the first meeting being held in London, after the United Nations’ conference on world organization.

UNITY FOR PEACE
AS FOR WAR

Our meeting here in the Crimea has reaffirmed our common determination to maintain and strengthen in the peace to come that unity of purpose and of action which has made victory possible and certain for the United Nations in this war. We believe that this is a sacred obligation which our Governments owe to our peoples and to all the peoples of the world.

Only with the continuing and growing cooperation and under-

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON FREED PRISONERS

A comprehensive agreement was reached at the Crimea conference providing detailed arrangements for the protection, maintenance and repatriation of prisoners of war and civilians of the British Commonwealth, Soviet Union and United States liberated by the Allied forces now invading Germany.

Under these arrangements each Ally will provide food, clothing, medical attention and other needs for the nationals of the others until transport is available for their repatriation. In caring for British subjects and American citizens, the Soviet Government will be assisted by British and American officers. Soviet officers will assist British and American authorities in their task of caring for Soviet citizens liberated by the British and American forces during such time as they are on the Continent of Europe or in the United Kingdom, awaiting transport to take them home.

We are pledged to give every assistance consistent with operational requirements to help to insure that all these prisoners of war and civilians are speedily repatriated.

CRIMEA BUILT ON TEHERAN FOUNDATIONS

There is nothing new in principle in the decisions of Crimea. At Yalta the Big Three built upon the foundations already laid at Teheran, and at the Moscow Conference of Eden, Hull and Molotov that preceded Teheran.

The historic significance of Crimea consists precisely in the fact that it undeviatingly continued and further developed the line already indicated clearly at Moscow and Teheran.

I wrote a book about Teheran and its consequences. That book assumed that Teheran would be followed by just such a Conference as that recently concluded at Yalta. If the Crimean Conference had been different, my book would have lost much of its practical validity. Because Crimea was the logical continuation of Teheran, that book is today confirmed. There is nothing new in principle to add to that analysis.

There is, however, much to record,
analyze, and digest that was only forecast and promised at Teheran, but is now being realized in the events of life as a result of Crimea.

The Teheran line was applied and proved itself in the military conduct of the war. Its fruit was the successful opening of the Second Front, with the liberation of France, much of Belgium, and a part of Holland. This helped the Red Army achieve its annihilating offensives which "tore the guts out of the Nazi beast," and brought the Soviet forces into the areas of Berlin, Dresden, and Vienna in the weeks preceding the Crimean meeting. All of Hitler's allies and quislings were knocked out, and the war was brought onto German territory from East and West.

On the political and diplomatic field, the line of Teheran had been applied with less consistency. Such notable progress as that registered at Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton Woods was clouded by the deadlock of the Aviation Conference in Chicago. It was this fact that gave Hitler hopes that the Coalition would be split by the divergences that began to appear. In Belgium and Greece (and, in a different form, in Italy), the power of British and American armed forces were thrown into the scales against the native liberation forces, for the preservation and utilization of collaborationist circles—in the name of "maintaining order." In Greece, bloody civil war raged for six weeks, with the British Army fighting side by side with those Greek armed forces that had been in the service of the Nazi occupationists. The world was given a small laboratory sample of what all Western Europe would become if there was not a quick return to the principles of Teheran.

After Teheran, every clear application of the policies there laid down brought advances toward victory, and additional guarantees for the orderly construction of a stable and prosperous world thereafter. Every departure from the policies of Teheran brought comfort and hope to Hitler, delayed the victory, and threatened to sow the seeds of civil wars now and eventually a new world war.

That was the experience leading up to the Crimean Conference, making necessary and inevitable, given the high statesmanship of the three principal leaders, that the decisions made should be an emphatic reaffirmation of the Teheran line, and its concrete extension to all the most burning problems of Europe in the stage of the war where the final smashup of Hitlerism impends. The last remnants of that concept of three separate and conflicting policies for Europe were removed. The concept of one common over-all policy was put into practical terms. The hopes of Hitler were banished beyond recall. Europe and the world were denied the disruptive choice between three rival leaderships, and were given instead the unified and unifying leadership of a firmly con-solidated Anglo-Soviet-American Coalition.

