COMMUNISTS
AND
NATIONAL UNITY
An Interview of PM with
Earl Browder
This pamphlet contains the complete text of an interview given by Earl Browder to Harold Lavine, assistant to the managing editor of the New York newspaper *PM*, March 15, 1944.
COMMUNISTS AND NATIONAL UNITY

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QUESTION: We have been following your speeches and Robert Minor's "Questions and Answers" and various editorials in the Daily Worker the past month or two and we have several questions that arose in our minds. We wanted to find the answers.

The first question we wondered about was: What do you feel now distinguishes Communists from other elements in our society which in your own mind are progressive, pro-war, pro-world cooperation and the general progressive New Deal elements? Or, another way of stating that: Why does the Communist Party still feel it necessary to have a separate organization within other New Deal groups?

ANSWER: It is quite true that, as far as the current issues of the day are concerned, we have more points of similarity than of difference with other progressive groups, and it is our policy to stress the points of agreement rather than the points of difference. We think, however, that the very existence of our organization helps to bolster up the other progressive groups. We feel we have a distinct contribution to make in the fields of political orientation, theory and organization which would be lost if we were to dissolve ourselves. We do
not, of course, exist as a separate organization within other progressive groups.

We find that progressive elements in America are very badly organized, although America generally has a reputation of being first-class in the field of organization. On the other hand, we pride ourselves as having some mastery of the art of organization and we think we have in this field a distinct contribution to make to the general progressive camp, a contribution which would immediately be lost if we were to dissolve. We would not be strengthening the progressive movement by that act but would be weakening it.

That seems to us sufficient reason, rather than to disperse our organization, to attempt to make it even stronger while making all necessary organizational adjustments to enable us to contribute to the maximum to the common tasks.

**QUESTION:** Do you feel there are any others of importance beyond that one?

**ANSWER:** We also feel that as a distinct group we can make political contributions to the general progressive camp particularly in the field of prompt response to new political problems and finding the correct approach to them.

The general progressive camp in America flounders in facing new complicated issues and approaches them entirely through trial and error. Essentially this is a contempt for theory. We think we have a contribution to make to the broadest progressive camp in this respect by bringing to it theory, a clearer orientation and the ability to face questions without flinching.

Of course we don't have any exaggerated opinion of our relative strength. We are keenly conscious of the fact that...
we are a very small group against which there is organized a comprehensive system of social reactions and prejudices, so that we do not overestimate our ability to directly influence the political scene.

**QUESTION:** Another thing we wondered about is this: You state you are cooperating with other elements in our society to achieve relative prosperity after the war under the present free enterprise system. On the other hand, you resist liberal criticism of monopolies and cartels, and in fact denounce liberals for attempting to prevent the growth of monopolies and cartels. To us that seems something like a contradiction because, by their very definition, monopolies and cartels are combinations in restraint of trade; they are organized for the specific purpose of regulating production, keeping up prices, regulating technological development; in short, organized almost to produce scarcity. To us it does seem that while on the one hand you talk about prosperity under free enterprise, on the other hand, you are fighting or deriding the liberals who are attempting to achieve just that.

**ANSWER:** I think that in the liberal circles there is a certain misconception of this whole problem, a dangerous misconception, because, unless it is clarified, the progressive program will be weakened. The liberals look at monopolies and cartels and see only their negative and parasitic manifestations; but that is only one side of the picture. Monopolies and cartels are inevitable forms of capitalist economy in its higher stage of development. It is impossible for an economy like America's to go back to the pre-monopoly stage. If you are going to try to make the present system work, you can only do it on the basis of its main features; the only alternative would be a new social system.
Since it is our judgment that the country is not ready politically to replace capitalism by a socialist structure of society, we face without flinching the only other practical alternative. And that is to see if it is not possible (without tilting at windmills or setting impossible tasks) to help our country, under the system of capitalism as we have it (basically a monopoly system which regards itself as a system of free enterprise) to play a progressive role in this next period.

It seems to us that the liberals have completely blinked this whole problem; they avoid it; they don’t face it; they are neither for capitalism nor for socialism. If they are for capitalism, it is for some vague abstract ideal of capitalism that does not exist and which they cannot bring into existence. They place themselves outside of the sphere where real decisions are made and policies are really worked out; they become soldiers from the sidelines. Their attitude toward the Baruch Report is typical of this. The whole liberal approach to the Baruch Report has been one of scolding from the sidelines without assuming any responsibility for the solution of the problems that Mr. Baruch was really trying to face, and assuming in advance, even without reading his report, that the report must be wrong.

