A Note on the Transcription


We began our preparation of this volume using the Fourth Printing, having assumed that this edition marked an improvement over the previous one. Only much later did it become clear, after some spot-checking with the Third Printing, that in certain very important respects the newer printing reflected a carelessness that rendered it inferior to its predecessor. For example, in the Fourth Printing there was the inconsistent use of Greek and German characters for the same words which introduced unnecessary confusion; there were also instances where vertical lines that Lenin placed in the margins adjacent to his comment were omitted. On a couple of other occasions small blocks of text were re-ordered, and while such practice can clearly fall within the purview of editorial discretion, there were also a couple of places where a few lines of text are repeated, word for word, with no accompanying editorial note to indicate that such a *faux pas* had its source in Lenin’s reading notes (which suggests that the problem was with the editorial staff). In nearly all cases where there were discrepancies between the Third and Fourth printings, be they substantive or merely annoying, the greater confidence in the Third Printing prevailed.

Notwithstanding such carelessness, we proceeded to use the Fourth Printing as the basis for the formatting, layout and pagination of this digital edition. The afore-mentioned *faux pas* were removed and this required some reformatting, and this proceeded on the basis of the 1972 printing. Perhaps it is worth noting that neither edition was particularly generous in translating into English the German expressions and phrases Lenin’s frequently used in the body of the texts. Nor
was it ever indicated why some German text was rendered into English and other text (by far most) never was. In those instances when translations were ventured, unlike the 1972 edition which placed them in the footnotes, the 1976 edition placed the English translations directly in the body of the text and omitted the German altogether. The latter edition also revised some of the editors’ endnotes, expanding on a few items, reducing others, and most salient of all: omitting the repetative phrase “reactionary philosophy” from every note pertaining to idealist philosophers.

Although Marx to Mao has always tried to limit its role to that of transcription, we are confident that in spite of, or perhaps because of, our ocassional editorial intrusion in this instance, nothing has been done to degrade the integrity of the material we are placing before the reader.

In preparing this digital edition of the *Philosophical Notebooks* we encountered one nagging technical problem: establishing a consistent and uniform appearance for the vertical parallel lines (both “normal” and “bold” faced) appearing throughout the volume. We have reached the limit (as we know it) of what we can do to control this. The file has been tested on two different versions of Acrobat Reader (4.0 and 6.0), but there has been no cross-platform testing. We can only apologize if these marginal markings are aesthetic disasters on your particular system.

1 May 2008

From Marx to Mao
M-L Digital Reprints
LENIN
WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

LENIN

COLLECTED WORKS

38
ИНСТИТУТ МАРКСИЗМА—ЛЕНИНИЗМА при ЦК КНСС

В. И. ЛЕНИН

СОЧИНЕННИЯ

Издanie четвертое

ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ ИЗДАТЕЛЬСТВО
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Volume 38 of the Fourth Edition of the *Collected Works* of V. I. Lenin comprises resumes and excerpts from books, plus his critical remarks and evaluations concerning various aspects of Marxist philosophy; it also includes notes, fragments and other philosophical material.

The volume includes Lenin’s philosophical writings first published in *Lenin Miscellanies IX and XII* in 1929-30, and then, from 1933 to 1947, published repeatedly as a separate book under the title of *Philosophical Notebooks*. This material comprises the contents of ten notebooks, eight of which, relating to 1914-15, were entitled by Lenin *Notebooks on Philosophy*. In addition, the volume includes comments on books dealing with problems of philosophy and the natural sciences made by Lenin as separate notes in other notebooks containing preparatory material, as well as excerpts from books by various authors, with notes and underlining by Lenin.

