

Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power by Chalmers A. Johnson
The Emergence of Revolutionary China (1937-1945)
Stanford University Press, 1962

This is the only work I know on Guerrilla Warfare that relates the Chinese to the Yugoslav Guerrillas. However, I am interested only in the details on the Chinese, especially as it relates to growth of the communist, before and after the invasion of China by Japan. Thus, on p. 73 there is the documented figure that the Chinese Communist military force at the end of the Sino-Japanese War (1945) was TEN TIMES the size of the Communist army at the time of the Japanese invasion. Johnson then takes up, both the 8th route Army which was the new name of the Communist army after August, 1937. "Following the rapprochement between the NMT and the CCP and the outbreak of the war, the National Government ordered the reorganization of the Red Army. The government placed the upper limit of the new Eighth Route Army's manpower at 45,000 men ... (p. 74) If the figure of 50,000 for 1937 is too low, the figure of 500,000 for 1945 may well be an underestimation also. Mao Tse-tung actually claimed in his Seventh Party Congress address (April 24, 1945) that the Communist forces have expanded to 910,000 and that the strength of the civilian militia corps was more than 2,200,000." (On Coalition Government, Selected Works, IV, 253-54.)

In Chapter VII, "Communism in the Service of the Nation-State" the author shows how China "had to defend its national interests -- for example, in obtaining Russian aid and trade; in securing the renunciation of Soviet claims to Port Arthur and railroad interests in Manchuria; in ousting the pro-Russian leader in Manchuria, Kao Kang, who sought to abolish his independence from Peking; and in negotiating the abolition of the Sino-Russian Joint Stock companies." (p. 177) (a footnote here states that the relation between Kao's ouster and subsequent suicide and the Soviet policy in Manchuria on the other is best analysed in Kuo Ping-chia's analysis, China, New Age and New Outlook, London 1960 rev. ed. ps. 150-159.

P. 181: "The manipulation of ideology in China actually began during the war, simultaneously with the awareness of the Chinese leaders that they had finally achieved leadership of a mass movement. In Yanan in 1942, the Chinese Communist Party began the first of a continuing series of movements for internal Party education. These so-called cheng feng, or rectification, movements are peculiar to the Chinese Party in that they are not purges, but, rather, intensive indoctrination sessions."

In tracing through the Cheng Feng campaign in 1942, Johnson shows that, on the whole, it was a question of elevating Chinese Communism at the expense of Soviet Communism though it was supposed to have been mainly based on integrating the new members, it was, in fact, equally directed against Russian formalists. Evidentially, Boyd Compton translated these party reform documents in his book Mao's China (University of Washington Press, 1952)

The most interesting and valuable conclusion that Johnson draws, both on the question of when the Chinese Communists obtained a mass following and when they elevated Mao's thought as making a special and unique contribution to Marxism is, peculiarly enough not so much placed in the two pages of conclusions as, in the very lengthy footnote to these conclusions, thus: p. 237:

Persons familiar with the academic controversy in America concerning Maoism may be surprised at my contention that Maoism flowered during the Sino-Japanese war. Thus, in order to avoid confusion, the following points should be mentioned:

(1) Most studies of Maoism have concentrated upon its earliest manifestations - the rural-base Red Army policy of the Kiangsi period - and have ignored the major divide in CCP history represented by the Long March. They over-look the fact that the wartime Communist-peasant alliance, which actually brought the CCP to power, bore no relation to the earlier policy of "land to the peasants."

(2) There has been considerable discussion about Mao's "originality" in the Kiangsi period and later. A near-perfect precedent for Mao's Kiangsi alliance with the peasantry may be found in Lenin (see Ada, Ulam, The Unfinished Revolution, an Essay on the Sources of Influence of Marxism and Communism (New York, 1960), pp. 182, 184). However, even if Mao has no objective claim to originality, the discussion of his originality has overlooked the more significant fact that the Chinese themselves hail him as an innovator. In order to understand this development, Maoism should be regarded in terms of Chinese national myth.

(3) Part of the confusion about the origins of Maoism reflects an uncritical acceptance of the CCP's own ex post facto apotheosis of Mao. Party ideologists began publishing Mao's works after 1949 and extending backward in time his title to the position of Marxist-Leninist sage. This is in accordance with the Stalinist tradition of making the leader always appear to be "correct", and it strengthens Maoist ideology as national myth. But in order to make Mao a sage, Party history has had to be rewritten for the period before 1935, when Mao became undisputed leader of the Party. (See "Appendix: Resolutions on Some questions in the History of Our Party," adopted by the Seventh Congress, April 20, 1945, in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, IV, 171-218.

For an example of fully developed Maoism in its role as state ideology, see the handbook Hsueh-hsi Mao Tse-tung san-hsiang (Study the Thought of Mao Tse-tung) (Hong-Kong, 1960).

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containing articles by Ch'en Po-ta, Chiang Wei-ching, Su Hsing, Li Fu-chun, Shu T'ung, and others on how to study and understand Mao's works. For the controversy on Maoism, see R.A. Wittfogel, "The Legend of Maoism," *China Quarterly*, January-March, 1960, pp. 72-85, and April-June, 1960, pp. 16-34; and B.L. Schwartz, "The Legend of the 'Legend of Maoism,'" *ibid.* (April-June, 1960), pp. 35-42. The most important point in any discussion of Maoism is that without the Japanese invasion it would always have remained irrelevant."