The December 1986 month-long student demonstrations in China brought into the open the present turnell, but they were neither the cause nor the consequence of what is bringing the crisis to a climax. Both the reformist within the Communist Party leadership trying to shift the blame for the present crisis from itself to the rallies of students, the "western" dogmatists and vulgar glibness about economic "reform" and political "democracy." Clearly, in one respect, it is a question of the succession to Deng Xiaoping which will be on the agenda in the fall when the Thirteenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is held. But even that is only a partial answer, for it is not a question of who will follow Deng, but what will follow any successor. To avoid the question of that type of burning question, Mao Zedong had called the near-civil war of the 1971 Lin Biao affair "the great disorder under Heaven."

There is no doubt that had been the most serious crisis since winning power, and that the crisis came not from the outside but from capitalist elements within the country, but from within the ruling Communist Party leadership, from the very one Mao had constitutionally designated as his successor ("closest comrades in arms").

A whole decade has passed since Mao's death. The disasters of his final decade called the Cultural Revolution have been halted. Yet the "new" world stage has been in motion by rolling the red carpet out for Nixon in 1972. The Nixon's visit in 1972 is exactly what happens to national questions in a global context. The so-called Maoism is struggling for single world mastery and you do not unfolding a true independent challenge.

THE 1986 YOUTH CHALLENGE TO DENG'S OPENING TO JAPAN AND OTHER

THE 1985 YOUTH CHALLENGE TO DENG'S OPENING TO JAPAN AND OTHER

STRIKES

The Youth have always had a very special role in the Chinese revolutionary movements, and none more important than the 1990s (to which we will return). But to fully understand the current demonstrations in 1986-87, we have to turn to the demonstrations the year before, to the final quarter of 1986. The demonstrations in China in 1986 was not on any youth problem they were a challenge to Deng's raw policy on Japan. The students read Prime Minister Nakasone's militaristic visit to the shrine where World War II officers lain buried as signaling the same retrogression move as Reagan's visit to the shrine in the U.S. which produced the same type of outcry against this so-called conciliation with the anti-Japanese militarist past. It was a direct challenge to Deng's deviationism, not only on Japan but globally, and not only on "foreign affairs" but nationally, from the lazer-logical relationship at work (witnesse the steel workers' strikes) as well as reflecting the continuing restlessness in the People's Liberational Army.

That the CCP leadership understood that's what the students were doing could be seen as early as Oct. 9, 1985, when the Japanese Foreign Minister, Shintaro Abe, arrived in Beijing to discuss the new Peace and Friendship Treaty that had been signed between China and Japan. The Chinese Vice-Premier Li Peng agreed with him that relations between China and Japan were now on an even keel, but nevertheless reminded the Japanese Foreign Minister of all the difficulties that have been between the two countries.

Indeed, the Japanese news agency Kyodo reported that "Li obliquely blamed" the Japanese government for having caused certain "negative elements in their relationship." Since clearly the student demonstrations in Japan continued, it certainly cannot be considered an accident that the CCP official at that moment confirmed that "rapprochment talks were going on between it and the Japanese Communist Party."

At the same time there were contradictory reports (more or less deliberately contradictory) so that the reader didn't know which one set the direction for the year. Was it, for example, a fact, denied by China, that it and the United States engaged in joint naval maneuvers, or was it a fact that China itself was undergoing great technological and militaristic developments in the Pacific? (See also, 106 and 107 of the Quarterly Chronicles and Documentation Sections of the China Quarterly)

FROM MARX TO MAO

To fully understand what 1987 has in store for China, in light of what has been developing in the objective situation in the 20th century, we must begin with the Mao legacy on the other, we have to turn to 1983. The significance of 1983 rests on the fact that it was both the Mao Centenary Year and the 30th anniversary of the founding of the CCP.

What is of more immediate importance is Mao Zedong Thought. On Nov. 27, 1983, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party finally passed a resolution entitled, "Mao Zedong's Historical Role and Mao Zedong Thought." "To prove that though Mao had made "great mistakes in the 'Cultural Revolution', his merits are primary and his errors secondary," they summarized Mao's Thought as follows: Mao made a theoretical synthesis of China's unique experience in its protracted revolution in accordance with the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism... many outstanding leaders of our party made important contributions to the formation and development of Mao Zedong Thought and they are synthesized in the scientific work of comrade Mao."

By 1983 there was a great deal more than just the continuations of Mao's Collected Works. The question was what is that collectivity that produced Mao Zedong Thought? They have now issued the Selected Works of the current day recognized leaders—Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Deng, Deng. Deng is the only one living, the one with the power, the one who is bringing about the most challenge to his own rule. The first who had to fall as those demonstrations reached a climax was his protege, Hsiao Yibeng.

"Let's never forget that youth have a very special role in China in the 20th century. Back in the mid-1960s, they even thought that they could use the Cultural continued"
Revolution as a point of departure, not just for democracy, but, as they put it, for having a real Paris Commune type of government. That is to say, a communal non-state form of government.

The Wangari commentators rushed all too fast to compare the 1986-87 demonstrations to the movement in Hong Kong. There is no doubt that it was easier to it in time than for 1986, when youth unfurled an altogether new demand in Sheng Yang’s “Whither China?” (published in that called China the centerpoint of world revolution precisely because it was the point of greatest world contradiction. But the placards for democracy that the 1986-87 demonstrators carried were not just for democracy, Wall, but covered the labor struggle, the arts struggle, the really massive, ongoing opposition to the regime for altogether new human relations.

IS DENG DOING THE OUSTING, OR IS HE BEING OUSTED?

