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Dear Roy.

Yours of July 15 interested me greatly because I have been busy working out what possible affinity Iranian revolutionaries could see between an analysis of intellectuals in the state-capitalist age in so advanced a society as USA and one so different as Iran, 1979. The fourth paragraph in your letter states that to be "the affinity between those who believe in the end of ideology in the West and those who call the Russian government a workers' state." Harcuse's whole direction as he moved to substitute technological rationality for human Reason, once he had declared man to be "one-dimensional", was not only totally wrong but was very instrumental in disorienting the revolutionary youth who were serious about trying to transform a world they did not make.

One very serious contradiction that you may not know about my disputes with Harcuse but which definitely answers the questions which concern the Iranian revolutionaries — dialectic methodology — is evident in the distance between what Harcuse suggested and what I actually transformed it into. I'm referring to the fact that originally my draft form of Mar did not have a section on the Second International, 1839-1914. When he first asked me to develop one, I was furious with him, shouting, why the hell should I care about the Second International; they did bothing but saturate some organizational experience. His answer was, you cannot erase 1869-1914 from the historic calendar. I then forced myself to deal with that historic calendar, and though I still refused to give them a numbered part and titled the section in a put-doyn kind of way, "Organizational Interlude". But because dialectic methodology, never left me; dialectics of revolution continued to preoccupy me the most magnificent of all results came out of that section as I concluded that long batter the 1914 betrayal — in 1907 to be specific — the Second International had died. That is to say, it became clear if you are a revolutionary dialectician, that for the Second International bot to have put the 1905-07 Revolution on the agenda of their Congress resulted in exactly what I had entitled it: The beginning of the end."

Please read (when the Perspectives come off the press) the new subtitle I created for the second subsection of Part III. What was Harx's dialectics of revolution to the post-Harx Harxists of the Second Intermational?" and see how it relates directly to this year's perspectives; and of course, for you, where there has always been a direct connection in what I brought to the Iranian revolutionaries was that 1905-07 Revolution, except that in Iran it extended to 1911 and there it witnessed the birth of the very first women's shore.

You're right also when you say "it is not enough to be only Hegelian to see the Reason in human activity." To which I would like to add not only that it cannot be done without Marxian dialectics, but, if I may say so, the Harxist-Humanist analysis of the 3 final syllogisms which none before me had done. With that in mind, may I suggest a very heavy test, since you do seem to have a very quick head for philosophy: that for the next few months you study very carefully Ch. I of Pak, "Why degel? Why wor?" and add to that the 1932 new Introduction to Pak where I answer the critique that the orthodox Hegelian, Beorge Armstrong Kelly, leveled against my interpretation of Absolute Eethod, then write me about it.

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Dear Roy,

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One very serious contradiction that you may not know about my disputes with Marcuse but which definitely answers the questions which concern the Iranian revolutionaries — dialectic methodology — is evident in the distance between what Marcuse suggested and what I actually transformed it into. I'm referring to the fact that originally my draft form of M&F did not have a section on the Second International, 1889–1914. When he first asked me to develop one, I was furious with him, shouting, why the hell should I care about the Second International; they did nothing but gather some organizational experience. His answer was, you cannot erase 1889–1914 from the historic calendar. I then forced myself to deal with that historic calendar, though I still refused to give them a numbered part and titled the section in a put-down kind of way, "Organizational Interlude". But because dialectic methodology never left me, dialectics of revolution continued to preoccupy me, the most magnificent of all results came out of that section as I concluded that long before the 1914 betrayal — in 1907 to be specific — the Second International had died. That is to say, it became clear if you are a revolutionary dialectician, that for the Second International not to have put the 1905–07 Revolution on the agenda of their Congress resulted in exactly what I had entitled it: "The beginning of the end."

Please read (when the Perspectives come off the press) the new subtitle I created for the second subsection of Part III. "What was Marx's dialectics of revolution to the post-Marx Marxists of the Second International?" and see how it relates directly to this year's Perspectives; and of course, for you, where there has always been a direct connection what I brought to the Iranian revolutionaries, was that 1905-07 Revolution, except that in Iran it extended to 1911 and there it witnessed the birth of the very first women's shora.

