tablishes the acceptance of India as a nation by all other signatories. The acceptance of the signature of the present government on behalf of India is not a confirmation of that government's right to rule India, but merely a confirmation of India's right to be present in the Council of the United Nations. And the very Declaration of the United Nations to which India's name is thus signed is a declaration of the untenability of the position of the present government of India when it is challenged by the people of India. The Declaration which created the United Nations gave to the United States and all other signatories the right to raise the question of the full mobilization for the war of each country, including India. This right exists, as the lawyers delight in saying, not only de facto in the nature of the situation, but also de jure by the agreements which have been signed by the United Nations.

The United States has not only the right but the duty to take such steps as will ensure the full mobilization of the manpower and economy of India for the common cause of victory in the war. If the rulers of Britain, from their special interests and ancient prejudices, fall down on this job, it is up to the other members of United Nations to intervene in the common interest of all. We are all in one boat, at least until victory is attained, and we hope that boat will prove useful also after victory. But if the boat is to reach that port of victory, there must be United Nations control of the navigation through such rocks as the India issue, on which the boat may be wrecked.

In the interest of victory for the United Nations, India, now formally a member and recognized as a nation, must be given at once that measure of practical nationhood which will enable her to fight and defeat the common enemy at her borders. As to all else, that may be left to the future and to the people, when victory is won. That is a sound position for the United States to take, a position dictated by military necessity of a desperate war, a position confirmed by the common declaration of policy of the United Nations, a position buttressed by international morality, a position which will be enthusiastically supported by the overwhelming majority of the population of the United Nations, by oppressed peoples everywhere, and by a majority of the British people themselves. Any other course threatens new and more serious reverses to the United Nations.

Are we big enough for our tasks? Have we the moral and intellectual resources required for survival in this dangerous world? The answer to these questions will be given by the course we take regarding India.

**CHAPTER XVII**

**AFRICA AS A FACTOR IN THE WAR**

ONE cannot ignore a continent with one hundred and fifty millions population. Certainly the Axis is not ignoring Africa, which it hopes and plans to exploit with scientific thoroughness as a slave continent in its “New Order.” And equally certain it is that the United Nations is vitally concerned with the defense of Africa against the Axis; the United States is especially concerned in that Africa is the jumping-off place for Axis invasion of the Western Hemisphere.

No one in official circles has as yet given serious thought to Africa as a potential power on the side of the
United Nations, not a mere piece of booty to be defended from the Axis. Africa has not yet been considered as a participant in the war. But an Africa mobilized and armed on the side of the United Nations would change the world relations of power quite decisively in our favor, and thus hasten the day of victory.

Are we so strong on our side that we can afford to forget about this military potential, that we can leave Africa’s defense entirely to European and American soldiers shipped long distances at great expenditure of shipping facilities, instead of organizing Africans themselves for the defense of Africa?

The Jordan-Luce school of American imperialism looks upon Africa exclusively as booty for empire; it recognizes that the old imperialist structure is shattered and that the old administration of the continent was bankrupt; it examines admiringly the Nazi plans for a slave empire on that continent; and it concludes that these plans must be rejected for Germany, but proposes that they shall be adopted for America—with perhaps Britain as a partner. This proposal, whatever its “merits” for special interests, is certainly not calculated to help win the war. It weakens the moral force of the United Nations against the Axis; it tends to undermine the United Nations from within; it raises sharp controversial issues among the powers which must be close allies for winning the war; it encourages all Fifth Column elements within Africa itself; and it negates all possibility of enlisting Africa in its own defense. Examining Africa entirely from the viewpoint of its place in winning the war, all such ideas regarding that continent must be completely rejected.

Africa, through no fault of her people, but entirely because of the long-standing complete imperialist exploita-

tion and suppression, has not reached such preconditions for a self-determined development as India has already attained. It is clear, however, that the march of events leads Africa in the same direction, that its problems are essentially the same, only less developed. The African masses are rising in consciousness and solidarity, struggling for a constantly increasing measure of civil rights, for breaking the colonial system of land monopoly, for amelioration of the outrageous degree of exploitation of the continent’s resources for the exclusive benefit of foreigners, for a more balanced development of the continent’s economy on the basis of the needs of the African population.

