

POLITICAL THEORY

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life, and that to appeal to it would evoke responses that are now latent. This is why it matters so much to his argument that his theory, no matter how much of it concerns the detail of contemporary politics and the matter of modern political science, is an expression of an indigenous Indian tradition of thought and practice. Politically creative theory can, in his view, only be the reinterpretation and the remaking—even if sometimes a radical remaking—of tradition. Hence it would at one level be missing the point to remark that many of the key concepts for which he relies upon Indian sources are also found in classical western tradition. Mehta is well aware of this; he is sometimes as apt to quote Plato or Aristotle as the Vedas or the *Mahabharata*. But he recognizes that the coincidence of major traditions of thought and practice does not mean that we can abstract that on which such traditions concur and possess it independently of our own participation in any tradition.

Mehta's argument throughout this book is dense and compact, and in sketching its main outlines I have had to ignore important components of it: conflict and violence, for example, and the relationship of nationality to the nation-state. On these topics, as in his central argument, what Mehta says is sufficiently exciting and compelling to make it exceptionally important that he should present his ideas at much greater length.

—Alasdair MacIntyre
Vanderbilt University

ROSA LUXEMBURG, WOMEN'S LIBERATION, AND MARX'S PHILOSOPHY OF REVOLUTION by Raya Dunayevskaya. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1982. Pp. xii, 234.

Everyone feels in his soul that we live in troubling days of capitalist contradiction. Profit-making presses prefer texts of Marxiology to other political works. Urban bookstores shun the classics of history, but provide large shelves for "Marxist studies," "women studies," "black studies," and "astrology, religion, and philosophy" (*sic*). Although mainly rebuffed by economics departments, Marxism has made a discreet entry (often in weird partnerships) to philosophy and literary criticism. A good deal of erudite Marxist imagination and vocabulary has conquered the speech habits of "the brighter students." Yet the work of

Raya Dunayevskaya is a good reason why we should cultivate the grapes and not just the wine. Yet it is a dialogue about the more popular commentaries keep revolutionary movements from

She is not a "sitting down" or political journal; she has been involved in tangled politics of those of the NBL, a compendium of the Tirana and from barricades. Yet her persuasion, and her scholarship, historical consistency. The fascinating associations deposited in the

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Raya Dunayevskaya has been unjustly neglected. I can think of only one good reason why this should be so: academic smugness. Those who cultivate the grapes rarely share the table with those who sniff and drink the wine. Yet it is more profitable to engage with this writer in essential dialogue about the world's prospects than with countless others who are more popular or more prestigious. While fine-tuned Marxist commentaries keep being churned out, Dunayevskaya, who has been a revolutionary militant for fifty years, gives us *The Acts of the Apostles*.

She is not a "socialist of the chair"—one can scarcely imagine her sitting down. She is what might be called in archaic parlance an agitator or political journalist. Most of her activity has been in Detroit, where she has been involved, at close quarters or from afar, in decades of the tangled politics of the Extreme Left—from the heroic days of the CIO to those of the NBFO (National Black Feminist Organization). She is a compendium of who-is-who in liberation movements from Zanzibar to Tirana and from Teheran to Lima. She is an intellectual of the barricades. Yet she prefers to work in an atmosphere of argument, persuasion, and freedom. That much is demonstrated by her concern for scholarship, historical accuracy, and (by her lights) philosophical consistency. Those interested in her life and work and her many fascinating associations may consult the collection of papers she has deposited in the Labor Archives of the Wayne State University.

Since Dunayevskaya's years have been spent in the nitty-gritty struggles of the Marxist revolutionary movement to expand its strength and correct its tendencies, she has never catered to her own self-advancement. Aside from a great deal of fugitive journalism, she has published four books: *Marxism and Freedom*; *Philosophy and Revolution*; *Nationalism, Communism, Marxist-Humanism and the Afro-Asian Revolutions*; and the volume under review. In proper Marxist style, each of these works is a mixture of agitprop and philosophy. They are written to urge and obtain a commitment. But they are not woolly-headed books at all: they are an effort to transcribe for intellectuals what the straight and true path of Marxism is and to show how the society for which Marx fought and made philosophical provision is laboring to be born in all corners of the earth. Admittedly, Dunayevskaya does not express her views in cool, value-free sentences. She follows her master, who castigated academic writing in his own doctoral thesis on Democritus and Epicurus. If we do not meet "lackeys" or "running dogs," we will find "tail-enders" and "abysmal opportunism" and an "exploitative, racist, alienating system," etc. After hacking through this

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special argot of insult (which is, after all, the mark of a life chosen and lived according to a certain protocol), one confronts a thinker of great interest.

