THE DEBACLE


GENERAL ROZANOFF, in Vladivostok, was driven from power on January 31, 1920. There was no fighting in this turnover, and, as I remember, there was only one shot fired, and that was from a piece of field Artillery at the house occupied by General Rozanoff. That shot missed its mark, but the sound seemed to be sufficient for Rozanoff and his sup-porters, the Japanese, to lose their nerve, as the Japanese clothed Rozanoff in a Japanese officer's long cape, and Japanese military cap, and conducted him to Japanese Headquarters, which ended his crooked career in Siberia.

At the time of this coup d'etat, Mr. MacGowan was American Consul at Vladivostok, and as soon as it was certain that Rozanoff was to be overthrown, he rushed to Major Johnson, who was the American in charge of the military police in Vladivostok, and requested him to place a guard of American soldiers at the home of a certain Russian, in order to prevent any of the new regime from entering the house.

Major Johnson, unfortunately, complied with the re-quest, without consulting me. Later, when Mr. Mac-Gowan wanted the guard increased, Major Johnson then suggested that they see me about it and I not only refused to increase the guard, but directed Major Johnson to remove it from the house.

It was later reported to me that Mr. MacGowan went from my office to the Russian's house and that he and the Russian put some papers in a sheet and took them to the American Consulate, before the guard could be removed. I never knew and could never understand why Mr. MacGowan was so solicitous about the premises and papers of this particular Russian, as he was noted as being one of the most violent anti-American unofficial Russians in Vladivostok. It was stated frequently that he was in the habit, at weekly luncheons of a certain anti-American Russian group, of making the most immoderate talks about the Americans.

In October, 1920, when en route to Nagasaki, Japan, from Manila, I was told by the Captain of the transport, that this same Russian was to board the transport at Nagasaki for San Francisco.

I immediately wirelessed to General Kernan in Manila, protesting against this man's going to the United States, and suggested that he confer with Major Eichelberger, and Major T. W. King at his Headquarters, as to the anti-American attitude taken by this Russian while we were in Siberia. General Kernan revoked his permit to go on the transport, and we left him in Nagasaki.

I was later informed, however, that he did get to the United States. Something is wrong with our immigration laws or the application of our laws, when such Russians as the one under consideration and Semeonoff could be picked out as of the favoured few to receive a permit to enter the United States.

I naturally supposed that Consul MacGowan was behind permitting this Russian to enter the United States, and I have often wondered what his object was. The circumstances connected with this whole case were such as to cause unfortunate conjecture.

Major P. R. Faymonville, U. S. Army, on duty on board the U.S.A. T. Mount Vernon, used in transporting Czechs from Vladivostok to their home, in-formed me of the following communication received by him upon his arrival in Panama, May 24, 1920:

" Reliable report indicates presence on board Mount Vernon, due Panama shortly, of two dangerous Bolshevik officials, natives of Vladivostok, Krakovetsky and Telucheff. These men refused admittance to United States at San Francisco. Will probably try to leave ship at Panama.

(Signed) Churchill,
Director Military Intelligence."

Major Faymonville replied to this communication:

" These two men are aboard but they are neither Bolsheviks nor dangerous. They were from January until their departure the best friends America had in Siberia. So far as known they were not refused admittance in San Francisco, as they did not apply. There is not the faintest chance of their trying to leave the ship at Panama."

Major Faymonville wrote me a personal letter about this incident in which he said: " the Bolsheviks have been ashore, and the Gatun Dam has not yet been blown up ! " As the MacGowans left the ship at San Francisco, I think they must be the reliable authorities " on which General Churchill depended.

This and other Russian cases were the outcropping of Mr. MacGowan's bitterness at the American Military in Siberia, and the only foundation for this bitterness was the refusal of the Army to follow the lead of Consul General Harris, and himself, in supporting the autocratic class of Russians.

By this time, the Americans had ceased guarding the railroad, except where it was necessary for Americans and Czechs to reach Vladivostok to embark for their homes.

The Japanese acted as if they had some idea of offering resistance when Rozanoff was deposed at Vladivostok, although they evidently did not expect the anti-Rozanoff troops to arrive from the country district away from the railroad, and were, therefore, very much surprised when they marched into Vladivostok early in the morning. Some American officers heard of their approach and hurried out to witness the entry into the city. They reported to me that the Japanese Military were at sea as they had. expected troops to enter by the railroad, and had posted troops along the line to Nikolsk. They did not like to give up, even after Vladivostok had been taken, and it seems incredible that they had no plan of action, but it certainly looked that way. I was sick in bed with tonsillitis and could not leave my bedroom with safety.

About ro o'clock in the morning of the 31st, three or four hours after the overthrow, a message came to my Headquarters that the Japanese had posted their troops on the American sector of the railroad, endangering the safety of the road in case of hostilities. I resented the action of the Japanese, as they were interfering with the operation of the Railroad Agreement, which interference might result in destroying a tunnel between Vladivostok and Nikolsk and frustrate the plans of evacuation of the Americans and Czechs.

I knew I had to see General Oi, tonsillitis or not, so I ordered rr,y car, and went to Japanese Head-quarters. I found General Oi in a very ugly mood but I at once told him my business, and demanded the removal of his troops from my sector. He replied that he ranked me, and by reason of that fact he commanded me and all American troops in Siberia. I told him he knew he did not command American troops and I knew he never would command American troops. He then said that I was a military man and knew there could not be two heads to any military expedition. I replied, that might be his opinion and it might be mine, but he knew that I could not release command of American troops without instructions from my Government, and he could not give up command of the Japanese troops without instructions from the Japanese Government. He said, almost immediately:

" I must admit the logic of your statement, the Japanese troops will be removed."

