

Winter 1959

**INTERNATIONAL
SOCIALIST
REVIEW**

John Gates' Story

— A Review —

THE SOUTH'S DILEMMA



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A "Free" Ballot?

The exclusion of three minority parties from the ballot in New York in 1958 once again pointed up the hypocrisy of Washington's boastful claim to the world that "free" America practices political democracy (except maybe in the South where progress, nevertheless, is being made).

The Socialist Labor party was ruled off the New York state ballot although it had collected 16,000 signatures on nominating petitions. The People's Rights party was denied a place for its candidate Benjamin J. Davis of the Communist party in Manhattan's 21st Senate District despite 6,000 signatures. Likewise brushed aside were the signatures in Manhattan's 19th Congressional District supporting David McReynolds of the Socialist Party—Social Democratic Federation. Only the United Independent-Socialist party with 27,000 signatures managed to get on—after a difficult court fight that cut in heavily on time for campaigning.

How minority parties are deliberately barred from even placing the names of their candidates on the ballot is well explained in an article by Ralph Nader and Theodore Jacobs in the October 9 *Harvard Law Record* from which we would like to quote somewhat extensively for the information of our readers.

"In its Model Election Law, the American Civil Liberties Union urged that minor parties be required to accumulate signatures equivalent to only one-tenth of one percent of the total vote cast in the preceding gubernatorial election, with a maximum limit of 10,000 signatures. Compare this standard with the requirements of 2 percent in Missouri (36,000 votes), 3 percent in Massachusetts (71,643 votes), 5 percent in California (259,000 votes) and 7 percent in Ohio (259,000 votes) . . .

"New York, Illinois, Massachusetts, and Ohio demand that the signatures obtained on nominating petitions represent a prescribed number of counties throughout the state. Apportionment requirements often result in giving disproportionate power to rural areas and discourages urban and, in some cases, rural centered groups from availing themselves of the election process . . .

"Regulations pertaining to authentication of signatures, even in states with liberal signature and apportionment legislation, provide further hurdles for small parties to overcome. Six states require individual notarization of every signature on a nominating petition.

"In Missouri, each of the 36,000 names needed must be certified by a notary who personally knows the signer or by two witnesses who can swear to his identity.

"Early filing dates, often four to six months before the election, effectively bar eleventh hour protest or splinter parties and force the gathering of signatures before the acme of the public's political consciousness. In other states, the period within which signatures may be obtained is severely restricted. Pennsylvania, for example, requires that the total number of necessary signatures be obtained within a 20 day period.

"The potential group from which signers may be solicited is even limited in many states. Prevented from signing an independent nominating petition are those who voted in a contemporary party primary as well as voters affiliated with another party within a specified previous period . . .

"One of the characteristics of an inflexible standard is the facility with which it can be abused in its enforcement. Thus, even when a minority party complies with all the major regulations

Cover

Patricia Bradford, 5, and her brother Allan, 6, of Washington, D. C., sat in front of the Supreme Court last August while the nine judges heard arguments in the Little Rock school integration case. The decision was favorable but there is still a tough fight ahead before "Equal Justice Under Law," the motto over the entrance to the court, becomes a reality in America.

there remains a fair possibility that the petition will be totally negated by a technical defect or omission often due to ambiguities in the election law . . .

"Added to these legal obstacles have been a variety of pressures in the form of discriminatory judicial and administrative enforcement, and harassing, intimidating tactics by vigilante groups. The latter pressure has been expressed in the past by publishing petitions in newspapers to embarrass or black-list signers and even by physical violence against small party workers."

(For the information of our foreign readers, we should like to point out that these arbitrary restrictions do not apply to the Democratic or Republican parties. These parties appear automatically on the ballot from year to year. The restrictive laws were enacted by the Republicans and Democrats specifically to maintain their monopoly of the ballot. In many instances when small parties have managed to get through the gauntlet, the Republicans and Democrats have "reformed" the laws — by making them still more dictatorial.)

The article calls attention to the important contributions minor parties have made in American history and to their "educative value" in the political process. It submits that it is a basic right "to present minority candidates before the electorate on equal terms with other parties."

Exclusion blocks "perfectly legitimate aspirations. Access to the election slate not only permits the expression of public opinion but also has a high publicity value in marshalling greater support. It is the only practical way by which minor parties can say, 'Republicans and Democrats — take notice!'"

"A democratic society should not dismiss a freedom as unimportant merely because it has comparatively little direct significance to the majority. We would do well to remember that suppression once sanctioned has epidemic qualities and that all of us are minorities in one framework or another."

For a copy containing the complete article, the address is 23 Everett St., Cambridge 38, Mass. The newspaper sells for 10 cents.

School for Executives

Big Business has come around to the view that its executives need humanizing. They're too conformist, too money-grubbing, and too ignorant of the liberal arts to make a good impression on "large groups of people, such as employees, customers and stockholders." And so a number of corporations are sending their thousand-dollar-a-month junior executives to eight-week polishing courses at such top universities as Swarthmore, Dartmouth, Williams, Northwestern, Columbia, and Drake.

David Ray reports in the Dec. 6 *Nation* that at Northwestern, for example, they study architecture, modern art, and literature. The eight-week grind is made as endurable as possible. Students are freed of their job responsibilities, live in a hotel, enjoy daily cocktails. They "attend classes be-

tween rounds of coffee breaks and field visits." "Discussion is informal; classes are conducted in a carpeted lounge, with excellent lighting, ash trays by each foam-rubber chair, and even a blower to keep the air clean."

But it seems that this humanizing of the executive personality does not always help improve relations with production crews. In one instance, when a graduate, practicing what he had learned of the liberal arts, tried to "impress upon his workers the importance of their individual contributions to the company," an employee responded:

"Doc, don't rub it in. How would you like to be reminded that the most important thing you can do in life is to put four bolts in the right rear end of a car?"

Editorial

After the Cleveland Conference

THE Cleveland conference of socialists, held November 28-30, marks, we believe, the end of one stage of the process of regroupment of revolutionary socialist forces in this country and the opening of another. The perspectives, in our opinion, are quite hopeful.

The conference itself met simply to assess the effort at united socialist electoral activity in 1958 and to discuss the possibility of a more intensive effort in 1960. No action was taken except to agree to meet again within a year. A committee was set up to coordinate correspondence and discussion.

America's various shadings of socialist opinion were represented in their complete range. Participants included leaders of the defunct Progressive party and American Labor party, the Socialist Workers party, and the Communist party, as well as unaffiliated independents and former members of the Communist party. The Socialist Party — Social Democratic Federation and Socialist Labor party sent observers. Christian socialists were present. A leader of the Oehlerite Revolutionary Workers League spoke for the ultra-left.

The Socialist Labor party, in a five-page, single-spaced letter explaining why it was only observing and not participating, called the conference "one nondescript brew." However, most of those in the brew felt that the adjective "nondescript," used by Frederick Engels at another time in another context, did not indicate the central significance of this gathering. What really occurred in Cleveland was a resumption of the old tradition of free discussion, fraternal exchange of opinion, and readiness to seek points of united action against the common class enemy that characterized the American socialist movement before the advent of Stalinism. Engels, if we must appeal to his shade, would have considered this revival of democracy an encouraging development, we think.

The strength of the sentiment for reviving this fine tradition was most tellingly indicated, in our opinion, by the presence at Cleveland of leading spokesmen of the Social Democracy and the Communist party. Neither of these tendencies played an exactly heroic role in

the effort to put up united socialist tickets in the 1958 election; yet both found it necessary to attend the conference where this was the main topic under consideration.

When the United Independent-Socialist ticket was fighting for its place on the New York ballot, the Social Democratic leadership harassed the new electoral party with threats of court action, thus aiding the De Sapio machine in its attempt to maintain the Big Business monopoly on the voting machines. At Cleveland, the Social Democratic spokesmen sought to cover up this sorry lapse in the defense of democratic rights in New York by strongly championing democratic rights in Soviet bloc countries. The response of the conference was scarcely enthusiastic but the patience displayed indicated the importance attached to even the most formal gestures of the Social Democrats in the direction of comradely discussion.

The Communist party leadership, committed like the Social Democrats since 1936 to supporting candidates of the Democratic party, had similarly sought to block the United Independent-Socialist ticket. They were not so crude as to threaten court action. They sought first to prevent formation of a united socialist ticket; and then, failing in this, they sought to dissuade the ticket from running a candidate for the key office of governor, since this meant opposing Harriman. Finally they withheld support in getting signatures for the nominating petitions and when this failed they tried to cut down the vote for the socialist gubernatorial candidate. As precinct workers of undoubted energy in the Democratic party, they stayed on De Sapio's ill-fated bandwagon to the last, calling for Rockefeller's defeat "at all costs."

At Cleveland the Communist party spokesmen, while proclaiming devotion to distant socialist goals, tried to justify the anti-socialist policy of "working within the Democratic party." They did not succeed in convincing anyone not already convinced, so far as can be judged, but even their most unyielding opponents sought an amicable, if vigorous, refutation of their point of view.

The Socialist Workers party was well represented at

the conference, but unaffiliated socialists and former members of the Progressive and American Labor parties easily constituted the strongest contingent. Such figures as Vincent Hallinan, John T. McManus, Annette Rubinstein and the Rev. Joseph P. King set the tone, which was one of optimism and confidence. There was nothing forced or artificial about this. They came fresh from auspicious electoral actions, particularly in New York, in which — not least in importance — they had demonstrated that it is possible for socialists in America to find common ground for united action despite serious differences. Then the exchange of views from all over the country rapidly gave proof that the New York experience was not something freakish. As John T. McManus put it in the *National Guardian* (Dec. 8), “. . . the approaches to socialist unity — at least among independents and rank and file Socialists, Communist and Socialist Workers Party members — were certainly clearer and apparently more realizable after two days of matching views.”

It is not our intention to go into the details of the meeting. These are available in the issue of the *National Guardian* mentioned above and in the December 8 *Militant*. We wish only to discuss features of the conference touching most closely on larger questions of policy and their relation to preparations for 1960. One

prominent fact, however, deserves special comment: the size and quality of trade-union representation. This, if we are not mistaken, was a refreshing surprise to some of the conference participants who in recent years have become inured to seeing former militants, grown fat between the ears and elsewhere, taking orders from the Democratic high command. The trade unionists at the Cleveland conference represented those lower levels in the labor movement who are somewhat less than enthusiastic about the way the political policies of the Reuthers and Meanys have paid off in anti-labor bargages and weakened unions. Their inclinations are to go in the direction of a labor party that could effectively express the true weight and importance of the American working class in the political field. Many of them, as was clear at Cleveland, are prepared to go much further in the direction of socialism.

Their main contribution at the Cleveland conference was to indicate more precisely how socialist activity can be linked with such popular issues as defeating the referendums on the miscalled Right-to-Work laws. Both the Ohio and California experiences offered much food for thought on this. In California, for instance, socialists and trade unionists of this type ran a pilot campaign of socialist opposition to the Right-to-Work proposition with encouraging results. This stood in contrast to Communist party utilization of the issue to ring up votes for the cold-war candidates of the Democratic party.

The significant number of trade unionists who showed up at Cleveland testifies to the inspiring effect of united socialist campaigning in 1958. Union militants are attracted by candidates capable of standing up to

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the political spokesmen of the corporations; and the demonstrated capacity of socialists of varying views to get together in a united effort has given many unionists new hope that the long monopoly the two parties of Big Business have exercised in American politics can finally be breached. The lesson is obvious. The socialists who conferred at Cleveland are on the right road to attracting wider support in militant sectors of the labor movement.

THREE main political positions were voiced at the Cleveland conference in connection with the main issue confronting socialists in electoral activity. John T. McManus summarized them succinctly in the *National Guardian*:

"The possibilities of independent electoral action were brought into much better focus as unionists, students, and gray political veterans took the floor to argue for middleground maneuverability between hardrock positions represented by the Communist Party, which advocates operating within the Democratic Party with the labor movement, and the Socialist Workers Party, which refuses to support candidates of 'capitalist' parties, and advocates challenging them with independent socialist candidates in every possible situation."

These positions were debated during the formation of the United Independent-Socialist ticket in New York. Neither the Communist party nor the Socialist Workers party altered their stands. The "middlegrounders" could see little difference in repugnant evils between the dynasties of Harriman and Rockefeller; and so a basis was provided to put a united socialist ticket on the ballot, offering voters a genuine choice. Communist party officials were much exercised over this "sectarianism," while members of the Socialist Workers party and readers of the *National Guardian*, pitching in enthusiastically to overcome the difficulties of putting the ticket on the ballot, felt that a big turn had been made.

The discussion on this question at Cleveland, we take it, was not intended to register a congealing of previous positions but rather to open up further discussion which can now proceed at a more leisurely pace in the absence of major electoral opportunities in 1959. It is important, we think, to go as far as possible in removing differences, or at least in getting a clearer understanding of the differences, in advance of an action.

An instructive case in point was the discussion last summer over including a plank in the United Independent-Socialist platform in support of efforts of workers in the Soviet bloc to achieve restoration of proletarian democracy. This was resisted by a majority of supporters of the ticket, who felt that it placed an unnecessary obstacle in the way of Communist party participation in the united campaign. The Socialist Workers party, which had been pressing for this plank, reluctantly agreed to concede and leave it out. The Communist party did not respond to the gesture and the candidates soon found themselves forced to take a stand anyway on the need for democratic rights in the

Soviet bloc. The issue was posed very sharply in the murder of Imre Nagy and the shameful campaign against Boris Pasternak. But once the candidates had indicated on radio and TV how they felt on this question, they found it easy to defend the progressive Soviet achievements which the October Revolution and the planned economy made possible. The red baiters, on the other hand, found it difficult to attack the ticket. The American people *are* interested in Soviet successes; at the same time they are deadly earnest in their distaste for dictatorial Stalinist practices. That is a fact of life.

It would seem fair to conclude that even though it was not possible to reach agreement on this question when the platform was drawn up, the free discussion made it easier later for the candidates to make the necessary adjustment when the issue came up in press and radio interviews. But it would clearly have been politically advantageous in answering early attempts to smear the ticket as "Stalinoid" to have been able to refer to a simple statement in the platform on the need for Soviet democracy.

In this spirit — looking forward to 1960 and its problems — we would like to continue the discussion that occurred at Cleveland on support, "maneuverability" or opposition in regard to candidates of the Republican and Democratic parties.

First, it would prove instructive to see how well the course toward united socialist tickets, in complete opposition toward both Democratic and Republican parties, measured up to the general voting pattern of the working people. The *Worker* made much of the fact that McManus, the candidate for governor on the ISP ticket, came short of the 50,000 votes required by New York's reactionary electoral statutes to qualify for permanent ballot status. (The final vote for McManus and Rubinstein was 31,658; Mulzac, 34,038; Gray 31,746; Lamont, 49,087). Lack of funds and time for registration of supporters and time for public campaigning, the court attack of the De Sapio machine and the studied silence of the press, are sufficient to account for the inability to reach the goal. Under the circumstances the ticket did remarkably well. It is clear that the actual vote can not be taken as the decisive gauge in measuring how well the political course paralleled voting trends.

In raising the question of policy in pointing to the low vote, the *Worker* fails to mention the effect of the 22-year Communist party and Social Democratic policy of calling for a "lesser evil" vote in favor of the Democratic party. If a consistent policy of independent political action had been followed during this same period by these organizations, with their once powerful trade-union influence, the socialist movement in 1958 might have been close to taking office, if not already in office, in many of America's industrial centers. The real explanation the *Worker* owes its readers is why it began supporting Democratic party candidates and why it continues to this day to support them despite the disastrous consequences.

The nationwide swing to the Democrats continued the shift away from the witch-hunt atmosphere of the

McCarthy period. The Democrats profited from it, cashing in on a distorted expression of popular mood. In 1952 the swing was toward Eisenhower and the Republicans because the Democratic wing of the capitalist political machine had become identified as the war party and the General offered an end to the Korean conflict. In 1958 the swing was toward the Democrats because ever since the thirties the Republican wing of the capitalist political machine has been identified as the depression party and the "recession" of 1958 again confirmed this impression. Behind the political twins, the popular mind sees the twin evils of war and depression.

It was apparent that big segments of voters have made an elementary association: under the two-party set-up a mere vote against war may mean a vote for depression and a mere vote against depression may mean a vote for war. Such a conclusion constitutes a rejection of both Democrats and Republicans.

This mood was spotted from coast to coast in such illuminating pre-election surveys as those made by the *New York Times*. Widespread bullet voting and crossing of party lines confirmed the accuracy of the surveys. The outstanding example, of course, was the countershift from the Democratic to the Republican column in the most populous state in the country and the deep inroads Rockefeller made in the working-class and minority-group voting bloc in New York City, the country's political capital. Rockefeller's gimmick was to appear *neither* Republican nor Democratic. He succeeded in proving thereby that in this key state a decisive layer will take a vacuum in preference to war or depression.

On a nationwide scale, the voters pounded on the walls of the two-party system like prisoners seeking escape.

The other important new fact was the mobilization of workers against the Right-to-Work propositions. No credit for this goes to Democratic candidates, who reaped part of the benefit. They played it cool in view of the money Big Business shifted from the Republican to the Democratic column of its political expense book. It was the rank and file unionists who singled out these ultra-reactionary propositions and set out to deal them a resounding defeat.

Viewed objectively, the conclusion is inescapable that the strong stand which the ISP and similar formations elsewhere took against both Democratic and Republican candidates in 1958 reflected a widespread if inadequately organized, sentiment in America today.

This, of course, is proof only of the timeliness of independent political action. That fact, however, should give anyone favoring socialism on any grounds long pause about holding open the possibility of a "maneuver" involving support of a capitalist party candidate. If we have read the election signs correctly, further economic decline or even continued stagnation, with its accompanying unemployment and general insecurity, can lead to rapid radicalization of the American working class. Nothing would be more out of season in such an atmosphere than advocacy of support to this or that "lesser evil" candidate of the parties

of war, depression and witch-hunts. To promise it in advance would cast a pall over any independent enterprise in its very infancy. Militant workers, who take their politics seriously, would cast a cold and suspicious look at it, and they would be fully justified in this. Why take a ride with a driver who announces he may crack up manipulating the first curve?

More than a century of the most variegated experimentation has shown that it simply does not pay to support candidates committed to the ruling class, no matter how liberal their promises, or demagogic their oratory. In every case such support has at least undermined independent political action and more often led to political catastrophe. The recital would fill a good-sized book; we will return to this in the future, hoping that it is sufficient here to pose a single sentence: Why vote for a Democratic candidate on the American Labor party line when you can vote for him directly on the Democratic line?

