
THE ELECTIONS IN PHILADELPHIA

BY SAMUEL ADAMS DARCY

THE defeat of William C. Bullitt, candidate for Mayor of Philadelphia, is one of the signal victories of this election campaign for the forces of victory and progress.

An Associated Press dispatch dated November 3 reported:

"At a testimonial lunch in honor of James Farley given by the Kiwanis Club, he said that results of Tuesday's voting indicated that the American people are dissatisfied. He recalled that a year ago in Omaha he said the people 'were a bit tired of being kicked around.' 'It is apparent that they are still dissatisfied,' Farley continued, saying that 1944 will be 'the most important election year we have ever had' and expressed the hope that yesterday's voting 'will have a very salutary effect on those who guide the destinies of the nation.'"

Mr. Farley, it seems, lost no time in launching his campaign against Roosevelt, on the assumption that the people were turning against the President.

But for Pennsylvania the election results show no general trend toward the Republican Party, and (as for Philadelphia in particular) defeat of the Democrats took place

where the Farleyites and their local anti-Administration allies were standard-bearers.

In Allegheny County, of which Pittsburgh is the center, the Democratic ticket, with a leadership completely pro-Roosevelt, won a smashing majority, exceeding previous records. One of the few Republicans to survive this sweep was judiciary candidate Blair Gunther, who is head of the progressive Slav Congress.

In the anthracite region, despite John L. Lewis' conniving, the Democratic candidate for Mayor of Wilkes-Barre, Cornelius McCole, defeated the Republican incumbent, Mayor Charles Loveland.

In York County, in a strategic election for State Senator, the known progressive, win-the-war Democrat, Guy A. Leader, defeated his Republican opponent. This county's election constitutes a pointed refutation of Farley's pessimistic anti-Administration position, because while Leader won his Senate seat by several thousand votes, the Farley-Democratic Boyd, who had captured the nomination for Mayor of York in the Democratic primaries, was defeated by about 500 votes.

Relation of Forces in Philadelphia

In contrast to the pro-Roosevelt leadership of the state Democrats headed by David Lawrence and the Breslin-Ross forces, the Philadelphia Democratic Party has been controlled by a Farley type of leadership headed by the Kelly-Clark-Donoghue-Flanigan group. The candidates of this group have hardly been distinguishable from the Republicans, and frequently they have nominated so-called "independent Republicans," while denying labor adequate candidacies. Each time their candidates met defeat. But at each year of Presidential elections, the Roosevelt national ticket, whose progressivism was clear, won by overwhelming majorities. The following figures of the Philadelphia vote are illuminating:

| <i>Year</i> | <i>Democratic Vote Compared with Republican Vote</i> |
|-------------|--|
| 1934 | —19,856 |
| 1935 | —49,186 |
| 1936 | + 209,876 |
| 1937 | + 10,359 |
| 1938 | —12,448 |
| 1939 | —29,676 |
| 1940 | + 177,271 |
| 1941 | — 4,962 |
| 1942 | — 139 |

Note that in 1936 and 1940 Roosevelt gained majorities of about 200,000 over his Republican opponent. But, as the local Democrats veered further from the President's policies, the Republicans scored higher majorities. Last year (1942) the Democratic candidate for Governor was Clair Ross, nearest to an

F.D.R., win-the-war state candidate that Pennsylvania has had. He refused to red-bait, and some of his speeches were excellent win-the-war addresses. He lost Philadelphia by only 139 votes, in the final count, out of 635,000 cast.

All signs pointed to the need for a strong, progressive, win-the-war Democratic candidate in the 1943 mayoralty elections. Had they nominated such a man, and several were available, the Democrats would have swept the elections.

Bullitt's Nomination and Its Support

Philadelphia has a small but powerful and wealthy aristocracy, known after the section of the city in which they live, as the "Main Line" people. The Democratic wing of this Main Line, headed by Attorney-General Biddle and William C. Bullitt, is that dangerous group which parades as liberals while doing reaction's dirtiest work. Biddle joined with Farley to cook up a deal whereby Bullitt was nominated for Mayor of Philadelphia. Their plan was a cunning one: The Mayor of Philadelphia controls 19,000 jobs; if the Biddle-Bullitt group could acquire that patronage, they would dominate Pennsylvania's delegation to the National Convention in 1944, which is second only to New York's. This delegation would then unite with the Farley forces, the Southern Poll Tax Democrats, and other anti-Roosevelt elements in an effort to seize control of the Administration to carry through their reactionary program. They aim to change the country's foreign policy particular-

ly in line with Bullitt's Soviet-hating "carrot and club" speech; to change the Administration's attitude toward labor in line with Biddle's persecutions of progressive labor leaders; and to change all other domestic policies in line with Farley's reactionary views.

