József Attila 1938
Source: Originally published in Hungarian in Szép Szó, 21, VI (1938), fasc. 1 (January-February), pp. 16-23, combined fragments from ELTE Source 1, Source 2 and Source 3.
Translated by: László Molnárfi, 2025.
Today, everyone knows that Marxism needs psychoanalysis. There is the revolutionary tradition of Wilhelm Reich, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari with all of its radical affirmation of life and endless possibilities, rooted in significant modifications to psychoanalysis linking it to the circuits of capital. In this 1938 work by Hungarian poet József Attila titled ‘Hegel-Marx-Freud’, written during the time of the Third Reich, he asks the very same question as the aforementioned thinkers: How can people desire their own oppression? Why are the masses not revolting? Why do we not have socialism yet? There is a tendency in Marxism to downplay the subjective element, and emphasize the objective element, of revolution, a mistake which can only be corrected by accounting for the psychological attitudes of the masses arising from social structuring. Lukács György says that socialist revolution is essentially a voluntaristic affair, in which the working masses, the identical subject and object of history, reach class consciousness, and fulfills its historic destiny. The subject reifies the object, and thus becomes a real force embedded in a dialectical relationship, but at the end of the day, the subject, mediated by successive steps, must wilfully destroy the reified object. Consciousness, and its emphasis, is a crucial counter-balance to mechanical materialism. Only those who do not desire power, but want to ‘endlessly critique power’, reject the revolutionary fusion of psychoanalysis with Marxism. People move when inspiration strikes at the deepest nerves, and touches all the libidinal senses, and only then will they be inspired to revolt, alongside all objective factors of societal development. Beneath the political economy, stands the libidinal economy, the circuits of life-force coupling and uncoupling within society’s mechanicum, sublimated. As Deleuze and Guattari say in Capitalism and Schizophrenia: A Thousand Plateaus from 1971:
The truth is that sexuality is everywhere: the way a bureaucrat fondles his records, a judge administers justice, a businessman causes money to circulate; the way the bourgeoisie fucks the proletariat; and so on. And there is no need to resort to metaphors, any more than for the libido to go by way of metamorphoses. Hitler got the fascists sexually aroused. Flags, nations, armies, banks get a lot of people aroused. A revolutionary machine is nothing if it does not acquire at least as much force as these coercive machines have for producing breaks and mobilizing flows.
Revolutionary socialism has, today, sadly lost its ability to arouse the masses, too stale, too boring and too meek. While life-force’s repression is necessary for existence, its ‘surplus repression’ by capitalist machinery is unnecessary, as argued by Herbert Marcuse. So, this parasitic growth on civilization must be overthrown. At this point, a different system of social repression needs to be introduced, but this, the socialist machinery, embodies a higher degree of freedom. Where are the emotions, spectacles, rituals, morals, music, poetry, stories, images and myths which propel people towards this act? It is as such, that like the fascists, revolutionary socialists would, so to speak, do well to put on a uniform, wave a flag and engage in culture-building, to arouse the libidinal senses of the masses and create new subjectivities. Antonio Gramsci stresses this sort of cultural renewal to produce a socialist ‘good sense’ replacing bourgeois ‘common sense’. To make the jump from perpetual melancholic victimhood to strength, we demand not the right-wing ‘aestheticization of politics’, but its reverse, the left-wing ‘politicisation of aesthetics’, as identified by Walter Benjamin. We differ from fascists insofar as their philosophy is irrational, ours is rational. Through libidinal reconfiguration, this wraps the rational core of our philosophy within an emotional force capable of overturning the prevailing social order.
It is not necessary to be a scientist nor a poverty-stricken proletarian to realize that the capitalist economy today is in serious trouble. Merely considering the civilized world, tens of millions are left destitute. Despite this, if not geared towards war, the State aims to artificially lower productivity through interventionism. Several great authorities on economics conjure up all sorts of reasons and justifications for this profoundly irrational course of action, one which the sane mind cannot comprehend. Marxists, on the other hand, identify the root of the problem in the mode of production, and believe that, as per the “natural laws of societal development”, general disenfranchisement will grow to such an extent that the proletariat, those who work to earn a living and yet remain destitute, will organise themselves in some form as a fighting class and rise up against the prevailing social order. Depending on which Marxist theory is applied, this could be a peaceful or revolutionary transition to a socialist economy. This belief, which has found fertile ground amongst the masses ever since the latter half of the nineteenth century, has recently undergone notable changes. It has changed amongst those who believe in a peaceful transformation, namely insofar as proponents of this theory no longer believe they can count on the entirety of the proletariat class, and hence seek to forge comrades from other classes, to the same extent as from the proletariat, thus establishing cross-class parties. Equally, amongst those who are of the revolutionary tradition, there is great anticipation of an unavoidable societal tragedy, such as war, which will serve as an opportunity for an organised minority to seize power, and due to the support of the masses or their apathetic good-will, can begin to work towards the ultimate aim, the realisation of socialism. The two theories form the base of two movements, which both call themselves “scientific socialism”.
