

oughly this fundamental fact can be made clear, the better for Anglo-American relations. For such an understanding will clear the way for dealing with these relations from the approach of the true national interests of the peoples, and of the tasks of winning the war.

There is one clear and overriding interest common to the British and American peoples, as to all the United Nations, and that is the interest of survival, of victory in this war, and the establishment of a tolerable post-war world. Everything else must be subordinated to this common interest. And a common course must be hammered out in practical life, on the anvil of war. That which proves disastrous in the war must be ruthlessly searched out and eliminated; that which helps to victory must be found and built up and carried through to the end. Wherever it leads us, the one thing we need to know is that it leads us away from a world of Axis enslavement and the death of civilization.

CHAPTER XV

CHINA AS CITIZEN OF THE WORLD

THE Republic of China is a member of the United Nations and has a decisive voice in its leadership. For the first time, China has been accepted as a full citizen in the world family of nations. This is a measure of the fundamental changes in the world from the days when in 1919 China waited in the anterooms of Versailles, only to be forced at last to walk out without signing the peace treaty

because, although China was one of the victor nations, the treaty took away from her one of her greatest provinces. Yes, the world has changed, and now China takes her place among the "great powers." No treaty can be imposed upon the world at the end of the present war except one which the representatives of China have had their hand in writing, and which is acceptable to the Chinese people.

The story of the emergence of China as a self-determined citizen of the world is a story of struggles against foreign oppression, against native reactionary militarism, against puppets of foreign powers, struggles between tendencies in the national movement, and for the past five years against large-scale Japanese invasion. It is a story of the hammering out of a national will and a national consciousness in a nation of over four hundred millions population, with a backward economy and a social order which carries over the remnants of the oldest Asiatic feudalism. China is a modern miracle, raised up against the pressure of machine-made imperialism by the almost naked hands of a people armed chiefly with clear minds and steel wills. It is an epic which we know only in fragments. The unsung heroism of many millions of men and women directed by some of the most brilliant minds to be found anywhere on this earth has created modern China.

It is probable that historians will date the opening of the present global war with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931. That was the beginning of a continuous chain of aggressions by the Axis powers which brought the world into its present condition. And it must be said that, aside from the achievements of the Soviet Union in the war against the Nazi invaders, which are quite incomparable with anything else in history, China has stood

the test of war much better than any other of the United Nations.

Until 1937, China was torn by continuous civil war, which made impossible any effective national unity against the invaders. The "anti-Communist" wars carried on by the Kuomintang government were stimulated chiefly by Japan, which constantly protested that it was the influence of "communism" in China which made necessary Japanese encroachments as a measure of "protection." It must be said, too, that British and American policy also encouraged this fratricidal strife. In 1935 the Chinese Communist Party began a persistent campaign throughout China calling for a cessation of these wars and for a national unity of all forces to resist the Japanese encroachments. This campaign came to a dramatic culminating point in 1937 with the Sian events, the mutiny of Chang Hsueh-liang and his capture of Chiang Kai-shek. Since this was a turning point in Chinese history, it is worth reviewing again, especially as it is so little known.

Chang Hsueh-liang is the son of Marshal Chang Tso-lin, ruler of Manchuria for a generation until he was murdered by the Japanese in 1928 (his train was blown up by a bomb as it approached Mukden). Chang Hsueh-liang joined the Kuomintang government after the murder of his father and in 1936 he was sent at the head of an army to subdue the Chinese Soviet districts in the Northwest, where he established headquarters in Sian. His army did not relish fighting against fellow Chinese and came under the influence of the Chinese Communist propaganda for a national front against the Japanese. Chang Hsueh-liang was himself converted to this idea and ceased his military operations against the Communists, at the same time beginning conversations with them. At this juncture,

in 1937, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek flew to Sian in an airplane to inspect the situation. Chang Hsueh-liang imprisoned Chiang Kai-shek and threatened to kill him unless he promised to stop the civil war and make peace with the Communists, in order jointly to resist the Japanese invaders. Fortunately, there was present in Sian one of the Chinese Communist leaders, Chu En-lai, who was personally acquainted with Chiang Kai-shek. Knowing that threats could not influence Chiang Kai-shek and that his death would be a serious blow against national unity, Chu En-lai undertook to mediate between the mutinous general and his Generalissimo, finally inducing Chang Hsueh-liang to release his captive and himself to surrender and return to Nanking as a repentent mutineer. This incident made such a profound impression upon the country and upon Chiang Kai-shek himself that within a few months the Kuomintang-Communist united front was established in fact, the Soviet districts came under the national government with district autonomy, and the Chinese Red Army became the National Eighth Route Army under the supreme command of the Generalissimo. That was the beginning of a united China which in 1938 took up the struggle against the Japanese invaders in deadly earnest.

