ON October 24, 1918, General Ivanoff-Rinoff appeared in Eastern Siberia. He was a typical Czarist Russian official, and believed in treating all who stood in his way in a ruthless manner. The Directorate in Omsk had put him in command of all Russian troops in Eastern Siberia, and on November 3, 1918, he declared the provinces of Amur, Primorskaya, Sakhalin, and Kamchatka to be under martial law, making him-self, in effect, Dictator of Eastern Siberia, and placing the question of life or death in the hands of the autocratic class, who were determined to see that the principles advocated by autocracy should not die in Russia.

I reported, with reference to the declaration of martial law :

" The object has not escaped the Russian people, and, in my judgment, the feeling is so strong that a clash will occur even if the Allied troops remain, and no one doubts that it would occur immediately upon the withdrawal of Allied troops. As I see it, the effect of keeping troops in Siberia, is to permit the crowd of Reactionaries, headed by General Horvath, supported by former Russian officers, to try to firmly establish themselves while the Allied troops are in Siberia."

I expected Allied troops, as well as United States troops, to be withdrawn from Siberia soon after the signing of the Armistice, and I seemed to be the only military representative who was not aware that we had a war of our own in Russia, and that our War was in-dependent and separate from the War in France. The Armistice had absolutely no effect in Siberia. It seemed to me, as all the stated reasons why the United States took part in military action in Siberia had entirely disappeared before the Armistice, or at the time of the Armistice, we would withdraw our troops from Russian territory and naturally the question repeatedly came to my mind, why are American troops kept in Siberia? I had complete confidence in the accuracy of the statement made by the State Department, that the United States was not going to take sides in Russian internal affairs. The presence of Allied troops was undoubtedly delaying the settlement of Russian questions by the Russian people and, no matter what attitude the troops took towards internal conflicts, we could not escape responsibility for some acts against the Russian people that could not have been committed if foreign troops had not been in Siberia.

On December 13, I reported as follows:

" Kolchak troops are arresting and murdering the people and basing their actions on the authority of Admiral Kolchak, that every one opposing the Government should be punished." I also stated, " General Krestachintsky had informed me that the Japanese had agreed to supply new equipment for 10,000 men for duty in the Far East."

Japan was- already supplying Semeonoff and Kalmikoff troops and, in my judgement, if details were ever discussed as to the use of these men for whom Japan offered equipment, the Russians would find that Japan demanded that the troops be put under their control. There was at this time great resentment in Omsk against Semeonoff, because he would not support Admiral Kolchak, although he always claimed that he was supporting him.

He was finally ordered to Omsk, with a view to going to the front, but he refused on the ground that conditions in Trans-Baikal were such that he could not leave. Undoubtedly, Kolchak hoped to get Semeonoff from under the control of Japan, and in this way break the strangle hold of Japan, in that the Japanese could, through Semeonoff, stop supplies reaching him, as all supplies had to go through Chita. In this way Japan could demand any concession from Kolchak and he was powerless to refuse them.

Evidently this was what Kolchak referred to in March, 1919, when he told Consul General Harris that " his Government could not control the situation, ilt the Far East, and that he was practically unable to exercise authority, and also, that particular attention must be paid to Ataman Semeonoff, who is backed by Japan. He added, that due to these conditions, his Government could not assume responsibility for what is to take place in the Far East."

This declaration of Kolchak was considered " extremely confidential as no similar statement has been given to the other Allies, in this connection."

Kolchak's statement mentioned above was the truth, but, by no means the whole truth, and it was manifestly given out for American consumion. It was characteristically an autocratic Siberian statement, designed to answer any inquiring Government, relative to reported conditions in the Far East.

In connection with Kolchak's liberal statements to Mr. Sharkey, Associated Press, and to Mr. Harris, U. S. Consul General, Mr. Fisher in his " Soviets in the World Affairs," Vol. I, page 197, states that there was found in the secret archives of Kolchak's Minister of Foreign Affairs, a telegram from Mr. Ughet, financial agent of the former Russian Government in Washington, which suggested: " that the Supreme Ruler make a declaration of liberal policies in order to win United States public opinion."

In my reports and cables I was stressing the excesses, not only of Semeonoff and Kalmikoff, but of the Kolchak Russian troops under the immediate control and direction of Ivanoff-Rinoff. The excesses of the troops under the latter, in so far as assault and robbery were concerned, were in magnitude nearly equal to those of Semeonoff and Kalmikoff, although the troops under the control of Ivanoff-Rinoff and Horvath were not killing to the extent practiced by the troops of Kalmikoff.