We need to locate Dunayevskaya in the galaxy of Marxism. She is, by her own declaration, a "Marxist humanist." This means, first of all, that she is a fervent advocate of the human being as maker of himself, rejecting thought of any higher intelligence or higher creation (in Kolakowski's words, "the self-deification of mankind"). It means, secondly, that she places heavy stress on the developmental continuity of Marx's project and writings, and insists on the importance of the Paris manuscripts, where, according to the author, are to be found in embryonic philosophical clarity the claims by which Marxism is privileged to become the "science" for a variety of worldwide movements of liberation, however disparate they might seem to the naive observer. Third, it means a resounding rupture between the true Marx and the leaky legacy left to his followers by Friedrich Engels. Not only did Engels bequeath to the communist movement a mechanical and complacent tendency, but he misread and distorted Marx's interpretation of the man-woman relationship in his work on *The Origin of the Family*. According to the author, a careful reading of Marx's 1844 text in conjunction with the newly available *Ethnological Notebooks* sets the matter straight. Similarly, Marx, against the orthodoxy that prevailed in the Second International, was prepared to favor socialist revolution in underdeveloped countries without any bourgeois interlude. Thus, according to Dunayevskaya, Marx's thought provides for a more diverse panorama of liberation than many of his principal lieutenants had believed possible or desirable. Colonialized nations, racial minorities, females are all privileged to consult the corpus of uncontaminated Marxism for an identification of their role in the evolution of mankind from slavery to freedom. They must not, however, mistake or forsake his irrefutable insights (this was a problem for Rosa Luxemburg). "Our age," Dunayevskaya writes, "has the advantage in that we finally are in possession of nearly *all* of Marx's works" (p. 121).

Dunayevskaya respects dialectical philosophy as the truth of the world. She does not believe that Marx ever deviated from his early humanistic formulation: his philosophical anchorage can be identified from the early writings through the *Grundrisse* to *Capital* and the *Gotha Program*; and that is decisive for today's revolutionary movements. She attributes to Marx "one dialectical conceptual framework . . . masses in motion—a living, feeling, thinking, acting whole" (p. 119). "No doubt,"

she adds, "a gap in to know the *Grundrisse* are to be interpreted. This is, first of all, Zurich when he first extension of the Marcuse's *Reason* Marx's famous sentence *menology* . . . is the principle. "To me," dialectics only 'in negation,' which Ma a dogmatic and slant

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she adds, "a gap in the knowledge of Marxists resulted from the failure to know the *Grundrisse*" (p. 140). The world and its revolutionary acts are to be interpreted through what the author calls "Absolute Method." This is, first of all, an appropriation of the revelation that Lenin had in Zurich when he first read Hegel's *Logic* and annotated it; second it is an extension of the rapprochement of Hegel and Marx presented in Marcuse's *Reason and Revolution*. It is, especially, a follow-up to Marx's famous sentence on Hegel: "The greatness of Hegel's *Phenomenology* . . . is the dialectic of negativity as the moving and creating principle. "To me," the author declares, "philosophy did not mean dialectics only 'in general,' but, very specifically, 'negation of the negation,' which Marx had called 'a new Humanism'." This might seem a dogmatic and slanted employment of Hegelian resources.

The focus of this book is announced to be Rosa Luxemburg and her revolutionary connection with the feminist consciousness. We are told that this connection can be taken further than is commonly supposed. The personality of Luxemburg, her position in international socialism, her courage, and her pathos are well expressed in the earlier chapters. A principal point that Dunayevskaya wishes to make is that (*pace* Nettl, Luxemburg's excellent biographer) Luxemburg was a totally liberated woman who did not go into a decline following the rupture of her liaison with Leo Jogiches, but went forward to ever more productive activity. This is demonstrated very convincingly. The book is not, however, really about Rosa Luxemburg; rather, it is about some of the lessons that she teaches as much through her errors as her indomitable will. Luxemburg was a first-class revolutionary who got her economics a bit wrong, could not reconcile philosophy with organization, and, in fact, suffered from "near tone-deafness in philosophy" (p. 120).

The teleological relentlessness of "Absolute Method" is very discerning in producing arch-villains, villains, mixed types, and heroes. The villains are legion: Engels, Bernstein, Kautsky, Plekhanov, numerous Mensheviks, the virtual whole of the SPD, Sartre, Althusser, and, it goes without saying, Stalin and all his progeny. There are ancillary, unwitting heroes like various Abolitionists, American black women, and radical feminists who never read much Marx. And there are persons who were equipped for greatness if they had not harbored various blindnesses: Lenin, Trotsky, Luxemburg, Herbert Marcuse. Marx, however, is sufficient unto the day if read correctly and with emphasis on the right texts. All strategies of struggle need to be submitted to his canonical authority.