The methodological basis for scientific socialism is the explanation of historical phenomena by examining economic conditions, and this is called historical materialism. As found in Marxist handbooks, this is an intrinsically international perspective, because it traces its roots to German philosophy, British political economy, and French (revolutionary) politics. Indeed, historical materialism can be conceived of as a sublated critique of this modern European tri-partite. Dialectical, economical and humanist - that is to say, it conceives of human existence, society and State, in general the progress of our species, as tied to economics, loaded with contradictions and marching ahead with their dissolution.
Marx (the father of this philosophy of history), considered four factors, during the course of his life. The principle of historical progress (Hegel), the advent of new industrial technology, the uneasy working masses who under the weight of their burdens were catalysed to struggle, and so-called utopian socialism. Utopian socialism was marked by a peaceful rather than militant tradition, one that possessed a generalized humanitarian rather than proletarian character. Marx synthesised these four facts, accepting the principle of development based on contradictions. He placed industry and the working masses as the basis for societal progress, the former as its object, the latter as its subject, understanding that socialism is the next step for humankind. This was to be as a consequence of modern industry, from the vantage point of the object, and as the aim of the working class, from the vantage point of the subject. According to the objective factor, progress is tied to the collapse of the capitalist economy under the weight of its own contradictions, because its means of production are over-developed compared to the mode and relations of production, which gives rise to collectivist economy. According to the subjective factor, the working masses desire, and bring about the collapse, of the prevailing class rule, and organise - temporarily - their own.
Marx and Engels were focused on Europe. Indeed, Europe was swept by faith in progress, (a faith that has faltered into oblivion these days!), and industry and technology had advanced to such a degree that even the philosophers of the means of production were baffled. Workers organised themselves in mass parties, proclaiming their virtues, and with their more-or-less clear-minded concept of the need for collectivist economy had attracted even the non-wage working classes too. Given these circumstances, a question arises: why do we not have socialism yet? I do not wish to say that it will not happen, if the people desire that it happen. My question pertains merely to the miscalculation in the theory, namely that the so-called “objective factors” are present, yet its subjects are missing! Marx wrote that humanity should set itself only goals for which the necessary conditions of their resolution are truly present in reality. How can it be, then, that for the 60-million or so citizens of a State, the historical aim is perceived to be racial purity?
According to Hegel, the world’s development is a singular process in which every phenomenon is a manifestation of rationality, of the World Spirit, of Logos. This rationality, the Logos, is found in nature; in humankind, and in humankind’s process of enlightenment comes to be self-aware within the mind; and in the teachings of Hegel concerning the theory of progress, reaches a point where it defines itself in a generalized, law-like form. This principle is quite clear, and simple, despite Hegel’s complicated writing: “What is rational is actual, what is actual is rational”[1]. As long as we do not accept the existence of actuality’s rationality, or of rationality’s actuality, it merely reveals that within us (or rather, with us, with our actuality), the rationality has not yet reached the necessary level of consciousness. After accepting this principle, however, the task of our intellectual production is “merely” to perceive the rationality of actuality’s various phenomena, and within the found rationality, seek its actuality.