Once, however, the gates were opened to a “collectivity,” it was not just a question of Mao or Mao’s successor, but the Marx Centenary, and that meant Marx’s Humanism. That brought back the old theoretical-proponents. Chen Yang, who in 1987 had unleashed the theoretical fight against Mao’s 1949 Humanist Essays, in 1989 he announced that he now welcomed them but perverted them to “do include everyone bourgeois Humanism.”

At this point, the issue is multiplied enough not to know which side of the fighting Chen is on—with the so-called “hardliners” who consider themselves true Marxists, or “reformers” who want to shift from Stalinification of Marxism to rejection of it.

What has happened objectively? The foreign affairs of the theoretical disputes are not the only crisis. What is the determinant is the crisis at home in the production line, the poor living conditions, and unemployment of the masses, as well as the real massacre in the technology-technically reorganized Army, while seeing the emergence of a new kind of professor. This is most evident in the few so-called special economic zones. Recently the New York Times reported one such area, Shenyang, the industrial capital of Manchuria, which is evidently so high on “reform” that it emboldened one manager to announce that he had cut the work force at his factory from 1,000 to 800, adding, “I’ve still got 200 people too many.”

The 1986 demonstrations only brought to the fore the myriad crises that have been boiling up throughout the 1980s as China tried to catch its breath from Mao’s last disastrous decade. But China has found once again it is facing the two nuclear: Behemoth and it dare not go to build an independent path. Has Deng, as well as “hardliners” and “softliners,” given up hope that there is an independent Third World that would lead to independence from both Russia and the U.S.?

Integral to that is the international question: where to globally? Had one merely to choose between U.S. and Russia? Was Russia really enemy number one, so that Reagan could consider China his friend? The latest thing that China was very quick about denying was the Kyo- do news account that China and the U.S. were participating in joint naval maneuvers. China said absolutely no; they were just “exchanging greetings.” Somebody’s head will roll. Will it be Deng’s?

Feb. 10, 1987 


3. This is not the place to work out Mao’s Thought as he tried to deal with the authorization of presses outside for publication without a central decree into the new century. But see the New York Times, May 15, 1944 ed., and as “The Chinese Cultural Revolution” in New World Review (1979).

Notes for Possible T/F on China

Jan. 20, 1987

One word that is not mentioned at all, that is XH pouring forth from China these days on the new crisis, whether the concentration is on the student demonstrations, or on the intellectuals especially in the Science and Technology field, not to mention the steel strike and general labor restlessness, is the army. Yet it is precisely there where there has been resistance 1969, (as the head of the Army) when Lin Biao was and only the one who claimed that it was the army rather than the Party that is the model for the Youth to follow. That was the first time in any country that called itself Communist that the Army was designated by the Constitution itself as primary. Naturally, Lin Biao was part of that, which to assume any good vanguard meant building one’s own faction, so that when two short years passed, Lin Biao was named as the enemy, Mao was faced with armed factions and indeed have continued throughout, first to put down the Red Guards and then in general to plan a game for power.

Is this the case now? The context in which we need to examine this have two fundamental poles; One, is the strategic or more correctly (only) philosophic concept which has driven China, not only to independence from imperialism, but distinctly unique from all other Communists, is the concept n that the workers should put down their arms, should remain at their benches producing, while the Army, the peasant Army, surrounds the
cities and occupies them; two, this concept was then extended to the international scene with the birth of the Third World, where the "internationalism" was equated with the Third World, technologically backward, that would surround the whole advanced world, and when this was named the peoples' war. Lin Biao made that speech, but it was supposed to be Mao Thought, but perhaps Lin Biao was the only one who believed in it.

In any case, September 1971 brought about the crisis.

Quotations from The Rise and Fall of Lin Biao, by Jaap van Ginneken (New York: Avon, 1974; 1977)

The interesting thing is the last three paragraphs, beginning with Conflict on p. 369, continuing with the "Plot", the supposed Lin Biao plan, 571; and ending with the visit of Nixon.

Insofar as the question of the conflict is concerned,

"Before the Cultural Revolution Lin Biao had set himself up as the strategist of the Third World countries, by proclaiming the invincibility of the people's war. His enthusiasm for China's avant-garde role in the world had, however, caused him to be regarded very much as a Chinese chauvinist." (p. 251).

As soon as they announced the invitation to Nixon (7/23/71??) Lin visits many Army divisions on a supposed inspection tour, which Mao immediately decides is totally factional and starts the campaign against him.
Insofar as the next Part is concerned, which is the background of the "571" Plan, I am not interested in the theory that it is his son rather than Lin Piao himself who organized it. Then there is an epilogue on the Shanghai faction of the gang of four which is where it ends, but I am more interested in the 80s, especially since the Democracy Wall

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This commentary from Peking begins with what has been happening since last October when the CCP had a plenary meeting. If anyone thought that so-called modernization means political democracy because the December issue of the Red Flag carried an article by the 'new Culture Minister, Wang Meng hailed the new democracy, including evidently "other" schools of thought". Other of course meant non-Marxist. That was the Deng date, 12/15/86, when obviously had now decided that there had already been too much freedom as was clearly seen from the fact that the demonstrations by students had begun and by late December and early January a campaign was unloosed against so-called "bourgeois liberalization". More: heads began to roll since the coming to power of Deng; 1) Hu Yechang who was supposedly Deng's own heir apparent, resigned from the chairmanship of the CCP;

2) Fang Lizhi was expelled as was

3) Wang Ruowan who had questioned the single party
4) Liu Binyang, a reporter who exposed corruption has been expelled.

There has suddenly been a new stress on what they call "The 4 cardinal principles".