The theoretical explanation of the political folly of supporting capitalist candidates is not too difficult. To back a Democrat, for instance, implies the possibility of "capturing" the Democratic machine. (You bolster the "good" side in preparation for ousting the "bad" side.) Advocating a "lesser evil" is a negative expression of the same thing. (Agreed that you can't capture the machine; but Hangman Brown, you must admit, does tie a better-fitting noose than Hangman Jones.) The sage advice that a half loaf is better than none belongs here too. (That green hue is not mold but arsenic.) The Communist party variant is that socialists must stick with the majority. (A normal sheep follows the flock into the slaughter house.) Then there is the opening-wedge argument that an "exceptional" Democrat, say a trade unionist who bucked the local ward-healers in the primaries and is now running against a reactionary Republican, "deserves" socialist support. (What is he — a candidate for window dressing or an innocent who needs wising up to the fact that you can neither hijack nor reform the Democratic party?)

Are capitalist parties constructed so that they can be captured by the people? The most cursory study of the way the Democratic and Republican machines are owned, controlled and operated will reveal how illusory it is to imagine that these political instruments of Big Business can be torn out of the capitalist grasp and used against their possessors. You are up against billions of dollars, a hand-picked professional political gang hoary in the treacherous art of minority rule. You are up against organized corruption, lies, demagoguery, back-stabbing, bribery and ruthless determination to maintain the capitalist character of the bi-partisan twins. Is it so difficult to uncover the elementary law of politics that parties reflect the class structure of society? If this is true, then it is simpler and easier to go to the economic root of things — capture the giant corporations themselves and let their political extension wither on the vine. To do that, the workers need their own political party.

Such is the thinking behind the decision of Marxists to make it a principle; that is, a fundamental policy not to support capitalist candidates under any circum-

stances, any time, any place and to put their energy and resources, instead, into building an effective political instrument of the working class. The kind of party needed is utterly different in program, structure, control and operation from the capitalist machines. It has to be built from the ground up. It can't be captured ready made.

PEACE came up at the Cleveland conference along with other issues that figured in the 1958 election. However, little discussion occurred on the more specific international issues that are troubling the world today. One of the reasons for this was that the conference proposed only to discuss the 1958 election and possible preparations for 1960. This limitation was understandable and, in the circumstances, completely justifiable.

The fact remains, however, that American socialists have much to consider in attempting to reach a common viewpoint on international issues. Many socialists today can give you facts and figures by the yard on how Big Business is carving up our natural resources and seeking to extend its hooks further into the national domain. They are also up on what is happening in outer space, including the latest findings about radiation in the belt pierced by the new rockets. In between, where the bulk of humanity lives, their knowledge leaves much to be desired. Their tendency is to by-pass questions involving those areas, in the belief that we have enough to handle in our own back yard.

True enough, our national yard is sufficiently cluttered. But we can never afford to forget that the world's greatest imperialist power is located right here at home and that one of its biggest preoccupations is intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. American socialists are duty bound to follow events abroad with sufficient care to be able to determine which figures and forces line up on the side of Wall Street and which are in opposition.

It is not simply a question of good will and solidarity with oppressed people abroad fighting for their freedom, important as this is. An incorrect position on a struggle abroad, even abstention, can materially aid the monopolies, thereby making the domestic class struggle against them more difficult. On the other hand, helping to achieve a victory abroad weakens the monopolies and thereby aids the struggle for socialism in America.

All this is known, in general, to every American socialist. Where things get sticky is in those cases where the forces are contradictory. Here it is absolutely necessary to have certain knowledge and the aid of Marxist method and experience. Take the current example of Arab nationalism. Should socialists be for or against it? Or should they be for *and* against? Should they be for at one time and against at a different

time? Or at one and the same time? What criteria should they use in taking a position?

The difficulty or obscurity of some of these questions does not lessen their importance. The Korean problem, too, was complicated and obscure — until thousands of American boys began returning in coffins.

The fact is that a whole series of time bombs were planted all over the world in the closing phase of World War II and these have been going off, one after the other, each of them threatening to set off World War III. The entire struggle for peace, so acute in the minds of American socialists, is intimately tied up with such troublesome places as Quemoy, Taiwan, Viet Nam, Cyprus, Lebanon, Algiers, Berlin . . .

Moreover, the repeated outbreaks in these and similar areas all point to the great enigma of World War II. Why wasn't it followed by a series of socialist overturns in Western Europe that would have settled the fate of capitalism once and for all?

That question should haunt every socialist. World War I gave us the October Revolution in Russia, although there was only the small persecuted party of the Russian Bolsheviks to lead it. World War II was far more ghastly, far more destructive, far more conclusive in its revelation of the abyss into which capitalism is taking humanity. A great power, great enough to defeat German imperialism, claimed to have achieved socialism in the thirties and thereby to have set an example for the entire world. Tens of millions of workers throughout Europe turned toward the Soviet Union for leadership. Yet only in Yugoslavia and China, where Kremlin directives were defied, did overturns occur under national leadership. In the heart of Europe where the decay of capitalism was most advanced and most visible, this rotted structure managed to survive. How is this to be explained?

A riddle for historians? Yes. But what if the policies that secured the structure of European capitalism are still active? What are the connections between De Gaulle's return to power in 1958 and the Communist party policies since 1941? What does this signify for the struggle to achieve a world of enduring peace?

We do not suggest that interest in such questions should supersede interest in winning the struggle for integration in American schools, or in pressing for the thirty-hour week at forty-hours pay to combat unemployment, or in demonstrating for a sane nuclear policy, or in freeing Morton Sobell, or in reforming America's reactionary election laws to make it easier for minority parties to get on the ballot, or in building the circulation of the socialist press, or in getting socialists together.

But we do have the opinion that in America we suffer from a kind of socialist "isolationism" that takes a deprecating attitude toward some of the most burning questions on our planet simply because our visualization of geography lags behind today's jetplane time-tables.

We hope that one of the consequences of the Cleveland conference will be to inspire a discussion that will bring this side of socialist politics into better balance.

The South's Dilemma

Shall education be sacrificed to the racist fetish of segregation? Doubts begin to affect 'massive resistance'

by Lois Saunders

THE United States Supreme Court on September 29, 1958 told the South to end its obstruction and to get on with the task of integrating its schools.

It thus set the legal framework within which the continuing battle of the Negroes for equality in educational opportunities must unfold. For the first time the question was posed to the South as a choice between the alternatives of admitting a limited number of Negroes to all-white schools or closing down the schools entirely: integration or no education.

The Court made it clear that henceforth the South must accord the same rights to Negro children as it does to white children. "The constitutional rights of children not to be discriminated against in school admission on grounds of race or color," stated the unanimous decision, ". . . can neither be nullified openly and directly by state legislators or state executive or judicial officers, nor nullified indirectly by them through evasive schemes for segregation whether attempted ingeniously or ingenuously."

In an unusual move, the Court gave advance warning that it would hold unconstitutional any legislation or plan that seeks to subvert its orders. The decision continued:

"State support of segregated schools through any arrangement, management, funds or property cannot be squared with the [Fourteenth] Amendment's command that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

This emphatic "No!" was the Supreme Court's answer to an appeal from Little Rock officials for postponement of the token integration enforced there last year after federal troops put down riots officially inspired by Arkansas Gov. Orval E. Faubus. The request for a two and one-half year delay was a stratagem calculated to nullify the Court's previous rulings and bring integration to a halt.

Had the Court backed down and granted the delay, it would have meant putting off school desegregation to an

indefinite future throughout the South. Little Rock was the symbol and the testing ground, and this was universally recognized. In fact, federal judges in Virginia and elsewhere held up judgments in other school cases pending the Little Rock decision. The granting of the delay there would have been an invitation to racists everywhere to foment riots in the Faubus fashion, and then use the resulting violence and tension as an excuse for preventing court-ordered integration.

Even more was at stake, however, than the fate of integration; the authority of the federal government had been brought into question. By the time school opened in September, the South had gone too far in its defiance to permit the Court to yield to the Little Rock appeal. The South again, as in the period before the Civil War, was asserting the supremacy of the states and accusing the federal government of exceeding its powers by intervening in the matter of race relations. By choosing States Rights as its battle cry, the South threatened the foundations upon which the government is based. Successful defiance of specific federal court orders in one sphere opens the way for defiance elsewhere and weakens the entire governmental structure. Faced with a fundamental challenge to its authority, the Court had no alternative but to insist that its orders be carried out. This was the same issue that a year earlier had impelled the reluctant Pres. Eisenhower to send federal troops into Little Rock.

In the ruling of September 29, already referred to, the Court made it clear that it took a serious view of the challenge to its authority. Chief Justice Earl Warren, who wrote the decision, quoted from two of his predecessors, Chief Justice John Marshall who served from 1801 to 1835, and Charles Evans Hughes who was Chief Justice from 1930 to 1941, to restate the basic concepts of government that have guided the United States throughout its existence.

He quoted Marshall as follows: "It is emphatically the province and the duty

of the judicial department to say what the law is . . . If the legislatures of the several states, at will, annul the judgments of the courts of the United States and destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, the Constitution becomes a solemn mockery."

From Hughes, Warren quoted: "If a governor can nullify a Federal Court order it is manifest that the fiat of a state governor, and not the Constitution of the United States, would be the supreme law of the land; that the restrictions of the Federal Constitution upon the exercise of state power would be but impotent phrases."


Can It Be Enforced?

In denying the delay sought by Little Rock, the Court spoke out with unmistakable clarity. Yet its order was insufficient to send a single Negro child to a white school. In the normal course, the Supreme Court has spoken, its decision is final and the disputed issue is settled. This does not apply, however, to cases involving race relations in the South, for these cases reflect a basic clash between antagonistic social forces. Demands of Negroes for equality even in limited spheres can be satisfied only by weakening the Jim Crow structure of society, the system which assures the continued rule of the white supremacists. To settle cases that involve struggles of such sweep, something more than a Supreme Court verdict is required. Some means must be found to enforce the verdict.

This is the essence of the problem. Can the Supreme Court decision be enforced? And if so, how?

Negroes say that the decision *can* be enforced and that it *must* be enforced *now*. They regard it as a monstrous crime against their children that they continue to suffer the degradation and disabilities of segregated, inferior schools in defiance of the clearly enunciated law.

They are right, of course. Justice cries out that their demands be met. Concern for human dignity, for the education of



the millions of Negro children growing up in the South, for their modest but intense striving merely to be treated as equals, dictate that the court decision should be enforced.

But like the court ruling itself, such considerations carry little weight with white Southern leaders. Instead of complying, the South insolently defied the Court, challenged the decision and organized systematically to oppose it. Since May 17, 1954, when the Supreme Court handed down its initial school decision holding that segregation in itself equals discrimination and is unconstitutional, the Southern states have passed close to 200 laws to prevent integration in the schools.

They have devised endless delaying tactics; they have organized and activated the White Citizens Councils and the Ku Klux Klan; they have resorted to economic boycott and terror against Negroes who seek their rights, and economic pressure and social ostracism against whites who are unwilling to conform to the Southern dictate and obey its taboos. They have thus sought to organize the totality of white society into the "massive resistance" policy of which they boast.

The South has made it abundantly clear that it is prepared to use every

resource it can muster in defense of segregation. In following this course, it is doing what every ruling class or group has always done and always will do. It is fighting to preserve its own special privileges.

Those in power in the South owe their elevated position to the denial of rights to Negroes. This is true of the U.S. senators and representatives, the state governors, the state and city administrations and the courts. It is also true of the landlords who exploit the sharecroppers and of the manufacturers who benefit from the open-shop, low-wage situation that results from division of the workers along race lines.

This "way of life" is based upon the myth of Negro inferiority. Segregation is one of the means whereby the myth is perpetuated. Separate and inferior schools are part of the Jim Crow pattern and in turn supplement and reinforce the degrading effects of segregation.

Any gains made by Negroes, no matter how small, tend to destroy the myth. Give the Negro an adequate education, equal opportunities for employment, the right to vote and to hold office, and the myth will explode. Once Negroes acquire equality of status, the arbitrary rule of the white supremacists and the

advantages they reap from that rule will come to an end.

Integration — In Ten Centuries

The effectiveness of the South's resistance is reflected in the statistics on school integration. Up to the present time, not a single elementary or high school anywhere in the Deep South has been integrated, and there has been only a trickle of integration in the Middle South. The important gains have occurred in the border states, but even here the process has slowed to a virtual halt.

The first two years following the 1954 Supreme Court decision saw many thousands of youngsters attending mixed schools for the first time — in Washington, D. C.; in Wilmington, Delaware; in Baltimore; in much of Kentucky and most of Missouri.

Then integration bogged down. By the fall term of 1956, some 700 school districts, almost a quarter of the approximately 3,000 in the South, were desegregated. In 1957, only 57 new districts were involved. This September the number of newly desegregated school districts dropped to 12, involving only 307 Negro children.

In the whole state of Tennessee, one of the states of the Mid-South, a total of 117 Negroes were enrolled in formerly all-white classes up to the end of school last spring. If Tennessee were to maintain that rate, it would take about 1,000 years — ten centuries — to integrate its 133,740 Negro students.

The battles now convulsing the South are not being fought over full integration, but over token integration. Only a small number of Negro children in what is called "integrated situations," that is, school districts where some integration has taken place, are attending formerly white schools. This does not, however, minimize the importance of the present conflicts.

The resistance of the South surprised no one, least of all Negroes who know what it means to feel the lash and the torch of racist rule. Negroes, however, did believe that the federal government was bigger than the South and that, moreover, it spoke with one voice. They assumed that the President "of all the people" had the power to force the South to obey and the will to use that power. They were to learn otherwise.

The Sage of Burning Tree

The President of the United States enjoys great moral authority. Had Eisenhower spoken out at any time during the past four years in defense of integration, or had he at any time made it clear to Southerners that they must admit Negroes to white schools or suffer the consequences, much of the South's defiance would have crumbled. Those individuals who are prepared to obey the law whether they agree with it or not would have acquiesced. The lawless elements who carry out the re-

actionary tasks set for them by the Faubuses, the Almonds, the Eastlands and the Griffins would think twice before dynamiting a school, or a Negro church or home, or a synagogue, if they would be punished for their actions.

But time and again when Negroes have appealed directly to the President for support, he has been too busy shooting quail in Georgia, or fishing or playing golf to answer their appeal. A singularly glaring incident occurred on October 25 when Eisenhower snubbed 10,000 students who participated in the Youth March on Washington. Leaders of the demonstration had written in advance to request a hearing, but when a small delegation arrived at the White House, Eisenhower was not at home, nor were any of his aides. The delegation went away empty-handed, leaving its prepared statement with a police guard. The President, they learned, had spent the late morning at the Burning Tree Golf Course.


On those few occasions when Eisenhower has mentioned integration, it was to urge Negroes to be patient, repeating the old bromide about how you can't change men's hearts by passing laws. This is the language of the South, spoken by the President of the United States. It begs the question, for Negroes are little concerned about what goes on in the hearts of Southern whites. Let the Southerners hug their hate to themselves as tightly as they like — but also force them to comply with laws that guarantee Negroes their rights.

The farthest Eisenhower has ever gone in his speeches was to deplore the bombing of synagogues after the dynamiting of a Jewish temple in Atlanta in October. When he sent troops to Little Rock in September, 1957, he was careful to explain that he did so only because Faubus had openly defied a federal court order. Even in that tense situation he made it clear that he was not taking sides publicly on the integration issue. Instead of supporting the Negroes in their demand that the law be enforced, Eisenhower has given encouragement to the South in its resistance to the law.

Congress, the third branch of government, could have passed laws increasing the power of the Justice Department, but Congress, like the President, has refrained from taking action to back the Supreme Court ruling. In the Civil Rights bill which it passed in the summer of 1957 — the first such legislation since Reconstruction — Congress carefully extracted from the measure those sections that would have strengthened the enforcement powers of the federal government.

The fact is that, despite appearances, neither the President nor Congress serve the interests of the people. This is true whether those in office belong to the Republican party or the Democratic party. Both parties are controlled by finance capital which has ruled the country ever since it gained ascendancy

in the Civil War, and it is, by and large, the interests of Big Business that are served by the lawmakers and the executive. Control of Congress is exercised primarily through a bloc between Southerners and Northern conservatives. Within this bloc, the most stable group is that which comes from the Deep South. Wall Street, despite the fact that its publicists keep assuring us that



Marx's theories have been disproved, has a clear understanding of the conflict between its interests and those of the workingman, whether he has a white skin or a black skin. It has, therefore, a profound distrust of any congressmen or senators who show a tendency to "coddle" labor, including the Negro, for it recognizes that not all the legislators are equally pliant and reliable servants. When Pres. Eisenhower in his campaign speeches prior to the November elections lashed out against what he called the "radical" wing of the Democratic party, he was not merely indulging in campaign oratory; he was also voicing the apprehensions of the financial rulers of the country.

The strange phenomenon of the Supreme Court enunciating a policy which neither the President nor Congress is prepared to enforce reflects the contradiction faced by Big Business. It is determined to impose its policies through control of the executive and the conservative bloc in Congress. At the same time, it is bedeviled by Negro pressure at home and damaging criticism of American race relations in foreign countries. It is also faced with the changing economy of the South where industrialization is beginning to supplant the plantation in importance, with the resulting increase in the demand for semi-skilled and skilled labor.

To satisfy these conflicting needs,

Wall Street finds it convenient to speak with two voices. The Court says proceed with integration; the President counters with an admonition not to proceed too rapidly. With one hand it giveth; with the other it taketh away.

We can expect, therefore, that the extension of Negro rights will be held to a minimum, and that, as a corollary, the gains that Negroes make will be in proportion to the amount of pressure exerted both here and abroad.

"Massive Resistance"

The crisis that has built up in Little Rock and in Virginia and which will develop elsewhere stems in large part from the dual policies of the government described above. Astute politicians like Faubus are emboldened to defy the Supreme Court by the sympathy they find in high places. When the Court this fall issued what amounted to an ultimatum, Faubus replied by putting into operation the "massive resistance" laws passed by a supine legislature, and proceeded to close the city's high schools. Little Rock's educational system was thrown into chaos. For two months some 3,500 students were deprived of their right to attend classes. Since then makeshift private schools, poorly equipped and inadequately staffed, have been limping along, giving a sketchy education to some of the white students. No provision has been made for the Negroes.

A similar, though somewhat calmer, development took place in Virginia. There Gov. J. Lindsay Almond also closed the schools rather than permit token integration, and they have remained closed. He shut 10,000 white students out of Norfolk schools rather than allow 17 Negroes to attend classes with them. He closed schools in Charlottesville affecting 1,700 white pupils and in Front Royal, where about 1,000 white youngsters were involved. The court had ordered 12 Negroes integrated in Charlottesville, 22 in Front Royal. In Little Rock only six Negro students were ordered admitted to Central High School.

The logic of the elaborate plans the South has worked out during the past four years made the closing of the schools inevitable. Yet this act was decisively different from all those which had preceded it, for now for the first time a segment of the dominant whites was injured just as much as were the Negroes.

Encouraging Signs

As a result, cracks and fissures have appeared in the South's smooth façade of white supremacy. Up to now the division has been along race lines, with divergent views among the white population smothered in a common anti-Negro unity. With the cracking of that unity, the differences that have existed beneath the surface, including class

differences, begin to manifest themselves.