Before Marx, it was Feuerbach who experimented with revealing the Hegelian principle within social relations between individuals. He rejected the Absolute Spirit, the Logos, and in its place, stood the “human”. “The periods of humanity are distinguished only by religious changes. A historical movement is fundamental only when it is rooted in the hearts of men. The heart is not a form of religion, so that the latter should exist also in the heart; the heart is the essence of religion” [2]. Feuerbach thus keeps the principle of progress, but substitutes the Hegelian Absolute Mind as the basis of historical change for the disposition of the religious person. Gods - so to say - which humankind’s religious disposition created, are nothing more than its externally projected mirror-images. During the course of historical development, the fantasies that humankind created about Gods begins to dissolve, and humanity recognises itself, that is to say, they come to realize that the reified Gods who they endowed with omnibenevolence was all along omnibenevolence for humanity itself. In place of the idea of the omnibenevolence of Gods comes the conscious omnibenevolence of the human by human, and thus, descending from heaven, creates the religion of love for humankind. Just as protestantism removes the mediating priest between God and believer, and so creates a direct connection between the heavenly Father and his earthly children, so does Feuerbach remove the mediating belief in God between the loving and the loved human, establishing a direct connection between them. Feuerbach considers copulation as being endowed with religious devotion, without priestly or God-given permission. Of course, the question here remains, why is it necessary in the first place to conceive of sexuality as religious, as either with God or the Church, or in the case of Feuerbach, humanist consecration?
With Hegel, rationality operates - unconsciously - within the morals of civilization, and with Feuerbach, morals come to the foreground and make rational the varying fantasies of the religions in each era.
It is because of the shared Hegelian principle that Marx is connected to Feuerbach. Feuerbach understands religious disposition as the ultimate reality, and believes that history is humaneness, the self-realization of humankind united by love. Marx sees more in history. For him, history is human becoming human, the process of its self-development. “The whole of what is called world history is nothing more than the creation (or rather, production: Erzeugung) of man through human labor”[3]. What is it to be a human? “Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the human essence. But the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.”[4]. In history, humankind develops its own essence and at the same time perfects it; its social nature makes people function better in society, and in turn, people make its social nature a better fit for societal purposes. For the physiological act of reproduction, the human needs a partner, and it is this essence which makes it so that during the course of history, a situation is reached in which each individual becomes a necessary precondition of life for all other individuals. Social relations give rise to the actuality of progress. Such a progress of reality and the reality of such a progress is expressed scientifically in the theory of socialism.
According to the theory of Marx, humanity develops its species-essence through production, just as according to Hegel, the World Spirit develops itself in historical nature. Humanity first realizes in production its social nature, then grasps this with its consciousness. Naturally, this consciousness itself is a product of society, as language is too, given that “language is practical, real consciousness that exists for other men as well, and only therefore does it also exist for me” [5]. Within production, as such, humanity produces itself. On the one hand, it appropriates external nature for its own use. On the other hand, it transforms its inner nature towards social existence, up until the point that the whole of humanity amalgamates into a single society, and for each individual this society becomes their inner nature.
Natural life necessitates reproductive organs, and human life, the producer, necessitates the means of production. The liver, kidney and sexual organs, as well as organs in general, serve to reproduce the existence of each being in an individual sense, as well as in a species sense, from day-to-day. The organs of social existence, in the same way, are the means of production. The liver and the kidney are organs of the species, but so are the means of production. As the organs of the body and the instincts attached to them develop, they demand at each step of the way the appropriate lifestyle and the consciousness it necessitates, so that they can work together and the individual can develop. The means of production and the attached forces of production, in the same way, demand a corresponding mode of production and the ideology it necessitates at each step of their development.
Based on this, in each era we can grasp the prevailing social relations and the relation of society to nature by examining the means of production. As such, changes to the form of society, and to that of the unfolding human essence, is ultimately in relation to changes and developments in the means of production. Modern industry necessitated the transition from feudal to bourgeois society; and today’s even more modern industry necessitates that the bourgeois society transform into the society of the working masses. Production is a social matter, that is to say shared work, and the increasing division of labour makes production ever so more a social matter. Society breaks into opposing classes, and individuals form classes based on their relation to the means of production, based on whether they own them or work for those who own them. Since human essence is the ensemble of social relations, it is clear that private property laws, morals, the sciences and the means of production as well as class struggle and the relations between genders are manifestations of the actuality of the human essence.
Marx derives his categories from the species-essence of humankind. This means that sexual activities are conceived of as economic, part of the process of production. In the economic and political spheres, however, only sees the manifestation of species-essence, and does not see sexuality. Sexuality, and with it, humankind, is understood, so to speak, from the physiological rather than biological point of view, from the the organs of the corpus in action rather than base instinctual considerations, as these organs connect and are connected with a partner, an understanding which finds its counterpart in society where individuals must likewise connect with one another under the prevailing means of production.
