Source: Insert published with Marx-Lexikon Zur Politischen Ökonomie vol. 2, March 1969;
Translated: for marxists.org by Michael Schauerte;
CopyLeft: Creative Commons (Attribute & ShareAlike) marxists.org 2006.
The following discussion of Marx's method of political economy was published as an insert for the third volume of the Marx-Lexikon zur Politischen Ökonomie edited by Kuruma. For the Marx-Lexikon, Kuruma gathered together key passages from Marx's collected works, as well as passages written by Engels, in both the original German and translated Japanese, to clarify a number of key topics, such as "historical materialism," "crisis," "competition," and "money." The second volume, which the discussion below concerns, was the first of two volumes dealing with the topic of "method." As in the other volumes, Kuruma organized the passages under headings and subheadings, and underlined or highlighted in bold those parts of particular importance. Each of the 15 volumes also included an insert with a discussion between Kuruma and the others involved in the Marx-Lexikon regarding the topic at hand. The other names are indicated by initials because the text is an altered version of the actual discussion that took place, which involved Kuruma first introducing information on his editorial approach and then fielding questions from those present. The format was altered to make the content easier to understand.
A: Here we are going to look at the question of method, but Professor Kuruma in the past seems to have had a dislike for methodology.
Kuruma: Hold on a moment there. You say that I have disliked methodology, but certainly I haven't failed to recognize the importance of method within political economy.
A: Yes, but setting aside methodology as discussed by Marx and Engels, you must admit that there is a great deal of the sort of methodology typically dealt with in Japan and elsewhere that you dislike.
Kuruma: I don't read many works of that nature, so I can't really say whether this is the case or not, but as far as "methodology" understood in terms of this or that part of Capital corresponding with x or y in Hegel's Logic, those who say that Capital cannot be understood without reading Hegel, those who brandish about Hegel while not giving much thought to what problem Marx is raising and solving at a particular point, or those who generate with outrageous misunderstandings from Hegelian thinking, well, such arguments remind me of a person who "goes out for wool and comes back shorn."
A: Your critical views on such methodology were laid out in the book Theory of the Value-Form and Theory of the Exchange Process published [in 1957] by Iwanami, weren't they?
Kuruma: It was many years ago so I don't recall precisely, but the original intention of that book was to present my views on the significance of the theory of the value-form and the theory of the exchange process, as well as the reciprocal relation between them, which I had struggled to grasp over a long period of time and had finally come to understand in my own terms. So this was not a book intended to deal with methodology, but I suspect that what I wrote did end up being somewhat useful in terms of clarifying Marx's method. It is true that the book, written from this sort of perspective, was surprisingly well-received by people at the time, including Hegelian scholars with a Marxist outlook. But this was unexpected, at least in terms of the goal I had in mind when I wrote the articles that make up the book. Since Marx's method is rendered concrete in Capital, the surest way to become familiar with his method is to straightforwardly and carefully read Capital. Of course, Marx himself, on numerous occasions, says that he learned a great deal from Hegel, so familiarizing ourselves with Hegel is of course very beneficial for understanding Marx. However, Marx did not take over Hegel's ideas as they were, and instead incorporated these ideas on the basis of a fundamental criticism of them, so if we plunge into Hegel without being careful, it will, again, be like "going out for wool and coming back shorn." I think this volume of Lexikon has quite a few passages from Marx and Engels that will be useful in terms of looking out for this point.
A: I think that's exactly right. However, you say that Theory of the Value-Form and Theory of the Exchange Process does not deal directly with methodology, but that isn't necessarily the case. In your book there are things that clearly seem to be written as a criticism of the discussion of Hegel that was prevalent among Marxists in postwar Japan.
Kuruma: Oh really?