The nomination of Bullitt for mayor did seem at first like a master stroke for the Farley-Biddle combination. It appeared for a while as if Bullitt would become a coalition candidate of the Democrats and a great section of the Republican Party. State Senator George Woodward, one of the most reactionary Republicans in the State, representing the rich Germantown-Chestnut Hill district of Philadelphia, hailed Bullitt's nomination in glowing terms. So did the well-known Republican industrialist R. P. Brown, and many others.

The Republican Philadelphia *Inquirer* described the city as "elated" at the nomination and termed it a "success" for the Democratic Party. The Republican *Bulletin* (largest evening newspaper in the country) declared:

"Citizens who want Philadelphia to press forward . . . will welcome the sight of William C. Bullitt's hat in the mayoralty ring.

"Mr. Bullitt's first obligation as candidate will be to make it clear that his aim is to serve Philadelphia rather than the national Democratic Party and that he does not wish to ride into the campaign on President Roosevelt's coat-tails."

Throughout his campaign, Bullitt was guided by this advice not to

make support of President Roosevelt a plank of his platform.

After Acting Mayor Bernard Samuel was nominated as Republican mayoralty candidate, a group of independent Republicans, resenting him as a "ward-upstart," acclaimed and supported the Main Line aristocrat Bullitt. Some of these, however, such as the *Evening Bulletin*, changed their minds as the campaign progressed and they saw the swing of sentiment against Bullitt.

A further ally that Bullitt had was in the concern of some pro-Roosevelt forces as to the effect of a Democratic Party defeat upon the President's chances of carrying Pennsylvania in 1944. The Bullitt forces argued demagogically that without the benefit of the 19,000 patronage jobs (which Bullitt intended to use against him!) F.D.R.'s chances would be jeopardized. But for the past ten years, as the figures show, the President has received overwhelming majorities without benefit of the 19,000 patronage jobs and despite the consistent defeats of the local Democratic tickets.

A still further ally that Bullitt had was a section of the Catholic hierarchy, particularly the group headed by Brother Alfred, who directs Catholic trade union action. This seemed a substantial asset, since Bullitt had the use of Catholic halls throughout the city, with the parochial schools and church influence on his behalf.

Where Did Labor Stand?

Throughout the campaign the Bullitt forces claimed that labor was

united behind him; but on the day after elections all admitted that this was a childish illusion. The Social-Democratic Dubinsky forces pledged to "deliver" labor over to Bullitt, but they failed completely.

Philadelphia labor took a great step forward this year by forming a United Labor Committee for progressive independent political action and rallying one-third of organized labor in the city to active participation. However, the leadership of the United Labor Committee was seized by the Dubinsky forces, represented by Otto in the International Ladies Garment Workers Union and Charles Weinstein of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union. Unfortunately, Jim McDevitt, President of the State A. F. of L., permitted himself to be used as a front by these elements. They refused to lift a finger to intercede in the Democratic Party in the pre-primary period for the selection of progressive candidates. After Bullitt was nominated, they tried to ram that nomination down the throats of the labor movement. The Social-Democratic leaders of the needle trades unions, pretending to speak for all of labor, issued fawning statements as soon as Bullitt's nomination was announced, declaring that "Bullitt will make the best candidate for Mayor the city could have," and pledging that "organized labor will support him." This "independent labor political action" did not succeed! After a heated debate, over twenty locals voted against endorsement of Bullitt, declaring themselves also against Samuel. Through manipulation of votes, the Otto-

Weinstein group appeared to get a great majority for Bullitt, but actually achieved their majority by silencing the minority opposition in a number of large delegations through invoking the unity rule.

After this fight in the United Labor Council, about fifteen other A. F. of L. local unions, led by William Green's representative, Mallen, voted to endorse Samuel. In the rest of the unions, including I.L.G. W.U., and Amalgamated Clothing Workers, the membership and lesser officials refused to help Bullitt's candidacy during the entire campaign and on election day. Despite the distribution of a vast amount of Social-Democratic literature supporting Bullitt, including special editions of the *Jewish Daily Forward* and the *New Leader*, Weinstein, who had promised the Bullitt Committee 5,000 election workers, was able to deliver less than 300!