“The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals. Thus the first fact to be established is the physical organisation of these individuals (just as in society the level of development of the means of production!) and their consequent relation to the rest of nature.” [6]. Humans “distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence” - this is “conditioned by their physical organisation” [7]. “The way in which men produce their means of subsistence depends first of all on the nature of the actual means of subsistence they find in existence and have to reproduce. This mode of production must not be considered simply as being the production of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part. As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce. The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions determining their production.”[8]. “This production only makes its appearance with the increase of population”[9]. The very first relation of production is “the relation between man and woman, parents and children, the family.”[10]. “The production of life, both of one’s own in labour and of fresh life in procreation”[11] is at the same time a natural and a social relation. With the growth of the population, “there develops the division of labour, which was originally nothing but the division of labour in the sexual act”[12]. “Moreover, it is quite immaterial what consciousness starts to do on its own: out of all such muck we get only the one inference that these three moments, the forces of production, the state of society, and consciousness, can and must come into contradiction with one another, because the division of labour implies the possibility, nay the fact that intellectual and material activity – enjoyment and labour, production and consumption – devolve on different individuals, and that the only possibility of their not coming into contradiction lies in the negation in its turn of the division of labour”[13]. With the division of labour, in turn, appears “property: the nucleus, the first form, of which lies in the family, where wife and children are the slaves of the husband"[14]. “In the approach to woman as the spoil and hand-maid of communal lust is expressed the infinite degradation in which man exists for himself, for the secret of this approach has its unambiguous, decisive, plain and undisguised expression in the relation of man to woman and in the manner in which the direct and natural species-relationship is conceived. The direct, natural, and necessary relation of person to person is the relation of man to woman. In this natural species-relationship man’s relation to nature is immediately his relation to man, just as his relation to man is immediately his relation to nature – his own natural destination. In this relationship, therefore, is sensuously manifested, reduced to an observable fact, the extent to which the human essence has become nature to man, or to which nature to him has become the human essence of man. From this relationship one can therefore judge man’s whole level of development. From the character of this relationship follows how much man as a species-being, as man, has come to be himself and to comprehend himself; the relation of man to woman is the most natural relation of human being to human being. It therefore reveals the extent to which man’s natural behaviour has become human, or the extent to which the human essence in him has become a natural essence – the extent to which his human nature has come to be natural to him. This relationship also reveals the extent to which man’s need has become a human need; the extent to which, therefore, the other person as a person has become for him a need – the extent to which he in his individual existence is at the same time a social being.”[15]
Marx could attack Feuerbach for “idealising” sexuality, whereas Feuerbach could likewise attack Marx for “materialising” sexuality.
There are many people who show-off with the term "Marxism", sometimes calling it "proletarian socialism". In the same vein, they speak of "proletarian literature" and "proletarian culture", by which they understand not ethnological peculiarity, but something which is of a higher-order than so-called bourgeois knowledge. However, according to Marx, everyone is a socialist who deliberately works towards the aim of humankind being true to itself, and the development of the species-essence towards its ultimate form, and to abolish the societal inequalities which were necessary when the productive process was less developed, but now stand as barriers to production itself, good-sense morals and for humanity’s self-consciousness. Why does Marx, regardless, see the proletariat as the force, which is destined to transform society? He himself responds to this question as follows:
“When socialist writers ascribe this world-historic role to the proletariat, it is not at all, as Critical Criticism pretends to believe, because they regard the proletarians as gods. Rather the contrary. Since in the fully formed proletariat, the abstraction of all humanity, even of the semblance of humanity, is practically complete; since the conditions of life of the proletariat sum up all the conditions of life of society today in their most inhuman form; since man has lost himself in the proletariat, yet at the same time has not only gained theoretical consciousness of that loss, but through urgent, no longer removable, no longer disguisable, absolutely imperative need—the practical expression of necessity—is driven directly to revolt against this inhumanity, it follows that the proletariat can and must emancipate itself. But it cannot emancipate itself without abolishing the conditions of its own life. It cannot abolish the conditions of its own life without abolishing all the inhuman conditions of life of society today, which are summed up in its own situation. Not in vain does it go through the stern but steeling school of labor. It is not a question of what this or that proletarian, or even the whole proletariat, at the moment regards as its aim. It is a question of what the proletariat is, and what, in accordance with this being, it will historically be compelled to do. Its aim and historical action are visibly and irrevocably foreshadowed in its own life situation as well as in the whole organization of bourgeois society today”[16].