THE COMPLETE LIQUIDATION OF NAZISM

At Moscow and Teheran, at the end of 1943, the general goal of complete extirpation of Nazism was agreed upon. Aside from the military task of crushing Hitler's armies, the means of attaining this goal was not defined. In Crimea this definition was given.

Germany will be subjected to military occupation by the Big Three Powers, plus France, in four zones of occupation, under a unified commission of the Coalition Powers which will lay down common detailed policy. Germany will be disarmed, the German General Staff and Army will be abolished, all war criminals will be punished, industries of war purpose or potentiality will be removed or controlled, the last remnants of Nazism will be rooted out. Germany shall make the fullest possible reparation of the destruction wrought in occupied lands, the amount of which is to be determined by a commission working from Moscow. As and when these aims are established, the German people are to find a place again in the comity of nations. These are the main practical features of the policy of unconditional surrender.

That there could be no other practical policy toward Germany was established by events in the fourteen months from Teheran to Crimea.

In this period, when the inevitable military debacle of Nazism was established, there had yet emerged no effective leadership within Germany able to offer itself as an alternative to Nazism, and able to surrender Germany. There exists no internal force within Germany capable of challenging Nazism. There is no alternative, therefore, to the occupation of Germany until Nazism is rooted out, and new forces have had time and opportunity to grow again from a purified soil.

The provision of a common center of Coalition policy for all Germany, closes the door to the rise of conflicting policies among the main allies which would provide crevices for the Nazis to creep back into power again. It is the key and symbol of the unity of Coalition policy toward the problems of Europe as a whole. It is the negation of the concept usually spoken of as "spheres of influence," which is another way of speaking of conflicting policies, the concept that there is no long-time common interest but only a temporary and opportunistic compromise of conflicting interests. It assumes, on the contrary, that the common interest of the Great Allies is existent, and that it is the determining factor.

Separate zones of occupation, under the common direction, serves to guarantee the stability of common policy, by making clear where responsibility lies for its application at all times and places. It leaves room
POLITICAL AFFAIRS

for the free play of all secondary differences of preconception, ideology and understanding, which manifestly exist among the great Allied Powers, but places them under the grave responsibility to prove by results that these differences are not obstacles to the common policy but rather can be made to serve it. Whenever secondary differences of this sort accumulate to the point of impairing the common policy, then the joint command of the Coalition is present to iron out the difference and impose a united course. Each occupying Power will work under the necessity to prove by results that it advances the common policy, and there may well be friendly rivalry to see who can show the best record of achievement.

POLAND, YUGOSLAVIA AND LIBERATED EUROPE

A joint attitude toward the problems of Poland and Yugoslavia, defined by the Big Three at Yalta, gives the pattern for all liberated Europe. It is the policy of encouraging and supporting the broadest democratic unity within each liberated country, recognizing that priority in leadership belongs provisionally to those who earned it in battle against the German invaders, and guaranteeing the free self-determination of each nation in choosing its permanent institutions.

In the case of Poland, this means that the mischief-making “government-in-exile” in London is finally consigned to the scrap-heap of history. The government that is actually operating on the soil of liberated Poland is to be asked to broaden its composition, under the advice of a three-Power commission, to include some additional outstanding democratic leaders within Poland and from abroad, who have hitherto withheld their participation awaiting the united invitation of the Big Three. The eastern borders of Poland shall be approximately the Curzon Line, which are those of ethnographic Poland, while the western borders, to be precisely determined after the war, shall be adjusted westward at Germany’s expense, to provide security for Poland, a broad coastal access to the Baltic, and the integration of all Polish populations.