The Weinstein-Otto leadership did succeed in frustrating the United Labor Committee's declared purpose of independent, progressive political action, and narrowed that organization's activity to a handful of Social-Democrats. Jim McDevitt could be the center of a great movement for united labor political action in Philadelphia. He has played a positive role, and has done the labor movement much good. He will not accomplish that on the political field, however, as long as he defers to the Weinstein-Otto leadership.

The Progressive Ticket

Even before the nomination the anti-Bullitt forces had been rallied.

A bitter pre-primary struggle had been carried on by the more progressive labor leaders, some Democratic Party progressives, and the Communist Party. Bullitt's nomination was accompanied by a terrific Red-baiting campaign launched by the *Philadelphia Record*, which announced in front-page cartoons and leading editorials that only the Communists were opposed to Bullitt. His nomination was hailed as our defeat; he did appear as a formidable, almost irresistible candidate.

Immediately upon his nomination, trade union progressives circulated letters exposing Bullitt's record to Democratic committeemen, ward leaders and city officials, to all trade union officials, etc. In support of this action, *The Worker* published an exposé of Bullitt's anti-labor, anti-Semitic, reactionary writings, and created a sensation in the city, temporarily staying the tide of Bullitt sentiment. This was followed by a campaign of enlightenment, exposing Bullitt's betrayal of Spain, betrayal of France, responsibility for Munich, and giving his anti-Soviet connivings from the time of the Bullitt-Steffens mission to Moscow in 1919. In this campaign *The Worker* played a leading part and gained thereby a substantial increase in subscription circulation. Over one million pieces of literature were distributed in the city by the progressive forces against Bullitt, in addition to newspaper advertisements, radio programs, mass meetings, etc.

The progressives and Communists

worked out the following line of action: to make victory and the war the main issue; to reject Bullitt as unacceptable by his record on this issue; to endorse the remainder of the Democratic ticket; to reject the entire Republican ticket as constituting a front for Pew, the anti-Roosevelt America First; and to effect the formation of an Independent Voters League for Philadelphia. This committee, under the chairmanship of a prominent Roosevelt Democrat, Dr. Daniel Longaker, nominated a member of the A. F. of L. Central Labor Union, Jules C. Abercaugh, as candidate for Mayor.

How Did the Struggle Develop?

The Bullitt forces tried to limit the campaign to "local issues" from the beginning. No questions concerning the war or President Roosevelt were to be discussed and all references to Bullitt's political history were to be excluded as "personalities." In announcing discussion of the Democratic platform, the Bullitt Committee said, "Absolute freedom of expression is guaranteed to each organization except that personalities will not be permitted and the discussion must be confined to Philadelphia problems." At the end of September, the platform committee leaders announced that they must "put pure water first in the platform" and "the construction of a sewage disposal system."

This policy was given substantial support by a large section of the Republican Party, including the two biggest newspapers, the *Bulletin* and the *Inquirer*, and all of the "re-

spectable" Main Line Republicans. Some of the Republican ward leaders, however, were influenced by, and made a good deal of the exposures circulated by the progressives with regard to Bullitt's Munich record. Their chief spokesman was County Commissioner Morton Witkin, who declared:

"Mr. Bullitt has not yet been able to deny his own statements as printed in the leading newspapers of America at the time of the fall of Paris. Nor has he been able to deny the charges against him by leading Americans.

"Now, Mr. Bullitt, isn't it true that the leader of Russia, Mr. Stalin, asked for your removal from Russia? Why? Wasn't it because of your infamous intrigue with the Trotskyites whose leader he also banished? Mr. Bullitt, didn't you side with the Japanese at the end of 1935 with regard to the peninsula at Vladivostok?"

The Main Line Republicans, the Pew forces, the *Inquirer*, and the *Bulletin*, publicly denounced Witkin for "following the Communists," and to the end of the campaign there was a running public controversy in the Republican Party on this issue. The *Bulletin*, for example, after denouncing Witkin in one editorial, declared in a follow-up:

"If either Acting-Mayor Samuel or Mr. Bullitt is at a loss for an issue of genuine concern to Philadelphians, one might be found . . . the matter of sewage disposal is of prime importance. . . . It could be discussed without defaming any individual or the city. Let's have enlightenment."

In issuing the Republican election platform, the win-the-war group won out, and the opening sentence declared for "full support to the Federal Government and the armed forces and the achievement of final victory." Acting-Mayor Samuel pledged "unqualified support to President Roosevelt on the conduct of the war."