We cannot see anything constructive come out of such an approach.

**QUESTION:** That may very well be true, but it still does not indicate to me just how you make cartels work for plenty.

**ANSWER:** For example, the only possibility of realizing the perspective of full employment in America which is opened up by the Teheran Agreement is making use of the existing organization of the capitalist monopolies and cartels. Can you
Imagine any but a highly organized economy operating in the post-war period on the broad, sweeping scale necessary to realize such a perspective of full employment in America?

The basic feature of this economic problem of the post-war period is large-scale programs of industrialization of Latin America, Africa, Asia, Europe. There are two ways in which such large-scale projects of economic advancement could be carried through. One would be through a governmental economy; another would be through the large organizations of capital, that is, monopolies and cartels under governmental plan and direction.

If we in America would set ourselves the task of realizing the purely government-organized economy we would find ourselves up against the necessity of overcoming the resistance of the most powerful element in our society, which is precisely the large capitalists. In such a collision the program of immediate economic advancement would be immediately lost, whatever the outcome of the struggle might be. But there is little basis for predicting that the resistance of large capital in America could be overcome in time to have any influence on the immediate development of the world. If America is to play any role of world leadership today it has to be through national unity of all sections of the population, including large capital, for the fulfillment of the Teheran Agreement. Anyone who rejects that is rejecting the very thought of America playing a major role in the readjustment of the world in the post-war period.

Liberals have not yet begun to approach these questions in the practical fashion of men who have to assume responsibility for the outcome; you have to join in implementing practical policies to secure their adoption.
QUESTION: Well, I notice that the whole emphasis of the Communists at the present moment seems to be on avoiding conflict, not that there is any denial that there are conflicts in our society, but it is an attempt to either iron those conflicts out or prevent them from becoming violent in any fashion; which are perhaps all right except that it takes two to make a conflict.

ANSWER: It takes two to make a peace.

QUESTION: Maybe you can convince the trade unions that they should not strike; and maybe you can convince the liberals that they have to adjust themselves to monopolies and cartels; but how do you go about convincing Henry Ford that he should not smash labor unions, which he is attempting to do at the very moment, and how go about convincing Standard Oil that they not attempt to use cartels in the old fashioned way of preventing progress? In short, are you not avoiding conflict in a way that you can avoid a conflict by not hitting back if someone smacks you in the teeth?

ANSWER: It is not as simple as that. As a matter of fact, it is being demonstrated every day that the camp of big capital is not an undifferentiated group of reactionaries and labor-haters and fascists and semi-fascists; that there is in the ranks of big capital an intelligent desire to adjust the practice of capital to the necessities of democratic advance and a general rise of the well-being of the country.

It is our opinion that by finding the path of collaboration between the democratic forces of the people and these elements of big capital, you can place those tendencies of big capital in the position of decisive influence in determining the policy of the whole country. We can enlist capital in the regulation of capital, overcoming its worst abuses.
If this expectation of ours proves to be illusory, we will have been proven wrong, but we find in many circles of the capitalist class keener appreciation of this problem in its practical terms than we find among most of America's traditional liberals at the present moment. In these capitalist circles there are patriotic men who are really facing these problems and assuming personal responsibility for a favorable outcome for the country, men like Baruch, Charles Wilson, Stettinius, Donald Nelson. These are men who represent big capital; they are taking a really responsible attitude to the problems of the nation. We Communists have a very deep appreciation of this—an appreciation that is made more deep by the fact that our whole origin has been one of struggle largely against their whole class and a preconception that during this epoch nothing progressive could come out of that circle.

There is something new under the sun today and people who go by old formulas and preconceptions cannot find their way in the present world. We haven't the slightest idea that matters will work out without conflict and sharp differences, but we do think that such conflicts must be minimized, and that the whole approach to the question must be directed toward solutions through agreement and not toward solutions through test of strength in battle.

We haven't got time for that now if we are going to solve post-war problems, not to speak of winning the war. We are working against time now if we are to avoid catastrophe bigger than any that had been expected in this war. Our emphasis upon agreement that transcends all class divisions is in no way an underestimation of the crisis of the present system. But we know that the only alternative to this program we put forward is a real catastrophic smash-up of a
large part of the world which may throw our country and most of the world back into barbarism for 50 or 100 years.