Ivanoff-Rinoff and Hovarth recognized Kolchak's authority and he could have stopped these excesses of the White Russian troops if he had so desired. The fact of the matter is, it is rather unreasonable to expect the practice of centuries to be stopped suddenly by the Czarists and especially, when there was only a slight chance that the ruthlessness practised would be published to the world. The Allies in Siberia had become so enmeshed in Siberian affairs, in their determination to destroy bolshevism, that they could protest only feebly against Czarist Russian excesses, if they protested at all.

As to Admiral Kolchak's statement through Consul General Harris, to Washington, it was well known that Consul General Harris resented the reports the Military were sending and he was not only instrumental in getting Washington to cable me that most remark-able statement that the United States Government expected to look to the State Department for information on Siberia, but he reported that the Army in Siberia was playing politics. Subsequent events have shown clearly who was playing politics, and it was not the Army.

In December, 1918, Admiral Kolchak issued an order directing the mobilization of all officers and soldiers of the Russian Army, and this practically included all Russians of military age. I stated in my report with reference to this mobilization order:

" There is a belief in some quarters that there is danger in arming any large number of troops, as the people from whom soldiers are drawn are, generally speaking, opposed to the autocratic form of Government."

His mobilization order was a long step towards the end of Admiral Kolchak's regime.

When I first arrived in Siberia representations were being made everywhere to the effect that the Russians, in some other section of Siberia, were in need of arms with which to fight the Central Powers, and the peas-ants were being told that the Allies were then in Siberia, and the Russians no longer needed these arms for their personal protection. A large number of arms were being turned in by the peasants, and Cossacks were being sent into villages, and were taking by force the arms not willingly surrendered. If a peasant was discovered with a rifle and ammunition it often meant his death and certainly meant a frightful lashing with the knout. The two methods succeeded in getting nearly all arms out of the hands of the peasants and this enabled the Cossack troops, in the Far East, to safely carry on their ruthless campaign of murder and robbery.

It is amazing that the Czarist Russian Army Officers did not realize that some change had to be made in the Army practices used during the Czar's regime, and the atrocities being committed east of Lake Baikal were so overwhelming that no open-minded person could doubt the truth of many of the reported excesses. On January 24, I reported to the War Department:

" There is now a meeting being held at Vladivostok of the selected Zemstvo representatives from all provinces East of Lake Baikal, and from Irkutsk and Semipalatinsk, West of Lake Baikal. In addition to these, there is also attending this meeting representatives of the Dumas."

These gentlemen, or a representative body of them came to see me and they impressed me as being intelligent, well informed, and fair men.

Kolchak sent an order to his representative in Vladivostok directing him " not to permit this convention to discuss or consider any question concerning his powers, constitutional right, or politics." This convention was held in accordance. with the law and the subjects they were to discuss had been published, and the meetings and discussions were to be public. Could there have been made a much plainer statement to the Zemstvo representatives who were elected by the suffrage of the people, that henceforth Autocracy, not representative Government, was to reign supreme in Siberia?

It soon became apparent that Kolchak's statement to Mr. Sharkey was for consumion in the United States. The question in every one's mind was, is Kolchak really in favour of some of the concessions demanded by the people or is he, at heart, a Monarchist? In my judgement, he had the same ideas as the Monarchists in so far as the oppression and suppression of the great mass of the Russian people are concerned. He had surrounded himself with the most distinct type of Absolutists, and had, thereby, rendered himself powerless to act according to his own judgement, if he had desired, and one could hear frequent rumblings that he was too liberal in his views, but I never saw any indication of liberalism in his actions toward the people.

On January 30, I cabled the War Department, in part:

" The following from Major Slaughter, at Ekaterinburg, January 27th, Bolsheviki power growing here, espionage service says that any Russian Army will fall to pieces, the order to mobilize five new classes same as organizing army for Bolsheviks. New mobilization worst feature."

This was from Western Siberia, four thousand miles from where I was reporting same conditions in Eastern Siberia - and this is the kind of report characterized by Consul General Harris as " Army playing politics."

On December 30, 1918, Captain Schuyler, at Omsk, telegraphed me:

"Nine new Japanese Staff Officers just arrived in Omsk. They are trying to form Japanese party in Russia, especially among Army officers, and are having considerable success. They promise anything wanted, whether they can perform or not and point out failure of Allies to afford effective aid and in spite of promises."

This was a move by Japan to determine definitely and surely what could be done with Admiral Kolchak. If he could be handled satisfactorily, then Japanese influence could be extended beyond Lake Baikal.