The Chinese Republic was able to fight Japan because from the beginning of its national struggle against the Japanese it has continuously received military supplies from the Soviet Union. To the shame of the United States it must be recorded that our country was the main source of supplies to Japan, not to China, right up to 1941.

The course of national unity in China after 1937 was not a smooth one. Powerful elements in the Kuomintang continued the "anti-Communist crusade," which was also the justification used by the renegade Wang Ching-wei

when he deserted to the Japanese and became the puppet head of the Nanking government. The constant sniping war that continued against the Chinese Communists occasionally broke out in serious engagements, even though Chiang Kai-shek exerted his influence to restrain it. The "anti-Communist" crusaders justified their course with the argument that the United States continued its unlimited supplies to Japan from fear of the Chinese "Communist influence," and that the only way to win United States support was to break the united front with the Communists.

In January, 1941, the Kuomintang-Communist united front relationship was brought to a breaking point with the dispersal and slaughtering, at the hands of a Kuomintang army, of the New Fourth Army led by the Communists. This disastrous event caused even the somnolent United States public to stir in awareness of great danger. The conservative *New York Herald Tribune* of February 1, 1941, in the course of a long editorial comment, said:

"At this juncture, when Japan is prepared to go marauding in the South Seas and when the Chinese should be ready, in their own interests as well as in those of their friends, to put all they have into immobilizing as big a Japanese force as possible, it is indeed a pity that they are working up a bitter domestic feud. We are confident that Chiang Kai-shek is too big to foster it; and we hope that he is big enough to bring it under control."

The truth was, of course, that stupid American advisers had brought the Kuomintang into this Axis trap. It was not without reason that T. V. Soong exhibited much bitterness when asked for an explanation by the *New York Post* for this untimely break of national unity, and reminded

Americans of their own unbridled red-baiting, which was part of the American pressure upon Chiang Kai-shek to break the united front, as the Japanese demanded.

The frightened uproar in the American press brought from the Foreign Office (Waichiaopu) at Chungking a cable of explanation which was released to the press by the Chinese Embassy in Washington. This was largely suppressed, however, and is little known to the American public. It is so naïvely revealing of the realities of the situation that I choose this document to illustrate how the Axis Fifth Column worked in relation to China, rather than anything from Chinese Communist sources. The following is the cable:

"Chungking, January 19, 1941

"For defiance of military orders and plot to stage a revolt the New Fourth Army has been disarmed and Commander Yeh Ting has been placed under arrest to face court-martial, announced a spokesman of the Military Council. This was entirely a question of military discipline, it was emphasized. The High Command was compelled to take action, because of the refusal of the New Fourth Army to move into the designated areas as ordered.

"Early last December the High Command ordered the New Fourth Army south of the Yangtse River to move northward until it crossed the Yellow River by January 31st for operations against the Japanese. The region between Fan-chang and Tung-ling south of Wuhu, Anhwei, was designated as the route for the army to cross the Yangtse. To the contrary, the New Fourth Army at King-hsien, sixty kilometers south of Wuhu, started moving in a southerly direction toward Tai-ping, the objective

being to press an attack on General Shangkwang Yun-hsiang's headquarters.

"It happened that the Fortieth Division transferred from southern Kiang-su was on its way northward for reorganization.

"Having learned the route taken by the Fortieth Division and its arrival at San-chi, fifty kilometers south of King-hsien, on New Year's day, the entire New Fourth Army slipped through to Mao-lin, forty kilometers south of King-hsien on the night of January fourth. It spread out in three forces to waylay the Fortieth Division. Taken completely unawares, the Fortieth Division fought in self-defense whereupon General Ku Chu-tung, Commander-in-Chief of the Third War Area, ordered disciplinary measures to be taken.

"By January twelfth, the entire New Fourth Army was disbanded and Yeh Ting arrested. Furthermore, by order of the Military Council, the said Army as a unit has been abolished. The Chief of Staff of the New Fourth Army, Chao Ling-po, was among those arrested. According to his statement, as soon as order for the New Fourth Army's removal was received, Yeh Ting decided to ignore it. While demanding a million dollars from the Government, the New Fourth Army collected its main force at King-hsien and Fan-Chang. Then on pretext of the Japanese blockade, they decided not to cross the Yangtse as ordered, but to penetrate into south Kiang-su.

