The End of Relative Capitalist Stabilization and the Tasks of Our Party

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EXCERPTS FROM THE REPORT TO SIXTEENTH PLENUM, CENTRAL COMMITTEE, C. P.
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(Concluded from last issue)

WE have made a few efforts along this line, but not yet serious and systematic enough. One can find, for example, Comrade Foster's appearance before the Fish Committee in which he organized his presentation of the Communist position, around the question of American revolutionary traditions and historical development. I made a little attempt along this line in my speech in Newark, N. J., which was widely reported by the capitalist press in New Jersey, a fact which made the Daily Worker print this speech also. (Laughter.) I mention this especially because this speech has been challenged as politically incorrect and impermissible. Comrade X. has challenged this as a sign of a wrong line on my part along with a good many other things which are wrong with me. I want to develop this and to put it forward as one of the necessary features of the Bolshevik arming of our Party. I want to insist that it is necessary to develop this a hundred times more than we have done so far, rather than discourage the attempts that have been made to make use of the revolutionary traditions of the American working class. I think that Comrade X.'s opposition to this, his belief that this represents a wrong line, proves not that we are wrong, but that he himself has a narrow, right sectarian approach to this and other questions.

A few words about the problems of concentration. I don't think anything is to be gained by repeating all of our formula on the question of concentration, that we have not carried them out, again to say that we will carry them out. I think we must begin to understand, to examine and find what are the reasons why our concentration, which we place as one of the essential features of
our work, does not develop as we expect it to. I think the basic reason for it is that we still look upon concentration as sort of a thing in itself, we give it certain mystical qualities. We build the word "concentration" around a certain empty space, but we do not fill it with contents, and as a result everybody demands that concentration shall solve his problems and nobody knows what concentration means concretely. We must get rid of this formal conception of concentration. Concentration is not primarily a problem of shifting forces and finances from one place to another. This is merely an incident of concentration and in the majority of times is not required. Concentration must be first of all a concentration of political direction and attention upon a particular spot for the purpose of better understanding its problems and making this understanding the property of all those who have to take part in that work and thereby bring forward and develop the cadres right out of the field of that work, capable of solving the problems of that field.

I think we must absolutely insist upon this character of concentration, the character of drawing new forces out of the point of concentration. At the present time concentration seems to mean to everybody's bringing outside forces into the point of concentration and nothing else. I think we must reverse that a little bit, and all of the bringing in of forces must not be measured by volume but by the quality. Are the concentration forces able to draw new forces out? If not, do not send them in. Their qualities are useless because they develop a sort of parasitism of concentration points which is one of the most dangerous problems we face today. Instead of developing these concentration points we create a field of helpless dependence upon outside forces. This is not concentration. This kills the point of concentration. I think that Pittsburgh is still suffering from the effects of that kind of concentration. It is our fault, the fault of our methods of work, of our understanding of concentration, and we have got to change it. I think that one of the first tasks for every concentration point, district or union, or industry or factory, or section within the district, must be to work out their plan of work on the basis of the development of forces within that industry or locality. That's first and primary; it comes before everything else. And if we give financial assistance from the outside to that place, it should be in the form of supplementary assistance for the purpose of developing it to where it will, step by step, develop its own financial resources, and there must be a definite system by which financial assistance is gradually reduced, preferably a sliding scale.
Now a few words about the struggle for the Bolshevization of the Party in the various language organizations. In the past period we have had certain struggles in the Bolshevization process in the language field. We had the rise of a sharp right wing opposition in the Lithuanian movement, an opposition which attempted to seize control of the Chicago organ of our Lithuanian fraction and which was defeated only in a very sharp struggle in which we had to mobilize the entire Lithuanian membership of the Party and the Lithuanian mass organizations. We have had, however, a very satisfactory ending of this struggle which greatly improved our Lithuanian language work, deepened it politically and extended its mass base. We turned this obstacle to our work, this blow against us, into an asset, into an instrument for winning new masses.

In the Hungarian field, we had great difficulties with the Hungarian Buro, which developed a certain sectarian fossilization which prevented it from solving the problems and reaching the Hungarian masses, from facing the problems of the new period of struggle. Out of that grew a very sharp factional situation which required a drastic intervention of the Central Committee, of the Political Bureau, a drastic shaking up of the Hungarian Bureau. I think we can report now that as a result of this shake-up of the Hungarian Bureau we now have a Hungarian movement on the road to a real mass development. It is improving its work, stabilizing its paper, and extending the circulation, developing real broad penetration into the non-Party mass Hungarian organizations, which was the place where we had come to a standstill before. I think we can say the Political Bureau succeeded in solving the deadlock in the Hungarian work.