You're right also when you say "it is not enough to be only Hegelian to see the Reason in human activity." To which I would like to add not only that it cannot be done without Marxian dialectics, but, if I may say so, the Marxist-Humanist analysis of the 3 final syllogisms which none before me had done. With that in mind, may I suggest a very heavy test, since you do seem to have a very quick head for philosophy: that for the next few months you study very carefully Ch. 1 of P&R, "Why Hegel? Why Now?" and add to that the 1982 new Introduction to P&R where I answer the critique that the orthodox Hegelian, George Armstrong Kelly, leveled against my interpretation of Absolute Method, then write me about it.

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Dear Raya Dunayevskaya:

Please let me begin with the fact that the process of reading chapter one of Philosophy and Revolution "smashed to smithereens" all concept of Theory, Practice, Nature and Revolution that had gotten me together for a long time. It was possible when I read your letter dated August 2, 1984 at the beginning, where I found myself in the middle of History, Philosophy, Revolution, Organization and Subject.

To me the very central point in that chapter is Nature. Its movement, its theories inherent in its actions are so critical that it has provided a different attitude toward itself and toward the objectivity. Nature and its development demands theoretical expression. But the theoretical expression which develops independently from the source (Nature) will provide a parallel - for theory and practice, Life and Science, Practical Idea and Theoretical Idea, Nature and Formal Logic, and because they do not co-exist peacefully, one would dominate the other. Your sections on the last paragraphs of Philosophy of Mind show that at each stage where Nature and Mind become mediations, they will have both Objectivity and Subjectivity. That put the end to my revolutionary romanticism and intellectual impressionism as if they were movements from Practice and Theory. Paragraph 576 shows the unification of Theory and Practice. That is very important to me because I had always thought that when I encounter philosophic works I should return to my mind and work them out. But where we talk about Theory/Practice or we talk about Praxis we are not dealing with abstracted concepts, because the philosopher who does not separate her or his mind from Nature and movement writes concrete and Universal; if there be any ambiguity, it would be in the reader's mind, and not Marx's or yours.

Chapter one of P & R has a logic which is also the logic of the whole book: from Hegelian Dialectics to Alternatives, and from the Reality to the forces and passions who want to transform the Reality into the Ideal. Therefore Philosophy becomes the mediation. Now I know better why you criticize both Kelly and the 1960's youth and their attitude toward Philosophy.

One of the most exciting parts of my readings was the sections on Phenomenology of Mind, where you divided the whole book into two parts: before and after. Old you divide that way in the Lordship and Bondage chapter? Because in that section we read of the destruction of the old and the appearance of Consciousness. When I was reading that section in P & R I asked myself: "Why did these discussions not appear before WW II? Why did we not have these forces and this philosophy 50 years ago?" I had to return to Phenomenology of Mind as well as P & R where you talk about the second half in the Phenomenology ... I saw that the Absolute Movement does not stop at any stage - it goes from Consciousness as itself to in itself to Reason. It was here when I understood History better. Capitalism has organized not only the workers who have a direct relationship

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to the production line but also the rest of society and the forces which had come a long way in history. Their revolt against this new organization of Society based on fetishism opened a new epoch and the beginning of the New Philosophy. "Leisure time" means nothing. Marcuse thought he could turn to youth because of their "leisure time". But they showed that they create movement not in their "leisure time" but when they have a direct relationship to Society: to education, to militarism.

The process of reading from Science of Logic to Philosophy of Mind created new questions for me. Dear Dunayevskaya, am I right if after reading the relationship from Universal to Particular to Individual, I come to say that the whole debate on Nationalism and Internationalism - even in their unification, is half dialectics to the Local what delves even deeper is the recreation of the dialectic for Epoch and Society? May I also ask that, because of the whole History, Philosophy and Movement from Practice as well as Movement from Theory and, especially the sections on Being, Essence and Notion plus the warning of the danger of the Third attitude to Objectivity, are so together and integral in chapter one; that this chapter is the ground for a Revolutionary Organization?

Dear Dunayevskaya may I also add that what distinguishes you from all other philosophers (Marcuse, Lukach...) is in paragraph 572 where they put their logic as the mediation, but you turned to masses in motion and their self-movement and self-liberation to create the workers journal? You also posed the Absolute Idea as a coming together of oppositions, and no longer a triplicity. Does it mean that we, against all Materialists and Idealists, should put an end to the separation between: Material and Spirit, Cognition and Life, Theory and Practice, External and Internal, Objectivity and Subjectivity? Here I want to ask another question and that is: What distinguishes Absolute Mind from Absolute Knowledge? And what distinguishes these from Absolute Idea?

