War, Peace and Socialism

Earl Browder
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by

Earl Browder

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A Lecture Delivered Before the Forum Group, at Caravan Hall, 110 East 59th St., New York City, April 11, 1949.
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WAR, PEACE, AND SOCIALISM.

Introduction.

Winston Churchill's speech in Boston on All-Fool's Day eve, celebrated the completion of the Atlantic Pact. Churchill claimed that it was the realization of his proposal at Fulton, Missouri, three years before, which opened the "cold war" against the Soviet Union. This time Churchill called for a new offensive, to press for a quick decision—with a loud rattling of atomic bombs to make clear the alternative should the Soviet Union fail to run up the white flag of surrender.

The Soviet Union's answer to the ultimatum came before the night was over—a formal protest against the Atlantic Pact as an act of aggressive significance, in violation of the United Nations' charter and of previous agreements reached at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam, which had laid preliminary foundations for peace.

Will it be war or peace? Clearly, so long as America follows the Churchill leadership, the world is headed directly toward war. The struggle for peace has, therefore, entered a new stage.

The mass of the American people view this dangerous development with uneasiness, suspicion, and distrust. But at the same time there is deep confusion, no clear understanding of the alternatives between which choice is being made. If this confusion is to be cleared away, and the peace-loving
majority of Americans aroused to action against the war party, it will be necessary to study and explain more clearly and deeply the economic basis of the questions of war and peace.

The recent Conference for Peace held in New York on the call of the Council of the Arts, Sciences and Professions, excellently dramatized the cultural and ethical problems of the struggle for peace. I hope that I will not be accused of minimizing the importance of these aspects if, for the purpose of this lecture, I make my main concentration upon the economic foundations of the problem and those factors most directly determined by economics.

I. Struggle Between Two Systems.

The allies of World War II were able to agree on all the difficult and delicate problems of conducting the common military struggle against Hitler and his Axis, even if sometimes with great delay and difficulty. But after accomplishing their common military aim, they have fallen into a deadlock of disagreement on the problems of reconstruction of the world. They are proceeding to realize the prophecy made by Hitler. The United Nations, proclaimed as the instrument of peace, has itself become an arena of the "cold war". The allies of yesterday snarl at each other as the enemies of today. American newspapers openly discuss a list of 70 Soviet cities picked as targets for atom bombs in a prospective war. Hundreds of Conferences have ended with no agreements on the main questions of peace. A huge superstructure of disputes mounts ever higher, hiding the basic questions of how the people are to
live, the economic problems, which are less and less discussed except as weapons for the "cold war".

It will be helpful to the mass of Americans in thinking their way through these complications, to remember some of the lessons of our own national history. Today we have on a world scale all the manifestations of an "irrepressible conflict", similar to that which led America in the mid-19th century step by step into bloody Civil War. Can this comparison throw light on our present problems?

In the American Civil War it was ideological, cultural and ethical considerations which dominated the minds of most people on both sides. But the underlying factor which pushed the nation into war was the historical struggle between two rival economic systems—the semi-feudal plantation system based upon slave labor, versus the modern capitalist industrial system based upon mechanical power, machinery, and free labor.

On the world stage today, the "irrepressible conflict" also grows out of the antagonism between two rival economic systems—the capitalist system which has developed into the domination of great privately-owned monopolies, versus the new socialist system based upon common social ownership of the machinery of production.

The American North and South, before they fought out their antagonism by military means, had operated on the basis of a modus vivendi, a way of living together without war, a compromise. It had lasted during the first 85 years of the American
Republic, precariously, with a series of crises, breakdowns, constant strain, all of which dominated the political life of the nation during that period. It was patched up again in each crisis, until finally it was smashed on the issue of which system should dominate in the development of the newly-opened Western territories. Finally the antagonism was settled with guns, in Civil War.

In the modern world the two antagonistic economic systems had also reached a modus vivendi for the purpose of conducting the common war against the Axis; they had made a solemn promise to the world, at the war-time Conferences of Teheran and Yalta, that it would be continued after the war, to establish a stable peace for some generations.

This war-born modus vivendi between socialism and capitalism, embodied in the relations between the Soviet Union and America, was wrecked on the first problem of peace, what to do about Germany. The future of Germany has played the role of breaking up the modern modus vivendi similar to the role played by the new Western territories in dissolving the compromise between two systems within America in the mid-19th century. Each side fears that Germany, if aligned with the other, will radically compromise its vital interests. The Soviet Union fears this because twice in a generation her territory had been invaded and ravaged by Germany, and now she demands a guarantee against another repetition. The U.S.A. fears that a Germany not fixed in hostility to the Soviet Union will turn socialist, and therefore refuses a German peace settlement which permit Germany to be united, demilitarized, and friendly to
the Soviet Union.