I returned to my Headquarters, and in order that the record would be straight, I wrote him the following letter :

" 1. Referring to our conversation this forenoon, I desire to notify you that I formally and officially protest against the interference with the operation of the railroad this morning when an echelon of partisan troops was stopped by Japanese troops at Station Okeanskaya, on a sector guarded by American troops.

" 2. My duty in connection with the guarding of this sector of the railroad is in accordance with the Inter-Allied Railway Agreement, with which the Japanese representative was a party."

When Rozanoff was driven out of office, the incoming forces did not establish a new Government but supported the existing Zemstvos, who had been ready and willing to function, but since the advent of Kolchak, they not only could not regularly function but were forbidden to discuss questions concerning Kolchak's government. The question as to whether the Partizans desired the Zemstvo as a government or the Soviets is perhaps best answered by events subsequent to the withdrawal of foreign troops, but the fact re-mains that, they requested the Zemstvo to take charge as the only legal authority in the district.

By virtue of this action, Mr. Medviedeff became head of the Primorsk district, which included Vladivostok. This was a very difficult and trying position for the Zemstvo representatives, as there were foreign troops and Russian troops still in the Province and they knew well Japan's resentment at their temporary elimination from " the power behind the throne." Other Allied national representatives, as well as Consul General Harris, showed by their actions that the Zemstvo could not expect the same treatment as had been extended to Kolchak. For instance, Consul General Harris failed to respond to an invitation to a dinner, given by the new Provincial representatives. This was a clear indication of his attitude.

I received no further complaints from the State Department at my failure " to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians may be willing to accept assistance." The State Department, through General Churchill, charged me with failure to carry out my instructions because I did not help to " steady the effort of self-government " of Kolchak. If it had been logical for me, without specific instructions, to help Kolchak, it would have been equally logical for me to help the new Zemstvo Government, because all Russians were willing to accept assistance, which was the only condition stated in my orders be-fore assistance could be given. Of course, the President, or whoever wrote my instructions, could not logically expect that the Military, without specific instructions from Washington, should help any contending faction in Siberia.

The Zemstvo representatives took their new duties very seriously. Mr. Medviedeff came to see me and, without doubt, went to see other foreign representatives, and made the following statement:

" Russia has already spilt too much blood. As long as I am the head of this Government, no person will be deprived of life, liberty, or property except by decree of our civil courts. We will no longer permit the military to decide to kill some one, and then convene a military tribunal so as to make this murder legal in the eyes of the civilized world.

" I want to call your attention to the fact that we have not changed a single judge, and we do not intend to make any changes. The Chief Justice here was appointed by the Czar, and has been on the bench for eighteen years, and the Zemstvo is willing to abide by the decrees of the civil court."

I was very much impressed by this statement, as it indicated a tendency towards justice which I had not seen since my arrival in Siberia. I have no means of knowing for certain that this policy was followed, during the two months I was in Vladivostok while the Zemstvos were in power, but I do know that no one ever complained to me of unjust treatment by the Zemstvo officials. If anyone had been killed, I am sure word of the killing would have been brought to me at once, as there were too many people in Vladivostok looking for a chance to criticize this new regime.

I observed these Zemstvo officials carefully for the two months I remained in Siberia, and I never saw anyone try harder to be fair and just to everyone than did these people. I was very much surprised to receive newspapers in which it was stated, in effect, that the streets of Vladivostok were flowing in blood; the Bolsheviks were killing everyone with money or an education. These reports were so unjust I could not help wondering where they originated.

It was well known in Vladivostok that from November 18, 1919, to January 31, 1920, Rozanoff had killed between five and six hundred men, without any comment relative to his murders. The method to decide to execute and then convene a military tribunal to legalize the intended murder, was the method used by Rozanoff. This procedure was well known in Vladivostok, and I tested the accuracy of the information in one case, at the request of a Russian woman who had lived in New York at one time.

The Japanese remained quiescent, in the Primorsk province, during the remainder of my stay in Siberia, but Mr. Smith, American representative on the Inter-Allied Committee, telegraphed from Trans-Baikal that they were doing everything they could to retard the evacuation of the Czechs. They refused to let the Czechs go into the railroad shops to repair engines that were to be used in hauling them to Vladivostok. Mr. Smith stated:

" The Czechs will not permit this state of affairs to continue much longer, but will take matters into their own hands."

The Japanese, however, as was characteristic of them during the entire intervention, never went quite to the extent of having a clash, and the Czechs continuedto come east.

The Americans had a very uneventful two months, from the overthrow of Rozanoff to the departure of the last " echelon " on April 1, 1920, with which I left Siberia.

It was evident that the Russians in Vladivostok hated to see the Americans leave, with the Japanese remaining.

The Japanese and the Russians both requested me to inspect a battalion of their troops, as my last official act on Russian soil. The Japanese had been the first to extend the invitation to me, and I agreed to, acce, so I inspected the Russian troops an hour be-fore boarding the transport, and the Japanese troops just before going on board.

Just before sailing, a representative of the Associated Press, whose permanent assignment was in Tokyo, rushed on board to tell me that something was planned by the Japanese, but he did not know just what was contemplated. I asked him how he knew, and he replied that a Japanese official representative, whom he had known in Tokyo, had just said to him that he hoped the Americans would not think the Japanese people approved of what the Japanese Military contemplated doing as soon as I had gone.