To this, we can add that the proletariat are driven by material need in this historical process, others are driven in a socialist direction by moral need. So became Marx a socialist, by theoretical necessity, because in each need, societal, that is to say, species-essence, finds expression. Those “Marxists”, who in everyone and in everything seek material interest, and make material interest the sole principle by which they examine human consciousness and its actions, understand nil from the thought of Marx.
As we can see, Marx speaks of what must happen, and not about the thoughts of, and the goals set by the proletariat and their parties for themselves. Thus, Marx conceives of humankind in its perceivable, material and concrete reality, derived from its preconditions of life, and from its “real being”, and was thus able to theorize about its future. This follows, because for him, the individual’s being is immediately accessible by their consciousness. “Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process“[17]. “It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness”[18]. As a result of this, he believes that humans develop by changing their circumstances of life, and these in turn change their being. This means that it is not possible to directly transform our being merely with our consciousness.
However, a new science, psychoanalysis, in the course of trying to cure patients, has discovered that the mind is capable of the direct transformation of being, by rejecting and repressing thoughts which the “real being” would otherwise suggest, and through this act transforms its being. It transforms its being to such an extent that the healthy individual becomes a sick individual, the rational thinker, for instance, becomes religiously disposed, revealing the existence of that concrete state of mind which Engels found ridiculous in Feuerbach. This sort of person, and in the historical past of humankind, we can only rely on such persons, is without doubt a real being, however, their consciousness does not correspond to their instinctual being, species and sexual alike, but conveys merely the image of being that they have already distorted. This consciousness does not distort the image of being, but the being itself in its nature, and then more or less faithfully preserves the distorted image of thereof. As stated by Engels: “We simply cannot get away from the fact that everything that sets men acting must find its way through their brains — even eating and drinking, which begins as a consequence of the sensation of hunger or thirst transmitted through the brain, and ends as a result of the sensation of satisfaction likewise transmitted through the brain.”[19]. Since then, within the development of the individual - the social being - psychology has uncovered phenomena which the 19th century philosopher could not have known. He merely touched on topics which, given the state of scientific development today, he could examine through a clearer lens in pursuit of the validity of his system of thought. Since then, we have come to understand that the link between hunger and consciousness, or that between sexuality and consciousness, can be broken. The mind can fail, and often fails to cognise when hunger has been satisfied, and similarly when it comes to matters of sexual satisfaction, despite the physiological processes underpinning these having been brought to completion. Indeed, it regularly fails to cognise these, if - to use a colloquialism - “it has no blessing”.
What did Marx overlook, and what real aspect of human existence remained out of his sights? What is it, which by necessity is obscured by a thinker, who seeks to understand the development of society from its means of production, and the individual from their bodily organs?
Marx believed that religions reflect the human essence within the imagination. In Christianity, it is the child, the son of humankind, who redeems humanity from its suffering. Marx overlooks the child. He stated that the relation of the individual to themselves is reflected in the “most natural” relationship between man and woman, but does not consider that in the same way, the “most natural” relationship is that of the adult and the child. He cannot, since he could not have possibly known, back then, that one’s relationship with themselves is a reflection of one’s relationship with adults in childhood. This relationship is not merely another reference point for the mind, but psychological actuality, its symptoms being the malfunctioning of bodily organs. Psychological actuality, which finds expression in actions and the thoughts guiding them, in the imagined nature of most human needs. It is in Daedalus and Icarus, the flight of the father and the son, and in the modern-day technical realization of this ancient dream. The airplane - and we can confidently add - the illness of dyspepsia, both of which represent the material-technological expression of the human essence, do not convince the observer that humanity stands before the gates of freedom on earth. The technology of the airplane makes it a rational necessity that humanity be organised according to the common good, but the individual’s dyspepsia, arising from biological existence, makes irrational conscious participation in such a drive for reorganisation.
Marx could not extrapolate, from the organs of the child, that they too are sexual beings. So, he could not conclude that the relationship of the individual to themselves is the relationship of the adult to the child. Each adult, in their own being, despite having outgrown the material child, continues to carry it within. Ultimately, this relationship is nothing more than that of the relationship between sexuality in childhood and in adulthood, within the same individual. Without dissolving this relationship in a conscious manner, individuals simply cannot take possession of their organs and the workings of their organs to avail of them in a free manner, the same way humanity has not yet taken possession of the means of production, and the forces of production, in a free, self-conscious manner.