By controlling Semeonoff at Chita, and Kalmikoff at Habarovsk, and, as far as the Allies were concerned, they had a dominating power over Ivanoff-Rinoff at Vladivostok, they practically controlled Eastern Siberia. If they could establish a working agreement with Kolchak they could eliminate, to some extent at least, the causes for friction between themselves on one side and the English and French on the other. This friction had existed since the assumption of power by Admiral Kolchak.

England, France, and Japan were still in step, in so far as bolshevism was concerned, but England and France believed their objective could be reached more surely by treating bolshevism as an equal menace in all parts of Siberia and by using Kolchak as their agent in destroying it. Japan had spent considerable money in Eastern Siberia, and her main consideration was to destroy bolshevism there, and at the same time be in a position to take advantage of any situation that might arise, but bolshevism west of Lake Baikal was secondary to her interests in Eastern Siberia.

As an indication of the success the nine Japanese officers had in their efforts to form a Japanese party in Russia, I received, on January 31, 1919, the following telegram from Captain Schuyler, at Omsk:

" Small reactionary revolt here last night as protest against liberalism of Kolchak, which displeases many officers. Demonstration against Allies in restaurant, and toasts drunk to Japan, the only friend of Russia. This has strengthened position of Japanese, here, who have been under a cloud as a result of their activities last December."

What did this apparent change in the attitude of the Russian officer class towards the Japanese mean? It meant that the Japanese Staff officers had promised the Russian officers anything they wanted, and they were not only ready to take assistance from any source, but were very grateful for this assistance. Looking at the situation from their point of view, one can hardly blame them. Their backs were against the wall and their main object was to help establish some Government in Russia that would restore them to the positions they had before the War, which they had no hope of reaching if the Soviets remained in power. With them, however, fighting bolshevism was a means for accomplishment of their main object.

Notwithstanding some bitterness remained between the Japanese and the old Russian officer class, due to the Russo-Japanese War, the position of the Russians was such that they were glad to accept support from Japan. The more Japan gave them the greater was the praise for her and her people. This apparent friend-ship could not be obtained without the expenditure of money or military help.

Three or four years after I left Siberia the American Military Attache in Tokio sent me a report of a speech made in the Japanese Diet, in which the speaker was reported to have said that the Siberian venture cost Japan about nine hundred million yen.(The value of a yen is fifty cents U. S. money.) One naturally wonders why Japan put all this money into Siberian intervention and it is hard to believe her object was entirely altruistic. I have no definite information as to her real intentions and have no idea that I ever will have such information.

As an indication of a Czarist Russian's ideas of ethical methods in securing funds, Colonel Korff, Russian liason officer with American Headquarters, told Colonel Eichelberger, the American Intelligence officer, that General Ivanoff-Rinoff and General Romanoff sky had the power to stop all criticism of me and of all Americans, as well as of American policies, and if I would get the United States to give the Russian Army twenty thousand dollars a month the propaganda against Americans would cease. He also told Colonel Eichelberger, at the same time, that Lieutenant General Krestachintsky would be in his car at the railroad station until 6 o'clock that evening and that it would be to my advantage to see him.

Kolchak's mobilization order was not complied with by the great mass of Russians within the military age and, as soon as it became evident that force would have to be used to mobilize them, Ivanoff-Rinoff did not hesitate to send his Cossacks to bring in the men of prescribed age, which started a reign of terror difficult to believe.

In March a young woman who had been a village school teacher, came to American Headquarters and asked for a guard for herself and her brother so they might return to their village of Gordyevka, and bury their father who had been killed by Ivanoff-Rinoff troops. The young woman said the Russian troops had come to Gorayevka looking for young men to force them into the Army, but the young men had escaped, so the troops took ten men of the village, who were beyond military age, tortured and killed them, and were guarding the bodies to prevent their families from burying them. This seemed so brutal and unnatural that I ordered an officer with some troops to go to Gordyevka and investigate the report, and I notified the young woman of my intentions.

The officer sent to make the investigation reported as follows :

" On arrival at the Gordyevka school house, I was met by a body of seventy or eighty men, all armed with rifles, mostly Russian army rifles, with a few old single shot 45-70 caliber among them. The information I obtained was all taken in the presence of these seventy or eighty armed villagers and some twenty five or thirty women. Most of the information was from the wives of the victims, and these women broke down repeatedly, during this trying ordeal for them. The first woman interviewed said her husband was on his way to the school house with his rifle to turn it in to the Russian troops, as ordered. He was seized on the street, beaten over the head and body with his rifle, and then taken to a house a short distance from the school where he was stretched by his neck to a pin in the rafter, his hands tied, and terribly beaten about the body and head until the blood was splashed even on the walls of the room, and the marks on his body showed me that he had been"hung by his feet also.