John Woodruff is the Chief of the Peking Bureau of the Baltimore Sun, does not spell out the 4; instead, he stresses that the most important of course is maintaining a total "monopoly on political power." Actually what he is talking about is evidently a new "middle class"; it's actually state-capitalism, even though what he goes back to as an example is 4,000 years of dynastic history. Evidently what the Western reporter is talking about is what we call "Yuppies" and "competent managers" instead of "power in the hands of Communist Party secretaries." That is what the West is talking about, is that one of his conclusions is, "Deng himself may be a long way from fully committed to opening China's politics in the ways that would be needed to make a modern economy workable." He then talks about the thousands of students studying abroad; "there is a generation of returning students waiting just behind the current top Chinese Communist leadership..."
A Few more disconnected thoughts, but this may actually return me back to the China topic because I've now decided that in actuality, what Deng is doing is moving away from Reagan.

This doesn't mean that there is no crisis in China, indeed there is the great troubles under heaven, as Mao said in a very similar situation when the crisis became so total in China that he issued an invitation to Nixon to visit China. That transformed the crisis into an outright civil war between Mao Tse-Tung and Liu Piao, that is to say, between the party and the army.

What is paramount now? The point is that what Deng discovered within the top CCP leadership at the very time when the youth were demonstrating loudly for demanding freedom and democracy, was that that top bureaucracy were warning Deng that that's exactly what was due to happen if there continues to be such looseness in the "principles", i.e., ideology, of the vanguard itself, the CCP, that all we will get out of this seeming opposite but actual similar attempt as Mao of achieving in one year 20 years progress. Nixon who already rhetorically announced us a superpower hadn't brought that prosperity to us and Reagan who never intended any such thing has no intention whatever of making it easy for us to achieve either high technology or losing his privatization is only sending some individual profit motive rules to Canton and new Shanghai; and next Manchuria? Or will Japan? Reagan is certainly busy arming that old enemy in violation of the
Also fn 165
+ all the essays in N&L on 60s, incl. Letters from Hong Kong

very Constitution they imposed on Japan.

No, all that he is inspiring is a Chinese version of the so-called new middle class they call the Yuppies, who are interested in only one thing, profiteering, careerism and that's the generation that's knocking at your door Deng, when you retire next Fall. So you'd better have Hu Yaobang resign first.

The first important M&F analysis was that one single new paragraph that cost me $200, to add to M&F already in galleys as Mao made the speech 'How to Handle Contradictions Among the People'. It was followed in the 2nd (1966) edition with a new chapter on the challenge of Mao Tse-Tung that detailed Mao’s development, with stress on philosophy and the Yanan period on Contradiction, but actually returning to his very first original departure from Marxism, the Human Report, ending with Two Types of Subjectivity. XNXX

1973 P&G
Mao Zedong: A Preliminary Reassessment by Stuart P. Schoen
(Hong Kong: The Chinese Universities Press, 1984).

I will begin with the appendix which is actually the
tom thing that's important, On Questions of Party History.
resolution adopted 11/27/81. The first sub-title is
"Comrade Mao Zedong's historical role and Mao Zedong Thought".
It starts with no. 27, so there much have been very few
on history before Mao came along. With no. 27, it establishes
that Mao "was a great Marxist and a great proletarian
revolutionary, strategist KHAKH theorist. It is true he
made gross mistakes in the 'cultural revolution'...His
errors are primary and his errors secondary,"

No. 28 writes of Mao having made a theoretical synthesis
of China's unique experience in its protracted revolution
in accordance with the basic principle of ML...many outstanding
KHAKH leaders of our party made important contributions
to the formation and development of Mao Zedong thought
and they are synthesized in the scientific work of comrade
Mao Zedong."

No. 29 then lists the number of books which deal with
his contribution: A) "The New-democratic Revolution"; B) The
two kinds of Bourgeoisie, comprador or bureaucratic and
national; C) The "united front is armed struggle are the
two basic KH weapons of defeating the enemy" with party
building, they constitute the 'three magic weapons'. The
listing of the contributions then goes on to the point of
"socialist-revolution" and "socialist construction." And
again a bunch of books are mentioned; On the building of a revolutionary army and military strategy, Comrade Mao
satisfactorily solved the problem of how to turn a revolutionary army, chiefly made up of peasants, into a new type of peoples army which is proletarian in character, observes strict discipline, and forms close ties with the masses. And here they have listed several on strategy, especially Problems of strategy in guerilla war against Japan, on protracted war and problems of war strategy. Listed too and made into a category are New Democracy

On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People

On Question of Whether Imperialism and all reactionaries are real Tigers

On Party building, there is listed a whole series of books.

No. 30. “The living soul of Mao Zedong Thought in the stand, viewpoint and method embodied in its component parts mentioned above, This stand, viewpoint and method boil down to three basic points: to seek truth from facts, the mass line, and independence. Comrade Mao Zedong applied dialectical and historical materialism to the entire work of the proletarian party, giving shape to this stand, viewpoint and method so characteristic of Chinese Communists in the course of the Chinese revolution and its arduous, protracted struggles and thus enriching Marxism-Leninism. They find expression not only in such important works as "Oppose Book Worship"
On Practice, on Contradiction", "Preface and Postscript to Rural Survey", "Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership" and "Where do Correct Ideas come From?", but also in all his scientific writings and in the revolutionary activities of the Chinese Communists."

No. 31. The last paragraph, they simply remind us all over again of the "valuable spiritual asset of our party by having Mao Zedong Thought."