The basic conflict over the future of Germany has poisoned and embittered every phase of international relations. The "irrepressible conflict" feeds upon itself, the flames of disagreement are fanned by fear, and spread to all the world, to all phases of life. Is there, then, no conclusion possible except a world-wide version of the American Civil War?

In my opinion there is another road possible, away from the present movement toward war, a road toward peace which it is not yet too late to take. But to open up that road is a difficult and complicated task because, since Roosevelt mapped that road for America in the last years before his death, it has been blocked by political barbed-wire entanglements, land-mines, and booby-traps.

First of all, before the slightest progress can be made toward peace, it will be necessary for America to throw off the leadership of Churchill and Churchill's theory which holds that the threat of atom-bomb warfare, institutionalized in the Atlantic Pact, can force the Soviet Union to surrender to an Anglo-American dictated peace.

In my opinion there is not the slightest prospect that the Soviet Union and her allies will capitulate before the Churchill ultimatum backed up by Truman's threat of using the atom-bomb. On the contrary, the most extreme "get tough" attitude toward the Soviet Union can produce nothing but an equally tough position on the Soviet side.
And it could not be any other way. A peace settlement dictated by Anglo-American interests in disregard of Soviet interests is politically impossible because it is contrary to the real relationship of forces in the world. When the Soviet Union was young and weak, Lenin himself led her to accept momentarily the humiliating German-dictated peace of Brest-Litovsk, but that was only because the Soviet Union was physically unable to fight at that moment. But today the Soviet Union is a great power, is a victor in the war, having overcome four-fifths of the military power which Hitler mobilized from all Europe, while combined Anglo-American power had its difficult moments dealing with one-fifth. Under such conditions the Soviet Union cannot be dealt with as a defeated power by those nations whom she saved from Hitler. The Soviet Union is a great power with whom the peace settlement must be negotiated as with an equal. Otherwise there can be no peace.

II. An Illustration From American History.

A superficial and misleading analogy between the problems of the United Nations today and those of the American Republic in the period of its founding is being advanced in public discussion. According to this analogy the project of "a supreme world government" is the analogue of the American Federal Government which united the thirteen independent States into one nation.

This is an unsound and impractical use of the lessons of American history. It illustrates the dangers
of thinking by analogy. It hides the lessons that American history really can teach us. It forgets that the American States could unite in one nation because of factors which are absent among the United Nations—namely, a common colonial origin, and the necessity to unite against Europe to maintain their newly-won independence; a common language, common political and cultural traditions; and the joint possession of a great and rich continental hinterland awaiting development. Such concepts of "world government" are, therefore, only idle dreams, Utopias, which merely add to the confusion of the public mind.

We will find it profitable, however, even when we reject such unsound thinking by historical analogy, to pursue further our earlier reference to American history for those experiences which illustrate how problems, similar in principle to those of today, were successfully dealt with. This is valuable not because "history repeats itself", not because American history contains any uniquely valid patterns, but simply and solely because it is helpful in stating today's problems in forms already familiar to American thought, and therefore less subject to misinterpretation and misunderstanding. Having stated the problem in terms of such historical comparison or illustration, we will then seek to base its solution only upon grounds of today's reality, not of historical analogy.

Pursuing this line of thought, therefore, we repeat again that the American Republic in its formative period faced a problem which was similar in principle to the present problem of the United
The thirteen separate and independent States which were uniting in a common organization (it is immaterial that the type of organization was different), contained among themselves two irreconcilably different economic systems, which we have already described, just as the United Nations comprises among its members two rival systems.

Now let us suppose that, back in 1776 or 1787, there was an American of penetrating historical foresight who could look ahead for 100 years. If this far-seeing American told his fellow-countrymen that the new Republic was a house divided against itself, that it contained two irreconcilable economic systems which could neither combine nor live side by side in peaceful accommodation, that one system was fated to destroy the other by violence—such a statement would have been completely correct from the broad historical point of view. But if this hypothetical far-sighted American went on to propose, as an immediate practical political program, the violent solution of the rivalry between the two systems, as the necessary precondition to setting up the common organization of the States, he would have been thoroughly and completely wrong. And his error would not have been justified merely because, 85 years later, that violent solution did take place.

In 1776 it was a broad historical truth that the rival American economic systems were irreconcilable, that one must destroy the other—but then and for some generations thereafter the immediate practical political truth was something quite different, namely: That the peoples and governments comprising the two economic systems faced the necessity to compromise
with each other, to find a modus vivendi, however difficult, however unstable, however certain of final dissolution. This was necessary because neither side was strong enough to overcome the other, and any attempt at solution by violent means could result only in disaster for both sides.

If the American "irrepressible conflict" had been prematurely forced to a violent solution, the result would have been the common ruin of the contending parties, the parcelling of the American continent, its Balkanization, for a hundred years or more.

Therefore, the historically progressive policy in the American Republic during most of its first 85 years, was the policy of modus vivendi between the rival economic systems, the policy of postponement of the "final conflict". This policy, adhered to by the most enlightened minds on both sides for many years, was, interestingly enough, finally smashed by decision of the obsolete system which was destroyed in the ensuing war.

