

The Rising Tide of Labor in Britain

By Michael Drum

The New
INTERNATIONAL

May • 1944

The Steel Workers' Convention

By David Coolidge

Trotsky on Engels

Marxism and Military Warfare

A Middle-Class Interpretation of History

By Joseph Leonard

China Under Japanese Domination

By Ria Stone

The S.W.P. and the Fourth International

By Max Shachtman

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The Notebook

Paul Temple's analysis of the economic and political theories of technocracy (March and April NEW INTERNATIONAL) stirred a tempest in some quarters. The "CHQ" (Continental Headquarters) of Technocracy, Inc., ordered two hundred copies of the March issue and two hundred and fifty copies of the April issue. A California technocrat sent in cash for ten more and the morning mail continues to bear written evidence of a literary bombshell that really exploded!

In all honesty we must report that the comments were mostly of the taunting kind, denoting a high degree of loyalty that technocrats have to their movement. What did our readers think of the Temple articles? We'd like to have their opinions on this—and everything else—that appears in The NEW INTERNATIONAL.

A reader in Detroit writes: "The Piece on 'Ups and Downs of the Labor Party Movement' hit the nail on the head. Not only about the Stalinist tactics—deliberate lying, etc.—of the leadership of the Socialist Workers Party, but about the potentialities of the recently formed Michigan Commonwealth Federation. The leaders of the MCF are playing Jekyll and Hyde with their 'principles,' as witness their disgraceful antics at the PAC conference in Detroit. I guess we won't get a Labor Party in the United States until the rank and file of labor, which has more guts than its leadership, succeeds in instilling some of it in the high places."

A detailed, analytical article on the MCF is in preparation and will appear in an early issue. Written from first-hand observations in Detroit, it will include a history of its origins, development, leadership and prospects. However, it may be delayed to include the results of the MCF constitutional convention to be held in Lansing, Mich., sometime in July.

Subscriptions picked up slightly in the past month. New York City, Brooklyn and Reading, Pa., led all the rest, with subs received from Washington, D. C., Columbus, Berkeley, Buffalo, New Haven, Cleveland, Chicago, Cincinnati, Birdsboro, Pa., Brookline, Mass., and points as distant as Texas, Wyoming and the San Fernando Valley in California. Youngstown, Ohio, ordered a monthly bundle and two of the nation's leading universities completed their files of The NEW INTERNATIONAL with bound volumes for the past years.

Incidentally, the bound volumes of the NI for 1943, long delayed by manpower shortages at our printer's and binder's, is now on sale. The indexed, red-covered, stiff-bound volume retails at \$2.50. Your check, money order or cash, addressed to our business office will bring you this volume, post-free

We have assembled a limited number of volumes of The NEW INTERNATIONAL, dating back to the time of its initial appearance in 1934. These will be bound and offered for sale soon. Readers who are willing to part with unneeded or duplicate copies of early issues of the NI could make a worthy contribution to our press fund by sending them in to us for binding purposes.

Did you know that July, 1944, marks the tenth anniversary of The NEW INTERNATIONAL? As part of our "tin" jubilee celebration, we are planning that issue to be the biggest and best value in our history, with special features and articles by past and present contributors. We are even toying with the idea of a slick cover in colors for the special event, and an enlarged issue. But more about that later on.

T. R. C.

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THE NEW INTERNATIONAL

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VOLUME X

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NOTES OF THE MONTH

Labor Problems at the Steel Workers Convention

The recent convention of the United Steel Workers of America revealed in the starkest manner all the contradictions which the labor movement has been placed in through the operation of the class collaborationist and pro-war attitude of the trade union leadership. And not only were the contradictions between class collaboration and the material needs of the working class easily apparent, but it was also clear that among the CIO leadership, at least, there is great fear that they will not be able to hold the line much longer in the face of growing resentment among the workers. Furthermore, the labor leaders are beginning to understand just a little that they too, as well as the rank and file, are being kicked around by the Administration in all its various branches. This fact, known not only to all the trade union leadership but to the rank and file as well, does not make it easier for the labor bureaucracy to continue with the line of the past two years. Neither the big stick, nor pleading, or sophistry or the usual maudlin and extraneous sentiments about not failing the boys on the fronts, suffices any longer. One simple weakness of the tactic of appealing to the patriotic sentiments of the workers is its total irrelevance in the mind of the intelligent worker. Not only is this appeal irrelevant but also misplaced and essentially impotent. It is irrelevant in the first place because it bears no logical or practical relation to the question of production, except from the standpoint of increasing capitalist profits. Virtually every government official who has any connection with war production has commented again and again on the tremendous and phenomenal rise in production. This has been particularly true in the production of ships, airplanes and munitions. Next is the fact that the demand of labor for wage increases is just that and nothing more: a demand for more money in the pay envelope to take home. A steel worker can be a flaming patriot, like Murray, or a revolutionary opponent of the war and yet discover a community of interest based on the need for a wage increase of seventeen cents an hour.

The Labor Leaders and Wages

The labor leaders continue to tie up the demand for wages with the question of production and the problem of winning the war. The government claims that wages are stabilized because this is a device for avoiding inflation, or runaway inflation, as it is often termed. Labor leaders as a rule do not attack this inflation theory of the government. This would lead them

into a head-on conflict with the Administration, expose the fraudulent nature of the "inflationary spiral" propaganda and make it extremely difficult for the union bureaucracy to continue support of the concessions which labor has made during the war. Union leaders have posed as experts on the war and what is required from labor, but they have had little to say on the matter of monopoly prices and the maintenance of cartel agreements in relation to inflation. That is, such important and pertinent things as high profits, salaries, dividends and monopoly prices are not used by the trade union leadership in order to expose the essentially fraudulent claims about wage increases producing inflation.

The CIO has demonstrated that the cost of living has risen 43.5 per cent since January, 1941. But even this is not pushed energetically as the basis for the demand for a rise in wages. The labor leadership refrains from conducting a campaign for wage increases based on the increase in profits, salaries, dividends and the rise in the cost of living. They always bring in the war. Not the war profits, salaries, dividends and interest, but the military problem of winning the war and the patriotic responsibility of labor to win the war, no matter what the bourgeoisie may happen to be doing.

There is a reason for this queer procedure by the trade union bureaucracy. Should they say point-blank that the workers are entitled to a wage increase and that the granting of such an increase has no necessary connection with the winning or losing of the war, then there would be no way to escape making a frontal attack on the whole governmental set-up as it relates to labor. To take such a position in practice would be inconsistent with the pledge not to strike for the duration of the war. Should the labor leaders take the war and patriotism hokus-pocus out of the wages question and stick to their time-honored claims about economic demands, collective bargaining and the "just demands of labor," they would be forced to answer very embarrassing questions about the no-strike pledge.

In order to escape this embarrassment we see the miserable performance of Murray at the recent steel workers' convention, telling the delegates that if they withdrew the no-strike pledge that would be regarded as an insult to the armed forces, and using the preparations for the coming military invasion of Europe as an argument against rescinding the no-strike pledge. If one looks only at the surface antics of the labor leadership, neither their position nor their apology for their position makes sense. Here is the fact that both the AFL and the CIO have produced statistics to prove that the cost of living has risen 43.5 per cent since January 1, nearly twice as much as the index of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The steel workers have prepared a thoroughly documented and competent brief on the condition of steel workers and the ability of the steel corporations to pay increased wages. Industry was dumbfounded at the deadly accuracy of this brief and the irrefutable presentation of the steel union officials. Furthermore, the figure of the Bureau of Labor Statistics shows that the cost of living has advanced beyond the provisions of the Little Steel formula. And yet the CIO leader-

ship contents itself before its own members with the argument that the objective economic situation is not what should decide the policy of the unions but the military question of winning the war; a matter, of course, which labor is not called on to decide and cannot now decide. The question which labor can decide and is squarely confronted with and for which labor is responsible to itself is deliberately obscured by the leadership in the most jesuitical manner, with a great deal of cant and saccharine verbosity about labor's responsibility for not holding up production and for the necessity "to win this war."

Labor and "Winning the War"

Even if it is assumed that labor has a responsibility to "win the war," what can the working class do that it has not already done? Nobody except a few professional liars, DAR reactionaries and the most incorrigibly and blindly reactionary of the bourgeoisie even pretend that labor has not produced in more than abundance. Even the most stupid must know by now that net profits have mounted to such gigantic sums that the money is actually available to pay even greater wage increases than are asked by the workers. Then why do the labor leaders hesitate to let the matter of wage increases rest on the sound and unadulterated foundation of need, validity, justice and the availability of the necessary wealth with which to meet the demand? Why do they confuse the question of the war with the simple economic demands of the workers, especially when the material satisfaction of those demands can easily be taken care of with ill effects only upon the big monopolists?

Furthermore, why does the labor bureaucracy become so disturbed when the no-strike pledge is attacked? Is it because they believe the no-strike pledge has resulted in gains for labor? How can they prove this and to whom? Surely not to the steel workers or the shipyard workers. It would be difficult to prove to the miners that they would have gained more if they had not had their four strikes last year. This, of course, is one of Murray's beloved arguments. The steel workers had a certain number of members at the time the no-strike pledge was given; and now, just look: after two years of the pledge, the union has around two hundred thousand more members. Could any argument in support of the no-strike pledge be more fatuous and asinine? To be sure the union has more members. It has a bigger treasury. Having more members and a bigger treasury made it possible to raise the wages of the regional directors from \$360 to \$500 a month. But the steel workers get the same wages from the steel corporations they got two years ago. Their regional directors will get an additional \$140 a month from the union treasury, but the ordinary rank and file have no idea when, if ever, they will get their modest little seventeen cents an hour increase. Murray gets his \$20,000 and Bittner, Golden and McDonald their \$10,000, but the seventeen cents an hour increase of the steel workers rests safely in the archives of the War Labor Board.

Are the labor bureaucrats worried for fear revocation of the no-strike pledge would produce strikes all over the country and thereby curtail production? Strikes would stop production; that is the purpose of a strike. But does it follow that mere rescinding of the pledge would cause strikes? We can say that it would be possible to rescind the no-strike pledge and there be no increase in strikes merely because the pledge had been rescinded, just as it would have been possible to refuse to give the pledge and yet keep strikes at a minimum. Workers don't go on strike merely to demonstrate their

independence, or to prove that they can live without working.

In the present concrete situation, however, revocation of the no-strike pledge would undoubtedly precipitate a wave of strikes and filing of strike notices under the Smith-Connally Act. The labor bureaucracy knows this. They know that the pledge is a deterrent. Therefore they fight in every convention and in every edition of the union papers for a continuation of the pledge. But this can't save them. When we say that revocation of the pledge would be followed by a wave of strikes we only say that the strikes would be justifiable and a reasonable and responsible action by the working class. That is, it would be a responsible class action by the workers in their own class interests.

Effects of the No-Strike Pledge

No matter what arguments were or could have been made for the no-strike pledge, those arguments have been proved invalid, defeatist and disruptive. The pledge has weakened the labor movement and pushed it back. The militancy of the movement was dampened while the employers and the government took the offensive against labor. Constant reaffirmation of the pledge left labor no weapon with which to meet this offensive. All of this should be clear even to the editor of that putrid and miserable petty bourgeois weekly, *The Nation*, which proclaimed last year that the miners should not strike, no matter what their grievances were.

It is because they recognize now that they face defeat that the workers would resort to their former militancy, including the strike. They have beheld the complete failure of the cringing and puerile pacifist methods of their leaders. The miners were forced to strike four times in one year to get even some slight gains. The shipbuilding workers asked for a small wage increase in the summer of 1943 and some of these workers were granted about one-half of the increase asked in the spring of 1944. The steel workers' contract expired in December, 1943, and despite Murray's blustering about not working without a contract, in May, 1944, these workers do not have a contract. After a walkout of approximately 175,000 of them in December, 1943, in May, 1943, not only have they not received any wage increase but there is no evidence that the WLB plans to render a decision prior to the November election. As this is being written, the only activity going on in connection with the case is a parade of steel barons, bourgeois economists and other sycophants before the WLB insisting that to raise wages in steel would wreck this infant and struggling industry. This is the industry whose net profits during the war have increased 244.6 per cent over the period 1936 to 1939. Steel dividends during the war have increased 59.1 per cent, assets over one billion dollars and reserves have increased by 161 million dollars. To this must be appended the revenue provision that steel companies which break even or make a profit during the war are guaranteed tax refunds for two years equal to their peacetime annual average net profits.

All of these facts and more have been placed before the steel workers in the brief laid before the WLB. While this brief applies specifically to the steel industry, its main lines are applicable to the whole of industry and labor. The grievances of labor have been compiled, organized and argued with clarity and force. Not a single contention made by labor has been refuted. But the labor movement only sits and waits and listens to the upper bureaucracy demand reaffirmation of the no-strike pledge.

Murray feigned surprise at the steel workers' convention that the delegates showed so little interest in the wage ques-

tion when presented to the convention. He wanted spirited discussion on this issue. But what was there to discuss? Two days before, the convention had reaffirmed the no-strike pledge. A rock-ribbed case was in the hands of the WLB. In the light of this real situation, what was there to discuss? The growing experience of labor, the facts in the case and the increasing realization that a stalemate has been reached indicate one thing and one thing only: labor cannot move so long as it adheres to the no-strike pledge.

An Impasse Has Been Reached

Murray, the two Greens, Thomas, Reuther and the rest of the AFL-CIO leadership know this. They know that an impasse has been reached. They know that the condition of the working class is not improving. They ought to know that it will steadily grow worse if some steps are not taken to halt the organized and planned offensive of the bourgeoisie and its government. This situation confuses and perturbs hundreds of thousands of workers. At the recent steel convention, the writer was discussing the question with some delegates who took the position: "We don't want strikes during the war, but we are against this no-strike pledge. It ties our hands."

In order to clarify the problem before the trade unions it is necessary to get at the roots of the difficulty. The problem is not resolved merely by saying that the union bureaucracy is pro-war. Thousands of workers are pro-war in the sense that they believe Hitler must be defeated or that fascism must be defeated. Thousands believe that the war is being fought for something they call "democracy." There are other thousands who take a more positive and unambiguous pro-war position. But in the ranks of each of these groups are very militant workers who are thoroughly dissatisfied with the no-strike pledge and other events transpiring today. There is reason to believe that if a secret referendum was held the overwhelming majority of labor would vote to revoke the no-strike pledge.

AFL and CIO Differences and Similarities

The CIO leadership is pro-war, but there is a difference between the AFL and the CIO on this matter. With the AFL the pro-war position is a type of unadulterated and direct class collaboration. The AFL leadership goes along with "free enterprise" wherever it may lead, whether in peace or war. This leadership does not and cannot conceive of the labor movement as in any way divorced from capitalism even in its most conservative manifestations. The AFL can therefore endorse Martin Dies for reelection and issue a statement on post-war planning that in no important aspect differs from the pronouncements of Eric Johnston, president of the United States Chamber of Commerce. To be sure, a part of the orientation of the AFL is based on its feud with the CIO and the preference of the big bourgeoisie for the older organization. Furthermore, the AFL is always concerned with using and protecting whatever bargaining advantages it may have as an organization of skilled craftsmen which has established a certain prestige and stability in the narrow field in which craft unionism operates. This prestige and stability and the preference of many employers for dealing with a "responsible" organization give the AFL some advantage when attempting to expand into the mass production field.

The AFL was never as ardent a supporter of the New Deal as was the CIO. The older organization was always a little suspicious of the value of government intervention in the solution of the problems of industry-labor relations. This attitude

was based not only on the basic Gompers philosophy but probably on the experience of the leaders with concrete experiences the organization had had with such forms of intervention as court injunctions, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and the Clayton Act. Long before the New Deal, Gompers had hailed Section 6 of the Clayton Act, beginning with, "The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce," as labor's "Magna Charta upon which the working people will rear their constitution of industrial freedom." Despite this outburst of Gompers, a few years later the AFL was fighting all along the line for a change in the procedure of the courts in validating "yellow dog" contracts and holding them not in violation of the provisions of the Clayton Act.

Furthermore, the AFL, following the oft-quoted statement of Gompers, believed that the time had come for industry and labor to sit together at the council table to arrive at decisions in the mutual interest of both groups. The government should remain aloof and permit labor and capital to solve their own problems. The old-line trade union bureaucracy were and remain protagonists of a type of craft business unionism which developed alongside *laissez-faire* capitalism. This philosophy is reiterated and emphasized again in the recent AFL pronouncement on post-war planning.

While it must be emphasized over and over that both the AFL and CIO are pro-war and class-collaborationist institutions, the difference in approach to the solution of the problems of labor is important for understanding the dilemma of the CIO leadership.

New Deal Misunderstood

The pro-war allegiance of the CIO bureaucracy flows not only from their basic collaborationist position but also from the way this bureaucracy appraises the New Deal. In the long run, of course, any principled position they may have in connection with the New Deal is reduced in practice to simple support of Roosevelt, who to them is the New Deal made flesh and dwelling among men. It must be remembered that the CIO came on the scene in the heyday of the New Deal, which was hailed as labor's new Magna Charta upon which the working people would surely this time rear their constitution of industrial freedom. It is not difficult to understand how such simple and primeval minds as Philip Murray's might be beguiled into believing that New Deal capitalism was pro-labor. One can understand also why a leader such as R. J. Thomas, fortuitously hurtled to the top of the UAW, might not be able to grasp the meaning of the New Deal. It is easy also to explore the minds of the "socialists," John Green and Walter Reuther, and see that to them the New Deal represented one rung in the gradualist ladder leading to "socialism in our time."

Murray, and John L. Lewis too for that matter, did not understand that the New Deal was a relief measure. The fact that some of the more romantically exuberant and liberal New Dealers may have believed that their refurbished capitalism would bring plenty for all does not alter the fact that the New Deal was instituted in order to hold the line for capitalism. Roosevelt said this again and again but class collaborationist labor leaders are not famous for being guided by these utterances of bourgeois statesmen which are true and factual. The federal housing program was a relief measure and was never envisaged as a permanent feature of capitalist society competing with private construction. The forty-hour week was also a relief measure made for an emergency in order to spread the work. The capitalist press is correct in stating

this insofar as the bare facts in the case are involved. The bourgeoisie hammers away at this for its own class reasons, of course. What the labor leaders have failed to do is to attack the scuttling of the federal housing program and the extension of the work-week in a way demanded by the class interests of the proletariat. The same goes for the so-called premium pay which was relinquished without a struggle.

The more enlightened of the CIO leadership saw that the system of "free enterprise" had broken down. Roosevelt saw this also. He set out to repair the damage. The CIO leaders concluded that a part of the damage Roosevelt would repair was the damage which had been done the working class and the trade unions in the days of Harding, Coolidge and Hoover. The Republican Party was conceived in sin and born in iniquity, but the Democratic Party of Roosevelt had been washed in the blood of the lamb. They sensed that in the circumstances, government aid and intervention were necessary. They called on the New Deal to protect labor, to rescue the people from want and insecurity.