With regard to the general question which is central for the whole process of Bolshevizing the Party, that is the question of cadres, the finding and training and developing new leading forces, I want to raise just one or two questions. First, that it is necessary to understand what is a cadre policy. We are beginning to develop a cadre policy in the center. In the districts I do not think our comrades yet know that there is such an animal as a cadre policy. This is necessary. Every district must have systematic, persistent attention to the development of its leading forces, the proper distribution of these forces, know these forces—where they can do the best work, the study of these forces to see what are the obstacles to the development of each one of these forces, the overcoming of these obstacles, giving help. And this can only be done if it is organized. It cannot be left to individual initiative, it must be a definite policy which must be developed, and this must be the result of collective
work. We must have a cadre policy in every district, and finally in every section and unit, and in every union, by the way. We must develop such an understanding and grasp of the problem of forces and cadres, that we do not solve every question that comes up by inspiration. We cannot have a situation where one day we decide this one way, and another day we decide something else—nothing is by plan, everything is by guess.

This is the cause of much of the bad work of our Party. And this is the reason why we cannot discover new forces. That is the reason why we cannot develop new forces. The moment we get a man, we throw him into some place where there are tremendous tasks and we destroy him. With regard to this whole question of forces, I think one of the best things ever said on this is another quotation from Lenin that I want to read to you. It is much better than anything I can say on it, and I bring it forward as the most important word that can be said on this subject. Lenin said:

"We should keep in mind that just now, of much greater importance for the purpose of training and teaching, is action which teaches those as yet untrained, to embrace our point of view, yes, wholly our point of view. There are plenty of such people, never yet did revolutionary Russia posses such a mass of people as now. Never yet was the revolutionary class faced with such exceptionally favorable conditions as regards temporary allies, true friends and involuntary helpmates, as is the case with the Russian proletariat of today. There are plenty of people, masses of them, all that is necessary to do is to throw overboard all thoughts and sayings that keep you lagging behind, and to give full leeway, to open the way to the initiative of the masses."

In my opinion that is the solution of the cadre problem, that is the point that we must emphasize before everything else on this question. Of course, we must have school work. We have made some progress in the development of our school work. I do not want to recapitulate this. Other comrades will give detailed information on the development of our school work. It is sufficient to point out: we have increased the scope and the size of our school work in the center and in the districts. We have enlarged the number of district schools, both night and full time training courses, and the youth have developed systematic school work. All of this is only a beginning. The greatest progress has been in a certain political deepening of this school work and bringing it closer to the practical everyday life. What is still especially missing, is a cadre policy with regard to the product of the school, the following up of the students after they leave the school so that the school attendance does not become a mere incident but rather the beginning of serious development of students for leadership.
Then the question of the tasks of our Party. I have already dealt with many of the most important of them. I don't intend, in concluding the report, to go over again all those tasks enumerated in the Fourteenth Plenum resolution, and give a catalog of them, or of the present resolution which registers them and adds a few. Just to remain ourselves, what the Twelfth E.C.C.I. Plenum says about our tasks:

"C. P. of U. S. A.: The American Party must mobilize the masses and concentrate chiefly on the struggle: 1) for social insurance, against wage cuts, for immediate assistance for the unemployed; 2) for assistance for the ruined farmers; 3) for equal rights for the Negroes and the right of self-determination for the Black Belt; 4) for the defense of the Chinese people and the Soviet Union. It is necessary to carry out the decision on the turn in the work of the Party and the Trade Union Unity League."

These are our tasks, the tasks of the development of mass struggles—first of all, development in leadership of the strike movement which is going to grow in far larger proportions in the year 1933. The present strike in the automobile industry is an indication of what we shall expect in the coming year. In the mining industry we will have a mass movement of struggle centering around the first of April in which issues of the mining industry will come to a crisis. In the railroad industry we will have a crisis on the question of wages, and struggles around it. In the marine industry we have all the developments for mass struggles, and the importance of the marine industry cannot be overemphasized for our Party and for the revolutionary movement, not only in the United States but of the world. In most of the industries on a larger or smaller scale struggles are brewing. In the unemployed field we have already the development of a national mass movement which is consciously carrying on daily struggles, crystallizing its own cadres, and uniting with the struggles of the employed workers, towards uniting the strike movements and the unemployed movement in one big united front movement to force unemployment insurance. We have special farmers' movements, the mobilization for the struggle for Negro rights. Interweaving with these are problems which we often tend to neglect, such as the winning of the American workers. It is necessary that at this Plenum we make a little step forward in putting this to the fore in a practical way, as one of the tasks of the Party.