Thus from American experience we may draw an illustration of a possible American attitude toward the central problem of the United Nations today. The United Nations is also born with two great systems represented in its member States, of which one is destined ultimately to supersede the other, if not peacefully then violently. That is today the broad historical truth, in the view that looks forward for many years. But the immediate practical political truth is something quite different, and will be different for a considerable time; it is,
namely, that socialism and capitalism, regardless of their fundamental incompatibility, are forced to compromise with each other on the world stage, to find a modus vivendi, however unstable it may seem, however difficult to maintain, however certain may be its ultimate dissolution.

The condition which makes this necessary is, that only within particular countries do the forces of capitalism or socialism have sufficient strength to overcome its rival, but on a world scale the resort to violent solution of their antagonisms threatens common disaster to both sides as the only possible outcome. Our illustration from American history suggests that within the United Nations the historically progressive policy, for many years and for both the rival systems, is the policy of modus vivendi, the policy of prolonged postponement of the final conflict between them.

Such a policy of modus vivendi between the nations of the rival economic systems does not, of course, remove the basic issues between them as matters of political struggle (class struggle) within the different nations—just as the 85 years of American experience did not see an abatement of the struggle against slavery within the separate States and in the new States as the Republic spread Westward, by all means short of war. There was no "reconciliation" of irreconcilable forces, there was no nonsense about "forgetting the differences" of the two systems, there was only the cold logic of the necessity to avoid common disaster.
III. Modus Vivendi—A Historical Necessity.

How far, and in what respect, does the existing situation of the world today correspond to the terms of the policy suggested by our illustration from American history? In the first place, is it true today that neither of the rival economic systems possesses the requisite military strength to conquer the other?

I will proceed from the assumption that military attack upon America from Europe is impossible, is obvious nonsense that does not enter into the calculations of sane persons, that the locus of the war danger lies in Europe which would be the principal battlefield in such a war. America is secure against possible invasion and conquest.

Not so obvious, but equally true, is the fact that it is impossible for America to conquer the Soviet Union by military attack. It is not so obvious because America holds military bases in Europe, and is now establishing military alliance with the combined Western European governments and proposes to re-militarize them—which carries the threat of invasion of the Soviet Union. In what way, then, is the Soviet Union immune to military conquest? The answer is: Through her own demonstrated economic and military strength, and her improved strategic position, which makes it possible for her to disperse any hostile military concentrations against her in Europe.
If and when, for example, the Soviet Union became convinced that war for her destruction was being mounted in Western Europe by America, she would have the military strength to seize the German Ruhr (the necessary economic base for any new war, as it was of all past wars, against the Soviet Union) and all strategic points from which she can be effectively attacked. Such a step would be very unwise and unprofitable for the Soviet Union so long as she is not immediately threatened—but under the imminent danger of attack and of military conquest it is practically inevitable as the only means to equalize her position with that of America.

Such a threat of conquest against the Soviet Union, and such a Soviet answer to the threat, would crystallize the potential military stalemate inherent in the present world situation. Neither side could possibly carry the war to military victory over the other. The most extreme use of the atom bomb by America could not change the fundamental stalemate. It could only intensify the mutual destructiveness of the war. It would force measures of retaliation, equally futile in breaking the military stalemate, but equally punishing and destructive, even if America holds a monopoly of atomic warfare, which is extremely questionable.

The military and economic capacity of the Soviet Union to establish such conditions of military stalemate may be denied, by the same type of mind (the type which occupies the most authoritative military posts in America and Britain) which in 1941 predicted that Hitler would finish the Soviet Union in three weeks to three months. But not everyone is
as blind as the "brass hats". Most intelligent persons with the leisure to study the facts know quite well their meaning in terms of Soviet strength; most Americans, especially the workers, will understand without difficulty as the facts are brought forcefully to their attention and explained. It will be useful to review some of these facts.

First, is the lesson of World War II: The Soviet Union suffered tremendous initial losses, 40% of her industrial areas were occupied and ruined, millions were killed. Nevertheless, she grew stronger, militarily and economically, in the course of the war. The huge invading army, with the most modern equipment, with the economy of all the rest of Europe at its command, was thrown back, driven across the border, followed into the very center of Berlin, crushed and dispersed. When that invasion began, American "experts" gave Hitler three weeks to three months to finish off the Soviet Union; instead, within four years the Nazi army and State had been wiped out.

The tide of that gigantic battle turned against the Nazis before lend-lease supplies began to arrive from America and before the Second Front was opened in the West. Even in the last phase of the war, American supplies were less than 10% of Soviet military requirements, and the Anglo-American armies on the Second Front engaged less than 10% of Hitler's total armed forces. The Soviet Union had proved in action that she was able to win, and was winning, solely with her own resources, before any significant aid came to her from the West. Even
then, in the Battle of the Bulge, the Anglo-American forces got into extreme difficulties and it was the Soviet Union which came to their aid, responding to Churchill's urgent pleas at great cost to themselves.