This 1983 reassessment by one of those super-spots on China to a Chinese audience (Stuart Schram talking to the United College on April 1983) covered no less than the whole period from 1917 to the end of his life in 1976, and the preface actually dated 6/20/83, has exactly one sentence on Lin Piao, who was named in the Constitution itself as the one closest in HUANG arms to Mao, certainly produced the greatest crisis that China lived through in all its years since gaining power, not to mention what is still going on in the military now. This is the man who was the first to write on the political "思想" thought of Mao, and also wrote his book on Mao's Theory of Permanent Revolution. Indeed, he was so hard that he also idealized the "wan-shi" Documents which talked of the "ants living on after the nuclear holocaust."
At the end of p. 76 in the first edition, I rather hastily to Oblivion?" three words, "struggle against Lin Piao" and this single sentence: "In the domain of modernisation and economic development, after the upheaval of 1966-69, and the further disruption caused by the struggle against Lin Piao, a new compromise appeared to be emerging in 1971-72."

On p. 76, there is a reference to the PLA without ever mentioning Lin Piao: "What I do not know, as a foreign observer, is how much residual attachment to the Mao of the Cultural Revolution there may be in the countryside--where I have spent relatively little time--and in the PLA, with which I have had no contacts at all." And finally what he didn't do though that is what he said he would do are the four fundamental: In assessing particular aspects of Mao's Thought, I propose to look at four points, all of which, as we have seen, have a history extending back beyond 1949: the relation between China and foreign countries; the role of human and subjective factors in the revolutionary process; the relation between democracy and centralism; and the analysis of contradictions in Chinese society."
in order to both try to single out something current for the T/P column that is going to press this weekend, and that I would compete Saturday with Peter to hand to Blyden, and give an outline on Monday to Mike what to choose from the Archives on China that would be dealt with as ongoing and constitute the next ($3 biweekly) T/P.

The few current things that do mention new elements that are not played up: 1/19/67 from Beijing.

NYT, by A. Gargan, entitled "in China, from marches to leadership crisis". Actually, the new is not what sounds so general, Leadership Crisis, but specifically, contrasting the demonstrations to XMA what happened the month before in the State. Thus, the shake-up is by no means finished, precisely because it is not just the leadership crisis, but a question of which arm of the government -- Party, State, Politics (Ideology) -- and I would say that that is the contradiction that has characterized Chinese Communism from its very birth. Not only was XX the Army decisive long before Communism, but the guerilla form it took under Mao became the XX 20th Century XX Great (in a form) Contradiction between War and Revolution, which we've always called the shortcut that ends in the long defeat and which Mao has called the protracted war.

Insofar as the present Gargan article is concerned, the factional presentation, both by the Chinese Intellectuals
and the Western diplomats, as if it were a question between rapid economic change and slow, is wrong. By relying on the Japanese news agency Kyodo, it's as if all ideology is whether the so-called economic reform is fast or slow. Considering the reduction of philosophy to numbers, the Chinese leadership is likely to discuss the two factions -- military and party -- as, are we going to have two or one.

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The Time Magazine, 2/2/87, surprisingly captures a little bit of Xi at least the military too and at least mentions that an ideological campaign gathered force to rescind many of the political and economic freedoms permitted recently by Hu. The constant totally wrong transfer of Western expressions,
like "hardliners" and "conservatives" makes it very nearly impossible to know what is really at stake, but at least this one mentions some names, and the three singled out as "conservative resurgence" are: Peng Zhan, 84; and mentions that the People’s Daily published two reports by him singling out the "U "cardinal, which focused on CP leadership and "Marxist-Leninist-Mao Thought" principles of Chiao, and that that did happen last November.

Was that the military Commission?

The Party and State now to become one by Zhao retaining both the premiership and now assuming, supposedly temporarily, Hu’s Party status? Otherwise, there is going to be two, not one, then the paper seems to say that Li Peng, 52, a Soviet-trained engineer who speaks fluent Russian and closer ties with Moscow, becomes the leading candidate. And if that isn’t confusing enough, it mentions that George will be in Peking in March.

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Foreign Affairs.

The Le Monde section of the Manchester Guardian, 1/15/87, but the specific article is dated 1/15, 1/19, has an article by Patrice Beer entitled "Deng Throws Hu to the Wolves", has so far as I’m concerned only one interesting, but quite mystifying new word and that is "200" campaign--i.e., he combined 100 flowers and 100 schools of thought contend. According to this, there was a national conference of the CP in Sept. 1986, when the so-called conservatives who actually were the Left re-surfaced in another campaign against "spiritual pollution," even though that had been stopped early in 1986.
This is the time when the "100 Flowers, 100 Schools" slogan.

What is interesting is that the same reporter in writing up Shenyang, the Industrial capital of Manchuria, is flying way ahead with economic reform and obviously economic reform has so emboldened the managers that one Lin proudly announced that he had cut the total EB work force from 1,000 to 800, and added, I've still got 200 people too many.
Jan. 30, 1987

The 1st notes on Jan. 20 were concentrating on the fact of what noon was saying, as they were writing on the student demonstrations, and that is the Army and labor unrest, with the Army being essentially important both because it has always characterized Mao from the start, and because in 1969 he had actually made Lin Piao head of the Army and designated him his closest comrade-in-arms. I then cited the 1971 plan and fall of Lin Piao.

(2nd notes, the next day -- but actually just p. 5 of these same notes -- the 1st and central new point was: "I've now decided that, in actuality, what Deng is doing is moving away from Reagan."
15 is backed up by the fact that that's exactly what happened in 71 when the carpet was being rolled out for Nixon and Lin suddenly decided that, whereas it's true Russia is Enemy #1, he doesn't want to be in the hip pocket of Nixon either. Nowadays is Deng saying the same thing in relationship to Reagan? And I cited 2 of my own Chinese turning points, 1st in M&F (that fnr. on Mao's "On Contradiction") and the 2nd edition having a new chapter that ended with "Two Types of Subjectivity", and in P&R summing it up once we had the exact opposite in Sheng Wu-lien.