" He was later stood in a row, with eight other men, and shot to death at 2 o'clock P.M. There were ten men in line and all were killed but one, he being left for dead by Ivanoff-Rinoff's troops. -The next woman I interviewed was the woman, in whose house all the men were beaten, and in the back of whose barnyard the men were shot. She stated that about 11 A.M., the morning of March 9, 1919, a number of Ivanoff-Rinoff's officers came to her house and made her take her hus-band to another house, and about 11:30 they took her husband back to her house and beat him, with the rest of them, also broke one of his arms and cut out his fingernails, and knocked out all of his front teeth. Her husband was an invalid and a cripple."

The officer said in his remarks:

" I found that the floor of the room these men were beaten in was covered with blood, and the walls in the room were all splashed with blood. The wire and loops of rope that were used around the men's necks were still hanging from the ceiling and covered with blood. I also found that some of these men had been scalded with boiling water and burned with hot irons, heated in a little stove I found in the room.

" I visited the spot where these men were shot. These men were lined up and shot, and each body had at least three holes in it, and some as many as six or more. They were apparently shot in the feet first and then higher in the body."

There was much more evidence taken and reported by the young officer making the investigation and the evidence not quoted agrees, in every detail, with that above quoted.

This seemed to be such a terribly shocking case that I ordered the young officer to report to me in person. He was not a regular Army Officer, but was in the service only for the duration of the War. I shall always remember the remark this officer made to me after I had finished questioning him. His remark was:

" General, for God's sake, never send me on another expedition like this. I came within an ace of pulling off my uniform, joining these poor people, and helping them as best I could."

From Spasskoe, on the railroad between Vladivostok and Habarovsk, an entirely separate section from Gordyevka, the Intelligence officer reported relative to Russian officers sent to Spasskoe:

" They laughingly tell of their experience in the recent raids, in search of arms and clothing. In order to make a point of duly impressing the people of the seriousness of their mission, they seize the first man they see, upon entering a village, and give him fifty lashes, and later give him more if there was reason to believe that he held back any information."

If this was an isolated case it might be taken as the boasting of young ignorant officers, but reports showed that this practice was carried out in other parts of the Far East, and reports of these terrible atrocities reached me from many different stations of American troops. Many of these reports claimed that the maltreating of the peasants was done by Japanese soldiers, or by Russians under the protection, and in the presence of Japanese troops. I had no means of investigating nine tenths of these reports, and even if we had made an investigation and found they were true, we had no remedy. The object of this terrorism was not only to spread terror among the peasants, but Japan and the Russian autocratic class hoped to create a situation that would force the peasants to try to protect themselves, and this would justify calling for more Allied troops to put down the Bolsheviks. By the ruthless and systematic search for all arms in the hands of peasants, these poor people had no means of protecting themselves and could only pray and hope for relief and trust that the Russian troops being mobilized were not in sympathy with the Kolchak Government, and would revolt and save them from the terrible punishments being inflicted upon them.

The Kolchak adherents, including Semeonoff and Kalmikoff, who claimed to be supporting him, were assembled along the Ussuri, Chinese Eastern, and Trans-Siberian railroads. They could not have existed away from the railroads and, in my judgement, at no time while I was in Siberia was there enough popular support behind Kolchak in Eastern Siberia for him, or the people supporting him, to have lasted one month if all Allied supports had been removed.

Judging from the liberal, material, and financial support given by Japan to certain reactionary leaders in Eastern Siberia, and from the energetic efforts she and her paid Russians agents were making to spread terror there, I was always convinced, and am so convinced today, that the Japanese were constantly looking for and expecting some occurrence or event to hap-pen that would justify them in directing Semeonoff to declare Eastern Siberia independent of the rest of Russia. This could have been claimed as a necessary step in fighting bolshevism.

The Japanese and Cossack leaders were always trying to attribute their troubles to the presence of United States soldiers and every time I was approached by anyone with a proposition involving the use of American troops, I told them that our forces were to take no part in these differences and would not be used to protect either side in case of conflict. The Japanese and their Cossack puppets hoped to get the United States in a position where we would be attacked by the Bolsheviks and then I would take sides. This would have relieved them of a great deal of embarrassment.

On February 2.5, 1919, I cabled Washington, in part:

" General Romanoffsky, representing Kolchak, in-formed me yesterday that the Russian people were now pretty well crystallized into two parties and they considered any man not with them, as being against them; that they had to fight for their existence, and proposed to take such steps against their enemies, in Eastern Siberia, as they considered necessary, without regard to the Allies."