A: In fact, Kyūzō Asobe, in his book Shihonron kenkyū-shi (pp. 27-8), writes:
I would like to raise the following as one of the positive contributions made by Samezō Kuruma. That is, in the period after the war, as I noted in the previous section, there was a tendency to apply Hegelian philosophy to the study of Capital, which Fumiio Hasebe referred to as the "plague of Hegel." This was premised on a sort of a priori schema, with Capital then being understood on the basis of this schema. But in the scholarship of Kuruma, the understanding of Capital based on this approach comes to a decisive end, and we come across various things we need to learn from his scholarship, which has no supporting structure. To relate one small personal matter that occurred several years ago: When I visited Professor Kuruma at his home, I happened to raise the subject of a new trend in interpreting Capital, but he could not subscribe to the new view because he said Capital is a work of political economy. I did not agree with the overall meaning of his comments, but in a sense Theory of the Value-Form and Theory of the Exchange Process could be called an act of resistance by a representative of prewar Marxism against the tendency of his postwar counterparts. Indeed, in one part of his book (pp. 41-2) there is a passage that might be viewed in this light. For the postwar school to demonstrate the correctness of their method, first it was necessary to counter Kuruma's approach by substantially understanding the content of Capital.
B: In the passage from Asobe's book, he indicates pages 41 to 42 of Theory of the Value-Form and Theory of the Exchange Process as meriting particular attention, but as I don't recall exactly what Professor Kuruma discusses in this passage, so perhaps we could read a bit of it.
A: Let's see, I'll start with page 40 because otherwise the meaning may not be clear:
Marx himself, near the end of chapter two on the exchange process (as the final consideration of money prior to this third chapter that deals with the theory of money) writes: "The difficulty lies, not in comprehending that money is a commodity, but in discovering how, why, and through what a commodity is money"  Here the indication of these three difficulties clearly suggests Marx himself brilliantly overcome them, but no hint is provided as to where this was carried out. I have interpreted Marx as having answered the questions of how, why, and through what, respectively in the third and fourth sections of chapter one and in chapter two. Thus, according to this view, the three difficulties are listed in the order that they were overcome in Capital.
Here I want to note, incidentally, that these three problems were not posed by Marx as a sort of logical schema, or in some sort of frivolous manner. Without solving each one of them an adequate understanding of money is not possible. Indeed, earlier political economy slipped into a variety of errors by failing to solve these problems. One must begin by posing the realistic problem to be solved, and then the issue becomes how the solution should be carried out, with the question being where and how the issue should be discussed - not the other way around. Therefore, it would be a waste of time, like "casting pearls before swine," to present the solution to a person who has not even grasped the problem itself. Some imagine, however, that Marx is engaging in a sort of frivolous discussion here, while others focus their attention on this as the penetration of a Hegelian "logical process." Considering this, I think the following, taken from Marx's letter to Engels in which he expresses his thoughts on a book by Ferdinand Lasalle, entitled Heraclitus, the Dark Philosopher, should be fully relished:
"Heraclitus, the Dark Philosopher, is quoted as saying in an attempt to elucidate the transformation of all things into their opposite: 'Thus gold changeth into all things, and all things change into gold.' Here, Lassalle says, gold means money (c'est juste) and money is value. Thus the Ideal, Universality, the One (value), and things, the Real, Particularity, the Many. He makes use of this surprising insight to give, in a lengthy note, an earnest of this discoveries in the science of political economy. Every other word a howler, but set forth with remarkable pretentiousness. It is plain to me from this one note that, in his second grand opus, the fellow intends to expound political economy in the manner of Hegel. He will discover to his cost that it is one thing for a critique to take a science to the point at which it admits of a dialectical presentation, and quite another to apply an abstract, ready-made system of logic to vague presentiments of just such a system" .
B: I see. That's very clear to me. But from what we read here...
Kuruma: Wait a moment, let's not dwell on ancient history. The main point of discussion here is the editorial approach for Lexikon.
A: I'm sorry that we seem to have gotten off track. If anyone has a question or point regarding the editing of Lexikon or its original plan, please speak up.
C: have a question.
A: Go ahead.
C: The headings in the first volume of Lexikon on Method are: "I Overview of the Method of Political Economy"; "II Method of Inquiry and Method of Presentation, Downward Path and Upward Path"; "III Analysis and Analytical Method"; "IV Abstraction"; and "V Dialectic, Dialectical Method" - but if we look at heading "II Method of Inquiry and Method of Presentation, Downward Path and Upward Path," the first citation is Marx discussing the method of inquiry and the method of presentation in his afterword to the second edition of Capital, followed by Marx in the introduction to Grundrisse on the downward path and upward path. In terms of the order these were written I would think it natural for the passage from the introduction to Grundrisse to come first, so I had doubts about this point.