This seemed to me to be of enough importance to cable to Washington, and I wrote the following:

" I have just been informed, by a reliable American, that a Japanese representative has just told my informant not to be surprised at anything that may happen. He said he, did not personally approve of the contemplated action of the Japanese Military, nor did he believe the Japanese people approved. When asked if the Japanese would declare war, he said Japan belonged to the League of Nations, and could not declare war without authority of the League, but the Japanese Military would act independently in Siberia. He also said that the Russian Staff had not exaggerated, when it stated that the Japanese had concluded an armistice with the Russian troops, at Nikolaevsk; had professed friendship and then had treacherously attacked the Russian Headquarters at one o'clock in the morning, with incendiary bombs and machine guns. In these two days fighting the Japanese were forced to surrender, after heavy losses."

I left the message with Colonel Eichelberger, who had been ordered to go to Tokyo, before going to Manila, and directed him to code, and send it that day. This was done and the message must have been in Washington not later than the second of April.

This comment of the Japanese representative undoubtedly referred to the action taken by the Japanese, on the night of April 4, in Vladivostok.

I received a complete account of the occurrence, and have it before me now, and there can be no doubt, in the mind of any fair-minded man, that it was a hostile occupation of Vladivostok, accompanied by reckless firing in the streets, resulting in the loss of human lives. The Zemstvo representatives had agreed to the demands of the Japanese, and as far as Mr. Medviedeff knew, there was no friction between them and the Japanese.

There are sufficient details in the report I have, which was made by an American official, to show conclusively that the Japanese started the firing, and the signal for the firing to commence was two red flashes, which were seen by the naval officer on watch on the U. S. S. " Albany." The Japanese justified the attack by claiming they had been attacked. Two days before I left Vladivostok, I went in my car around the out-skirts of the city. I had Colonel Eichelberger with me, and near First River we saw the Japanese digging trenches and filling sandbags as if they were preparing for a strong defense.

My personal relations with the Japanese left nothing to be desired, but, as the United States and Japan went to Siberia with the same announced purpose, and our paths of procedure went in opposite directions, official clashes were inevitable.

General Oi kindly sent a band to the dock to furnish music before the sailing of the " Great Northern, the transport on which I left for Manila, and as the boat backed away from the dock the Japanese band began playing the good old American tune, " Hard Times Come Again no More." Some looked upon this tune as amusing, others as indicative of past official relations.

I feel that this statement of my experiences in Siberia would be incomplete without mentioning the American organizations, and individuals cooperating with me in my work. I also believe the reader would get a clearer picture of Siberian intervention, if I give a short summary of my conclusion as to the intention of the various Governments with troops in Siberia. The conclusions were formed from the actions of the representatives of these Governments.

As to the American troops in Siberia, I can not sufficiently express my gratitude for their loyal support. In guarding the railways, the organizations had to be broken up into very small detachments, of sometimes only eight or ten men, and they all performed their duties in a manner worthy of the best traditions of the American soldier. They knew what was right and they did the right thing, regardless of the calumny and abuse heaped upon them by the press and people interested in misrepresenting them.

I was not surprised, but none the less gratified, that the American officers and enlisted men were, almost to a man, firm believers in the traditional policy of the United States, as old as the Government itself, that all Countries should settle their own differences, with-out interference of the United States soldier. Misrepresentations of the American troops, as well as the cry of " bolshevism " did not swerve the American officer or soldier from his conception of what was right and just.

The Military were indebted to the Navy for very cordial cooperation, support and helpfulness, and I, personally, am particularly indebted to Admiral Knight and Admiral Rodgers for helpful suggestions as to procedure in times of stress.

The Y. M. C. A. carried out the traditional policy of that organization of giving succour and assistance where needed, regardless of politics or strata of society, and they rendered help to Americans as well as to all other Nationals. The fact that the Y. M. C. A. was giving assistance direct to Russians, rather than through the Russian official class, was the cause of unjust charges of improper and unethical activities.

The Knights of Columbus gave most of their time, attention, and funds to providing recreation and entertainment, as well as some small articles for the American soldiers and sailors. The service furnished by this organization was very helpful.

As far as I could see, all American welfare organizations, exceing the Red Cross, were not only in favour of, but followed the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of the Russian people.

The American Red Cross was used in supplying the Kolchak military forces. In a report made by the Red Cross in Vladivostok, of the work of the American Red Cross in Siberia, appears the following:

" The present work of the Red Cross is divided into two main lines of activity - military and refugee re-lief. The military relief, that is, the establishing, equipping, and operating of hospitals; the supplying of the All-Siberian Army with clothing, underwear, and other necessities, and the providing of drugs, medicine, and hospital supplies for Russian hospitals."

These- hospitals were military hospitals, which ac-corded with my observations. Again the report continues :

" The second activity is being taken in co-operation with the Government at Omsk. It is the ordering of medical supplies, through the Red Cross, and for the Kolchak Government of drugs and medicines to the value of at least two million dollars. This huge order, the largest, it is said, that has ever been sent to Siberia from America, is being filled as fast as possible. In the line of immediate service to the Russian troops, is the sending West of three hundred thousand suits of light underwear. The first shipment of these suits to Vladivostok was due to arrive about May 15, and will be immediately shipped West. Other big underwear shipments are to follow."

This reported aid to Kolchak was given, judging from the last statement, prior to May i5, 1919. I have no means of knowing what amount was expended by the Red Cross to assist the military forces of Kolchak, but I heard, while in Siberia, that it amounted to several million dollars. I hope this is excessive.

I personally thought it most unfortunate that such a pronounced action, against the announced policy of the United States, should be taken by a welfare agency of the United States because it was not possible to separate, in the minds of the Russian people, the acts of the Red Cross from the responsibility of the United States Government.

It does not seem possible to reconcile the actions of the various Governments in Siberia with the announced objects of intervention.