"The plan was to move into Kin-tan, Tan-yang, Ku-yung, Lang-chi and Li-yang to create a special area there with the ultimate objective of setting up a base at Nanking, Shanghai, and Hangchow, thus forming a triangular area to defy the government. On January 3rd they decided to attack points in the vicinity of Ning-kuo in

southern Anhwei, raid the military store there and assault General Shangkwang Yu-hsiang's headquarters. Later the left wing would advance to Lang-chi toward Li-yang and attack other Chinese units. When such a situation was created, the New Fourth Army hoped to coerce the Government into accepting their demands.

"The speedy liquidation of the crisis, according to the spokesman was largely due to the fact that officers of the New Fourth Army decided not to side with the rebels but to join the loyal Government troops.

"Waichiaopu

"Chinese Embassy

"Washington, January 21, 1941."

Now, of course, to the general American reader all this has the incomprehensibility that is popularly described as a "Chinese puzzle." It is little wonder that the newspapers could make nothing of it at the time, but those who know China understood it completely then, and history itself has since provided the keys for even the layman to penetrate this puzzle. Let us proceed to unravel it in simple American terms:

First of all, we may disregard most of the details in this long cable. I have printed it in full only in order that I may not be accused of hiding anything in the official version. These details are largely disputed by the Chinese Communists, but we are not interested now in judging the issue of veracity as to these details. What is important is the *policy* revealed, and the *situation* which is disclosed.

The policy of the New Fourth Army is declared to have been that of "setting up a base at Nanking, Shanghai, and Hangchow, thus forming a triangular area." That area is the key to the whole central China coast and the Yangtse

valley. It was, and is, occupied by the Japanese. The New Fourth Army was, therefore, striking at the heart of the Japanese occupation of China.

The policy of the Kuomintang general in charge of that Third War Area is revealed to have been dominated by a fear that the New Fourth Army, once it had seized that base, would "defy the Government." Therefore he decided to prevent this ousting of the Japanese, and to disperse the New Fourth Army violently, rather than permit it. He considered that Japanese occupation of this area was preferable to its occupation by the New Fourth Army.

The situation is revealed that, in the judgment of the Kuomintang general, it was possible that the New Fourth Army would succeed in this project. If it would fail it would be destroyed by the Japanese, and there would be no occasion for General Ku Chu-tung to slaughter one of his own armies. That he decided to do the job himself proves that he feared success, not failure, of the attack against the Japanese forces. He cold-bloodedly decided to protect the Japanese against this assault—moved probably in part by the desire to placate the "anti-Communist" forces in the United States.

The situation is revealed further that the New Fourth Army which was ready and able to seize a key area from the Japanese army was not at all prepared to fight a Chinese army. When they were attacked by General Ku Chu-tung, they laid down their arms—but despite this fact, they were slaughtered. Among those thus killed in cold blood were many of my own personal friends of long-years' standing. This fact fully disposes of all the complicated stories of "reasonable intentions" in the leadership of the New Fourth Army.

The opportunity to seize from the Japanese that great

area of Shanghai-Nanking-Hangchow was lost. The "discipline" of General Ku Chu-tung was "vindicated." The anti-Communists of the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and Japan were reassured of the "purity" of the Kuomintang from "Communist taint." But the net result was a terrific blow against the national liberation of China, a tremendous strengthening of the position of Japan, a shaking of the whole structure of national unity in China, a defeat for the later-organized United Nations which contributed materially to the debacle one year later in Malaya, Singapore, Indonesia, and Burma. The whole thing was a Chinese repetition of the tragedy of the Spanish Republic a few years earlier.

I do not relate this story today for the purpose of opening old sores, but solely with the aim to help prevent a repetition of this story in the further conduct of the war. The lessons of these events *must be learned* as a military necessity for the victory of the United Nations over the Axis. And they must be learned by all thinking persons in every country. If we keep on repeating such disastrous mistakes, then we are handing victory to the Axis, we are digging our own collective graves.

The Chinese Communists did not permit this horrible provocation to break their relations with the government of Chiang Kai-shek. They patched up the situation as best they could, although it is evident that this blow terribly decreased the effectiveness of the whole of China against the common enemy.

Difficulties between the Kuomintang and the Communists do not arise from ideological conflict between "capitalist" and "socialist" proposals for the organization of the country. The Chinese Communist Party accepts the perspective of a capitalist development of China, not only

now but for an indefinite future. The Chinese Communist Party is not challenging the Kuomintang for the leading role in the country; it accepts the dominant role now played by the Kuomintang. It is not attempting to weaken the central government, but on the contrary does everything in its power to help the central government establish its power in reality over the multitude of divisive forces that still operate within Republican China.