(3rd and I believe that will be the form, and that is what I dictated on 1/29/87 and I'm now including the very latest --
today's NYT, which reports a gathering of senior Party and military leaders in the Great Hall of the People to celebrate the Chinese New Year, where he talks of "socialist democracy" and assures them that supposedly there is going to be a limit to the campaign against dissent, a very limited number will be disciplined"). What is interesting in this article is that not only are Hu and Li (China's president) absent, but so is Deng. And again, there is assurances that the campaign will "not be conducted in rural areas". This brings to the fore that not only is the dissent in the Party, in the Youth, in the Military, but among the bureaucracy. Supposedly, there will be a reduction of the role of the Party in economic management.

That 1 thing, management, vs. Party discipline, or rather, "ideological interference", is actually against labor and demand for greater and greater production, which was seen very prominently in one of the reports in the "La Monde" section of the Manchester Guardian in the regional section Shenyang, the industrial capital of Manchuria. One of the managers (bosses) was emboldened enough to announce that he had cut the total work force in his factory from 1000 to 800, adding "I have still got 200 people too many." (New 1/25/87 -- the article itself dated 1/19/87 and/or 1/15/87).

11105
What I mean by the form of 1/29 (YP) is that here, the context is that the shakeup is by no means ended, that the actual continuing struggle that has characterized Mao's deviation from when he wasn't yet the leader of the CP, and, indeed, his historic role -- he has gone down in history as the strategist of the protracted guerrilla war as the shortcut to revolution. Indeed, Mao's historic role -- and that is the nationalist revolution of China -- was the deviation which Mao first of all held that the peasantry, not the proletariat, would conquer power, and would remain at their work places, unarmed, while the peasant army surrounded the city and conquered the state power. When this was expressed by making Lin the head of the Army, as the closest-comrade-in-arms, of Mao himself, everybody was asking whether that was one more military dictatorship. Mao's answer, that "no, the Party still controls the gun, not the gun that Party" was hardly the most convincing.
Kyoto, the Japanese news agency, to much more accurate to the facts and understanding of those topics as the military question is concerned, but they fail to connect with what is inseparable from it, and that to foreign affairs, preferring to keep the reports within the technology debate and as if it were a question of intellectual vs. managerial instead of managerial vs. proletariat. What, however, may be the key to them not focusing on foreign affairs is that it is Japan, that Japan has been "the eternal enemy" and hasn't remained something only of the past, as was clear when all of the student demonstrations in September, 1985 against Japanese militarism, and what students actually termed the "invasion" of China by Japanese consumer goods. In 1986, the demonstrations were not openly directed against Japan. Yet there is no doubt that part of the turmoil was on that same question of militarization as U.S. was encouraging Japan to violate its own Constitution and militarize itself. What Reagan called having sufficient to "defend" itself, echoed by Japan....

That the whole ideological campaign has been made to sound as if it were a question of what they call conservatives, which
the Chinese considers left, orthodox Marxists vs. what the West
calls reformers and equates all with acumen, hungering for
"political freedom", in fact the economics that is important has
nothing to do with so-called reformism or so-called intellectualism,
and everything to do with good old capital/labor relations. Politics
has nothing to do with private trade freedom and everything to do
with foreign affairs. And none, even the Japanese who have had
better reports, have so much as breathed a word about the anti-
Japanese feeling in the 1985 demonstrations against Deng's openings
to Japan. Above all, it did not and in 1985. It definitely has
continued into 1986, and is no doubt remaining, not merely as so-
called revengism or any kind of chauvinism, but anti-militarization,
anti-war, in Japan and in China itself, and all of that impinging
on so-called foreign affairs, specifically, even Deng, who signed
the so-called new peace treaty, is backing off a little not only
from Japan but from the U.S. Whether that has anything to do with
the restlessness in the army, which is also related to the so-called
modernization, as well as the near-civil war, occurring between Mao
and Lin having been not "treachery" or what they called illicit
country relations with a foreign country, meaning Russia, but Mao's rolling
out the Red Carpet for Nixon. Yes, they want to be against both
poles of the super powers -- Russia and U.S. -- but they don't want
to be considered in the hip pocket of U.S. imperialism just because
they named Russia as Enemy No. 1. They certainly haven't gotten
from Reagan any of the promises they got from Nixon when he suddenly
decided they were a big power.

(‡ China Quarterly of 3/86 chronicles and documents the overt, public
anti-Japanese signs. p. 195)
In Party and State now to become 1 by Zhao retaining both the Prime ministership and now (supposedly temporarily) Hu's Party status? The paper seems to say that Li Peng, 58, a Soviet-trained engineer who speaks fluent Russian and has closer ties with Moscow, becomes the leading candidate. And if that isn't confusing enough, it mentions that George Schultz will be in Peking in March.
to be followed rather than chronology
(though chronology will become the form at certain periods
for China study)

1) We begin with Dec. 1986 student demonstrations

2) To see that the demonstrations did not first
appear in 1986, but in the last quarter of 1985 and, far
from being only incomes, they were on foreign affairs, spe-
cifically Japan, but actually global. Go to the demonstra-
tions against Nakasone’s visit to the Japanese war
shrine and the return all the way to 1931.

3) At that point, i.e. anti-militarism, one has to
also consider a very different type of anti-Deng movement
within the Chinese army, which may actually go back all
the way to 1974, but for the present, we will only take
up it in relationship to technology and modernization
of the army. Actually, it is the whole question of Maoist
deviationism on war and revolution.