This was a correct statement of the situation. This same day a representative of the Zemstvos informed me:

" The middle class are bitter against the newly formed Russian troops as they are whipping and other-wise maltreating the people and this resentment may extend to the Allies, as the people believe this condition could not exist if Allied troops were not in Siberia."

I felt sure, in my own mind, that no one could interpret my instructions other than I had interpreted them, although I knew the Consul General in Siberia, Mr. Harris, was anything but favourable to my attitude there and I also felt, but without the same knowledge I had with reference to Mr. Harris, that the Section of Russian affairs in the State Department was unsympathetic. I had reason to believe that Mr. Morris, American Ambassador in Japan, and handling the Russian question in the Far East for the State Department, heartily approved of my stand in Siberia.

In order that there could be no misunderstanding I cabled the War Department:

" The feeling is now becoming so bitter that each faction claims that if you are not with them you are against them. The Japanese have started a campaign to put down an uprising in Amur Province and my refusal to permit'the use of United States troops in the trouble between Russian factions has enabled the reactionary party to claim that Americans are Bolsheviks and enabled the other party to claim that we are favorable to the reactionaries because, by our presence, the reactionary party is enabled to commit excesses on the people which they could not do if the Allied troops were not present. No one doubts the truth of this latter contention. Japan and the United States are in Siberia with the same announced purpose and are following opposite courses relative to taking part in internal troubles. This has made it seem advisable to me to ask if my policy, in considering the Bolshevik trouble in Siberia, entirely an internal trouble, in which I should take no part, is the policy the Department desires me to follow."

On the 28th of March, I received a reply from General March, Chief of Staff, as follows:

" The delay in answering cablegram has been due to the fact that State Department cabled it in full to the President for his instructions, and, so far, no reply has been received. Your action as reported in the cable-gram was in accordance with your original instructions and is approved, and you will be guided by those instructions until they are modified by the President."

After this I felt doubly sure as to the desires of the principal officials in Washington, regardless of what subordinates might try to do in order to carry out their own conceions as to what the United States Government should do in Siberia.

In addition to this cable I received a personal letter from General March, which I am going to publish without asking his consent, for if I did ask his consent to publish this letter it might embarrass him. This short statement throws a ray of light on General March's conception of duty, which should be better understood in the United States, and this very significant and agreeable letter read:

" Keep a stiff upper lip, I am going to stand by you until   freezes over."

In February, a committee of six peasants came to see me. They were from the Olga district, which is off the railroad and in the extreme east of Siberia. They reported that the White Russian troops, when unable to find the men they were looking for, would beat the women over their-backs with ramrods taken from their guns. They said these women were beaten until their backs were raw, and the spokesman of this committee said:

" You do not have to take our word for this, we do not want you to take our word, send an officer to investigate and bring a Japanese and an English officer with you. We can show them many women who have been terribly beaten by these Kolchak troops."

I received official reports confirming the statement of these peasants, and in referring to this in my official report said:

" These Russian troops committing these acts are part of Ivanoff-Rinoff's troops and, for reasons above stated, I believe to be armed, equipped, and paid in part by Japan."

In any country in the world, whether civilized or not, the inhabitants would take such steps as they could to protect themselves from such inhuman atrocities. There was great resentment against Japan by the peasants of Eastern Siberia, because everyone knew these atrocities were committed by Russians in their pay and under their protection, and the United States was not, and should not have been, entirely free from the harsh feeling of the people for these terrible cruel-ties committed by Japanese hirelings, as the United States had let it be known, throughout the world, that she had invited Japan to join her in sending troops to Siberia. My reports to Washington were filled with these terrible atrocities and, so far as the people of Siberia knew and, in fact, so far as I knew, not one word of protest was ever made to Japan for these acts.

In view of Consul General Harris' attitude towards the controversy in Siberia, between the Bolsheviks and the anti-Bolsheviks, I doubt very much if he ever reported these atrocities, and as the State Department announced that the Government intended to get its information as to conditions from representatives of the State Department, it is possible that the United States Government had no official information of these atrocities.

On March 3, I reported to Washington:

" Japanese Headquarters inform me of the following losses suffered in fighting against bolsheviks in the vicinity of Blagovestchensk -
Feb. 11th, two officers, eighteen soldiers, killed near Zabetaya.
Feb. 15th, one officer and from ten to twenty soldiers killed near Andreskaya.
Feb. 16th, a reconnoitering patrol of one officer and fifty men encountered a Bolshevik force, of about twenty-five hundred, near Skranskoy, about thirty kilometers Northwest of Alexeyensk, the entire Japanese patrol killed.