Those events proved the high military effectiveness of the Soviet Union. That military power was based upon an economy much smaller in total production than that of the U.S.A., and still inferior in output per man-hour of labor, but it supported a far greater military effort.

Today the military potential of the Soviet Union is far higher than ever before, and its expanding economic basis is more readily adaptable to the military needs of defense. Even an aggressor twice or thrice as powerful as Hitler was could not break it. And a new Hitler could no longer mobilize all non-Russian Europe against her.

The Soviet Union has also improved her strategic position. She is no longer encircled, as she was from her birth until Hitler's aggression, by a solid line of enemies. Outside of America, all the enemies of the Soviet Union are so pitifully weak that they depend, from day to day, upon the "poor relief" handed out by America, they have become mercenaries in the pay of America, with all the parasitism and undependability that has marked mercenaries in all history. America has not a single ally for a war of aggression against the Soviet Union, upon whom she can depend for anything except constantly increasing demands for more dollars and
more "help". The peoples of Western Europe cannot be driven into a war of aggression against the Soviet Union by their governments, no matter how many Atlantic Pacts these governments may sign.

Furthermore, the former main base of strength of the Western Empires, the colonial system that embraced a majority of humanity and the largest land area of the world, is now shattered, in ruins, beyond repair, a source of weakness rather than strength to the enemies of the Soviet Union. China has thrown off the rule of the American-puppet government of Chiang Kai-shek. Indo-China is fighting a war of independence against the French, who are pouring resources into this rat-hole greater than the Marshall Plan aid they are receiving from America, from which nothing can ever be recovered. Indonesia fights for her independence against the Dutch with similar results. India, having gained formal independence, gathers her strength to battle for its reality. All the colonial world seethes with revolt against the absentee rulers. America tries feebly and fumblingly to patch up the broken colonial system, but gains nothing for her pain (and dollars) but the hatred of millions, of hundreds of millions, of people; her practical results are typified by the debacle of American policy in China.

The world situation is such, indeed, that if and when America should launch a war of aggression against the Soviet Union, she will be able to carry it on only in an attempt to police the world with American soldiers, by American military occupation and government of the world.
Whatever one may judge to be America's military and economic strength, it clearly does not measure up to such a task, nor even to ten percent of such a task. And if American masses were cajoled and driven into such a war, they would soon, on learning the falseness of the promises of "war prosperity" and easy victory, turn against it, and turn out any government which began it. If World War II cost America hundreds of billions of dollars, the new war would cost her thousands of billions, and would bankrupt her economic system.

Explaining these facts and their significance to the workers and the American people generally is an essential part of the fight for peace, that is being sadly neglected at present.

This relationship of forces in the world, in which the two great powers representing two rival economic systems cannot possibly expect to settle their antagonisms by resort to war, in which war can bring no decision but only common disaster, is a classical example of a historical situation in which the policy of seeking for a modus vivendi, a way of living together without war, is necessary and the only possible progressive policy.

IV. America is Losing the "Cold War".

It takes two sides to arrive at a modus vivendi, while only one side can force a war. What is the degree of readiness of each of the two sides to discuss in a practical way the problems of living together without war? To find the answer to this
question we should examine deeds rather than general declamations.

The most difficult and important practical problem at issue in the "cold war" is the future of Germany. The Soviet Union has made elaborate and detailed proposals for joint policy for the four Great Powers on the German question. America has rejected these proposals, with the concurrence of Great Britain and France.

For the purpose of our present argument it is immaterial whether one agrees or disagrees with the specific Soviet proposals on Germany. What is significant is, that the Soviet Union made its proposals in form and intention designed as joint policy of the Big Four—that is, she made a step toward reaching a modus vivendi. What is significant further, is that America rejected those proposals without making any counter-proposals—that is, America refused to take the first step toward reaching a modus vivendi. America has had no policy toward Germany, in words or deeds, except the policy of organizing the Western occupation zones against the Soviet Union.

This general relationship on the German question was recently given another dramatic and concentrated expression when, in the United Nations Assembly in Paris, the proposals made by a group of lesser powers in America's camp to settle the narrow issue of the Berlin deadlock, were accepted by the Soviet Union but rejected by America—again without making
any counter-proposals, which means demanding unconditional surrender from the Soviet Union. In short, America has made not a single step to show that, on the decisive question of Germany, she is willing even to discuss in a serious way any proposal for joint policy, that is for a practical modus vivendi. The Soviet Union has demonstrated that she seeks such a modus vivendi. Therefore, the answer to the question of peace or war lies with America, not with the Soviet Union. It is America who forces the "cold war", and all its consequences upon the world. And now that America is losing the "cold war", she must give the answer as to what follows.