Already we are hearing voices that sound strange in the South. When Faubus, after ordering the high schools to remain closed, called for a referendum to decide whether the schools should be kept closed or opened on an integrated basis, white women of Little Rock organized a "Women's Emergency Committee to Open Our Schools," and conducted a house-to-house campaign to get their neighbors to vote in favor of integration. One member of the committee commented: "It's ridiculous to try to retain the ways of old grandad in this age of sputniks and missiles." During the same campaign, 63 of the city's leading lawyers, many of whom number railroads and other large corporations among their clients, took out ads in the daily papers, urging a vote for integration.

In Charlottesville, Virginia, last June, when school closing was threatened but had not yet become a reality, a poll was taken of PTA members at Venable Elementary School, one of those affected by the court order. Of the 305 parents who replied, 177 favored "limited integration," against 128 who preferred closing the schools rather than admit a few Negro students. When the school was finally closed this fall, the townspeople were split in two. Two committees were formed, one for integration, the other for segregation.

A sizeable section of Virginia's teachers also are prepared to accept integration. At its state convention October 30, the Virginia Educational Association heard an address by Gov. Almond and then voted a resolution asking him to convene the General Assembly and pass laws to reopen the schools. A softening resolution was tabled by a vote of 650 to 151.

The American Federation of Teachers likewise took a fine stand at its convention in Milwaukee and set an example that other unions should copy. The convention refused to reinstate its all-white Chattanooga local and upheld its constitutional provision that prohibits any local from "limiting its membership on account of race or color."

It also called upon the federal government to take over and run on an integrated basis all schools that have been closed. This same proposal has appeared in a number of places and gives some evidence of developing into a popular demand.

Another proposal that seems likely to spread is one for "local option," that is, letting the residents of a city or town ordered to integrate decide by referendum whether they prefer to close the schools or admit Negro children. One such referendum has been held in Norfolk, Virginia. A threat to close schools next year in Atlanta, Georgia, has brought forth a similar demand from the mayor there. Let the people vote on the issue, he urged.

Crime of the South

Commenting on the Jimmy Wilson case, the Harvard Law Record (Oct. 2) had this to say about the "Crime of the South":

The spotlight recently has been focused upon the struggle of Negroes in the South to attend the same schools as white people. But even more important than this is the Negro's fight for life, for his freedom, in cases which arise in Southern courts every day of the year.

The case of Jimmy Wilson is unique in one way, for seldom is anyone anywhere condemned to death for stealing \$1.92. But it is typical, all too typical of the "raw deal" that the average Negro receives in local criminal courts throughout the South day after day.

Governor Folsom is to be commended for saving Jimmy Wilson's life. But he hesitated a good while before doing so. He did not act until after the case had received widespread publicity throughout not only this country, but the whole world, almost all of it sympathetic to Wilson, until he had received a floodtide of letters, including many from important personages such as George Meany, pleading for Wilson's life to be spared, and until Secretary of State Dulles sent a telegram, informing him of the

black eye that the case was giving the United States abroad.

Would Governor Folsom have commuted this sentence if widespread publicity had not been given to the case? Would he have commuted the sentence if he had not received such a flood of letters demanding and appealing that the prisoner's life be spared? Would he have commuted the sentence if the big city newspapers had not decided that Jimmy Wilson made good copy?

It is not so much the Negro desiring to fulfill his wish to attend an integrated school in Little Rock or Norfolk who needs protection. It is the unheralded Negro in the unheard-of town, the one who is accused of a crime but who can't afford to hire a capable lawyer to defend him, and who is not offered top quality, high-priced counsel by the NAACP.

It is the Jimmy Wilsons that nobody ever hears of, whose cases are not unique enough, do not have a novel enough twist to make them worth the attention of big city journalists; it is the Jimmy Wilsons who don't command wide publicity, who don't receive the benefit of letters from public personages throughout the country pleading for their lives; it is the Jimmy Wilsons that the New York newspapers don't cover that need protection.

An action that is highly unusual in the South — if, indeed, it has ever occurred before — took place in Norfolk in October when a group of white parents filed a lawsuit against the governor and other state officials asking that the state's segregation laws be ruled unconstitutional and that the six schools that have been shut down be reopened.

The press, too, here and there, is showing signs of shifting its position. On October 5 the Roanoke (Virginia) Times commented editorially: "The program of massive resistance has now come to the bitter and inevitable finality . . . [Yielding to the court is onerous] but to deprive Virginia's children, white and colored, of education or to give them a defective education is an even greater evil."

There has occurred, also, a beginning of political activity in favor of integration. In Virginia, a white woman, Dr. Louise O. Wensel, the mother of five children, ran as an independent candidate in the November 4 election against Sen. Harry F. Byrd and his tightly knit, pro-segregation machine. In her campaign, she charged Byrd with using "dictatorial control" to impose an unconstitutional program of massive resistance. She obtained an unprecedented vote equal to one-third of the total. Her strongest support came from

those cities immediately affected by integration orders: Norfolk, 42 per cent; Arlington, 38 per cent; and Charlottesville, 37 per cent. A special referendum two weeks later on November 18 confirmed the election results. In voting on the school issue, 41.2 per cent of Norfolk's citizens preferred accepting integration to keeping the schools closed.

In Houston, Texas, in the November elections, a Negro housewife, Mrs. Charles E. White, upset all expectations and won election to the city's school board, after campaigning on a clear-cut pro-integration platform. She could not have been elected without white votes.

Of special interest among these first voices raised against the monolithic anti-Negro refrain are the voices of the youth. At the height of the agitation in Little Rock this year, a group of teen-agers gathered at Hall High School and solemnly drew up a petition asking that the schools be reopened and stating that they had no objection to attending classes with qualified Negroes. In Norfolk, when the schools were closed there, about 100 students gathered in a parking lot near the Northside Junior High School and collected signatures on a petition which stated: "Not as segregationists or integrationists but as students who want an

People in Glass Houses

"The sudden spread of military regimes in the free world worries the Eisenhower Administration," according to a Dec. 7 special dispatch from Washington to the New York Times.

In the last six months, generals have taken over in seven more countries, bringing the total to sixteen.

"Responsible men at the topmost levels of Government" are "asking why the demo-

cratic system is ailing in so many parts of the world" and what "if anything" should be done about it.

The White House, naturally, "does not consider itself responsible, much less to blame" for the trend toward dictatorial military rule. Nevertheless the fact "that the President of the United States is a general probably adds to the sensitivity of the Administration."

education we ask you to please keep our schools open."

In Van Buren, Arkansas, in the western part of the state, a 15-year-old girl, Jessie Angelina Evans, president of the Student Council, put her elders to shame when she stood up before a turbulent school board meeting and asked segregationist parents: "Have you thought what you make those Negro children feel like, running them out of school?" To hostile questions, she replied: "Negroes have a right to attend school just as much as anybody. If we don't object, why should anybody else?"

These are as yet only scattered voices in a wilderness of reaction, for the most part neither pro-Negro nor pro-integration, merely pro-education. In almost every case those who have spoken out in favor of integration have prefaced their remarks with the accepted ritual of the South: "I am opposed to integration . . . but" or "I dislike the Supreme Court decision as much as anybody . . . but". Thus the prejudice remains, even while segregation tends to break down in fact — proving again the Marxist theorem that outworn social ideas often persist after the institutions which nourish them have disappeared.

The numbers involved in this incipient opposition to the South's "massive resistance" are as yet too few to give the needed assistance to the Negroes who, as a minority, must find allies in order to carry their fight to a success-

ful conclusion. The logical alliance is with the labor movement, but the cooperation that exists between Negroes and labor is limited and sporadic.

It would be incorrect to say that the labor movement has done nothing to further Negro demands for equality. The industrial unions formed in the militant thirties, especially in such areas as Detroit, have an excellent record in this regard and have demonstrated what can be done when workers unite. The unions have fallen down miserably, however, where their support is needed most, in the heartland of Jim Crow. In most instances the white workers of the South, instead of mobilizing on behalf of Negro rights, have formed an unnatural alliance with their class enemies against the Negroes, while their national leadership, grown conservative, has buckled under segregationist pressure and has failed even to discipline its own members. (There have been some exceptions. One, already noted, is the American Federation of Teachers; another is the Packinghouse Workers Union.)

Insistence on the part of the national union leaders that their locals in the South support the Negro fight for integration would, moreover, bring them into conflict with the politicians of the South and would pose the need for forming a labor party, in opposition to the Democrats as well as the Republicans. Such a perspective runs counter to the intentions of the union leadership which is busy courting the Democrats in the false hope that they can resolve the problems facing the working class by putting in office the political representatives of the capitalists.

Negro leaders have been preoccupied with efforts to steer a course towards victory in the fight against segregation, while at the same time avoiding the horror of a racist massacre, and have shied away from organizing along political lines, even when such a development seemed possible, as in the march on Washington on May 17, 1957, the third anniversary of the Supreme Court decision.

They didn't call the demonstration a March on Washington. Instead, they referred to it as a "Prayer Pilgrimage,"

and the choice of name was significant. The leaders did not conceive of the demonstration as an inspiring beginning of a mass movement, national in scope, spearheading the formation of a new political alignment. Had the Rev. Martin Luther King, the acknowledged leader, called upon that demonstration to reject both Democrats and Republicans and take steps, together with white workers, to initiate a new party, he would have set in motion a political force that could eventually have challenged Jim Crow rule. Those in charge of the demonstration chose to contain it within safe limits and channel it into a prayerful supplication, pleading for understanding and love, then dispersing quietly and inconspicuously.

In the main, Negroes have chosen to carry on the fight through legal contests, where they have won singular successes. Both the Negro leaders and the Negro people have given inspiring examples of integrity, courage, devotion and persistence. They demonstrated these qualities in the Montgomery bus boycott where the entire community under the leadership of the Rev. King and the Rev. Ralph D. Abernathy, organized itself to walk for more than a year in order to win the right to "sit up front." A heroic example was set also by the "Little Rock nine" who faced the mob and the bayonets of the state troopers and who then stood up to the jeers and insults and taunts of white students throughout the school term. Their heroism has been matched by that of students in other test cases, and of countless other individuals in every section of the South.

But heroism, even when backed by a Supreme Court decision, has proven insufficient to overcome the entrenched power of the Southern rulers. They maintain their power through political control and it is only through political action that they can be dislodged. In other words, we can expect that the Supreme Court decision will be enforced in the Deep South only when a political realignment has taken place of such proportions as to make possible a successful bid for power by forces in opposition to the white supremacists.

It is for this reason that the rift within the white population of the South brought about by the closing of the schools is of such special significance. Integration in places like Norfolk has become a live political issue instead of merely a dirty word used to inflame passions and instigate violence. There is now activity where before there was dead calm.

It is too soon to predict future developments, but this much can be said: the more Negroes challenge white supremacy, the more the division within the white South will deepen, and the greater will be the opportunity for the liberal forces and the white workers to line up alongside Negroes so that together they can strike a decisive blow against segregation and for equality.

Hospitable America

The lively interest America takes in its foreign visitors is well illustrated by the experience of Ram Chandru Basu, 22-year-old mechanical engineering student from Calcutta, India.

While a guest of this country on his round-the-world motorcycle trip, Basu reported last September that by the time he reached Tucson, Arizona, he had been stopped 210 times by police, searched several times, and even taken to jail once for questioning.

This record in hospitality topped anything accorded in thirty-eight other countries.

Socialism and Humanism

Humanists come in many varieties. Should followers of Marx be included among them?

by William F. Warde

THE opponents of Marxism from the Catholic theologians to the capitalist liberals have repeatedly indicted socialism for its alleged inhumanity. The solicitude of such critics for human welfare does not prevent them, however, from supporting a system which breeds fascism and military dictatorships, drops A-bombs on civilian populations, sends troops to protect the profits of oil magnates and keeps colored children from unsegregated schools.

The socialist movement, which aims to uproot these and similar evils, can easily defend itself against accusations of inhumanity from pro-capitalist sources. But recently a far more serious current of questioning about Marxism's regard for humanity has welled up within the socialist camp itself.

Revolted by the practices and pretenses of Stalinism, or repelled by the cowardice of the Social Democracy, an increasing number of socialist and communist intellectuals are calling for a reconsideration of the relations of socialism to Humanism. There is a demand for a humanized socialism, provoked for different reasons in different parts of the world.

In Western Europe and England it voices the disillusion among the younger generation of radical intellectuals with the capitalist Welfare State policies of the reformist socialist parties. The new Humanists are deeply troubled by the perversion of socialist ideals they observe

This is the first of two articles. The second will deal with Socialist Humanism in the Soviet zone and present some thoughts on a genuinely materialist Humanism.

in the traditional working-class parties and their regimes. They are looking for an explanation of these pollutions and for the way to eliminate or avert them in the future. The Stalinist and Social Democratic leaders, they say, are so indifferent to the needs of ordinary people because they have forgotten the Humanist heritage of Marxism — and they recommend a return to Humanism in order to save socialism from further degradation.

The editors of *Universities and Left Review*, which came to life in England "between the re-entry of Soviet tanks into Budapest and the first combined assault of Port Said," form one significant section of this tendency. These young radicals start by rejecting two prevalent propositions: one, that socialism has culminated in the Welfare State; the other, the simple identification of Stalinist regimes with "the socialist half of the world."

This combined rejection of Social Democratic reformism and Stalinism is not only a sound beginning of political enlightenment; it is also an advanced one. It means that these spokesmen for the younger generation start — in words, if not yet in deeds — by skipping two whole stages of working-class political evolution.

While they are not quite so certain of their positive positions and program, they advocate a Socialist Humanism. "What we need now more than ever, as we open up the undiscovered area beyond the Welfare State," these political explorers write, "is a deep, radical critique of our society, a critique informed by Humanism (so little in evidence in either of

the competing ideologies), holding to the revolutionary perspectives of socialism, which will break out of the cramp of orthodoxy into the freedom of new possibilities. A re-statement of the humanist basis is necessary, not only to purge away the crimes committed in the name of socialism, but as the first premise in a new argument, as an indispensable beginning to coherent thought on what the word means."

This accords in its own way with the much more powerful and insistent movement toward a Socialist Humanism associated with the anti-Stalinist struggles in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In 1955-1956 Imre Nagy wrote a critical essay, *Morals and Ethics*, which was sent to all members of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party. "The Party membership and the Hungarian people . . . do not want a return to capitalism," he declared. "They want a people's democratic system in which the ideals of socialism become reality, in which the ideals of the working class regain their true meaning, in which public life is based on higher morals and ethics; they want a system that is actually ruled not by a degenerate Bonapartist authority and dictator but by the working people through legality and self-created law and order. They want a People's Democracy where the working people are masters of the country and of their own fate, where human beings are respected, and where social and political life are conducted in the spirit of humanism."

These were "dangerous thoughts." For the official indictment of Kadar's

government covering Nagy's execution in June 1958 charged that they served to inspire the Hungarian uprising of October 1956.

An issue fraught with such grave political and personal consequences deserves careful consideration. What are the real relations between Socialism and Humanism? In order to arrive at a correct answer to this question, it is first necessary to find out what Humanism is and what its history and achievements have been.

The Humanist Tradition

Humanism is a much older philosophy than Marxism and in various periods it has had a highly progressive influence upon human thought and social action. Before the advent of scientific socialism this mode of thought had already traversed a series of historical stages extending from antiquity to the Humanism of the Renaissance, the Humanism of the bourgeois-democratic revolutions, and the liberalistic Humanism of the nineteenth century.

Humanism first appeared as a distinct philosophical viewpoint among the Sophists in the Athenian city-state of the fifth century B.C. Under the impact of the democratic movement in that mercantile slave republic these wandering "teachers of wisdom" shifted the focus of theoretical attention away from the problems posed by the phenomena of nature, which had engrossed earlier Greek thinkers, to the activities of the citizen.

They sought to find out: "What is the good life and how can it be attained in this world?" Protagoras, the most renowned of the Sophists, not only diverted philosophy from nature but also from religion. Neither nature nor the gods but man "was the measure of all things," he taught. "As to the gods, I cannot say whether they exist or not. Many things prevent us from knowing, in the first place the obscurity of the matter, then the brevity of human life." For such agnostic doctrines he was accused of impiety, his books were burned, and he was driven from Athens.

The Humanist concentration upon a rational investigation of the affairs and destiny of mankind persisted

into Roman times. One of the most memorable utterances of Humanism has come down to us from the Roman poet Terence: "I am a man and nothing that concerns a man is a matter of indifference to me." This maxim was a favorite of the French Humanist Montaigne and of the German socialist Karl Marx.

After its long eclipse by Christianity, Humanism re-emerged during the fourteenth century in Italy as one of the first rays of enlightenment issuing from the nascent urban merchant-craftsman culture. This literary Humanism of the Renaissance, proceeding from the Italian Petrarch to the Dutch Erasmus, broke through the prison walls of medievalism. It opened a wider horizon on history than the enclosed outlook of the Catholic Church and circulated fresh air through the stale atmosphere of scholastic thought.

The Humanist writers, scholars and artists threw off the constrictions of the feudal monastery by immersing their minds in classical Greek and Roman life. Turning away from absorption in the hereafter, they began to celebrate the joys of life on earth. They took fresh delight in the human body and the senses and studied the conduct of mankind in preference to the mysteries of divinity. The more secular interests of the Renaissance Humanists educated the advanced elements of their times, helping to displace the values of Catholic supernaturalism and clear a path for Protestantism and bourgeois culture.

Humanism came into its own with the spread of the ideas and influences of the bourgeois revolution. This can be seen in the formative period of our own country. Many of the leaders of the First American Revolution, from Franklin to Jefferson, were imbued with Humanist ideals. Soon after Franklin's arrival in Philadelphia, he gathered around him, Charles Beard tells us, "a coterie of printers, shoemakers, and carpenters — a group known as the Junto which he called 'the best school of philosophy, morality, and politics that then existed in the province.' Three questions asked of new members revealed the spirit of this strange academy: 'Do you sincerely declare that you love mankind in general of what

profession and religion soever? Do you think any person ought to be harmed in his body, name, or goods for mere speculative opinions or his external way of worship? Do you love truth for truth's sake and will you endeavor impartially to find and receive it yourself and communicate it to others?'" With the support of the Junto, Franklin founded the first institution of learning with a scientific and secular program of study in place of the classical and clerical curricula offered by the other colonial colleges.

The cosmopolitan outlook of this profoundly democratic and militant Humanism was best exemplified in the life and work of Tom Paine, who proudly proclaimed: "The world is my country and to do good is my religion."

In the field of religion Humanism was associated with Deism and later with such Protestant sects as the Unitarians who denied the divinity of Jesus, sought to rationalize and simplify Christianity, and substituted moral imperatives applicable to all mankind for theological dogmas. These churches still today in some places provide refuges for political dissenters.

At its extreme, this rationalism evolved into free thinking which rejected God altogether, discarded the last vestiges of supernaturalism, and made a cult of abstract humanity. In the United States it has found quasi-religious organization in Ethical Societies and Community Churches.

