victim look like the aggressor, who by his own provocations brings re-
tribution on himself.

The real motive behind such action would not be anything that happened along the borders, but rather China's steady growth in power. After the 1955 summit conference Harold Macmillan noted in his diary that the Russians, unhappy with Mao, would have preferred "a weak nationalist or capitalist. China they could plunder".

If that put it too strongly, we have the recent Russian warning to China, that "there can be no genuine third force in the world scene in our times... There is no room for one anymore. Those who try to become such a force have come too late in history". China's launching of a space satellite shows that she is becoming just such a third force. The question is whether the Russians will accept it, or try to break China's power while they still can.

Denigrating Stalin

Moni Guha

IMMEDIATELY after the 20th Congress of the CPSU and Krushchev's secret report almost all the communist parties of the world, not excluding the CP of China, joined the chorus with Krushchev in denouncing Stalin. Almost overnight they discovered that some of Stalin's theories were subjective and oversimplified — that he became conceited and impudent and gave wrong advice to the international communist movement. Surprisingly enough, concrete instances were not given. Nobody attempted, rather dared, to analyse and assess the four brilliant documents discussed at the Nineteenth Congress. Moreover, some comrades, in their overzealousness to prove that Mao Tse-tung is greater and more original than Stalin, misinterpreted some of Stalin's theses, managed to forget some of his brilliant theses and joined the anti-Stalin chorus. While Krushchev & Co tried to obliterate Stalin from the pages of history, these people recognised Stalin as a co-founder of Lenin's cause, as a defender of Lenin, but not as a developer of Marxist-Leninism.

CPC said in its "On the question of Stalin": "The facts have shown ever more clearly that their (Khrushchev & Co) revision of the Marxist-Leninist theories on imperialist war and peace, proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, revolution in colonies and semi-colonies, the proletarian party etc., is inseparably connected with their complete negation of Stalin."

Three days before the 19th Congress of the CPSU opened, a collection of comments on the draft of a new textbook on political economy under the title Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR written by Stalin was published in Moscow. The 19th Congress of the CPSU was held in October 1952 and Stalin 'died' in March 1953, within six months of the congress and the publication of his book.

These events occurred in such rapid succession that the policy guidelines of the 19th Congress and the Economic Problems of Socialism did not receive the attention and analysis they deserved. A stage-managed silence on the policy guidelines of the 19th Congress was maintained by the leadership of the CPSU after Stalin's death. The four documents, viz The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, the Report of the Central Committee delivered by Malenkov, the brief but most significant closing speech delivered by Stalin to the delegates of the foreign communist parties and the organisational report of the Central Committee, delivered by Khrushchev, were never discussed and analysed. Taken together these documents conveyed an analysis of the international situation and the policy guidelines for the Soviet Union, the world communist movement and the problems of peace and war. The only 'attention' that was given to these documents was Mikoyan's criticism of Stalin's essay as "hardly correct" at the 20th Congress, and as "vulgarily simplified" at the 1961 Congress, and then those documents were buried forever. Most surprising is the fact that those who do not agree with the onesided negation of Stalin and recognise the great role he played are also not serious at all in reopening the question of Stalin and re-assessing these historic documents.

Postwar Background

Before going into these documents it is necessary to discuss some aspects of the post-war situation and the imperialist conspiracies in and around the Soviet Union and Stalin's fight against all these. Historical parallels are bad logic, but one may compare the situation in China and the position of Mao Tse-tung in the CPC vis-a-vis Liu Shao-chi & Co to that of Stalin in the Soviet Union in the period from 1945, especially from 1949 up to his death. From 1956 Mao Tse-tung, relinquishing the post of chairmanship of the FRC, concentrated his energies in the party to fighting revisionism and yet it took him more than eight years to launch a frontal attack against Liu Shao-chi & Co. Stalin had been preparing for the final fray from 1949, but before he could set the stage, he died.