These aspirations of the African peoples can be linked to the cause of the United Nations and thus win precious allies—or they can be ignored and repressed, thus creating only additional problems for the United Nations and encouraging potential helpers for the Axis.

That is the essential issue regarding Africa and the war, stripped of its details and put in a nutshell.

That is the issue which is being almost entirely neglected, and, by default of any coherent policy, the United Nations muddles along in Africa, fighting indecisive military battles, some brilliant and others not so brilliant, but entirely blind to the potential forces there which could make of Africa an impregnable stronghold for the United Nations.

It is perhaps hopeless to expect any change of policy to be initiated from those circles steeped in the traditions of colonialism, to whom the African people are only so many working cattle. To such persons and groups, the words of the Atlantic Charter have significance only for
the "civilized peoples" of Europe, not for their own "subjects" whom they have ruled for generations.

The United Nations, however, is a grand coalition including many countries which have a higher interest in victory than in perpetuating Africa as a field of colonial exploitation. There is China, there is the Soviet Union, and there is the United States which, for different reasons, have no interest whatever in the direct exploitation of Africa as part of a colonial system, but have a direct interest in Africa as a fighting ally against the Axis. China, the Soviet Union, and the United States, as members of the United Nations mutually pledged to mobilize all their resources for the common victory over the Axis, have the full right to raise the question of mobilizing African manpower to that end. They would find support within Britain itself, if not in the government then surely among the people who are more and more showing a disposition to press their views upon the government.

In the United States, it must be admitted, there is still little thought along such lines. Our interest in Africa is intense, and our government has military and economic missions all over Africa, studying the problems of its defense and its economy in relation to the war. But Africa's manpower in relation to the war is still taboo as a subject for serious investigation and proposals. This question is fully as serious in Africa as it was in Malaya, Singapore, Indonesia, and Burma, where its neglect brought such disastrous results for the United Nations.

What sort of practical program promises any success, in the necessarily twofold aspect of winning the co-operation of the African masses and at the same time securing at least a minimum of co-operation from the powers which have long administered Africa as a group of colonies?

Such a program, it seems clear, can only be worked out as a program of the United Nations, not of the separate powers. An over-all unity of approach to the problem will be required if the development of Africa in the war is not to be left to "run its natural course," with bureaucratic stupidity and bourbonism co-operating with the Nazis in the role of "nature." United Nations' intervention, which is the assertion of the common interest in victory, is a necessary precondition to the enlistment of Africa in full force on our side in the war.

Only in a reconciliation of the various viewpoints, typified by Britain, the United States, China, and the Soviet Union, and their unification in a plan for Africa designed to achieve the maximum agreement and active co-operation for the war on the part of the African population, is there any immediately practical possibility of changing, in a decisive fashion, the relation of forces in Africa in favor of the United Nations.

Given such an initiative by the United Nations, however, there is every possibility for such a practical program. It would involve the following necessary features:

For the African people: Lifting all the most onerous restrictions upon their civil rights, such as poll tax, pass system, press restrictions, and limitations of suffrage in local government; the opening of unused lands for cultivation by Africans, the spread of small-scale farming, breaking down the land monopoly; control over the exploitation of African natural monopoly; control over the exploitation of African natural resources, especially mining, to guarantee an increasing share of the benefits to Africa, raising the level of its economy and the living standards of its people. Only some guaranteed prospect of such political and economic progress, not in some vague post-war period, but now during the war and as a means of
more effectively conducting the war, can rouse the African people to the position of conscious allies of the United Nations.

For the common cause of the United Nations, such a program would contribute: the increased military and economic potential of Africa, which could be expanded with as much speed as that with which the new policies were put into practice; the isolation and disarming of the centers of Axis Fifth Column undermining work; the solidification of the world coalition of anti-Axis forces in the United Nations, by softening the rival aspirations in Africa, and by reassuring China, India, the Soviet Union, Latin America, and all anti-imperialists that special vested interests are not being allowed to interfere with victory.

An approach to Africa such as the one suggested would be the practical application of point five of the Atlantic Charter: "The fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing for all improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security." It would be the practical implementation of the Declaration of the United Nations: "To co-operate with the Government's signatory hereto and "to employ its full resources, military and economic," for victory in the war.