"On the same day two peace strength companies of Infantry, total of about two hundred and fifty men, one company of Artillery and one section of Infantry met the same bolshevik force at different times, and only three Japanese escaped, all others being killed. In this connection on February 12, General Oi, Japanese at Habarovsk, called on Colonel Styer for one company of American soldiers to be sent to Japanese assistance. Colonel Styer asked for Instructions. I sent Colonel Robinson, Chief of Staff, to the Japanese Chief of Staff to tell him that before I could take part in this trouble I must know that the so-called Bolsheviks were not Russians resisting unjust treatment by troops. The Japanese Chief of Staff said he had not heard of this trouble from General Oi and told Robinson not to do anything unless he heard further from him. Nothing more on the subject."

This incident was used where it could be, to stir up resentment against United States troops, and the Japanese press was very acrimonious in their comments.

In this connection I saw in the American press a statement that, " the Japanese War Department has issued a version of the encounter between the Japanese and the Bolsheviki. Accompanying this story is an allusion to the attitude of General Graves, who is alleged by the Japanese to have refused to go to their assistance."

Again on April is, 1919, the press carried the following statement :

" The Japanese press has been making capital in Tokyo out of the allegation that the American forces were permitted by General Graves and other officers of the American expedition, to stand by while a Japanese Military contingent was being wiped out."

By false statement and implication, the persons responsible for these reports were trying to make political capital out of a terrible disaster which we all regretted, by bearing false witness against a representative of a friendly nation. In the first place the Japanese Commander, through his Chief of Staff, conveyed to me, through my Chief of Staff, the message not to take any action on the request of General Oi unless I heard further from Japanese Headquarters at Vladivostok, and I never received any request relative to the trouble from Japanese Headquarters. However, I probably would have refused to send American troops if I had been requested to do so, unless the Japanese could have shown me they were not the aggressors, which I am confident they could not have done. While the statement given out in Japan does not specifically say American troops were in the vicinity of the fight, it was so worded, and intentionally so worded, as to give the impression that Americans could easily have given assistance. As a matter of fact, there was not a single American soldier within four hundred miles of where this action took place. The Japanese in Siberia knew perfectly well, no matter what action I took, and no matter what action Colonel Styer took, relative to this fight, that the Americans could not have saved a single life of the Japanese. Why didn't the Japanese send their own troops to the assistance of their men? They had an entire division in Habarovsk and vicinity, while the Americans had but two battalions. General

Oi's request to Colonel Styer, on February 12, was to get Americans to go out for the specific purpose of fighting whom he called Bolsheviks, and which he knew perfectly well I could not and would not do.

About this time the American press was beginning to show a disposition to be critical of me and the American troops because we were not fighting the Bolsheviks. One paper said:

" We are not at war with the Bolsheviki, of course. We are fighting them at Archangel, but it is not war."

This writer expressed an idea quite prevalent in the world in 1919, and this idea could be justified only on the theory that might makes right. If the United States should send troops to Russian territory at the present time and begin fighting any faction in Russia, it would be War because the Soviets are now in a position to redress their injuries by use of force and, undoubtedly, would do so.

If I sent American troops with Japanese troops, as requested by General Oi, Americans would no longer have been pacific observers of the atrocities being committed in Siberia, but we would have been participants in them. The question is naturally asked what had these so called Bolsheviks done to justify General Oi in sending Japanese soldiers to destroy them? They were Russians, in Russian territory, against whom no nation had declared War, minding their own business and not endangering life, limb, or property of any Ally.

To those of our people who were impressed with the necessity of fighting bolshevism regardless of American policy, I was never able to determine who was a Bolshevik or why he was a Bolshevik. According to Japanese representatives and her paid puppets in Siberia, all Russians were Bolsheviks if they were not willing to take up arms and fight for the Semeonoffs, the Kalminoffs, the Rozanoffs, and the Ivanoff-Rinoffs, and the annals of crime in the United States will not show worse characters than these. According to the British and French representatives, all Russians who were not willing to take up arms and fight for Kolchak were Bolsheviks. At this time no nation in the world was willing to recognize any of the above named men, or any other man, as the de facto or de jure head of any Russian Government.

Soon after I arrived in Vladivostok I met General Nakajima of the Japanese forces. He seemed to be a most important Japanese official, without having any specific duty as was customary with other Japanese generals. He was always very courteous and pleasant, and seemed to be in the forefront of all discussions, regardless of the subject. He was known in American Headquarters as the political General of japan. He came to me and suggested that, as Japan and the United States were so closely associated in their work in Siberia, it would be advisable for the military representatives of both countries to have knowledge of what the other was reporting to his Government, and suggested that I tell the Japanese of important communications I sent to Washington, and they would tell me what important messages they sent to Tokyo. I knew, of course, that they would not show me the Tokyo dispatches of any importance, and he was reflecting upon my common sense by suggesting that I show him my dispatches to Washington.