Dear Dunayevskaya, I am not really finished with chapter one, but since I said once - in my letter dated July 15, 1984, that you laid the groundwork for us to call to fill the theoretical void, and because now I know much better about Marxist-Humanism, I would like to take those words back and instead take a responsibility for Marxist-Humanism and be a part of the movement of Ideas, since P & R shows the integrality of History, Revolution, Philosophy and Organization, there has been a philosophical foundation laid: Marxist-Humanism and its expression: News and Letters. And the best place to begin to practice it is in the last paragraph in your 1982 Introduction:

Only when the ideal of a new classless society no longer remains simply an "underlying philosophy" but becomes social practice—at one and the same time uprooting the exploitative, inhuman capital-labor relations as well as creating totally new human relations, beginning with the Man-Woman relationship—can we say that we have met the challenge of our age both in philosophy and in revolution.

Yours, Roy

Dear Roy:

Hurrah: You really leaped 63 years forward, i.e. from 1920-22 (when Lenin wrote his Theses on the National and Colonial Question for the Second CI Congress, and when, at the Congress, he suddenly declared that Roy's Thesis and Zadeh's Thesis were the same and therefore no separate Thesis was necessary as he accepted their "amendment") to 1985 when you fully grasped the philosophy of Marxist-Humanism because it became concrete for you, in relationship to the Iranian Revolution. Here is what I mean:

Lenin did not mean what he has been interpreted to mean, either that they were really the same; they aren't. Or that, as the cynics claim, he knew they weren't and said they were out of pure opportunism. The real truth is that he himself didn't know what would come from these great national revolutions and he was so happy to find voices from those lands — India and Persia — that he wanted to leave the door open. It is hard for any dogmatists or cynics to understand that it isn't ulterior motives that compel a revolutionary to say something that isn't beyond the shadow of a doubt, because they really want to see what arises from below, knowing that the dialectics of revolutions will show what has been implicit.

I will begin, not with most of the questions you asked, which you yourself actually answered, but only with the final question on page2 in the penultimate paragraph: What distinguishes Absolute Mind from Absolute Knowledge? And what distinguishes these from Absolute Idea? In one sense they all -- Knowledge, Idea, Mind -- mean the same, and in fact have been translated interchangeably, depending upon which edition you read. And I use that interchangeability for popularization purposes. In truth, of course, it is no accident when and where Hegel used each. In Phenomenology of Mind the Absolute was Absolute Knowledge, and missmified a unity of History and Meaning, i.e. philosophy. In Science of Logic, when he had worked his philosophy out, not just phenomenologically but having created philosophic categories that he considered a science, and others considered a "system", he was stressing the unity of theory and practice and the unity of objective and subjective so tightly that the solution to all the problems then would be in Subjectivity alone, bedause by then it had absorbed objectivity. To warn all those who from that would have concluded that we had reached the end, he warned in his last two paragraphs that he was not finished, that there was still a philosophy of Nature and a philosophy of Mind to transverse. Now comes the shock. In the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences which supposedly is just to make it easier for students to grasp his philosophy of Mind, he actually has two phenomenal new sections of which there was practically no hint earlier. One is the

phenomenal "Introduction" which sums up all those "Observations" in the <u>Phenomenology</u> and the many polemics with other philosophers in the <u>Science of Logic</u>. The other is what we have paid the most attention to -- that the <u>Philosophy of Mind</u> in his final Syllogisms (which he added only the year before his death) actually REPLACES THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC SO THAT THE FINAL SYLLOGISM #577 LEAVES THE DOOR OPEN ALL OVER AGAIN, EVEN IN RELATIONSHIP TO ALL THAT HARD LABOR THROUGHOUT HIS LIFE. That is what I mean in my March 21 lecture when I said I had discovered also "a new Hegel", and I feel that we have every historic right in our age to combine what he called "the Self-Thinking Idea" and what we mean by "the Self-Bringing Forth of Liberty" that we have gained from the movement from practice as the need of our age.

Now to return to the beginning of your letter, and take it up paragraph by paragraph. Your 1st paragraph delighted me at once, both because it was a concrete repponse finally to Chapter One of <u>Philosophy and Revolution</u>, and then, after you had taken so seriously and followed through with my suggestion for further reading in my letter to you of August 2, 1984, because you concluded that all your previous concepts had been "smashed to smithereens," and you found yourself "in the middle of History, Philosophy, Revelution, Organization and Subject."