In its heyday, Humanism formulated the worthiest ideals of the democratic revolution. It was one of the highest forms of the bourgeois rationalism and individualism of the Enlightenment. In certain respects and in certain thinkers it came very close to materialism. The German materialist Feuerbach, for instance, thought of himself as a Humanist.

Present-day Humanism functions under the towering domination of monopolist capitalism, long after the completion of the democratic revolution and in the face of powerful labor and advancing socialist movements. It is essentially liberalistic, expressing the ethical attitude of cultivated city middle-class individuals who have torn up traditional religious ties, are agnostic or atheistic, phil-

anthropically inclined and interested to some degree in social reform and political progressivism. *This Humanism can be one of the last stopping places on the way to socialism — or, conversely, one of the first stations on the road away from Marxism.* In analyzing the evolution of any particular Humanist, it is imperative to determine in which of these opposite directions he is traveling.

Where Marxism and Humanism Differ

Liberal Humanism adjoins Marxism at a number of points, just as the middle classes and the workers have certain interests in common. In so far as the Humanists combat obscurantism and reaction in any field, defend science and promote education, support progressive movements and measures, they have found allies among the Marxists.

But Humanism is no more than a neighbor of Marxism; they do not live under the same roof. There are too many deep-going differences in philosophy and politics between them. They share certain general aims. When, for example, Corliss Lamont, the most able American expounder of Humanism, writes that "the chief end of human life is to work for the happiness of man upon this earth and within the confines of Nature that is his home," (*Humanism As A Philosophy*, p. 7) every scientific socialist will agree with him. But the two schools of thought proceed from different premises, advocate incompatible methods of action and rely upon different social forces to realize their objectives.

First of all, Humanism is not a philosophy of the working class, either in origin or in intent. In fact, it explicitly repudiates any specific class basis or affiliation. Its teachings are not founded upon the facts of economic life but upon universal ethical standards which are binding upon all people, because of their common human nature. This viewpoint conforms to the abstract individualism which is the substance of the ideology of bourgeois democracy.

On its social and political side, Humanism not only preaches peace by negotiation among nations but

the reconciliation of classes, on the ground that the general interests and aims of all members of the human race, or inhabitants of a given country, transcend their particular social divisions. In this view the main source of social conflict comes, not from opposing material interests, but from ignorance, indifference and prejudice. Humanists therefore depend primarily upon the effects of education, reasonable arguments and appeals to the moral conscience of individuals to overcome the hostilities of contending social forces. This is a secular version of the universal embrace of Christian brotherhood without the Fatherhood of God or the mediation of the Son-Savior.

Marxism, on the other hand, explains existing antagonisms as the inescapable outcome of the irreconcilable material interests of the exploiters and exploited in capitalist society and bases itself upon the decisive role of the revolutionary struggle of the working people in bringing forth a better world.

In the second place, although many Humanists are materialist in their rejection of supernaturalism, they are quite idealistic in their approach to history and the solution of social problems. For them the motive force of historical progress does not come from the development of class conflicts brought about by changing economic conditions but from the diffusion of democracy, intelligence, moral values and higher ideals which stand above narrow class considerations and crass material interests. They may be radical democrats and social reformers but they are not scientific socialists or working-class revolutionists.

Corliss Lamont, for example, is a thorough-going materialist and atheist in his outlook on nature and religion. When it comes to the reconstruction of our social system he advocates the methods of reason, democracy and science. These are admirable methods. But he will not admit that there is anything reasonable, democratic or scientific in the class struggle and the forms of action which flow from its recognition.

Humanists can and do support many progressive causes, from colonial revolutions to socialist electoral campaigns. But they hesitate

to follow these positions to their logical conclusions and usually seek the intervention of some supposedly impartial agency to adjudicate and settle the claims of the contending forces. In the case of the Negro struggle for equality they look to the Supreme Court and the government; in strikes to boards of arbitration; and in the struggle for peace to the United Nations.

They fail to see, when the most vital issues are posed for decision, that concrete antagonisms turn out to be stronger than the claims of an abstract humanity in class society. The actions and reactions of strikers and scabs, Negroes and white supremacists, colonial rebels and imperialist agents are determined, not by their membership in the same human family, but by the defense of their respective interests. The unity of society gives way before the real fraternity of the oppressed confronting the camp of the oppressors.

There are, of course, Humanists of many hues, from the conservative to the radical. But their principal spokesmen are united in their preference for the conciliation of classes as the means of social reform. The philosopher John Dewey was both a pragmatist and a Humanist who rejected the method of dialectical materialism and the Marxist doctrine of the class struggle. He justified the practice of class collaboration in the following characteristic conclusion: "To say that all past historic social progress has been the result of cooperation and not of conflict would also be an exaggeration. But exaggeration against exaggeration, it is the more reasonable of the two."

Socialist Humanism in the Capitalist World

It is necessary to bring forward these points about the history of Humanism and its essential connection with middle-class liberalism because of the light they cast upon the movement for a "humane socialism" developing within the capitals of the West. Unlike the Humanist liberals, most of these Socialist Humanists presumably accept the premises, methods and conclusions of Marxism. In reality, many of them tend to

slip over by degrees toward the standpoint of bourgeois Humanism.

Despite certain ideological similarities, there can be sharp differences between the social and political functions of Socialist Humanism in the Soviet zone and in the capitalist environment. The Soviet Humanists are in the vanguard of a revolutionary opposition. They face a ruthless enemy in the entrenched holders of state power. They risk their careers, liberties and lives speaking and writing as they do.

The Socialist Humanists who operate in the capitalist West have a more ambiguous character. In so far as their Humanism becomes an ideological lever for promoting a break with the Stalinist perversions of socialism and opens a road to genuine Marxism in theory and in practice, it has a liberating effect. But it may also work in the opposite sense. Humanism can become the pretext, not for simply cutting loose from Stalinism, but for leaving the ground of dialectical materialism altogether, renouncing class-struggle policies, and shaping ideas to the prejudices of a petty-bourgeois outlook.

In one case Humanism can serve to bring its advocates closer to an unfalsified, revolutionary Marxism. In the other it can propel its proponents onto a wrong path. It is important to observe in which of these directions any avowed Socialist Humanist is heading.

In addition to the young men of the Labour party around *Universities and Left Review*, some ex-Communist party scholars headed by Professors E. P. Thompson and John Saville, who edit *The New Reasoner*, have also raised the banner of a Socialist Humanism but in a more regressive manner. In their outrage against the recently reappraised abominations of Stalinism they incline to throw out the materialist basis of Marxism in favor of a moralistic and Utopian brand of socialist theory.

Here in the United States the demand for a more "humane" approach to the solution of social problems is a persistent theme of the reformist socialist and ex-Trotskyist writers assembled around the magazine, *Dissent*. One of its editors, Irving Howe, wrote in an article, "A First Word

On Sputnik," in Winter 1957: "The major problem of our world is no longer —*assuming for the moment that it ever was*— (my italics) the development of technology. Advances in technology bring no necessary good; when controlled by repressive governments they can cause pain and harm to many people; and if they seem to solve certain problems it is only by bringing into existence new and, at times, more difficult problems. The need of our time remains the ordering of a humane society, the creation of human relations among human beings. And that is why one remains a socialist."

Noteworthy in this lamentation is the light-minded way in which the author tosses aside, almost in passing, the materialist foundations of scientific socialism. Marxism insisted from the first, in opposition to all varieties of bourgeois idealism and Utopian Socialism, that the construction of a humane society depends upon a high development of technology along with the productive forces as a whole.

It is no novelty to learn that reactionaries can misuse progressive achievements, although the current world crisis drives that lesson home with emergency emphasis. That is why the workers have to wrest the means of production — and destruction — from the capitalist rulers. But from this situation the new Humanists infer, where they do not assert, that the materialist premises of Marxism — and the political practice based upon them — must be given up because they somehow obstruct the road to "the creation of human relations among human beings."

It would be wrong to contend that Marxism has had nothing to do with Humanism either in the course of its formation or in the completed structure of its thought. During its birth process Marxism passed through a Humanistic stage. In the early 1840's, as he evolved from the Hegelian idealism of his university years to dialectical materialism, the youthful Marx at one point adhered briefly to Humanism and called his philosophy by that name. That was while he was an avowed disciple of Feuerbach. Just as Marx was a radical democrat before becoming a Communist, so he was a Humanist in philosophy before

he emerged as a full-fledged materialist.

Those intellectuals who are hunting for the causes of the Stalinist perversions of Marxism in its departure from Humanism have seized upon this historical episode for their own purposes. Just as the Protestant reformers went back to the original gospels to find an uncorrupted Christianity, so these Socialist reformers are going back to the first writings of the immature Marx for the unpolluted sources of socialism.

Unfortunately, their research does not always produce progressive results. They arrive at extremely one-sided conclusions. While playing up the similarities between Marxism and Humanism, they fail to show wherein they essentially differ and even conflict with each other. Nor do they bother to explain why Marx and Engels revised and repudiated the Humanism they learned from Feuerbach in favor of the superior theory of dialectical materialism.

In philosophy, as in other domains of knowledge, the creators of Marxism incorporated into their own theory whatever remained valid and valuable in earlier schools of thought. They did this not only with the materialism of Feuerbach and the French Encyclopedists and with the dialectical logic of Hegel but also with the viable elements in the Humanist tradition of the Western world.

The major theoretical difference between their version of Humanism and all its preceding forms is that the latter were based to one degree or another on non-materialist premises, especially in the fields of sociology, history and politics. The Humanism of Marx is solidly integrated into a comprehensive and consistent materialist viewpoint.

When they weaken or discard these materialist foundations, the neo-Socialist Humanists wipe out the advance made by Marxism and obliterate the fundamental distinction between all types of bourgeois Humanism and a genuine Socialist Humanism. Whether they realize it or not, they do not pass beyond Stalinism but are pulling Socialist theory back to an infantile pre-scientific stage it has long since outgrown.

Europe and the Recession

America's recession terrified capitalists in Europe. But the dreaded impact has not been felt as yet. A Marxist explains why

by Tom Kemp

ONE of the most significant aspects of the American recession of 1957-58 was the attention which it received in the European press. Even before it became clear that it was to be the most acute since the war, it had probably occupied more space in the press, especially in Britain, than the two previous postwar recessions together.

The defenders and beneficiaries of capitalism in Europe began to lay bare some of the anxiety which had been dormant during the great boom era. Some resentment against the transatlantic big brother, whose every minor ailment was liable to afflict its weaker brethren with debilitating disease, was to be detected. Others sought in the lessons of the past the key to the "American Enigma"¹ and some dire predictions were circulating by midsummer, 1958, even in the sober pages of United Nations publications. It is true that all good men accepted that a recurrence of anything like the depression of the 1930's was out of the question.² But if their arguments were subjected to rational appraisal it could be seen that faith played an important role in them.

As it happened, of course, more by good luck than judgment, the predictions of numerous economists on both sides of the Atlantic that the recession would be sharp but short seems to have been confirmed. The revival currently proceeding could be a mere respite be-

fore a more drastic downward plunge; such things have happened before. On the other hand the prospect of a renewed powerful upswing, based on a high level of new business investment, seems improbable for the moment. It seems unlikely, therefore, that the European economy will, in the coming months, receive much impetus from the United States; if anything the situation on this side of the Atlantic is likely to set limits to the extent of American recovery.

Both segments of world capitalism are in positions today somewhat unlike anything predicted. How did this occur? Even those who were confident that the recession in the USA would not be prolonged, often tended to be gloomy about its impact upon the rest of the capitalist world. Thus a long, leading article in the *London Economist*, regarded as an organ of City business, put forward a series of detailed proposals intended to deal with the threatened shortage of dollars consequent upon the recession.³ Dollar injections into the world economy on a sufficient scale to prevent the volume of world trade being curtailed were to be effected either directly or through the underwriting of the Sterling Area and the turning of the International Monetary Fund into a "super central bank"

3. *The Economist*, May 3, 1958. A panacea long favored by some economists; e.g., R. Harrod in *International Affairs*, June 1958, was an increase in the world price of gold, a step which would depend upon the good graces of the American government. It would add automatically to the purchasing power of gold reserves, thus increasing the international liquidity of other countries. It would also boost gold-producing countries, such as South Africa (and the USSR).

Another favorite is, while praising the United States government, "so friendly and so generous as we know them to be," to ask them "to remove the obstacles to the growth of international trade." The words are those of the British Minister Sir David Eccles at the meeting of GATT, October 1958.

Among other economists of similar opinion, R. R. Neild suggested: "Since the negotiation of a return to discrimination would take some time, the rest of the world is placing considerable faith in the U.S. in abstaining from action now." *London and Cambridge Economic Bulletin*, No. 25, May 1958).

well supplied with dollars. A heartfelt appeal to "economists in the American administration" to "start working on the minds of the non-economists among their colleagues" concluded the article, which reflected the prevalent anxiety in business circles at the time of its appearance in May 1958.

In the following month the *Economic Bulletin for Europe* contained a highly technical article on "The International Impact of the United States Recession" which made less specific proposals but was based on similar premises.⁴ That is, a chronic shortage of dollars was in the offing and if world capitalism was not to be severely shaken by the inevitable trade contraction which would ensue, the United States should "take part in arrangements designed to alleviate the impact of the recession on international liquidity." And these "would be needed even if domestic action were to be taken in the near future to raise demand in the United States." There was another alternative to which the authors of the article pointed: "concerted action by the industrialized countries of western Europe to maintain high levels of output and trade in the international economy outside the United States."⁵ And this would entail some measure of discrimination against imports from that country.

The Labour party's economic program, published in July, while seeing the "possibility of a world slump arising out of the present American recession," evaded the question of how its effects in Britain could be countered. The main line of defense suggested was the re-

4. Vol. 10, No. 1.

5. *Ibid.* This article made clear that it was considerably easier for the West European countries to withstand the United States depression than the primary exporting countries, whose reserves had already been running low in 1957. It also pointed to the danger of a cumulative contraction spreading through the international economy. Another article in the same issue hazarded the guess that "it seems likely that economic activity in western Europe will be easier to revive than in the United States."

1. An article under that title in *Barelays Bank Review*, November 1957, concluded by stressing the need for a resurgence of production in the United States because "in a world so divided ideologically, capitalism as exemplified by the American way of life must demonstrate its ability to prevent a severe recession."

2. Thus in the *World Economic Survey*, 1957 it was asserted that "There is no question of the recession taking on the dimensions of the pre-war depression; a decline on any such catastrophic scale is inconceivable, on social and political, as well as on economic, grounds."

This is a British Marxist view of the effects of the recession on European capitalism. Tom Kemp teaches economics at Hull University.

In God We Trust

American billionaires are withholding investments in Asian and African lands because of their "fear of expropriation," according to the Dec. 7 New York Times. But these "also are the regions in which the Communist 'economic challenge' is being most vigorously pursued."

Philip Cortney, chairman of the United States Council of the International Chamber

of Commerce and president of Coty, Inc., came up with the following solution to the problem:

"It will require more intelligence than dollars, enlightened selfishness and unselfishness of the free nations and people, a great responsibility of their leaders, if we are to stave off the flux of the barbarians. So help us God."

striction of dollar imports; i.e., discriminatory practices hardly to the liking of the U.S. government.⁶ Clearly the authors of this document sincerely hoped that the danger would never have to be faced. Not long before, one of the Bank reviews, discussing possibilities for government action to maintain home demand, added that it was "certain that the U.K. could not hope to spend itself out of a serious American recession."⁷

From about May 1958 an undercurrent of serious doubt crept into discussion of the American recession for several months, especially in Britain which was particularly vulnerable to cold blasts blowing in from a disorganized world economy.

Precarious Equilibrium

The reason for the anxiety was that even before the recession began European capitalism faced the prospect of a serious recession of its own.⁸ In both the previous postwar recessions in the United States powerful upward movements had persisted in most European countries. Then, throughout the 1950's, Europe had experienced a surge forward of investment and production with a classic capitalist boom superimposed upon a high level of activity generated by armaments and other state expenditures. As a consequence there was a strong pull on the industries producing means of production both to expand their own capacity and to equip the industries turning out consumer goods. The extent of this investment boom differed in each country, being generally most rapid and far-reaching where wartime destruction and previous underinvestment had left a terrific backlog of investment opportunities, which, in the favorable conditions of an expanding world market and technological change, could be profitably exploited.

In the nature of things such a boom

6. *Plan for Progress*, Labour party, July 1958.

7. *Westminster Bank Review*, May 1958.

8. Thus Andrew Schonfield, one of the most influential of British financial journalists, wrote in *The Observer*, June 29, 1953: "Even if the American recession gets no worse, clear evidence that it was falling to revive in the autumn could have a serious effect on business sentiment, on consumer-buying, and perhaps most important, on stock markets. The danger is that the second phase of the American slump and the first phase of the European slump might coincide."

tends to exhaust itself — rising costs cut into profits, some sectors of industry grow disproportionately and markets tend to become saturated. Already during 1956 the rate of expansion had slackened and in many countries it slackened still further in 1957.⁹ During 1958 a distinct contraction was perceptible in Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands and was incipient in a number of other countries. The emphasis of economic policy had shifted from coping with the inflation and recurrent pressures on the balance of payments, which had accompanied the boom, to the problems involved in utilizing capacity and maintaining the rate of new investment. Not only did the American recession threaten to confront the European countries with a new shortage of dollars to maintain their external trade but it could precipitate a sharp and perhaps uncontrollable plunge in domestic activity.

Despite the rapid recovery of the capitalist world market since the war, largely made possible by dollar injections through the Marshall Plan and other American aid programs, it is still in precarious equilibrium. The disproportion between the United States and the rest of that market still remains. It shows itself in the dependence of the other countries upon their ability to earn dollars for essential payments in the USA. And most capitalist countries — Western Germany is the main exception in Europe — have very slender reserves available to cushion adverse changes in their own balance of payments. The fear of a repetition of the 1940's, with their chronic dollar deficits, hangs over foreign economic policy. Hence the measures taken by the British government in September 1957 to meet a drain of sterling, though that meant dampening down business activity at home. Hence, too, the measures proposed in many quarters during 1958 to meet the apparently imminent all-round shortage of dollars expected to

9. A useful summary of the phases in post-war capitalist development is given in chapter four of the *World Economic Survey*, 1957. The ending of the boom in Europe — though that did not lead immediately to recession — may have had some influence on precipitating depression in the United States, where expansion continued until about the middle of 1957. It is doubtful whether it could have been a major element. Policies of American businesses in Europe seem to have been more influenced by what happened in America than vice versa.

be a consequence of the U.S. recession.

The boom in the industrial countries was closely interlocked with the growth in their foreign trade, including increasing trade amongst themselves and with the USA. The expansion of demand from the primary producing countries consequent upon this boom in turn reinforced it. For some time before 1957, however, commodity prices had been falling, raising the prospect that within a foreseeable time they would have to curtail their imports from the industrial countries — setting in train, or contributing to, a contraction in world trade and depression in the industrial countries. The U.S. recession introduced a new fear, that of further pressure on commodity prices by reason of the lower demand for imports, likewise playing back upon the industrial countries.