I determined, however, to play his game and told him I thought his suggestion an excellent one but it seemed only fair that, as Nakajima had suggested the scheme, that they put it into operation by showing me the first dispatch. I expected him to show me an innocuous dispatch, and I intended to meet him in kind, but this beautiful agreement was never put into operation.

After a month or so, Nakajima was sent back to Japan and it was soon an open secret that his activities were objectionable to some foreign representatives, and he had been recalled by the Japanese Government, supposedly not in its best graces. We were soon to realize, however, that his activities were not objection-able to the Japanese Government, by hearing of his promotion from a Major General to a Lieutenant General in the Japanese Army. Mr. Carl Ackerman, in his book, " Trailing the Bolsheviki," speaks of him as the General Ludendorff of the Japanese Army.

The next time I heard of him was on March 16, 1919, when I received a cable from the American Military Attache in Tokyo, it said:

" Japanese General Staff reports ten American Army deserters have joined red guards Northeast of Vladivostok, and one has been caured. Lieutenant General Nakajima, Japanese General Staff, called me for a private conference and expressed great concern as to the future relations of the Japanese and American troops in Siberia, because (omission) and Americans are not. He referred to our failure to render assistance to General Yamada on the Amur, and to recent American deserters joining the Bolsheviks. He asked quite pointedly, what the Americans would do if the bolsheviks cut the railroad, after the new plan for guarding the railroad had been set up, and whether we would assist Japanese, remain idle, or assist their enemies, the bolsheviks. He was clearly opposed to your troops being stationed at Chita or Manchuli."

This is a fair example of the charges Americans had to meet, not only where the false allegations were made and could be refuted by the facts, but elsewhere, where neither party to the discussion knew the facts and could not intelligently discuss problems arising in Siberia.

Nakajima's statements bordered on an insult and, in my judgement, did not deserve a diplomatic answer. I replied to the telegram:

" There are six American deserters at large. The one reported as caured, has not been delivered to me. False statements have been so common that I will not believe they have captured one unless I see him. Nakajima does not know that the American deserters have joined the bolsheviks. This is a typical erroneous statement. I consider his question as to what I would do, under certain conditions, borders on insulting insinuations and characteristic of. other meddlesome actions in business which pertains to the United States alone. I expect to guard my part of the railway in my own way, and this does not concern other Nations until I have failed in my duty. General Inagaki informed me yesterday that they' had instructions not to fight bolsheviks unless attacked or to prevent disorders in the country. I cannot see why the United States cannot send troops into China or Siberia without getting the consent of Japan. They would bitterly resent any foreigner atteming to interfere in the locating of their troops in this same country. I do not consider they have any more interest in Manchuria and Siberia, than the United States. Japanese headquarters here have in-formed me that the Japanese supplied Kalmikoff with his arms and equipment. There is not a man in the bolshevik, or any other army, worse than Kalmikoff, who recently stated that he was glad to be under the command of General Oi."

The Vice-President of the Provincial Zemstvo, an editor of a local paper, and two other men in Vladivostok were arrested on the night of the and of March, 1919, by Russian White troops under instructions of Ivanoff-Rinoff, and at 5 o'clock in the morning were started west in a prison car. It was well known in Vladivostok that these four men had been started for Semeonoff's murdering ground.

Very soon after they had started, the wives of three of the men came to American Headquarters and wanted to see me. I told the officer who came to my room to report to me, to tell the women that I had nothing to do with it and could take no action, but they were not satisfied and refused to leave without seeing me. In the morning when I got up at the regular hour and passed my office door, I saw the women still there, so went in to tell them we could take no part in the Russian difficulties. It was remarkable to see how quiet and determined these women were.

The woman, who did the talking, heard me and then, in a quiet voice, said the people of Vladivostok had thought, as the Allies were responsible for order there, they were safe from such outrages. She then said: " there will be an uprising and all we want you and the other Allies to do is to continue your policy of non-interference." She said the reactionary Russians who had committed this outrage had been given arms by the Allies, but that they could manage them if the Allies kept their hands off. I made no further comment to these women and they left my office.

Soon after I had finished my breakfast, Sir Charles Eliot, British High Commissioner, came to see me and in a very excited manner said he understood I had said that American troops would not be used to prevent an uprising of the people. As I had not discussed the question with anyone, and had said no such thing, I told Sir Charles he had been misinformed. He then asked me if I would use American troops in case of an uprising, and I replied that I would not make any definite statement as to what action I would take until I knew the nature of the uprising and the cause. He became more excited and said the lives of British subjects and British property were involved and that he must know my attitude.