It is interesting to note that John Foster Dulles, leading ideologist of the war-party, made the flat declaration on the eve of the provocative Atlantic Pact signing ceremony, that he does not believe that the Soviet Union desires war.

Unquestionably this is part of a campaign to calm the fears of the people, to reassure them that even if the Atlantic Pact is a gross provocation, an act of aggression, it may still be adopted without fear of immediate war because the Soviet Union is too weak to answer it in kind. Mr. Dulles and his kind feel safe in speculating on the Soviet Union's intense desire for peace.

But it has another and deeper significance. It expresses a profound misjudgement of the economic results of the "cold war" and the postponement of the peace settlement, that the position of America
grows stronger and that of the Soviet Union weaker with the continuation of the struggle. Mr. Dulles evidently thinks that the Soviet Union and her allies need peace settlements for economic reasons more urgently than do the United States and her allies. It is upon this misjudgement that the policy of extreme provocation and pressure against the Soviet Union must be based, in the hope and expectation that the Soviet Union will sue for any kind of terms of settlement. I will make only a few observations upon the nature and significance of this miscalculation.

The illusory appearance of a preponderance of power in the world on the side of America arises from a direct comparison of an inventory of existing over-all assets, especially economic. This is an illusory and misleading standard of judgement, in relation to the "cold war", for, among others, the following five reasons:

(1) American economic force is exercised from a distance; it is reaching out to the far corners of the world; it is enormously overextended; in the field of actual struggle, in Europe and Asia, it is to be measured not by its total assets, but by its surplus available far from its base, for foreign use without repayment, as expense, not investment, for without peace investment becomes only another word for gift.

(2) This surplus suffers from enormous leaks and wastage, a high proportion being absorbed by a monstrous and growing parasitism among recipients of American aid, most notoriously and ludicrously shown
in China and Greece.

(3) The use of what remains for the "cold war" is less effective, unit for unit, than the resources of the Soviet Union and her allies, because America habitually squanders huge sums to achieve comparatively trivial results, as, for example, in the much-boasted "air lift" to Berlin.

(4) American aid to her allies weakens more than it helps them because it is distorting their economies, cutting them off from their natural markets, impelling them into swollen military expenditures beyond their means, driving down their living standards, making them dependent upon American doles constantly under threat of curtailment, intensifying their disequilibrium in every way.

(5) American policy in the "cold war", while temporarily easing the pressure of the maturing economic crisis of overproduction by military and Marshall Plan expenditures, is deepening the effects of the economic crisis when it finally breaks out, and is thoroughly disorganizing the world market which alone could alleviate that crisis in a form helpful to America and to the world.

For these and other reasons, the economic impact of America's "cold war" upon the countries of socialism is only a small fraction of that which American "high strategists" calculate. The damage and hardship inflicted upon the socialist camp, in comparison with its results upon the capitalist economies, constantly declines. In the economic field it rep-
resents a net loss to America in the world relation of forces (which is true also of political factors mentioned elsewhere).

This fact is established sufficiently by comparison of the United Nations reports on economic reconstruction in the socialist economies with those of American allies which have received enormous subsidies. These figures show that the socialist countries, working entirely with their own resources, make quicker economic progress than America's proteges with all their much-advertised "American aid". The economic "blood transfusions" from America do not restore the health of European capitalist economies. And the United Nations figures are compiled by men who have passed the most rigid tests for 100% anti-communist records.

America is losing the "cold war", in the economic as well as in the political field. Both sides lose heavily as a result of the "cold war", but the American side loses the most.

This fact is still obscured for many Americans, who are blinded by propaganda about America's high standard of living as the decisive proof of American economic superiority. They forget two great lessons of American history: First, America has never been able to "export" her higher standard of living, a fact witnessed by the descent of Puerto Rico into abject poverty under 50 years of American rule; second, a less technically-developed country may have greater vitality and strength than more highly-developed countries, if it makes better use of what it has, and if it has adequate natural re-
sources. It is the direction and tempo of development that is decisive, and not the absolute level from which that development proceeds. A declining level is weaker, even if higher, than a rising level. America should have learned that lesson from her own early rise to independence and power in the family of nations.

V. Churchill's "Dilemma" for America.

In Greek mythology the idea of "dilemma" was symbolized in the figure of a bull with two great sharp horns, upon one or another of which he impaled the unfortunate human who fell in his way. The victim, however, was granted a boon from the gods—he could choose for himself upon which horn he wished to be impaled.

Winston Churchill has invented a modern Greek dilemma for the world, and especially for America where alone it is really effective. He tells us that we are faced with a dilemma, and can only choose one or the other horn: Either we enforce surrender of the socialist sector of the world with atom bomb warfare, or America itself must surrender to revolution, chaos, collapse and then socialism.