Such expectations had shown themselves to be only partly valid in the previous U.S. recessions. As it happened in 1957-58 a number of other factors entered the picture, obscuring the clear-cut outlines that had been expected or feared. In fact the manifold relationships of the capitalist world economy do not lend themselves to mechanical representation as a series of two-way transactions or cause-and-effect sequences. They are inherently dialectical in their complex interactions; shot through with unevenness and contradictions. Moreover, each boom-slump cycle in capitalist development shows its special features: the effect of technology, harvest variations, wars and war preparations are among the factors which may impose variants on the abstract theoretical pattern. The resultant for any particular national economy of the happenings in the world market — to which it contributes in greater or lesser degree — are not easily deduced from the original elements. Thus, for example, a recession in the United States will not have easily predictable results on other countries. A good deal will depend upon the nature and extent of the recession, as well as upon the point at which it impinges upon the latter, whether they are booming, as in 1953-54, or on the threshold of contraction as during 1958. Likewise experience shows, as will be seen, that a downturn in the USA does not necessarily aggravate the outstanding economic problems of other countries. Some may, at any rate for a time, derive more good than harm from the fact.

Why They Escaped

The most direct way in which the recession could have made its impact upon the European economy was through a fall in U.S. demand for its exports. All the main European producers have made special drives in recent years to extend their direct sales in the expanding American market, with not inconsiderable success. Had these sales dropped, the effect on the in-

dustries most concerned would have been severe. No doubt there would be a time lag until pre-recession orders had been fulfilled, but repeats could have expected to be lower. In fact, however, while some European exports did fall off others rose, making possible an overall increase for the first nine months of 1958.

The key to this unexpected outcome lies in the nature of the U.S. recession to date. The main brunt fell on investment outlays, inventories, industrial production, business profits and employment, all spread unevenly over the economy. On the other hand, though consumer demand ceased to rise as it had been doing during the previous period, and even fell back a little in per capita terms, the aggregate level of consumption fell by no more than about one per cent. If European exports had entered the circuit of exchange via the production of means of production (Department I) as raw steel, heavy machinery, machine tools and raw materials, they would have felt the full blast of the reduction of American industrial activity. Indeed, since imports from Europe would have tended to be the first to be cut the effect would have assumed an exaggerated form; Europe would have become a depressed area. As it is, comparatively few European exports pass through those parts of the economy most severely affected by the recession. A considerable part enter more or less directly into the consumption stream, either in competition with the American-made article or as non-competitive specialties. The maintenance of consumption meant that their market was preserved, especially as they were not generally the kind of goods consumed by workers most affected by unemployment and short time.

Had the recession become increasingly virulent during the second part of 1958 there is no doubt that these favorable conditions would have been in jeopardy. Consumption would have fallen, and had it reached the higher income levels, European imports might have been severely affected. In addition, had higher tariffs been imposed under pressure from American manufacturers, or had they switched successfully to compete with the imported article, a valuable market might have been greatly reduced.

A special factor of considerable force was the ability of European automobile manufacturers not merely to maintain, but greatly to increase, the volume of their sales, despite the depression in the American industry. Not only did that mean valuable dollar earnings; but it contributed to the high prosperity of the European car industry which, both through its heavy investment outlays and its rising production figures, had been a star performer in the boom of the fifties.¹⁰

The behavior of American consumption was clearly a vital factor in pre-

venting direct contagion of the European industrial countries. At the same time, the influence of American conditions on already existing world trends contributed to easing rather than intensifying their dollar problem as had been expected. It is true that these expectations had foundation in the light of the experience of the latter part of 1957 when there was some constriction of the flow of dollars into the world economy. Thanks to the maintenance of American consumption, decline of exports and continued foreign investment there was no overall shortage of dollars in the course of 1958.

As far as the industrial countries of Europe were concerned, the main operative factor was a continued improvement in their terms of trade as the prices of primary products continued on their downward course — assisted on their way by the fall in American demand. Consequently, coincidental with the recession in 1958, has gone a strengthening in their balance of payments, and additions have been made to their international liquidity in the shape of gold and dollar reserves despite a falling off in world trade.¹¹

This process has imposed a serious strain on the primary producers, more particularly those whose staple exports have been subject to marked declines in world prices. Some have been running heavy deficits in their current balance of payments, drawing down reserves of foreign exchange previously accumulated in other centers, London in particular. Loans and credits from various sources, including the United States, have enabled them to go on buying from the industrial countries. In general, however, their position has become more precarious and will be made even more so to the extent that production falls in Europe. At any rate the industrial countries of Europe have automatically profited from their embarrasments up to now. Unless the recent slight recovery in primary product prices is confirmed and continues for some time, or further injections of foreign aid can be obtained, some of

10. In the first half of 1958, foreign car registrations in the USA amounted to nearly 160,000, accounting for 6.7% at a time when new car registrations were the lowest for six years. The American market was the largest single overseas market for the automobile industries of Britain, France and Germany. Its growth in 1957-58 was an important factor in the prosperity of the industry in those countries. (Statistics from the London Financial Times, Motor Industry Supplement, October 20, 1958).

11. The American angle on this is to be found in the Survey of Current Business, September 1958, which comments: "The fact that the rise in foreign reserves was limited to the more advanced industrial nations, while the reserves of most of the other countries remained low with little field for maneuver, affects our export prospects." Likewise it pointed out that "An increase in exports to Europe cannot be expected until the upward movement in general business activity there is resumed." This was particularly so because of the supplementary nature of certain U.S. exports to Europe. For example, coal has still been exported to Europe on the basis of long-standing contracts; meanwhile Europe's unsold stocks of coal have reached unprecedented heights.

Class Index

One of the Greek philosophers is reputed to have said that man is the laughing animal.

In light of the scientific investigations of Professor Alex Inkeles, a Harvard sociologist, the Greek view evidently requires further refinement. Prof. Inkeles has found that the laugh is a barometer of social status.

"Contrary to popular belief, the lower you are in social status, the less likely you are to report having laughed during the past day." In addition, lower-status women are more likely to have said they have cried.

The professor reported, moreover, according to United Press (Dec. 6), that his "rule held true in warm countries such as Italy, as well as cold countries, such as Britain."

Thus modern science must be credited with another discovery of far-reaching benefit to mankind. You can now tell a capitalist by his horse laugh.

the underdeveloped countries will have to make cuts in imports and impose further trade restrictions. The attractions of trade with, or aid from, the Soviet Union will increase. The recent agreement between Argentina and the USSR is but another sign of the times, for Latin America is a comparatively new field for such deals as far as the latter is concerned.¹² It is noteworthy that business representatives of Germany, France, Britain and other countries have been scouring the region for years in an effort to extend their trade; rivalries would certainly intensify if Europe's difficulties increase.

Up to the last quarter of 1958 the American recession has had few appreciable effects on European capitalism and may even have temporarily alleviated some of its more pressing problems. The fears which were so widespread a few months ago have tended to be dissipated. Confidence seems to have been favorably influenced by the behavior of Wall Street prices as well as by the easier foreign exchange position. The usual seasonal pressure on sterling, for example, did not occur this year; instead there has been an unusually high surplus on the balance of payments. Nevertheless, in Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and to some extent in France, recession is either developing or is feared.

Respite for How Long?

The threat to the equilibrium of the world market, and, even more dangerously, to the very survival of capital-

12. The \$100 million deal with Argentina allowed for the credit purchase of oil-drilling plant, in certain lines of which the USSR enjoys an undoubted technical advantage. A severe shortage of foreign exchange threatens Argentina's economy with disaster; increased production of oil from domestic sources would ease the strain and reduce dependence upon foreign oil companies. These later offered Argentina increased credit. A deal with Brazil followed, comprising barter of Brazilian surplus commodities against needed imports from the USSR.

ism which would have followed upon a severe American slump spreading out on a world scale seems to have receded into the background for the moment. The spokesmen for European business are visibly relieved. Now they are wondering what sort of respite they have secured. As one of them wrote recently: "Europe has so far remained largely insulated from American developments. Unfortunately it looks as though she will continue to be so in the immediate future, for it is unlikely that the American recovery will produce a rapid improvement in the economic climate here."¹³

In other words, a number of European countries — West Germany seems the most important exception at present — are facing their own recession unaided by any powerful uplift from a full-scale expansion across the water. In this negative sense the American recession has had an important bearing on the situation of European capitalism. The mere failure of the United States to continue its boom through 1957-58 may deprive Europe of the spur it needed, and still needs, to prevent it from lapsing into a comatose state of semi-stagnation, symptoms of which have been apparent in Britain for some time.¹⁴

For the present, facing lowered production and unemployment that has risen above the 500,000 mark, the Conservative government consoles itself with the improvement in the strength of sterling. The shape of the problems looming before European capitalism are perhaps most sharply delineated in the case of Britain, but in essence they are to be found everywhere. In France and Germany they have been slower in coming to the forefront for a number of special reasons, but they may not be long delayed and would break through very quickly were there to be a sharp contraction of world markets, such as might be precipitated by a worsening of the position of the primary producing countries.

In the meantime the governments of the capitalist countries, under the pressure of business interests, have been considering how they can maintain their share of trade in the more intense competition now expected. The proposals for a European Free Trade Area for the sixteen OEEC countries (those which benefited from the Marshall Plan) and for a customs union, known as the European Common Market, of France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries, have been given a new appraisal

13. *The Financial Times*, October 20, 1958. This article looked to "a renewed upsurge in demand for Europe's exports from the raw material producing countries overseas." The same journal stated November 1 that "There is general agreement among businessmen that exports will probably tend to decline over the next few months."

14. It is worth noting that while exports to the USA have continued to increase, trade between the European countries themselves has been falling, a trend which has affected Britain to an important extent.

Clean Earth

Whether a clean bomb will be produced is still uncertain. What is certain is that the bombs already made can produce a clean earth.

"It would . . . be possible," said the Council of the Federation of American Scientists, Nov. 25, "for a fanatical ruler to pull down the entire human race to destruction. With a stockpile of the size that now exists, it is possible to cover the entire earth with a radiation level which for 10 years would remain sufficiently intense to prove fatal to all living beings on land."

in the light of changing prospects. Each country is now afraid of being at a disadvantage if others have their way; threats, menaces, bickering and horse-trading have characterized the negotiations of recent months over initiating the new structures.¹⁵

No substantial agreement has been arrived at internationally to deal with the eventuality of a deepening of the recession. Instead, steps have been taken to give exporters more generous credits or to diminish the threat of outside competition by restrictive policies. Each national capitalism seems likely to seek a solution of its own problems regardless of whether the measures adopted will adversely affect the prospects of the others. The race will be to the strongest. Thus the French industrialists, with their high production costs, seek to avoid a situation where they will have to confront their German competitors in their own territory with the lower level of protection which entry into the Common Market will impose. Likewise the British cotton textile manufacturers, hard hit by competition from Hong Kong (and to some extent from India, as well as from China in Far Eastern markets), have been trying to secure a "voluntary" limitation of exports into their home market from Britain's colony.

Moreover, in general, recession seems to have a loosening effect on the common front which the capitalist powers have put up against the Soviet bloc since the war.

The immediate prospects of European capitalism depend upon the capacity of the system to extract and realize sur-

15. The French Patronat is afraid of German competition inside the Common Market; British and other businessmen are afraid of Common Market discrimination against their exports; the Commonwealth countries are afraid that their interests might suffer from some bargain reached between Britain and the "Six"; and so on. The prospect of the division of capitalist Europe into two rival trading blocs is now being considered as a possibility. "It is idle to speculate as to which side would come off worst," writes the November 7 *Financial Times*. "The only thing that is certain is that both would come off badly."

plus value on an expanding scale. Clothed in special forms, concealed, if not modified, by the changes which it has undergone in recent decades, the classic dilemmas of capitalism still impose themselves. The most pressing question is whether markets can be expanded to enable the capacity built up during the boom to be profitably employed and to enable the producers goods industries — most threatened or affected by falling output — to resume their advance.¹⁶ Even the adherents of the system are mostly convinced that this can only be done by some measure of state intervention amounting, in effect, to the provision of markets in which surplus value can be realized and which would not otherwise have come into being.¹⁷

In Britain there has already been some decline in arms spending as a proportion of national income, and Prime Minister Macmillan has offered this as one of the reasons for the growth in unemployment. On the other hand the continued rise in industrial production in France through 1957 was accounted for in part by "a steep rise in public expenditure, consisting primarily of higher military outlays connected with the Algerian conflict."¹⁸

Although some German sources claim that the slight recession experienced in some sectors earlier in the year has been overcome, there is little doubt that performance will be less brilliant in 1958 than for many years.¹⁹ In the first half of the year the rise in exports came to an end; they were expected to fall in the second half. The effects of this slackening has so far been counteracted by continued construction and investment, but the United Nations *Economic Bulletin for Europe* doubts whether this "will suffice to secure an accelerated increase in total output in the rest of the year given the tendencies towards stagnation or decline of private consumption and exports."²⁰ The prospects of West

16. Thus, despite an apparent revival in business confidence in Britain and government measures against depression, the November 1 *Financial Times*, in commenting on the problem of unemployment in regions dominated by heavy industry, writes: "None of the expansionist measures taken by the Government so far has been able to make an appreciable impression on this problem."

17. "What is wanted is . . . a general expansive force to raise output to something nearer its potential level and give an incentive to further investment." *London and Cambridge Economic Bulletin*, September 1958.

18. *World Economic Survey, 1957*. A marked slowing of the growth in industrial output has been apparent since the summer, and talk of "recession" has been growing. Unemployment remains minimal, however.

19. Witness to continuing optimism is shown by the readiness with which the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (September 25) claims that Germany has already overcome the slight recession in the internal market of which there were signs earlier in the year. It adds, "The repercussions of the American economic crisis, with the exception of a few sectors, were slight. Proof has again been given that, in a large measure, the West German economy is independent of the American conjuncture."

20. Vol. 10, No. 2.

The Real Incentive

A recent study of 2,500 "wage" incentive plans in 29 industries reveals that for every 1 per cent increase in wages earned by the worker, the companies on average increased productivity by 3.1 per cent and cut unit costs 1.25 per cent.

Germany depend to a large extent upon the future behavior of world trade and whether incentives will be found for a continued high level of investment. Its comparative immunity from the effects of the American recession does not signify that it will be able to continue on an upward course.

Now and in the near future the Keynesian claims that appropriate fiscal measures and government spending can avert depression will be put to the test. Already in Britain the rapid increase in unemployment within the last nine months has induced the government to step up investment in the nationalized sector, lower the interest rate from its crisis height of 7% down to 4½% and take measures to encourage instalment buying of homes, cars and consumer durables. There is not much doubt that these measures can give some relief by creating, as it were, an artificial market. The volume of consumer credit, for example, is only about one-fifth that current in the USA.²¹ With one car to twelve people, against one to three in the USA, the automobile manufacturers look hopefully towards a growth in the home market demand. At present, however, cars carry a luxury tax (known as "purchase tax") amounting to 60% added to the factory price. Even with 10% deposit and two to three years to pay, as under the new credit terms, few workers can expect to buy a new car.²² The Conservative government will no doubt consolidate electoral support with the middle class with such measures, but whether they will stem the drift into recession depends upon many factors, including important ones quite beyond their control.

Not Immune

Countries with high export ratios, such as those of Western Europe, cannot expect to expand for long unless the whole world market is doing so. A great deal depends upon whether the present

21. Mortgage debt outstanding is one-quarter of the annual national product in the USA, only one-tenth in Britain.

22. Automobile manufacturers fear that export sales will fall, especially if Detroit turns seriously to the production of smaller models. Britain's share in world markets has been declining. "This will mean that an extremely large number of vehicles will have to be sold on the home market if total capacity is to be fully utilised. It seems, therefore, that considerable surplus capacity may emerge in the industry as the present plans for extending capacity are carried out." A. Silberston in *The Structure of British Industry*, Vol. 2.

limitation of the market is a passing phase or merely the prelude to a resumed expansion. The shift towards a more optimistic view of market prospects which has been taking place in the past two or three months in business circles is obviously based upon the latter view.²³ The growth in foreign exchange reserves — a result of falling import prices — has given the industrial countries the means whereby to finance the larger volume of imports needed in the early stages of a re-expansion. On the other hand, if their exports continue to fall not only would this tend to dissipate the reserves once more but government spending and fiscal policy would be of doubtful efficacy against the cumulative deceleration taking place within the economy. The main difficulty would be of maintaining those industries and sectors hardest hit by the loss of overseas orders, as well as by cut-backs in private investment which would also follow.²⁴

A situation of this kind could have been expected to follow for Europe had the American recession deepened and extended through to 1959. As has been seen, other counteracting forces, largely of a kind which cannot be counted upon to recur, were sufficiently potent to alleviate, rather than intensify, the tendency to recession already apparent in Europe. Certainly the experience of the past year does nothing to prove the immunity of Europe — or of one or more countries on that continent — to a subsequent depression. Should it coincide with a contraction of the world market the most exposed sections of European capitalism would be thrown into an economic crisis which, while perhaps not as profound as that of the

23. In a much-quoted speech made October 16, Cobbold, Governor of the Bank of England, while anticipating boundless expansion for the future, said that he did not see what the existing business confidence was based upon. In the course of his speech he suggested that Britain "may still have to feel more strongly the effects of the world-wide change in the last year or so from a sellers' market to a buyers' market" and "may not yet have felt the full effects of lower commodity prices on some of our best customers' spending power." (Speech reported in the *November Banker*). Loss of earnings by Sterling Area countries, such as Australia and New Zealand, has, besides involving them in a foreign payments crisis, threatened them with severe depression which has so far been warded off mainly through expanding credit. In the first half of 1953 Australian exports fell 33% and those of Pakistan by 23%.

24. As perusal of the many articles on the possible repercussions of the American recession shows, the Keynesians are well aware that the kind of anti-cyclical measures they recommend depend upon two factors. The first is international cooperation — which, despite pious talk, does not seem likely to be realized, and would be hardly likely to succeed without the participation of the United States. The second is timely action. As the British economist E. A. G. Robinson puts it in the *June London and Cambridge Economic Bulletin*, "There is good reason to think that, as recession deepens, it becomes more difficult to reverse, and that in an anti-cyclical policy one of the most essential ingredients is promptness of action." That also was not forthcoming in the United States; nor can it be said to have happened in Britain. The Conservative government waited until October before taking its very mild action against stagnationist tendencies which had been visible for many months.

Space Can Wait

"The ultimate goal of space travel is sometimes cited as justification for the missiles race. Anyone who believes this belongs on a psychoanalyst's couch. Since the intensity, duration, spatial distribution and frequency of radiation bursts are only now being investigated, it is by no means certain that man can venture into interplanetary space and survive. And if it should prove feasible, what's the hurry? An effective therapy for cardiovascular disease alone would be worth far more to the human race than a few fledgling astronauts setting foot on the moon."—Carl Dreher in the *Dec. 13 Nation*.

early thirties, might be even more significant in its political results.