4) Now then, let’s go to the China Quarterly 98 and
from 1986 and 105 and 106 from 1986. The most important
is 98 June 1984 by Tang Jiaou, a U. of Chicago professor
reviewing the Selected Works of Deng, (actually writing a
review-essay.) It is no less than 27 pp, taking up the
critical years 1975-82, and entitled, ”The Historic Change
in Direction and Continuity with the Past”. I imagine it
is also the beginning of the anti-Deng rumbles since ob-
viously this was the attempt of Deng to become, if not
as important as Mao himself, certainly the fact that i
this 1983 publication, on the 62nd anniversary of the founding
of the CCP, and therefore also of the leaders like Chou en-lai, Liu Shao-chi, their selected works. The point is
that it came after the 1981 finally historic summation of Maoism which this year, 1986, **.xxx** has been
revised. The essence of this is that the historical per-
spective in which Mao is being viewed combines political
and ideological study in order to establish the development
of Mao's (but also other) viewpoint and so explain the
causes of major historical events... since Mao Zedong
Thought, since the annotations on the resolution "Certain
Historical Questions of the Party since the Founding of
the People's Republic" is the crystallization of the collective
wisdom of the Chinese Communists, represented by Mao Ze-
dong." [106, 6/86, from the Quarterly Chronicle and Doc-
umentation Section of the China Quarterly.

Now then, so far as the author of the review-essay,
Tang Taou, is concerned, though the Deng collection begins
in 1975, he begins it in 1971-76 as the first of the 3
Crucial periods; including the Lin Biao affair, which
**xxx** brought Deng to his greatest power, because what fol-
low is the reorganization of the PLA, and the strenghtening
of the Party, rather than the Army as the spokesman for
Marx/ Lenin / Mao Thought. With Deng becoming chief of
the PLA staff, chairman of the military commission and

The 2nd period is 1976-78, when *xxx* loses All these
Powers, and the 3rd is Dec. 1978 when Deng returns
with a "Great Historic Change of Direction"
... and telling sequence, which means the theoretical grounding not only for all that has happened this year which has just begun, and may very well end with the center of meaning can be seen in 1983 the Marx Centenary, when, by no accident whatever, we suddenly got a plethora of both illuminated theoretical articles that what has been happening in the 1960s, brought us back to the 1960s, when Zhou Yang, who was then the main theoretician, unfurled a campaign against Marx's Humanism because the 1956 Hungarian Revolution was still so very alive and not at all covered by Mao's talk of endless contradictions among the people. Mao reappears as being for Marx's Humanism indeed, for Humanism, even bourgeois Humanism. Clearly, the restlessness that was being shown, in the army or amongst the peasantry, among the youth or among labor, within the leadership, or the people in general was not for more exploitative capital/labor relationships, whether by Party or management, but for truly human relations, international.

Integral to that was the question: where to globally? Had one merely to choose just between US and Russia? And was Russia really enemy #1, so that Reagan could consider China his card? What China was very quick about denying was the new account that China and the US were participating in joint military maneuvers.

China said: absolutely no; they were just exchanging greetings!

Somebody's head will roll. Will it be Deng's?
A telling sequence, which means the theoretical grounding not only for all that has happened this year which has just begun, and may very well end with the bust of Deng can be seen in 1983 the Marx Centenary, when, by no accident whatever, we suddenly got a plethora of both illuminated theoretical articles that what has been happening in the 1980s, brought us back to the 1960s, when Zhou Yang, who was then the main theoretician, unfurled a campaign against Marx's Humanism because the 1956 Hungarian Revolution was still so very alive and not at all cowed by Mao's talk of endless contradictions among the people. Was reappears as being for Marx's Humanism indeed, for Humanism, even bourgeois Humanism. Clearly, the restlessness that was being shown, in the army or amongst the peasantry, among the youth or among labor; within the leadership, or the people in general was not for more exploitative capital/labor relationships, whether by Party or management, but for truly human relations, international.

Integral to that was the question: where to globally? Had one merely to choose just between US and Russia? And was Russia really enemy #1, so that Reagan could consider The latest thing that China was very quick about denying was the Kyodo new account that China and the US were participating in joint military maneuvers.

China said: absolutely no; they were just exchanging greetings. Somebody's head will roll. Will it be Deng's?
Deng

Is Mao being ousted, or is he doing the ousting? The question I asked in "Mao's Last Hurrah" on the golorification of Mao in his last years was: Is Mao being defiled or mummified? Just as that didn't mean that Maoism would disappear from China's history, so I don't mean that Deng's "reforms" would disappear. Quite the contrary. Though very short-lived, and with none of the charisma of Mao, and hardly deserving the name "reform", it does mean objectively do retrogressive a step towards some form of "mixed economy", i.e. state capitalism, that will go on. What I do mean, however, -- and again just as the question was posed with "Mao's Last Hurrah", and I called Chou-en-lai's speech Maoism without Mao, this is exactly what we are witnessing now.

(INSTEAD after first sentence on Deng) Two quite different versions have surfaced on what happened at a meeting between Deng and Hu: one has it that Hu asked Deng to step down now instead of waiting for the next Congress; that had Hu so enraged Deng that he removed; the other version is that the student demonstrations actually were a threat to the whole leadership, and Hu had encouraged them, with his demand for political as well as economic "democracy", that he had to sacrifice his apparent choice of heir, Hu. Both versions, and for that matter, all that pours forth from China now, via Western reporters who are as
dogmatic and subjective in their pragmatism and use of language of democracy, reform, free trade, as are the Chinese in an so-called "bourgeois liberalism." Rather than the party have the last word, and the party is "ideological interference," the managers tell you nothing, either about what is really happening or how it is related to anything else that has happened the day before or the day after. No word is mentioned for example, in foreign policy be it Russia, Japan or the U.S. Nor is a word mentioned on the students' relationship to other strata, especially the workers, who have been striking. Finally, and that is most important, both because that dates itself back to the near-civil war and what Mao called "the great disorder under heaven," between himself and Lin Biao, and because, whether or not Lin plotted to "assassinate" Mao, he certainly knew enough to build his own faction, from which China is still not without proof, although this is nearly 20 years later.