Labor leaders either forgot or did not understand that business was also calling on the government for help. If their plea was not so loud as that of labor, business at least was willing for government to intervene long enough to help "free enterprise" to stand on its feet again. Also the labor bureaucracy did not realize that in days past business had not only acquiesced in government intervention but had demanded it. For decades and decades, for instance, business has demanded and received aid and protection from government in the form of increasingly high protective tariffs. And the story of the building of the railroads with government subsidies in cash and free land could have taught labor leaders some of the things important to know about whose interests capitalist governments really serve.

The New Dealers declared that they were out to help everybody. The CIO leaders took their representations at face value. These gullible men, politically ignorant and whose grasp of economic realities is as slight as that of Alf Landon, dragged the whole labor movement into the New Deal fair-land. In the long run, as is evident today, this meant to drag the labor movement into the net of the bourgeoisie. There were certain agitational and tactical advantages labor could have secured from the New Deal. But the class-collaborationist labor leaders, like all class-collaborationists, proceeded tactically and in practice not from a base of proletarian class principles, but on a purely opportunistic platform which keeps the working class tied to the Democratic Party—which means: tied to Roosevelt and the bourgeoisie. This is important for any understanding of the dilemma the CIO leadership finds itself in. The root of the difficulty would be crystal-clear if the Republicans should win in November. It is in part to save themselves from this acute embarrassment that Murray and the others strive with might and main to force Roosevelt to run again, and will turn heaven and earth to secure his election.

Tied to Roosevelt

The coming of the Second Imperialist World War complicated things for the trade union bureaucracy, especially the CIO leadership. Not simply because, as believers in class collaboration, they would accept the war, but concretely for the reason that they were and are Roosevelt idolators. They are not only American patriots of the common garden variety, but Roosevelt patriots. They were blind to the relationship between the New Deal and capitalist society, but also to the

relationship between the present war and capitalist society. They make no significant connection between the war, capitalism, the importunities of bourgeois society and the difficulties the labor movement faces. The CIO leadership still looks to Roosevelt as a savior; not just a lesser evil, but a real savior. To them there is only one evil, the defeat of Roosevelt and the victory of the Republicans. They see but two alternatives: Roosevelt or the Republicans. They follow Roosevelt even though he slay them and the labor movement.

This is why Murray is always disturbed by the raising of the no-strike pledge. A commitment has been made to Roosevelt. He is for Roosevelt and Roosevelt is for the war. This is the concrete way that class collaboration expresses itself right now. This is how and why in practice the CIO bureaucracy delimits the activity of the unions even on the wages question and other matters like longer hours, "work or fight," job stabilization, income taxes, etc.

We said further back that the existence of the war is not relevant in a discussion of the wage demands or to insistence on revoking the no-strike pledge. It is now necessary to clarify this judgment. These considerations are not relevant if one is taking a position based on the needs and interests of the working class as a class. Labor resents the no-strike pledge, presses its demands for wage increases and continues to strike because the working class discovers out of its experience that it must do this to protect its organization and standards of living. That is, labor pursues the class struggle because of class need despite any attitude which workers may have on the war as such. We are witnessing today the formation of class-conscious attitudes in the ranks of labor. This is unquestionably due in part to the increasing success of the propaganda of the Marxists, which is surely being integrated into the experience of the proletariat.

The trade union bureaucracy has some meager understanding of what is taking place. They know that to yield only a little will cause the dam to burst and the result will be the rising of the resentment of labor to flood tide. Hence the appeal to patriotism, to the "support of the boys over there" and to keeping "our promise to the President." In this sense, that is from their pro-Roosevelt, pro-war position, their advocacy of class peace and the feeling that there is no other place to go, the seemingly queer actions of the leaders are relevant.

Restoring Labor's Power

It is interesting to note that whereas the AFL and CIO make a different approach to the problem of government intervention, the paths of both organizations converge and they move off together in the same direction: support of the Second Imperialist World War. And not only this, but each organization moves in the direction of the other in politics. The AFL for years has had the position that in politics they would "reward their friends and punish their enemies." But that is precisely what the CIO position reduces to. The fact that the people supported by the CIO are less reactionary than some supported by the AFL does not by any means answer the real problems faced by the labor movement. Neither the AFL nor the CIO candidates for office are pro-labor in the sense of being against the Little Steel formula, high income taxes for workers, or any of the other measures put through by the ruling class. The AFL supports those candidates who are friends of labor as the AFL understands it. The CIO supports those candidates who support Roosevelt.

The no-strike pledge today represents the apex of class collaboration. The fact that it was given in relation to the

war is not only significant as evidence of the support of the imperialist war by the labor bureaucracy but also as a manifestation of the willingness of the trade union leadership to push the working class as a class into capitulation to the bourgeoisie as a class. The rescinding of the no-strike pledge would not be merely an incentive for labor to press its demands by vigorous mass action but, far more important, it would mean that as a class labor had risen to its feet again, that it had improved its understanding, if not of the theoretical implications of their action, at least of the more practical manifestations of present-day imperialist society. Such a political act by the proletariat would certainly be understood by the bourgeoisie for what it really was: intensification of the class struggle.

Furthermore, in the course of the struggle against the no-strike pledge, those militant workers who are still pro-war would have their education enhanced. They would begin to understand the contradiction between support of the impe-

rialist war and the insistence on their class rights and the defense of their class position. They would learn that the Little Steel formula is a class weapon of the ruling class in a period of capitalist war and that support of that war can only militate against asserting an independent working class position even on the seemingly simple question of wages in an era of gargantuan profits.

Revoking the no-strike pledge as a militant class action would also reveal to labor the real rôle of Roosevelt and the Democratic Party. In the ensuing class conflict labor would discover the need for independent working class political action, the most imperative need of the proletariat today. The continued activity of the Marxists in the labor movement and their persistent intercession in behalf of class struggle would open the way for the rehabilitation of the labor movement on a far higher and more political plane.

DAVID COOLIDGE.

A Blow at the Fourth International

'The Militant' and Our Italian Comrades

Those of us who are interested above all in the victory of international socialism have received exceptionally good news. We have waited with patience and with confidence for the emergence of the genuinely revolutionary socialist movement in Europe. Our confidence has been justified; our patience rewarded. In Italy, where the imperialist front was first broken by the revolutionary uprising of the masses, the real socialists, the Trotskyists, have come together again and formed an organization of their own.

That is a sign of things to come. The treachery of the Stalinists, and the miserable capitulation of the right-wing socialists, has left the road clear to the growth of the revolutionary socialist movement represented in the United States by the Workers Party, in Italy by our new organization, and throughout the world by the Fourth International. In its growth lies the hope of tomorrow. Every worker to whom the ideal of socialism is dear follows its growth with passionate interest and the warmest solidarity.

We of the Workers Party greeted the formation of the new group with great enthusiasm, and immediately decided to give it the maximum aid. Our members and friends throughout the country have joined in this greeting with almost unprecedented vigor.

Like *Labor Action*, *The Militant*, which is the spokesman of the Socialist Workers Party, also printed the first manifesto to be issued by our Italian comrades. Here is how they headlined it in the April 8 issue of *The Militant*: "Trotskyists in Italy Issue Call for Socialist Struggle. Denounce the Betrayals by the Second and Third International; Summon Masses to Fight for Socialist United States of Europe." The editors commented that this "very important document" was "issued by the Italian Trotskyists in the name of the Provisional National Center which has been constituted for the building of the Communist Internationalist Party (Fourth International). The text of this document is the first definitive proof that the gen-

We reprint here an article that appeared in a recent issue of *Labor Action* because it deserves the attention of our readers in general, and in particular of those revolutionists throughout the world who are working to rebuild the international Marxist movement. The position taken by the Socialist Workers Party toward our Italian comrades is nothing less than a blow struck at the Fourth International. It is an urgent duty of all the supporters of the Fourth International to react against this blow and to react immediately and forthrightly. Silence or equivocation on this question would be inexcusable.—*Editor*.

uine voice of revolutionary socialism is beginning to make itself heard amid the crucial events in Italy."

It is true that in reprinting the manifesto, the editors noted what they called "the vaguest and weakest section of the document," namely, the section on Russia. The reason for this was that the section indicates that our Italian comrades have not fallen into the reactionary trap of supporting Stalinist Russia in the war or designating that slave régime as a "workers' state." The document, while showing how Russia serves Anglo-American imperialism, does not refer to Russia's own imperialist ambitions and plans. But this defect is quite opposite to that of which the SWP complains. In any case, *The Militant* did speak of the document on April 8 as "the genuine voice of revolutionary socialism" and of our comrades as "the Italian Trotskyists." That was good, that was right, that was wise, that was intelligent.

A Change of Mind

But since April 8, the editors have apparently received instructions that are neither good, right, wise nor intelligent. In their May 13 issue, they make a turn-about-face which is downright disgraceful. Under the imposing heading of "Trotskyism and the European Revolution," the editors suddenly find that the manifesto of our Italian comrades is no longer "the genuine voice of revolutionary socialism."

The editors are of course aware that members of the So-

cialist Workers Party, like members of our Workers Party, have responded with enthusiasm and sympathy to the news from Italy. They know, also, that many SWP members are beginning to reflect seriously and critically upon their disastrous party policy of supporting the Russian army as it advances to crush the coming European working class revolution under the weight of the GPU. The SWP policy of "unconditional defense of the Soviet Union" is not working out so well! So the editors proceed to pour an icy douche over this part of their followers:

"Nothing could be more fatal to the Trotskyist movement than to permit instinctive sympathy—for any insurgent groups fighting under the difficult conditions which exist in Europe today—to betray us into political conciliationism."

Political conciliationism with the counter-revolutionary Stalinist régime is all right for the SWP—but no "conciliationism" with the revolutionary socialists of Italy. The editors piously note that they can help the revolution in Europe and help "build a strong Trotskyist organization, only by drawing a sharp line of demarcation between the genuine Trotskyists and the imposters and muddleheads." In five short weeks, the Italian Trotskyists have ceased to be Trotskyists or to speak with "the genuine voice of revolutionary socialism" and have become "imposters and muddleheads."

Why? Because the "wiser" heads in the SWP have now realized what was always clear: "The authors of this manifesto, who apparently wish to deny such defense [of Russia], felt the necessity of equivocating. No group can really be Trotskyist if it attempts to straddle the Russian question. The manifesto does not call for the defense of the Soviet Union. It does not characterize the Soviet Union as a workers' state. Therefore the manifesto is not an authentic Trotskyist manifesto."

The language and style are typically Stalinist (even if used in the name of Trotsky), and so is the spirit of this excommunication.

Position of Italian Comrades

Just think of this:

After more than twenty years of fascist rule, after almost five years of the most devastating war in history, and in face of mountainous difficulties, a group of Trotskyists is organized and comes forward with a document which rings out as the "genuine voice of revolutionary socialism" even to the editors of *The Militant*. This group has what is so rare in the working class movement right now—a sound position on the imperialist war and both camps in it. It has a correct position on fascism, imperialist democracy and the struggle for socialism. It has a correct position on Stalinism and the right-wing socialists, the Third and Second Internationals. Its position on the Socialist United States of Europe and world socialism is correct. So is its position on the struggle for democratic rights and demands in Italy, and the relation of this struggle to the fight for workers' power.

All this is of tremendous importance to the reviving revolutionary movement in Europe, and therefore to all of us here in the United States. On May 13, however, *The Militant* sees absolutely nothing of all this and has not a word to say about it. Its original greeting is replaced by a venomous denunciation. The "Italian Trotskyists" become "imposters and muddleheads." Workers are warned against yielding to their "instinctive sympathy" for the new Italian movement. The whole fundamental position of the Italian revolutionists fades

into complete unimportance by the side of their unforgivable sin: *They do not adopt the SWP position on Stalinist Russia!*

SWP Wrong on Two Counts

The editors of *The Militant* are wrong on two counts (we politely use the word "wrong" instead of the more accurate term, "stupid and criminal").

First, so far as the "Russian question" is concerned, the Italian comrades are a thousand times more correct than the SWP. The latter can only help break the neck of the coming revolution in Europe. Today, the Russian army already stands on the threshold of Poland; tomorrow, perhaps, it will face Germany. The workers and peasants who will surely move to overturn their ruling classes and attempt to establish their own government power, will face an army which Trotsky once rightly called the tool of the Stalinist Bonapartes, the counter-revolution in Moscow. If the Polish and German masses follow the policy of the SWP, which calls upon them to work for the victory of the Stalinist army, they will facilitate the crushing of their revolution by this army and by the GPU—nothing less. *The SWP is simply asking these workers to dig their own graves!*

Our Italian comrades understand this; the SWP, with its mad fixation on "unconditional defense" of Stalinist Russia, refuses to understand it. We are entirely opposed to the SWP here, and entirely on the side of our Italian comrades and of all the other European Fourth Internationalists who have already taken or who will certainly take the same basic view.

Second, even if the Italian comrades were as wrong on Russia as *The Militant* says, since when has the position on this question become the *only* decisive test for partisans of a Fourth International? Who decided that, and when? We know that in the past many comrades were similarly "wrong" on the Russian question without being read out of the Trotskyist movement—and read out so shamefully at that. In 1939 and 1940, when half of the American Trotskyist movement was also "wrong" on the Russian question, in the opinion of *The Militant* and even of Trotsky, the latter strongly insisted that there was room in a united SWP for both groups and opinions, and that there should not be a separation over that question. If a split did nevertheless occur in the SWP, it was mainly because of the impossible conditions for membership the party leaders tried to make the opposition swallow.

Trotsky understood that the "Russian question" was not quite so simple as the SWP now holds it to be; that positions taken on it were much more subject to change than on any other important question in the revolutionary movement; that it was the Trotskyist movement itself, more than any other, which had modified its position on Russia a dozen times in accordance with changes in the situation and reconsiderations.

Trotskyism, for us, is modern revolutionary socialism. For us, all the fundamental principles of the socialist criticism of capitalist society, of the struggle for workers' power, of the building of the new society—the principles of socialist internationalism—are embraced by the word "Trotskyism," modern Marxism. Only idiots can reduce "Trotskyism" to one aspect of Trotsky's position—real or perverted—on Russia, and declare slavish adherence to this position *THE* supreme test of a revolutionary socialist.

It is the SWP leaders who have introduced this new twist in the Trotskyist movement. We shall see what the other supporters of the Fourth International, as well as the SWP

members themselves, have to say about this innovation. The SWP itself has changed Trotsky's position on Russia—but in a reactionary direction, so that it becomes more and more the tail-end of Stalinism, as we have repeatedly shown in these pages. The party leaders are blind and seek to blind everyone

who listens to them. Their attack upon our Italian comrades is one of the rottenest examples of what we mean. Will they open their eyes only after the "defense of Russia" has brought about the crushing of the European revolution?

MAX SHACHTMAN.

Engle's War Articles

Trotsky Reviews "The General's" Military Work *

Friedrich Engels' book is, for the most part, an analytical chronicle of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. It is composed of articles published in the English *Pall Mall Gazette* during the war events. This is enough to make it clear that the reader cannot count on finding in these articles a sort of monograph on war or any systematic presentation of the theory of the art of war. No, Engels' task consisted—proceeding from the general appraisal of the forces and means of the two adversaries and following from day to day the manner of employing these forces and means—in helping the reader orient himself in the course of the military operations and even in lifting the so-called veil of the future a little from time to time. Military articles of this kind fill at least two-thirds of the book. The remaining third consists of articles devoted to various special fields of the military profession again in closest connection with the course of the Franco-Prussian War: "How to Fight the Prussians," "The Rationale of the Prussian Army System," "Saragossa-Paris," "The Emperor's Apologia," and so on.

It is clear that a book of this kind cannot be read and studied like the other, purely theoretical, works of Engels. To understand perfectly the ideas and evaluations of a concrete, factual kind contained in this book, all the operations of the Franco-Prussian War must be followed step by step on the map, and the viewpoints set forth in the latest war-historical literature taken into consideration. The average reader cannot of course set himself the task of such a critical-scientific labor: it calls for military training, a great expenditure of time and special interest in the subject. But would such interest be justified? In our opinion, Yes. It is justified primarily from the standpoint of a correct evaluation of the military level and the military perspicacity of Friedrich Engels himself. A thorough examination of Engels' extremely concise text, the comparison of his judgments and prognoses with the judgments and prognoses made at the same time by military writers of the time, could count on attracting great interest, and would not only be a valuable contribution to the biography of Engels—and his biography is an important chapter in the history of socialism—but also as an extremely apt illustration in the question of the reciprocal relations between Marxism and the military profession.

A Thoroughgoing Work

Of Marxism or dialectics, Engels says not a word in all these articles; which is not to be astonished at, for he was writing anonymously for an arch-bourgeois periodical and

*Friedrich Engels: *Notes on the War*. Sixty articles reprinted from the *Pall Mall Gazette*, 1870-71. Edited by Friedrich Adler. Vienna. 1923.

that at a time when the name of Marx was still little known. But not only these outward reasons prompted Engels to refrain from all general-theoretical considerations. We may be convinced that even if Engels had had the opportunity then to discuss the events of the war in a revolutionary-Marxian paper—with far greater freedom for expressing his political sympathies and antipathies—he would nevertheless hardly have approached the analysis and the estimation of the course of the war differently than he did in the *Pall Mall Gazette*. Engels injected no abstract doctrine into the domain of the science of war from without and did not set up any tactical recipes, newly-discovered by himself, as universal criteria.

Regardless of the conciseness of the presentation, we see nonetheless with what attentiveness the author deals with all the elements of the profession of war, from the territorial areas and the population figures of the countries involved down to the biographical researches into the past of General Trochu for the purpose of being better acquainted with his methods and habits. Behind these articles is sensed a vast preceding and continuing labor. Engels, who was not only a profound thinker, but also an excellent writer, dishes up no raw material for the reader. This may give the impression of cursiveness in some of his observations and generalizations. This is not really so. The critical elaboration he made of the empirical material is tremendously far-reaching. This may be perceived from the fact that the subsequent course of the events of the war repeatedly confirmed Engels' prognoses. We need not doubt that a searching study of this work of Engels in the sense referred to by our young war theoreticians would show even more the great earnestness with which Engels treated the conduct of war as such.

Quantity and Quality in War

But even among those who merely read and do not study the book—and they will make up the overwhelming majority even among the military people—this work of Engels will arouse great interest, not because of its analytical presentation of the various military operations but because of the general appraisal of the course of the war and the judgments made in the specific military fields that are scattered through many passages of his war chronicle and in part, as already stated, are dealt with in entire articles.