On August 8, 1918, the British made the following statement:

" We are coming as friends to help you save your-self from dismemberment and destruction at the hands of Germany, which is trying to enslave your people and use the great resources of your country to its own ends. We wish to solemnly assure you that we shall not retain one foot of your territory. The destinies of Russia are in the hands of the Russian people. It is for them, and them alone, to decide their forms of Government, and to find a solution for their social problems."

I am unable to find any similar statement made by the French Government.

On August 3, 1918, the United States made this announcement, relative to sending troops to Russia:

" As the Government of the United States sees the present circumstances, therefore, military action is admissable in Russia now, only to render such protection and help, as is possible to the Czecho-Slovaks, against the armed Austrian and German prisoners who are attacking them, and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians them-selves may be willing to accept assistance. Whether from Vladivostok or from Murmansk and Arch-angel, the only present object for which American troops will be employed, will be to guard Military stores which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces."

The complete policy of the United States, which the troops were to follow, will be found in Chaer One.

The Japanese also made an announcement on Au-gust 3, 1918, in part, as follows:

" In adopting this course, (intervention) the Japanese Government remains constant in their desire to promote relations of enduring friendship, and they re-affirm their avowed policy of respecting the territorial integrity of Russia, and of abstaining from all interferences in her national politics."

The Czecho-Slovak National Council at Washing-ton made this statement on July 27, 1918:

" The Czecho-Slovak Army in Russia was created in order to fight the Germans and Austrians, and when Russia deserted the cause of the Allies, arrangements were made by Professor T. G. Masaryk, president of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, and Commanderin-Chief of the Czecho-Slovak forces with the Allied representatives in Russia, and also with the Bolsheviks, to march the Czecho-Slovaks out of Russia and take them to the Western front. It should be kept clearly in mind that the occupation of Russian territory or the restoration of an Eastern Front was not thought of when these arrangements were made, in February, 1918. It was due to one of those German blunders, like the one that brought America into the War, that the Czecho-Slovaks, instead of withdrawing from Russia, are now in control of Siberia and a considerable territory west of the Urals. . . . A week ago (July 2oth), professor Masaryk received a lengthy cable report from the leader of the Czecho-Slovak forces in which the following words are found, indicative of the present desires of the men; ` In my opinion, it is most desirable and also possible to reconstruct a Russia-Germany front in the East. We ask for instructions as to whether we should leave for France or whether we should stay here to fight in Russia by the side of the Allies, and of Russia.' Professor Masaryk has since then instructed the forces in Siberia to remain there for the present."

All these statements are taken from Russian-American Relations, 1917-1920, Documents and Pa-pers. The complete statements will be found on pages 243, 237, 239, and 235. The dates these statements were made should be kept in mind.

In considering the British statement it will be observed that they did not make a definite statement that they would not interfere in the internal affairs of Russia, but the statement was so worded as to give the impression that their contemplated action in Russia was wholly altruistic.

In the discussion of the causes for intervention, one must now realize that one of the main reasons, if not the main reason, was carefully and designedly kept concealed.

The Allies were much disturbed because the Soviets had extended their authority throughout Siberia long before the decision to intervene, and it is evident England, France, and Japan went to Siberia with the distinct idea of fighting bolshevism but, for some reason, they tried to cover up this design by advocating the formation of an Eastern front, which they also hoped could be accomplished. It is very significant that all the Governments taking part in intervention in Siberia considered it unwise to let the world know that they intended to try to destroy the Soviets. Definite reasons for concealing this objective are, generally speaking, still unrevealed to the public.

In Russian-American Relations, under the heading, " Notes on Conversations held in the office of M. Pinchon, at the Quai d' Orsay, on January 16, 1919, page 285, appears:

" Mr. Lloyd George stated that there seemed to be three possible policies, 1. - Military intervention. It is true that the Bolshevik movement is as dangerous to civilization as German Militarism, but as to putting it down by the sword, is there any one who proposes it? If he now proposed to send a thousand British troops to Russia for that purpose, the armies would mutiny. The same applies to United States troops in Siberia; also the Canadians and the French as well."

Mr. Lloyd George also said, at this same time :

" Moreover, from information received, it would appear that Kolchak had been collecting members of the old regime around him, and would seem to be at heaft a monarchist." Kolchak had then been in power less than two months.

With reference to this same discussion, on page 287, Mr. Wilson is reported as saying in reply to the observation of Mr. Lloyd George: " He did not see how it was possible to controvert the statement of Mr. Lloyd George. . . . He did not believe that there would be sympathy anywhere, with the brutal aspect of bolshevism, if it were not for the fact of the domination of large vested interests in the political and economic world. . . ."

President Wilson stated that he would not be surprised to find that the reason why British and United States troops would not be ready to enter Russia to fight the Bolsheviks was explained by the fact that the troops were not at all sure that if they put down bolshevism, they would not bring about a reestablishment of the ancient order.

This was a remarkable statement for the President to have made, as the history of the United States does not disclose an incident where troops hesitated to obey the orders of the Government, regardless of their own personal views.

These statements are very significant as to why no mention of Soviets or Bolsheviks were made when the announcements to the world were published in August, 1918.

As to the attitude of the British in Siberia, General Knox, who had more to do with shaping the British policy than any other Britisher, did not share the views of Lloyd George, but considered Kolchak a liberal Russian, and felt that after the British had put Kolchak in power as Supreme Ruler, bolshevism would soon disappear. The definite statement, that the British put Kolchak in power, is based upon the following statement of Mr. Winston Churchill in the House of Commons, with reference to the Kolchak Government:

" The British Government had called it into being, for our own aid, at a time when necessity demanded it."

This statement, coupled with the action of the British troops in Omsk, the night the Directorate was overthrown and Kolchak was announced " Supreme Ruler," seems indicative of British intent.