Furthermore, Deng's power begins in earnest at that very point when Lin loses his. Deng becomes chief of the staff of the PLA, vice-premier, that is, second only to Mao, of the Military Commission, and after he has accumulated all that power, Mao makes another 180° turn and casts his vote against Deng, and for what became the Gang of Four, and Hua.

The managers and the Party both demand greater production.
The 1/25 issue of the Manchester Guardian weekly had 2 separately dated articles in the Le Monde section. 12/30/86 speaks of the industrial capital of Manchuria, Shenyang as the example of "strict economic reform." Where one factory owner by the name of Lin brags about the fact that he has cut his workforce from 1,000 to 800, adding "I've still got 200 people too many."

The second article, dated 1/18-19/87, is XXXX titled: "Deng throws Hu to the wolves".

If, however, we turn the clock back to 1985 to see that the restlessness of the students is neither about "student affairs", or so-called democracy, or economic reforms, rather, it is about changes in global direction, especially the move to Japan. The tremendous demonstrations that everyone seems to have forgotten about occurred in a reaction to the last quarter of 1985, and were Nakasone's visit to the Japanese shrine of war heroes. Clearly, that re-kindofconciliationism, far from being chauvinistic, is very much like the demonstrations here and throughout the world against Reagan's visit to Bitburg. Indeed, the China youth demonstrations in Japan, especially in Tiananmen Square were in commemoration of the 1931 Japan attack on Mukden which opened up the invasion of Manchuria. The students' banner read: "Down with Japanese militarism". As these demonstrations continued into December, they were against Deng's opening to Japan.

(Quote Li to his counterpart in Japan).
FINAL DRAFT

Is Deng Being Ousted, or is He Doing the Ousting?

The present turmoil in China which came into the open with the month-long student demonstrations in May and June 1989, is not the cause, nor was it the occasion of Deng's removal from direct leadership at the 13th Congress of the CCP. Deng himself -- and Mao not only on the minimally crises in China after the victory of the Nationalist Revolution, the "Great Leap Forward" in 1957, and under with the whole decade of disasters with the Cultural Revolution. How far the new crops and grain yields, though all except the first, were not yet the new system of agriculture, which Mao not only on the minimally crises in China after the victory of the Nationalist Revolution, the "Great Leap Forward" in 1957, and under with the whole decade of disasters with the Cultural Revolution.
Revolution -- but China in a global context. But differently, whatever were the true facts of the Mao-Lin Piao Affair, which we certainly do not know, the point that is clear beyond a shadow of a doubt is that it all happened when Mao decided to roll out the Red Carpet for Nixon. It is one thing to oppose both superpowers. It is quite another to choose one against the other. It is not out of the question that right now (Feb. 1987) the question of Foreign Affairs is quite a decisive issue (we will return to this later).

The present ramifications of the Dec. 1986 student demonstrations with today's headlines (2/3/87) trying, at one and the same time, to say that dissent will be tolerated but not from any rank-and-file who are members, only further beclouds the issue. Actually, we need to go further back than December of this year, XXXXXX first to the final quarter of 1985 to see what it was that was stirring the student demonstrators.

Even if we cannot divert all the way back to 1971 except to say that clearly these tremendous crises required Mao to accept the restoration of many of the old organization leaders, like Deng whom Chou en-lai insisted on reinstating in 1973.
deviationism not only on Jackson but globally, but not only on foreign affairs. The
official line from the Soviet Communist leadership at Marx (witness Khrushchev) and
reflecting the continuing needlessness by the Peking.

The full understanding of the fundamentals of this dispute Marx essentially observed without.
requires a second look into the year 1983, not only because it was the Marx Centenary when Marx as a
totality from 1843-44 to his death in 1883 was the "official" topic, but that is a great deal more
immediate to these, Mao Tse-Tung Thought, and above all the fact that finally the Central
Committee of the CCP had approved a summary of the works of Mao Tse-Tungs and begun the work
of the publication of the Collected Works of Mao, in
immediately to these, Mao Tse-Tung Thought, and above all the fact that finally the Central
Committee of the CCP had approved a summary of the works of Mao Tse-Tungs, and begun the work
of the publication of the Collected Works of Mao, in

1983 publication of Deng's Selected Works from 1975
to 1982, with the all-too-obvious connotation of Deng as
the Leader must have started whole questioning
of what is to follow Deng. Not just by any means, and
just concentrating "economic reform", or what supposedly

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Footnote for p. 1, last paragraph after first sentence:

This is not the place to work out Mao's Thought as he tried transforming his substituted guerrilla warfare for proletarian revolution into a new universal, first with the Great Leap Forward, followed by the challenge to Russia as the head of the international Communist movement by the mid-1950s causing the great disasters which he called the Cultural Revolution (1966-71) that was the Great Substitution of Marx's EER revolution-in-permanence. See the chapters 'The Challenge of Mao Tse-Tung in Mao and the Cultural Revolution' as well as New Essays on 'Post-Mao China: What Now?'