The old idea of the Pythagoreans, that the world is ruled by numbers—in the realistic and not the mystical sense of the word—may be especially well applied to war. First of all—the number of battalions. Then the number of guns, the number of ordnance pieces are expressed quantitatively: through the range of the firearm, through its accuracy. The moral quali-

ties of the soldiers are expressed in the capacity to endure long marches, to hold out for a long time under enemy fire, etc. However, the further we penetrate into this field, the more complicated the question becomes. The amount and character of the equipment depends upon the condition of the forces of production of the country. The composition of the army and the personnel of its command is conditioned by the social structure of society. The administrative supply apparatus depends upon the general-state apparatus, which is determined by the nature of the ruling class. The morale of the army depends upon the mutual relations of the classes, upon the ability of the ruling class to make the tasks of the war the subjective aims of the army. The degree of the ability and talent of the commanding personnel depends in turn upon the historical rôle of the ruling class, upon its ability to concentrate the best creative forces of the land upon their aims, and this ability depends again in turn upon whether the ruling class plays a progressive historical rôle or has outlived itself and is only fighting for its existence.

Here we have disclosed only the basic coördinates, and even these only schematically. In reality, the dependance of the various fields of war conduct upon each other, and of all of them taken together upon the various aspects of the social order, are much more complex and detailed. On the battlefield, this is all summed up in the last analysis in the number of ordinary soldiers, the commander, the dead and wounded, prisoners and deserters, in the size of the conquered territory and in the number of trophies. But how is the end-result to be foreseen? If it were possible exactly to register and determine in advance all the elements of a battle and a war, there would be no war altogether, for nobody would ever think of heading toward a defeat assured in advance. But we cannot talk of such an exact foreseeing of all the factors. Only the most immediate material elements of war may be expressed in numbers.

In so far, however, as it is a question of the dependence of the material elements of the army upon the economy of the country as a whole, any appraisal, and therefore also any foresight, will have a much more conditional value. This applies especially to the so-called moral factors: the political equilibrium in the country, the tenacity of the army, the attitude of the hinterland, the coördination of the work of the state apparatus, the talents of the commander, etc. Laplace says that an intellect that was in a position to take in at a glance all the processes developing in the universe would be able to foretell without error everything that would take place in the future. This undoubtedly follows from the principle of determinism: no phenomenon without a cause. But, as is known, there is no such intellect, neither individual nor collective. Therefore it is also possible for even the best informed and most gifted men to err very often in their foresight. But it is clear that the right foresight is most closely approached the better the elements of the process are known, the greater the ability to find their right place, to estimate them and combine them, the greater the scientific creative experience, the broader the horizon.

Infantry, Then and Now

In his military newspaper chronicle, so modest in the task it sets itself, Engels always remains himself: he brings to his work the sharp eye of a military analyst and synthesizer who has gone through the great social-theoretical school of Marx-Engels, the practical school of the Revolution of 1848, and the First International.

"Let us now compare the forces," says Engels, "that are being got ready for mutual destruction; and to simplify matters, we will take the infantry only. The infantry is the arm which decides battles; any trifling balance of strength in cavalry and artillery, including mitrailleurs and other miracle-working engines, will not count for much on either side." (*Notes on the War*, Note I, page 1.)

What was right, by and large, for France and Germany in 1870, would undoubtedly no longer hold for our time. It is now impossible to determine the relationship of military forces only by the number of battalions. It is true that the infantry remains even today the main factor in battle. But the rôle of the technical coefficients in the infantry has grown extraordinarily, although in very unequal measure in the different armies: we have in mind not only the machine guns which were still "miracle-working" in 1870; not only the artillery, which has increased in number and importance; but also perfectly new auxiliaries: the motor truck for war as well as for transportation purposes, aviation, and war chemistry. Any statistics that do not take these "coefficients" into consideration and deal only with the number of battalions, would now be completely unreal.

On the basis of his calculations, Engels reaches the conclusion: Germany has a far greater number of trained soldiers at its disposal than France, and the superiority of the Germans will manifest itself increasingly with time—unless Louis Napoleon forestalls the enemy at the very outset and strikes him decisive blows before he can bring his potential superiority into play.

Therewith Engels gets to strategy, to that independent domain of the highest war art which is, however, connected by means of a complicated system of levers and transmissions with politics, economics, culture and administration. With regard to strategy, Engels deems it necessary to make the inescapable realistic restrictions right at the outset:

"In the meantime it is well to remember that these strategic plans can never be relied upon for the full effect of what is expected from them. There always occurs a hitch here and a hitch there; corps do not arrive at the exact moment when they are wanted; the enemy makes unexpected moves, or has taken unexpected precautions; and finally, hard, stubborn fighting, or the good sense of a general, often extricates the defeated army from the worst consequences a defeat can have—the loss of communication with its base." (*Ibid.*, Note III, page 6.)

This is indubitably correct. Only the late Pfuell or one of his belated admirers could raise objection to such a realistic conception of strategy: to take into account what is most important in the whole war plan and to do it with the greatest completeness permitted by circumstances; consideration for those elements which cannot be determined in advance; formulation of orders in such a flexible way as to make them adaptable to the actual situation and its unforeseen variants; and the main thing: timely recording of every essential change in the situation and corresponding alterations of the plan or even its complete rearrangement—this is precisely what the true art of the conduct of war consists of. If the strategical plan could be invested with an exhaustive character, if the state of the weather, of the soldier's stomach and legs, and the intentions of the adversary could be accounted for in advance, then any robot who has mastered the four first rules of arithmetic could be a victorious field commander. Luckily or unluckily, it cannot be done. The war plan has in no wise an absolute character, and the existence of the best plan, as En-

gels rightly points out, far from guarantees the victory. On the other hand, any lack of plan makes defeat inevitable. Any commander who is half-way serious knows the orienting, if not absolute, value of a plan. But the commander who would reject a plan for this reason, would either be shot or locked in a madhouse.

Politics in the Army

How did matters stand with the strategical plan of Napoleon III? We already know that Germany's vast potential superiority lay in the numerical preponderance of trained human material. As Engels emphasizes, Bonaparte's task consisted in making the employment of this superiority impossible by means of rapid, resolute attacks upon the enemy. One would think that the Napoleonic tradition would have favored precisely such a procedure. But the realization of such audacious war plans, disregarding everything else, depends also upon the exact work of the commissariat, and the whole régime of the Second Empire, with its unbridled and incompetent bureaucracy, was in no wise fit to assure the provisioning and equipping of the troops. Hence the friction and loss of time right at the beginning of the war, the general helplessness, the impossibility of carrying out any plan, and as a result of all this—the collapse.

In some passages, Engels mentions fleetingly the harmful effect that the penetration of "politics" can have in the course of war operations. This observation of his seems at first blush to be in conflict with the conception that war, by and large, is nothing but a continuation of politics. In reality, there is no contradiction here. The war continues politics, but with special means and methods. When politics is compelled, for the solution of its fundamental tasks, to resort to the aid of war, this politics must not hamper the course of the war operations for the sake of its subordinated tasks. When Bonaparte took actions which were obviously inexpedient from the military standpoint in order, as Engels opines, to influence "public opinion" favorably with ephemeral successes, this was undoubtedly to be regarded as an inadmissible invasion of politics into the conduct of the war which made it impossible for the latter to accomplish the fundamental tasks set by politics. To the degree that Bonaparte was forced, in the struggle to preserve his régime, to permit such an invasion of politics, an obvious self-condemnation of the régime was revealed which made the early collapse inevitable.

When the vanquished land, following the complete defeat and capture of its armed forces, attempted under Gambetta's leadership to establish a new army, Engels followed these labors with astonishing understanding of the essence of military organization. He characterized splendidly the young, undisciplined troops who had been assembled by improvisation. Such troops, he says, "are but too ready to cry 'trahison' unless they are at once led against the enemy, and to run away when they are made seriously to feel that enemy's presence." (*Ibid.*, pages 88f.) It is impossible not to think here of our own first troop detachments and regiments in 1917-18!

Popular Armed Forces

Engels has an excellent knowledge of where, given all the other necessary pre-conditions, the main difficulties lie in transforming a human mass into a company or a battalion. "Whoever," says he, "has seen popular levies on the drill-ground or under fire—be they Baden Freischaaren, Bull-Run Yankees, French Mobiles, or British Volunteers—will have

perceived at once that the chief cause of the helplessness and unsteadiness of these troops lies in the fact of the officers not knowing their duty." (*Ibid.*, page 79.)

It is most instructive to see how attentively Engels treats the home guards of an army. How far removed this great revolutionist is from all the pseudo-revolutionary chatter which was very popular in France right at that time—on the saving power of a mass mobilization (*levée en masse*), an armed nation (armed in a trice), etc. Engels knows very well the great importance officers and non-commissioned officers have in a battalion. He makes exact calculations on what resources in officers have remained to the republic following the defeat of the regular forces of the Empire. He gives the greatest attention to the development of those features in the new, so-called Loire army which distinguish it from armed human mass. Thus, for example, he records with satisfaction that the new army not only intends to proceed unitedly and to obey orders, but also that it "has learned again one very important thing which Louis Napoleon's army had quite forgotten—light infantry duty, the art of protecting flanks and rear from surprise, of feeling for the enemy, surprising his detachments, procuring information and prisoners." (*Ibid.*, page 96.)

This is how Engels is everywhere in his "newspaper" articles: bold in his grasp of affairs, realistic in method, perspicacious in big things and little, and always scrupulous in the manipulation of materials. He counts the number of drawn and smooth-bore gun barrels of the French, repeatedly checks on the German artillery, thinks of the qualities of the Prussian cavalry horse, and never forgets the qualities of the Prussian non-commissioned officer. Faced in the course of events by the problem of the siege and defense of Paris, he investigates the quality of its fortifications, the strength of the artillery of the Germans and the French, and take up very critically the question of whether there are regular troops behind the walls of Paris that may be called effective for battle. What a pity we did not have this work of Engels in 1918! It would surely have helped us overcome more speedily and easily the then widely disseminated prejudice with which it was sought to counterpose "revolutionary enthusiasm" and the "proletarian spirit" to a professional organization, flawless discipline and trained command.

Engels' Method

The military-critical method of Engels is very clearly expressed, for example, in his thirteenth letter, which deals with the rumor launched from Berlin about "a decisive advance upon Paris." The article on the fortified camp of Paris (Letter Sixteen) met with Marx's enthusiastic applause. A good example of Engel's treatment of military problems is offered by the twenty-fourth letter, which deals with the siege of Paris. Engels sets forth two fundamental factors in advance: "The first is that Paris cannot hope to be relieved, in useful time, by any French army from without. . . . The second point settled is that the garrison of Paris is unfit to act on the offensive on a large scale." (*Ibid.*, page 71.) All the other elements of his analysis rest upon these two points. Very interesting are two judgments on the *franc-tireur* war and the possibilities of employing it, a question which will not lose its importance for us even in the future. Engels' tone gains in confidence with every letter. This confidence is justified inasmuch as it has been confirmed by a twofold test: on one side, by comparison with what the "genuine" military people have written on the same questions, and on the other, by a more effective test—the events themselves.

Relentlessly ruling out of his analysis every abstraction, regarding war as a material chain of operations, considering every operation from the standpoint of the actually existing forces, means and the possibility of employing them, this great revolutionist acts as . . . a war specialist, that is, as a person who by mere virtue of his profession or his vocation proceeds from the internal factors of the conduct of war. It is not astonishing that Engels' articles were attributed to renowned military men of the time, which led to Engels' being nicknamed the "General" among his circle of friends. Yes, he handled military questions like a "general," perhaps not without substantial defects in specific military domains and without the necessary practical experience, but, in exchange, with a talented head such as not every general has on his shoulders.

But, it might be asked, where, after all this, is Marxism? To this may be replied that it is precisely here—up to a certain degree—that it is expressed. One of the fundamental philosophical premises of Marxism says that the truth is always concrete. This means that the profession of war and its problems cannot be dissolved into social and political categories. War is war, and the Marxist who wants to judge it must bear in mind that the truth of war is also concrete. And this is what Engels' book teaches primarily. But not this alone.

If military problems may not be dissolved into general political problems, it is likewise impermissible to separate the latter from the former. As we have already mentioned, war is a continuation of politics by special means. This profoundly dialectical thought was formulated by Clausewitz. War is a continuation of politics: whoever wishes to understand the "continuation" must get clear on what preceded it. But continuation—"by other means"—signifies: it is not enough to be well oriented politically in order to be able therewith also to estimate correctly the "other means" of war. The greatest and incomparable merit of Engels consisted in the fact that while he had a profound grasp of the independent character of war—with its own inner technique, structure, its methods, traditions and prejudices—he was at the same time a great expert in politics, to which war is in the last analysis subordinated.

It need not be said that this tremendous superiority could not guarantee Engels against mistakes in his concrete military judgments and prognoses. During the Civil War in the United States, Engels overrated the purely military superiority that the Southerners displayed in the first period and was therefore inclined to believe in their victory. During the German-Austrian War in 1866, shortly before the decisive battle at Königgrätz, which laid the foundation stone for the predominance of Prussia, Engels counted on a mutiny in the Prussian Landwehr. In the chronicle of the Franco-Prussian War, too, a number of mistakes in isolated matters can undoubtedly be found, even though the general prognosis of Engels in this case was incomparably more correct than in the two examples adduced. Only very naïve persons can think that the greatness of a Marx, Engels or Lenin consists in the automatic infallibility of all their judgments. No, they too made mistakes. But in judging the greatest and most complicated questions they used to make fewer mistakes than all the others. And therein is shown the greatness of their thinking. And also in the fact that their mistakes, when the reasons for them are seriously examined, often proved to be deeper and more instructive than the correct judgment of those who,

accidentally or not, were right as against them in this or that case.

Class Tactics and Strategy

Abstractions of all kinds, such as that every class *must* have specific tactics and strategy peculiar to itself, naturally find no support in Engels. He knows all too well that the foundation of all foundations of a military organization and a war is determined by the level of the development of the productive forces and not by the naked class will. To be sure, it may be said that the feudal epoch had its own tactics and even a number of coördinated tactics, that the bourgeois epoch, in turn, has known not one but several tactics, and that socialism will surely lead to the elaboration of new war tactics if it is forced into the position of having to coexist with capitalism for a long time. Stated in this general form it is correct, in the degree that the level of the productive forces of capitalist society is higher than that of feudal, and in the socialist society it will with time be still higher. But nothing further than this. For it in no wise follows that the proletariat which has attained power and disposes of only a very low level of production, can immediately form new tactics which—in principle—can only flow from the enhanced development of the productive forces of the future socialist society.

In the past we have very often compared economic processes and phenomena with military. Now it will perhaps not be without value to counterpose some military questions to the economic, for in the latter domain we have already garnered a fairly considerable experience. The most important part of industry is working with us under conditions of socialist economy, by virtue of the fact that it is the property of the workers' state and produces on its account and under its direction. By virtue of this circumstance, the social-juridical structure of our industry is incisively distinguished from the capitalistic. This finds its expression in the system of administration of industry, in the election of the directing personnel, in the relationship between the factory management and the workers, etc. But how do matters stand with the process of production itself? Have we perhaps created our own socialist methods of production, which are counterposed to the capitalistic? We are still a long distance from that. The methods of production depend upon the material technique and the cultural and productive level of the workers. Given the worn-out installations and inadequate utilization of our plant, the production process now stands on an incomparably lower level than before the war. In this field we have not only created nothing new, but we can only hope after a number of years to acquire those methods and means of production which are at present introduced into the advanced capitalist countries and which assure them thereby of a far higher productivity of labor. If, however, this is how matters stand in the field of economy, how can it be otherwise in principle in the military field? Tactics depend upon the existing war technique and the military and cultural level of the soldiers.

To be sure, the political and social-juridical structure of our army is basically different from the bourgeois armies. This is expressed in the selection of the commanding personnel, in the relationship between it and the soldier-mass, and primarily in the political aims that inspire our army. But in no wise does it follow from this that now, on the basis of our low technical and cultural level, we are already able to create tactics, new in principle and more perfected, than those which the most civilized beasts of prey of the West have attained. The first steps of the proletariat which has con-

quered power—and these first steps are measured in years—must not—as the same Engels taught—be confused with the socialist society, which stands on a higher stage of development. In accordance with the growth of the productive forces on the basis of socialist property, our production process itself will also necessarily assume a different character than under capitalism. In order to change the character of production qualitatively, we need no more revolutions, no shake-ups in property, etc.: we need only a development of the productive forces on the foundation already created. The same applies also to the army. In the Soviet state, on the basis of a working community between workers and peasants, under the direction of the advanced workers, we shall undoubtedly create new tactics. But when? When our productive forces outstrip the capitalistic, or at least approximate them.

It is understood that in case of military conflicts with capitalist states, we have an advantage, a very small one but an advantage nonetheless, that may cost our possible enemies their heads. This advantage consists in the fact that we have no antagonism between the ruling class and the one from which the mass of the soldiers is composed. We are a workers' and peasants' state and at the same time a workers' and peasants' army. But that is no military superiority but a political one. It would be extremely unwarranted to draw conclusions from this political advantage that would lead to military arrogance and self-overestimation. On the contrary, the better we recognize our backwardness, the more we refrain from braggadocio, the faster we learn the technique and tactics of the advanced capitalist armies, the more warranted will be our hope that in the event of a military conflict we shall drive a sharp wedge, not only of a military but also of a revolutionary kind, right between the bourgeoisie and the soldier-mass of its armies.

Engels' "Nationalism"

I am not certain whether it is appropriate here to mention the famous discovery of the no less famous Chernov* on the "nationalism" of Marx and Engels. The book before us gives a clear answer to this question too, which does not alter our former judgment, but, on the contrary, strengthens it in the most striking way. The interests of the revolution were, for Engels, the highest criterion. He defended the national interests of Germany against the Empire of Bonaparte, because the interests of the unification of the German nation under the concrete historical relations of the time signifies a progressive, potentially-revolutionary force. We are guided by the same method when we now support the national interests of the colonial peoples against imperialism. This position of Engels found its expression, and a very restrained one, in the articles of the first period of the war. How could it have been otherwise: It was after all impossible for Engels, just to please Napoleon and Chernov, to evaluate the Franco-Prussian War in opposition to its historical meaning only because he was himself a German. But the minute the progressive historical task of the war was achieved, the national unification of Germany assured, and besides this, the Second Empire overturned—Engels radically changed his "sympathies"—if we may express his political tendency by this sentimental term. Why did he do this? Because it was now a question, beyond what was achieved, of assuring the predominance of the Prussian Junker in Germany and of Prussianized Germany in Europe.

*Chernov was the outstanding leader of the Social-Revolutionary Party of Russia, a petty bourgeois, non-Marxian organization.—Trans.

Under these conditions, the defense of dismembered France became a revolutionary factor or it might have become one. Engels stands here entirely on the side of the French struggle of defense. But just as in the first half of the war, he does not permit his "sympathies"—or at least endeavors not to permit them—to gain influence over the objective evaluation of the war situation. In both periods of the war, he proceeds from a consideration of the material and moral war factors and seeks a firm objective basis for his prognosis.