If these forces of social conflict once break out of control, it is very difficult to see how soon America will get back to the road of progress. This is no longer a situation in which particular issues can be consigned to decision in battle with the idea that it is just an incident in a stable, progressively developing society. Now there is no isolation of particular conflicts; once you start the process of fighting it out, it becomes an endless chain in which all civil order will disappear. It can only be controlled by men of intelligence in all camps joining in a policy of national unity.

QUESTION: Another aspect of the same problem: I don't presume to be a Marxist; I am at a great disadvantage here, but as I have always understood it, Communists and Socialists are supposed to believe that crisis is inherent in this system, that although through one means or another, say, during the New Deal through spending and after the war perhaps again through spending or through the development of foreign nations, capitalism can achieve a period of relative prosperity—these periods are ended by a new crisis which is greater than the preceding one. Possibly that is neither clear nor accurate, but what I am wondering is, do you now believe that through this collaboration with the best elements in society we can, if the collaboration is more or less permanent, permanently stave off crisis, or that this is just a temporary thing which will bust up when conflict becomes too great?

ANSWER: I never think of it in terms of permanency, an abstract thing, because everything is relative. I prefer to put
it not in terms of permanency but as long-time practical policy over an indeterminate period of years. In that sense I say it is possible for the perspective outlined at Teheran to be realized; that is, a long-term period of peace for some generations and a rising stage of economic well-being for the peoples of the world.

I base that not upon any revision of the Marxian analysis of the inner contradictions of capitalism, but upon the fact that these principles are operating in a new world situation. The most reactionary, the most obstructive, the most parasitic elements of the world capitalist system will have been smashed with the defeat of Nazism and Japanese imperialism. There will be three great powers in the post-war world, in a military sense—the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union. It is entirely within the bounds of possibility that maintenance and further systematic unfolding of the agreements that were reached at Teheran will enable these three powers collectively to guide the whole world along the path of peace and economic progress, democratic progress.

Whether the United States can play its role in that progressive combination is largely a question of whether the United States can operate on the basis of full production. This is a question of markets. The perspective is clearly possible to work out, with the underwriting of the project by the three major powers in the world, a program of large-scale industrialization of the less developed continents on a continent-wide basis, integrating the various nations into that program, not on the basis of their subordination to a super-government, but on the basis of their progressive, democratic self-determination within the larger scheme. This will at once provide America with the markets essential for it to play any role, and at the same time it will provide the necessary economic
initiative and initial support for the program in the rest of the world.

America has to play the leading role in this if this is to be realized; no other nation can do it. America cannot do it alone because, projected as a peculiar American program, it merges with the whole concept of the American Century of the Luce-Jordan school of thinking, which is just a “loose” form of imperialism that would range the rest of the world against America. America can do it in cooperation with Britain and the Soviet Union. These very concrete practical aspects of the present situation require that we place the old formulas in quite a different setting and work them out with quite different results.

Of course this requires thinking in new terms not only on our part but on the part of the capitalists. Very few of them have as yet begun to think about the foreign market in terms of the tens of billions of dollars necessary, instead of billions. If this is going to work out the capitalists will be able to, and will have to, expand their foreign trade horizon some one thousand per cent.

I think it will work out. I think their present timidity is a passing phase and that you will begin to see them come out and stop talking about three, four, five billions of dollars of foreign markets and talk about thirty, forty, fifty billions of dollars per annum. Some of them will immediately accompany that with dreams about an American world empire, but in practice they will quickly begin to find out that it won’t work in those terms. They will have to revise their thinking in that line too and think in terms of world partnership instead of world empire because that will be the only way to get results.

Liberals will call this utopianism, the new utopianism, or
the new imperialism, because they cling to the past; they cling to the past even as much as some conservatives do, only in a different form; they cannot think in terms of the future. They still believe there is nothing new under the sun.

**QUESTION:** This is what I think is another difference, and that is, we were a little surprised to see your letter to Colliers magazine concerning George Creel’s article, because Mr. Hull has been the kind of man that is distrusted by liberals. For you to wish him many years more as Secretary of State or absolve him personally from responsibility and praise the way he in general has handled foreign affairs—that sounded like Arthur Krock to us. To us Mr. Hull represents Peyrouton and Giraud and the conflict with de Gaulle. He represents playing with Franco and playing around with Archduke Otto, playing around with Mr. Badoglio and the King; and we don’t like it. We don’t wish him many years more as Secretary of State.