Also, both of the passages discuss the method of political economy, and are passages that I think provide us with important clues for understanding the method of Capital, but there are various points regarding the content Marx is speaking of in each, and the relation between them, that I am not certain about and would like to take this opportunity to ask you about this.
Could it be said that the downward path and the upward path, mentioned in the introduction to Grundrisse, and the method of inquiry and method of presentation spoken of in the afterword to Capital, could be described as the downward path of inquiry and the upward path of presentation, so that they basically have the same meaning? And if so, why does Marx say in the introduction to Grundrisse that the upward path, not the downward path, is the scientifically correct method?
Kuruma: Your first question I believe is why, in the section "II Method of Inquiry and Method of Presentation, Downward Path and Upward Path" of Lexikon, the method of inquiry and method of presentation appear first.
In a word, this is because I felt that in terms of Marx's comments on his own method of political economy, his afterword on the method of inquiry and method of presentation has greater significance. Even granting that the passage in the introduction to Grundrisse and the one in the afterword discuss the method of political economy, I think there is a big difference between them. In particular, in the part of the introduction to Grundrisse where it is said that the ascending path is the scientifically correct method, which you raised, Marx is speaking of the history of political economy. If we look at the history of political economy, it first followed the downward path, and after reaching a certain point it shifted to the upward path, with various systems of political economy coming into existence. Marx is saying that it is the latter that is the scientifically correct method. This clearly pertains to the historical process of the generation of political economy, so I think it would be an error to view this as directly referring to Marx's own method.
Kuruma: It would be a serious error to interpret that Marx, when he says that the end of the descending path is the beginning of the ascending toward a system of political economy, and that the latter is the scientifically (Wissenschaftlich) correct method, is saying that the descending path and the ascending path are in an "either/or" relation where one is correct and the other incorrect. The descending path, according to Marx, is the indispensable premise of the ascending path. I think that what is meant by the latter being the scientifically (Wissenschaftlich) correct method is that political economy as a science (Wissenschaft) is first established by the various pieces of economic knowledge (Wissen) forming a system, and this is expressed in the form I mentioned. This way of thinking was previously explained by Hegel - of course in the field of philosophy rather than political economy - as constituting the core of his philosophy. For instance, Hegel writes:
The true shape in which truth exists can only be the scientific system of such truth. To help bring philosophy closer to the form of Science, to the goal where it can lay aside the title "love of knowing" and be actual knowing?that is what I have set myself to do. The inner necessity that knowing should be Science lies in its nature, and only the systematic exposition of philosophy itself provides it .
Unless it is a system, a philosophy is not a scientific production. Unsystematic philosophizing can only be expected to give expression to personal peculiarities of mind, and has no principle for the regulation of its contents .
When Marx says in the introduction to Grundrisse that, "as soon as these individual moments had been more or less firmly established and abstracted, there began the economic systems, which ascended" and that "the latter is obviously the scientifically correct method," I suspect that he had in mind the sort of language used by Hegel in the passages just cited.
C: I see. That point is very clear now. It is not the case that the ascending path is correct whereas the descending path is incorrect, but that via the ascending path, or via systematization, political economy first becomes a science.
Kuruma: That's right.
D: I understand the previous point quite well, but I feel that in the introduction to Grundrisse, where Marx discusses the descending path and the ascending path, he mentions history in the latter half, whereas this is not necessarily the case in the first half, where he is instead generally stating his opinion on the method of cognition for political economy. And to this extent I don't think there is such a difference from the mention of the method of inquiry and method of presentation made in the afterword to Capital. But if there is in fact a difference, what would it be? You said that the emphasis should be placed on the afterword to the second edition in terms of understanding Marx's own method, but is there a reason for this. Could you address this point a bit more concretely?