We have the various actions around which we mobilize all phases of our work, the action of March 4, the struggle for unemployment relief and insurance which must be comparable in volume and political development to that of March 6, 1930, the Anti-War
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Congress, and the Mooney Congress. Around all of these tasks and struggles, special and general, we must gather the workers under the leadership of the Communist Party, building and Bolshevizing our Party through the process of leading and organizing the mass struggles of the workers, winning them away from the social fascists, defeating the misleaders of the workers, consolidating the workers' united front for the struggle against capitalism in the United States.

EXTRACTS FROM CONCLUDING REMARKS

I will try to make the summing up as brief as possible, as we are all very tired from three heavy days of work. Certain questions, however, will have to be dealt with at some length. First, just a word to emphasize the seriousness of the tasks that are placed upon the Party at the present time. I think that it is sufficient to look at this evening's paper to understand that the entire world is a sort of powder magazine now with a lot of sparks spluttering around everywhere. That this applies not only to international relations but to class relations within each country. In this evening's papers, you see in the headlines spread all over the first page: "Fascists in Office in Germany"; reformist trade unions discussing whether they are not forced to go into the general strike that has already been called by the Communist Party; Hitler announcing that he is going to secure a majority in the Reichstag by outlawing the Communist Party. And inside the United States, news which is almost equally important for us. The New York Life Insurance Company has suspended farm sales as a result of the struggle against these sales in the State of Iowa. It is quite clear that we are already in a period of sharp struggles, clashes between states and between classes, that events are moving with terrific speed. And it is necessary for us to emphasize what this means for our Party, because this requires a terrific speeding up of our work, a speeding up of the tempo of the transformation of our Party. And it is in this sense that we must emphasize the lagging behind, in this sense we must emphasize the utter inadequacies of all of our work, and not in the static sense that would try to picture us as standing on the same spot where we were a year ago. We all of us realize, and have specifically established here in this Plenum, the fact that the carrying through of the resolution of the Fourteenth Plenum, which is a concretization of the tasks of our Party in the line of the Twelfth E.C.C.I. Plenum, remains the basic task of the Party which is as yet unfulfilled. We are in complete agreement with the criticisms of the work of our Party, its weaknesses and shortcomings as developed in the Twelfth Plenum of the
E.C.C.I. in the speech of Comrade Gusev, a speech which calls for a sharp change in the methods of work of the Party, the development of a real inner democracy and a real move forward in the development of new cadres, as a basic instrument for the leading of the mass struggles which will be our task in the immediate future. We have made certain progress. The character of this progress is, of course, still limited. It could be described perhaps as creating some of the necessary pre-conditions for a decisive change. One of these pre-conditions for a decisive change, and a pre-condition for any adequate leadership of mass struggles, is the hammering together of a solid, monolithic leadership. It is impossible to lead mass struggles with a divided leadership, utterly impossible! It is impossible to make a change in the character of the Party’s work without a monolithic leadership in the Party. And one of the best contributions that we have made in the past months to the making of the change in the Party is the development of certain decisive steps toward drawing together and binding together into a real working, collective body the leadership of the Party. The reports that have been given to this Plenum were not personal reports. They were reports for a Political Bureau.

Comrade Hudson said openly in his speech that he found it possible to agree with the report because the report had been corrected by Comrade Hathaway. And what was the nature of this “correction” that Comrade Hathaway made? Comrade Hudson explained that while from the report it could be understood some of these advances had been caused by some of the work of the Party, in truth all of the improvements were the results of the spontaneous upsurge of the masses. [Interjection: That is, in spite of the Party.]

The spontaneous upsurge of the masses had brought certain improvements in spite of the Party! Now Comrade Hudson here introduces a correction into the report which Comrade Hathaway did not bring forward. According to this interpretation, all of the advances that have taken place are the gifts of the spontaneous action of the masses. Is that a correct interpretation? Of course, it is not. And of course Comrade Hathaway never said anything of the kind. And of course if anybody says that, we have to reject it because it is not true, and moreover it contains a very dangerous theory—the theory of the reliance upon the spontaneity of the masses, the failure to recognize the role of the Party in leading the masses. Comrades, can anyone say that it would have been possible to have the present great strike in Detroit without the Party? Can one say this took place in spite of the Party? I say that except for the work of the Party there would have been no
strike. Can one say there would have been this mass movement among the farmers without the Party? I say that we would not have had this mass development among the farmers except for our leadership. Or can one say we would have had the development of the unemployed movement in this country without our Party? I say that the Party has created the unemployed movement and even that without the Party there would not have been the social fascist unemployed councils—which come into existence as counter-organizations to our organizations, and where we do not work they do not come into existence, and so on in every other field of work.

We have to reject this theory—this theory of spontaneity. Our advances have been made possible because we are working with more clarity, more system, more energy and more unity. And this for us is decisive. We do not rely upon spontaneity. We do not believe that we can be completely bad and yet produce some good results either. Because things that are accomplished are the production of the good part of our Party and its work.