**ANSWER:** And yet, strangely enough, when we were faced with a very practical, immediate problem of blocking the further advance of fascism in the Americas, and we had a pro-Nazi coup d’etat in Bolivia, we had a spectacle in the United States of the liberal press plumping for the immediate recognition of this pro-fascist junta in Bolivia and Mr. Hull taking the lead in blocking the whole business. Now, if Mr. Hull is such a bad man, and the liberals were so wise about foreign policy, how did it happen that he was right on that question and the liberal press so completely wrong?

As I said in my letter to *Colliers*, there are many features of American foreign policy which we are profoundly convinced must undergo the process of modernization and be
brought into harmony with the main line of American foreign policy. But to assume that Mr. Hull is personally responsible for these shortcomings in our policy is just to shut one's eyes to the fact that on these very questions in which liberals have a correct criticism of the State Department, the liberals themselves are jointly responsible for the shortcomings. And further, that in the profound reorientation of American foreign policy that has taken place, and it is profound, the liberals have completely shut their eyes to the fact that Mr. Hull played a leading role in it with very little help from the liberals.

**Question:** I presume that when you speak of that you mean the Moscow and Teheran Conferences. I would hardly say that he had very little help from the liberals because the liberals were plumping for that for years before they took place, at least insofar as my paper is concerned. But beyond that, when you say that we are personally responsible for the shortcomings, I won't argue with that; I don't think so. Take the specific policies which we have pursued and are pursuing, namely, on Franco, Badoglio, Peyrouton, Giraud—Just take those as examples of the kind of policy we are pursuing. Would you say you are in favor of any of those?

**Answer:** I have made my position clear in detail on all those questions as they arose and at the time they were being decided, but I have always refused to allow the struggle against these negative aspects of American policy to be transformed into some sort of a permanent sniping expedition which assumes these things can be changed by a campaign directed against the Secretary of State. As I said in my letter to *Collier's*. I have never taken any part in any campaign
against Cordell Hull, and I think the liberals make a mistake to the degree they fall into any such kind of line or anything that could be interpreted as any such kind of a line.

**Question:** It is, I think, necessary, possibly for psychological reasons, to personalize these things; namely, if you don't like playing ball with Mr. Victor Emmanuel and Mr. Badoglio, you have to yell some, and Mr. Hull is the logical person to yell at, being Secretary of State.

**Answer:** That is the American over-simplification of politics. I don’t think it gets results.

**Question:** I don’t know whether it gets results or not.

**Answer:** It gives people a spiritual satisfaction.

**Question:** I grant there are deep psychological reasons, but beyond that, a change of policy in our foreign policy must be made by men; at least they must announce the change.

**Answer:** Men make it.

**Question:** Mr. Hull is the man who must announce the change; he must sign the papers.

**Answer:** And he has a great deal to do with formulating policies also. I am not one who says “he gets it from the White House.” He plays a very important role in the formulation of America’s foreign policy. Therefore, when I see such satisfactory progress in the main orientation of that policy, I am inclined to concede a great part of the credit to him. When I absolve him from personal responsibility, from defects, it does not mean in any way to minimize his role.
He plays a very important role particularly because in the eyes of the country he stands to some degree separate from many of the previous divisions within the country and is looked upon with good will by large circles on both sides of the main political division in Congress. Of course, if he would more nearly resemble me he could not play that role, but in this case I will have to be reconciled to his following a different model!

**QUESTION:** You feel that the major policy is such an accomplishment that these other things are just minor defects?

**ANSWER:** The main direction of policy is going to determine everything else, and to understand how true that is, just look back six months and see what happened with relation to Yugoslavia.

**QUESTION:** But look back two days and see what happened in relation to Italy.

**ANSWER:** Yes, but you could have had the same pessimistic attitude on Yugoslavia as you have on Italy today. It is cleared up not by barking at Cordell Hull but by the logical development of the policy that Cordell Hull himself initiated last October at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, and you will have the same clarification with regard to Italy within another six months. We may cry about the time that is lost but that's the way things work out in this world. We cannot get everything all at once, and particularly you cannot get progress on the little things until you do get the main orientation correct. That we have today. Past delays were largely because the whole world was marking time waiting for Teheran. Now we can move forward faster.
Of course, even some of the best of our press still seems to be a little bit fearful about this perspective of Teheran. The *Herald Tribune* the other day editorially rebuked me by name for trying to make a career out of Teheran. What does it mean when they use that kind of a formulation? Surely, if they were going to promote Teheran, they have a much better opportunity than I personally have, and if they are afraid that I might make a career of it, it only means they are doubtful about what they are going to do.