Kuruma: I emphasized what was written in the afterword to the second edition because, compared to the introduction to Grundrisse, the expressions used are not only more exact, but the content is also clearly more precise. In particular it is necessary to carefully read his point about the method of inquiry having to "appropriate and to track down" the "inner connection" of the material, after which "the real movement [can] be appropriately presented," which I think expresses the characteristics of Marx's analysis in the most precise way. By contrast, in the introduction to Grundrisse, he writes: "If I were to begin with the population, this would be a chaotic conception [Vorstellung] of the whole, and I would then, by means of further determination, move analytically towards ever more simple concepts [Begriff], from the imagined concrete towards ever thinner abstractions until I had arrived at the simplest determinations." Here the characteristics of Marx's analysis - and its difference from the previous and subsequent analysis of political economy - is not made clear. The defect in the analysis of previous and subsequent political economy is not that there was no move from the "concrete towards ever thinner abstractions," but that it had not "analyzed [the material's] different forms of development and track[ed] down their inner connection." In criticizing the method of classical political economy, for example, Marx writes:
Classical political economy seeks to reduce the various fixed and mutually alien forms of wealth to their inner unity by means of analysis and to strip away the form in which they exist independently alongside one another. It seeks to grasp the inner connection in contrast to the multiplicity of outward forms. It therefore reduces rent to surplus profit, so that it ceases to be a specific, separate form and is divorced from its apparent source, the land. It likewise divests interest of its independent form and shows that it is a part of profit. In this way it reduces all types of revenue and all independent forms and titles under cover of which the non-workers receive a portion of the value of commodities, to the single form of profit. Profit, however, is reduced to surplus-value since the value of the whole commodity is reduced to labor; the amount of paid labor embodied in the commodity constitutes wages, consequently the surplus over and above it constitutes unpaid labor, surplus labor called forth by capital and appropriated gratis under various titles. Classical political economy occasionally contradicts itself in this analysis. It often attempts directly, leaving out the intermediate links, to carry through the reduction and to prove that the various forms are derived from one and the same source. This is however a necessary consequence of its analytical method, with which criticism and understanding must begin. Classical economy is not interested in elaborating how the various forms come into being, but seeks to reduce them to their unity by means of analysis, because it starts from them as given premises.
Kuruma: Classical political economy, in analyzing the forms of wealth under the capitalist mode of production, thought of this in terms of being natural and supra-historical, and therefore, starting from treating these forms as "given premises," they showed no interest in "elaborating how the various forms come into being," solely concerning themselves with the effort to "reduce them to their unity by means of analysis." Not a single classical economist thought to "analyze the different forms of development [of the material] and track down their inner connection." This is the reason why there is no development in their systems. A passage from Theories of Surplus Value, listed under subheading 8 of Lexikon, discusses in detail the degree to which the structure of the main work of Ricardo, who brought classical political economy to its completion, lacks development, which arises necessarily from his mistaken method of inquiry. I think that reading this passage helps fully clarify this point, so I'd like to read the main part of it:
Ricardo's method is as follows: He begins with the determination of the magnitude of the value of the commodity by labor-time and then examines whether the other economic relations and categories contradict this determination of value or to what extent they modify it. The historical justification of this method of procedure, its scientific necessity in the history of economics, are evident at first sight, but so is, at the same time, its scientific inadequacy. This inadequacy not only shows itself in the method of presentation (in a formal sense) but leads to erroneous results because it omits some essential links and directly seeks to prove the congruity of the economic categories with one another.
Hence also the very peculiar and necessarily faulty architectonics of his work.
The Ricardian theory is therefore contained exclusively in the first six chapters of the work. It is in respect of this part of the work that I use the term faulty architectonics...But the faulty architectonics of the theoretical part (the first six chapters) is not accidental, rather it is the result of Ricardo's method of investigation itself and of the definite task which he set himself in his work. It expresses the scientific deficiencies of this method of investigation itself...
Thus the entire Ricardian contribution is contained in the first two chapters of his work...Hence the great theoretical satisfaction afforded by these first two chapters; for they provide with concise brevity a critique of the old, diffuse and meandering political economy, present the whole bourgeois system of economy as subject to one fundamental law, and extract the quintessence out of the divergency and diversity of the various phenomena. But this theoretical satisfaction afforded by these first two chapters because of their originality, unity of fundamental approach, simplicity, concentration, depth, novelty and comprehensiveness, is of necessity lost as the work proceeds. Here too, we are at times captivated by the originality of certain arguments. But as a whole, it gives rise to weariness and boredom. As the work proceeds, there is no further development. Where it does not consist of monotonous formal application of the same principles to various extraneous matters, or of polemical vindication of these principles, there is only repetition or amplification; at most one can occasionally find a striking chain of reasoning in the final sections.