Unlike previous editions of *Philosophical Notebooks*, this volume contains Lenin's comments and markings in G. V. Plekhanov's pamphlet *Fundamental Questions of Marxism* and in V. Shulyatikov's book *The Justification of Capitalism in West-European Philosophy, from Descartes to E. Mach*, markings and underlinings on those pages of A. Deborin's article “Dialectical Materialism” which were not included in earlier editions; comments in G. V. Plekhanov's book *N. G. Chernyshevsky*, including markings, which in the course of work on this edition were proved to have been made by Lenin; and a number of notes on books
and reviews of books on philosophy and the natural sciences. Published in this volume for the first time is a note which Lenin wrote late in 1904 on a review of *The Wonders of Life* and *The Riddle of the Universe*, two works by the German biologist Ernst Haeckel.

A large number of the items included in *Philosophical Notebooks* relate to 1914-16. It is no coincidence that Lenin devoted so much attention to philosophy, and above all, to Marxist dialectics, precisely during the First World War, a period in which all the contradictions of capitalism became extremely acute and a revolutionary crisis matured. Only materialist dialectics provided the basis for making a Marxist analysis of the contradictions of imperialism, revealing the imperialist character of the First World War, exposing the opportunism and social-chauvinism of the leaders of the Second International and working out the strategy and tactics of struggle of the proletariat. All the works of Lenin written during that period — the classical treatise *Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, *Socialism and War*, *The United States of Europe* Slogan, *The Junius Pamphlet*, *Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination* and other writings — are inseparable from *Philosophical Notebooks*. The creative elaboration of Marxist philosophy, the Marxist dialectical method, and a profound scientific analysis of the new historical period were the basis for Lenin’s great discoveries, which equipped the proletariat with a new theory of socialist revolution. *Philosophical Notebooks* is inspired by a creative approach to Marxist philosophy, which is indissolubly bound up with reality, the struggle of the working class and the policy of the Party.

The volume opens with Lenin’s conspectus of *The Holy Family, or Critique of Critical Criticism* by Marx and Engels. The conspectus written in 1895 traces the formation of the philosophical and political world outlook of Marx and Engels. Lenin quotes and marks those passages in the book which show how Marx approached “the concept of the social relations of production” (p. 30 of this volume) and which characterise “Marx’s view—already almost fully developed—concerning the revolutionary role of the proletariat” (p. 26). Lenin gives prominence to Marx and Engels’ crit-
icism of the subjective sociology of Bruno and Edgar Bauer and their followers and their idealist views on the role of critical-minded people.” Lenin stresses the theses advanced by the founders of scientific communism: that the real and actual makers of history are the people, the working masses; and that “with the thoroughness of the historical action, the size of the mass who perform it will therefore increase” (p. 82). These theses are organically linked with the struggle waged by Lenin at that time against idealist Narodnik views on “heroes” and “the crowd,” against attempts to provide a theoretical basis for the cult of the individual. Lenin made a detailed résumé of the chapter of the book in which Marx thoroughly characterises the significance of 17th-18th century English and French materialism.

_Philosophical Notebooks_ pays great attention to German classical philosophy, one of the sources of Marxism. In a summary of Ludwig Feuerbach’s book, _Lectures on the Essence of Religion_, which he wrote apparently in 1909, Lenin emphasises Feuerbach’s contributions as a materialist and atheist. He also points out those propositions in the Lectures expressing the materialist conjectures contained in Feuerbach’s views on society. On the other hand, Lenin reveals the weaknesses and limitations of Feuerbach’s materialism, noting that “both the anthropological principle and naturalism are only inexact, weak descriptions of _materialism_” (p. 82). In comparing Marx and Engels’ works of the same period with _Lectures on the Essence of Religion_, which Feuerbach delivered in 1848-49 and which were published in 1851, Lenin writes: “How far, even at _this time_ (1848-1851), _had_ Feuerbach _lagged_ behind Marx (The Communist Manifesto, 1847, _Neue Rheinische Zeitung_, etc.) and Engels (1845: Lage)” (p. 77).

In elaborating the theory of materialist dialectics, Lenin paid special attention to the study and critical analysis of Hegel’s philosophical legacy. His résumés of Hegel’s _The Science of Logic, Lectures on the History of Philosophy_ and _Lectures on the Philosophy of History_ occupy a central place in _Philosophical Notebooks_.