**Question:** I think you misinterpret it because I think I know how the *Herald Tribune* feels, and I think it is a kind of a feeling that Communists in general act as though they are the only true patriots, that they had just been in conference with God, that everyone who disagrees with them secretly wants Hitler to win the war. I think that is a pretty general reaction which Communists instill in people.

**Answer:** Well, it is unfortunate. Maybe you can tell us how we can avoid that. It is not a choice on our part. I have studied that problem, not only with regard to this paper, but in general, a good many years and I find what they object to about the Communists is not that we brought the latest message from God, but that we bring a definite message at all. It seems to leave some sort of bad taste in America to have a definite point of view that you fight for. The correct thing in American intellectual life is to have four or five or seven or eight points of view on everything, throw them into a hat and then vote who shall be the man who pulls the correct solution out of the hat, and because Communists don’t agree to this as the correct thing, we create a certain embarrassment
and discomfort wherever we go. We recognize the fact, we only give a different interpretation of the cause for it.

As a matter of fact, nobody engages in any serious political discussions with our point of view; nobody—not PM, not the Post, not the Herald Tribune, not the Times—nobody presumes to sit down and criticize our point of view. It is supposed to be sufficient answer to everything we have to say to bring out the old clichés and to say, “Who can trust a Communist anyway?”

**Question:** That raises another point. This distrust arises from a pretty general conviction which may be owing to lack of understanding, or may be owing to a coincidence, but it seems to outsiders that changes in the Communist Party always revolve around the Soviet Union. To take the changes in the past three or four years.

*The Communist Party became anti-national preparedness when the Soviet Union signed a pact with Hitler; it became fervently pro-war when the Soviet Union was invaded by Hitler, and right now it is the Teheran Conference, in which the major fact of the Teheran Conference was the participation of the Soviet Union in what had previously been an Anglo-American alliance. Always it seems that the major factor of any Communist Party change is another country, and that, I think, is one reason for the mistrust and prejudice.*

**Answer:** To get a correct picture of that, we should connect it up with another fact—that the major factor in deciding the fate of the world has been the Soviet Union. This last is a fact which exists independent of whether there are any American Communists or not, because certainly, no credit or blame
for that fact, in the last place, rests upon a little group of Americans who are Communists.

Now, if the fate of the world is decided by the Soviet Union, does it not follow that anyone who is thinking correctly about taking part in deciding the fate of the world long ago should have been conscious of this fact and have had this as a central point of all his decisions? Is it not true that if the statesmen who decide the role of Britain and of America had had this fact in their minds for the last ten years, we would not have had this war at all; it would have been prevented? In fact, the great disaster of the world has been that there were not enough men who understood that the role of the Soviet Union was a decisive one for the whole world.

If that is true, how can you make it a point against the Communists in general, that in every decisive moment their position was determined by what happened in relation to the most important fact in world affairs? Anyone whose opinions were determined by any other consideration was orientating himself on minor facts in the world situation. Or perhaps he was orientating on a wrong attitude to the central factor, the most decisive factor, the Soviet Union.

Whether Communists were right or wrong on a particular question should not be determined by a general formula; your general formula tends to prove that we were right and everyone else was wrong, because everyone has come around to the recognition now that he was blind before to the most important fact.

Of course our attitude was determined by our recognition of the Soviet Union's relation to the national welfare of our country and the world. That is why, in September, 1939, we addressed an open letter to the President and Congress to
which I would like to call your attention in this connection. Why did we say the relation of our country to the Soviet Union is the most important, even after the war broke out? Let me read a few extracts from the letter, dated Sept. 11, 1939, addressed to the President and to members of Congress:

“We are Americans who love our country and would serve it by our best thought and most energetic action. As we understand the American tradition and Constitution, all persons, parties and groups, have the responsibility and duty to make clear, beyond doubt, their firm and unconditional defense of American social and national security; with this established, we believe that all, including the Communists, have the full right to participate in the democratic public life of our nation and to participate in its common tasks, without discrimination on account of creed or political affiliation.