Churchill's dilemma is not very effective in Europe, where the broad masses have already chosen socialism, not as the horn of a dilemma but as a consciously-determined solution of their problems. But in America the situation is different, the broad masses are not adherents of socialism. They wish to
avoid the revolutionary socialist horn of Churchill's dilemma, and when convinced that they cannot avoid both horns, that it is really a dilemma, they reluctantly submit themselves to the one Churchill recommends—and which is so beautifully decorated with laurels of peace and cornucopia of prosperity in paper fac-simile.

Churchill's version of the dilemma facing America is quite false. The true alternative to war for America is not socialism here, but a modus vivendi with socialism in Europe, the recognition that two rival systems must and can live in the same world without war. That was the heart of Roosevelt's great plan for peace, the plan which Churchill was unable to block until Roosevelt died.

Churchill won the American bourgeoisie, the ruling circles, to his policy, by playing upon their serious doubts of the ability of capitalism to compete successfully with socialism under conditions of peace, and upon the new faith in their ability to make war which they drew from the inspiration of the atomic bomb.

With the ruling circles of the bourgeoisie it is impossible to debate these questions. Their lack of confidence in the ability of their own system to compete with socialism cannot be repaired by us, while their faith in the atom bomb is irrational, a form of wishful thinking, and therefore not subject to argument with them. Their course toward war can, therefore, be changed only by blocking the road, making it obviously impossible to pursue. That task inside America is, first and foremost, a
task of separating the mass of the people from the war party, rousing and organizing them in conscious opposition to the present march toward war, to free the masses from the influence of Churchill's false posing of the dilemma.

The war party exercises its heavy influence upon the American masses, including the working class, by a clever manipulation of their deep desire for peace and prosperity. The masses are "sold" on each step toward war, or at least discouraged from opposition by representing it as the only way to peace with prosperity, the only alternative to revolutionary upheavals. It is the technique of the "carrot and club", the carrot being the promise that, under sufficient threats, the Soviet Union will surrender and sign whatever terms Anglo-American leadership offer them, and the club being the threat of economic breakdown and chaos in America, followed by a socialist revolution to which the masses are not committed.

The leaders of the peace party in America have not, since the death of Roosevelt, known how to expose the falsity of the reactionary slogans to the masses and win them to active opposition. Why this failure of the fight for peace to enlist the broad masses? Why, for example, did Henry Wallace receive less than two-and-a-half percent of the total vote in 1948?

The only possible explanation is that the masses did not receive, in a form they can understand and act upon, an alternative program to the one given them by the war party.
The reason why the peace movement is so weak in exposing the falseness of Churchill's "dilemma" of either war or socialism, lies in the fact that the movement suffers from a divided mind in relation to this issue. Most of the Left-wing section actually welcome the idea that peace and socialism are inseparable for America as they are for Europe, and can have no zeal, therefore, in refuting it. The non-socialist sector, much the largest, the main body, avoids serious and systematic discussion of the issue, partly because it has not thought the problem through to the end, partly in the wish to avoid controversy with the Left and to "maintain unity" thereby. The false "dilemma" of Churchill's invention is, therefore, but weakly or not at all combatted among the masses, but goes unchallenged.

VI. Peace Through Socialism—Or Peace Between the Two Systems.

If the American peace party is to succeed in enlisting majority mass support, it must decide where it is going, what is its task.

If the task of the day is to enlist the American masses now in a fight for peace, and for socialism in America as the only road to peace, that is one possible clear perspective, and it demands a program that expresses that goal in clear and practical terms, that can be translated into action which will clear away confusions.

If, however, the task of the day is not to establish socialism in America, but to secure the condi-
tion of peace between nations, even while America remains capitalist, if it is peace through a modus vivendi on a world scale between the two systems, then such a decision requires an entirely different program for the peace party.

The choice between these two alternatives is the real dilemma, it is a choice that can be avoided only at the cost of being impaled upon both its horns, receiving the punishments and disadvantage costs of both and the rewards and advantages of neither.

There are two kinds of compromises in political life. One kind is permissible and sometimes absolutely necessary—the practical compromises necessary to unite the progressive camp to accomplish the tasks of the moment or the day. The other kind is always impermissible, always disastrous—the compromise of failing to meet squarely and to answer clearly the central issue of the day, of postponing difficult but inevitable decisions on policy from the opportunistic motives of "unity" on the basis of unclarity, of political cowardice, or of simple confusion. It is the impermissible kind of compromise that is being made in the peace movement in America, in the refusal to give a clear-cut answer on the relation of peace to socialism in America.

VII. Can America Copy Europe?

America obtains no help as yet in the solution of this problem from the peace movement in Europe. This is because in practically the whole of Europe the
transition to socialism is the task of the day, and the struggle for peace is indissolubly bound up with it. The peace movement of Europe cannot have any program for peace except upon the foundation of its immediate program for socialism. The movement is completely immersed in the solution of the problems of its own struggle, and is unable to give a different kind of advice to the American peace movement which works under quite different conditions in which the transition to socialism is not yet the practical task of the day.