The definition of attitude toward Yugoslavia is even more simply stated, and the same in substance. The Yugoslavian government that arose under Marshall Tito, and as modified by the agreement with Subasich, who represents the regime-in-exile, is unconditionally recognized, with a recommendation for the inclusion in the provisional national assembly of some additional former members of the pre-war parliament who did not compromise themselves with the Nazis. The efforts of the youthful King Peter to intrude his personality as a decisive factor in settling Yugoslavia’s present problems are pointedly ignored, and, in the classic phrase of Churchill, “his consent is assumed.”

All other liberated countries are dealt with in the published communiqué by the general formula, without specific mention. It is obvious, however, that the general policy enunciated is backed by a more concrete common understanding of what it is to mean in practical application, than has hitherto been the case. It is equally obvious that there is confidence among the Big Three as to its mutual application. The fact that Churchill and Eden went from Yalta to Athens, must be expected to bring the situation in Greece into line with the policy publicly enunciated for Poland and Yugoslavia. In Belgium, the situation did not wait on the Crimea meeting: Pierlot resigned, and a coalition cabinet moving in the direction of the people came into being. Today there is not a government operating on the continent, outside the Nazis and the so-called neutrals, without Communist members, and ranging the democratic political gamut to and including the Catholics—except that of Greece which remains for the moment purely a British construction.

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The Big Three decided to call into general assembly all the United Nations, in San Francisco on April 25 of this year, to act upon the Dumbarton Oaks plan of general world organization; with France and China requested to join in the invitation as initiating Powers. It was announced that agreement had been reached on those points which had been left open at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, with the exact form of the agreement to be officially announced after France and China had been consulted. Unofficially it has been made known that the question of voting procedure, the chief item of former differences, had been resolved to the effect that the requirement of unanimity among the permanent council members in dealing with issues of aggression shall apply only to the stage of deciding upon economic or military sanctions.

Coincidentally with the calling of the San Francisco meeting of the United Nations, President Roosevelt sent to Congress the projects of the Bretton Woods Conference for international economic collaboration, with the request for its immediate consideration and adoption. Since America’s wholehearted participation in the orderly economic reconstruction of the world after the war is a condition precedent to any successful political structure on the Dumbarton Oaks model, prompt action by Congress in approving the Bretton Woods plan would do more than all else to assure success and to strengthen the leading role of the United States in the San Francisco assembly of the United Nations.

HOW CRIMEA AFFECTS THE FAR EAST

Decisions reached in Yalta speci-
the way, which enjoy free expression—namely, the course of dissolving the Kuomintang dictatorship and its substitution by a coalition government of all parties including the Communists.

THE BATTLE ON THE HOME FRONT

Now we enter the fight to rally America overwhelmingly in support of the policies formulated in the Crimean Conference. This battle on the home front is engaged under favorable auspices, but it is still a fierce struggle, because for the reactionary enemies of the Coalition policy it is the showdown—to be or not to be.

Americans welcomed with joy and enthusiasm the Crimean agreements, like all other peoples of the world. But only America has such a constitutional system that the minority opposition still holds the possibility of veto against the majority. Senators Vandenberg and Taft lead a potential bloc of obstruction in the Senate which might prevent the realization of the necessary two-thirds majority for the ratification of treaties. That obstructionist bloc can only be surely broken up if the whole country is awakened to the true issues involved, and the obstructionists are revealed in their role as saboteurs of American national interests and the prospects of a peaceful world.

It was, therefore, wise statesmanship for President Roosevelt to appoint Vandenberg as a member of the American delegation of eight to the San Francisco gathering of the United Nations. With Hull and Stettinius leading that delegation, Vandenberg will be forced to reveal himself early in the game either as a supporter of his nation's policy or as an irresponsible wrecker with ulterior motives. His dilemma is already revealed in his hesitation to accept the appointment immediately.

What all Americans must understand today is that every one takes part in making this decision, and not merely a few Senators. The whole country must be aroused and fully informed of the issues. There must be organized behind the President such an irresistible and unbreakable unity of the vast majority, that the reactionary opposition will find its own supporters deserting it, will see the handwriting on the wall, and will surrender to the expressed will of the people.