“We add our voice to the popular condemnation of all who are attempting to find personal profit or narrow partisan advantage in the conditions of world crisis which press upon our people; we pledge our party to cooperation with those who subordinate their personal partisan or class interests in order to serve the interests of the nation.

“We call attention to the fact that our country, most powerful in the world, occupies a position toward the world menace of war, similar in most important respects to that occupied by the second most powerful nation, the Soviet Union. Both are neutral toward the rival imperialist ambitions and interests, both are deeply sympathetic to the peoples whose national independence is in jeopardy, both ardently desire and strive for an ordered and peaceful world, both wish to make the world safe for human culture, science, work and happiness. This common attitude of the two greatest world
powers reflects profound common national interests which must, sooner or later, and preferably sooner, result in common policy and action, together with all like-minded peoples and governments, to banish the forces of destruction from the earth, to establish orderly international relations, to secure world peace."

The reason why nobody paid any attention to what we really said in those times and created an absolutely false picture to the world of what we actually stood for, is because they disagreed with us in one important judgment we made—that is, where we said the Soviet Union is the second most powerful nation in the world. They did not believe that and that is why they believed everything else we said was wrong. But that was a fact; that was true then. It has not just become true; now, the truth of that time has become recognized.

People who told America that the Soviet Union was weak and rotten and without common interests with America, were the ones who were betraying America's national interest. Nobody better expressed America's national interest in September, 1939, than we did in that letter we addressed to the President. I am ready to put that up for all historians today to match with anything else that was said in that whole period. But when we say such things, instead of taking up our challenge and really putting the issue to an examination and impartial test, our critics say, "Uh, the Communists always claim to be right; what can you do with such people?"

**QUESTION:** I don't see any profit in getting into an argument over what the Communists did as well as of what they said.

**ANSWER:** That's the main argument against us—what we did in the period of 1939.
QUESTION: Both the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. were neutral. The Soviet Union was prepared for war with Germany which it knew would come. When Mr. Roosevelt tried to prepare for what he knew would come, the Communists argued we should not have selective service and spend all that money on armaments and the like; and Mr. Roosevelt was right.

ANSWER: If you really examine what we said—you will find that what we said was that armaments without a correct policy will bring disaster to America. We never opposed armaments; we were in favor of armaments, and we argued for armaments at a time when the leading liberals of America were arguing against us. But when armaments were brought forward as a substitute for policy, we fought against it.

QUESTION: More or less in summary, it seems that what you said to me, when the Communists talk about cooperating with all progressive groups and liberals, it almost seems as if the liberals are idiots and in order to cooperate with Communists we have to become Communists ourselves.

ANSWER: No. As a matter of fact we don't expect a large number of people to become Communists themselves, but we do expect a large majority of the Americans to come to agree on larger policies of the nation for which we stand. And that is quite possible because our proposals are not for a Communist policy for the nation and the whole nation will see and agree with them and will carry them out without turning Communist at all.

QUESTION: This is more directed at Republicans than at liberals, in that Republicans would have less to change than liberals would.
ANSWER: It is true, but only to the extent that the Republicans in some cases find it easier to change than liberals do. If you want to find someone who really thinks he has the last word from God, and that it came fifty years ago, it is the liberals. Yes, even the Republicans change with less painful inner writhings than do the liberals.

QUESTION: I had a discussion with two friends of the NAM and I must say that you would get along with them fine. In large sections they almost sound word for word like you.

ANSWER: That's fine; I'm awfully glad to hear that. I am not sorry when you say that leading members of the NAM talk like me. My report to the Plenum of our party was distributed to every delegate at the economic conference of the NAM and I am told most of them read it through.

QUESTION: How has the reaction been among the rank and file of the party on this? Has there been much discussion, any kind of resentment on a large scale?

ANSWER: The greatest discussion in the history of our party has taken place in the last sixty days, with unprecedented enthusiasm and unity in support of this policy.

QUESTION: I wondered also how you have been making out in your recruiting drive. I notice that in February you set out to get 25,000 new members.

ANSWER: The exact goal set was 22,000. We are not keeping up to the schedule we set on this, but we are getting larger results than we ever had in any previous recruiting drive. So it is a mixed picture in that respect—not living up to our ambitions, but doing better than usual.
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