There would seem to be no other manner in which the Declaration, and the Atlantic Charter, which President Roosevelt has declared to be valid for the entire world, could be given a specific validity for Africa in an immediately practical form.

It is clear that such a practical program for Africa does not pretend to settle all fundamental questions. It does not abolish imperialist exploitation and control of Africa—but in the interests of the war, in the name of the United Na-

tions, it sets up certain limitations to that exploitation and control, much as labor legislation controls capitalist exploitation generally without abolishing capitalism, being rather one of the necessities of capitalism. It does not answer the questions of the national self-determination of African peoples, some of which must perhaps be answered more directly in the course of the war, and others can be dealt with only in the post-war world. It does not answer the problems of rival claims upon Africa by European powers, except in the definite exclusion of the Axis from Africa, but it does remove the acuteness of rival ambitions within the United Nations, and renders them more easy of adjustment, bringing in the mediating influences of other world forces without any direct special interest of that sort. It is a program of drastic limitations upon imperialism in Africa, in so far as these are necessary to the fullest development of Africa's military and economic contribution to victory, but it leaves open for future settlement the whole question of the post-war status for Africa, except as that is already indicated by the Atlantic Charter which promises post-war self-determination to all peoples.

To work out such complicated problems as those of Africa, it will be necessary, of course, that the United Nations shall become an entity more organized than at present. But that is equally a necessity for the conduct of the war in general, a more difficult and complicated problem than is Africa, which is only one sector of the war.

Africa, indeed, makes a most useful contribution to the development of the United Nations, by posing in a sharp and immediate form most of the general problems of the United Nations' policies. In seeking a path for the development of Africa, we are at the same time helping to clarify the role of the United Nations in the whole world
situation and preparing it for its tasks in the post-war world.

The conception of United Nations’ control over the mobilization of Africa for the war, with the participation of the African peoples, must not be confused with the League of Nations’ mandate system over colonial areas. In the first place, the League of Nations was something quite different from that which the United Nations now is; it had neither the U.S.A. nor the U.S.S.R. (until the last few years before its demise), as members, and China was only a second-class citizen therein, whereas these three powers are among the “big four” of the United Nations. In the second place, the mandate system of the League of Nations was the negation of a united control and direction, as is witnessed by the fact that it was the mandate system which gave Japan the Pacific war bases she is now using in the war against the United Nations. It will be necessary, of course, to be sharply vigilant against the intrusion of the old “mandate idea” into the United Nations’ program for Africa, since strong tendencies in that direction will doubtless show themselves. An alert public opinion in the United States and Britain, together with the natural inclinations of China and the Soviet Union in the councils of the United Nations, must be relied upon to keep our present-day efforts toward world organization away from the rocks upon which the League of Nations was wrecked.

In times like these, a certain amount of pushing into “unexplored territory” becomes obligatory. The cause of victory in this global war demands a global concept of its strategy and tactics, and a global mobilization of forces. Africa is one of the greatest factors in this world situation. Africa must be integrated in the most practical way into any concept of the United Nations which is not mere opportunism. The global viewpoint which I have developed in this book has dictated the approach to Africa and the outline of the tentative proposals.

CHAPTER XVIII

LATIN AMERICA’S CONTRIBUTION TO VICTORY

HITLER’S march toward world conquest has brought danger to the very existence of independent nations in Latin America for the first time since their emergence in the Bolivarian revolution in the early nineteenth century. Latin America belongs, of necessity, in the ranks of the United Nations. The ten republics of Central America and the Caribbean were among its first adherents. Brazil, declaring a state of war with Nazi Germany at the moment this is being written, brings the largest of South American nations into the coalition. Yet it was not without serious reason that Vice-President Wallace, in his famous speech of May 8, warned of serious Axis incursions into Latin America as an imminent danger. The struggle for Latin America between Hitler and the United Nations is intense and bitter, and Hitler’s Fifth Column invasion has long been under way.

It is in the struggle against the Fifth Column that the war appears predominantly at the present stage in Latin America. And this Fifth Column has greater organized forces in Latin America than Hitler was able to command in any of his European victims of armed conquest. In Ar-