Of course, these good words should be remembered in the light of previous and similar Republican demagoguery. In the 1942 elections, the Republican campaign circulars for Governor Martin demanded the "Second Front." Nevertheless, the state organization of the Republican Party is going through an increasingly severe struggle to determine its course for 1944. At the last State Committee meeting held in Philadelphia, in the second week of October, three groups, all anti-Roosevelt, were evident, all showing considerable strength: one headed by Pew and Grundy, another by Governor Martin, and the third by Senator Davis, who has expressed sympathy with Willkie.

The progressives' fight to make the winning of the war the main issue of these elections also affected the Democrats. Bullitt's "carrot and club" speech is by now notorious, having been so brilliantly exposed by Comrade Browder. On September 13, *after he was nominated and despite his own announced restriction of the campaign to 'local issues,'* Bullitt made an even more vicious speech before the organization calling itself the Polish Relief Society. He not only declared him-

self on the side of the Polish fascists who were conniving and arming against the Soviet Union; he not only demanded fulfillment of all claims against the Soviet Union by the Polish feudal landlords and their London Government-In-Exile; he also rattled the sabre, threatening that if this were not granted, "the sons and daughters of American soldiers and sailors and marines and aviators who are now facing death will have to go out again to fight."

As the campaign continued and it became increasingly evident that the electorate was hostile to Bullitt's anti-Sovietism, he began to change his tune. He later protested that he was a friend of the Soviet Union and opposed to Japanese claims at Vladivostok. On October 21, realizing the tremendous effect on Philadelphia voters of Browder's recent statement that support of Bullitt would be a slap at the Soviet Union, Bullitt issued a press release urging that "Americans pray for the success of the Soviet parley."

The Democratic election platform which had begun with sewage and water as the main issue, in its final draft had as point number one, a mild declaration for "cooperation in carrying on the war." This was weakened by a mass of verbiage concerning post-war adjustments, which made the Democratic platform on the war issue weaker than the pro-war declarations of the Republicans. Philadelphia did not miss the significance of Bullitt's maneuvering with the question of support to the war.

In the post-election summaries,

some Republicans claimed that the anti-Bullitt vote was an anti-Roosevelt vote. There is not one fact to sustain this contention. Although Samuel declared for "unqualified support" to Roosevelt's conduct of the war, Bullitt never approached such a declaration. He brought the President into the campaign only to shift the blame for the betrayal of Paris from himself, saying that what he did in Paris for the Nazis was done because the President had ordered him to stay there. When Harrison Spangler, National Republican Chairman, delivered a speech in Philadelphia, stupidly calling Bullitt a "pawn of the White House," it was repudiated by Democrats and Republicans alike. The *Inquirer* declared in a headline, "New Deal is not issue in Mayoralty campaign," and the *Evening News*, staunchest of Republican papers, declared, "F.D.R. keeps out of Philadelphia fight. . . ." The progressives were able, however, to repudiate Bullitt's policies insofar as they differed from President Roosevelt's.

The Activity of the Communist Party

As the campaign progressed, "local issues" were pushed into the background, and finally the election was fought on the issues of Bullitt's war record. Our party was a leading factor in this process, and in the entire campaign. It should be noted, however, that we were less successful in exposing the menace of the reactionary Pew's operations behind the innocent-appearing front of Acting-Mayor Samuel. Bullitt's pa-

per, the *Record*, tried to evade the war issue with a long-winded series of articles attacking the Communists. Involuntarily they paid tribute to the vigor of the Communist Party's role in the fight, stating that "for the first time in Philadelphia's history, the American Communist Party has jumped into a mayoralty campaign with both feet."

Frank R. Kent, a vicious, Westbrook Pegler type of anti-Roosevelt columnist, wrote:

"In no other place and at no other time have the Communists in the country made a fight of this character. . . . [They] assailed the Democratic candidate with a violence and fury of which no previous indication has been given. . . . Earl Browder, head of the Communist Party in America, recently made a virulent attack against Mr. Bullitt in a Town Hall speech. Other Communist orators have followed suit and the full weight of the Communist Party is being used to encompass his defeat."

Then follows a detailed defense of Bullitt's anti-Sovietism, closing:

"This is a new development in American politics. Nothing quite like it has been done before. . . . Obviously their idea is to prevent any man openly unfriendly to the Soviet system rising in American politics and if they can to penalize such men for holding such views. . . . [The Communist attack] ought to help Mr. Bullitt."