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What does a nonbeliever make of all this? In my judgment, this is an intelligent, though excessively polemical and optimistic, tract. After reading all of Raya Dunayevskaya's books that presume to gather all the wretched of the earth beneath the umbrella of "Absolute Method," referring all their individual and collective frustrations and desperations to works that Marx left unpublished and a discovery that Lenin made in the library, I cannot say that the messy world looks much clearer. Marxism (never mind other "liberations") is today so split into separate and warring chapels that it resembles Protestantism and liberalism, and probably also Catholicism. It is also "for rent" to forces beyond it. The great "-isms" are in trouble. The earth is not, I think, embarked on any privileged, though sanguinary, journey toward what Dunayevskaya considers fitting and humane. Moreover, like most contemporary progressivists, she cannot imagine or portray (except in the most abstract terms) what it would be like for all human beings to live together with equality, dignity, autonomy, and justice. She rejoins her antagonist Bernstein: the end is dim, the process is all. I suspect that in order to survive tomorrow, survivors of today will have to forsake most of their visions of what we might become. They will have to think in terms of what we must do in order to stay. But reading this book could profit them.

—George Armstrong Kelly
The Johns Hopkins University

THE LEFT AND RIGHTS: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE IDEA OF SOCIALIST RIGHTS by Tom Campbell. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983. Pp. 253. \$11.95 (original paper).

This is a study of the theoretical compatibility of socialism and the practice of rights. The argument focuses on certain vulnerable presuppositions of the liberal conception of rights and criticizes both liberal and "revolutionary socialist" theorists, the latter because they have adopted the "narrow" concept of rights developed by the former. Campbell seeks to excise the liberal content from the concept, and, through a shift in theoretical assumptions about what it is to have a right, accord the practice a place in socialism, whereby socialism is meant an ideal arrangement conforming more or less to Marx's sketch of communism. Campbell is careful not to saddle himself with a defense of the historical prospect of socialism, so understood, but instead concerns

himself with the question of how, for this purpose I have said, the insurmountable difficulty of any conceptual right. Doesn't the institution of rights and so on? This strategy of conceptual rights leads him to pursue the following way.

Pursuant to a question Tom Campbell settles on, he asks: "governed by social laws?" "undercuts the 'modern' critique of rights, for it is more than an evaluative interpretation purged of right. . . it is necessary warrants, entitles or obligates this warrant having no right in question" (p. 10). About this definition, law or conflict of interests, Austin, and Kelsen. Laws are either direct or indirect. "It is pure conceptual, necessarily related. It demonstrates its coercive concurrence, and has occasionally broken down in the collapse of the possibility of noncoercive, their recognized social, possibly viewed as enabled to organize social life. Society requires organized administrative and judicial what the rules mandate, otherwise human creature, tiredness, forgetfulness, regulate, and publicize

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

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
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A Look at Books



Insightful Marxist Analysis: Dunayevskaya's Perspectives on Africa

Kevin Anderson

Raya Dunayevskaya, **ROSA LUXEMBURG, WOMEN'S LIBERATION AND MARX'S PHILOSOPHY OF REVOLUTION** (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1982), pp. xii, 234, \$19.95 hardcover, \$10.95 paperback.

Raya Dunayevskaya, **PHILOSOPHY AND REVOLUTION: From Hegel to Sartre and from Marx to Mao**, (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1982, orig. 1973), pp. xxvii, 372, \$10.95 paperback.

Raya Dunayevskaya, **MARXISM AND FREEDOM: From 1776 Until Today** (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1982, orig. 1958), pp. 381, \$10.95 paperback.

THE RAYA DUNAYEVSKAYA COLLECTION, Marxist-Humanism: Its Origins and Development in the U.S., 1941 to Today (Detroit: Wayne State University Archives of Labor History and Urban Affairs, 1981), pp. 6561+, \$60 microfilm.

The titles listed above constitute the bulk of a forty year contribution to political and social theory by the well-known Marxist humanist writer Raya Dunayevskaya, who in 1982 completed her third book on Marxist theory. This

Kevin Anderson is an Adjunct Lecturer in Sociology at the College of Staten Island, City University of New York.

writer is already familiar to long-time Africa Today readers through her first-hand reports on The Gambia and Ghana (July and December, 1962). The new editions of her work by Humanities Press (1982) and the Wayne State University microfilm collection (1981) have finally made the whole of it easily accessible to interested scholars. Each work listed above offers theoretical and empirical insights for Africanists. This review will look briefly at each to get an overview.

Rosa Luxemburg, *Women's Liberation and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution* centers around analyses of women and non-Western society in relationship to overall theoretical issues in Marxism. In the section on Luxemburg, she unearths valuable and new material on the relationship of Africa to the disputes inside the West European left, particularly the German SPD. In 1911, when Luxemburg broke with the conservative SPD leadership three years ahead of Lenin, Dunayevskaya shows that it was Luxemburg's opposition to German colonialism in Africa that precipitated the split and the ensuing debate. In 1911 Luxemburg had criticized the party leaflet on Morocco thusly:

"Let us add that in the whole of the leaflet there is not one word about the native inhabitants of the colonies, not a word about their rights, interests and sufferings because of international policy. The leaflet repeatedly speaks of 'England's splendid colonial policy' without mentioning the periodic famine and spread of typhoid in India, extermination of the Australian aborigines, and the high-potamus-hide lash on the backs of the Egyptian fellah." (25)

She also traces Luxemburg's concern with the question of Namibia. Having shown that, Dunayevskaya goes on to present a critique of Luxemburg's position on national liberation, where Luxemburg opposed national independence movements as utopian and reactionary in the era of imperialism. She also gives an incisive critique of the philosophical and economic underpinnings of Luxemburg's great work on the theory of imperialism, *The Accumulation of Capital*.