Lenin sharply criticises Hegel’s idealism and the mysticism of his ideas. But Lenin also reveals the significance
of Hegelian dialectics and points out the necessity for evaluating it from a materialist standpoint. "Hegel’s logic," wrote V. I. Lenin, "cannot be applied in its given form, it cannot be taken as given. One must separate out from it the logical (epistemological) nuances, after purifying them from Ideenmystik..." (p. 266). In summarising Hegel’s writings, Lenin formulates a series of highly important propositions on the essence of materialist dialectics.

The brilliant article “On the Question of Dialectics,” written in 1915, is related to Lenin’s summary of Hegel’s works. Though small in size, this article is a crystallisation of unsurpassed depth and richness of thought of all the important and essential elements in materialist dialectics.

Lenin’s résumés of Lassalle’s The Philosophy of Heraclitus the Obscure of Ephesus, Aristotle’s Metaphysics and Feuerbach’s Exposition, Analysis and Critique of the Philosophy of Leibnitz trace the historical preparation of materialist dialectics. Lenin examines the history of philosophy from Heraclitus and Democritus to Marx and Engels, and presents a profound Marxist evaluation of the work of outstanding thinkers. He reveals the progressive contribution which they made to the development of philosophical thought, and at the same time, discloses the historical limitations of their views.

In his comments on books concerned with the natural sciences, as well as elsewhere in the volume, Lenin criticises attempts to reconcile a scientific explanation of nature with a religious world outlook, the vacillations of natural scientists—spontaneous materialists—between materialism and idealism, and their inability to distinguish between mechanistic and dialectical materialism. He inveighs against a contemptuous attitude toward philosophy and philosophical generalisations and demonstrates the vast importance of materialist dialectics for the natural sciences and for philosophical generalisations based on the discoveries of modern science.

The last section of Philosophical Notebooks is made up of markings and comments by Lenin in books on philosophy (by G. V. Plekhanov, V. M. Shulyatikov, A. M. Deborin and other authors), which show how scathingly Lenin crit-
This criticism is a vivid example of the uncompromising struggle by Lenin against vulgar materialism and the slightest deviations from Marxist philosophy.

The remarks made by Lenin in Plekhanov's book on Chernyshevsky are of considerable interest. They are evidence of his great attention to the history of Russian social thought and his high opinion of its progressive, materialist traditions. Lenin stresses the revolutionary democracy and materialism of Chernyshevsky and his determined struggle against idealism. In pointing out the shortcomings of Plekhanov's book and Plekhanov's failure to see the class content of Chernyshevsky's activity, Lenin writes: "Because of the theoretical difference between the idealist and materialist views of history, Plekhanov overlooked the practical-political and class difference between the liberal and the democrat" (p. 546).

In *Philosophical Notebooks*, Lenin consistently upholds the principle of partisanship in philosophy, and demonstrates the organic connection between dialectical materialism and revolutionary practice.

*Philosophical Notebooks* contains invaluable ideological richness, and is of immense theoretical and political significance. In it Lenin elaborates dialectical and historical materialism, the history of philosophy, focussing his attention on the problems of materialist dialectics. Along with his basic philosophical work, *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*, *Philosophical Notebooks* is an outstanding achievement of Lenin's creative genius.

Lenin's excerpts and comments provide a definition of dialectics as the science of the most general laws of development and cognition of the objective world. Of exceptional importance is his proposition on the identity of dialectics, logic and the theory of knowledge. He pointed out that the fundamental failure of metaphysical materialism was its inability to apply dialectics to the process and development of cognition; dialectics, he stressed, is the theory of knowledge of Marxism. In his *Philosophical Notebooks* Lenin advanced Marxist dialectics still further by elaborating the question of the dialectical process of cognition and the dictum that the dialectical way of cognising
objective reality consists in the transition from living perception to abstract thought and from this to practice.