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2 See also the Feb. 9, 1987 report of Vice-foreign Minister Qian Qichen, reported in an Associated Press dispatch of Feb. 9, that China and Russia had opened discussions on their border dispute.

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3 Concretely spelled out, in 1983 it meant the works of other than Mao were published, though Mao's were his Collected Works. In the others are Selected Works. Those included Chou en-Lai, Lin Shao-Fu and Deng. Deng is the only one living, the one with the power, the one who is bringing about the most challenges to his rule. The first had to fall since those demonstra- tions were his protege Hu Yaobang.

4 Sheng-wei-Fen's challenge from the Left in Hunan Province which was established during what was known as the 'January Storm' in the Shanghai Communist, wrote 'Wither China'. It was first translated printed by Survey of Mainland China Press, no. 4190, June 4, 1968 and was ex- cumented in Par, particularly chapter 3, 'The Challenge of Mao Tse-Tung'. The 1968 edition of PAR has acceptably new point of departure in its introduction by answering Prof. George Armstrong Kelley's critique in Bagel's Retreat from Euphras (Princeton Univ. Press, 1978).

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There is no doubt that this was the most serious crisis since gaining power, and the crisis came not from the outside, or capitalist elements within but from within the ruling Communist Party. Not only that, but philosophical as well as political - from the very leader, Mao had made a category of creating a constitutional new phenomenon that was a total perversion of what Marxism is. In making the head of the Red Army the head of the State, his closest comrade-in-arms successor at that famed ninth national congress heading in 1969, was the one heading the so-called Cultural Revolution and then destroying it (the Red Guards). Mao indeed had to not just explain but reverse the course of the whole decade of the 1960s. No wonder it took two full years - from Sept. 12, 1971, when a Chinese military aircraft on which (Lin Biao) is supposed to have been on and which crashed in Outer Mongolia, to Aug. 24, 1973 when the 10th National Congress of the CCP met and finally announced Lin Biao by name and gave the official version, in an 8,000 word political report by Chou en Lai.

The only word of truth we know, is that report, is that there was something true (Plan 571). What is of great relevance...
(Either here, or perhaps at the very last paragraph of the New, Expanded version, the following would appear:)

There is no doubt whatever that the greatest or lowest original contribution of Mao was his very first Human Report where the peasant appeared much more successful and having a greater role to play than the proletariat. Of course it wasn't really the peasant, but the Peasant Army, and it wasn't the army of a social revolution but of protracted guerrilla warfare. It is this that brought him to power, a protracted, very protracted war. Actually it meant that once the first attempt at the revolution in China, 1925-27 had failed, the alternative that Mao came up with was to substitute guerrilla warfare for social revolution, was to create an army that he called revolutionary, and indeed he even created a philosophy of On Practice and On Contradiction, a new idea of Education and Propaganda. By the end of the 50s he was ready to challenge Russia itself as the center of newly born world revolution, and put himself as the leader of the third...
World. Whatever it was that Mao believed could be transposed of his principle, that the workers remain at their production line while the army surrounds the cities and wins the power, all of which he called the Peoples Revolution, Lin Biao took seriously the fact that not only was that a truth for China, but that the Third World would surround all the metropoles and win power worldwide; in a word, he was the strategist of the Third World Peoples War. The whole leadership was opposed to the two superpowers, but it was abstract in the sense that it didn’t mean, or they didn’t take it to mean, to side up with one of them as against the other rather than striking out completely for independence.

The great shock of all came with the fact that Mao and Chou had extended an invitation to President Nixon just as Nixon was releasing bombs on the Third World. It is that rolling out of the red carpet that brought about the “great disorder under heaven”. The fact that it was by no means just a question of Lin Biao, but a good part of the whole general staff of the Army likewise removed, and that to this day K as Deng is continuing with his so-called reforms, not only modernizing weapons but in the army.

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(Naturally this will all have to be cut very sharply, but what I intend to do at that point is go along with the original 3rd paragraph of the Theory/Practice)
February 17, 1967

Dear Kevin,

I heard you thought that you'd want to find an outside journal that would want to publish my China article; I don't know whether you have anything concrete in mind, but here is what I thought I'd do if it were concrete and if I didn't change my mind if I thought it would require too much re-organization:

If I were brave, the title now would become a sub-title of the last section with an entirely new title, like 'Whither China?' as the title. Because there is such a special role in the concept of Youth in China, I felt that I would start with something like: Far from the peaceful turmoil in China being just a passing phenomenon, the Youth in China have always anticipated great divides. During the Cultural Revolution it was not the Red Guards which garnered all the headlines that was important, but a little group called Zheng Bulian with it's thesis 'Whither China?'

Whether or not I also transpose some of the paragraphs on that special role from the end to the beginning, the point is that what I want to add would be the Lin Biao Affair. Instead of as a footnote, as it appears presently, that would come in directly after the second paragraph on page 1 and would probably occupy two pages that would deal with the concept of the Army in Mao Zedong thought, the actual concepts of Lin Biao taking himself seriously as the strategist of the so-called Peoples War surrounding the cities, only this time wending the Third World surrounding the metropolis. When the announcement was made to the invitation to Mao, all things fell apart.

I don't know whether I'd have made want to develop another point I just figured out, and that is there was one more faction fight we haven't heard about since the fall of Biao and the death of Chou en-lai, and that is the quite fight between Mao and Chou, which Mao did his best to try to destroy in the few months left between their two deaths. So we had one more tragedy of errors instead of comedy of errors -- Hua Kuo-feng and the Gang of Four. But finally even Deng when Chou had "dominated".

Instead of coming back hail and hearty from vacation, I'm beset by a bad cold but still I hope the cold would be gone and I would come down a week from Wednesday to the Local.

Yours,