One must not forget the notorious Fulton speech of Churchill which set the imperialist ball rolling against the Soviet Union. 'Containment of the Soviet Union' was the war cry of the imperialists. The enemy tried to play his role both from without and within. In December 1948 New York Times quoted Truman as say-
ing that he thought some Russian leaders wanted to be conciliatory towards the United States, thus showing the complicity of some Russian leaders in the U.S. conspiracy. Together with the conspiracy of the imperialist powers, beneath the outward appearance of monolithic conformity, incipient revisionist pressures were challenging Stalin and his line. Between the party's wartime losses and the mass admission of new members during and immediately following the war, about half the party membership by 1947 consisted of unseasoned recruits.

In a widespread party verification process to tighten admission requirements and ideological discipline and to replace the obsolete 1919 programme, although the party's line was pursued, the new programme was being prepared by the Central Committee to replace the obsolete 1919 programme. Although the party statute and the new party programme were in the process of preparation from 1947, the statute could not be presented before the 19th Congress in October 1952, and the new programme could not be presented during the lifetime of Stalin. From this one can realize the depth and volume of intransigence inside the party that Stalin had to cope with.

One can only gauge the depth and range of the conspiracy against Stalin and Stalinism-Leninism when one looks into the international implications of the Leningrad affair. In one of his letters to Tito, Stalin charged Yugoslavia with complicity with the Leningrad group. The letter accused Djilas of having collected intelligence from the Leningrad organisation during his visit to the city in January 1948. Together with this, Yugoslavia's conspiracy informing an East European bloc including monarchist Greece, thus drowning the revolution in Greece.

Varga's Thesis

Stalin's pre-election speech and the introduction of the postwar Five Year Plan came as a shock both to the imperialists abroad and the revisionists at home. The revisionists could no longer remain lying low. They raised their heads, placing Eugene Varga at the helm. Varga was the chief of the Institute of World Economics and Politics and one of the most eminent authorities on world economy in the communist world. He foretold the 1929 crisis of capitalist economy and subsequently wrote a brilliant book, 'The Great Economic Crisis and its Political Consequences. As such, he was the most suitable person for the revisionists to counter Stalin's line. In September 1946, Varga published 'Changes in Economy of Capitalism resulting from the Second World War', in which he propagated the relative stabilization of capitalism through the increasing intervention of the state in the economic process, the possibility of socialist reform in Europe without revolution and the possibility of economic planning under capitalism. His theory further implied that the war was not inevitable even while imperialism continued, and suggested a non-revolutionary policy on the part of the Soviet Union. Anticipating eventual peaceful gains as a result of the breakdown of colonialism and evolutionary changes in capitalist states. This was pure revisionism, which people tried to introduce in the Soviet Union, immediately after the termination of the war and against which Stalin fought. Khrushchev & Co accepted and adopted all the theories of Varga after Stalin's death.

Immediately after the publication of Varga's book in September 1946, public discussions were organised and the book was severely attacked. Not only were all the "theories" propounded by Varga heatedly rejected. But Varga was also charged with betrayal. In spite of all this criticism which appeared in the 'Problems of Economics, Problems of Philosophy and Party Life', Varga remained firm and continued to stick, to the essentials of his position with a reasonable degree of "independence of spirit". This proved how strongly entrenched were the revisionists inside the Party. But Stalin did not stop fighting revisionism, after the first round of his defeat. The criticism and attack on Varga and his line continued through late 1947 and early 1948 and reached a new intensity in October 1948 at an enlarged session of the Learned Council of the Economic Institute of the Academy of Sciences called to discuss the "Shortcomings and Problems of Research in the field of Economics." At this meeting Varga was charged with "retreat from Marxism-Leninist to reformism", while the bourgeois press claimed him as...
a man of “Western orientation.” Varga stood firm this time too. However, in March 1949, Stalin was able to muster strong his forces and ultimately Varga was forced to retreat. He promised to correct his errors in a revised edition of his work, which appeared in 1953. He was at particular pains in his letter to Pravda to dissociate himself from those in the West. “I wish to protest most strongly against the dark hints of the war instigators to the effect that I am a man of Western orientation. Today, in the present his orical circumstances, that would mean being a counter-revolutionary, an anti-Soviet traitor to the working class.”