We have to recognize, in addition to this good part and in addition to this progress, we still have left a heavy inheritance from the past of the bad methods of work. And what we accomplish, we accomplish in spite of these fad things, the inheritance of the past.

I want to correct one of the formulations that I made in my report which seemed to give grounds to some comrades to think that while Comrade Zack's theory is all wrong, his practice is all right. This impression arose out of the fact that I said Comrade Zack is a very practical worker and overcomes some of his theoretical shortcomings in the work. I should have explained that more. Comrade Zack does overcome some of these shortcomings, not by changing his own mind, but by yielding under the pressure of the leading comrades who surround him a little bit, who control him and press him. Comrade Zack feels this thing as a sort of hostile, not a very helpful thing, but he sometimes makes the best of a bad situation and bows to the pressure. The unfortunate thing is he rarely changes his mind in that process and when the mechanical pressure is removed, Zack is back on his own line again. Of course it would be foolish to think that under such a situation he can do good practical work. It is impossible to do good practical work under these circumstances. Comrade Zack himself knows it. He feels that his work is being completely destroyed by the pressure of the Political Bureau. And he feels what a glorious thing it would be if he was free from the pressure of the Polburo, if he could go out and build up the labor movement again like in 1921 when he
did create a "United Labor Council" under the nose of the Political Bureau without the Political Bureau knowing anything about it. But Comrade Zack, the days of 1921 are gone forever. The most that you can do now along that line is the creation of a carpenters' union of 120 members. You got away with that.

The statement that Comrade Zack has submitted does not straighten him out a bit. On the contrary. It intensifies his error and brings it to a height that we have not seen for years and years. This last statement of his is in substance a theoretical formulation of the slogan: "Out of the reformist unions!" Nothing else. Of course with Zack's eclecticism one can draw all kinds of conclusions from it. But if one is to be logical and draw the necessary conclusions he must issue the slogan: "Out of the reformist unions; smash the reformist unions." And we have to say to Comrade Zack: there is no room in our movement for such theories, and we are going to smash them.

Comrade X. said that he did not object to our making use of the revolutionary traditions of American history, but only made objection to the particular kind of use I made of it in my speech in New Jersey. In order that you may judge this question on its merits, I want to read to you a brief report that was in the Daily Worker:

"The Republican, Democratic and Socialist Parties," said Browder, "attack the Communist Party on the grounds that it advocates a violent revolution. They say that revolution is un-American; that it strikes at the very foundation of our government. In attacking us on such grounds do these men realize that they are attacking the very origin of these United States? Have they not heard of the American Revolution, surely one of violence against the tyranny of George III of England? Why, even the Republican Party was born in violence, in four years of Civil War. If the Americans of old, the revolutionists of 1776, could hear these Republicans, Democrats and Socialists talk against the Communist Party they would turn over in their graves and kick over their headstones.

"What do they call Americanism? Shall we sit quietly by and see our wives and children starve without any effort to find a way out, without seeking new guarantees of security?

"What we need is the revolutionary spirit of 1776, brought up to-date; the spirit of that part of the Declaration of Independence, which says, that it is our duty to throw off an oppressive government, and establish new guarantees for the masses. This is the spirit of the Communist Party in the United States applied to the new issues and class relations of today.

"What America needs is again a revolution to build a government on the basis of the organized power of the working class, allied with the toiling poor farmers, and the impoverished middle classes."

What is wrong with that? I say it is correct and I want to
say that when Comrade X. objects to that, he is not objecting to any incorrect use of American revolutionary traditions, he is objecting to the very idea of making use of these revolutionary traditions.

When Comrade X. says that I made a very bad speech in the John Reed Club, I am not in a very good position to defend this speech because I have not re-read it since it was printed in the Daily Worker. The stenogram was taken without my knowledge and it went into the Daily Worker without my seeing it. I shall have to rely on my memory as to what I said; and the circumstances under which it was delivered makes me feel that the speech might have been open to criticism, so that I don't want to reject all criticism. But I want to reject the criticism made by Comrade X. He declared the Russian workers did not need any John Reed. I think the Russian workers did need John Reed. Lenin thought so. Lenin was delighted to have John Reed in the revolution and sometimes after the ending of the civil war, Comrade Lenin went out of his way to cause to be printed in Russian John Reed's book, and more, he wrote a special introduction for this Russian edition, in which he recommended it to the workers of the entire world. Comrade Lenin did not do that for many books—you won't find many introductions by Comrade Lenin. I want to read the introduction. It is important for the purpose of our argument:

"With the greatest interest and with never slackening attention I read John Reed's book Ten Days That Shook the World. Unreservedly do I recommend it to the workers of the world. Here is a book which I should like to see published in millions of copies and translated into all languages. It gives a truthful and most vivid exposition of the events so significant to the comprehension of what really is the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. These problems are widely discussed, but before one can accept or reject these ideas, he must understand the full significance of his decision. John Reed's book will undoubtedly help to clear this question, which is the fundamental problem of the international labor movement."