In the section on women's liberation, Dunayevskaya discusses the relevance of early African women's revolts such as the 1929 Igbo Women's War against British imperialism to present-day struggles of women in the Third World. She analyzes women's participation in modern upheavals in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau as well as Portugal in the 1970s, and goes from there to a critique of the Chinese and more recent Third World revolutions from the vantage point of women's liberation. She views women as a crucial and newly emergent "revolutionary subject" in the 1980s.

The last section of this book deals with Marx. Much of it centers around his last writings on Russia and on non-European society such as his little-known *Ethnological Notebooks* and his 1881 letter to Vera Zasulich on the possibility of a direct transition to socialism from the Russian pre-capitalist communal village. Dunayevskaya shows that all of Marx's major last writings, including the last edition of *Capital*, Vol. I (Paris: 1872-75) which he personally prepared for the printer, show the importance of this theme of alternate paths to human emancipation. Dunayevskaya quotes Lafargue's 1882 complaint to Engels that, after his trip to Algiers, "Marx has come back with his head full of Africa and the Arabs" (191). She concludes the book by arguing that with these last writings "Marx's legacy is no mere heirloom, but a live body of ideas and perspectives that is in need of concretization." (195) Nowhere are such late writings of Marx more relevant than to African studies, where Marxist class analysis is increas-

Kevin Anderson

ingly being applied. Dunayevskaya's new reading of Marx shows an openness on his part seldom found in post-Marx Marxists. She shows that he intended much of the framework of *Capital* only for America and Western Europe and was working at his death on new approaches to non-European society.

Philosophy and Revolution was originally issued in 1973 and has been republished with a new introduction. The core of this book's discussion of Africa is in the major chapter "The African Revolutions and the World Economy." There, Dunayevskaya maintains that: "The African revolutions opened a new page in the dialectic of thought as well as in world history" (213). She then discusses African nationalist leaders and theorists such as Nkrumah, Senghor, and Fanon. It is Fanon whom she finds the closest to her own view when she writes that despite the great achievements of the independence struggles, "we must soberly face the present bleak reality" (217). She concludes:

"The greatest of these tragedies, however, is not the external but the internal one, the separation between the leaders and the led in independent Africa. It is to this we must turn because without masses as reason as well as force, there is no way to escape being sucked into the world market dominated by advanced technologies, whether in production or in domination for nuclear war." (218)

The rest of the chapter explores the neocolonial relationship of the world economy to Africa and offers a critique of dependency theories as well as conservative development theories.

But its Marxist analysis does not end there. Instead, Dunayevskaya continues it by returning to where she began: the living human subjects who have the power, in her view, to alter economic relationships, the African masses. She argues that despite the world economy "neocolonialism could not have been reborn so easily in Africa had the revolutionary situation continued to deepen." (236) At the core of her analysis is the inter-relationship of political and economic factors:

"Precisely because the African masses did, at the start, feel that they were not only muscle but reason, holding destiny in their own hands, there emerged what Marx in his day called a new energizing principle. This resulted in the growth of production even in societies whose economy was restricted to a single crop." (237)

Despite the setbacks of neocolonialism, she concludes the chapter by arguing that the situation in Africa was still "fluid" in that: (1) new revolutions were ready to emerge in southern Africa, (2) the youth had shown resistance to neocolonialist regimes, (3) the neocolonial social structures in Africa were hardly as firmly implanted as, for example, those in Latin America.¹

But Africa has importance in *Philosophy and Revolution* far beyond the single chapter on Africa. Dunayevskaya's central concept is that of an "open" or "un-chained" dialectic where, she argues, Hegel (and Marx) "present the structures

1. I have employed this framework in my paper "The Tanzanian Model of Third World Development: After Twenty Years," presented to the Eastern Sociological Society, Baltimore, March 1983.

not as mere fact, not as hierarchy, not as pinnacle, but as movement" (39), and view human reality as "one long trek to freedom" (43). The African revolutions of the 1950s and 1960s were, to Dunayevskaya, a key example of the centrality of a dialectic of freedom to human history. For such a Marxist, African revolutions are not a place to "apply" a ready-made theory, but a unique human experience out of which Marxist theory can be reconstructed for the present. *Philosophy and Revolution* also contains valuable discussion of Lenin, Mao, Marx, and Sartre, theorists not without relevance to African revolutionaries.