That is not to say that the strengthening of the working-class movement in the European countries necessarily depends upon a sharp deterioration in the economic situation. The growing uncertainty, the threat to jobs, the swings from inflation to recession, the inability of the system to justify itself in terms of living standards will provide increasing opportunities for developing a new leadership on a militant socialist program. At the same time, the crisis of confidence on the part of the advocates and beneficiaries of the system, which came close to the surface under stress of recent events — in Britain the fear of an American depression, in France the crisis of the colonial system — may break through and stand fully revealed.

It is not suggested that these possibilities are immediate; but they do seem to sum up the tendencies in European capitalism. Taking account of the complex interplay of all the components; considering the effect of the spread and consolidation of the colonial revolution; adding the possible consequences of increased rivalry and pressure from the Soviet-Chinese bloc — then the prognosis of an indefinite smooth expansion of world capitalism seems entirely excluded.

A primary unknown is the time schedule. It is impossible to foresee how long it will take for these various processes to work themselves out and at what time conditions will be most favorable for superseding a system which has long outlived its historic usefulness.

Nor should it be assumed that capitalism will break down of itself. Without the intervention of the subjective factor, a conscious socialist movement, capitalism will always be able to "solve" its problems as it has done before: through crises, fascism and war.

Production, Profits and Inflation

Do the 'deep roots' of inflation lie in the falling rate of profit?

by Arne Swabeck

TWO apparently contradictory phenomena are manifest simultaneously in the American economic structure today; at least they appear contradictory in the terms by which they are often described — inflation and deflation. A vastly expanded credit system, with its mountains of fictitious capital, has debased the currency almost beyond recognition. Alongside of this, excess capacity of production shows up in idle plants, or partially operating plants, and the resultant large-scale unemployment.

On closer examination, however, these apparently contradictory phenomena turn out to be directly interrelated consequences of the disintegrating tendencies that are besetting the capitalist system.

For serious students of the laws of capitalist production this poses a number of important questions. Correct answers to these questions will enrich our understanding of the operation of these laws. From this point of view the contributions to a discussion made by Albert Phillips in "The Deep Roots of Inflation" have their own special merit.

Needless to say, Phillips adheres to the Marxist approach in his attempt to elucidate some of these questions. He starts out from one of the basic features of capitalist production: the disproportionate expansion of constant capital (equipment and materials) as against variable capital (labor, wages) and the resulting higher organic composition of capital which fosters the tendency of the average rate of profit to fall.

On the whole, many of the important points made by Phillips contain food for thought; but his general analysis suffers from a certain weakness. It tends to be too schematic. His basic thesis seems to be that the explanation of the inflationary process "lies in the falling rate of profit along with the positive effects of the class struggle; and that the growth of debt, including state debt, and the growing inter-

vention of the state in the economy are increasing contributory effects rather than prime causes." (Summer *International Socialist Review*, p. 96) This thesis is not substantiated; nor can it be substantiated in the form in which it is presented. To arrive at a more exact analysis some serious modifications will have to be made in the relationship between the above-mentioned factors, while other interconnected components need to be taken into account.

But before discussing this basic thesis, let us take another look at the relative position of capitalist production during its earlier expanding period and its present declining stage. I agree entirely with the statement made by Phillips, that capitalism during its progressive youth — roughly prior to the twentieth century, — was able to lower prices and simultaneously extend the market, expand production, profits and the accumulation of capital; to absorb lowering of the hours of work and to increase both real and money wages over the long run.

The process whereby this was achieved was, generally speaking, the same for capitalism everywhere. Primarily it found its expression in the transition from handicraft to manufacture and to large-scale industry. The formerly limited and scattered individual means of production were concentrated, enlarged and transformed into giant social means of production which enabled a vast increase in the productivity of labor to occur.

For the United States, however, there should be added the fact that capitalism here, during its early stage, enjoyed the exceptional opportunity to expand on a virgin continent. This permitted the rapid mechanization of old industries, the tapping of new resources, the building of new industries and the constant industrialization of new regions, which again provided for the swiftly mounting capitalization of appropriated surplus value. This process included the extermination of the Indians, the degradation of the Negro population and the turning of the mighty flood of immigrants into producers and consumers of goods pouring out from a rapidly expanding economy. The exten-

sion of the market tended to act as a self-sustaining process promoting expanded reproduction.

The changes that have taken place in the capitalist economic structure since its progressive youth are, of course, fundamental in nature. But the changes described by Phillips do not correspond to reality.

A Faulty Calculation

For example, he quotes the calculation made by Lewis Corey, that in American manufactures, fixed capital rose 1,758% from 1849 to 1889, output only 1,170%. "But," says Phillips, "that was in another century and before the death agony of capitalism. What is happening today in this relationship makes the figures that Corey cites pale into insignificance. The total output of all goods and services in 1953 dollars went from \$187.9 billion in 1939 to \$367.2 billion in 1953, a rise somewhat under 100%. But in order to achieve this increase, business expenditures for new plant and equipment rose from \$5.5 billion in 1939 to \$27.8 billion in 1953, an increase of close to 500%."¹ (*Fall International Socialist Review*, p. 149).

This assumed relationship of 100 to 500 (a result of faulty calculation) has led Phillips astray. And it seems likewise to be at the bottom of a whole series of erroneous assumptions: for example, (1) that capitalism is now faced with a constantly disproportionate increase in the cost of production, (2) that the ratio of increased labor productivity is not keeping pace with the increased cost of capital investments, (3) that this also brings into question the ratio of the corresponding surplus value produced by labor.

It is my impression, moreover, that Phillips has compounded these erroneous assumptions by interpreting the tendency of the falling rate of profit in absolute form; that is, in a form which must continue steadily downward to a fatal conclusion. This process would be

1. The "\$27.8 billion" should be \$28.7 billion, apparently, and for 1955, not "1953." The figure of "\$187.9 billion" for 1939 likewise appears to be inaccurate.

This is a response to the discussion article "The Deep Roots of Inflation" by Albert Phillips, published in the summer and fall issues of the *International Socialist Review*.

somewhat like an uncontrolled nuclear chain reaction resulting in the inevitable explosion that converts matter into energy and leaves in its wake only the proverbial blob of atomic ash.

The trouble is that Phillips was led astray by his own careless handling of statistics. The figures he quotes for total output are in *constant* dollars, the figures for expenditures for new plant and equipment are in *current* dollars. In other words the former are figures excluding the effects of inflation, the latter are not.

To set the matter straight one needs merely to measure both items in current dollars. Such figures are the most easily accessible and they will work out the same way for both items. These figures are as follows: The total output of goods, measured in current dollars, went from \$91.3 billion in 1939 to \$364.9 billion in 1953, a rise of about 400%. Also based on current dollars, expenditures for new plant and equipment rose from \$5.5 billion in 1939 to \$27.8 billion in 1953 (using Phillips' figures), an increase of about 500%.² Thus instead of an erroneously assumed relationship of 100 to 500, we have an actual relationship of about 400 to 500.

If we extend this over a longer period we get a more complete picture. Let us compare the year of 1929 with 1956. Both represent peak years of twentieth century capitalist prosperity in the United States. The period as a whole includes its deepest and longest depression as well as its highest and most sustained war and armaments "prosperity." During this period total output of goods and services, measured in current dollars, rose from \$104.4 billion in 1929 to \$414.1 billion in 1956, an increase of 396%. Business expenditures for new plant and equipment, also measured in current dollars, went up from \$9.2 billion in 1929 to \$35.1 billion in 1956, an increase of 385%. Thus we notice that the rise is about equal for both items or, in other words, the increase in output kept abreast with the increasing cost of capital investment. Looking at this relationship from another angle we find that the ratio of investment for new plant and equipment to total output, remained constant at a little less than 9% for both 1929 and 1956.

With these corrections introduced we can get a better view of the basic thesis propounded by Phillips. Is the falling rate of profit, along with the positive effects of the class struggle, the primary cause of inflation, while the growth of debt, including state debt, etc., adds only contributory effects?

We start out in agreement, as previously stated, that the transition from handicraft to manufacture and to large-scale industry enabled the bourgeoisie to cheapen the commodities produced.

² All figures quoted by me, unless otherwise noted, are from official government sources as presented in the *Statistical Abstract of the United States*.

In England, this transition dates back to the Industrial Revolution. In this country it is possible to fix a fairly exact date. The United States Census of 1900 is authority for the statement that "the factory system obtained its first foothold in the United States dur-



ing the period of the Embargo and the War of 1812." But the same authority informs us "it was not until about 1840 that the factory method of manufacture . . . began rapidly to force from the market the handmade commodities with which every community had hitherto supplied itself."

Let us now follow the wholesale price index from that period to the present day. We learn from the Bureau of Labor Statistics data, with 1926 as 100, that the index of wholesale prices stood in 1840 at 71.1 and reached its lowest point of 46.5 in 1896. During the Civil War and World War I the index went up quite high for a relatively short period on both occasions, to drop somewhat lower during the Great Depression and reach 77.1 in 1939. Since 1939, however, the wholesale price index has made a steeply upward climb, practically uninterrupted for two decades, without any sign of reversal of this trend. Projecting it forward with 1926 still as 100, instead of the average of 1947-49 now in common use as the base, by October, 1955, the wholesale price index stands at 184.9, a rise of almost two and one-half times since 1939.

For the United States this is an entirely new phenomenon. Its reverse side is the drastic currency depreciation; and this phenomenon of the last twenty years is rightly named inflation. Moreover, the reluctance of the American people to buy government bonds to finance the present huge federal budget deficit seems to indicate that the further rotting of the dollar is now accepted as inevitable as death and taxes.

The Role of Credit

Popular awareness of inflation seems to spring from a more realistic appraisal of what it really is than all the bewildered effusions of the bourgeois economists mentioned by Phillips. For if the latter were to approach an explanation of the problem, they would have

to turn their attention first of all to one of the basic institutions of capitalist society — the credit system. There they would find the most direct source of the origin and growth of inflation.

Marx made the scathing indictment that "the credit system . . . develops the incentive of capitalist production, the accumulation of wealth by the appropriation and exploitation of the labor of others to the purest and most colossal form of gambling and swindling, and reduces more and more the number of those who exploit the social wealth." (*Capital*, Vol. III, p. 522).

Marx also provided us with a thorough analysis of the function of money, and tokens of money, in capitalist society. He explained how money becomes capital in the process of production by the intervention of the commodity labor power, "a commodity whose use value possesses the peculiar property of being a source of value." Marx similarly explained the two-fold function of money in the process of circulation. In the one instance, in its abstract or ideal form, it becomes the socially recognized measure of value inasmuch as it represents the incarnation of human labor. In its concrete form, money performs the function of a socially recognized medium of exchange (including the function of means of deferred payments or credit).

In the latter case, the function is transient. After having mediated at one point, between purchaser and seller, the money moves away to repeat its office elsewhere. Because of being a "transient and objective reflex of the prices of commodities," said Marx, money (gold or silver) is "capable of being replaced by a token," but "only in so far as it functions exclusively as coin, or as the circulating medium, and as nothing else." (*Capital*, Vol. I, pp. 144-145).

Marx subjected interest-bearing capital, banking capital — which forms the essential basis of operation within the credit structure — to a careful examination. While he was aware that such capital in the hands of the banker appears as an independent self-expanding value, he demonstrated how it can in reality have no independent function separate and apart from capital employed in the process of production. And Marx found a great proportion of such "money capital" to be fictitious. From this he drew the observation:

"With the development of the credit system and of interest-bearing capital all capital seems to double, or even treble, itself by the various modes, in which the same capital, or perhaps the same claim on a debt, appears in different forms in different hands." (*Capital*, Vol. III, p. 553).

This purest form of gambling and swindling has today gone far beyond anything ever experienced at the time of Marx. The mountains of fictitious capital created to finance World War II,

the Korean "police action" and the subsequent armaments race served as the initial means to debase the currency. Goethe was modest, indeed, when in the second part of *Faust* he blamed the invention of paper money on Mephistopheles. The modern bankers and their governmental agencies have done much better; they have manufactured money out of thin air to finance both public and private debt. This has left its imprint on all banking capital, on the money supply and the liquid assets of the nation. All these are debased almost beyond recognition.

During World War II, for example, the government borrowed money from the banks and from the citizens. About one hundred billion dollars were borrowed from commercial banks, giving government bonds as security. The government spent that capital. It was spent for bullets, bombs, planes, tanks and battleships blown to bits or sunk long ago. But the government bonds — gilt-edged to be sure, yet still only shadows of capital — remain in the banks as deposits upon which the bankers can again make loans to the tune of six times their face "value." Thus the capital — whose progeny, interest, is paid by the state — is illusory, fictitious capital. It consists of certificates of indebtedness, to which corporate and private debts add their load. Moreover, the interest and principal on those bonds can be paid only by taxing the production of real capital.

The heavy injection of fictitious capital into the credit system is illustrated by the following: At the end of 1939 currency in circulation and demand deposits in banks (check-book money) amounted to about \$36 billion. At the end of 1952, when the most intense inflationary heat began to subside, but not to disappear, currency in circulation and check-book money had risen to about \$129 billion. It had more than trebled! The extra \$93 billion entered into and vastly augmented the money supply of the nation.

For the United States this is also an entirely new phenomenon, of which the steeply rising price index expresses the other side of the reality. Never before in American history has anything even approaching such a tremendous increase in the money supply occurred. And precisely in this do we find the main roots of inflation. These enormous sums of fictitious capital flowed as an element of dissolution into every pore of the financial and economic structure. There it has remained as a parasite feeding upon productive capital and drawing value away from all money capital.

New forces were thus set in motion which generated their own internal dynamic and kept on advancing beyond the control of the capitalist rulers. The quantitative increase in the money supply resulted in its qualitative decline. The almighty American dollar suffered

Say That Again?

The March 28, 1958, *New York Times* quoted Walter Reuther, president of the United Automobile Workers, as saying: "We don't believe in the class struggle. The labor movement in America has never believed in the class struggle."

By the end of the year, more automobile workers had been out on strike than in any other year in the history of the union. Moreover, for the first time in a single year, strikes included all the Big Three — Chrysler, Ford and General Motors.

a precipitous depreciation. As a measure of value it shrank drastically. In the short span of twenty years it has lost more than half of its purchasing power. This is the real picture of inflation, its causes and its manifestations; and inflation has become a distinguishing characteristic of capitalist disintegration wherever this system prevails. In the European capitalist nations inflation is ravaging workers' living standards and the same uncontrollable forces are also on the rampage in the United States.

The "Return" Is What Counts

What then is the relation of the tendency of the falling average rate of profit to the present process of inflation? To be sure it always enters as a component part of the commodity price system, especially of the big monopoly concerns. So do rising labor costs, or higher wages, both nominal and real, that workers have actually gained as a result of their organization.

The really important statistic that the "successful" executive of capitalist enterprise never loses sight of, is the return on invested capital. But this in no way justifies a conclusion that either the falling rate of profit or the higher wages of workers (positive effects of the class struggle) are the basic causes of the present inflation. These, as well as a number of other factors, such as productive capacity, labor productivity, consumer markets, monopoly domination, foreign investments, interest, prices and taxes, etc., are all interconnected components of capitalist economy, its industry and finance. They all function as integral parts of its process of development; and to that extent they partake in the inflationary spiral. But it is important to understand correctly the relationship between them.

The realization of profit and the accumulation of capital is the primary urge and motivating force of all capitalist production. To increase profits the monopoly enterprises are driven ceaselessly to reduce labor costs and

enlarge the scale of operation. The most direct outcome is a change in the composition of capital; and such changes underlie all the contradictions of capitalist accumulation. The tremendous growth of plant, equipment and raw materials in modern industry, operated by relatively fewer workers, is an expression of the disproportionate expansion of constant capital as against variable capital. With each new labor-saving machine installed, labor productivity rises and the absolute mass of that part of labor which is unpaid, and represents surplus value, is increased.

Living labor alone produces surplus value. But the decline of living labor employed in comparison to the volume and value of total capital it sets in motion brings about the result that the surplus value produced also tends to decline in comparison to the magnitude of total capital invested. And since the proportion of the mass of surplus value to the value of total capital employed forms the rate of profit, this rate tends to fall continuously.

Marx always insisted that the fall in the average rate of profit manifests itself as a tendency and not in absolute form. Its effects become clearly marked only under certain conditions, for instance during crises, and over long periods. But Marx also established the fact that the same causes which bring about this tendency of the falling rate of profit likewise produce the forces that counteract this tendency.

The increase in labor productivity due to the higher organic composition of capital expresses itself in a progressive increase in the absolute mass of the appropriated surplus value or profit; thus on the whole, a relative decrease of variable capital and profit is accompanied by an absolute increase of both. There is an accelerated accumulation of capital. Generally the growth of the magnitude of total capital proceeds at a more rapid rate than that expressed by the fall of the rate of profit. And along with the growing mass of employed capital, the mass of profit increases, while the rate of profit may fall. The opposites here interpenetrate. The same causes which bring about the tendency of the falling rate of profit simultaneously promote an increase in the mass of profit.

However, the rate of profit as well as the realization of surplus value depends also on other circumstances. It depends quite directly on what Marx calls the second act of the process of production — the sale of the products. The constellation of the market is, therefore, pertinent to our discussion. It can throw further light on the relation of the falling rate of profit to inflation.

As we have seen, the period of inflation coincides with the existence of a huge artificial market for armaments production. Precisely this artificial market created the extraordinary conditions in which the factors counteract-

ing the tendency of the falling rate of profit were the most active. I leave aside here the factors which have become familiar in the past, such as: greater intensity in the exploitation of labor, cheapening of the elements of constant capital, export of capital, etc. To be sure these were still present, but more important now is a consideration of the special conditions created by the armaments markets. These can be set down about as follows:

(1) In this artificial market, prices and profits were far less affected than usual by competition. Production of armaments did not enter into competition with consumer goods and the capitalist overhead cost of advertising could be held to a minimum.

(2) Corporations holding cost-plus arms contracts were favored by accelerated amortization enabling them to deduct the cost of capital investment for plant and equipment from federal taxes over a period of five years instead of the customary twenty year period.

(3) More nearly than ever, all the fixed capital (plant and equipment) was set into motion by labor, turning out products in ever greater volume and, incidentally, eliminating payment of fixed charges on idle plants.

(4) To what extent, under these extraordinary conditions, the greater mass of surplus value or profit extracted compensated for, or exceeded, the greater capital investment is difficult to say. But it is a known fact that the artificial armaments market during most of the period of its existence absorbed a vastly enlarged output and permitted, thereby, the most complete realization of surplus value.

These factors counterbalancing the tendency of the falling rate of profit were active simultaneously. Not only did they help to overcome the effects on profit caused by the recessions of 1948-49 and 1953-54, but the rate of profit apparently experienced a new, even though temporary, rise.