It will not be superfluous to point out, at least cursorily, how the "patriot" and "nationalist" Engels, in his article on the fortification and defense of the French capital, sympathetically considered the possibility of an English, Italian, Austrian and Scandinavian intervention in favor of France. His arguments in the columns of an English paper are nothing but an attempt to promote the intervention of a foreign power in the war against the dear Hohenzollern fatherland. This certainly weighs much heavier than even a sealed railway car!*

Engels' interest in military questions had not a national but a purely revolutionary source. Emerging from the events of 1848 as a mature revolutionist who had the *Communist Manifesto* and revolutionary struggles behind him, Engels regarded the question of the conquest of power by the proletariat as a purely practical question, whose solution depended not least of all upon war problems. In the national movements and war events of 1859, 1864, 1866, 1870-71, Engels sought for the direct levers for a revolutionary action. He investigates every new war, discloses its possible connection with revolution, and seeks for ways of assuring the future revolution by the power of arms. Herein lies the explanation for the lively and active, by no means academic and not merely agitational treatment of army and war problems that we find in Engels. With Marx, the position in principle was the same. But Marx did not occupy himself specifically with military questions, relying entirely on his "second fiddle" in such matters.

In the epoch of the Second International, this revolutionary interest in war questions, as, moreover, in many other questions, was almost completely lost. But opportunism was perhaps most plainly expressed in the superficial and disdainful attitude toward militarism as a barbaric institution unworthy of enlightened social-democratic attention. The imperialist war of 1914-18 recalled to mind again—and with what implacable inconsiderateness!—that militarism is not at all merely an object for stereotyped agitation and speeches in Parliament. The war took the socialist parties by surprise and converted their formally oppositional attitude toward militarism into humble genuflections. It was the October Revolution that was first called upon not only to restore the active-revolutionary attitude toward war questions, but also to turn the spearhead of militarism practically against the ruling classes. The world revolution will carry this work to the end.

LEON TROTSKY.

March 19, 1924.

*An allusion to the sealed railway car in which Lenin, together with other Bolshevik and Menshevik leaders, travelled through Germany, by arrangement with the Hohenzollern government in 1917, in order to reach revolutionary Russia. The "sealed car" episode was used by Russian reactionaries, and even some "socialists," as the basis for a slander campaign against Lenin as a "German agent."—Trans.

Rising Tide of Labor in Britain

A Report on the Class Struggle in Great Britain

The massing of Allied military forces in Great Britain for the invasion of the continent obscures for the moment the developing class struggle in the United Kingdom.

While masses of troops and great quantities of war material are deployed, the Churchill-Bevin government finds it expedient to issue orders to Scotland Yard to raid the offices of the Trotskyist Revolutionary Communist Party. It would be difficult to understand this apprehension on the part of the British government and its Labor Minister, Morrison, in whose name the order was issued, if one were unacquainted with the labor scene in the British Isles.

Why are the capitalists and their labor lieutenants so jittery that they must prepare repressive measures against a relative handful of British militants? Not so long ago it was the same Morrison who signed the order for the release of the fascist, Mosley. Although five million workers signed their names in protest against this act of solicitude in behalf of Britain's would-be Führer, the deed was done and the lame explanation given that so strong was Britain's position *vis-à-vis* Hitler that the latter's pal was no longer in a position to render him any effective aid.

There is some truth in this explanation. From the point of view of the British imperialists, Mosley no longer represents a "danger" to them. At the same time, with Hitler's invasion of Britain gone forever, new dangers have come to the fore. The British working class is now presenting its bill with ever-increasing urgency to its ruling class. This is at the core of Churchill's and Bevin's concern over agitators and Trotskyists.

It is somewhat nightmarish for these gentlemen to contemplate that with the second front just beginning, Britain has already experienced a series of nation-wide strike waves greater than any since the British general strike of 1926. What is even more disconcerting is that the London bus drivers should walk out right after Morrison issued his order against "outside agitators" who foment strikes and incite industrial unrest.

The Basis of Unrest

Apparently there is a sound basis for the unrest which is stirring both the most advanced and the most backward industrial areas of the British Isles, and this dissatisfaction promises to make the year 1944 a bigger year for strikes than even 1943.

Neither patriotic appeals from the trade union bureaucrats and the Stalinists nor the chorus of threats and slanders of the Tory press have diverted the British workers from what they consider to be their fighting front for the right to a decent life. What is more, public opinion is with them! The strike of the 100,000 South Wales miners received widespread sympathy from the common people throughout the British Isles.

The working man and woman is not, fortunately, possessed with that irreducible logic that one finds in a Stalinist for whom Russia is everything, the second front paramount, and class peace essential. The British workers have had five years of war and in that time they have learned that things are not

so simple. Much has happened since the air blitz following the fall of France. At that time they thought in elementary terms of survival and were grateful for the miraculous stand of the Royal Air Force, for Hitler's blunder in attacking Russia, and the subsequent amazing resistance of the Russian armies.

Admiration for Russia yielded the British Communist Party large returns. Their membership grew to 60,000. New adherents flocked to them not only from the petty bourgeoisie but also from the working class. It is they who control the national shop stewards' movement.

At the same time, Churchill became the man of the hour, the supreme defender of the nation. In those days, when good old Winnie promised retribution for the bombings on London, Liverpool and Coventry, the same thoughts of revenge existed in the minds of people. This mood has changed. A recent poll of the inhabitants of the most severely bombed areas reveals that a majority of them do not want the German people to be bombed any more. Hate and revenge are giving way to understanding and sympathy for the common people in Germany.

No doubt the British people still want to see Hitler beaten, but this single aim of the past has receded before more immediate and more genuine aspirations. Five years of war have taken their toll of sacrifice. During that time every family has had wrenched from it the best of its manhood. Family life has been greatly destroyed. Women have been forced into industry. Five and a half million women are employed and over two million of them are to be counted today in Great Britain's all-time high of over eight million workers organized in the trade union movement.

What has the working woman's contribution to the war effort netted her? According to the latest official returns of the Ministry of Labor, the average wage for men is about \$26 a week while for women it is about \$12.45. Though the nominal wage in Great Britain is higher than the pre-war wage, the real wage has been computed to be no more than the pre-war real wage. This means that the standard of living of the women workers today in the so-called prosperity period of the war boom is only half of that of the pre-war years.

Wage grievances do not by any means exhaust the causes of discontent of the British workers. But while on the subject of wages it is well to observe that 700,000 British miners average about \$19 a week. In other words, their earning position is just about midway between women workers and the average wage for men. When that is all experienced miners make, it becomes understandable why Bevin has to conscript youth to work in the mines and why such conscription is regarded as the greater evil to conscription into the armed forces. There is no preference given to the young men who are unlucky enough to draw a ballot assigning them to the mines instead of to the forces. Hundreds have already chosen to go to prison as a lesser evil. The thousands who were drafted to work in the mines were among the first to join the strikes of the miners.

Stalinist Strike-Breaking

The Stalinist misleader of the miners, Arthur Horner, toured the South Wales coal fields to break the strike. The [London] *Daily Worker* editors worried themselves sick lest there be a lack of coal for the second front and shrieked:

Britain's war effort is being threatened by dangerous disputes in the coal fields which only the prompt intervention of the government can bring to an end.

We deplore these strikes. They undermine the war effort and do great harm to the cause of the miners. (*Daily Worker*, March 8, 1944.)

The Stalinist appeal for sustaining the second front against the fascist Hitler was understood least of all by those who were conscripted to work in the mines. They had their own ideas as to the location of the real front against forced labor.

The fighting reply of young apprentices in the shipbuilding and engineering industries who were subject to conscription into the mines was formulated in an appeal to the miners by the Tyne Apprentice Committee, which concluded with a demand for "nationalization of the mines and their operation under workers' control."

The capitalist press, assisted by the trade union bureaucrats and the Stalinists, attempted to work up hysteria against the striking British workers, and innumerable cartoons appeared in the bought press around the monotonous theme of the striker stabbing the soldier in the back.

This slimy campaign could get nowhere, as the British soldiers are acutely aware of their class position. Social and class issues are constantly discussed in the armed forces. The British ruling class has found it impossible to prevent widespread and organized discussions of political issues among the soldiers, sailors and airmen. That a similar condition is lacking among American soldiers is difficult for the British soldier to understand. The British Eighth Army is famous not only for its military exploits. The miners and other workers who compose it have made it just as well known for its advanced political and social ideas. Its ideology even penetrated to some degree the seemingly impervious ranks of the American armies which fought with it in the African campaign.

Proposals by Tory spokesmen for an Allied occupation army in Europe for years could only promote still more the anti-Tory sentiment in the armed forces. Government resistance to a raise in pay for the armed services and the fake reemployment bill for ex-servicemen which contains such loopholes as: "The employer's obligation is to reinstate an applicant at the first opportunity, IF ANY, at which it is REASONABLE AND PRACTICAL for him to do so," explains why, in a mock election to Parliament held by a group of British soldiers in Africa, the outcome was overwhelmingly anti-Tory.

Americans in Britain

Contact with the American soldiers has concretized for the British worker and soldier his bleak expectations of the post-war world. Unenviable as is the lot of the millions of American soldiers who have been shipped thousands of miles away from home, the fact is that their appearance in Britain is taken by the people as being somewhat in the nature of a friendly invasion.

In Australia, American forces arrived just in time to help stave off an impending attack from the Japanese. To the people in the British Isles the arrival of the Americans did not even have this merit. Hitler's invasion threat evaporated long

before the mass arrivals of the Americans. Russian resistance to the German armies was received all the more enthusiastically since there was no danger of the Russians operating from British soil.

The presence of great numbers of Americans in Great Britain revealed to the British workers and particularly to the British soldiers the superior competitive position of their American ally. The British found themselves at a disadvantage when it came to buying the good things of life in which one can include what is known as a good time. Shows, dances, dinners, taxis and gifts have always appealed to girls the world over, and in this sphere the British men have often come off second best.

An inferior standard of living is bad enough. It is worse when one is confronted daily with a better one by those who come from the same class though from a different nation. It does not make matters better when, in addition, the Americans take their superiority for granted and do not take the trouble to hide their contempt for their hosts. American arrogance is best expressed in their unflinching use of the resented word "Limey," which is only slightly above the connotation given to the word "Nigger."

For their part, the British people have shown no inclination to appease the racial hatred of the backward American soldiers toward their own Negro comrades. It is a common sight to observe Negro soldiers in the company of British girls. The attempts of Negro-hating American soldiers "to put the Negro in his place" in the British Isles have met with widespread sympathy on the part of the British people for the American Negro soldiers, and American Negro-baiters are often reminded that they are not in the American South but in a much freer community.

The British workers and soldiers are not unaware of the wranglings between their own capitalist class and the American capitalist class over oil in Arabia, post-war air and shipping supremacy, markets, monetary policy and such other items commonly associated with an imperialist war. They have no doubt as to who is calling the tune. Admiration for Churchill fades before the realization that it is Roosevelt who gives the orders which will result in America being the only real victor in the war.

The British worker sees with what means the British ruling class intends to sustain Great Britain, even as a second-rate power. The Tories have no other solution except that of depressing the standard of living of the British working class. That is why Churchill scrapped the mild Beveridge Plan and intervened personally to reverse the passage of the bill giving equal pay to women teachers.

The latter was made into an issue of confidence in the government because it could have become an opening wedge in the struggle to grant women wages equal to those of the men workers. The British ruling class cannot grant the slightest reforms. A slight raise for the men in the armed forces is magnified to the point of a threat of unbridled inflation. The government's housing scheme remains on paper, for fear of offending the lords of real estate and the speculators in land.

Decline of Churchill

There is no confidence at all in Churchill as a peacetime leader, and even as a war leader his prestige constantly diminishes. Between Churchill's enthusiasm for the war and the weariness of the masses, there is a great gulf. That is how it was possible for him to make a terrible psychological blunder when not so long ago he referred to the resumption of German

bombings on London as the return of the good old days. The British people reacted bitterly to this callous remark. This is far from surprising. Even today in every subway station in London one finds women and children victims of a neurosis which drives them to sleep nightly in the stations even when there are no air raids.

Churchill's enthusiasm is understandable from the point of view of his class. The stock exchanges record high dividends, and profits soar. Industrial conscription has been applied only to the common man, while conscription of wealth is a myth. The workers have seen production impeded by bad management and private ownership, but improvement is resisted because it interferes with profits.

The Essential Works Order has resulted in the victimization and imprisonment of thousands of workers, but not a single employer has gone to prison as a result of countless violations on his part. The Joint Production Committees which the Stalinists sponsor so vehemently are used only to increase the exploitation of the worker.

The middle classes and the white collar workers have seen their fixed incomes hit by an increase in the cost of living that is up forty-five per cent over pre-war standards, according to the Oxford Institute of Statistics. At the same time, income taxes slice away as much as fifty per cent of the common man's earnings. It is therefore not difficult to account for the desire of the Postal Workers & Civil Servants Union to affiliate with the Trade Union Center, a step which is strongly opposed by the government. It explains also the success of the Commonwealth Party among the middle classes and the white collar groups.

The Commonwealth Party

The Commonwealth Party registers the leftward mood of the British people. It has intervened in the electoral truce and its successes threaten to sever it. What is significant about this party is that the response to it has been to a program rather than to an organization. In the constituencies in which it has scored victories it participated without a local and established machine. Its electoral apparatus, derisively called Sir Acland's Circus by the Tories, comes to the constituency almost entirely from the outside and scores its victory after an intensive, whirlwind campaign.

The Commonwealth Party is not a revolutionary party. It has never bothered to work out a strategy for ousting the capitalist class should the latter defy the will of the people. Likewise it has never bothered to build a base for itself in the only class capable of overthrowing capitalism—the working class.

However, since there is no lack of money from prominent, rich backers, wealthy men of good will, the party is able to carry through extremely competent agitation and propaganda campaigns. Its meetings take place in the largest halls. Speech-making by prominent national orators is supplemented by music and movies. They have put out an abundant literature, comprising something like three hundred different pamphlets on every conceivable issue. They headline their activity with the demand for a *new social order* and their general demands are: vital democracy, common ownership, equality and security, colonial freedom, and world unity.

The Commonwealth program is general, vague and contradictory. It could not stand up under any serious analysis. Suffice it to say that the Commonwealth Party supports the present war, although it is plain enough that the war is the natural product of capitalist decay. Its idea of world unity

is based on the continued existence of capitalist countries led by the United Nations and the belief that they could form a World Council "to pioneer vigorously toward a world government based upon economic and political democracy and the unity of the human race."

The unreal and illusory character of the Commonwealth program does not invalidate the fact that the British people go for the idea of a new social order and common ownership and the other socialistic planks of the Commonwealth platform, and that they go for it at the drop of a hat.

The mood of the British people is so definitely leftist that it is not strange to find the Commonwealth Party seeking unity with the Labor Party, the Independent Labor Party and the Communist Party for a disruption of the electoral truce and for a common fight against the Tories. Commonwealth has already indicated that it has no desire to compete against the labor parties and plans to put forward one hundred and twenty candidates in the constituencies dominated by the Tories.

The Gallop Poll of June, 1943, revealed that the British people were in a majority for the Labor Party. The middle classes are seeking a rapprochement with labor. If the latter should fail to take the lead toward a new social order, then the Commonwealth Party could conceivably become a fascist party, but this is definitely not the case today.

The Labor Party is under terrific pressure to break with the Conservatives and to take the power that lies waiting for it. Already within the Labor Party local labor leaders intend to run as independents where vacancies occur, as a means of circumventing the truce and preventing any embarrassment to the Bevins and the Morrisons.

The opening of the second front may create a temporary lull in the political and economic struggle of the classes, but there is every assurance that the battle will be that much sharper on the morrow. The longer the Labor Party hesitates, or is unwilling to break with the Tories, the more will its support go to the other parties with a leftist program. The Labor Party leaders are in a dilemma which they cannot resolve. The alternative is a break with the Tories or suffer a big split in the party.

Rôle of Communist Party

The strike-breaking activities of the Communist Party are so cleverly obscured that they could be the chief beneficiaries of the electoral truce if their pro-war line lead them to support it. They are for the truce to the point of supporting the Tory candidates against independents.

The *Daily Worker* on occasion even records the fact of its scabbing. One of its spokesmen, Jack Owens, writes:

A large number of the convenors of factories are members of the Communist Party, and the rest are in sympathy with the policy. I am sure that the general public do not realize that the smooth working in the factories, the absence of strikes, the drive to increase production, can be traced largely to the efforts of the Communist Party. (*Daily Worker*, March 8, 1944.)

If the activities of the Communist Party were so nakedly apparent to its followers, it would not exist as a force on the British scene. Unfortunately, largely because of Russia, it still appears to many workers as *the* revolutionary party. Thus, at the same time as it scabs, the Communist Party can also pose as the champion of the worker in industry. The Stalinists are very clever at exploiting the discontent among the workers. Only a few weeks ago they organized a national conference of shop stewards which was full of sound and fury.

The conference claimed 1,422 delegates, representing 590,438 workers. Even if these figures are inflated, that is no doubt that the Stalinists influence a great many workers. One can see from the resolution adopted by the conference how the Stalinists pretend to be interested in the workers. They are past masters in collecting grievances. The language is familiar:

This dissatisfaction and irritation arose over the open flouting of the Essential Work Order by employers; low rate of pay to women and youths; refusal to recognize trade unions, and a vicious policy of victimization carried on by the more unscrupulous of employers.

The delegates from the shops made fighting speeches and there was a great deal of applause. In the end the resolution showed that it was all to let off steam in order the better to fasten the workers behind the war machine. It urged:

... fullest support to the trade unions in any action they may take to get the government to bring workers into their confidence, by conducting a campaign explaining the need of the war effort so that changes necessary for the coming offensive will be understood.

The Stalinist control of the shop stewards' movement and the dead hand of the bureaucrats on the official trade union organizations provided a dam against strike action, which was bound to crack against the rising flood of discontent. It was in the concrete strike actions that the Stalinists and the trade union bureaucrats revealed themselves for what they are. As a consequence, militant workers who were formerly under their influence are beginning to take an independent line of action.

Rank and File Movements

Thus in Barrow, on the Tyne, on the Clyde, in the Midlands, in South Wales and South Yorkshire, in many of the strike areas, fighting committees have arisen outside of the official trade union and shop stewards' machinery. In Glasgow, traditional center of militancy, workers organized into the "Clyde Workers Committee" and, recognizing the need for a national federation of trade union militants, took the important step of initiating and establishing a national "Militant Workers Federation."

Within the context of the boiling economic and political scene in Great Britain, this development could become a real threat to the hold of the Bevins, Morrisons and Pollitts on the British workers. Potentially these militant factory committees represent also the soviet form of organization in the factories.