Dunayevskaya's first book, *Marxism and Freedom*, originally published in 1958, at first glance seems to contain little on Africa. But there is much of importance to Africanists, such as the lengthy economic and political analysis of the outcomes of two major revolutions, the Russian and the Chinese. In analyzing post-revolutionary Russia and China, Dunayevskaya uses with great subtlety her concept of state-capitalism, first developed in economic writings in the 1940s. But in keeping with her present Marxist humanist stance, she stresses not only economic and political categories, but also philosophical and ideological ones, as well as the relationship of spontaneity to revolutionary upheaval. The analysis of China reads especially well in 1963, given the collapse of the Maoist dream during the last decade. This section had earlier seemed too sharply critical of Mao's experiment to many readers. The concepts of state-capitalism and of spontaneity and humanism developed in this book offer many vantage points for a Marxist analysis of the contemporary African scene. Her overall concept of socialist humanism, first articulated here, was developed parallel to that of socialist humanists in Africa such as Nyerere and Senghor, and especially Fanon, who wrote during the same period.

The Raya Dunayevskaya Collection includes virtually all of Raya Dunayevskaya's voluminous other writings, plus many by people with whom she has worked, from her earliest days as secretary to Trotsky in 1937-38 to today. Of special importance to Africanists are the following documents: (1) Her 1959 pamphlet *Nationalism, Communism, Marxist-Humanism and the Afro-Asian Revolutions* (2682-2723); (2) her writings on West Africa in 1961 and 1962 before and after her trip there (2906-3153 passim, 3124-3251); (3) a 1976 series of "Philosophic-Political Letters" (5182-5300) which include discussion of the Portuguese and African revolutions of 1974-76, the civil war in Zimbabwe and the Soweto uprising; (4) the 1978 pamphlet *Frantz Fanon, Soweto and American Black Thought* (5305-5363), written by two colleagues of Dunayevskaya, Lou Turner and John Alan, and introduced by her.

Taken as a whole, Dunayevskaya's three books and the Wayne State University collection contain an important contribution to African studies by a writer who has spent a lifetime as a political activist as well as a theorist. The passionate commitment to human liberation is never absent from Dunayevskaya's work, yet at the same time there is no lack of theoretical and analytical rigor.

sta agli inani tentativi di chi ritiene possibile determinare l'essere nella presenza fluidità di un dinamismo interiore o, quantomeno, coglierne il movimento fenomenologico. Si tratta, insomma, della non riducibilità di due livelli di conoscenza, l'una, nonostante gli evidenti limiti teoretici, saldamente radicata nel farsi quotidiano di un'azione raramente problematizzata, ovvero non svincolata dal dato della contingenza immediata, l'altra, proprio per il suo alto grado di problematicità, disancorata dall'effettualità dell'esistenza e proiettata in sfere che, alla fine, non sono in grado di comprendere il concreto del vivere. Ma se la servetta traccia ride dell'insanità dell'impegno del teoreta, il quale, all'atto pratico non mostra capacità nell'agire, il teoreta, tutt'al più, può sorridere del «sano intelletto» della servetta, in capace di penetrarne, malgrado l'apparente evidenza, il profondo delle motivazioni. Su un piano più direttamente psicologico, si tratta dello scontrarsi di due atteggiamenti nei confronti dell'esistenza connotati da un forte senso di «superiorità», cioè dalla reciproca percezione dell'altrui «inferiorità». Il riso della serva e il sorriso del filosofo sono i fenomeni esteriori di tale sentimento abbarbicato nell'intimo della coscienza singola. Il filosofo si stacca dell'immediatezza del sentire per spostarsi sul versante complesso dell'intelletto: la servetta ignora la possibilità medesima di quella complessità, legata com'è al centro dell'essere. Due forme, insomma, inconciliabili di «razionalità», il cui affermarsi è rispettivamente dovuto alla priorità che viene attribuita o al dato conoscitivo a cui la ricerca, svincolata da contingenze determinate di breve respiro, può condurre, o alla funzionalità di una strumentazione atta a muoversi «proficacemente» nell'ambito delimitato della solida utilità quo-

tidiana. In fondo, la storia della ricezione della caduta del filosofo nel pozzo non può concludersi, poiché non può concludersi il divenire del pensiero umano.

Fabio Bazzani

R. DUNAYEVSKAYA. *Filosofia e rivoluzione*, trad. it. di M. Fugazza e A. Vigorelli, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1977, pp. 312; R. DUNAYEVSKAYA, *Rosa Luxemburg, women's liberation and Marx's philosophy of revolution*, Atlantic Highlands, Humanities Press, 1982, pp. 234.

Publicato originariamente all'inizio degli anni Settanta, *Filosofia e rivoluzione* ha rappresentato e continua a rappresentare uno dei più significativi esempi di una ricezione di Hegel operata al di fuori del marxismo accademico. L'autrice, già nota al lettore italiano per la pubblicazione della sua altra importante opera (trad. it. 1962) è nata in Russia, ma si trasferì ancora bambina negli Stati Uniti. Agli anni 1937-38 risale la sua conoscenza di Trockij, che influenzò notevolmente parte della sua produzione intellettuale e di cui fu segretaria e collaboratrice durante l'esilio messicano. Tornata negli USA svizzero, maturando un sempre più marcato distacco dalle posizioni trotskiste, una analisi della realtà sovietica sulla base di un minuzioso esame delle ideologie dei primi tre piani quinquennali: in tale ricerca veniva messo in rilievo non soltanto il carattere burocratico e dispotico del regime staliniano, ma anche e soprattutto il suo definirsi come uno stadio del tutto nuovo del capitalismo mondiale. Tra il 1942 ed il 1943 pubblicò i risultati di questa sua indagine sul capitalismo di stato sovietico in una serie di articoli apparsi su riviste

