement in favour of autonomy or secession in the Southern Sudan, and mention has already been made of the events in Nigeria and the efforts to secede undertaken by its eastern part in 1967.

When studying the various movements in different African states aimed at secession and the creation of individual states, it seems necessary to take into consideration a complex of many factors. On the one hand, these movements are closely connected with ethnic processes and may testify to a rising national self-awareness when the frontiers drawn by colonisers and cutting across single ethnic organisms turned out to be obstacles on the path towards national consolidation (Ewe, Somalis).

On the other hand, a longing for separation and the creation of an independent state can be explained by political motives when the drive towards self-determination is impelled by a rising bourgeoisie (Biafra, Katanga) or feudal circles (Buganda).

Finally, the slogan of self-determination is being used more and more by neo-colonialists in order to strengthen their own position, as well as by nationalist leaders in inter-party struggles and especially during elections to legislative bodies.

It is necessary to emphasise that such movements are not merely local: they touch on a whole complex of internal and inter-state problems. The Ewe movement for reunification caused serious complications between Ghana and Togo, and the Somali problem and the plan for creating a "Great Somalia" affected the relations between Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya.

Moreover, the striving of the peoples for self-determination has its effect on relations between various states outside Africa. Today such problems are becoming an international problem.

There is no doubt that the principle of self-determination has substantial importance for the solution of the nationalities question within the present national states. The right to self-determination and to an independent working out of its destiny belongs to every people irrespective of its size and level of ethnic, social and economic development. This Marxist-Leninist principle is familiar to everybody.

But the inalienable right of self-determination, including the right to secede and form independent states, must not be confused with the practical and political expediency of secession or gaining autonomy in each concrete case. It is certainly not true that separation is always in the real interests of a people. The division of Africa into many small, economically weak states is already proving to be a serious obstacle to its social and economic development. The implementation of the self-determination principle on an ethnic basis in forms that would increase separatism would not only aggravate the difficulties of the present situation, but would lead to further fragmentation of the continent. The question of who will benefit from self-determination is by no means immaterial to the various peoples. In many cases, it may only be of use to neo-colonialist powers, who have an interest in the existence of small or economically and politically weak states.

Recognition of the political inadvisability of separation for various peoples is not the same as rejection of the self-determination principle, since self-determination may take different forms. The unitary state, confederation, federation or autonomy are all different forms of self-determination. Moreover, it does not imply *a priori* recognition of the legality of military suppression of a people longing for separation. Such actions may only make ethnic relations even more complex. In any case, they do not provide a stable and long-term solution of the question.

In resolving the problem of self-determination the tasks imposed by the common struggle for social emancipation are the main and decisive condition.

Every independent state in Africa has its specific character, which obviously makes its mark on various aspects of the nationalities question. In addition, we must take account of the extreme complexity and contradictory nature of ethnic processes in different countries: detribalisation, rising national self-consciousness and the formation of great ethnic communities are accompanied by supertribalisation, the strengthening of ethnic self-awareness and nationalistic and separatistic tendencies.

Every country has its own priorities in the field of ethni-

cal development. In spite of the peculiarities of every state, the ethnic factor plays a certain role in the political life of these countries.

There can be no doubt about the importance of the principles for resolving ethnic problems, as declared in constitutions and party policy statements, as well as the policy of consolidating all the peoples in a country.

By calling the peoples in their states single nations, the constitutions and party policy statements emphasise national unity, the common element uniting people of different ethnic affiliations.

It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that within the state framework single nations, e.g., a Tanzanian or Guinean nation, may emerge in the future. At the moment, however, the process of national integration and consolidation still has a long way to run. Specific historical conditions in the individual countries produce different variants of ethnic development. In some countries they may lead to the emergence of a single ethnic community from the different ethnic constituents of the state; in others several communities, including nations, may form or are forming (e.g., Nigeria).

In such countries, naturally enough, government policy has to interlock with the processes of ethnic development. In other words, it has to facilitate the formation and, later, the harmonic development of several nations.

However, in a number of cases the identification of a nation and a state produces negative results. The declaration in the constitutions of some countries that all the peoples within the state political boundaries form a single nation, regardless of the ethnic processes that are operating, merely glosses over the ethnic problems. State political unity can only be attained through a correct national policy. Many African leaders start from the premise that a single nation exists and that the task is, therefore, to consolidate it. In our view, the task is to *create* this unity. Any exaggeration of the part played by the ethnic factor, just like attempts to ignore it, can only make the existing difficulties worse.

The complicated ethnic structure of many countries is an indisputable fact. But some African leaders deny the existence of diverse ethnic groups in their countries and

consider the ethnic names themselves to be something shameful. A long time will pass before the Masai stop feeling themselves to be Masai, or the Bakongo give up their ethnic self-awareness and call themselves Congolese, or the Ibo and Yoruba consider themselves to be only Nigerians. Ethnic consciousness is still strong, and this undoubtedly influences relations with other ethnic groups.

While ethnic communities exist, ethnic interests exist too. Ethnic nihilism and indifference to the needs of individual peoples when formulating and implementing a programme for economic and cultural construction, just like reactionary forms of nationalism and chauvinism, may not only do great damage to the improvement of inter-ethnic relations, but also hold back the drive towards national and social emancipation. As Lenin pointed out, "...only exclusive attention to the interests of various nations can remove grounds for conflicts, can remove mutual distrust..."<sup>63</sup>

Democratic methods for resolving ethnic problems presuppose: the equality of all peoples, large or small; the eradication and prohibition of all discrimination or ethnically motivated privileges; a democratic state system that ensures the equal development of ethnic minorities; the absence of coercion when the language problem is being settled; respect for national culture, beliefs and traditions; help to backward peoples, in order to bridge the gap in economic and social development; etc. Most of these principles are proclaimed in the constitutions of the African states and other policy statements from African governments and ruling parties. The use of these democratic guidelines in dealing with ethnic problems will do much to relieve the ethnic contradictions in African states at their present level of social, economic and political development.

The formation of national unity which in this case is understood to mean not the formation of a single nation within the state frontiers but the nurturing of the feeling of belonging to one state and the identification of the individual with other peoples in the same state, all having a common aim, is a long process.

<sup>63</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 386.

In order to reduce this period, progressive forces in Africa are fighting resolutely against any displays of inter-tribal enmity, national narrow-mindedness and tribalist and chauvinistic tendencies. They want to educate members of different ethnic groups in the spirit of mutual respect and co-operation.

The experience of national construction in the independent states of Africa illustrates the need for extreme caution and great tact when dealing with ethnic problems.