I would also like to highlight another passage where Marx discusses the lack of development in Ricardo's system. This is also taken from Theories of Surplus Value, and appears under subheading 21 of Lexikon, which is entitled "Correct Abstraction and Incorrect (Insufficient) Abstraction." In the passage, Marx criticizes Ricardo for "regarding the phenomenal form as immediate and direct proof or exposition of the general laws, and for failing to develop it", and in terms of this Ricardo's abstraction is formal abstraction, and as such, mistaken. Ricardo starts from the law of value as the most general law of the bourgeois economy, but instead of carrying out a development from this law of value to production price, he seeks to "immediately and directly" "demonstrate or exposit" it. He thus falls into contradiction, which indicates above all that his manner of abstraction is mistaken (i.e. "formal abstraction"). This passage is also a good reference when considering the close relation between the method of inquiry and the method of presentation, which are two sides of the same coin.
This is basically my view on the matter. If your own view differs please let me know.
D: Since this is a rather new way of thinking, it's difficult to say immediately, at least in my own case, whether I agree or disagree. Previously I generally felt that the core of Marx's method was the descending and ascending paths, but this is probably because I never gave the matter sufficient consideration
E: This is not related to the main point we have addressed, but I want to ask about one term you spoke of. That is, you said that Ricardo's abstraction is "formal abstraction" and is mistaken as such. When Marx speaks here of "formal abstraction," what does he mean by the word "formal"? What would be the antonym of "formal" in this case?
Kuruma: Well...I don't really have any idea myself about an antonym. But in terms of the sort of abstraction that "formal abstraction" is actually referring to, I think this should be clear from the previous and subsequent relations. I think Ricardo does in fact start from the most fundamental economic law, being the law of value - which is the determination of value by labor - but instead of posing the question, upon this as the basis, of how production price arises, a production price that does not directly correspond to value, he seeks to "demonstrate or exposit" production price "immediately and directly" upon the basis of the law of value. On this point his abstraction is formal, incorrect abstraction.
One thing I recall, incidentally, in relation to this is the following from Hegel's work Phenomenology, which I quoted from earlier, that ground-breaking book in which he constructed a philosophy that merits the greatest attention:
As for content, the other side make it easy enough for themselves at times to display a great expanse of it. The appropriate a lot of already familiar and well-ordered material; by focusing on rare and exotic instances they give the impression that they have hold of everything else which scientific knowledge had already embraced in its scope, and that they are also in command of such material as is yet unordered. It thus appears that everything has been subjected to the absolute Idea, which therefore seems to be cognized in everything and to have matured into an expanded science. But a closer inspection shows that this expansion has not come about through one and the same principle having spontaneously assumed different shapes, but rather through the shapeless repetition of one and the same formula, only externally applied to diverse materials, thereby obtaining merely a boring show of diversity. The Idea, which is of course true enough on its own account, remains in effect always in its primitive condition, if its development involves nothing more than this sort of repetition of the same formula. When the knowing subject goes around applying this single inert form to whatever it encounters, and dipping the material into the placid element from outside, this is no more the fulfillment of what is needed, i.e. a self-originating, self-differentiating wealth of shapes, than any arbitrary insights into the content. Rather it is a monochromatic formalism which only arrives at the differentiation of its material since this has been already provided and is by now familiar.
This criticism of Schelling by Hegel, in its fundamental points, closely resembles Marx's criticism of Ricardo that we just looked at. For example, it is quite similar to Marx's saying of Ricardo: "As the work proceeds, there is no further development. Where it does not consist of monotonous formal application of the same principles to various extraneous matters, or of polemical vindication of these principles, there is only repetition or amplification." In the passage just quoted, Hegel speaks of the "repetition of one and the same formula" (Formel) and of "formalism." I think it may be more appropriate to think of the term "formal" in Marx's criticism of Ricardo's abstraction as being "formal abstraction" in this sense. Does this help?
E: Put that way, I think I understand.
C: To return to a previous point, Professor Kuruma said earlier that to become familiar with Marx's own method, it is the discussion of the method of inquiry and method of presentation in the afterword to Capital, rather than the downward path and upward path in the introduction to Grundrisse, that should be emphasized. But this doesn't necessarily mean that the discussion of the downward and upward paths in the introduction to Grundrisse is mistaken, does it?
Kuruma: Yes, of course, that's exactly right.