The first sentence in your second paragraph, however, made me bring out a "caution" sign to myself, which shows you how wrong first negativity can be. I feared that, when you used the word "Nature" as the central point to you, you were not accepting what Lenin had described Nature to be -- "stretching a hand to materialism", practice. You see, there are so damn many Existentialists and Frankfurt School adherents that begin their attack on Engels as if dialectics does not relate to Nature at all, and that that is what is wrong with "materialism." We, of course, accepted Lenin's definition that Nature meant practice, because that is, in fact, what Marxism has been from the beginning -- masses in motion, practice, relating philosophy to reality. But the rest of your sentence made me see that it is not at all a rejection of practice, that on the contrary you stress that all these ideas do not co-exist peacefully. And you follow that up by grasping where Nature and Mind become mediations, so that I put a v.g. (for very good) both at your recognizing that this put an end to your "romanticism" and at your beforence? to wpara. 576 made and your conclusion: "if there be any ambiguity, it would be in the reader's mind, and not Marx's aor yours."

Your third paragraph is magnificent in its realization both of my critique of Kelly in the Introduction to the 1982 edition of PAR, and my critique, at the same time, of the 1960s youth. I believe there are too many who think there is a contradiction in my criticizing both Kelly and the youth, but, in fact, the critique of both is very much needed.

The final paragraph on page 1 is where I consider that your questions are really answers, and brilliant ones at that, as well as concrete. Thus, both the reference to my division

of the whole <u>Phenomenology</u> as well as the division between Lordship and Bondage can illuminate that fundamental question of "before" and "after" a revolution, and before and after consciousness grants meaning to an experience. Your whole concept of History, in the concrete history of the whole period since World War II, shows you are reaching for that specificity of our Marxist-Humanist philosophy that came with the post WWII period when we made a category of the movement from practice to theory, which is itself a form of theory — a form of theory that is not yet philosophy.

My whole demand for the concrete, concrete, concrete and insistence that only in that way can be get to the Concrete Universal, has gained yet a newer life from your leap forward in that first paragraph on page 2. Please allow me to capitalize your own words as they concretize Universal, Particular, Individual with this conclusion: "I COME TO SAY THAT THE WHOLE DEBATE ON NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM -- EVEN IN THEIR UNIFICATION, IS HALP DIALECTICS BECAUSE WHAT DELVES EVEN DEEPER IS THE RECREATION OF THE DIALECTIC FOR RPOCH AND SOCIETY." I also was most delighted with the question which I considered you answered yourself, that followed that sentence, because you there not only speak of Theory and Practice, of Being, Essence and Notion, but also bring in the warning about the danger of the Third Attitude to Objectivity, and conclude that "this chapter is the ground for a Revolutionary Organization."

In one respect I was so impressed with the question in your penultimate paragraph that my whole letter began with that. I want to say a few more things on it. Your reference both to Para. 577 of the Syllogism and/being able to single out my distinction from all other philosophers, specifically Marcuse and Lukacs, is again magnificently related to the whole question of rejecting the superficiality of relating Hegel to just triplicity. Pinally, your profound grasp of Organization as well as Philosophy is again concretized in how you relate the journalism of N&L and the organization of News and Letters Committees to our philosophy of Marxist-Humanism. Welcome!

Yours, Paya

P.S. I'm xeroxing copies of both your letter to me and this answer to you to send to each organizer for our locals. As you know, from the Letter to the Locals of March 27, we intend to include both letters in a new bulletin.



Dear Roy:

You were at the Plenum and so you know how tired I must be, and altogether too busy to write you at length. This will not only be brief, but a little too critical, with the first part of my remarks, please forgive me, almost exclusively on style. This is in reference to your essay-discussion article in Uta #10, 1984, which you translated 8/12/85. It is so poorly translated, and so loosely expressed (not to mention the unwieldy size of the paper) that I'm not sure of any content. So, if I'm wrong in attributing something to you, you should know that if a content is important to you -- and it is -- then the style ought to convey it, precisely, not loosely. Not to be underplayed is the audience which you are addressing. In this case, your Iranian colleagues, so the first three paragraphs could have been skipped, Here is where style comes in:

- 1. You always have to begin with what is new. You have to ask yourself: What am I saying that has not been said before and yet in which my audience will recognize I am not speaking from the top of my head? That is why I am asking you, after the fact, to "start" with the fact that you are a witness to what the Left was doing in "Turkemen Sahara". The same holds true for the next paragraph on the independent women's Movement. After you have drawn the audience's attention to your experience you can skip REXEMENT one paragraph and go into your critique of the Islamic Republic.
- 2. Another reason I asked you to skip the paragraph on Marx, himself, is that there are two inaccuracies in it. We are not using Marx's methodology "to discover" the social forces in a country; we take that for granted; what we are doing with Marx's dialectic methodology and you do grasp that very well in other places is to single out the single dialectic operating in the objective and subjective movements, so that it is not separable from the battle of ideas. And therefore that is "your discovery", that is to say, the recreation of the methodology for what social forces as Reason are crucial in the specific revolution that concerns you.
- 3. On your second page, both on the question of the Man/Weman relationship that Marx had worked out and the patriarchal designation of this society that the existing WLM has made a priority question, the use of the word, "essence" is inaccurate. Here is what I mean. It is essential but it is never separated from Marx's concepts of class, alienation, truly human relations, the future. So if you say that Man/Woman is the essence in each societys you are not accurate in the greatness of Marx, who in the very break with capitalism had also mentioned everything frem religion, to class, to Man/Woman, to patriarchy.
- 4. On that same page, in speaking of internationalism and organization, what really should have been developed more, but you give it only a footnote, is the question of the "Third Force". The battle of ideas is exactly what should have been

developed further, both in the theory of Khalil Maleki and Mosadegh; and you wouldn't have been quite to abrupt as well as categorical with your final sentence on that page.

On the other hand, you can see what a great selfdevelopment you have experienced because your quotation from
your letter to the E&A comrades on 5/30/85 is EVX's a very
superior piece of work, with which in general I agree, and
would especially like for you to continue developing the
third paragraph on that page, which developes the relationship
between N&L and E&A. In this case, it's not just a question
of style but our actual relations, which are of the essence.
The responsibility for Marxist-Humanism cannot be separated
under any circumstances from N&L, which, organizationally, I
have not always felt is an ongoing process.

that in the penultimate paragraph the philosophy of revolution does not get the full priority it shald have before the invention of the category, worker and intellectual. What I meen is that both historically and philosophically, we had to work out Marxism for our age, break through the Absolute Idea as a movement from practice and from theory — a united movement, to have concluded that both the break with the concept of vanguardism, the working out of the theory of State-Canitalism in which implicit was new human relations, when we specified that we wanted a different type of paper, with a waigue combination of worker and intellectual.

I hope this helps some. I think we are both looking forward to the next book on "the Dialectic of "the Party".

Yours.

October 11, 1985

Dear Lou Turner:

I've been reading the first part of your article, "STUDIES IN DIALECTICS OF CONCRETE: Absolute Idea as new beginning, as a new Humanism, as a 'new Hegel.'" I must say that I am very much looking forward to the other two parts.

You take up Mr. Theodore Geraets' essay, "The Impossibility of Philosophy . . . and Its Realization," and show that even if one comes to, say, a "never ending process of acutalization," one doesn't necessarily stand next to Marxist-Humanists.

I had always thought there are only two major tendencies: "negating" (or "transcending" the philosophy. Your article challenged me to see different tendencies concerning what happens to philosophy after you "grant the mind of your own," or after the existence of capitalism.

In contrast to materialists, Raya Dunayewskaya's categories such as "the day after the revolution," "a ceaseless movement of history," etc., show that the question of transcendence or "abolition" of the philosophy is not at all a simple question. You write (page 1, last paragraph) that "The argument presented here is that though Professor Geraets wants to grasp Hegel's philosophy as "essentially historical and innovative, because it mobilizes the efforts of each of us to comprehend our time," he, in fact, makes such a comprehension impossible, and that Dunayevskaya's view of Hegel's Absolutes not only does disclose the historic-philosophic structure of our epoch, but reveals a "new Hegel."