americane; l'impatto delle tesi della Dunayevskaya fu estremamente vasto sullo scenario della riflessione politico-economica della sinistra internazionale e se ne ritrova traccia anche in quegli autori che, proprio in quegli anni, cominciavano ad occuparsi delle nuove ed inquietanti forme assunte dal totalitarismo (ad es., A. Koesler).

Negli anni Quaranta e Cinquanta partecipò attivamente alle lotte del movimento operaio americano e iniziò quell'itinerario teorico che la porterà, nel 1958, alla sua prima rilettura in chiave umanistica del marxismo, significativamente accostata alle analisi compiute da H. Marcuse in *Soviet Marxism*, che fu pubblicato nello stesso anno (*Marxism and Freedom...* from 1776 to Today assieme a *Philosophy and Revolution* è stato recentemente ristampato negli Stati Uniti in occasione del centesimo anniversario della morte di Marx).

Nel 1955, dopo una lunga militanza nella sinistra americana, la Dunayevskaya costituì a Detroit l'organizzazione marxista-umanista «New & Letters», il cui omonimo organo di stampa esce tuttora; in essa è presente in modo esplicito il riconoscimento della funzione direttamente politica, «organizzativa» della filosofia. Nel rapporto sulla organizzazione del Plenum del New and Letter Committees, citato da M. Fugazza e A. Vigorelli nella introduzione alla versione italiana di *Filosofia e rivoluzione*, si legge infatti che ciò che distingue originalmente questo movimento è il connubio tra «una forma di organizzazione di comitato che comprende sia lavoratori che intellettuali, sia neri che bianchi, sia uomini che donne, [in cui] la filosofia non è un ingrediente aggiunto. E' il nucleo centrale» (cit., p. 9). Va ricordato tuttavia come il rapporto tra filosofia e pratica risalga nell'elaborazione teorica dell'au-

trice, al suo primo approfondimento dello studio del pensiero di Hegel che si era già concretizzato nel 1953 con la pubblicazione delle sue Lettere sull'idea assoluta di Hegel. E' significativo a questo punto rimarcare come, di lì a poco, il riconoscimento della necessità di una rilettura del rapporto Hegel-Marx ed in particolare del tema della dialettica e della contraddizione si affermasse in un orizzonte teorico segnato dalla crisi della vecchia ortodossia marxista-leninista (basti qui ricordare esemplificativamente il recupero della Fenomenologia dello spirito come strumento per una lettura della patologia borghese nella costituzione filosofica della critica dell'economia, o i pionieristici lavori di G. Lukàcs e di H. Marcuse).

«Perché Hegel, perché ora?»: ancora ponendo questa domanda la Dunayevskaya aprirà, nel 1973, il capitolo iniziale di *Philosophy and Revolution*. From Hegel to Sartre and from Marx to Mao, dove l'attualità di Hegel viene colta nella centralità del concetto di assoluto e nella possibilità di utilizzare il momento della negazione della negazione come un formidabile strumento interpretativo dei processi rivoluzionari del presente: «Ciò che fa di Hegel un contemporaneo è lo stesso motivo che lo rendeva così attuale per Marx: l'efficacia della dialettica della negatività per un periodo di rivoluzione proletaria, proprio come per quell'epoca di "gestazione" in cui Hegel era vissuto. [...] Il suo metodo assoluto ha una forza di attrazione straordinaria perché il nostro bisogno di teoria deriva dalla globalità della crisi attuale [...] E' ormai tempo di affrontare Hegel sul suo stesso terreno; il metodo assoluto, che sappiamo in costante movimento ed insieme così "inflexibile" da non piegarsi ad alcuna sostanza assoluta. E ciò proprio perché è la dialettica del sogget-

to, il continuo processo del divenire, il metodo dell'"assoluta negatività", cioè dell'automovimento, autoattività ed autosuperamento (trad. it., cit., pp. 18, 19).