The attitude to the capitalist world economy was to have a vital bearing on policy direction and as such there was obvious dispute within the Party on this question. Sometimes Stalin had the majority, sometimes he was in the minority. So the fight against revisionism was not a matter of simply thrusting a knife into butter. In all other fields of politics, administration, intellectual and artistic activities the campaign against revisionism was in full swing. Zhdanov’s assault was on ideological slackness in literature and arts, in philosophy and other academic fields. Artists and intellectuals were remobilised into the service of the Party’s goals, organisations and journals were dissolved or reorganised. It was a sort of cultural revolution on all fronts. These are all well-known facts.

Not all the information regarding Stalin’s fight against the revisionists conspiracy is available or known as it was deliberately suppressed subsequently or destroyed. We now know that Mao Tse-tung opposed the Khru'chev line and the line of the 20th Congress on the very morrow of its session, but within two months of the Congress, and on December 29 of the same year the CPC leadership published two articles entitled “The Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat” and “More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat” basically and principally supporting the 20th Congress. If from this we conclude that Mao remained oblivious to the fact that revisionism in his own country and in the Soviet Union was striking roots, then it would be doing injustice to Mao.

After Varga, Voznesensky

After Varga came Nikolai A. Voznesensky, Deputy Prime Minister, and Chairman of the State Planning Commission as a member of the Politbureau. Like Varga, Voznesensky was also a precursor of revisionism in the present-day Soviet economics. He had also written a book entitled The Economy of the USSR during World War II. This time the revisionists were particularly cautious and they proceeded more cunningly. Voznesensky had been among those who had led the attack on Varga in 1948 and even argued in his book against Varga’s belief that capitalist states could engage in planning. But in substance there was no inconsistency between Varga’s analysis of capitalism and Voznesensky’s prescription for the Soviet economy. With the publication of his book the revisionists made a great noise and as a result the book received a Stalin Prize in May 1948 and was highly praised in Soviet and the world communist press. This must, in no way, be taken that Stalin supported Voznesensky’s book or line. Take the example of China. The fate of Liu-Shao-chi’s book How to be a good Communist is well known. But immediately after the 20th Congress of the CPSU and especially after the Eighth Congress of the CPC, this very book was reprinted twice with certain alterations and additions, with a great fanfare, and included in the CPC as one of the compulsory text-books. This, certainly, does not mean that Mao Tse-tung supported the book. He had to swallow many a bitter pill given by Liu Shao-chi & Co and he had to “lie low” for a time. However, the publication of Voznesensky’s book and the award of the Stalin prize once more demonstrated how strongly the revisionists were entrenched in the party and administration and how arduous and tortuous was the fight Stalin had to wage against the revisionists. While rejecting Varga’s theory of the possibility of temporary stabilisation of capitalism, non-inviability of war and a long-term perspective of the competition between the two systems, Voznesenskii had advocated a greater degree of “rationality” in the administration of the economy, for taking account of the real costs in assigning prices to producer goods and for reappportioning the balance of economy between light and heavy industries with additional emphasis on consumer goods. All these points were repudiated and demolished by Stalin in his Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR. Despite the Stalin prize, Stalin ultimately was able to organise public discussion on Voznesensky’s book and Voznesensky was ultimately relieved of his various positions at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet in March 1949. Yet Stalin had to face stiff opposition. P. N. Fedoseyev, editor of the Bol'shovik, continued to praise this book in a guarded way, in the name of review and criticism. Action against P. N. Fedoseyev and others could not be taken before 1952 for the “sycophantic praise” of Voznesensky.

It will take more than a volume to analyse in detail Stalin’s fight against revisionism though the material at our disposal is scanty and disjointed. The author of “India-China Dispute and the Soviet Union” (Frontier, July 25), charges Stalin with the following: (a) great-nation chauvinism, (b) introduction of the principles of special incentives to scientists, managers and specialists guided by the principle of “pay according to labour” which created conditions for the growth of the ‘Soviet bourgeoisie’; (c) unwillingness to see any communist state ‘independent of the Soviet Union politically and militarily’ and (d) the theory of socialism in one country which later developed into communism in one country. To all this, intend to return later.