General Knox had served in Russia as Military Attache during the Czarist regime. He could speak the Russian language, and undoubtedly thought he under-stood the Russian people. He probably did understand the character and the peculiarities of the Russian People with whom he associated in Petrograd, but I can not believe he understood the aspirations of the great mass of the Russian people. If he had understood these people, he could not have thought, as he apparently did, that the Russian peasants and workmen would take up arms and fight to put in power the Kolchak supporters, who were committing such atrocities against the people to whom they looked for military support. General Knox expressed to me the thought that " the poor Russians were only swine."

I, personally, never thought that Kolchak had any chance of establishing a Government in Siberia, but the belief of Knox and others like him, that the mass of the people were swine, and could be treated as such, hastened the downfall of Kolchak.

General Knox was disillusioned by the time he left Siberia. He came to see me and said that he had completely failed, that he had done nothing for Russia, his own country or himself. He might have gone further and stated that, in addition to accomplishing nothing, he had brought the resentment of the great mass of Russians upon himself and his country.

No Government engaging in intervention in Siberia could have escaped the resentment of the Russian people, but General Knox was so pronounced and so persistent in his interference in their internal affairs that the resentment was stronger against him than it was against any other foreigner in Russia.

It should be of record that all British representatives had, by no means, the same ideas as to the situation in Siberia as did Sir Charles Eliot and General Knox. When General Knox left, Colonel Wickham was, by virtue of seniority, in charge of the British Mission. In a few days he came to see me and told me he did not expect to last, as he was not willing to let his Government remain in ignorance of the real condition, and he had submitted a report, which he believed the British Government would not like, and he thought he would be relieved. He also told me that he had found, in his office, a report from a British officer, who was with Denikin, and this report showed that the conditions under Denikin were similar to conditions in Siberia; that by changing names of places and individuals the atrocities committed in Siberia could be made to apply in the country dominated by Denikin.

The French attitude in Siberia, as exemplified by General Janin, was identical, as far as I could see, with that of the British.

The Czechs, as represented in Siberia, believed in a Parliamentary Government as opposed to an Absolutist form of Government. Notwithstanding their democratic ideas, and their aversion to the treatment accorded by the Kolchak adherents to the masses, under the protection of the Czechs and other foreign troops, the Czech leaders were very desirous of working in harmony with the Allies, because of gratitude for what the Allies had done for the Czech people.

The statement of Dr. Girsa, Czech representative, in November, 1919, previously quoted in Chaer IX, expressed the real sentiment of the Czechs, as to the atrocities being committed against the mass of the Russian people, by a small fraction of the Russians who were being protected against punishment for their offenses, by foreign troops. When the Czechs, in May and June, 1918, drove the Soviets out of the towns along the Trans-Siberian Railway, and established a Government in accordance with their views, they did not realize that they were taking part in a Russian conflict that was predestined to establish either an Autocratic Government or an extreme Socialistic Government in Russia.

I certainly did not realize, and I imagine few foreigners did, how deep seated the factional feeling was in the Russian classes. We all knew there were many times the number of Bolsheviks in Siberia, at the down-fall of Kolchak, as when we first went to Siberia. My Intelligence officer, after considering reports, from all parts of the Trans-Siberian Railway, concluded the bolsheviks had increased ten fold. I think his estimate was very conservative.

It is difficult to understand how Japan could make the solemn statement to the Russian people in August, 1918, that they intended to refrain from all interference in the internal politics of Russia, and then take action which I imagine no Japanese authority will now claim did not constitute interference in the internal affairs of the Russian people. In fact, Baron Kato, head of the Japanese delegation to the Limitation of Arms Conference, in Washington, in 1921-22, officially stated that the Japanese, about the time the Allied contingents were sent to Siberia in 1918, decided to give Semeonoff material support in order to aid him in checking the Bolshevik influence from permeating the Far East.

Baron Shidehara, a member of the Japanese delegation to the Limitation of Arms Conference, officially said to the Conference:

" The Military expedition of Japan to Siberia was originally undertaken in common accord and in co-operation with the United States in 1918. It was primarily intended to render assistance to the Czecho-Slovak troops, who, in their homeward journey across Siberia from European Russia, found themselves in grave and pressing danger, at the hands of hostile forces under German command."

The first official statement given out by the Japanese Government as to intervention in Siberia, was on August 3, 1918.

The Czecho-Slovak National Council at Washington, D. C., on July 27, 1918, one week before the Japanese and Americans decided to go to Siberia to relieve the Czechs, stated, as previously noted:

" That the Czecho-Slovaks, instead of withdrawing from Russia, are now in control of Siberia and of considerable territory West of the Urals."

As a matter of fact, the Czechs had taken control of the Trans-Siberian Railway, and most of the towns on this line and had definitely decided not to leave, TWO MONTHS BEFORE JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES DECIDED TO GO TO THEIR RELIEF, AND HELP THEM TO GET OUT OF SIBERIA.

This is established by the very complete stenographic report of Colonel Emerson, previously quoted, and confirmed by Professor Masaryk's statement, as president of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, that he had instructed the Czech " forces in Siberia to re-main there for the present." These instructions were given in response to a cable report from the Czech leader in Siberia, received in Washington July 20, 1918.

In my judgement, the Japanese, without cessation, and in the most obnoxious way, interfered in Russian affairs from the day I entered Siberia until the day I left. They did not deny supporting Semeonoff and Kalmikoff, whose actions under the protection and sup-port of Japan, were sure to cause resentment by the Siberian people, not only against Japan, but against all other nations taking part in intervention. The Siberian people were sure to reason that the presence of foreign soldiers made it possible for the Cossacks to murder, beat, and rob men, women and children. They are sure to come to this conclusion, because the stubborn facts justify it. These facts have been, and may continue to be hidden from the American people, but they are not hidden from the Russian people.