In this attack against our party, several things were significant: (1) no other Democratic candidate, no spokesman for the Democratic Party

joined in any part of the Bullitt-Stern-Kent attack upon our party. The contrary happened. In the lower ranks, the fiercer the election struggle became, the larger the numbers of the Democratic Party officialdom that became friendlier to our party and expressed resentment at Bullitt's having been put over on them. To the end of the campaign, Red-baiting was limited to Stern-Bullitt and the Social-Democrats. At one point of the campaign, some of Bullitt's closest co-workers, including Kelly, his campaign manager, publicly expressed disgust at the line of his speeches. Within the labor movement, the handful of Social-Democrats carried this Red-baiting policy both in the speeches of Weinstein and Otto, as well as through the *New Leader* and the *Forward* and miscellaneous pamphlets which were distributed by commercial agencies at enormous expenditure of funds. But Red-baiting was never less effective and union officials in their own unions showed their attitude by boycotting meetings of election workers called by Weinstein and Otto. In no election in the past ten years have Weinstein and Otto been able to turn out so few election workers from their own unions as in this election.

The Meaning of the Results

What did the final election result show? Bullitt, who began his campaign with the expectation of sweeping the city, sustained a defeat by a larger margin than any Democrat has suffered since the Democratic

Party became a serious organization in Pennsylvania this century. He lost by over 65,000 votes

More significant than that, however, Bullitt ran behind his own entire ticket. He ran over 8,000 votes behind his running mate, Judge Bok, the well-known Roosevelt progressive. The campaign of the progressives in the trade unions and of the Communist Party to support the Democratic Councilmanic candidates while defeating Bullitt, bore fruit, so that, despite the Bullitt defeat, the Democratic Councilmen have increased their vote. At this moment, with the official count not completed, it seems certain that they will retain the seats they had in the previous council and that they may increase their number.

The Social-Democrats have circulated preposterous excuses for Bullitt's defeat. One such excuse is that rain cut the vote. Another excuse, voiced in *PM* and other newspapers under varying degrees of Social-Democratic influence, is that the anti-Bullitt forces, particularly the Communists, organized a bus tie-up. That the bus tie-up on election day cut the total vote and that a small total vote operates in favor of the Republicans, whereas a larger vote operates in favor of the Democrats. Every item of these excuses is false.

The baselessness of the excuse that a smaller vote operates in favor of the Republicans is shown, for example, by a study of the polls in previous years:

In 1939, 750,000 votes were cast. The Democrats were beaten by 30,000 votes.

In 1942, 630,000 votes were cast (120,000 less than in 1939). The Democrats lost by only 139.

Thus, if these statistics are important, they would seem to indicate that a smaller vote operates in favor of the Democrats. Of course, all such mechanical explanations are nonsense. Bullitt was defeated by political factors. Bullitt's war record, his anti-Sovieteering, his collusive role in relation to Munich, Spain and the betrayal of France, his avoidance of giving President Roosevelt all-out endorsement, his Red-baiting and his fronting for the Social-Democrats in Philadelphia—these are the factors that defeated him.

The Effect of Abercauph's Candidacy

There were more split tickets in Philadelphia this year than in any other year. About 5,000 voted for Abercauph for Mayor and the rest of the Democratic ticket. Another 6,100 voted for Samuel for Mayor and the rest of the Democratic ticket on the theory that voting for Abercauph is "throwing away the vote," in that it might not suffice to defeat Bullitt, whereas voting for Samuel would insure Bullitt's defeat. This indicates a weakness in the campaign to expose the menace of Pew in the situation. For, although Samuel was originally not Pew's candidate and Samuel's speeches and platform were not characteristic Pew speeches, there could be no check to date refuting the fact that Pew put considerable money into the Republican campaign and together with Grundy dominates and controls the Republi-

can Party for anti-Roosevelt, and, as recent events have shown, even anti-Willkie, purposes. Estimates based on the unofficial count indicate that from 15,000 to 20,000 voters failed to vote for any mayoralty candidate, although voting for the other offices. The total of all these is 25,000 to 30,000. This does not count the many tens of thousands of Democrats who simply stayed away from the polling places altogether. There were 10,000 fewer total votes cast in the entire election as compared to 1942, but the fall-off in the vote for the Democratic candidate for mayor was 37,000. It should be noted that there were also a considerable—as yet uncounted—number of votes cast for Bullitt for mayor and for the balance of the Republican ticket. These were largely upper class Republicans. Their number early in the campaign threatened to be larger.