I don't remember what terms of praise I used in my speech for his book, but I am sure I did not go very much over the estimate of the book given by Lenin. Comrade Trachtenberg just informs me that now, fifteen years after the revolution, the Comintern has just given instructions to get this book translated into the Hindu language. It seems that even fifteen years after the revolution, the book is so valuable that there is no other book which quite replaces it. It still is taken as important work to be translated into all languages so as to make it accessible to the broadest masses.

Here it is necessary for me to say something I wanted to say
at the John Reed meeting. I had made note of it and meant to include it in my speech (and here is where justified criticism comes in because this should have been said at that meeting). It is something I must say here. That is, that there are serious political inaccuracies and mistakes in John Reed’s book and some of these were even pointed out by Comrade Stalin. There are certain statements which do not correspond with historical facts and which fit in with the Trotskyist distortions of history. I should have pointed these errors out in order to vaccinate the readers against these particular mistakes.

In regard to this too, I think that what Comrade X. really objected to was not the contents of the speech I made to the John Reed Club. He objected to the fact that I made the speech. Comrade X. has had that attitude toward all of the work we have been doing in the last months among the intellectuals and professionals—that this work is a sort of abandonment of the proletarians, and that it constitutes a serious deviation. He thinks it is getting away from the true working class line. In connection with this, Comrade X. is so strongly for a strict proletarian line and proletarian ideology, he even objects to us reading the New York Times, and he thinks we ought to read nothing but the Daily Worker.

Also, Comrade X. is not very sympathetic to our work among the farmers. He thinks that one of the strong points in the indictment against Comrade Puro is the fact that he has neglected Finnish work for agrarian work and is, therefore, no longer qualified as a Finnish leader.

All of this constitutes merely one phase of a typical narrow, right sectarianism. It is non-Bolshevik and non-Leninist. It is the attitude which scorns the problems of the allies of the proletariat. And what this means politically was described by Comrade Stalin when he pointed out:

"Obviously those who are getting ready to seize and hold power, cannot afford to be indifferent about the possibility of finding powerful allies... Now, one who dreads revolution, one who does not wish to lead the proletariat to the conquest of power, is not likely to be interested in finding allies for the proletarians."

The rejection of the leading role of the Party among the non-proletarian strata of the population is a rejection of the hegemony of the proletariat in the revolution. It is fundamentally non-Leninist.

Now about the Spencer united front. I must admit a shortcoming on my part, that I learned about this united front first from the article of Comrade Morton. And it was on the basis of Com-
rade Morton’s article on the united front that I formed my judgement that a sectarian error had been committed, and every bit of additional information I get on this confirms my judgement on this point. What were the facts? The facts were that in Spencer a picnic was arranged for the defense of the Soviet Union, jointly by the Branch of the Finnish Federation and the F.S.U. Branch, headed by a Socialist Party member, the purpose being to finance this Socialist Party member who was a delegate to the Amsterdam Anti-War Congress. Somebody wrote to Buffalo and said to the District Bureau that Comrade Amter is coming through on his election campaign tour. The District was arranging meetings for Comrade Amter, and seeing that the picnic was taking place, they thought it could be transformed into an election campaign meeting for the Communist Party. And the Finnish comrades who knew the facts, knew this was wrong, and said that this would be wrong, that we cannot turn this picnic into a Communist Party election rally when the purpose is to finance a delegate to the Amsterdam Congress. I say, the Finnish comrades in Spencer were absolutely correct. I think the Buffalo District agreed at once that this was correct. Everybody agreed to it except the Finnish Bureau. The Finnish Bureau declared that that was a very serious mistake. This was an example, they said, of a united front from the top. And Comrade Morton wrote as follows:

"The comrades in Spencer arranged a joint picnic with the F. S. U. Socialist local and in this united front they were giving up all our conditions. This united front," she says, "was not made from the bottom, but also the leaders were taken in; secondly, this united front was not made on the basis of our program. Comrades even went so far, as being frightened to give a chance to our well-known comrade from New York to speak—not even though that "Socialists" had sent their leaders there. The comrades in Spencer had an entirely wrong conception of united front. They thought that the united front means, that they arrange a joint picnic with the "Socialists" in the name of the F. S. U. and be quiet that nobody would know that there are also Communists. It is the duty of the Communists to be always ready to explain the program that represents the interests of the workers and working farmers and to expose the betraying leaders."