The acts of these Cossacks, and other Kolchak leaders under the protection of foreign troops, were the greatest asset to bolshevism that could have been devised by man. The atrocities were of such a nature, that they are sure to be remembered by, and recounted to, the Russian people for fifty years after they were committed.

That the Japanese had some object in giving financial, moral, material, and military aid to the Cossacks, is a self-evident fact. Their statement, made at the Limitation of Arms Conference, as to the objects to be attained by intervention in Siberia, is not convincing to one on the ground with the Japanese Military. All of those not in the inner circle as to the intention of the Japanese, of which I was one, expected Japan to have Semeonoff declare himself dictator of Siberia, east of Lake Baikal, in order to be in a position to control Eastern Siberia, without being charged with bad faith in failing to carry out her solemn assurance to the Russian people, in August, 1918. The difficulty comes in deciding why this action was not taken, as two or three times the fruit seemed ready for Japan to pluck. I, of course, only saw the action of the Japanese Military, and had no means of knowing if the Japanese Government approved the action of the Military in Siberia, but the failure of the Japanese Military to complete their apparent designs seemed to me to indicate that something interfered; whether the attitude of their own government, or others, including our own.

The Chinese troops in Siberia were very faithful to the obligations they assumed, attended strictly to their own business and did not meddle in the affairs of other people.

It is more difficult to come to a logical conclusion as to the reasons for intervention in Siberia by the United States, than that of any other nation. I can come to a conclusion, satisfactory to myself, as to why other nations took part, but have never been able to come to any satisfying conclusion as to why the United States ever engaged in such intervention.

I must conclude that the reasons for intervention by the United States as given out on August 3, 1918, were not frank and complete, and my instructions, quoted in the first chaer, stated " Military action is admissible in Russia only to help the Czecho-Slovaks consolidate their forces and get into successful co-operation with their Slavic kinsmen." This was dated July 17, 1918, but was not made known to me, or to the public, until August 3, 1918.

It was known to Consul General Harris, in Siberia, and to Mr. DeWitt C. Poole, Consul General in European Russia, at least one month before I received my orders, that the Czechs were not in need of help; that they had taken the Trans-Siberian Railway and had driven the Soviets out of the towns along the railroad and had organized new Governments for these towns; and that they did not intend to leave Siberia, as con-firmed by the Czech National Council in Washington, at least one week before I was ordered to go to Siberia, for the purpose of their relief. It is difficult to believe that Professor Masaryk, who was head of the Czech National Council functioning in Washington, was not consulted as to the move of the United States troops to go to the assistance of the Czechs in far-away Siberia.

Consul General Harris, in Irkutsk, notified Colonel Emerson that, on July 2, 1918, he had received from the " Peking Legation," information that the Czechs were not going to leave Siberia. This is very indefinite, when one tries to reach a specific responsible official.

Mr. Harris did not say the information came from the American Legation, but as he considered it definite enough for him to take action, it must have come from someone in the American Legation in Peking, and I suppose this information came from Washington, through Peking, because Mr. Harris could be more surely reached that way than through the American Ambassador to Russia, who was at that time at Vologda.

It is known, from Colonel Emerson's report, that the Soviets had been trying to get the Czechs out of Siberia for two months before I received my instructions, and that they would not go. The Soviets had offered to send officials with them, to see that they were not delayed in transit to Vladivostok. My instructions stated that there was immediate necessity for helping the Czechs. As has just been shown, this was an error, or a deliberate misrepresentation. Was it possible, that the facts about the Czechs were not known in Washington, when my instructions were prepared?

The United States had Consular representatives in Siberia at the time. Consul General Harris was in Irkutsk, and to the west, in order to see about aiding the Czechs to get out of Siberia, and knew well, before my instructions were issued, that the Czechs were not going to leave and were not in need of help. Naturally one wonders if the facts were reported by the United States representatives and ignored in Washington, or were my instructions based upon the propaganda relative to the Czechs, and without any information from the consular representatives in Siberia? It has been established that the Czechs had possession of all the Trans-Siberian Railway, and if the condition of the Czechs, still in European Russia, demanded relief, such a situation could have no bearing on my instructions, as I was directed not to go west of Irkutsk, under any circumstances.

The United States was led to believe that the Soviets had released the German and Austrian prisoners, who were confined in Siberia, which was not a fact as shown by reports of United States representatives, who were sent to make an investigation of these re-ports, as well as by subsequent information which has come to light.

The Americans were also sent to guard the military stores, that might be needed in future by the Russian forces, but the lack of cooperation by the various representatives in Siberia made it impossible to accomplish much in this respect.

The only part of the original policy remaining was " to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance." This was the peg upon which the State Department hung its complaint by Mr. Poole, through General Churchill, that I failed to comply with this part of my order, because I did not help " steady " Kolchak.

It seems to me very evident that it was never contemplated by the War Department that the Military should pick out a faction of the Russians, and extend help to that faction without any decision in Washing-ton as to the desirability of helping that particular faction. In any case the War Department looked upon my instructions as I did.

I can not escape the conviction that Mr. Poole, in Washington, and Mr. Harris, in Siberia, both State Department officials, were very anxious for me to use American troops in fighting Bolsheviks. Mr. Poole had been Consul General in Archangel before going to Washington, and had seen American troops so used. I also believe these two officials, by criticism and by suggestion, hoped I would use American troops as they wished them used, rather than as ordered by the Secretary of War.

The different policies of the various representatives in Siberia was reflected in the attitude towards propositions coming before the Allied Commanders. It was noticeable that, when differences occurred, the English, French, and Japanese Commanders, almost without exceion, were in accord on one side, and the American, Chinese, Canadians, Czechs, and Italians were on the other side.