Among the Negro people a fair estimate shows as high as 70 per cent voted for Samuel. The Republicans and Pew himself had made special efforts to win the Negro vote. Pew was one of the first employers to yield to the pressure for hiring Negroes for skilled jobs, and now employs 18,000 Negroes in the Sun Shipyards. He interceded with Governor Martin of Pennsylvania against extraditing Negroes to the South, and sent his personal attorneys to aid Buckanon, the Negro whose extradition was sought at Trenton, N. J. Republican Governor Martin appointed a Governor's Inter-Racial Commission under the leadership of the Negro progressive E. Washington Rhodes, in which

those who wish to fight for equal rights for the Negro people are admitted without regard to political creed.

As against this determined effort of the Republicans to win the favor of the Negro people, the local Democrats have consistently ignored the problem. Bullitt was particularly offensive in his attitude. He cynically tried to trick the Negro people. In connivance with the Social-Democrats he announced a conference for "Inter-Racial cooperation" to take place on October 20 at the Academy of Music in Philadelphia. When people arrived there they discovered it was a cheap stunt to get them to a Bullitt election rally. Deep resentment resulted and the Negroes present demonstrated by walking out en masse.

Unfortunately, a great many of them were not convinced of the usefulness of Abercauph's candidacy as an alternative, and instead voted for Samuel.

Considerable progress has been made in advancing the struggle for Negro rights, but the above-given facts clearly indicate how much more has to be done for Negro and white unity. Especially the trade unions must awaken to the fact that if they do not act, Pew will—and not for good purposes.

In explaining the final vote the *Philadelphia Record* turns in wrath upon the labor movement. Its analysis of the labor vote (published November 4) reads as follows:

"Union labor leaders with the best intentions could not deliver 'the labor vote.' It is doubtful if there is a

'labor vote.' Union members are human beings like all of us. In America they are not class conscious as in England and on the continent. They don't like to be told how to vote by their union officials any more than they like to be bossed by their wives or union leader."

Considering that the *Record* made the chief feature of its campaign the claim that Bullitt's election was assured by the united labor vote, this sudden reversal of judgment can be attributed only to pique. It is nonsense to say there is no labor vote. One need only point to the fact that President Roosevelt gets a united labor vote in Philadelphia each time he runs and thereby carries the city by majorities of 200,000.

The Tasks for 1944

The essential nature of the Philadelphia election was, from the point of view of the win-the-war forces, an action to fight off a flank attack made on the war effort by the tactic of uniting the Bullitt-Biddle-Farley elements into a bloc which wanted to seize the Pennsylvania Democratic Party for anti-United Nations purposes. In this sense the pro-Roosevelt progressives of Philadelphia were victorious. It, however, left the Republicans in office. That is an unfinished task.

All progressive-thinking people should learn the lesson for 1944:

1. It re-emphasizes the lesson learned in so many other elections, that the Democratic Party cannot win with Republican types of platforms or reactionary Republican types of candidates.

2. The Democrats cannot win if

they permit special groups to seize leadership in the Roosevelt camp with special axes to grind such as Red-baiting or anti-Sovieteering or Bullitt's new post-election activity of advocating Federal Union, Inc., i.e., Anglo-American imperialist domination of the rest of the world.

3. For 1944 all win-the-war forces without any limitation but without ulterior partisan motives must be united behind candidates who support the Commander-in-Chief and the government's war program.

4. Labor unity for political action must be achieved. The error of permitting the Social-Democrats to seize leadership and setting aside the movement for independent political action to their own purposes and control is certainly evident in Philadelphia. On a state scale the movement for united labor political action which has already taken practical form in the 33rd Congressional District (East Pittsburgh and McKeesport) and in the 29th Congressional District (Erie), in Reading and in Philadelphia, and in many other parts of the state, must be united into a single state-wide movement.

5. One of the gains of the election is that the Communist Party has had restored to it its place on the ballot as a legal party. This breaks down the ruling to remove us made by ex-Governor James' reactionary commission of two years ago. The party must carefully utilize this opportunity to promote the general unity along progressive lines.

6. Special efforts must be made to strengthen the progressive work in the coal areas, where John L.

Lewis will no doubt play his usual disruptive role; and in Reading, where the Social-Democrats will try to carry through their policies disruptive of the war effort around Mayor Stump, who succeeded in gaining office, even though the rest of the Socialist Party ticket met defeat.

7. Finally, the entire state is discussing the lessons which this recent election has to teach. Every effort must be made to help in those discussions to promote clarity, so that all groups will be able to draw the proper conclusions from the events and work out an effective program for 1944.