One thing remains to be cleared. One should be modest in criticising Stalin and at the same time should take pains to know the ‘whys’ and ‘wherefores’ of the events. To prove
the undisputed greatness and originality of Mao Tse-tung one need not belittle Stalin’s greatness and originality. Mao Tse-tung’s thought is the continuation of Stalin’s thought; and activity, plus Mao’s own additions. In the art and science of continuous and in the genius and talent of addition and development lies Mao’s greatness and originality, not in re-pudiation and renunciation of Stalin or Stalin’s thought. Repudiation will lead us straight to Trotskyism on the one hand and Khrushchevite revisionism on the other.

Strategy For Development: India, China And The Soviet Union—II

The Chinese Experiment

UNLIKE in the Soviet Union, the civil war preceded rather than followed the 1949 revolution in China. The Chinese leadership unlike its Soviet counterpart in 1917 had ample opportunity to gain governmental experience, particularly at the local level; as such it came to power much better prepared for building a new order, with a much clearer concept of what was to be done and how. China had already before itself a crystallised socialist development model from which it could draw certain lessons concerning measures and policies to emulate or to avoid, and upon which it could lean for economic support, at least, for a while. Although there were significant local variations, he broad outline of the envisaged development pattern in China more or less followed the Soviet example, at least until 1957.

The initial economic conditions in China however, were very much different from those in the Soviet Union in its corresponding stage. The Chinese population pressure per acre of cultivated land in 1952 was almost ten-fold that of the Soviet Union in 1928. The Soviet grain output per capita in that year amounted to 480 kg as against only 220 kg in China in 1952. Again on per capita basis, China’s output of steel, oil, timber and flour was less than 10 per cent of the Soviet production; the corresponding figure was less than 25 per cent for pig iron, chemical fertilisers and sugar and less than 50 per cent for coal, electric power, cement, paper and cotton cloth. Thus in terms of a number of major indicators, China of 1952 lagged considerably behind the Soviet Union on the eve of its First Plan and slightly behind even contemporary India.

In 1949 China inherited a totally disrupted economy in which both industrial and agricultural production had been drastically curtailed owing to the protracted civil war and the war against imperialism. It is one of China’s great achievements that in just two years, by 1952, the phase of recovery was complete. Both industrial and agricultural outputs were restored to their pre-1949 levels; inflation was arrested; and fiscal and monetary stability was achieved.

The high density of farm population in China could be initially maintained only by intensive land use, based on double-cropping of vast areas and age-old soil conservation and irrigation practices. The crop yields per acre were relatively high, while yields per man were quite low. This fact suggests that crop production had been pushed about as far as traditional practices and methods would permit and that further large improvements in farm output could be attained only through the introduction of new technology and improved practices.

In the first phase of land reform (1949-52), the holdings of the landlords were expropriated and the land was redistributed to the tenant cultivators and landless workers. The average size of farms, therefore, was suboptimal from the standpoint of production efficiency. But it was indeed a tactically necessary stage designed to break the political and economic power of the landlords. The private small-scale farming of this period was followed immediately in 1953 and 1954 by mutual aid teams and semi-socialist co-operatives.

Tractors First?

Without appropriate institutional reform, it was held, technical advance and the resulting increased production in agriculture were impossible. Until 1954 technical progress was to a large extent, though not exclusively, identified with mechanisation; and it was believed that as in the Soviet Union, collectivisation was possible only when mechanisation had been introduced. But this, in turn, required waiting until China’s industry was in a position to supply the necessary equipment. Then in 1954 an important shift in the discussion about the relationship between collectivisation and mechanisation took place. Collectivisation was now seen as a precondition for mechanisation, not vice versa. Furthermore, the concept of “technical reform” of agriculture was viewed in a wider perspective which included much more than mechanisation. For China, it was argued, the high land-to-population ratio and the shortage of machinery called for technical innovations of a labour-intensive type such as double-cropping of rice, close planting, deeper ploughing, and the introduction of improved but traditional types of implements.

The campaign initiated in the summer of 1955 by Mao’s speech “On Co-operativisation” led to the “high tide of socialism”, so that fully