This is explained later when the article says that we can make the united front only on the basis of our revolutionary program:

"Our united front aim therefore is not to conciliate in any way with the social fascists; on the contrary it means uncompromising struggle against the social fascists leaders. We will never form the united front, except from the bottom. This means with the working masses (but not with the betraying leaders), and only on the basis of strictly revolutionary program. This looks very clear and
simple, but in practical application of the united front policy, many mistakes have been committed, and it looks as if many opportunist mistakes will be made, before we learn to make the united front for the benefit of the revolutionary movement."

Then, to show that this is not just an accident, just a mistake, a mistake of not knowing the facts in Spencer, the same article gives many other examples of the same kind of united fronts that were condemned, prevented and stopped.

"Sometime ago we noticed from the reports published in Tyomies, that in some place in the Middle West a joint meeting was held with the I.W.W.-ites, at which a debate was conducted as to which organization is better: Communist Party or I. W. W. To place such a question for debate is entirely wrong. If we submit ourselves to debate on such questions, this means that we recognize the I. W. W. as an organization which somehow represents the workers' interests. In many resolutions we have made clear, that Communist Party (and those workers' organizations that have recognized its authority) are the only organizations that truly represent the cause of workers and poor farmers. But, in spite of this, comrades mistakenly engage themselves in debate with the I.W.W.-ites on the question as to which organization is best."

And a further example of this conception of the united front:

"Last year when we had a special campaign against Finnish fascism and for the support of the Communist Party of Finland, the local comrades in many localities made erroneous united fronts with leaders of the I. W. W. We corrected these comrades and discussed these mistakes in public, but, in spite of this, new mistakes have been made."

Local leaders of the I.W.W. were drawn into action against fascism in Finland, and this was wrong. So you can see the Spencer case where this Socialist who was a delegate to the Anti-War Congress is placed as a leader with whom a united front cannot be made, is not an accident, it is a line, the line is systematically developed and crystallized into an article. Another feature of the article is that in the entire thing, there is not one positive example given of a united front that can be endorsed. The very title is "How Not To Make the United Front." And everything there is something that is condemned. And really an article such as this does teach how not to make a united front, and I am sure under the influence of this article there would be no united fronts at all. [Interjection by Stachel: Then you make no mistakes.] Yes, there would be no mistakes.

Now I want to deal very briefly with the anti-war errors. Some of the comrades, I believe especially the Chicago comrades, are of the opinion that in our resolution this has not been developed fully or sharply enough. We can accept this point of view without any
difficultly and agree that the resolution shall be largely elaborated on this point, sharpened in the precise spirit of the C.I. letter on this question.

We cannot accept the criticism of the Chicago comrades, however, on the Students Anti-War Congress. In the first place their criticism has one serious defect, in that it concentrates on certain minor questions while overlooking two big political weaknesses and mistakes in the Congress itself. The real weaknesses included the mistakes which was written into the resolution by one of our comrades, the resolution of recognition, which speaks of recognition as a means of abating the war danger, lessening the war danger; this was a really serious political mistake, something which has to be sharply criticized and was criticized by the Political Bureau. Another mistake was the retreat that was made at the end of the Congress before the social fascists on which our fraction split, one section stood for the correct line, the other proposed a retreat and carried the majority of the Congress with them. This was a very serious error and reflected the immaturity of our cadres there. We have to remember that the comrades in this Congress were quite young in the Party and League and we must not be too frightened by seeing deviations and weaknesses among them. But while we don’t get panic stricken in the face of such weaknesses, we have to brand every such weakness and every such mistake and use it to educate these comrades and strengthen them for the next fight. Then we have established in our discussions in the Political Bureau that the preparations for the Congress showed a serious weakness in failing sufficiently to bring forward the Y.C.L., its face, its line, as a separate organization in all of these preparations among the masses of students. The criticism of the Chicago comrades is not directed toward such questions as these but is directed toward organizational points, questions of posters and leaflets at the Congress and the demand for workers delegates to the Congress.

Now with regard to the posters and leaflets at the Congress. Was it necessary for us to have a leaflet at the Congress? I think that the attitude of the youth comrades was correct on this point. It was not necessary to have a leaflet in the Congress. Not necessary. If there was any question that we would not have our speakers before the Congress, then it would be necessary to have leaflets in reserve so that if the speakers do not get on, the leaflets will be distributed. Or if we see that our speakers are not strong enough to adequately present the point of view of the Party, then we should have leaflets to guard against any weaknesses of the speaker. Well, if our speakers were weak, then we should have had leaflets. No one has criticized the speakers. No one has said that the full Com-
munist program was not presented. Even the Trotskyites accepted the statement, which perhaps isn’t a compliment to the statement, and perhaps this should cause us to look at the stenogram and examine it carefully to see whether there was not a little ultra leftism there because on this point the Trotskyites had an ultra-leftist line and criticized this Congress in the same way that they criticized Amsterdam. But one can sustain this criticism about the lack of leaflets only if one says that because the leaflets were not there the Communist position was not properly and fully presented. One cannot have it both ways. With regard to posters, the objection to the posters that was raised in the committee was the objection to creating the appearance that the Communists were moving in and organizationally taking over the building and I think that on such little things as that we should always be careful and defer to the susceptibilities of whoever we happen to be working with in these general committees.