Questa lettura di Hegel — che ne mette in rilievo da un lato l'interpretazione unanistica datane da Marx e dall'altro lato la valutazione politico-rivoluzionaria leniniana — mira dunque a riaffermare come la filosofia non si ponga come semplice rispecchiamento esterno del reale, bensì sia già interna ad esso. Ciò che costituisce la novità teorica di questo libro è la messa in luce della essenzialità della interpretazione leniniana della filosofia di Hegel (nei Quaderni filosofici) ed in particolare della identificazione dell'idea assoluta con il movimento «dalla pratica alla teoria». Un altro punto che sembra importante richiamare è la considerazione della filosofia come fenomenologia delle «nuove forze e delle nuove passioni», vale a dire come fenomenologia dei nuovi soggetti che si prefigurano a partire dagli anni Sessanta. Commentando quel passo della Scienza della logica in cui Hegel definisce la negazione della negazione come «il semplice punto di riferimento negativo a sé, l'intima fonte di ogni attività, di ogni spontaneo movimento della vita e dello spirito, l'anima dialettica che ogni vero possiede in se stesso e per cui soltanto è un vero; perocché solo su questa soggettività riposa il togliere dell'opposizione tra concetto e realtà e quell'unità che è la verità» (trad. it. di A. Moni e C. Cesa, Bari 1974, Vol. II, p. 948), l'autrice rimarca non solo il ruolo che questa soggettività riveste in Hegel, ma sottolinea con forza anche come l'impatto hegeliano si riveli realmente dirimente quando, una volta raggiunto il vertice dell'assoluto, viene ad essere colpita addirittura la assoluta negatività.

L'Hegel tratteggiato dalla Dunayevskaya e la stessa rilettura di Marx, Lenin, Trockij, Mao, Sartre, risentono fortemente della attenzione che l'autrice pone ad una formulazione originale sia del concetto di politico (e di rivoluzione come movimento reale e polo dialettico rispetto alla filosofia) sia del concetto di soggetto che emerge nei movimenti radicali della nostra epoca (negri, studenti, donne, giovani) così pure come nelle lotte di liberazione dei popoli africani e nelle rivolte dei paesi dell'Est: questi movimenti sono l'oggetto della terza ed ultima parte di questo libro spesso provocatorio, ma che recentemente offre interessanti elementi di riflessione su questioni non irrilevanti del pensiero filosofico-politico contemporaneo.

La ridefinizione dell'antagonismo sociale nelle forme dei mutamenti di fondo intervenuti a livello della soggettività moderna (su base socio-antropologica) sembra inoltre costituire l'elemento di raccordo tra le tesi della Dunayevskaya e le più recenti formulazioni della cosiddetta "teoria dei bisogni": in entrambi i casi viene infatti messa in discussione una concezione del marxismo come teoria oggettiva della transizione, come metodo lineare del processo rivoluzionario, a cui viene contrapposta la maturità già politica dei soggetti sociali antagonisti; ma la radicale dissoluzione del politico tradizionale che ne consegue non sembra confrontarsi con la dimensione progettuale, che aggetta fortemente verso problematiche proprie della sfera dell'etico, altrimenti ripresa in parte della riflessione della sinistra europea.

Nell'ultimo libro dedicato a Rosa Luxemburg, women's liberation and Marx's philosophy of revolution viene da un lato compiuta un'attenta ricognizione della "dimensione femminista" della figura e dell'opera di R. Luxemburg (fi-

nora trascurata sia dagli studiosi marxisti sia da quelli non-marxisti) e dall'altro lato viene messa in luce la importanza della analisi del ruolo della donna negli ultimi scritti di Marx. La Dunayevskaya sottolinea come R. Luxemburg abbia sollevato in maniera pre-corritrice un problema ancora ampiamente presente nel movimento di liberazione della donna degli ultimi decenni, vale a dire quello della "spontaneità" e della sua connessione con la forma-partito, ovvero quella che viene indicata come «la questione della autonomia». Dopo una accurata ricostruzione dei movimenti più significativi della biografia della Luxemburg compiuta nella prima parte dell'opera (dalla rivoluzione del 1905 alla rottura, nel 1910-111, con Kautsky, alla polemica con Lenin, alla teoria dell'accumulazione del capitale e della crisi), la Dunayevskaya si sofferma soprattutto nel capitolo VII del libro sulla connessione tra «questione femminile» e lotta contro il riformismo, nella cui prospettiva l'autrice riconsidera anche il rapporto tra R. Luxemburg e C. Zetkin: «la loro comunanza rivoluzionaria si mantenne su tutte le posizioni per due decenni: dalla lotta contro il riformismo alla lotta contro il militarismo, alla lotta contro la burocratizzazione dei sindacati alla opposizione alla guerra» (cit., p. 90).

Un altro motivo di interesse di questo libro è costituito da una rivalutazione della opera marxiana che contesta la validità di cesure tra il giovane Marx ed il Marx degli anni dell'amatutità. L'autrice inizia a compiere la sua ricostruzione riprendendo alcuni dei temi già presenti nelle sue opere precedenti: la trasformazione della "rivoluzione filosofica" hegeliana nella filosofia della rivoluzione di Marx, i tratti più salienti del «nuovo umanesimo» marxista, per giungere, sulla base della re-

cente trascrizione degli Ethnological Notebooks of Karl Marx (a cura di L. Krader, Assen, Van Gorcum, 1972) a riconsiderare il ruolo che le questioni sollevate dall'antropologia e dall'etnologia della seconda metà dell'Ottocento ebbero nello sviluppo del pensiero di Marx: «Come il giovane Marx, nel suo primo rivolgersi all'economia, scopri il proletariato come soggetto che sarebbe stato "becchino del capitalismo" e guida della rivoluzione proletaria, così alla fine Marx fece scoperte ancora più nuove allorché si indirizzò agli studi antropologici della Ancient Society di Morgan» (it., p. XI).