In elaborating materialist dialectics, Lenin concentrated on the problem of contradictions. It is in Philosophical Notebooks that he explains that the doctrine of the unity and struggle of opposites is the essence and core of dialectics, that the struggle of opposites is the source of development. "The splitting of a single whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts ... is the e s s e n c e (one of the 'essentials,' one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristics or features) of dialectics" (p. 359).

It may be presumed that the preparatory material of Notebooks on Philosophy is evidence of Lenin's intention to write a special work on materialist dialectics, a task which he had no opportunity to fulfill. Although the material in Philosophical Notebooks does not constitute a complete work written by Lenin for publication, it is an important contribution to the development of dialectical materialism. The study of the great ideological content of Philosophical Notebooks is of tremendous importance for a thorough grasp of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, the theoretical foundation of scientific communism.

* * *

The summaries as well as the rest of this volume are given chiefly in chronological order. Remarks made in books have also been arranged chronologically in a separate section.

All of Lenin's underlineation has been reproduced in type. Words underscored by a wavy or a straight thin line have been set in italics; those underscored by two lines — in spaced italics; those underscored by three straight thin lines — in boldface, etc.

The text of this edition has been checked with Lenin's manuscripts; quotations have been verified with original sources.

Notes, an index of the sources mentioned by Lenin, name and subject indexes are appended.

Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the C.C., C.P.S.U.
V. I. LENIN
1917
CONSPECTUS OF THE BOOK
THE HOLY FAMILY
BY MARX AND ENGELS

Written not earlier than April 25 (May 7) but not later than September 1895 First published in 1930 in Lenin Miscellany XII

Published according to the manuscript
First page of V. I. Lenin’s manuscript
Conspectus of the book *The Holy Family* by Marx and Engels.—1895
*Reduced*
THE HOLY FAMILY,
OR
CRITIQUE OF CRITICAL CRITICISM

AGAINST BRUNO BAUER & CO.

BY FREDERICK ENGELS AND KARL MARX

FRANKFORT-ON-MAIN, LITERARY PUBLISHING HOUSE (J. RUTTEN)
1845

This little book, printed in octavo, consists of a foreword (pp. III-IV)* (dated Paris, September 1844), a table of contents (pp. V-VIII) and text proper (pp. 1-335), divided into nine chapters (Kapitel). Chapters I, II and III were written by Engels, Chapters V, VIII and IX by Marx, Chapters IV, VI and VII by both, in which case, however, each has signed the particular chapter section or subsection, supplied with its own heading, that was written by him. All these headings are satirical up to and including the “Critical Transformation of a Butcher into a Dog” (the heading of Section 1 of Chapter VIII). Engels is responsible for pages 1-17 (Chapters I, II, III and sections 1 and 2 of Chapter IV), pages 138-142 (Section 2a of Chapter VI) and pages 240-245 (Section 2b of Chapter VII); i.e., 26 pages out of 335.

The first chapters are entirely criticism of the style (th e w h o l e (!) first chapter, pp. 1-5) of the Literary Gazette Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung of Bruno Bauer—³—in their foreword Marx and Engels say that their criticism is directed against its first eight numbers, criticism of its distortion of history (Chapter II, pp. 5-12, especially of English history), criticism of its themes (Chapter III, pp. 13-14 ridiculing the Gründlichkeit** of the account of some dispute

** pedantic thoroughness—Ed.
of Herr Nauwerk with the Berlin Faculty of Philosophy),
criticism of views on love (Chapter IV, 3 by Marx), criticism
of the account of Proudhon in the Literary Gazette ((IV,A)—
Proudhon, p. 22 u. ff. bis* 74. At the beginning there is
a mass of corrections of the translation: they have confused
formule et signification,** they have translated la justice
as Gerechtigkeit*** instead of Rechtpraxis,**** etc.). This
criticism of the translation (Marx entitles it—Charakteri-
sierende Übersetzung No. I, II u.s.w.***** where Marx
defends Proudhon against the critics of the Literary Gazette,
counterposing his clearly socialist ideas to speculation.