I saw, from this, the difference between the Hegelian roots of Marx, and Mr. Geraets' Kantian roots. It was not clear, however, how you drew the conclusion that although Mark stopped at Philosophy of Mind, he at the same time "had caught, instinctively, its final results." I ask about this because We (E & A), through our study and translation of 1844 essays (in the Bay Area), while reading the minutes of Expanded NEB meetings of 1985, were challenged to address the question of the continuity of Marxist-Humanism since Marxism--precisely on Marx's stop in the Philosophy of Mind. We addressed the question as revolutionaries with Marxist roots, who are willing to meet the challenge of Marxist-Humanism,

Your beautiful placement of paragraph 143 from Logic as Actuality in Philosophy exposes Mr. Geraets' attempt to invoke Marx's "You cannot abolish philosophy without realizing it."
You began the second part with the conclusion of Philosophy of Mind. After demonstrating the differences between Hegel's

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Dear Raya Dunayevskaya

I recived and read Mary's letter dated Dec/11/1985, and my "answer" is <u>YES</u>, I will become a Detroiter in 1986. And, please allow me to admit that of all things in the Marxist-Humanist movment nothing is as exiting as to be taken seriously <u>organizationaly</u>.

There is nothing to stop me from moving, wether that be the question of "status" or friends and roots I have been saving for the next Iranian "Spring". Those of whom I am counting on for the better relationship when I actualy move to Detroit. The crusial point is, as Mary pointed out, my"love to Hegel and Marxist-Humanist Archives" and the fact of a big lack of relationship to working class since I moved to this country. All of the above will provide me a basis for actual self-development to become a Marxist-Humanist journalist-thinker-activist and that I call a life time oppotunity. Detroit is the best place for me.

Dear Dunayevskaya, I have also some questions to work out as part of my prepration of how to move. May I ask why did you"think specificaly" of Roy for Detroit? Also as you know it will be my second but most important Marxist-Humanist move. The first time was from San Jose to San Fransisco under the encouragment of Raha and Mary. They spent time with me and helped to establish myself in Oakland. Would it be then a good idea if I move to Detroit after Mary already moves? In relation to Bay Area local through which I came to know N&L, and they helped my self development, what kind of activity should I undertake in next year?

Dear Dunayevskaya, I am very enthussiastic about the mave to Detroit. In past 16 years of my activity I have always been a spontinious loyal revolutionary. Since the last letter from you to me in which you critisized my article, "Humanbeing & Organization" and now this offer to move to Detroit, time has come to bring all under the unity of Theory and Practice Marxist- Humanistly. Thank you for the great offer.

Koy

Yours for Freedom

Dec.30, 1985

Dear Roy:

It's a great feeling, don't you think?, the times two think as one not only in general about great revolutionary principles, but very concretely, organizationally, how to spell it out in alimited time-space. Well, I heard myself think when I oppened the express mail letter from you. Yes, three objective-subjective, present and the nearfuture, then coalesced: Detroit as a proletarian town, Detroit as the home, indeed world center of Marxist-Humanist Archives when we are on the threshold reaching the end of the road to a bi-weekly NEWS & LETTERS so that we can project dialestical revolutionary analyses of events as they happen and, with it, attract revolutionary forces as Reason to express themselves organizationally as Marx-Humanists.

Workshop/Classes, which I outlined yesterday to the expanded REB-(and expanded as the youth were specially invited, whether or not (mainly not) they were on NEB, and so indeedwere totally now members just because they were from Kansas and I have very warmfeeling for "Bloody Kansas" ever since Marx delare John Brown and the slave rvolts to have initiated a new world epoch)) will signal a good part of the dive for all of us as we learn to be practicing dialecticians. I made no extra copies, and the Center is rushing to try to stencil & mimeo it and run it/hopefully by the end of this month for classes to start mid-Feb. And since I would like you to have some feeling for it before the Bulf gets to the Bay Area, I'm enclosing part of it from the draft.

I had called Mary the minute I got your letter and of course we talked about it during the day of the meeting, and she agrees with you that the timeng of you two to Detroit should concide; she hopes to move by end of May or early June. You two will correxpond with each other and I agree with you that May is unique whether as archivist or activist or organizer and theoreticians, so you two will get along splendidly. She knows your situation better than I, so I leave it from now on in her hands. Take a look at Ch. Inf The Idea in Vol.II of Hegel's science of Logic along with VIL's commentary on it (Vol.30, pp201-4, and you' | get a new appreciation of why Hegel, the "abstract" philosopher in as close to the end of his philosophy, as the 3rd section of Notion all of us seems to "divert" to Life!

See you at the convention when you will have moved.

Mike will have compkted all the Archives, through 1985, if ever 1 get time to finish all my deadlines from 30 yr/Perspective to FF, etc.etc.

Yours, Rayer

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