Bevin was not unaware of this. It was the occasion for his first outbursts against agitators and Trotskyists, and his threats of repressive legislation. That was months before raids on the Revolutionary Communist Party. That the Trotskyists were singled out for persecution is to be explained not by numerical strength, which they lack at present, but rather by the political consciousness that they would supply to the forward march of labor.

The Militant Workers Federation, which is "outlawed" by both the Labor Party and the Communist Party, receives the active support of the Trotskyists. The Independent Labor Party, which claims 3,000 members, still concerns itself largely with parliamentary activity while its work on the industrial field is behind that of the smaller Revolutionary Communist Party. By their persecutions, Churchill and Bevin reveal what political tendency they fear.

The British Trotskyists will not be eliminated by persecutions of the ruling class and their labor lieutenants. The repressive attempts can only bring them additional support

from a working class which increasingly demands a socialist solution to present-day problems. Opportunities are multiplying for the growth of Trotskyist influence. To a large extent it will be at the expense of Stalinism.

The strike-breaking of the Communist Party has already lost it many militant supporters. However, thousands of others inside and outside the Communist Party still delude themselves with the unofficial line that to win the war and to help Russia to victory is the way to communism in Great Britain and Europe. They believe this because they assume that Russia is a workers' state which is obliged temporarily to play ball with the capitalist nations, but which will promote communism openly as soon as Hitler is defeated.

To these workers, the Communist Party appears as the revolutionary extension of Russia. The Stalinist leaders have been so sensitive to every wind from Russia that the workers rightly identify them as the bona fide representatives of the Russian state and the official defenders of it. It is only natural that workers who believe in the defense of the Soviet Union should also see nothing treacherous about the activities of the Communist Party. When they do lose faith in the Stalinists, they unflinchingly doubt Russia itself. After that, defense of the Soviet Union is meaningless to them.

By and large the British Trotskyists have a good program for the British workers, but their insistence on the defense of the Soviet Union is unrealistic, reactionary and a contribution to continued adherence of workers to the Communist Party. The workers who follow the Stalinists because of Russia have to be told that Stalinists are what they are because Russia is no longer a workers' state. The workers have a much simpler but truer appreciation of the connection between the Communist Parties and Russia. If the Stalinist parties are counter-revolutionary, then Russia must be counter-revolutionary. The sophistries about nationalized property and the "counter-revolutionary workers' state" are inexplicable.

It is therefore no accident that where the Stalinist parties and the Russian state are closely associated in their counter-revolutionary activities, the Trotskyists are beginning to shed the myth of the Russian workers' state. This is so in Italy and in Poland. We can expect the same to happen in more of the European countries. The European workers and the British workers will be presented with increasing evidence of counter-revolutionary activity of the Russian state and its bona fide representatives. They will then turn away from both Russia and the Stalinist parties. The British Trotskyists can only lag behind if they do not soon rid themselves of a superfluous and harmful fiction.

MICHAEL DRUM.

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Maurice William and Marxism

A Middle-Class Interpretation of History

In the December, 1943, issue of *Harper's Magazine* an article by M. Zolotow, entitled "The Dentist Who Changed World History," describes a book written by an old-time member of the Socialist Party attacking the fundamental principles of Marxism. Maurice William, the author, had his book, *The Social Interpretation of History*, privately printed in 1920; he sent copies to most of the better known socialist leaders in America, asking for answers to or appraisals of his work. He never got either.

Since the printing of the book, however, several reasons have appeared which, from the Marxian point of view, make an answer worth while. First, as the *Harper's* article describes, the book was instrumental in turning Sun Yat-sen from Marxism to reformism. Second, John Dewey, whose writings have had a profound influence on contemporary thinking, Marxist and non-Marxist alike, has taken the same line of attack against Marxism. Third, it has become apparent, to me at least, that the theory of William and Dewey is, succinctly stated, one of the fundamental concepts that liberals of less precise turn of mind uphold against the teachings of Marxism.

On page 273 of *Human Nature and Conduct* (Modern Library edition) John Dewey writes:

And the exaggeration of production, due to its isolation from ignored consumption, so hypnotizes attention that even would-be reformers, like Marxian socialists, assert that the entire social problem focuses at the point of production. Since this separation of means from ends signifies an erection of means into ends, it is no wonder that a "materialistic conception of history" emerges. It is not an invention of Marx; it is a record of fact so far as the separation in question obtains. For practicable idealism is found only in a fulfillment, a consumption which is a replenishing, growth, renewal of mind and body. Harmony of social interests is found in the widespread sharing of activities significant in themselves, that is to say, at the point of *consumption*.* But the forcing of production apart from consumption leads to the monstrous belief that class-struggle civil war is a means of social progress, instead of a register of the barriers to its attainment.

[The footnote indicated says: "Acknowledgment is due *The Social Interpretation of History*, by Maurice William."]

It is not the purpose of this article to examine Dewey's attacks on Marxism further, nor to analyze *The Social Interpretation of History* in its entirety (William commits many sectarian atrocities on Marxism, e.g., the "contradiction" between raising immediate demands and the fundamental principles of Marxian economics), but only to analyze the central concept of the book, i.e., the consumers' interpretation of history.

Socialist principles concern themselves with the welfare of the producer...with productive capital...with exploitation at the point of production...with the means of production of social wealth. [Whereas] Social evolution concerns itself with the welfare of the consumer...with consumable wealth...with exploitation at the point of consumption...with the distribution of social wealth. Socialist principles are based on the conflict of interest between the owners of the means of production and the workers, whereas social evolution operates in response to their common interests (page 42).

Organized society came into existence as the result of experience that taught the lesson of mankind's common problem and of the realization that its solution is more likely to be attained through the coöperation of all having a common aim (page 68).

...the propelling motive power behind all social change is the quest for a solution to the problem of existence....All past history is but a

record of trials and experiences man has encountered in his efforts to make secure his earthly existence. The will to live is the universal economic problem (page 68).

Each previous form of society has been called into existence as a gradual outgrowth of the preceding epoch and represented a distinct social advance. The test for any form of society is the ability of its productive forces to supply the wants of society (pages 68-69).

In their economic interests as social beings, as consumers, all groups in society have many more interests in common than those over which they differ; social progress, therefore, is registered mainly in the interest of consumers. Social systems change with a change in the mode of production, but modes of production change because they fail to solve the problem of existence (page 69).

Social evolution in its aim to prove the problem of existence has evolved the social mode of production. The social system adapted to the social mode of production is in the process of evolution, shaping itself in response to the social interests of the majority. Socialism will be realized through a movement of consumers and not a movement of producers (page 70).

...The majority is usually formed through a combination of the powerful and useful as against the remnant of the past and useless of the present. The powerful of our epoch are the owners of the means of production, the useful are all in society who render a socially necessary service (page 117).

The improved method of production [capitalism—J. L.] made the rate of exploitation of the new master class far greater than that to which it had itself been subjected....Nevertheless [the place]...of the exploited...in the social scale represented a distinct advance over the position of the exploited class in the preceding epoch. Their improved condition as consumers and as social beings were the considerations that united the exploited of the new epoch to their exploiters....(page 69).

...The masses have progressed and progressed rapidly, but...Practically the entire list of industrial and social reforms...serve the masses in their capacity as consumers and social beings (page 42).

Marx was a social pathologist. He studied social pathology and mistook the phenomena he observed for the laws of social biology. The manifestations of the class struggle are symptoms of social pathology analogous to such symptoms as pain, heat, redness and swelling in human pathology. The former are no more the laws of sociology than the latter are the laws of biology (page 71).

The class struggle is an effect, not a cause. It is due to insecurity in the means of existence. It is to the interest of society as a whole to eliminate the cause (page 68).

Historical Forces and Events

We shall find many pairs of ideas confused in *The Social Interpretation of History*. Probably the most important is the confusion of that which drives with that which is driven.

Dewey says the class struggle doctrine reflects a forced separation of means from ends. William expresses the same idea when he calls the class struggle an effect and not a cause. All ends are also means, and all effects are also causes. The class struggle is an effect of the unequal distribution of commodities, and the historical changes of society are an effect of the class struggle. More accurately, the class struggle arises out of *all* the conflicting interests of economic classes; the disproportionate distribution of the products of labor is a major bone of contention, but there are others, e.g., leisure time, education, political power, prestige and privileges, freedom from exhausting drudgery, etc. Similarly, the class struggle causes changes in the distribution of commodities, of political power, property forms and property relations, the accepted codes of behavior, religious beliefs, etc.

What Dewey and William mean, of course, is that the class struggle is an *unimportant* means or cause, a by-product

of history, so to speak, and that because Marxists consider it the *main* vehicle of progress they have converted it to an unjustified extent into an end in itself. This assertion involves not only denying the historical evidence that Marxists put forward, which is not under discussion in this article, but also the obligation to furnish an alternative to the class struggle as a motive force in the evolution of society. Marxists use their theory of the class struggle to explain historical facts, to guide their practical political activities, and to predict. If William wishes to do any of these things, and he indicates that he wants to do all three, he must give us something to replace that which he has "refuted." Data does not explain itself; it takes a statistician to make the figures lie.

William cannot, and he does not, furnish an alternative; he hides the deficiency by metaphysically imputing to the inherent nature of society the motive force he wishes to establish. "The quest for a solution to the problem of existence" and a "gradual outgrowth of the preceding epoch" are empty phrases.* Which group is most concerned with the "quest," or are rich and poor equally concerned? What is the origin of the things that make for a "gradual outgrowth?" These questions can be answered in terms of inventors, explorers, scientists and production experts, but this still leaves unfurnished the *vehicle* of change, viz., that advances are made today by *hired agents of the ruling class*.

Who will incorporate advances and discoveries into the economic structure? Marxists explain that the capitalist class today is finding it less and less to its own interests to use many of the brain-products of its own technicians. Only the dictatorship of the proletariat will be able to unleash the forces of production now held in check by the profit-market. (In 1933, the technocrats publicized some interesting data which substantiates the economic argument of the Marxists.) Marxists point to the "shelving" of inventions which would topple (or revolutionize) whole industries. They point to patent "freezing." They point to monopoly restrictions, trust agreements in restraint of trade, cartel commitments to refrain from manufacturing or marketing certain commodities, trade secrets, withholding commodities from the market, even the destruction of desperately needed ("social") commodities (e.g., under the cotton, destroying oranges, etc.). Marxists point to periodically idle factories, to the vast numbers who are either unemployed or in the army (depending on whether there is truce or war), to factories that *could* be built, to tractors that *could* be sent to farmers and peasants. What can William point to?

William's theory doesn't *explain*. "Social evolution" is a metaphysical concept, which is simply a capitalized name for, and abstraction of, the very things William seeks to explain. "Social evolution" (or "the will to live") is no more a scientific explanation than the statement, "Sedative properties is the reason opium puts people to sleep." William has given his ignorance a name, but this does not hide the fact that he has no *interpretation* of history. What passes for historical science in public school, whose teachings William reflects, is only a dry assortment of described events and facts arranged in chronological order, and lacking for the most part any understanding of the cause-effect development of what is described.

The Point of Production and the Point of Consumption

The class struggle that exists precisely at the point of production is an abstract one. The workers' interest is to pro-

*See Paul Temple, "Technocracy: Totalitarian Fantasy," *The New International*, March, 1944.

duce enough for all; the employers' interest is to produce only what can be sold today at a satisfactory profit. But it is not over the question of producing more or less that the struggle in real life develops, although that is its fundamental basis. The struggle to regulate production in the interests of society, or of a class, is a *political* struggle for state power. Before the proletariat can "dictate" the means of production, that is, expand and control production (which is to the interest of all consumers) it must establish its *ownership* of the factories and the land; the only way a class can own and control is through the control of the state.

There is, however, a form of struggle at the point of production which is not abstract. The employer wants the worker to work faster, and for less money, and the worker wants to be treated like a human being. The second of these conflicts, wages, involves not labor power, but the laborer as a consumer. The speed-up and bad working conditions, though, are exploitations at the point of production. In its elementary forms the struggle tends to center around the factory, where the means of production are (e.g., collective bargaining, strikes, lockouts, slowdowns, blacklists, pickets, thugs). But this class struggle, which *arises* from conflicts at the point of production, becomes in its ultimate expression a struggle, not between the union and the company, but between classes for control of the state, the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

There is another point at the point of production that needs clarification. This regards the introduction of improved machines, and of more efficient techniques of production that do not involve speed-up. Generally speaking, there is a very considerable lag between the increased productivity of the worker (and, often, the lowered quality of the product) and a corresponding productivity in his pay envelope. This, plus the fact of technological unemployment, has led some workers to oppose new machinery or shorter processes. This was more true in the early days of capitalism, particularly in England, where there were machine-smashing groups (about 1811-17) called Luddites, after Ned Ludd.

William argues that the workers' class interests are adversely affected by technological progress, but that as consumers they gain from such improvements. (*Whose* theory makes a forced separation between production and consumption?) If the workers fought only for their class interests, William reasons, they would oppose technological progress (i.e., William would say that the Luddites were consistent advocates of the class struggle doctrine). Therefore, it is not the class struggle that brings social progress, but the "social struggle" of consumers.

Capitalism in Ascent and in Decline

Marxists believe (a) that technology advances the consumer interests of the workers (and of all other classes), and (b) that technology *can* (if the machines are owned socially by, or in the interests of, all consumers) advance the interests of the workers as producers also. Therefore, Marxists tell the workers, the only intelligent way to protect their interests, as workers *and* consumers, is to destroy, not the machines, but the capitalist class, which uses the machines against them. The Luddites were not Marxists; it is William who must explain how it is that he and they agree that smashing machinery will advance the class interests of the workers.

William's understanding of the historical development of capitalism is frozen in the Luddite period. He is innocent of the evolutionary, historical idea that a system of economic

organization develops and changes: that in its early period it raises the efficiency and productivity and enables all to benefit (although not equally), but in its *later* period it becomes increasingly torn by conflicts between those who control and fetter production and those who produce and want to increase production.

The bourgeoisie has sprung from the oppressed classes in feudal society... The basis of existence for the new master class was proletarian exploitation (page 65).

William quotes the *Communist Manifesto* to bring out his point: "At this stage, therefore, the proletariat do not fight their enemies, but the enemies of their enemies, the remnants of absolute monarchy, the landowners, the non-industrial bourgeois, the petty bourgeoisie. . . . Every victory so obtained is a victory for the bourgeoisie." William reasons: "The proletariat fought the battles for the bourgeoisie" (page 66); the bourgeoisie was thereby enabled to increase its rate of exploitation, therefore the class-struggle theory is disproved.

William thinks that because the early proletariat aided the bourgeoisie, objectively, in consolidating its (the bourgeoisie's) power, the struggle could not have been a class struggle, but was a "social struggle" of the "powerful and useful" against the "remnants of the past."* A class struggle, thinks William, can only be waged by a class in behalf of its own interests, which at all points (points of production, that is, because a class is defined in terms of its relation to the means of production) are contrary to the interests of the class that exploits it. He thinks, too, that what was true "at this stage" is still true today, i.e., that the proletariat and bourgeoisie can *still* fight side by side in a common social cause that will benefit both the proletarian consumer and the bourgeois consumer.

The working class had, in the beginning, to fight alongside the bourgeoisie against the feudal barons *in order to create the conditions* (modern technology, for one) *for its own coming to power in a later epoch*. As capitalism developed to maturity, and past maturity, the struggle for social reforms came more and more under the leadership of the proletariat; reforms were supported less and less by the significant portions of the capitalist class, although this class had formerly led many of the struggles to achieve progressive reforms.

The Middle Classes and the Capitalist Class

William is for socialism. While he does not point to the economic fetters mentioned above in the section, "Historical Forces and Historical Events," he is against those forces in society which hinder production, which prevent a more abundant solution to the problem of (economic) existence.

The capitalist mode of distribution or exchange based upon the profit principle is inefficient and therefore detrimental both to the interests of the owners of the means of production and the vast majority in society as consumers.

The group of capitalists functioning in the sphere of circulation who obtain their profits through the purchase and sale of commodities have proved inefficient and thus a fetter to social progress. Social evolution, in response to the harmony of interests of the powerful and useful, is operating to eliminate the useless middleman, speculator, merchant, trader, etc. Social evolution has nothing in store for this group of parasites except oblivion. They hamper the full development of the capitalist mode of production and therefore are inimical to social progress (page 106).

*If by "social struggle" William clearly meant only the alliance at that bygone historical period only, of the capitalist class and the working class, this formulation would be acceptable. However, neither "social struggle," "alliance" nor "historical stage" are consistently interpreted by William.

Thus it is the middle class, the store keepers, who are the "useless of the present"; it is they who are holding up progress by their inefficient methods. Marxists agree (a) that small enterprise is inefficient and (b) that the middlemen are being converted into "useful" proletarians and trained technicians as capitalism becomes more and more "fully developed."

Why is there a struggle among consumers? Aren't the middlemen also consumers? Why are they "remnants of the past" or "useless"? What distinguishes them from the rest of society? The only answer that one who believes in William's theory can give is: "The 'remnants' represent an outmoded (inefficient) means of production; and the 'useless' are those who either do not produce at all or else produce at a much lower than average efficiency. Thus, the 'remnants' and the 'useless' are distinguished by their relationship to the means of production." This answer is nothing but the Marxian distinction of economic classes, clumsily put. William and Marx are thus agreed that progress is achieved by the struggle between the efficient classes and those classes which have been shown historically to be incapable of further significantly improving the efficiency, and extent, of production. This is the class struggle.

What about the bankers? Certainly bankers are "parasites"; it is not socially necessary, or efficient, or a likely aid to "social" production, to erect huge buildings to usury. Yet in these buildings most of the important decisions, not only of banks, but of industries and governments, are made.

A consistent believer in William's theory would explain bankers something like this: "It is only through the centralized control of huge amounts of capital that modern industry can develop. The curses of the small business man are that he is tied to his original small machines; he can afford only small-time advertising; he cannot produce for the future market because he cannot afford to have huge assets stocked in warehouses; he must pay monopoly prices for his raw materials and his shipping because he cannot afford his own mines (or whatever) or his own railroad, etc. The bankers, with their private control and extraction of private profit, are not as efficient as social control of the banking function. Therefore, (according to 'the laws of social evolution') the bankers are on their way out, and the banks are becoming socialized."

And then he would have to add either (a) "The government, which acts in the interests of the powerful capitalists and the useful workers (who together form the majority) will 'socialize' banking" or (b) "the bankers, who are part and parcel of the powerful capitalist class because they are among those who extract surplus value, must be forced to give up their parasitic privileges." *Both* these necessarily implied conclusions are asserted by William, not together or in connection with banks specifically, but in other places.