Now with regard to the question of workers delegates, we never at any time took the position that no workers delegates at all were to come in. In fact I think the original directives we sent to Chicago on this—as a very subsidiary point, but it was included—were to have a few worker fraternal delegates from selected organizations. [Interjection: That we decided on and that was rejected.] What was rejected was a demand that the Committee shall issue a call for delegates from workers’ organizations.

This was the issue which was raised by telegram and which was discussed in New York. And at that time I must say that I said, if there is going to be an issue about this, we can agree not to have any worker-delegates at all, because we do not look upon this congress as the instrument for leading the workers in the anti-war struggle. This congress is specifically designed to reach the students, and if there is going to be created the impression that the students are mobilizing against war, then keep them away. But we never rescinded the decision to have worker fraternal delegates. [Interjection by Green: There were 60 fraternal delegates from workers’ organizations.]

So I think that really we have to confirm the judgement of the Political Bureau which discussed this question and came to the conclusion that the raising of this kind of issue was not correct in relation to a big political event like this Students’ Anti-War Congress—which was big in a relative sense; not that it represented the main line of our work, but it was important as representing a new step forward among new strata, in which we were dealing with 650 people most of which we never had any contact with before, in which we were using every effort not to have any artificial obstacles placed between us, but to present our full political message
without any organizational obstacles. And to present this kind of criticism represents a certain narrow approach. I don’t think this is the result of a considered discussion among the Chicago comrades. I think they came to snap judgement on this, without much consideration.

On the question of the workers’ ticket in the local elections, I think everything that needed to be said was said by Comrade Schneiderman in his excellent ten-minute speech tonight. Comrade Schneiderman’s speech I think we will have to print as a directive on the question of the workers’ ticket.

The question of the analysis of the Socialist Party vote in the elections, I think we can deal with in summary by referring to Comrade Hathaway’s speech which in our opinion answered it fully.

On the question of the I. L. D., Comrade Paterson ably emphasized this here and we should give it an additional word of emphasis especially in connection with the concrete mass political campaigns that we have now around the Herndon case, the Atlanta Six and the Scottsboro case.

In connection with the local elections we must also raise questions about the general tendency to break down all protective legislation, all social legislation, which is going on on a local and state-wide scale everywhere. Included in this is also the growing tendency to do away with all the free features of the educational system; cutting down the feeding of children; to cut out free textbooks and establish tuition fees in all the higher institutions, from high school up; in many places a complete closing of the schooling system. These things are of the most intense importance in moving the masses in the election campaigns.

In connection with this we should not allow the slogan of unemployment insurance to be narrowed down so that we forget the other aspects of social insurance. There are many aspects of social insurance, although unemployment insurance is the main central issue of social insurance.

Some comrades have demanded of us that we give an explanation of the weaknesses of the second Bonus March. This is a justified demand. It is one of our weaknesses that we have not prepared such a well-considered analysis of this question. [Interjection by Grecht: Also an analysis of the basis of our united front with the Khaki Shirts.] This is more important in view of our opinion that we are by no means through with the veterans’ movement, that there are accumulating the forces for another big action of the veterans around the issue of the bonus and around the issue of the reduction in the disability allowances,
etc. And we must by all means prepare some adequate leadership of these actions. The weakness of the second Bonus March reflected not the dying out of these forces among the veterans, rather our own inability to draw forth these forces, due largely to weakness of organization and cadres, to the fact that we have not been able, due to these weaknesses, to overcome the influence of the police agents that infest especially the veterans' organizations, and to the continuation of a narrow understanding of the whole problem of organizing the veterans. Sectarianism in this field is just as strong as in any other field—and especially the absence of a program of local struggle upon which local organizations can be built. It is not possible to build an organization abstractly—it must have activity to carry on. You can't have national marches all the time. There must be a program of local activity and local struggle, which means local leadership, and this is actually the question which the districts must give attention to, providing a certain reliable, responsible leadership to develop the local veterans' organizations.