C: In that case, I think the following question arises: Is it appropriate to view the downward path mentioned in the introduction and the method of inquiry in the afterword as corresponding to each other, and the same being true of the upward path and the method of presentation?
Kuruma: If I had to answer yes or no, I would say yes, but it is also certain that they are not identical. In the case of the downward path and upward path, it is the direction of the path that is at issue. But in the case of the method of inquiry and method of presentation, even if it is said that the inquiry corresponds to the downward path, and the presentation to the upward path, it is the manner of tracing the paths that is at issue. Even if they head in the same direction, it is the nature of the direction that is being posed, and here is a major difference between the two.
E: So, in order to know the characteristics of Marx's own method, more than the discussion of the downward path and upward path in the introduction to Grundrisse, it is the discussion of the method of inquiry and method of presentation in the afterword that should be emphasized.
Kuruma: That's right.
A: Well, it's gotten quite late, so I think we should end our discussion here.
1. Asōbe Kyūzo, Shihonron kenkyū-shi (Kyoto: Minerva Shobou, 1958), 27-8.
2. The original German is "wie, warum, wodurch Ware Geld ist."
3. Kuruma Samezō, Kachikeitai-ron to koukankateiron (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1957), 40-43.
4. The passage from the afterword to Capital referred to is the following: "Of course the method of presentation must differ in form from that of inquiry. The latter [method of inquiry] has to appropriate the material in detail, to analyze its different forms of development, to trace out their inner connection. Only after this work is done, can the actual movement be adequately described. If this is done successfully, if the life of the subject-matter is ideally reflected as in a mirror, then it may appear as if we had before us a mere a priori construction."
5. The passage from the introduction to Grundrisse referred to is the following: "When we consider a given country politico-economically, we begin with its population, its distribution among classes, town, country, the coast, the different branches of production, export and import, annual production and consumption, commodity prices etc. It seems to be correct to begin with the real and the concrete, with the real precondition, thus to begin, in economics, with e.g. the population, which is the foundation and the subject of the entire social act of production. However, on closer examination this proves false. The population is an abstraction if I leave out, for example, the classes of which it is composed. These classes in turn are an empty phrase if I am not familiar with the elements on which they rest. E.g. wage labor, capital, etc. These latter in turn presuppose exchange, division of labor, prices, etc. For example, capital is nothing without wage labor, without value, money, price etc. Thus, if I were to begin with the population, this would be a chaotic conception [Vorstellung] of the whole, and I would then, by means of further determination, move analytically towards ever more simple concepts [Begriff], from the imagined concrete towards ever thinner abstractions until I had arrived at the simplest determinations. From there the journey would have to be retraced until I had finally arrived at the population again, but this time not as the chaotic conception of a whole, but as a rich totality of many determinations and relations. The former is the path historically followed by economics at the time of its origins. The economists of the seventeenth century, e.g., always begin with the living whole, with population, nation, state, several states, etc.; but they always conclude by discovering through analysis a small number of determinant, abstract, general relations such as division of labor, money, value, etc. As soon as these individual moments had been more or less firmly established and abstracted, there began the economic systems, which ascended from the simple relations, such as labor, division of labor, need, exchange value, to the level of the state, exchange between nations and the world market. The latter [ascending path] is obviously the scientifically correct method. The concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse. It appears in the process of thinking, therefore, as a process of concentration, as a result, not as a point of departure, even though it is the point of departure in reality and hence also the point of departure for observation [Anschauung] and conception. Along the first [descending] path the full conception was evaporated to yield an abstract determination; along the second [ascending path], the abstract determinations lead towards a reproduction of the concrete by way of thought. In this way Hegel fell into the illusion of conceiving the real as the product of thought concentrating itself, probing its own depths, and unfolding itself out of itself, by itself, whereas the method of rising from the abstract to the concrete is only the way in which thought appropriates the concrete, reproduces it as the concrete in the mind. But this is by no means the process by which the concrete itself comes into being."
6. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 3.
7. Hegel, Hegel's Logic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 20.
8. Marx, Theories of Surplus Value.
9. Marx, Theories of Surplus Value.
10. Marx, Theories of Surplus Value.
11. In the French edition Hegel adds "Schelling and his followers."
12. Phenomenology of Spirit, 8-9.