The Marxian interpretation of history shows that preceding and accompanying the gradual disappearance of the inefficient middle class, the banks and big business generally concentrate into their few hands more and more of the wealth and power of the nation. Merchant capitalism becomes finance capitalism, agrarian capitalism becomes imperialist capitalism, "rugged individualism" and "free competition" become monopoly capitalism. The main reason for the disappearance of the middle class is its inability to compete with the ever-growing power of the finance capitalists, who become the dominant section of the bourgeoisie in the highest stages of capitalism.

History records that the road to the highest stage of capitalism is not the road to socialism; it is the road to fascism.

(We shall see farther on that this is not the only place that William's "socialism" resembles Hitler's national socialism.) William still does not recognize the fetters indicated (in the section "Historical Forces and Historical Events"). Capitalism in its more efficient stages tends to eliminate the middle-

man's inefficient enterprises, but at the same time it becomes more and more monopoly capitalism, imperialist capitalism, fascist capitalism. (*To be concluded.*)

JOSEPH LEONARD.

Spain, 1936 – A Study in Soviets – II

The Dual Power in the Civil War

The other point I would like to consider in terms of the Spanish Revolution is the *vitality* of the workers' dual power organs, which ultimately, of course, is synonymous with the vitality of the oppressed classes that create them.

In Russia, from May, 1917, to October, the attacks against the incipient workers' power from the open and concealed counter-revolutionists met clear and forceful opposition from the Bolsheviks. This party called everything by its name, and used its entire apparatus to keep the workers informed as to who was for and who against them. By his skillful and truthful agitation, Lenin won to his party the support of a majority of the delegates to the principal Soviets. His main tactic was to urge the Soviets to the *offensive* against the counter-revolution being prepared in the government offices and foreign embassies. He succeeded, and thus the inherent vitality and recuperativeness of these basic democratic institutions were fused with a conscious leadership guiding them according to the workers' historic interests. Spain presents an enlightening case of mass democratic bodies, the committees, acting politically in a revolutionary situation, without any conscious Marxian leadership, and even without official recognition from any labor group on the scene. Counter-revolutionary attacks, such as the Russian Soviets were able to weaken, abort or beat off, gathered their full force against the unauthorized Spanish committees, and beset them from every side.

Even so, the committees held out for months and were only subdued then by armed violence. More than that, as the betrayal of the reformist socialist, Stalinist and anarchist groups became clear, many of the committees, led by rank and file revolutionists, began to give battle to the official parties, and call belatedly for a return to the revolutionary road—with a sharpness that fully equalled that of Lenin. A brief survey of the development of the dual power in Spain will show how the proletariat intervened again and again through its new political bodies to impose its revolutionary will and defend the workers' power it had established.

Developments of the Dual Power

The anti-fascist committees in the villages proceeded, as I have said, to organize the "new revolutionary order" in both the economic and political spheres and to put into the field an army that could defeat Franco. It was natural that these provincial initiatives should begin earlier and emerge more completely than the revolutions in the big centers. This has been true of other major social revolutions, such as the Rus-

sian and the French.*

But Barcelona is the Petrograd of Spain, and there the dual power was not declared and "legalized" by the armed proletarians as it was in the provinces. True, the Central Anti-Fascist Militia Committee was formed there on July 21; but under circumstances entirely different from those surrounding the constitution of the revolutionary municipal committees. First, the Central Militia Committee (CMC) was formed only *after* the anarchist proletariat had subdued the fascists by three days of hard fighting, not before, to organize that fight, as was the case elsewhere. Then, it was formed by the reformist leadership, not the revolutionary workers. And lastly, its announced purpose was not to make the social revolution, but merely to continue military operations against the fascists.

Once the masses had shown their profound anti-fascist feeling by coming out into the streets in thousands, the CNT-FAI leaders stopped their futile wait for the Generality to take the initiative, and gave what leadership it could. Durruti led the mass attack on the Telefónica, Ascaso was killed in storming the Ataranzas Barracks. On Monday, when the entire city was in the hands of the men of the FAI, in a scene strikingly similar to the formation of the Central Executive of the Russian Soviets, the anarchist and bourgeois-democratic leaders set up the Central Anti-Fascist Militia Committee. Companys, the Catalan nationalist president of the Generality, told the CNT-FAI top men, "Catalonia is in your power. You can set up libertarian communism, or do whatever you want. What are you going to do?" The anarchists, like the Mensheviks, emphatically refused to accept state power, and told Companys and the Republicans to remain at the head of the state. At the President's suggestion, the Central Committee of the Anti-Fascist Militias of Catalonia was set up to compensate for Catalonia's lack of an army. Presumably, had the central republican government allowed Catalonia a standing army, the CNT, like the UGT, would have attempted to enlist the revolutionary proletariat into that army.

No sooner was this Central Committee set up (the CNT allowed other anti-fascist parties what it considered a proportionate representation), than all the isolated committees from villages, factories, city districts, small and large industries, began to pour their problems into its lap. The Central Committee soon became the real executive organ of the workers' dual economic and political power *at the insistence of the bottom committees*. Despite the full intention of its anarchist

*This happens because the toilers are a majority everywhere, while the ruling class centers its apparatus and activities in the commercial and industrial towns. So, once the people are aroused, they easily control the power in the rural areas. The same thing happens in many small towns in the United States, where organizing a union in the one big factory will result in labor control of the town government.

founders not to undermine the state, the CC of the Militias was the *sole power in Catalonia* within two weeks after the revolution, and remained such until the anarchists dissolved it at the end of September.

Rôle of the Anarchists

The leadership the CNT-FAI gave to the committees consisted mainly in coördination and centralization of a technical, administrative and bureaucratic nature. *They had no solutions for the basic economic and political problems of the committee-led revolution that they tolerated for almost three months.* On the points that Lenin emphasized again and again as fundamental, they did nothing. They did not tackle the problem of the banks, the key to the economic situation. They did not smash the old state, which hung on tenaciously for its life in Madrid. They did not formulate a program for the revolutionary conduct of the war, using the great levers for arousing the Spanish and Moroccan peoples that the social revolution offered them (i.e., propaganda for the agrarian revolution and for colonial independence).

The bankruptcy of the anarchist theoreticians in face of the serious and pressing problems of the civil war soon led to a degeneration of the military and economic situation that was marked by the slowing-up of production, and by the victories of the well organized fascist offensive. Terrified by these reverses, the CNT-FAI in September deserted the committee structure for a return to the well worn paths of class collaboration within the state. Ten weeks after its inception, the workers' dual power structure found itself disowned and leaderless.

But even the short-lived existence of the CMC had convinced the Catalan workers of its superiority over the old order, and sowed ideas in the minds of all the Spaniards that remain ineradicable to this day. The activities of the CMC were prodigious. It helped carry out many varied mass initiatives of military, economic and political character. Militias were organized and sent to the front. Conversion to war production got under way. Revolutionary order in the rear was perfected and maintained. Equal division of food supplies, housing facilities, etc., was arranged. Aid was sent to the revolutionary militias in all parts of Spain.

Naturally the great strides made in Catalonia toward social equality and a democratic mass administration of the economy put fear into the hearts of the bourgeois democrats everywhere, and especially those of the government bureaucracy in Madrid. That city became the center of the opposition to the dual power in the North. The remains of the "Spanish Republic of All Classes" were the bitterest enemy of the anti-fascist committees. And at that, Madrid itself was sharply divided by a régime of two powers, although the proletarian power never reached the strength it did elsewhere. The political situation in Madrid was extremely complex. The proletariat, UGT and CNT alike, had instituted workers' control of all industry and proclaimed the revolution. Armed socialist and anarchist militia controlled the streets while their brothers were off to fight the fascists at Toledo and in the mountains west and north of the city. In this situation, every bullet or truck from worker-controlled Catalonia was potent propaganda for the dual power there, as the government well knew.

Left-wing UGT Leader Caballero half-way supported the revolutionary masses in order to establish himself as the only one able to control them, and thus force his entry into the government of the republic as premier. After six weeks of

maneuvering, the republican circles shoved his rival, Prieto, into second place. Caballero formed his own ministry and the Socialist Party assumed leadership of the bourgeois state. The new premier tried immediately to incorporate the socialist armed bodies into the old state apparatus. The militias resisted and, not trusting them to carry out the open war against the committees that he knew was inevitable, Caballero began reinforcing and augmenting the regular police bodies.

The Madrid government from the first refused to cooperate in any way with the Catalan Central Committee in the military prosecution of the war against Franco, or in the organization of a worker-controlled war economy. Caballero continued this policy. This is not the place to go into the disastrous military results of this treacherous brand of "anti-fascism" which prevented the rapid and successful culmination of the bloody civil war. To make a long story short, the "official" representatives of the workers' power in Catalonia, the CMC, lacking a revolutionary perspective, capitulated completely to Madrid's blackmailing refusal to give them gold for their war industry or arms for their troops. The anarchist chiefs dissolved the central dual power body and decided to restore all authority to the Generality, which they thought they could control, in hopes of getting aid from the "anti-fascist" cabinet in Madrid.

The Dual Power Versus the Central Government

Dissolution of the new workers' power bodies was easier to talk about than to accomplish. The FAI chiefs were confronted with the refusal of the uninvited base committees to dissolve. Instead, these groups continued their struggle for power against the republican state and added the Generality to their list of enemies. In this the ranks showed a political insight and wisdom far superior to that of their cowardly leaders. The common people knew from their own experience that the spineless bourgeois democrats were incapable of fighting fascism. And they knew that there was only one social force with sufficient vitality to do the job—the revolutionary committees. They knew, from the events of the last months, that the democrats would compromise the war rather than tolerate the power of the committees over the war industry or the militias. Later events proved these calculations correct.

Since the workers, especially in Catalonia, firmly resisted the demands of their leaders to surrender power back to the state, the top anarchist committees could only surrender to Madrid those organizations that they had set up as the culmination of the basic committee structure. The CMC was dissolved the last of September. The anarchists could not dissolve the thousands of local committees because they belonged to the people. So the dual power was only ended on paper: in reality the revolutionary masses held the upper hand until May, 1937, because they still had hegemony of armed power and of the economy.

The CNT-FAI gave up to the state the CMC and the control over Catalonia's army. *Until the end of the war it never got the promised arms or economic support.* Catalonia's production fell steadily until the end of the war. When the anti-fascist army did attack briefly in Aragon in the summer of 1937, it was the Stalinist troops who got the glory. All that the never-ending concessions of the CNT-FAI leadership accomplished was the strengthening of the Stalinist-Prieto reaction which was only waiting Britain's choice of the proper moment for a compromise with Franco. The state sabotage of Catalan industry became ever more effective in proportion

to the amount of power the anarchist chieftains restored to its feeble body. The dismal fruits of anarchist collaboration with the state demonstrated once again the irrefutable logic of the rank and file: *If they aren't with us, they're against us.*

The very essence of a dual power situation is its transitory and unstable character. Regulation of the numerous concrete economic and political activities of a class-divided nation cannot remain bi-partisan, dual or neutral: control must be exercised in the interest of one class or another. Hence both classes strive to end rapidly the intolerable division of power. The situation cannot stand still. It either moves forward to complete workers' power, or backward to capitalist power exercised by the bourgeois state. Until the dissolution of the central dual power organ by the CNT-FAI, the power in Spain was increasingly exercised by the revolutionists. That act reversed the trend. From October on, the counter-revolution advanced step by step and the workers lost ground. Their defeats were not decisive, because they were still armed, but the tide of the battle went against them. The very re-constitution of anti-revolutionary groups (the old police corps, the non-revolutionary Popular Army), which was impossible at first, indicated which way the power was flowing.

Disarming the People

The first victories of the counter-revolution were minor because the proletariat retained hegemony over the decisive element of state power, armed force. Before it could consider itself sovereign in anti-fascist Spain, the reformist-led state had to disarm the people. And it set this as its main task, hiding its true purpose under such phrases as "the need for restoring public order" and "eliminating the fifth columnists in the rear guard."

From September on, the committees and the state were locked in struggle. The consequent disorganization resulted in an uninterrupted fascist advance on Madrid, after the early period of proletarian victories. The "Loyalist Government" refused absolutely to improvise militarily or economically on the basis of the social revolution already effected, and it accomplished nothing. The proletarian militias ran out of arms; the worker-controlled economy needed credits, machinery and raw materials before it could supply the militias. The state controlled the Bank of Spain and the gold reserves, and refused the revolutionists everything. Result: the fascists advanced. Caballero tried to recruit the workers' militia into the regular army with no success: they had their own army and didn't want another. He bought a few planes and arms from Russia. After two months of doing nothing in Madrid, the government deserted that capital for Valencia. In this sanctuary, removed from the pressing threat of the fascist advance, the state concentrated on rebuilding its bureaucracy, recruiting police and regaining enough strength to attack the committee structure. The state's undivided attention to this matter was rewarded by a constant increase in its power to the detriment of the leaderless and disorganized committees, and by a steady series of military defeats for the anti-fascists at the hands of the rebels.

Madrid was saved by the revolutionary anti-fascists, not by the Popular Front government, which gave it up for lost on November 6. In the crucial months of November and December the anti-fascist committees bent every effort to support Madrid. Some 10,000 militias (excluding the 2,000 International Brigaders) were rushed to the city from Aragon, Catalonia, Levant and other provinces. Convoys of food and clothing were sent from the committees of many different re-

gions. Some day the tremendous gestures of the village communes and factory committees to aid Madrid will be fittingly recorded.

Meanwhile, the control committees of the Catalan industries became more and more impatient with the Central government's sabotage of production, and the counsels of tolerance for the counter-revolution that they heard from their union chiefs. In November, anti-Stalinist feeling ran high as the proletarian revolutionists realized the criminal rôle of these traitors to the socialist movement. Unrest within the CNT (into which were organized the decisive sections of the Spanish proletariat) mounted steadily. Many militants turned against the reformist leadership, *but they were without a program of their own.*

Assaults on Peasant Committees

The power of the "Loyalist Government" increased. In December it felt itself strong enough, thanks to the anarchist and socialist participation, to launch a series of armed assaults against the weakest of the peasant committees, those of Levant and Castille. Newly recruited police broke up the headquarters of the anarchist unions of poor peasants, killing or disarming and jailing the militants. The Communist Party was in the vanguard of this counter-revolutionary attack. The committees fought back, and in some places declared armed mobilizations against the police. This internal warfare lasted until March, 1937, but always outside of Catalonia, where the workers' power was still too strong and the state too weak for an open attack.

The CNT-FAI leaders completely disowned the committees, and joined the state in declaring the mobilizations illegal, undisciplined, and all the rest of it. The revolutionary peasants fought their battle against the police alone, with no help from the increasingly dissatisfied city workers. The leading CNT committees censored all news of the events from their press, while the socialists said the state was putting down "concealed fifth columnists." The result was that the revolutionary vanguard of poor peasants was disarmed, jailed or murdered, and their claims to communal ownership of the land declared invalid. *But collective exploitation of the land continued in anti-fascist Spain until the end of the war in 1937.* It even survived the criminal burning and destruction of the collectives by the Stalinist Lister Brigade and the remains of the International Brigade in 1937. In actual fact, the agrarian revolution in Spain was accomplished, and no disarming or killing of a few peasant leaders could change that. But, the proletarian revolution was the only guarantee of the peasant revolution. When the city workers failed to organize a workers' state to consolidate their power, the peasant collectives were doomed.

As a direct result of the Loyalist Government's prior concern with breaking workers' power behind the lines, Málaga fell to the fascists on February 10. Behind this tragedy lay a sorry tale of government refusal to supply munitions to the revolutionary Andalusian militias, of treason by the Popular Army officials and Stalinist political commissars at Málaga. The workers were willing to fight to the end: the People's Front government to which their leaders had entrusted the conduct of the war made this impossible.

The loss of Málaga confirmed the worst fears of the independent committees and aroused them to renewed action. Lacking a Bolshevik Party to show them the exact steps for ridding themselves of their misleaders, the committees raised all kinds of varied and impossible slogans against the govern-

ment. Meanwhile, their official leaders continued to assume responsibility for its acts. The CNT ministers chose this juncture to enter into close and intimate collaboration with Caballero. Local groups everywhere, and especially in Catalonia, demanded a general mobilization of manpower and economic resources for an all-out offensive against the fascists. This was a fantastic request to address to the Caballero government, for above all things it feared a renewal of the mass action such a mobilization would inevitably entail. And that was just what the ranks wanted: a revival of the widespread and highly effective direct action of July. They understood that only by drawing on the still unexhausted reserves of popular heroism, sacrifice and courage would fascism be stopped.

Caballero was sold completely on the idea of a non-revolutionary anti-fascist war; and he knew that he could never carry out this dream if he allowed the extremely revolutionary anti-fascist masses any direct participation. Hence the People's Front state answered the rising tide of mass demands for action by asserting that it alone was capable of organizing the war, by calling for *ALL power to the government* and, more important still, *All arms to the front*. The democratic defenders of the capitalist régime knew well enough that the best defense is an offense, and renewed their slanderous attacks against the "uncontrollable" committees.

At this point, after five months of a losing war, there was an important change in the orientation of the revolutionary committees. They began to address themselves directly to the people instead of pleading further with their reformist anarchist leaders. The rank and file not only laid the firm foundations of a workers' state, and forced the CMC to execute its will for a time, but it also proved able to recognize its reformist leaders as betrayers of the revolution, and turned against them.

The Dual Power Struggle in Catalonia

This realization of the rôle of their leaders, which was confirmed conclusively by the military defeats, had first risen because of internal Catalan developments. On October 11, after having dissolved the CMC, the Generality ordered the dissolution of "all the other organs born from the Revolution," and their replacement by municipal coalition councils in its own image. This measure restored courage to bourgeois politicians and non-labor elements who tried to stage a comeback in mid-October. The revolutionary municipalities soon stopped that and set up city councils that they could control. This experience started the turn against the CNT's policy of collaboration.

In Barcelona itself the main repository of workers' power was not the city government, but the workers' police. These "patrols of control," as they were called, obeyed only the orders and slogans of the factory committees, the unions, food supply committees, etc. Even after the CNT entered the Generality government, the patrols would not follow its orders if they conflicted with those of the revolutionary organizations, as those coming from the Stalinist departments invariably did. For this reason the state concentrated its attack in the capital against the workers' police. The Stalinists and Catalan nationalists inside the coalition cabinet began agitating for a "restoration of order" and a dissolution of the patrols in November. The CNT, backed by the POUM, resisted. In December the Stalinists forced the expulsion of the POUM from the government as the price of continued Russian aid; and in January the CNT-FAI capitulated to the reaction and agreed to reorganize public order. Still the gov-

ernment police did not dare show themselves on the streets.