I am, of course familiar (far too familiar?) with the lazy and helpless answer which says:

"If all you say is true, why do not the Marxists of Europe point out to us our shortcomings and mistakes, and put us on the right road? Apparently they are fully satisfied with what we are doing, or they would have said something about it. The European Marxists have much deeper experience and understanding than we have; it is 'American exceptionalism' to look for answers different from theirs without their direct guidance."

To persons who think thus, I would say:

Has it never occurred to you, dear comrades, that you have no right to shift all your responsibilities for thinking out problems, on to your comrades abroad? Has it never occurred to you that our comrades in Europe are struggling with mountains of problems, under conditions so different
from America that answers to American problems cannot possibly be a by-product of the huge history-shaping work they are accomplishing in their own lands? Have you never thought that perhaps they cannot directly answer our problems without danger of raising confusion in their own lands, where the problems require much different answers? Did it never occur to you that they performed their duty to us fully when they established the fact that a correct answer in America, though different from Europe's answers, would not be considered hostile to them or to Marxism, and that it is your duty to complete the task of thinking through to the correct answer, concretely and in detail?

Stalin, following Lenin, has made it clear that the co-existence and even cooperation of systems is desirable, possible, and necessary. He has made repeated offers to negotiate a modus vivendi with America. He has spoken of the crucial problems of markets for America's surplus production, which will determine her future history and thereby affect the whole world.

Zhdanov, at the founding conference of the Cominform, in September 1947, made it clear that the Marxist-Leninists of Europe did not, in fighting against the Marshall Plan because of its reactionary aims, thereby exclude the possibility and desirability of organized and systematic economic relations with America, which means markets for American goods.

All the most authoritative spokesmen of Marxism in Europe and Asia have made repeated statements of similar significance.
Why should we, in America, demand that our European comrades must spell out this question for us in detail? It would be inexpedient for them to do so, because their main task is to show the world that they can solve their problems if necessary without America and despite America. It is the task of the American Marxists, in consultation with all progressive allies, to give the American answer in concrete terms to the problem of markets, in a form that meets the necessities of both sides of the split world. Have we no minds of our own, are we no better than phonograph records? Is thinking impossible for Americans?

For myself I must say that my entire adult life has been given to the single task of absorbing and applying the great teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, to the extent of my abilities. I consider myself but a minor worker in the school of these great teachers. But I would consider myself unworthy of being known as even the humblest disciple, if I ceased to think independently and to speak the truth as I see it, from motives of "playing safe", while relying on the spontaneous course of events to solve our problems for us. To stop thinking and speaking one's thoughts is the deepest disloyalty to working class internationalism and socialism.

So long as the American peace movement waits for the answer to this problem from Europe, it will fail to adjust its practical program to current American reality. The American peace movement must learn how to unite itself indissolubly with the peace movement all over the world, while at the
same time adjusting its immediate practical program to the quite different realities of America. The American peace program cannot be a simple mechanical copy of the peace programs of Europe and Asia.

Continued hesitation and irresolution in defining the relations of peace and socialism, in accord with specific American conditions, can result only in ideological and organizational disintegration of all sections of the peace movement, the scattering of its forces, and the surrender of the masses to the control of the war party.

VIII. Peace, Jobs and Prosperity — a Progressive Program.

Failure up to the present to clarify the central problem of the peace party is due, to a large degree, to the lack of a common language and therefore of a substantial agreement on tasks, between two of the most decisive groups. The first of these groups is the non-socialist leaders, who best represent the political of the American masses, the level of the Roosevelt following and, since Roosevelt's death, that of Henry Wallace. The second group is the Communists, the Marxist-Leninists, whose decisive role comes not from their numbers (they remain a minute fraction of the mass) but from the fact that they represent the socialist future of America, and are an integral link with the socialist present of Europe. If the masses are to be enlisted in the struggle for peace, if World War III is to be prevented, this requires that these two groups
must solidly unite on a common program which the masses can understand and accept. Such a program has not yet been adequately defined. The existing unity is precarious, unstable, and ineffective in reaching the masses, because it is not yet based upon a clear definition of its task, but upon avoiding such definition.

The needed program cannot be directed toward peace through socialism in America, simply because the vast majority to be united in action around that program want peace but not socialism. It must be a program that accepts the right of other nations to adopt socialism, and the right of American socialists (Marxists) to advance their cause in every way consistent with the common struggle for peace. On the world stage it must demand a peace acceptable to the nations of both systems, a true modus vivendi. These are the main points required to define the relations of peace and socialism for the American peace program.