The United States troops tried, very conscientiously, to carry out the policy of avoiding the conflicts between the Russian factions, and this could be done until the Military was ordered to guard the railroads, which made it necessary for them to take sides, as the rail-roads were, in practice, operated by Kolchak adherents for the specific benefit of the Kolchak forces.

I was the agent for delivering arms and ammunition to Kolchak, for use by his fighting forces, the President having, on June 12, 1919, agreed to help Kolchak with " munitions, supplies, and food." I could not reconcile these acts with the principle of non-interference with the internal affairs of the Russian people. Although the State Department seemed able to do so, as on November 7, 1919, after the munitions, at least, had been given to Kolchak, it stated:

" This Government does not propose to depart in any way from its principles of non-interference in Russian internal affairs."

I doubt if any unbiased person would ever hold that the United States did not interfere in the internal affairs of Russia. By this interference, the United States helped to bolster up, by its military forces, a monarchistically inclined and unpopular Government, of which the great mass of the people did not approve. The United States gained, by this act, the resentment of more than ninety per cent of the people of Siberia.

It was known in the Far East that there was a distinct difference in the policy of the American troops from the policy of the troops of other nations, and I believe all Russians, except the autocratic class, were very grateful to the United States for their efforts to avoid taking sides by the Military in their internal conflicts.

To the great mass of Russians who had no personal knowledge of the situation in Siberia, the fact and circumstances of intervention will dominate and obscure every specific act connected with the intervention, and the resulting obloquy will fall almost equally upon all nations taking part.

What was the justification, in international law, for this intervention? There was no question as to the protection of life or property of American citizens involved, nor was there any prospect of future damage to American life or property, nor can the United States plead the act of intervention was a war measure, as it definitely refused to look upon it as such.

I doubt if history will record, in the past century, a more flagrant case of flouting the well-known and approved practice of States in their international relations, and using instead of the accepted principles of international law, the principle of Might makes right.

I think it can not be refuted that there were no beneficial results flowing from intervention in Russia, so far as all foreigners are concerned, and it undoubtedly resulted in placing the mass of Russians even more solidly behind the Soviets. This is shown by the promness with which the Siberian people accepted the Moscow Government, after the departure of the Allies. I realize it was very hard to learn the real sentiment of the people, under the conditions I faced in Siberia, but subsequent events have indicated that they were really socialistic.

For a few months after I arrived in Siberia, I thought if England, France, Japan, the United States, and the Czechs could whole-heartedly get behind a more liberal Government, such as the All Russian Provisional Government, overthrown on November 18, 1918, principally by the British because it was too liberal for them, it would have had a chance to succeed. This opinion was formed, after talking to many Russians, of different shades of political thought, but I gradually came to the conclusion that the mass of the Russians had a stronger conviction, as to the kind of Government Russia needed, than I first realized.

It is human nature, and therefore a self-evident fact, that no Government can add to its strength from its people, while being held in power by foreign bayonets. Kolchak realized this, as I heard him tell Mr. Morris that he did not want foreigners to fight for him, as the Russian character was such that the Russians would desert him if he received active military sup-port from foreigners. This is not a characteristic of Russians alone, it is characteristic of all Nationals.

The fact that the Kerensky Government, a liberal and partly socialistic Government, could stand only eight months, clearly indicated that the Russians were foreordained to have an Autocratic or an extreme socialistic Government, and by the time I left Siberia, April 1, 1920, I was convinced that Russia was des-tined for one or the other.

The complete collapse of the efforts of Kolchak, Denikin, Yudenich, and Wrangle did not look as if the Russian people favoured Autocracy.

Situated as I was, I could not determine how much the foolish acts of the supporters of Kolchak influenced the mass of the people against him, but it is interesting to study the conclusions of the different writers on Siberian intervention, as to the results of intervention.

Dr. Schuman, in his " American Policy towards Russia, Since 1917," on page 171 says: " The American expedition to Siberia failed as completely and in-gloriously as the force sent to Archangel to achieve the purpose for which it was intended."

Dr. Schuman further states :

" Military intervention was undertaken under the guise of rescuing the Czecho-Slovaks, and assisting Russian efforts at self-government."

I take this to mean that Dr. Schuman charges the United States with lack of sincerity in announcing the reasons for intervention, and I have come to the same conclusion.

Dr. Schuman again says:

" An attem has been made to overthrow the Soviet Republic, under the appearance of guarding railways and extending economic assistance to Siberia."

The results of guarding the railways justified Dr. Schuman's conclusions but I do not believe the United States, as represented by Ambassador Roland S. Morris, had in mind the overthrow of the Soviet Re-public when he negotiated the Railway Agreement. He hoped and expected this Agreement to bring re-lief to the long-suffering Russian people. I personally did not anticipate that the Kolchak adherents would oppose extending assistance to the people as they did, and I do not believe Mr. Morris expected the Rail-way Agreement to be used for the benefit of the Kolchak adherents only.

Mr. Louis Fisher in his " The Soviets in World Affairs," Vol. I, page 228, states:

" American intervention in Siberia, was a fruitless, dismal tragedy-comedy. Similarly in North Russia."

Both Dr. Schuman and Mr. Fisher fail to make it clear whether they consider the failure was due to the policy of the Government, or to the failure of the United States representatives taking part in the intervention, but the " dismal tragedy-comedy " was enacted the` moment the United States agreed to take part in military intervention in Siberia.

Despite the fiction of characterizing America's role as " Military Action," the fact remains that such action was intervention and as such was a deliberate interference in the internal affairs of the Russian people prolonging the Civil War and entailing untold loss of life and property.