The uninterrupted series of capitulations by the anarchist leaders, resulting in the surrender of many strategic positions of the dual power organs, did not prevent them from retaining control of these same committees up through February. The mere existence of soviets was no guarantee of victory for the workers' cause. Without democracy for the soviets to exist, without democracy *within* them, and without a resolute Bolshevik Party bent on exercising this democracy, it was impossible for the workers to advance along the road to power. For seven months, until the proletarian ranks themselves became disillusioned with the anarchist slogans of defeat, the committees blindly followed the FAI. True there were other political groups within the committees, but their democratic rights were not secure (due to notorious CNT strong-arm methods) and they did not have the firm revolutionary line necessary to win the ranks away from the syndicalists. There were POUMists and UGTists (i.e., Stalinists) in most of the municipal committees, factory committees, and workers' patrols of Catalonia, but the majority was usually anarchist. The Stalinists soon withdrew, leaving the POUM as the main opposition group. But the POUM would not oppose the CNT-FAI top committees publicly: if it could not convince them peaceably it gave up and went along with FAI policy of cooperation with the state.

Hence the committees were limited to a purely negative, defensive rôle in a situation that could only go forward, or back, and could in no case stand still. Since the committees did not act, the counter-revolution advanced, and when they finally reacted spontaneously, it was too late. After February, groups everywhere began to call the Loyalist government counter-revolutionary, but they had no positive program of workers' power to oppose to it.

The Workers' Patrols

In Barcelona events took a slightly different turn. Between January and May the top anarchist bureaucrats agreed half a dozen times to dissolve the workers' patrols. Even Dionisio Eroles, the FAI militant, who had created them and called them "the best guarantee of the brutal defeat of the bourgeois dogs," urged his men to surrender their guns to the old police. In the patrols was a strong group of POUMists who, after their party had been severely kicked around by the CNT and the Stalinists, finally came out with a strong and open position against the official anarchist line. They issued a manifesto in February urging the men of the FAI to refuse to disband it. The idea had an enthusiastic reception because it exactly expressed the sentiments of the anarchist patrol members. The patrols refused to dissolve, forced the Generality into a six-week crisis over "public order" and so brought the issue of armed superiority into the streets in the last weeks of April. Thus, the first approximation of the Bolshevik tactics of struggle within the workers' organs to strengthen them, and dominate them, brought immediate success to the POUM and led to an intensification and deepening of the dual-power struggle in Catalonia. But the POUM did not know what to do with its success, since it was not oriented toward a proletarian seizure of power. When the issue came to a head in May, Nin & Co. urged the workers to stay home and *not* to try to seize and hold the power.

The case of the patrols was exceptional. Most of the anti-collaboration sentiment in the proletarian ranks developed independently of the POUM, which was not really against collaboration in the first place. The POUM remained iso-

lated from this development for two reasons: (1) it avoided open mass agitation against the all-powerful CNT for fear of reprisals and (2) it had no clear program of workers' power to oppose to the anarchist program of class collaboration. This failure of the one self-proclaimed Marxist party to supply the leaders of the dual power organs with a clear picture of the road to power led different groups and localities to adopt a number of half-way and transitional demands aimed at stopping the counter-revolution. In the course of their struggle to put over these demands, ever larger segments of the CNT lost confidence in the possibility of reforming their leaders. In March the situation had reached a point where only the organization of a workers' state to crush the old state could stop the counter-revolution.

Despite their lack of understanding of the way to resolve the crucial problem of state power, there was one elementary measure that the Catalan proletariat could and did take. Through their municipal organs, and in Barcelona through a network of more highly specialized committees, they refused to surrender the basic sources of their power—their arms and their factories. In the northern part of Catalonia, the local committees even banded together for defensive action against the counter-revolutionary state. It had taken this state ten months to regain enough strength to test its power against that of the social revolution in Catalonia; the renewed aggressiveness of the revolutionists, and their open attacks on the "counter-revolution in high places" hastened the showdown.

Why Dual Power Lasted

There were several factors responsible for the fact that the dual power in Catalonia (and to a lesser extent in other parts of Spain) was able to last for ten long months without either side winning decisive control of the situation. One factor was the absolute bankruptcy of the labor leadership, which could not control its membership well enough to stop the revolution, and could only sabotage it by refusing to organize it nationally. Another was the clever rôle played by Great Britain, which had learned from two decades of indecisive class struggles the internal weakness of proletarian movements which lack a convinced Bolshevik leadership. The bourgeoisie forgets nothing: Britain held back from open intervention against the workers' power for a policy of boring from within the reformist organizations, i.e., buying off the leadership. In the confusion of a two-power régime, given the absence of a determined Bolshevik Party, and given the tremendous power exercised over Spain's internal economy by the policy of embargo and blockade, the Foreign Office counted on a gradual dissipation of workers' power, and the concentration of all authority back in the hands of the old state. The presence of strong labor movements in Britain and France also helped to prevent direct military intervention against the workers' power. A more determined proletarian revolution would have merited direct military intervention by the democracies, as was the case in Russia in 1917. Britain's desperate pre-war maneuvering to keep the balance of power on the continent added to her desire to avoid open conflict with the Nazis and Italians over Spain.

Thus the workers' power in Spain, although never crystallized into a workers' state, was able to last ten months because of a unique international situation, its own organizational weakness at the top, and because the social revolution to which it gave expression was so profound and so inevitable under Spanish conditions that it took the internal counter-

revolutionists that long to demoralize it, and organize enough non-labor elements for a frontal assault on it.

Without the Stalinists, it is doubtful if the counter-revolution would have been well enough organized to defeat even the uncentralized, isolated workers' power organ, and it is quite possible that Prieto would eventually have called for open British military support against the anarchist proletariat. Unfortunately, the Stalinists were there, and directed the seizure of position after position from the leaderless revolutionary proletariat. Their first victories were only on paper. Then came the day when they were prepared to contest for armed superiority with the Catalan workers, which struggle determined the fate of the more primitive dual power organs in the rest of anti-fascist Spain.

It is significant that when this showdown finally came, in May, 1937, the committee rose to meet the Stalinist provocation by asserting their complete mastery of Barcelona and most of Catalonia. The District Defense Committees of the FAI, the POUM locals, and armed unionists controlled Barcelona completely. The cannons of Montjuich fortress could have smashed to bits the main opposition focus, the Generality buildings, at a word from the CNT Regional Committee. But the armed superiority of the proletariat, and the final impressive demonstration of its power, availed absolutely nothing because they lacked a Bolshevik Party to apply this power at the crucial point, the conquest of state power.

The CNT-FAI leaders refused rank and file requests to organize a fight against the state to seize power. They insisted that the workers leave the streets and go home. For four long days the bottom committees of the CNT and FAI refused to obey their leaders and insisted on fulfilling their original program of disarming the police. Only the lack of a functioning organization to coördinate their activities prevented the district defense committees from assaulting the government buildings and seizing power. The organization could have been small, but with a correct understanding of the situation only an indispensable minimum of facilities (autos, printing press, paper, guns and agitators) would have been required to turn the May Day armed insurrection into a successful proletarian revolution. But that organization was lacking, and the counter-revolution triumphed. And, as the Fourth International predicted, proved itself absolutely incapable of bringing the anti-fascist war to a victorious end. Negrin paved the way for Franco.

Rôle of the Fourth International

Why were the Trotskyists unable to create a functioning revolutionary party in Spain? As I have shown, endless opportunities were opened up to them by the objective situation, especially by the continued struggle of the committees to retain their power after all the official parties had disowned them, and by the realization of the vanguard "where the counter-revolution lay." The answer to this question can be summed up: the Fourth Internationalists missed these opportunities because they were few, financially weak, foreigners, and at the front. Shortly before the May Days, and especially afterward, they began to grow in numbers. But it was too late for the success of the first Spanish revolution, because of the previous victory of the Stalinist counter-revolution, and the liquidation of the civil war shortly after in 1939. The growth of the Spanish Trotskyists in those last bitter days of illegal underground struggle is indicative of the future: *only the Fourth Internationalists emerged from that tragic series of betrayals and defeats with an unsullied banner.*

The main lessons of the Spanish Revolution that bear on the coming European struggles are:

1. Once again it is demonstrated that the proletariat is capable of learning the general historic truths of its epoch, and of reacting to them by decisive political steps without the leadership of any Bolshevik vanguard party. The workers' committees of Milan have demonstrated this anew.

2. The increased socialization of the productive process in the last two decades, combined with greater access to means of transportation and communication, resulted in Spain in an immediate and complete confiscation of all social wealth by popular committees created for that purpose. In the industrial centers of Europe, the same reaction will occur, more extensive and rapid than in Russia in 1917, more like what happened in Spain. The terrific economic and political chaos that must precede and accompany Hitler's collapse will give reality to the basic Marxist concepts in their most primitive and essential form. The economic groupings of the toilers will emerge more clearly than ever before as the only force capable of reviving society in the most immediate sense. Proletarian supply committees, workers' police patrols and factory committees will appear everywhere to act for the toilers forced to defend their very lives against the most devastating

calamity they have ever faced.

3. We can expect the dual-power organs that come into existence at Hitler's fall to cling tenaciously to their right to exist, and the struggle for full democratic rights for them is essential. This does not mean that the workers will draw what we consider the correct organizational or political conclusions from the dual power. On the contrary, we can expect to see the workers' committees in many places (France, for one) welcoming the Allied armies and the AMG. Nor will they be able to distinguish immediately between all the proclaimers of *The Revolution* and *The New Order* who will sweep in on the coattails of the imperialist victors.

4. However widespread and well developed the dual-power structure may be, there is only one kind of party capable of resolving the situation in a socialist direction and creating a workers' state. That is a revolutionary Marxist party in the full tradition of Lenin and Trotsky, the party of the Fourth International. The experience of Spain, of the whole pre-war era, and of the war itself has shown that. The next task in Europe today is to see and seize every opportunity presented by the independent actions of the masses to forge the vanguard party that can carry out our program of socialist emancipation.

MIRIAM GOULD.

China Under Japanese Domination—IV

Japan and the Capitalists in Eastern China

Japanese control extends over all the areas of China which had been industrialized to any degree before the war.

All Chinese factories which were not destroyed were either seized outright or reorganized under joint Sino-Japanese management. "Cooperating" Chinese, in North China at least, usually continued to get half of the profits from their own enterprises.* To Northern China, where little industry had been developed before the invasion, Tokyo sent heavy and light machinery to extract profits from Chinese labor.** Mineral deposits were developed and communications built to transport needed raw materials to Japan. Japanese manufacture became the source of supply for Chinese workers and peasants.

The Chinese bourgeoisie met this economic aggression either by "coöperation," flight or reorganization of their firms under Western control (until Pearl Harbor). Many of the Western capitalists welcomed the Japanese as protectors of foreign "rights" in China.

Politically, the Japanese tried to gain the favor of the Chinese bourgeoisie and the Western capitalists by their program for the eradication of communism. At Peking they set up a régime, now known as the Political Council of North China, under Wang Keh-min, erstwhile president of the Bank of China. At Nanking they set up Wan Ching-wei as president of the "National Government of China" and as "true" leader of the Kuomintang.

To the Chinese the Japanese posed as the liberators of

Asia from Western imperialism.† To meet this political offensive, Britain and America, on October 10, 1942, announced the relinquishment of extraterritoriality. In a counter-offensive, on January 10, 1943, Japan signed a treaty with the Wang Ching-wei government, relinquishing extraterritoriality and promising to restore to the Nanking régime all rights in Japanese concessions as well as in those which her army seized from Britain. The native bourgeoisie had desired this for years but had been unable to wrest it from Western imperialism. The puppet régime at Peking expressed "sincere thanks to the Japanese authorities for their kindness and this impartial step, which selfish Britain and America had never even dreamed of."

Japan and the Proletariat in Eastern China

Very few reports have come through from the Japanese-occupied cities of China and the data on the proletariat is therefore extremely limited. The most complete study has been made of Shanghai,‡ and this key city has thus been chosen as the chief subject of the present section.

Shanghai has been for more than half a century the crucible in which conflicting imperialist and class forces could be seen in struggle. At Shanghai was concentrated the majority of foreign and native mills and factories, banks and motor vehicles. It was at Shanghai before the war that the Japanese had their largest industrial investments. It was at Shanghai

†Before Pearl Harbor the Germans offered Britain a plan to save the International Settlement from Japanese hands. The price was German representation on the Municipal Council of the Settlement. Fear of popular indignation at home kept the British from accepting the offer. Goette, *op. cit.*, page 224.

‡Economic Shanghai: Hostage to Politics, by Robert W. Barnett, Institute of Pacific Relations.

*America's Role in Asia, by Harry Paxton Howard, New York, 1943; page 255.
**Japan Fights for Asia, by John Goette, New York, 1943; page 154.

that the workers carried out an insurrection in February, 1927, and it was at Shanghai that Chiang Kai-shek found sufficient bourgeois and imperialist support to dare his open betrayal of the Chinese revolution.

At Shanghai, from 1927 to 1937, the workers were most hostile to the Chiang Kai-shek government, which in cooperation with the Japanese and Western employers had clamped down on the right of Chinese workers to organize and strike, destroyed their unions and killed or imprisoned their leaders.

Before the outbreak of hostilities, industry in the International Settlement was employing 200,000 to 250,000 workers. The outbreak of the war brought a sharp decline to an industrial payroll of only 27,000 in December, 1937. At the same time, hundreds of thousands of refugees flocked in from war-torn China, seeking employment in foreign industry and safety beneath Anglo-American guns. The cessation of industry, combined with the tremendous influx of refugees, reduced the Shanghai workers to living in camps, scooping refuse from garbage pails for food, and finally in large numbers finding their last resting place in the huge piles of exposed corpses that littered the streets.

By December, 1938, however, Shanghai industry had staged a remarkable recovery. The number of employed workers had again jumped to 237,000. This phenomenal gain was possible and necessary principally because of the huge mass of cheap labor that was available and which, unemployed, constituted a threatening political force to both Japanese and Western capitalists.

The Japanese invaders needed rice for their populations at home and took it. Wealthy Chinese saw the enormous profits in rice speculation and hoarded. Living costs for the workers soared. By 1940 the real wages of the Shanghai workers had fallen to 55.43 from the 1936 index of 100.

The administrators of the International Settlement refused to control prices on the ground that it "was better for Shanghai to have rice at a high price than no rice at all." This was all very well for those gentry and capitalists who could pay the high price. The masses in the streets rioted seventy times in December, 1939, and in June, 1940, staged another epidemic of rice riots.

In the eight months of 1937, preceding the declaration of war, 80,820 workers had been involved in 213 strikes. When war came, the worker was thrown out of his job and his main thought was simple survival. Gradually as the war moved away from Shanghai and industry recovered, the proletariat began to revive its pre-war militancy.

In 1938 there were thirty-four strikes and in 1939, ninety-six. By October, 1940, the number had jumped to 247 for the first ten months alone. These strikes involved 110,642 workers. The strike movement of 1940 indicated that the proletariat, although competing hard even for the chance at employment, was no longer demoralized.

From the beginning of the war to May, 1939, the Shanghai labor unions had maintained continuous relations with the Chinese national government. During this period, strikes were discouraged by the Kuomintang because they might embarrass the Anglo-American employers, whose aid Chiang wanted against Japan. From May to November, 1939, labor activity was stimulated by the Japanese against Western employers. The Japanese formed a Chinese Republic Workers League as a means toward this end but dropped it like a hot potato when they found it impossible to control. Next the Japanese organized the Chinese Workers Welfare Organiza-

tion. This organization was disbanded when the Western employers refused to bargain with it. In the fall of 1940 there was a large-scale transport strike, partly political but basically grounded in the miserable working conditions of the strikers. All ruling elements recognized this strike as a danger to the peace and order of Shanghai and combined to break it. In December, 1940, there occurred a police strike.

Thus, when last heard of, the Shanghai proletariat was proving itself unmanageable by the Japanese and a danger to the combined duling forces of Shanghai.

The destruction of so much Chinese property and industry in the early months of the war diffused the Chinese bourgeoisie. After Pearl Harbor the Western capitalists were forced to flee. The Shanghai proletariat found its old native and Western enemies displaced as social powers. Chiang Kai-shek, that deadly foe of the Shanghai proletariat, was therefore forced to appeal to it to undermine the Japanese occupation. As early as 1939, Chiang was speaking to the workers in the following vein: "As your spirit is the most revolutionary, so your faith in the ideology of resistance must be firmer and firmer as time goes on. . . . You must realize that your strength is as great as that of our soldiers at the front. . . . Strengthen your organizations. . . . Those of you who work in factories, if only you would refuse to work, then our enemy would not be able to make any profits."

Against the Japanese and the Chinese Quislings, no serious force exists in Shanghai except the Shanghai proletariat—a proletariat which has no reason to love the Chinese ruling class and which has seen itself sacrificed time and again to rival national and international armies. In Asia, as in Europe, it is the proletariat which has been left to bear the burdens of living under the invaders and on whom therefore the bourgeoisie must rely for the national resistance.

We still know very little about the activity of the Shanghai proletariat today. Compared to the magnitude of its task, it is very small. But it has exhibited its revolutionary temper and capacity before, and it will not stand alone.

The Allies of the Shanghai Proletariat

Not only will the Shanghai workers find allies among the peasants throughout China. In backward Southwestern China, industrialization by the Chiang Kai-shek government is creating a proletariat, still small in numbers but being organized by the government itself in large-scale production and into unions. In the North the Japanese imperialists are bringing an industrial development hitherto unknown in this region.

In Southern China, for forty years the breeding place of revolutionary sentiments, significant changes have also taken place. From Hong Kong and Canton, thousands of workers have fled to their homes in the interior, bringing with them their training in the class struggles of capitalist production and their revolutionary experiences.

After the First World War, returned workers from the West played an important rôle in the organization of Chinese trade unions. Before the Second World War, overseas Chinese were, for the most part, petty bourgeois merchants and proprietors or employees in small shops, owned by their relatives. Today Chinese workers in the United States, for example, are for the first time employed in any numbers in the basic industries or conscripted into the modern American army.

The overseas Chinese workers have experienced the harsh discrimination of Western society and have no illusions about Anglo-American friendship for the Chinese. Generally known

is the refusal of Chiang Kai-shek, under British pressure, to permit Chinese soldiers under Tsai Ting-kai to participate in the defense of Hong Kong. The British preferred to let Hong Kong fall into Japanese hands rather than risk its defense by a large Chinese army.

The virtual peonage in which Chinese merchant seamen have been held in British ships and the refusal of the American government to permit them on shore have already resulted in riots and violence.

Finally the foundations are being laid in Eastern China for international class solidarity between the Chinese and the Japanese masses. The Japanese policy of developing North China industrially has brought the largest influx of Japanese settlers, peasants and workers. The Chinese have discovered a new kind of foreigner, an invader who has coolies as well as gentlemen. As many as 25,000 Japanese army "engineers" have labored alongside 63,000 Chinese coolies to build bridges. Japan's imperialist policy has created a situation in which class solidarity can be forged on the basis of common misery in the process of capitalist production.

Already Chinese soldiers and seamen in Japanese-officered troops and ships have mutinied and brought their arms and ships over to the Chinese.* Every action of this kind brings closer the inevitable demoralization in the ranks of the Japanese invasion forces.