That this was actually the case seems indicated by the estimated rates of profit of leading manufacturing corporations, submitted by Reuther to the 1957 UAW convention. Based on data from the First National City Bank *Monthly Letter*, profits after taxes per \$100 of investment rose for autos and trucks from \$23.50 in 1929 to \$29.10 in 1955. For tire and rubber products the corresponding figures rose from \$3.90 to \$15.10; for aircraft and parts from \$10.70 to \$24.70. Other industries listed, petroleum products and non-ferrous metals, showed somewhat lesser gains. These figures, of course, reflect the inflationary process, which affects both profits and capital investments. Nonetheless, they suggest a pretty fair position for the rate of profit.

A somewhat more conservative estimate of profit rates has been presented by the Labor Research Association. It

Capitalist Instinct

To grab for money, it has long been noted, is a deeply ingrained reflex among successes in the business world. A rather spectacular example of how this instinct pays off was reported last September when a Jersey Central train, carrying mostly Wall Street commuters, accidentally plunged through an open bridge into Newark Bay.

One of the survivors, Paul V. Land, a partner in the brokerage firm of Winslow, Cohn and Stetson, described his reactions:

"Then I was under water. I thought: 'Thank God I have lots of insurance.' Then I remember my wallet floating. I grabbed it and put it in my pocket. I don't know why I grabbed the wallet. There was only \$10 in it. I thought I was finished. I can't see how I survived."

That was when the miracle occurred. The dollars were inflated.

is based on tax returns to the U.S. Bureau of Internal Revenue by all corporations from 1909 to 1946. Over this period the estimated rate of profit on total capital employed varies considerably. It starts out with 5.4% in 1909, reaches a high point of 12% during World War I, to vanish with the great depression, rising again from 4.2% in 1939 to 8.3% in 1946. The authors admit that this estimate is on the conservative side and that it should, undoubtedly, be a good deal higher considering the particularly skillful art of concealing profits to avoid taxes that is practiced by the corporations. In this connection one needs only remember how corporation heads tremble with indignation when demands are made to "open their books."

Meanwhile, the same causes which bring about the tendency of the falling rate of profit simultaneously promote an increase in the mass of appropriated surplus value or profit. At no other time has this been more sharply illuminated than during the period of the artificially created armaments market. Profits after taxes of all corporations rose from \$5.0 billion in 1939 to \$21.0 billion in 1955, an increase of 420%. Even allowing for the effects of inflation, this is a phenomenal rise indeed. Moreover, capitalists are generally enriched by a smaller yield on a larger volume of invested capital. For example, according to the Labor Research Association estimates, in 1918, the last year of World War I, corporate profits showed a rate of 6.6% on a net worth amounting to a mere \$75.7 billion. But in 1945, the last year of World War II, the corporations pocketed a yield of 6.4% on a total net worth of \$165.0 billion.

It is true that the tendency of the falling rate of profit and the struggle against it conditions a fundamental aspect of capitalist development. But it

must be acknowledged that precisely this period of raging inflation, beginning with 1939, has been exceptionally favorable to capitalism both as regards the rate of profit and the mass of profit.

Labor Productivity

Obviously, this phenomenal profit gain, and the great magnitude of realized surplus value that it represents, was made possible primarily by the constantly higher labor productivity. The tremendous diversion of labor, of production and of national income to turn out armaments for hot wars and for the cold war could take place only on the solid underpinning of the high American labor productivity.

It is difficult to measure labor productivity; estimates made are usually rough approximations. However, the calculation by Edwin Clague, the Commissioner of Labor Statistics, appearing in *Scientific American*, September 1951, seems reasonable. Clague computed the productivity improvement for the whole economy at an average rate of 2% per year from 1900 to 1950. Phillips quotes *Labor's Economic Review* (AFL-CIO) which computed an annual productivity increase of 3.0% to 3.6% from 1947 to 1956. These higher figures may have reference only to manufacture where such gains are always greater. Nevertheless, the constant and substantial increase in labor productivity is clearly evident.

But the assumption repeatedly asserted by Phillips that "the increase in labor productivity tends to decline in proportion to the organic change in the composition of capital," is entirely without foundation in fact. In the long run, as we have seen, from 1929 to 1955, the rise in total output held up about evenly with the rise in total capital outlays.

Viewing this question of labor productivity from another angle, we can add the results of compilations just made public by the Federal Reserve Board, of output by U.S. factories, and by the Bureau of Labor Statistics giving the number of production workers employed. Both cover the last decade. The results are a 35% gain in output with 6% fewer workers employed. And the auto manufacturers, who have an especially keen sense of the rate of return on their invested capital, have been quite willing over a period of years to pay the annual 2½% wage increase for the so-called improvements factor. All in all, the evidence should leave little doubt that the rise in labor productivity has kept level with the higher organic composition of capital.

To be sure this labor productivity growth does not signify a second industrial revolution. And I am in complete agreement with Phillips that a second industrial revolution under capitalist auspices is precluded. My agreement however, derives from entirely different considerations than those given by Phillips which are summed up, if

I understand him correctly, in prohibitive costs.

Phillips presents a number of statements to this effect from industrial magnates, bourgeois economists and other mouthpieces of Big Business. What does it all add up to? These statements are perfect examples of the complaints, usually interlarded with brazen hypocrisy, that customarily emanate from these sources as a justification for higher prices, and as a means of counteracting union demands for higher wages.

J. Pierpont Morgan, the elder, is reputed to have been fond of saying: Every man can give a good reason for what he is doing; but these same men also have their *real* reasons — or words to that effect. I shall try to indicate the *real* reason for the statements mentioned by Phillips.

Whether or not "staggering costs" stand in the way of modern instrumentation, or automation, of the capitalist-owned productive plants is highly debatable. Wassily Leontief, the Harvard economist referred to by Phillips, states the contrary view as follows: "The estimated cost of total instrumentation of a new modern plant to automatize it as fully as possible today, ranges from 1 to 19 per cent (depending on the industry) of total investment in process equipment. The average for all industries would be about 6 per cent." Leontief adds, "... the smoother and better balanced operation of self-regulating plants has already shown that they can function with less capitalization than a non-automatic plant of identical capacity." (*Scientific American*, September 1952).

To illuminate the other side of the question, let us recall the case of the steel industry during the late forties. When the cold war and the armaments race began there were loud and insistent calls for enlarged steel capacity from President Truman which were echoed by the labor lieutenants of capitalism. The steel barons had an answer; it was a resounding, No! They pleaded poverty. Because of their heavy capital investment, they asserted, their break-even point — the point of production below which profits would vanish — had by 1949 reached 70% to 75% of capacity. But behind their pleas lurked their fear of excess capacity, the fixed charges on which would eat into surplus value and profits realized. And besides, their vested interest in existing technology paid off handsomely.

In fact, it paid off so well that Bert Seidman, of the AFL-CIO Department of Research, could comment this year: "Since 1939 the profits per man-hour of U.S. Steel have gone up from 13 cents to \$1.80, or an increase of 1,284 per cent."

With this, we begin to approach some of the *real* reasons for reluctance by the dominant monopoly entrepreneurs to take advantage of the new possibil-

ities offered by electronics, automation and nuclear energy. They may well cast envious eyes Eastward. Already the Soviet economy with its nationalized property and state planning is infinitely more capable than is capitalism of adapting to this higher level of technology. Not hampered by private profit motives, Soviet industry is able to skip stages and make a leap directly into the new forms of production while capitalism remains hesitant — except where implements of war are concerned — on the brink of this new era.

Lagging Consumption

The *real* truth is that capitalism is incapable of continuous, planned utilization of all the means and techniques that are available. And this arises out of the simple fact that it is incapable of developing commensurately the conditions of consumption.

The higher organic composition of capital with its greater labor productivity, inherently the basis of potential plenty, tends under capitalism to lead in the opposite direction. Not only does it foster the tendency of the falling average rate of profit. It sets in motion simultaneously a restriction on the growth of the market by imposing limitations upon the purchasing power of the great mass of the workers. For it is a fact that profits always race ahead of wages, and wages fall relatively to output and profits. Capitalism develops the forces of production more rapidly than the means of consumption.

But the expansion of constant capital at the expense of variable capital also reduces the demand for labor. Compared to the total capital set in mo-

tion, the labor force employed diminishes steadily. Therefore, the greater magnitude of capital, produced by the workers, becomes the means whereby they are themselves made relatively superfluous. The workers are face to face with the twin scourge of unemployment and inflation.

In the epoch of capitalist crisis and disintegration every serious advance in technique quickly renders obsolete existing capital equipment. It raises to more menacing proportions the ever-present spectre of excess capacity, of overproduction of capital. Simultaneously it deepens the contradictions of its mode of production and thereby intensifies the inner tensions and conflicts of capitalist society.

From its earlier progressive position, the capitalist mode of production is now in the stage of decline and decay. The constant expansion of the internal and external market, formerly operating as a self-sustaining process promoting expanded reproduction, has been thrown into reverse in a relatively contracted internal market and on an absolutely restricted world market. Heavy armaments production, devoid of use values, a drain on the economy; and manipulations of the credit system, with attendant inflation, are applied in an effort to prop up the sagging economic structure. These characteristics of the epoch lead to the conclusion that for the capitalist mode of production a second industrial revolution is precluded. It is precluded because on the historical scale the capitalist relations of production, i.e., property relations, which formerly served as forms of development of the forces of production, are now fetters on production.

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John Gates Tells His Story



by Joseph Hansen

THE STORY OF AN AMERICAN COMMUNIST, by John Gates. Foreword by Earl Browder. Thomas Nelson & Sons, New York. 1958. 221 pp. \$3.95.

In recommending this book, Earl Browder, former general secretary of the Communist party, says in his foreword: "Gates shows us that the influence of American communists on the future is now confined to the role of horrible example of what to avoid."

This assertion requires modification. The author of *The Story of an American Communist* disregards the influence on the future of those American communists who fought from the beginning against Stalinism. Moreover, he does not include as a "horrible example" the policies associated with Browder's leadership. In fact he advocates those policies.

John Gates' account of how he came to join the Young Communist League in 1931 is appealing. Anyone who became a radical at that time will recognize a kindred spirit in the college youth who responded in despair and anger to the depression and turned toward socialism.

But for one who was never in the Communist party, who came directly to the Trotskyist movement, as I did, Gates' 27-year experience arouses astonishment, despite everything one is prepared for. He does not appear to have ever felt the impact of Marxist theory. He does not appear even to have met or worked with a single serious Marxist theoretician. After almost three decades of fighting for socialism — which he still believes in — and after recognizing that the Communist party "has failed, and has disintegrated," he is capable of concluding: "But all other socialist groups and parties in America have also failed. Their membership is negligible and their influence insignificant."

Pure pragmatism! The elementary

axiom of Marxism, that the struggle for socialism begins with the struggle for program and that only in relation to the success of that struggle do "membership" and "influence" become significant, does not seem to exist for the former editor of *The Daily Worker*.

The meaning of the debacle of the Social Democracy in 1914, so analogous to the debacle of the Communist party today, appears unknown to Gates. He seems never to have realized — really realized — why Lenin's unyielding opposition to class-collaborationist policies and his insistence on a program of class struggle, despite the isolation and narrowing of "influence" this entailed in the early years of World War I, proved decisive in winning the October 1917 Revolution, while the big membership and wide influence of the Social Democratic bureaucracy did not prevent it from losing the German revolution and preparing the ground for Hitler.

I do not think that Gates is responsible for this defect. As with so many others, it was a consequence of intense but indiscriminating loyalty to the "land of socialism." In this lies the tragedy of his life as a Communist; for this kind of loyalty proved self-defeating. It was harmful to the defense of the conquests of the October Revolution; it was harmful to the struggle for socialism in America.

Gates, it is clear from his book, was primarily an activist, and, insofar as one can judge from his account, a capable organizer and administrator. His pragmatic bias and lack of drive in the direction of theory is native to the American working class and in a healthy party would have been of first concern to a leadership that recognized his talents.

But the Communist party in 1931 was not healthy. It had already succumbed to Stalinism. The founders had been purged. Democratic centralism had been displaced by bureaucratic monolithism.

The cult of Stalin was entrenched. The mind of a youth like Gates was systematically poisoned against Marxist criticism of the Soviet bureaucracy and its representatives in America. Even the true history of his own party remained unknown to him — not an academic matter in view of the way such knowledge shapes political judgment.

Despite this, he might have won his way to the truth and better political insight, as others did, if his positive qualities as an activist had not betrayed him. One of this temperament, becoming convinced of the need for socialism, gets to the point. "What are we waiting for?" He rolls up his sleeves and gets going. An admirable characteristic, quite typical of American workers. Fresh off the campus, Gates won quick recognition as a dedicated party organizer in the Youngstown steel area. In the unemployed demonstrations and union drives of the time, success seemed to follow success, and the party mushroomed.

Like himself, thousands of radicalized workers in the thirties did not distinguish between the Soviet Union and its Stalinist administration or between the Communist party and the program of Marxism. They were attracted by the October Revolution and by the militant record established by the Communist party in the twenties and did not see that a profound change had occurred both in the Soviet Union and in the American Communist party.

The growth of the Communist party, due to political capital accumulated by the founders of the Communist movement plus the intense activities and self-sacrifices of the Gates type, was thus ascribed to Stalin or to — Browder. The Gates's did not see that the policies followed by these exploiters of other people's achievements pointed in the direction of degeneration and disintegration.

A remarkable example of this blindness is recorded in the book. As a vol-

unteer in the Lincoln Brigade, Gates fought heroically against fascism in the Spanish Civil War. In the thick of this great revolutionary struggle he apparently never once rose far enough above the shooting to see a logic in the intense class struggle analogous to that of the Russian Revolution. He approved the suppression of the Barcelona workers who sought to follow the October 1917 example of the Russian workers.

"A comparable situation — perhaps easier for Americans to understand —" says Gates, "would be if a group of radicals had organized an armed uprising in Chicago against the Roosevelt government in 1944 when our troops were landing in Normandy." A more realistic comparison can be found in the Russian Revolution. A Gates there would have fought against Kornilov, but — listening to the slanders about the Bolsheviks being in the pay of the Germans and refusing to read Bolshevik literature — he would also have found himself in Kerensky's campaign against the Bolsheviks.

Kerenskyism failed in Russia; in Spain it succeeded in paving the way for Franco. Gates correctly condemns the "democracies" for refusing arms to Republican Spain; it still does not occur to him to condemn the crushing of all attempts to conduct a Bolshevik-type political struggle to dissolve the armies of the fascist general. Risking his life in an anti-fascist struggle, he nevertheless helped carry out a policy that ensured Franco's victory.

In 1949, as one of the first CP victims of the witch-hunt, Gates was sentenced by the notorious Judge Medina to five years and sent to Atlanta federal prison. There, cut off from activity, he read about Debs, who had been sentenced to the same prison as a witch-hunt victim in World War I. Gates was struck by the fact that the socialist leader was so esteemed by the workers that he had been able to run an effective campaign for President from prison and was eventually freed by a huge mass movement in his behalf. In painful contrast to this, there was an "almost complete absence of popular concern over our imprisonment."

This difference "weighed most heavily" on Gates and he gave it a lot of thought. Yet he misses the indicated deduction that Debs' "influence" was due to his policy of militant opposition to World War I; while the decay of esteem for the CP and its leaders was due, among other things, to the experience of militant workers with the CP's class-collaborationist "no strike," super-patriotic "keep 'em sailing" policies in World War II.

So powerful was Gates' indoctrination against Trotskyism that he did not notice, it would seem, a nationally famous case which showed once again that radical views are not a decisive barrier to winning the sympathy of American workers. Organizations representing

more than five million working people rallied to the cause of James Kutcher, discharged from his Veterans Administration job in 1948 because of membership in the Socialist Workers party. This powerful movement finally won everything it set out to get: restoration of the persecuted veteran to his job and payment of back wages. Today James Kutcher enjoys the singular distinction of being the only government employe in the United States avowedly a member of an organization on the Attorney General's "subversive" blacklist.

Similar widespread labor and civil liberties support came earlier to the leaders of the SWP, the first victims of the Smith Act, when they were railroaded to prison during World War II for opposing imperialist war and advocating socialism in the Debs tradition. (They were released from prison shortly before Gates succeeded in getting to Germany as a volunteer member of the paratroops). The SWP leaders won such support in contrast to the CP victims of the same witch-hunt law because they enjoyed respect among militant workers for their adherence to class-struggle principles.

Gates describes the factional struggle that broke out in the Communist party following Khrushchev's famous revelations at the Twentieth Congress in 1956. This struggle was accompanied by an exodus from the party, particularly after the Polish and Hungarian events when it became clear to the delegates at the 1957 National Convention that no perspective of reform was left in the CP, not even the hope of a well-organized struggle around an opposition leadership. "I did not lead them out," says Gates; "they led me." (His emphasis). That appears to be an accurate judgment, for nothing in Gates' experience in the Stalinized Communist party had prepared him to lead a factional struggle, particularly one involving fundamental ideas.

The party is now a "living corpse," in the opinion of this former top CP leader. The suspension of *The Daily Worker* was "the final dramatic proof of a situation that had existed for some time, that the Communist Party of the United States has ceased to exist for all practical purposes."

"Less than 5,000 members remain," he continues, "of whom no more than a third pay dues, and few carry on meaningful activities. The average age level is past 50, and for a decade there has been no recruitment of young people or new members. All of which contrasts with the 75,000 members at the close of the World War, apart from 20,000 young Communists, and it contrasts also with at least the 17,000 members when the party's crisis broke open in 1956."

Gates' present political position is contradictory. He remains opposed to capitalism, including emphatically such of its institutions as the House Un-

American Activities Committee and the FBI political police. He remains in favor of planned economy and socialism. He no longer feels allegiance to the Soviet bureaucracy although he is a partisan of Soviet achievements. He recognizes the truth about a number of vile crimes committed under Stalin. He acknowledges that workers democracy is needed in the Soviet bloc. ("... socialism is incomplete and distorted in the Communist countries. It remains to be fulfilled.") And, as before, he is for an end to the cold war and to the nuclear weapons tests; he advocates recognition of the new China.

All this is progressive. Quite different are his recommendations as to what to do next in the United States. These indicate deep pessimism: Until the labor movement accepts socialist ideas, socialist electoral efforts "can amount to no more than a cry in the wilderness." He is not against socialist tickets but they generally serve "to isolate socialists from the labor movement and even to make socialist ideas suspect." (As in the case of Debs?) He favors working in the Democratic party with the hope of "transforming" it into something "similar to the British Labor Party." (Is that easier than transforming the Communist party into something similar to a socialist organization?) His boldest goal for the immediate future is a new New Deal, a coalition embracing all classes which would establish "the principle" of "public regulation of Big Business." The "FDR" myth blocks his thinking. Paying penance for having gone along with what he now considers to be the unjust expulsion of Earl Browder, he believes that the Peoples Front policy of the Communist party under the "aegis" of Browder (Where was Stalin?) provides a model for the radical movement today. Even supporting Henry Wallace in 1948 was a mistake, he insists, not because of the former Vice President's capitalist program but because "we . . . cut ourselves off from the mainstream."