Whence, then, come the continuous difficulties between the Communist-led forces and the Kuomintang generals? They arise out of differing methods of conducting the war and different relations with the population of the war areas. The Kuomintang generals are trained in the methods of warfare of the German and Japanese schools, while the Communist military leaders arose out of the movements of the people; the former impose their plans upon the Chinese population, while the latter mobilize the population for the war and base themselves upon the population; the former wage the war by strictly traditional military methods, while the latter wage a people's war. In this difference, and in this primarily, lies the secret of the remarkable successes of the Communist-led armies in China. And it is in the main the lessons of these successes, inescapably learned by the Kuomintang military leaders in spite of their education and imposed upon them by necessity, that have brought the mounting degree of success of Chinese military operations against the Japanese.

The traditional military officers must depend upon the importation of arms from abroad (mostly from the Soviet Union); the Communist-led armies have almost entirely armed themselves with *Japanese* equipment, seized from the enemy. The traditional generals receive huge finances from the government, and still they have bad relations

with the population; the Communist-led armies receive practically nothing from the government and live almost entirely upon the population, but their relations with the people are outstandingly successful. It is the clash between these different methods of making war which causes most of the conflicts between the Communists and the Kuomintang generals, which still bedevil Chinese national unity.

This people's character of the Communist-led armies in China has been widely recognized in the United States. Even such an anti-Communist newspaper as the *New York Herald Tribune* finds it necessary to speak of their distinctive qualities in the following terms:

"A dozen correspondents and at least one competent American military observer have been behind their lines and have paid enthusiastic tribute to their splendid spirit, their amazing cleverness in getting through, between, and behind the Japanese lines at their pleasure, their good discipline and spartan mode of life and their excellent relations with the country folk, whom their agents have organized for guerilla operations in every district the Japanese have allegedly conquered."

Today, with the supply routes from America to China almost entirely cut by the Japanese, with the terrible pressure of war making it more difficult for the Soviet Union to supply the Chinese armies (the Soviet Union has never supplied the Communist-led armies), it becomes more than ever clear that the general adoption throughout China of these methods of the Chinese Communists furnish the only possible road to victory for that nation over the Japanese invaders, as a part of victory for the United Nations.

Those who see no possibility for carrying on the war

except by the methods of the traditional military schools are preparing the ground for a defeatist party in China, for moods of capitulation to the Japanese. This is especially true since these old-school military men are able to speak up in Chungking with the cynical remark that they "got along better in the war while the United States was out of it than since." The old-school military men in China are on the whole true patriots of their country, but the nature of their military training has always made them more susceptible to the undermining influence of defeatist moods, and when such moods begin to spread and crystallize they lead directly to the borders of treason. We must always remember that it was defeatism which transformed the brilliant officer of our own revolutionary army of the War of Independence, Benedict Arnold, into the blackest traitor.

Thus it must become clear to the American people, and to the whole United Nations, that China, one of the keystones of our world alliance against the Axis, will more and more have to learn the lesson of how to conduct a peoples' war, a lesson which has been and is being taught by the Chinese Communists. Because the Chinese Communists are a necessary factor in Chinese national unity and military success, the whole United Nations has a direct interest in understanding them and establishing a correct attitude toward them.

Because the Chungking government still believes that good relations with Washington require the continuance of the policy of suppression of the Communists, those in the government who wish to stabilize Kuomintang-Communist co-operation are blocked at every turn. As a result, today the pick of China's fighting forces are still not being used against the Japanese. General Hu Chung-nan with

440,000 crack troops, is engaged in blockading the Eighth Route Army in the north and northwest; General Tang En-po with 500,000 crack troops is occupied in blockading the present areas of the New Fourth Army in Central and Eastern China. Thus China continues divided, though civil war no longer rages, and a large part—the most efficient part—of China's armies is not used against the common enemy. And the most decisive reason for this is the "red scare" in Washington.

The Chinese Communists themselves are doing everything possible to dissolve the old barriers of distrust and suspicion upon which the "Antikomintern" Axis Fifth Column builds its work.

I have dealt at length with the position of the Communists in China, because this is particularly the point of vacuum in the understanding of that country by most Americans. So long as this vacuum is occupied by the prejudices and misinformation assiduously spread by the Axis agents, just that long will our understanding of China and her role in this war be incomplete and our attitude and policies toward China be distorted.

China, like the Soviet Union, furnishes an acid test of our ability to survive, to win victory out of this war.

CHAPTER XVI

IS INDIA A MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS?

A POPULATION of more than three hundred million persons lives in the territory we know as India. The gov-