E' noto che le tesi di Morgan segnarono un decisivo momento nello sviluppo dell'etnologia come scienza autonoma e che da esse, e dalle ricerche di Bachofen su Mutterrecht, Engels trasse spunto per L'origine della famiglia, della proprietà privata e dello Stato (1884) per dimostrare la consistenza delle tesi marxiane sulla transitorietà della organizzazione familiare borghese. Tuttavia l'autrice mette in rilievo, proprio attraverso un'attenta sismina degli Ethnological Notebooks, come il testo engelsiano sia tutt'altro che la «esecuzione del lascito» marxiano: in essi si evidenzia infatti come per Marx, a differenza di Engels, elementi della oppressione in generale, e di quella della donna in particolare, si creino anche all'interno del comunismo primitivo e non siano quindi correlati soltanto al superamento del matriarcato.

In opposizione ai tentativi degli ultimi anni di ritrovare nel testo marxiano la presenza di «più Marx», la Dunayevskaya ribadisce il carattere compatto, pur nella ricchezza delle articolazioni, dell'impresa marxiana; gli Ethnological Notebooks rappresentano per l'autrice non soltanto un importante momento della produzione marxiana, ma contribuiscono anche a «far luce sull'opera

marxiana come totalità. [...] Con l'analisi delle opere dedicate alle società primitive [...] Marx si immerse nello studio dello sviluppo umano in differenti periodi storici e nella fondamentale relazione uomo-donna. Egli tiene però fermi concetti già elaborati nei suoi Manoscritti Economico-filosofici del 1844» (cit., p. 190).

Valeria E. Russo

Fattori da Magenta a Montebello.

Catalogo della Mostra al Cisternino del Poccianti di Livorno, a cura di C. Bonagura, L. Dinelli e L. Bernardini, Roma, De Luca, 1983, pp. 395, L. 20.000.

«Storia e arte» più che «storia dell'arte» è il principio informatore del puntuale e ponderoso volume Fattori da Magenta a Montebello, che accompagnava la recente omonima mostra organizzata dal Comune di Livorno presso il Cisternino del Poccianti. Per chiarire meglio il significato e l'impostazione del lavoro condotto da Cristina Bonagura, Laura Dinelli e Luciano Bernardini, occorre però fare piuttosto riferimento al più ampio progetto di ricerca posto sotto l'egida dell'Archivio dei Macchiaioli, il centro diretto da Dario Durbé che, oltre a curare il catalogo generale degli artisti del movimento, si esprime anche attraverso una collana editoriale in cui la pubblicazione livornese si inserisce come numero 8. L'Archivio dei Macchiaioli si pone infatti come esempio di metodo per la raccolta dei documenti — figurativi e non — e l'analisi dei fatti — sociali, culturali, politici — legati allo sviluppo delle tendenze artistiche, secondo un rigoroso intento storico-documentario. Emblematica di tale metodologia cri-

tica è, direi, la sezione dedicata, nel volume, al «Clima del '59». Il 1859, anno di gran peso nella storia del Risorgimento italiano, rappresenta in Toscana, ad un tempo, l'euforia per l'indipendenza raggiunta e il timore di un decadimento della coesione politica intorno all'ideale unitario. La rievocazione di tale temperie attraverso la documentazione relativa al concorso, bandito dal Governo provvisorio toscano guidato dal Ricasoli, per l'esecuzione di varie opere d'arte (dipinti, monumenti, medaglie) celebrative delle virtù culturali, patriottiche e militari italiane, illumina reciprocamente le vicende storiche e artistiche, dando quindi perfettamente conto — grazie anche ad un sapore quasi cronachistico — dell'urgenza e della penetrazione della politica nella cultura e nel quotidiano, in un reale, popolare e soprattutto non usurato senso di politica culturale.

Fattori, come è noto, partecipa e vince nella sezione del concorso riservata ad un dipinto relativo alla battaglia di Magenta. Ma prima di giungere ad analizzare le genesi e la realizzazione dell'opera fattoriana, gli autori ci inseriscono appunto in quel «clima» senza il quale l'interpretazione pittorica non avrebbe potuto essere che artisticamente leggosa e concettualmente «pompiere».

Accanto alle preoccupazioni politiche in senso stretto troviamo così l'impegno a favorire il contributo di letterati e artisti al programma di governo, mosso anche dalla lucida consapevolezza che — come ebbe a scrivere in seguito il Poggi nelle sue Memorie del Governo della Toscana — «i subitanei sconvolgimenti avevano prodotto gravi sconcerti e tolto agli uni e agli altri molte occasioni di lavoro».

Un'affermazione questa di sconcertante e ammirevole realismo: non puntare solo sull'adesione delle forze cultural-