Gates thus appears to be inclined to move toward the program of socialist renovation of the Soviet Union; yet obstinately refuses to get out of the mire of "unity" with capitalist politicians like Harriman. From these mutually exclusive positions he gets well tangled in tactical questions facing the American socialist movement today. These involve what to advocate as transitional formations and measures on the road to socialism, such as a Labor party, a government that starts to go beyond capitalism but is still not socialist, increasing popular control of industrial management, curbs on profit-making, and so on.

While floundering in this fashion, Gates raises questions of fundamental concern: The ultimate cause of the lack of democracy in the Soviet Union today. ("There is something wrong in this system.") The real nature of the dicta-

torship of the proletariat. ("It is based on the total monopoly of the Communist Party . . . This easily becomes socialist despotism.") The correct relationship between democracy and centralism in a combat socialist party. ("Our problems . . . dated back to the party's inception forty years earlier.") The validity of Lenin's organizational concepts. ("I said we must take a 'new look at the concept of democratic centralism' which seems to result in a 'semi-military type of organization.'")

The drift of these ideas is clear. It is toward the Social Democratic position that Stalinism was inherent in Leninism; that Stalin's monstrous crimes and dictatorial rule can ultimately be traced back to Lenin's method of party organization. This is Gates' former superficial position with the signs changed. Stalin is still Lenin's heir but instead of pluses, both men get minuses. Added to the demand for "unity" with liberal capitalists and support of the Harrimans, this would seem to put Gates well within the Social Democratic camp. But a crucial difference remains: he is pro-Soviet.

Nevertheless the logic of his development must make it more and more difficult for him to escape the question, "What's to prevent crimes like those committed under Stalin from happening here if America goes socialist?"

For 27 years Gates evaded this question by refusing to admit to himself that anything could be less than perfect

under Stalin. The reality is now upon him and in 1958 he is faced with accepting one of two diametrically opposite answers — (1) serfdom is inherent in any planned economy; (2) planned economy in an industrially advanced area of sufficient size removes the material foundation for all forms of slavery and totalitarian rule.

One hopes that enough of the youthful Gates still remains to lead him to serious investigation of what Marxist theory and experience, as kept alive in the Trotskyist movement, has to offer in the way of proof of the correctness of the latter answer.

But he seems still to be under the influence of the Stalinist ban against reading anything by T----y. He was physically courageous enough to jump from planes in his paratroop training but not until he was in prison could he screw up enough intellectual daring to read Orwell's biting novel *1984*, which was on the CP's *Index*. Beyond that he mentions nothing to indicate an attempt to overcome his illiteracy. He gives no indication even of having accepted Howard Fast's challenge to CP members to read *The Revolution Betrayed*. It is safe to say, however, that without studying Trotsky's writings he will never reach an understanding of so much as his own 27-year experience in the Communist party. It remains to be seen how thoroughly this former leader of the Communist party has been shaken from his dogmatic slumbers.

"The economics and sociology of Marxism are simply wrong as an analysis and prognosis of 'capitalism.' In advanced industrial communities the 'proletariat' grows richer . . . 'workers revolutions' can come about only in backward rural economies . . . Marxism in practice serves purposes and fulfills functions that have nothing in common with the postulated aims and goals of Marxist theory."

Having built his thesis on such an untenable foundation, little wonder Schuman finds constant shifts in interpretation necessary!

If this renowned professor of politics and history had not gone in for what his publisher calls his "prophetic analyses" and had adhered to the use of authenticated, well-documented historical facts, he could have produced a book of lasting value for reference. For mixed with his analytical nonsense he gives in condensed form a lively account of Soviet versus capitalist diplomatic parrying in the hot and cold wars from the time of the 1917 Revolution to the crises of 1956.

His review of the ten days that shook the world; of the diplomatic perfidy of the Allies after the Revolution; the brutality they perpetrated in the civil war; his evidence that there was no popular support for the Constituent Assembly; his ridicule of the slanders of the Bolsheviks in the United States press — all this is valuable history concisely presented.

But then we step into a morass of falsehood and slander in Schuman's account of Soviet development after Lenin's death. This stems from Schuman's Stalinist leanings. In his *Soviet Politics* of 1946, Schuman accepted as authentic Stalin's falsifications of history and presented Stalin as the great leader and the real architect of Soviet progress. He repeated Stalinist slanders of Trotsky and for good measure added a few of his own. He revealed a hatred of Trotsky and all that Trotsky represented. Which, after all, is not surprising. One of Schuman's petty-bourgeois persuasion more often than not tends to gravitate to a Stalin rather than a Trotsky. Stalin had the power. And, as Trotsky himself wrote of such characters as Schuman: "The machinery of state! Every petty bourgeois is brought up in adoration of this mystic principle . . . Removing in imagination not only his hat but his shoes too, the petty bourgeois comes tip-toeing into the temple of the idol in stocking feet . . ."

But *Russia Since 1917* was written after the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU. This made it obligatory for Schuman to modify his tributes to Stalin. This he does, at times being severely critical. However there is no softening in his hatred of Trotsky. While admitting that Stalin had Trotsky's role in the civil war expunged from history, Schuman still accepts the

Dr. Schuman Reconsiders

by Hilde Macleod

RUSSIA SINCE 1917. Four Decades of Soviet Politics, by Frederick L. Schuman. Alfred A. Knopf, New York. 1957. 508 pp. \$6.50.

A note by the publisher informs us that Dr. Schuman, Professor of Government, Williams College, is an "outstanding interpreter" of Russian affairs. *Russia Since 1917*, written after his recent third visit to the Soviet Union, is in many respects a follow-up of his former *Soviet Politics* published in 1946. That this latest book was, in part, written to cover up the most flagrant misconceptions and misinterpretations so authoritatively presented before, he practically admits. "Many judgments" he writes, "on many matters offered a decade ago have been much modified in view of new facts, precisely as many of the evaluations here set forth may well be in need of alteration a decade hence."

Dr. Schuman is too optimistic. Many of his present evaluations already need alteration — only one year hence.

Schuman's failure of interpretation and his need for continual alteration "in view of new facts" stems from his superficial method. He bases his analyses on temporary conjunctures. This leads one to believe he has never conscientiously studied the fundamentals of the new Soviet society, has no understanding of Marxism, and lacks awareness of revolution as a motor force of history.

Schuman has observed Stalinism in action. For him that suffices. So he concludes that Stalinism equals Marxism, for Marxism is "a cosmology, a creed, a gospel" and the works of Marx and Engels are to Marxists "revelation, sacred writings and scriptures." ". . . the very history of the USSR refutes the relationship that Marx assumed"; so

Stalinist version of the disputes about industrialization and other economic developments in the USSR.

Schuman states categorically: "On all points Trotsky was wrong. Being wrong he was never able to forgive Stalin for being right." And as a measure of his hatred of Trotsky, he still refers his readers to that compilation of slanders, *The Great Conspiracy* by Sayers and Kahn.

In 1946 Schuman accepted the Stalinist version of the Moscow trials. In 1957, in spite of all the "new facts," he repeats his vilification of Trotsky and the Left Opposition. Only in a footnote does he suggest that there might be doubts about the authenticity of the evidence by his admission that "The injustices and abuses were of gargantuan proportions."

But then he also states: "It is still conceivable that some of the 'confessions' were partly true rather than wholly false . . . other evidence in support of the view that an actual conspiracy existed need not be ignored . . ." Furthermore Schuman does his best to cast doubt on the idea that Trotsky's murder was Stalin's GPU agent, seeming to prefer the murderer's own explanation that he was a disgruntled "Trotskyite."

It is also necessary for Schuman to ignore all of Trotsky's writings on the rise of fascism and its causes, particularly his warning to the Soviet Union of the danger it faced if Hitler came to power. It is Schuman's contention that Stalin was driven inexorably, by Allied rebuffs, to the deal with Hitler which, says Schuman, ". . . outchamberlained Chamberlain in a masterly super-Munich."

That the German CP was guilty of betrayal of the world proletariat, would, of course, never occur to Schuman, just as he could see no betrayal of the workers and of Marxist principles in Stalin's later role, of which he wrote with apparent approval: "He urged French Communists to support De Gaulle, and Italian Communists to accept King Victor Emanuel and Badoglio. He urged Tito to accept the monarchy and cooperate with Britain. By the same logic he urged Mao-Tse Tung to compromise with Chiang Kai-shek . . ."

Schuman's review of Allied diplomacy in the 1930's is, however, keen and cogent. His presentation of capitalist maneuvering in the cold war and Korean war periods gives a clear-cut picture of the antics and cloak-and-dagger performances of Western statesmen.

His argument that the double-crossing and chicanery of Allied diplomacy was due to the hope that the "Fascist Triplice" would save "civilization" from Bolshevism, is ironclad. His review of how the East European countries were sold out to Hitler by Allied statesmen should be required reading — in

public — for their counterparts of today, who, hypocritically, bemoan the plight of these satellites.

Also, in these days of "indirect aggression" Schuman's record of the diplomatic lying and the falsification of news by such authorities as Secretary of State Byrnes and the *New York Times*, particularly as preparation for the Truman Doctrine, is pertinent history. Likewise his listing — and an impressive listing it is — of the many incitements to war against the Soviet Union by United States congressmen, generals and their public mouthpieces who voiced such sentiments as "the vitals of the Soviet state will be scorched and destroyed by the terrible fire of the atomic bomb."

Hearing such threats, the Soviet people can hardly be blamed for extreme distrust of Western governments. They know what war means. Schuman reminds us of this: "So appalling was the devastation of [Russian] homes and lives and livelihoods that no alien ob-

Sure, They're Honest

by Paul Abbott

THE BIG NAME, by William M. Freeman. Printer's Ink Books, New York. 1957. 230 pp. \$3.75.

THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS, by Vance Packard. Pocket Books, Inc., New York. 1957. 242 pp. 35c.

Although there are "marginal operators interested only in the quick buck," today's advertisers as a rule are honest. They have learned "that an honest advertisement pays richer dividends in continuing public patronage than any other type of copy." *The Big Name* purports to be a study of how the most effective type of advertisement, the testimonial, came to be honest. The book also contains valuable information on how to wangle or buy signatures to testimonials (which are most often prepared by advertising agencies), how to avoid having testimonials create a sour response among consumers or result in damaging law suits.

Part of the secret is to undertake "a careful investigation" of the big-name signers of testimonials "in regard to morals, political beliefs, possibility of controversial aspects and any other implications that might not serve the best interests of the client. For example, it would not help very much to have John Smith, well-known poet, endorse the Thom McAn Jaguar Model shoe as the best for strolling in a sylvan dell and composing immortal lines for the Pulitzer prize, only to have it disclosed that he walked in the woods to leave

server could reasonably imagine any recovery within less than a generation." What it means to rebuild after such devastation the Soviet workers also well know, since they accomplished it in one decade. Schuman reminds us that "this miracle of restoration, unlike its counterpart in West Germany, Normandy and other battle-scarred regions was achieved without foreign aid."

Dr. Schuman has a special reason for his praise of the USSR. He is a man with a mission. He has a plan for world salvation based on his final thesis that the two great powers, the U.S. and the USSR, already have reached a degree of what he calls "cultural convergence." He thinks this trend will of necessity continue. That divergence, not convergence, is the trend would be obvious surely to any political realist. But divergence doesn't fit Dr. Schuman's thesis. He ends his muddled peroration with a prayer expressed in the words of the Lord to the prophet Jeremiah. It is an ending most fitting.

messages for a spy ring in a pumpkin."

In *The Hidden Persuaders*, a serious study, Vance Packard does not pay much attention to the "honesty" of the advertising racket. He notes that \$9,000,000,000 was spent in advertising in the United States in 1955, roughly \$53 for each man, woman, and child. Why does Big Business feel such compelling need to persuade people to buy the commodities they make?

The basic answer is that industry is producing "perhaps as much as 40%" more than the market can absorb. Under threat of extinction each company must increase its share of the market and all of them face the threat of "a great depression."

Packard surveys what the pitchmen are doing to induce greater buying, particularly how they are using depth psychology to get the public to buy despite its own best interests and rational inclinations. Packard's findings are startling, often amusing, and sometimes shocking.

The use of depth psychology by the hucksters is a perversion of science, in Packard's opinion. Grave enough in the commodity market, its extension into other fields involves the fate of America's democratic institutions. Both the Democratic and Republican machines, Packard notes, have turned increasingly to the hucksters to sell their candidates, "drawing upon the insights of Pavlov and his conditioned reflexes, Freud and his father images, Riesman and his concept of modern American voters as

spectator-consumers of politics, and Batten, Barten, Durstine and Osborn and their mass merchandising lore."

In what sinister ways the big corporations use the new psychological findings, beside stepping up the sales of cheese or prunes, is indicated by such instructive examples of their handling of employees as the following: "Several companies were reported employing a psychiatrist on a full-time basis. And increasingly employees began being psycho-tested in various ways while on the job. At a Boston department store girl clerks had to wait on customers with the knowledge that a psychologist was somewhere in the background watching them and recording their every action on an instrument called an 'interaction chronograph,' which recorded data on a tape recorder. The notations made of each girl's talk, smile, nods, gestures while coping with a customer provided a picture of her sociability and resourcefulness."

Psycho-testing in the selection of personnel for management goes so far as to include the wives of applicants. *Fortune* magazine is quoted: "Management knows exactly what kind of wife it wants. With a remarkable uniformity of phrasing, corporation officials all over the country sketch the ideal. In her simplest terms she is a wife who is (1) highly adaptable, (2) highly gregarious, (3) realizes her husband belongs to the corporation."

A study of 8,300 executives, reported in the *Harvard Business Review*, put it even more bluntly when it stated that the mid-century American wife of an executive "must not demand too much of her husband's time or interest. Because of his single-minded concentration on his job, even his sexual activity is relegated to a secondary place."

The liveliness of this exposé of Big Business huckstering and where it is taking us is illustrated by the following item which explains why the laughter at some of the jokes on TV comedy programs appears to have come from a brain-washed audience:

"It has been discovered, or purportedly discovered, that people are more apt to laugh and enjoy themselves if they hear other people laughing." But live audiences are not tractable; often they don't laugh when the advertiser wants them to. "As a result of this need for canned laughter companies have sprung up selling laughs by the platter, with such labels as 'applause'; 'applause with whistles'; 'applause — large spirited audience'; and 'large audience in continuous hilarity.' TV comedy writer Goodman Ace explains how this works . . . 'The producer orders a gross of assorted yaks and boffs, and sprinkles the whole sound track with a lacing of simpering snorts.' On another occasion he said that the canned laugh is 'woven in wherever the director imagines the joke or situation warrants a laugh. It comes in all sizes and the

director has to be a pretty big man who can resist splicing in a roar of glee when only a chuckle would suffice.'

"With the growing need for synthetic hilarity in precise dosages more refined techniques for producing it were developed. One network engineer invented an organlike machine with six keys that can turn on and off six sizes

of laughter from small chuckles to rolling-in-the-aisle guffaws. By using chords the operator can improvise dozens of variations on the six basic quantitative laughs. Also according to *Newsweek* the producer of the *I Love Lucy* show developed a machine that can produce one hundred kinds of laughs."

Schweitzer's Appeals

PEACE OR ATOMIC WAR? by Albert Schweitzer. Henry Holt and Co., New York. 1958. 47 pp. \$1.50.

These three appeals to end nuclear tests were broadcast from Oslo, Norway, on April 28, 29, and 30, 1958. Outside of the *Saturday Review*, which printed them in full, the press followed a policy of ignoring the eloquent words of the world-famous Dr. Schweitzer.

In the first appeal, Dr. Schweitzer stresses the danger of even a small amount of nuclear poisoning of the world's atmosphere. The crime is projected into the future; for, by affecting the human gene, thousands in coming generations are doomed to be born with "the most serious mental and physical defects." The crime also violates international law for it affects whole countries that do not engage in nuclear tests. "Who is giving these countries the right to experiment, in time of peace, with weapons involving the most serious risks for the whole world?"

The second appeal deals with the danger of an atomic war. At present, according to the author, there is a stock of about 50,000 atom and H-bombs. Only fifteen to twenty H-bombs are required to finish off countries like England, West Germany, and France. The danger of annihilating all mankind is therefore real.

The cold war can turn into an atomic war in Dr. Schweitzer's opinion. Even an accident can plunge the world into the nuclear catastrophe. How close we have already come to this can be judged from the following incident: "The radar stations of the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Coastal Command reported that an invasion of unidentified bombers was on the way. Upon this warning the General, who was in command of the strategic bomber force, decided to order a reprisal bombardment to commence. However, realizing the enormity of his responsibility, he then hesitated. Shortly afterward it was discovered that the radar stations had made a technical error. What would have happened if a less balanced general had been in his place?"

It is regrettable that Dr. Schweitzer chose, after this sound presentation of the crime and the danger, to offer in his

third appeal an unrealistic alternative to the present drift toward war:

His proposal is a Summit Conference — and a highly undemocratic one: "Only the highest personalities of the three nuclear powers, together with their experts and advisers, should take their seats there."

To make the conference successful, no preliminary conditions should be insisted upon such as general disarmament. The conference should confine itself to one point and begin with that — the renunciation of nuclear weapons.

However, to bring this desirable end about, Dr. Schweitzer is forced to indicate different preliminary conditions of formidable character: Statesmen must "return to a diplomatic method" and avoid "unnecessary, thoughtless, discourteous, foolish, and offensive remarks . . ." "In the final analysis East and West are dependent on presupposing a certain reciprocal trust in one another." "If we want to work our way out of the desperate situation in which we find ourselves, another spirit must enter into the people."


Perhaps as a lesson on how trusting people must become to follow his prescription, Dr. Schweitzer approvingly cites Eisenhower's demagogic response to the launching of Sputnik II: "What the world needs more than a gigantic leap into space is a gigantic leap into peace." This sentiment was expressed by the same Eisenhower who later took the gigantic Lebanon and Quemoy leaps toward atomic war.

Will the ordinary people of the world respectfully wait for the highest personalities of the three nuclear powers to respond to the entry of another spirit? It's not likely. The working people have means at their disposal for achieving peace more powerful than the nuclear war weapons held by the highest personalities. They have class solidarity, mass action and the goal of socialism.

How to facilitate the use of these means is the problem our best minds should be considering; not how to plead more effectively with the breed who began their nuclear tests by dropping two atom bombs on crowded cities.

J.H.

***Trotsky's
Diary
in
Exile
1935***



Reveals details of Trotsky's life in France and Norway as friends and members of his family fell under Stalin's persecution. Poignant passages disclose how the famous exile came to realize that his most important task was to train a new generation of socialist leaders. The notations he jotted down on his feelings, reading, and response to events show the world's leading socialist as a most human figure.

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