With reference to the British reaction to intervention, Dr. Straikhovsky, Department of History, Georgetown University, in an article published in Current History, March, 1931, says:

" There need be no surprise, then, that the special report of the committee to collect information on Russia, presented to Parliament, by command of the King, should contain the following bitter but frank feeling in 1920-21; ` With regards to the efforts of intervention, the abundant and almost unanimous testimony of our witnesses shows that the Military intervention of the Allies in Russia, assisted to give strength and cohesion to the Soviet Government. . . . There is evidence to show that up to the time of Military Intervention, the majority of the Russian intellectuals were well disposed towards the Allies, and more especially to Great Britain, but that the later attitude of the Russian people towards the Allies, became characterized by indifference, distrust and antipathy.' Such was the reward that Great Britain and France received for their activity in Russia."

As indicating the Japanese view, as to results of intervention, I take the views of Mr. K. K. Kawakami, a Japanese journalist of many years experience. In his book, " Japan's Pacific Policy," page 244, he writes:

" Of course Japan blundered most, but the United States and Great Britain are not free from mistakes.

Japan's primary purpose, in the Siberian expedition, was to oppose the spread of Bolshevism and to restore law and order, and she had consistently pursued that policy."

Mr. Kawakami has a different idea from most of us, as to what constitutes law and order. It was customary in Siberia, for the British and the Japanese to refer to the Russians they were supporting as the forces of law and order. This designation was not justified by the facts and they more nearly represented the forces of lawlessness and disorder.

Mr. Kawakami further says on page 250:

" From the beginning, the American idea of the Siberian undertaking was different from that of the Japanese. The Americans believed that they had nothing to do with the internal political conditions of Russia and that they were not in Siberia to attack Bolshevism or the Bolsheviki. On the contrary, the Japanese soldiers believed, or were made to believe, that the Bolsheviki were their enemies and that they were sent to Siberia to combat Bolshevism. On the whole the American attitude was wise and right."

On page 236 Mr. Kawakami states :

" The Siberian expedition has been a great fiasco, for which all the Allied Nations must be blamed. It was a great mistake to send any expedition at all. America should have stood firm upon her original stand, refusing to subscribe to any idea of intervention. When the American Government changed its mind, in the summer of 1918, it committed a most deplorable blunder. Of course England blundered just as badly as Japan and the United States. It was British policy which set up the Kolchak government in Omsk. To further that policy, Britain supplied Kolchak with money and munitions."

I can entirely agree with Mr. Kawakami in his statements, just quoted. The action of foreign representatives was not always entirely unselfish and free from an anticipated future advantage.

Undoubtedly the British expected special considerations, if Kolchak succeeded in establishing a Russian Government, while Japan hoped to be the dominant power with any Government established in Siberia, as was shown by their attitude towards Kolchak for some time after he assumed power.

There seems to be no difference of opinion, that intervention was a fundamental error, and the only possible benefit that can accrue to any of the Allied nations, or to the United States, must come from the realization that there was an inexcusable departure from the generally accepted practice of nations in their dealings with other nations, and the results have not fallen far short of being disastrous.

I was in command of the United States troops sent to Siberia and, I must admit, I do not know what the United States was trying to accomplish by military intervention.

As has been clearly shown, one must discard the statements of the United States, in August, 1918, that troops were being sent to rescue the Czechs from the German and Austrian prisoners, who were reported as having been released from prisons, and were organizing with the object of getting the military supplies at Vladivostok, taking the Trans-Siberian Railroads, and sending the supplies to Germany. These reports were untrue. Major Drysdale, U. S. Army, from Peking, and Mr. Webster from Moscow, were sent to investigate and ascertain if these reports were true, and had reported they had no foundation in fact.

Dr. Schuman, as previously stated, concludes:

" War had been waged under the pretext of showing the Russian people the path to peace and Democracy. An attem had been made to overthrow the Soviet Republic under the appearance of guarding rail-ways and extending economic assistance to Siberia."

The action of the State Department representatives in helping Kolchak, whose sole object was the destruction of the Soviets, justifies the conclusion that the United States was a party to the efforts to overthrow the Soviets, as Kolchak was unquestionably fighting them.

The agreement entered into by President Wilson and the Allies on June 12, 1919, " To assist the government of Admiral Kolchak, with munitions, supplies and food, to establish themselves as the government of all Russia " also justifies this conclusion.

It will be noted that President Wilson does not agree that United States troops would be used to help Kolchak destroy the Soviets. In substantiation of the belief that President Wilson did not intend to use United States troops to help Kolchak, he stated on June 26, 1919, just two weeks after he agreed to help him with munitions, supplies, and food, in reply to a Senate resolution:

" The instructions to General Graves direct him not to interfere in Russian affairs."

There is no question the War Department construed the American policy in Russia, which constituted my orders, as meaning that the American troops were not to take sides in the internal conflicts, as is shown by the cable from General March, Chief of Staff, on March 28, 1919, telling me to follow the policy of non-interference, which I had been following, until my instructions had been changed by the President, which was never done.

It is my personal belief that this policy was followed because no other course could be adopted with-out the Executive running counter to the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, by making war without a declaration by Congress.

If the American troops were not to be used in sup-port of the policy followed by the State Department, why were they sent to Siberia? If the United States had been deceived, as to the menace from German and Austrian prisoners, and had sent troops to Siberia to block this menace, why were they not sent home after the. Armistice, instead of being kept in Siberia with nothing to do from November, 1918, to April, 1919, the date of the Railway Agreement?

The absence of information from the United States and the Allied Governments, about military intervention in Russia, indicates that the various Governments taking part in the intervention take very little pride in this venture.

Who can blame them?