I finally told Sir Charles, after some more words, that I was well aware that he wanted to know my attitude towards protecting Ivanoff-Rinoff and Horvath and that I could answer his question, and the answer would be that he knew this was a cold blooded murder, and the United States had never been in the habit of protecting murderers, and that I did not intend doing so now and, so far as I was concerned, they could bring Ivanoff-Rinoff opposite American Headquarters and hang him to that telegraph pole until he was dead, and not an American soldier would turn his hand. This seemed to satisfy Sir Charles and he immediately left my office. I have always believed that the British and the Japanese knew these arrests were going to be made.

The prison car was stopped at Progranichnaya, a railroad town on the line between Siberia and Manchuria, and it looked to me as if when Sir Charles got back to his office and had discussed the question with White Russians and possibly others, they decided they had better not run the risk of an uprising, and so had stopped the car.

The Russians had a prison car at Progranichnaya, exactly like the one these prisoners were in, and as soon as they arrived at the station these cars were switched, the emy one going west with the train, and the one containing the prisoners left where the emy car had been. This was evidently an attem to fool some one.

Reports were received from the American R. R. Service Corps, by telegraph in Vladivostok, about the car which was not sent on to Semeonoff, as everyone expected it would be, but was shunted off the main line and started south on the Japanese line towards Changchun. The action being designed to create the impression they never had intended turning the prisoners over to Semeonoff to be killed. Japanese sentinels were placed around the supposed emy prison car at Progranichnaya and no one was permitted to go near it. They sent food to the men by a twelve year old boy and, the first time this boy brought a meal to them, he found an opportunity and, in the presence of the guard but in a sotto voice, told them that the engineer of the train waiting to go to Vladivostok said he would take any message they wanted to send to their families. They sent a note to their people so their whereabouts was known before the ruse of sending the other car to Changchun, on the Japanese line, was fairly started.

The Allied Commanders had a meeting and I pro-posed that we send a notice to the Russian Commander, Ivanoff-Rinoff, stating that, as the Allies were responsible for order in Vladivostok it was incumbent upon them to see that justice was shown to all, therefore, we would not permit Russians to be arrested and taken out of Vladivostok where their guilt or innocence should be determined, and, if tried, we claimed the right to send a representative to the trial with a view to determining if it was a bona fide trial for an offense.

The French representative claimed that this was an interference in Russian affairs and was also a political question which we could not deal with. The Japanese being the senior and presiding, again said as we were not unanimous we would drop it. I told the Japanese the day had passed when he could veto the action of a majority of the Allied Commanders, that the notice would be sent and those who did not wish to sign it need not do so. The Frenchman said he would have to consult his Government and asked if we would wait until he cabled to Paris, which we readily consented to do. In three or four days the notice was sent to Ivanoff-Rinoff and all the Allied Commanders signed it. General Blair, the British representative at that time, was selected to take the resolution to Russian Headquarters. The prisoners were never sent west of Progranichnaya and, in a few days after the resolution was sent to Russian Headquarters, they were sent to the military jail at Nikolsk and kept there for about two weeks, when they were released.

At this period of extreme criticism, I received an unexpected assertion from Colonel Butenko, who had been selected by the Russians and Allies for Fortress Commander before my arrival in Siberia. He came to see me and, with the aid of my interpreter, told me, in effect, that he was convinced the Allies could get nowhere by trying to assist individual Russians. The result would be resentment on the part of the mass of Russians and would be an injury to the cause the Allies desired to help. He said he felt that my policy of not taking sides was the only one that gave any hope of help to stabilize conditions. He also said that I undoubtedly knew of the opposition to my policy, not only by the Anti-Bolshevik Russians but by the Allies, and on that account he could not come to see me unless he came after midnight, but I could count on his assistance in every way possible.

This offer proved to be of great help to me, not only in that it gave me needed information, but helped me to check information from other sources. I knew that if Colonel Butenko was known to be friendly to me he would not last a week. I rarely ever saw him but he continued his assistance for about a year, when he received orders to report to Omsk. He knew, and I knew, that this meant he had been suspected of something and he feared that, as he passed through Chita, Semeonoff would take him off the train and kill him. He went west on a train guarded by American and Czech soldiers, and no effort was made to arrest him.

His help came principally from the fact that he had access as Fortress Commander, to all telegrams passing through the Vladivostok office, which all telegrams reaching Eastern Siberia did.