Conclusion

After the First World War, the revolutionary upsurge passed to Asia only after it had spent itself in the West. The war had been fought primarily on European soil. Japan had taken advantage of the European war to begin her assertion

*New York Times, June 30, 1943, and September 15, 1943.

of independent imperialist action in China. China during the war and for years thereafter was at the nadir of her political power. Nevertheless, China had developed industrially during the war. And the revolution which had precipitated the end of the war had been a semi-Asiatic revolution. It was therefore inevitable that the workers and peasants of China should assert themselves, as they so heroically did, in the 1925-27 revolution.**

The Second World War in reality began in China and is an Asiatic as well as a European war. The war, in Asia as well as in Europe proper, brought to a head the incompetence of the bourgeoisie to carry through the defense of the nation. As a result, soon after the beginning of the war, and in China even before, the process of differentiation between the masses of the people and the old ruling classes was taking place on a geographical basis.

At the end of the war, revolutions will occur all over Europe. These events cannot fail to produce effects at a very early date both on the bourgeoisie and the proletariat and peasantry of Asia. The collapse of Mussolini, brought about by the Italian workers, shook the whole Axis camp. The effects of the collapse of Germany will be immeasurably more drastic on the sole remaining Axis partner. Whether the proletariat and peasants of Japan or China or India will be first to move into action, it is impossible to say. But from the preceding analysis, we may safely anticipate that the Chinese masses will play a dramatic and decisive rôle in the world revolutionary upsurge after the Second World War.

**In Japan itself, from 1918 to 1923, hardly a year passed without virtual civil war between Japanese workers and peasants, and Japanese government forces. (Howard, *op. cit.*, pages 85-86.)

RIA STONE.

In Stalin's Prisons - V

Discussions and Divisions in the Trotskyist Group

[Continued from last issue]

While we were in prison discussing among ourselves and fighting against the GPU, events were precipitating in the country. In 1931 and 1932, the Five-Year Plan was reaching its peak.

Whither Russia? Is it going to explode like a boiler, or will it meet the test and see the spread of a new order? What to do? Defend the existing régime, or combat it? In what name, with what program? These questions were asked by the entire country as well as by the Opposition.

Trotskyists and the Five-Year Plan

In our prison, the Trotskyists, after their split, saw the problem in different lights. The "majority"—that is, the right wing and center—were interested only in the political aspects of the Five-Year Plan. The Red professors demonstrated in countless articles that this industry should have been created of that one, that it would have been better to begin with this plant instead of the other. They made deep analyses of the figure of the annual plans and disputed among themselves over percentages. All these reflections were not devoid either

of seriousness, of competence, or of dialectical power, but they were nonetheless pedantic and sterile. The country was in war: a social and economic war. What good were all these schedules, where everything was arranged minute by minute? It was clear that indigent and backward Russia could make its revolution only by first building up, by a superhuman effort, certain essential bastions, ready to line up the whole of its economy later on along these advanced positions! That is why all the lamentations of the professors of economic science on the frightful disproportions of the Five-Year Plan did not move me.

In the Spring of 1932, when the famine burst upon the country and the rate of industrialization had obviously exceeded the limit of possibilities, the theoreticians of the "majority" felt a new mission growing in their minds: to set up the plan for the retreat. They said to themselves: "Since the party, in the person of Stalin, once borrowed from the Opposition its industrialization plan, the party will not be able to do without the Opposition now that a plan of retreat must be established." To listen to them, the Stalinist policy was not determined by the social realities of the régime or the

necessities of its development, but solely by the "myopia and the stupidity of Stalin."

However, the elaboration of the plan of retreat produced a new split in the Trotskyist majority. The right, under the leadership of Solntsev, Yakovlev, Melnais, etc., judged that the retreat should be slow and prudent: the coercive measures taken against the peasants must be abated but not abolished, otherwise the kolkhozes would be threatened with collapse, bringing back to life the system of commodity exchange. On the other hand, they desired to make a bloc with the Stalinists for tactical reasons. This bloc was to prevent the petty bourgeois elements from preparing their "Thermidor" with the benevolent neutrality of the right wing of the All-Russian Communist Party—Bukharin & Co.

The Trotskyist center (Dingelstedt, Man-Nevelson, Aaron Papermeister, etc.) supported, contrariwise, the slogan of Rakovsky: "Restore the NEP," a slogan he had enunciated in his letters from exile. Their specialist in agrarian questions, the agronomist Sassarov, even admitted that the dissolution of all the kolkhozes was inevitable. In a word, the Trotskyist center found that the retreat had to go back all the further because of the fact that Stalin had gone ahead too far. As to the tactic to be followed, the Trotskyist center thought of making a bloc with the right wingers of the All-Russian Party. This bloc would force Stalin to constitute a "coalition" Central Committee—that is, a Central Committee in which all the communist factions would be represented—and to install democracy within the party. But it was not a question of eliminating completely the Stalinist faction, for it was feared that such an operation would threaten to shake "the proletarian power" and to facilitate a bourgeois restoration. . . .

Misplaced Criticism

In a word, the Trotskyist "majority" had no political program of great scope to oppose to the official program of Stalin. But still more: no attempt was made to criticize seriously the social character of the Five-Year Plan and the entire Stalinist régime. If the "labor policy" of Stalin was criticized, it was for the volume of sacrifices that it demanded and not for the social principles that it violated. If the "distortions" and "bureaucratism" of Stalin were criticized, they continued nonetheless to calculate the percentage of socialism realized in the USSR according to the percentage of the successes and failures of the Stalinist industrialization.

All these preoccupations of the Trotskyist "majority" left me indifferent. These people did not seem to me to differ greatly from the bureaucrats of Stalin. They were a little more correct and human, that's all. All my hopes went with the "minority" which, in 1931 and 1932, discussed passionately the questions of principle posed by the Five-Year Plan and by the whole Soviet régime. They did not confine themselves to judging the victory of the plan or the necessity of falling back toward the NEP. They posed clearly the question: does a dictatorship of the proletariat still exist in the USSR, is the economic development a socialist development by its social content, or state-capitalistic, or is it a transitional stage?

The transfer of prisoners following the hunger strike in the Summer of 1931 had greatly weakened the Trotskyist minority. The "Militant Bolsheviks" had lost their ideologist, Pushas, the "state-capitalists" had lost Densov. The Trotskyist Left of our prison decided nevertheless to work out its own program, with a position of intransigence toward the Stalinist bureaucracy. But it was soon seen that the differences

within the left wing were profound; it was thereupon resolved to discuss first certain questions and to seek a compromise in the formulæ sufficiently general to satisfy the varying opinions.

The first question discussed was that of the character of the Soviet state. Is it a workers' or socialist state? If not, what class does it represent? The discussion lasted more than six months, for it was not easy to establish contact among the members of the "minority," scattered to the four corners of the prison. But we did not want to risk a new split and were patient. We had still another thought in mind which advised us against great haste: we hoped that meanwhile Trotsky would cross the Rubicon and would deny the workers' character of the Stalinist state. Many of us were already convinced that there was not a trace of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" in the USSR, but thought it inopportune to proclaim it publicly before Trotsky pronounced himself on it. As for myself, while waiting with the others for a decisive political gesture from Trotsky, a gesture that seemed to be made logically inevitable by his preceding declaration—"the preparations for the installation of Bonapartism are already completed in the party"—I, along with other comrades, considered it was better to speak out without waiting for Trotsky. Would it not be easier for him to formulate the expected conclusion if he saw that it was already taking shape spontaneously in the minds of the militants themselves? Moreover, was it always necessary to wait for the word of the "leader," like common Stalinists?

Three Positions on Russia

In the end, three different resolutions were submitted to a vote. The first recognized, in spite of the numerous "bureaucratic deviations," the working class character of the state, because "vestiges of the dictatorship of the proletariat" subsisted in it, like the nationalization of private property and the repression of the bourgeoisie. It followed that there could be hope of "restoring the genuine proletarian dictatorship by means of a profound reform of the structure."

The "deniers" of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the USSR were unable to agree among themselves and presented two distinct resolutions. Some, guided by what remained of the principles of the "Militant Bolsheviks," found that there was no longer a proletarian dictatorship in the USSR but that the "economic foundations of the October Revolution subsisted." They concluded that it is necessary to make a "political revolution" plus a "profound reform of the economy." To them the existing régime seemed to be "above the classes" because, according to them, the bureaucracy in power was not a class but only a transitional social formation.

The other "deniers"—including myself—believed that not only the political order but also the social and economic order were alien and hostile to the proletariat. Therefore, we envisaged not only a political but also a social revolution that would open up the road to the development of socialism. According to us, the bureaucracy was a real class, and a class hostile to the proletariat.

Each of the three resolutions received the same number of votes, about fifteen. In other words, the "deniers" had the majority. But the others threatened to make a split if the point of view of the "deniers" was proclaimed obligatory upon the right-wing Trotskyists. The blind alley was broken through by declaring that the question of the character of the Soviet state remained open.

The slogan of the "Return to the NEP" was also subjected to a lively discussion and finally rejected by a crushing ma-

jority.

The attitude of the prisoners toward what was happening in the country and toward the Stalinist policy may be defined as follows, if it may be a little schematized: the majority of the political prisoners, regardless of their nuance, judged that the policy of the government was nothing but a preposterous adventure, that it violated the laws of evolution, that it betrayed, in a word, the incompetence of the leaders. At any moment we expected a catastrophe followed by a complete change in the leading personnel and this expectation stifled every desire to seek the social meaning of the events. But there were also other prisoners, less numerous and more isolated, who discovered a "method in this madness" of the government. They thought that their real task consisted precisely in analyzing and making conspicuous those things that were profoundly coherent in the apparent chaos of the policy of the bureaucrats. There was certainly no lack of material for them to analyze!

During the year 1930 and at the beginning of 1931, the government, in order to realize its plan of industrialization and production, employed primarily the methods of administrative coercion toward the workers: compulsory "emulation" in the factories, forced exploits of "udarniks" (élite workers), abolition of the right of the worker to quit the factory where he was working, the "right" granted women and adolescents to work at night and in the mines, etc. These measures aroused a campaign abroad against "forced labor," but, on the other hand, the official phraseology had some Westerners believe that the Soviet government was in the process of building up, even if by barbarous means, something that looked like socialism.

Changes in the Régime After 1931

The reforms that followed beginning with June, 1931, revealed the true countenance of the régime. Stalin commenced by heaping anathema upon one of the aspirations dearest to the heart of the workers, one of the last conquests of October that had not yet been wrested from them: the principle of economic equality within the proletariat. Upon an order from the dictator, a new gospel was set up: the labor hierarchy, the "reform of the wage system" with the aim of creating the "greatest differences of remuneration between the extreme groups." This essentially capitalist principle was declared to be in conformity with socialism and communism. The principle it replaced had a merciless war declared upon it and was stigmatized under the name of petty bourgeois "levelingism"!

It was no longer collectivism, nor solidarity, even if forced, that was to stimulate the worker to produce, but the old capitalist principle of egotism and profit. In addition, a system of piecework was introduced which had long ago been abolished in the West, thanks to the efforts of the labor movement. Having thus multiplied administrative coercion by a new "sweating system," the Soviet leaders proclaimed that the intensity of labor was without limits: the physiological limit that exists in capitalist production "is abolished with us, in the country of socialism, thanks to the enthusiasm of the workers." The "galley pace" of labor in chains in the capitalist countries was now to be . . . accelerated!

If every effort was made to create the "greatest differences of remuneration" among the workers according to their skills, what is to be said of the abyss that was created between the workers and the functionaries, communist or non-communist?

The "happy life" which the upper strata enjoyed to the detriment of the wretched masses does not fail to astonish the foreign tourist in the USSR, provided he takes the trouble to look around him. This "happy life" was legalized for the first time after the speech of Stalin in June, 1931. To add further to the privileges in food supply and lodgings, a new network of exclusive "distributors" and restaurants reserved for the upper communist or non-party administration was created. Finally, "state stores" were created for their exclusive use, where absolutely everything could be bought at prices beyond the reach of the worker. The cast-off clothing of "war communism" which the bureaucracy liked to dress up in at the beginning of the Five-Year Plan was dumped in the garbage. All this smacked of class egotism a mile away, and the tales of the recently-arrived prisoners confirmed the impression that this new policy corresponded to a profound and durable tendency. The people were not mistaken who defined the situation in this bitter phrase: "There are no classes among us, there are only categories." Indeed, the whole population of Russia was divided from the standpoint of living standards into five or six categories, which fixed everyone's position in society. But at the time of which we speak, the label "dictatorship of the proletariat" had not yet been replaced by that of "Soviet people": the most favored workers belonged as yet to category No. 1; and the bureaucracy designated its privileges modestly under the soothing title of "Category Number Zero."

The turn was, however, so patent and so brutal that the people at liberty could not be mistaken about it. A Moscow factory director who arrived in our prison in 1932 described the position of the communist personnel as follows: "In the daytime, we carry on propaganda among our workers in favor of the general line and we explain to them that socialism is about to triumph among us; but in the evening, among ourselves, we drink our tea and ask ourselves if it is the proletariat we represent or a new class that exploits us?"

The tendency to consolidate the new order of things born out of the Five-Year Plan manifested itself also by a desire to reconcile the various elements composing the social élite. The "non-party specialists," only yesterday hounded mercilessly, were now proclaimed the allies of the communist bureaucracy. "There are obvious symptoms of a change of attitude in intellectual circles," declared Stalin. "These intellectuals, who once sympathized with the saboteurs, now support the Soviet power. . . . Even more, a part of the saboteurs of yesterday is beginning to collaborate with the working class."

The middle stratum of the intellectuals, especially the technicians, was placed at the level of the factory workers, and a little later, in 1932, a solemn decree of the Central Executive Committee granted children of qualified intellectuals equal rights with children of workers. The attorney-general of the USSR, Krylenko, principal prosecutor in all the sabotage trials, commented on one of Stalin's speeches as follows: "The factory workers have become the masters of their country with full powers; now, after a long development in the relations between the Soviet government and the leading technical personnel, the latter, too, must participate to the full in the common cause, with the same rights as the factory workers." Thus were laid the foundations of the future "non-party Bolsheviks" which were to lead, in the Constitution of 1936, to the granting of civic rights to the non-communist intellectuals. The communist bureaucracy prepared itself to share with the "engineers" the monopoly of power it held "in the name of the working class."

"NEP Without Nepmen"

The "new style" of the Soviet cities, the reopening of elegant stores, restaurants and night clubs, the high-wide-and-handsome life of the leaders—all this brought back to mind the NEP. But there was no private initiative, no tradesmen, no "Nepmen." The "NEP without the Nepmen" seemed absurd to us in prison and the prisoners, imbued with outlived principles, predicted with eager rivalry the early appearance of this indispensable personage. But there were also prisoners who sought to understand the future otherwise than with the aid of old patterns and who replied: "To be sure, the NEP without the Nepman, that's the symbol of the new Russia which is replacing private trade by state trade, the tradesman by the bureaucrat, the private NEP by the state NEP!"

Rakovsky's letters from exile were very useful to us for an understanding of this evolution. Rakovsky and Trotsky supplemented each other in a certain sense, the former being very apt at grasping the social processes without being able to draw the political conclusions from them, the latter suffering from the reverse defect. And it is most unfortunate for the Russian Trotskyists that these two personages were not able to come together.

From 1928 onward, Rakovsky wrote several studies on the structure and functioning of the Soviet bureaucracy, of which the main one was "The Laws of Socialist Accumulation During the 'Centrist' Period of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat"; it has remained unknown abroad. It disclosed the parasitic and exploitive character of the bureaucracy, "which has transformed itself into a special social order to the detriment of the workers and peasants." From this to the conclusion that this bureaucracy was nothing but a new ruling class was only a step; but Rakovsky did not have the audacity to take it. At the decisive turn he chose to "save what can still be saved" and to "return to the NEP." His policy, instead of being inspired by the new interests of the proletariat, was dominated by the fear of a restoration of private capitalism. Rakovsky—in a study we have just alluded to—disclosed one of the salient traits of the Soviet bureaucracy: the sacerdotal cult of two truths, one, the "esoteric truth," in Rakovsky's words, the real truth, destined only for the initiated; the other, the esoteric pseudo-truth for the needs of the throng. He liked to compare these proceedings with those of the Catholic Church, of the Jesuits and other religious orders. The bureaucracy "merely managed" the means of production belonging legally to the proletariat, just as the church administered the *patrimonium pauperum* for its profit.

The "Total Collectivization"

In our prison discussions, the industrialization raised far fewer tempests than the "total collectivization." Indeed, if the Trotskyist opposition had adopted a clear-cut attitude toward the industrialization, the same could not be said of the peasant question. In the industrial field, Stalin had only followed the path drawn by the Trotskyist Opposition since 1923. Trotsky was not wrong in writing in 1931 that "all the viable elements of the official plan are only the echo of the ideas and the slogans of the Left Opposition." So we discussed only the manner in which Stalin was carrying out the industrialization plan.

The attitude of the Trotskyist Opposition toward the "total collectivization" was much more complex. It was not Trotsky—despite the prevailing opinion—but rather Zinoviev,

who, toward the end of the NEP, urged a reënforcement of the anti-peasant policy. The program of the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc in 1926-27 was determined, in its agrarian section, by the Zinovievists. When, in 1923, Trotsky proposed for the first time the industrialization plan, he foresaw at the same time that the agrarian development would have the "farm" as its type. He expressed this idea very clearly in his celebrated speech at Dniepropetrovsk.

Stalin began by carrying out the program of the Trotsky-Zinovievist opposition; then, in the offensive fire against the peasants, he was led to proclaim the "total collectivization" and the "liquidation of the kulaks as a class." But while Zinoviev accepted this policy, Trotsky was fiercely opposed to it. To go from "the struggle against the exploitive tendencies of the kulaks" to their complete expropriation, to push the partial collectivization to the point of "totality"—this, in his view, was only an anti-Marxian utopia in view of the historical conditions, and could lead only to a catastrophe. In February, 1930, in the midst of the bitter-end collectivization, Trotsky wrote that there should be collectivized, "up to the end of the Five-Year Plan, only twenty to twenty-five per cent at most of the peasant holdings, on penalty of exceeding the limits of reality." Stalin's haste, which did not even wait for the tractor factories to be complete, exacerbated Trotsky's irony: "By joining the bad hoes and the poor nags of the muzhiks you do not create big agricultural enterprises any more than a ship is built by joining together fishing boats."

These opinions of Trotsky, which just arrived in prison at that time, made a strong impression on the prisoners. Had not Stalin just pushed the collectivization to fifty and sixty per cent, and introduced—how belatedly!—mechanized exploitation? Some among us then began to await the verdict of events, others demanded loudly the return to the NEP.

A. CILIGA.

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