Why do we not have socialism yet - I asked at the start of my article. For now, I will reply by way of analogy. This analogy is not to be rejected, since Marx himself sees the sexual act as the starting point for humankind’s productive capabilities. Socialism does not exist, despite the means of production and the forces of production necessitating the economy to take such a form, in the same way as there is no orgasm in the neurotic’s coitus, despite the physiological development of the sexual organ and the instinctual needs coming together to desire such an outcome. The generalized frigidity of men and women alike, alongside the theory of psychologically-induced impotence serves as explanations for why socialism’s objective and technological preconditions exist, while its subjective, psychological preconditions are missing.
The followers of Marx believe that human nature is defined by interests, which includes needs. Humans are driven by needs, and in pursuit of the satisfaction of needs in society, interests become class interests, and a class war is established.
It is hardly disputable that with this understanding, it is often possible to shed light on society and its processes. However, the situation becomes muddier when we try to understand the needs, and interests themselves.
It seems reasonable to bring forward the argument against explaining societal phenomena based on the framework of competing interests, that people do not know their real interests and needs. It becomes clear, after due analysis, that interests and needs are imagined to a great extent, and “cultural needs” are so much more diverse than natural and biological needs. The monopoly of taxes on tobacco provides substantial profit to the bourgeois state, the production of tobacco and its distribution employs many people - and yet, all of this rests on the fact, that, in our childhood, we acquired a nicotine addiction, because we imitated adults, wanting to become adults ourselves, doing this in the hopes of eventually fulfilling other desires too. Why are diamond earrings a need? Or the tie? The office worker insists he must wear a tie, otherwise he will be fired from his job. As such, it is a societal need to wear one, it truly is necessary for life - but why does something which people could easily live without become a societal need, to such an extent that it becomes a precondition of life? If we examine the vegetating, cold and hungry masses, it seems that the Marxists are correct, who explain their activities through “interests” and needs. (Although, it remains unclear, why these same masses can be organised - on an emotional basis - against their own interests too). However, it is precisely the activities of the members of the ruling classes that remain misty through the lens of historical materialism. Why do the ruling classes cling to rule, specifically to capitalism? Why do they find beauty in capital accumulation, that act which protestant puritans elevated to a moral ideal by denying their sensual desire? Why is power, acquired from capital, a need? I understand that the advanced industrial capitalist state is working on securing colonies and through this acquire raw materials and fresh markets, but I do not understand why the “advanced industrial capitalist state” is a need for people. Why is it a need for someone to climb the social ladder and belong to the highest echelons of society, and why is it a need for someone else to submit to the ruling class, and why is it a need for yet another to withdraw themselves from society as a mentally ill person? A lot of people believe that society’s defining characteristic is fear from poverty. How come that forest animals, or in society, vagabonds and other, more "disorderly" people, do not fear poverty? What “material interest”, need, did Marx have, to dedicate his life to the struggle against capitalism, and Engels, the factory owner, to become Marx’s comrade and supporter? In general, we see that it is precisely with historical materialism that we understand the least those revolutionaries who navigate using historical materialism in this world, the puritan idealists, the Lenins, and their similarly puritan idealist enemies, the Hitlers, and their common enemy, religious christians with their barefooted monks, those people who are the bearers of society’s contending ideologies. This is despite the fact that Marxism is supposed to explain the ideas and morals which direct societal behaviour.
This philosopher contemplating the essence of Christianity turns morality, which itself requires explanation, into an explanatory principle. Nevertheless, it remains to their eternal credit that abstract thinking was directed towards sexuality, which, understood as a moral synthesis, expresses the sensual-human basis of historical religions.
Notes
[1] G. W. F. Hegel, Preface to the Philosophy of Right. 1820. [2] Friedrich Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy. 1886. [3] Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. 1844. [4] Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach. 1888. [5] Karl Marx, The German Ideology. 1845. [6] Karl Marx, The German Ideology. 1845. [7] Karl Marx, The German Ideology. 1845. [8] Karl Marx, The German Ideology. 1845. [9] Karl Marx, The German Ideology. 1845. [10] Karl Marx, The German Ideology. 1845. [11] Karl Marx, The German Ideology. 1845. [12] Karl Marx, The German Ideology. 1845. [13] Karl Marx, The German Ideology. 1845. [14] Karl Marx, The German Ideology. 1845. [15] Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. 1844. [16] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Holy Family. 1844. [17] Karl Marx, The German Ideology. 1845 [18] Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. 1859. [19] Friedrich Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy. 1886.