One point on the farm sales. One mistake that is made many times with regard to the selling out of the farms is to take the attitude of preventing the sale from being held. All this does is postpone the sale. We should try to carry through the sale, but make sure that we buy it, and not pay such high prices. I heard that they paid $14 for one farm. That's entirely too high (Laughter). Absolutely impermissible to pay $14 when it is already proven by the farmers in Pennsylvania that you can get them for $1.18. Then some cases of the sales in Iowa, where the farmers have contented themselves with preventing the sale of the farm at a figure lower than the mortgage, in order to prevent the "deficiency" judgment from seizing the chattels of the farm. This is an abandonment of the farm in order to save the stock. Now, while, of course, this is a step towards more militant forms of struggle, we should do everything in our power, and it should be possible in such a situation as that, to raise the struggle to a point where they will save not only the stock but also the farm itself. It wouldn't require more violence to save the whole thing.

Now with regard to special problems connected with the Negro work, I think that Comrade Haywood's speech covered all of these in quite a satisfactory manner. I would just say one word in addition to emphasize that we must not be afraid of building organization among the Negroes of any kind the Negroes want, that meets the needs of the Negroes. There must be a broad policy towards meeting all the needs of the Negroes, and especially in the form of cultural organizations, etc., and in this connection we have some questions raised by the comrades from District 17, the
question of the I.L.D. and the L.S.N.R. Comrade Ross thinks that in his district the I.L.D. performs all the functions of the L.S.N.R. and makes the latter unnecessary. This is too narrow an approach, Comrade Ross. This may seem to meet the same needs, because you have such a narrow base, and you feel a certain difficulty in having to handle two organizations when for your immediate needs one is enough. But you must think of the future, six months from now, when you may have thousands of people more. And you will have large numbers of Negroes who are interested in the struggle for Negro rights, but they are not interested in the general I.L.D. program for the struggle of the workers. And you must provide for the organizational needs of tying these people up with you without committing them to a general program on other things.

Then, we must say a word about this tendency that we have noticed in many places, that was reported as existing in District 16, to say, "Now we have the Negroes. What we need now is to get the whites," and then to proceed to get the whites by soft-pedalling the Negro issue. This, of course, is a most dangerous tendency. You can't get either the whites or the Negroes that way. In the first place, we haven't got either of them. We must win whites too in order to win the Negroes. But in order to win the whites, we have to win them on the issue of Negro rights, otherwise you haven't won them at all. You haven't won anything. The Negro question is one of our principal channels in winning the whites. It may seem to be an obstacle, but like many of our obstacles, we can transform them into instruments of strength for us. We can make it clear during the struggle that the division between white and Negro defeats them.

The question of the white farmers' and the Negro farmers' organizations. Of course, our orientation must be towards a single organization of white and Negro, but Comrade Ross takes a rather mechanical attitude towards this question which has grave dangers, and some of these dangers Comrade Ross himself exemplified in the report that he made. For example, he told us, "The Negro share-croppers are very hesitant about taking these white share-croppers in because one of the leaders of the white share-croppers is one who led mob action against them in 1931." Are we to take the attitude that we force the Negroes to take such whites into their organization? Even if there is the slightest hesitation among the Negroes, we should never insist upon it. That would be to create artificial antagonism between white and Negro farmers. We must organize both, and organize more fractions within both, and have one joint fraction, both working together and directing both, and
gradually bringing them together, eliminating all the distrust and opposition, and mixing them into one organization. This is a real contribution towards achieving the unity of the white and Negro farmers.

It is necessary to say a word about relief in strikes.

This question has been raised by the situation in the textile field in District 16 where it has become clear to us we had a certain danger facing us—a repetition of the old mistake. There was grave danger we would develop a strike movement among the textile workers upon the basis of having created among them the impression that by going out on strike under our leadership they would be guaranteed a steady flow or relief from the outside that would feed them during the struggle. And when we examine what that means in this small strike, it is that they would expect us to send in a minimum of $1,000 a day. Comrades, a strike that is called on such expectations as that would be a disaster for us. We must not have such strikes, because we know quite well, especially under the present conditions, that we will not be able to fulfil these expectations, and we must not create such expectations.

Comrades, this concludes the points I wanted to speak on in summing up the discussion. I think that in general, we can say that while there are still all of the fundamental weaknesses that we have been discussing since the Fourteenth Plenum of the Central Committee, that while all of the tasks laid down in the Fourteenth Plenum are tasks which still have to be carried through, yet we have begun to move, we have created some of the necessary preconditions for a change, a decisive change in the development of our Party towards a real Bolshevik mass Party. By seizing upon every step of progress for improvement of our work, and making this the basis for further, quicker, more drastic changes, we can begin to overcome the gap between our abilities and our strength and the tasks that are placed upon us. Thus we can more than ever before, become the leader of mass struggles, preparing for larger decisive class battles that are coming. This is the sense in which we must prepare and carry through the mass struggles and mass campaigns for the next months and upon the basis of this mass work, carry through a re-organization and transformation of our Party, in a war against sectarianism, in carrying on of the discussion, in the elections, and the work of the coming Eight Convention of our Party.