In principle, in an undefined form, the foundation exists for such a common program. It is registered on the part of the non-socialist leaders in their willingness to collaborate with the Marxists of America and the world; it is registered on behalf of the organized Communists of America in the words of their spokesman, stating that "in this year 1949 the American people are not called on to choose between capitalist democracy and socialist democracy", but that the central task of the day is "to realize what is popularly known as Roosevelt's 'Great Design' for lasting peace."
This is an adequate foundation in principle, but the practical conclusions required have not yet been drawn from it.

The masses love peace, above all because it is the necessary precondition for prosperity, for the preservation of past economic gains and the gradual winning of new ones. If peace does not promise prosperity, then it loses its chief attraction, and the masses lose their vigor in the struggle for peace, or even fall into the hands of the war party and the promise of "war prosperity".

For the European masses "peace and prosperity" are identical with "peace and socialism", since long ago they decided, by a great majority, that socialism is the only way to gain prosperity. In America "peace and prosperity" are, in the understanding of the masses, identical with "peace and jobs"--jobs under the conditions of Roosevelt's New Deal when Labor increased its organization and power, raised its living standards, and gained new measures of social security.

The peace program must, therefore, include a program of jobs and social security, or it loses its central mass appeal.

"Jobs", for the mass of Americans, means work in the production of commodities. Commodities are produced in order to be sold, for the market. If the markets fail to absorb the commodities as they
are produced, then goods accumulate in the warehouses. When the warehouses are full, production stops, factories are closed, jobs are lost, unemployed men walk the streets, prosperity is gone. A program for jobs must be a program for markets. If it is not that, then it is a deception, a miserable makeshift, without relation to the real problem it is supposed to answer.

America's productive economy, industry and agriculture, has reached a very high stage of technical efficiency, the highest the world has ever seen. Its productive powers are far greater than the capacity of the domestic market to absorb its products. American economy is more and more geared to the world market, and must export a growing proportion of its products or fall into deep crisis. If its growing surplus above domestic market capacity does not find a peaceful market abroad, then it will inevitably find a military market—which means destruction of peace, which means World War III.

Therefore, to make peace worth fighting for and to avoid the conditions which would make war inevitable and peace an illusion, the peace program for America must give a realistic answer to the problem of foreign markets for American surplus production.

That is what is missing from the practical program of the peace movement. The program for markets—and therefore for jobs—is left to the monopoly of the Marshall Plan advocates, the war party.
The peace-loving mass of Americans, and especially the organized workers, have been told— it is dinned into their ears by a thousand means in all their waking hours— that the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Pact and the "cold war" are all designed to protect American markets and thereby the jobs and prosperity of American workers. They are told that there is no other plan that answers the question of jobs.

These masses are not easy dupes. They proved that by re-electing Roosevelt three times, against the ferocious opposition of big capital and 85% of the nation's press. They do not trust or follow the newspapers. But they listen to the spokesmen of the peace party, and learn all about the virtues of peace— except on the question of markets for American goods which mean jobs for American workers. They hear no clear-cut counter program to the Marshall Plan's answer to the market question. And from the Left, from the Communists, they hear, indeed, that such a counter-program on markets is theoretically wrong, it is contrary to Marx, it is "revisionism", it is "Keynesism", it is a denial of socialism; they hear that advocates of such a program must be driven out of the ranks of the Left as "renegades" and barely tolerated among allies.

The masses conclude, therefore, that while the peace camp may be morally correct, virtuous and high-minded, and generally admirable, yet it has not come to grips with the practical problems of existence, of economics, of jobs and food. So they grope about, seeking another way, and fall into
the clever traps of the reactionary war party. The masses cannot be enlisted in the fight for peace without a program for markets and jobs.

IX. Roosevelt's "Great Design"—or
"Great Illusion".

If it is true that an American peace program cannot give a realistic answer to the market problem under the conditions of capitalism, then the establishment of that fact will leave the struggle for immediate transition to socialism in America as the only road to peace. In that case it is necessary to change drastically the present outlook, tactics and policy of the Marxists, of the Communist Party, which is still talking about Roosevelt's "Great Design". If a program for markets is impossible, then the "Great Design" of Roosevelt is transformed into a "Great Illusion" and to propagandize it further would be to criminally mislead and miseducate the working class.

For American Marxists it is an "either—or" problem, a true dilemma. Either drop all talk about the "Great Design" of Roosevelt, or implement it with a practical program, including Roosevelt's idea for expanding American markets in a form the masses can understand and accept. Any attempt to continue sitting on two stools must result in falling flat on our collective rumps.

Four long years have already been lost without the formulation of a clear answer to this problem, one way or another, four long years in
which the pace of history has speeded up. There is not much time left before the forces of war may take the answer out of our hands, leaving us with only one possible answer for which the present confusion is the worst possible preparation.

The first duty of Marxists is clarity and precision of thought. The worst crime that Marxists can commit against their own doctrine is muddling and confusion. The long-continued muddling on the market problem, and on the relations of socialism to peace, must come to an end. It is no longer tolerable. It can result only in the collapse of the mass movement for peace, and the triumph of the war party.

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