Marx’s tone in relation to Proudhon is very laudatory
(although there are minor reservations, for example refer-
ence to Engels’ Umrisse zu einer Kritik der Nationalökono-
nomie4 in the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher5).

Marx here advances from Hegelian philosophy to social-
ism: the transition is clearly observable—it is evident what
Marx has already mastered and how he goes over to the
new sphere of ideas.

(36) “Accepting the relations of private property as
human and rational, political economy comes into contin-
ual contradiction with its basic premise, private property,
a contradiction analogous to that of the theologian, who
constantly gives a human interpretation to religious concep-
tions and by that very fact comes into constant conflict
with his basic premise, the superhuman character of re-
ligion. Thus, in political economy wages appear at the be-

* und folgende bis—and following up to—Ed.
** formula and significance—Ed.
*** justice—Ed.
**** juridical practice—Ed.
***** characterising translation No. I, II, etc.—Ed.
****** critical gloss No. I, etc.—Ed.
of an object and its social usefulness. Later it turns out that value is determined quite fortuitously, not bearing any relation to cost of production or social usefulness. The magnitude of wages is determined at the beginning by free agreement between the free worker and the free capitalist. Later it turns out that the worker is compelled to agree to the determination of wages by the capitalist, just as the capitalist is compelled to fix it as low as possible. Freedom of the contracting Parthei*” [this is the way the word is spelled in the book] “has been supplanted by compulsion. The same thing holds good of trade and all other economic relations. The economists themselves occasionally sense these contradictions, and the disclosure of these contradictions constitutes the main content of the conflicts between them. When, however, the economists in one way or another become conscious of these contradictions, they themselves attack private property in any one of its private forms as the falsifier of what is in itself (i.e., in their imagination) rational wages, in itself rational value, in itself rational trade. Adam Smith, for instance, occasionally polemises against the capitalists, Destutt de Tracy against the bankers, Simonde de Sismondi against the factory system, Ricardo against landed property, and nearly all modern economists against the non-industrial capitalists, in whom private property appears as a mere consumer.

“Thus, as an exception—and all the more so when they attack some special abuse—the economists sometimes stress the semblance of the humane in economic relations, while, more often than not, they take these relations precisely in their marked difference from the humane, in their strictly economic sense. They stagger about within that contradiction without going beyond its limits.

“Proudhon put an end to this unconsciousness once for all. He took the humane semblance of the economic relations seriously and sharply opposed it to their inhumane reality. He forced them to be in reality what they imagine themselves to be, or, more accurately, to give up their own idea of themselves and confess their real inhumanity. He therefore quite consistently represented as the falsifier of econom-

* party—Ed.
ic relations not one or another particular type of private property, as other economists have done, but private property as such, in its entirety. He has done all that can be done by criticism of political economy from the standpoint of political economy.” (39)

Herr Edgar’s reproach (Edgar of the *Literary Gazette*) that Proudhon makes a “god” out of “justice,” Marx brushes aside by saying that Proudhon’s treatise of 1840 does not adopt “the standpoint of German development of 1844” (39), that this is a general failing of the French, and that one must also bear in mind Proudhon’s reference to the implementation of justice by its negation—a reference making it possible to have done with this Absolute in history as well (um auch dieses Absoluten in der Geschichte überhoben zu sein)—at the end of p. 39. “If Proudhon does not arrive at this consistent conclusion, it is owing to his misfortune in being born a Frenchman and not a German.” (39-40)

Then follows Critical Gloss No. II (40-46), setting out in very clear relief Marx’s view—already almost fully developed—concerning the revolutionary role of the proletariat.

...“Hitherto political economy proceeded from the *wealth* that the movement of private property supposedly creates for the *nations* to an apology of private property. Proudhon proceeds from the opposite side, which political economy sophistically conceals, from the poverty bred by the movement of private property, to his conclusions negating private property. The first criticism of private property proceeds, of course, from the fact in which its contradictory essence appears in the form that is most perceptible and most glaring and most directly arouses man’s indignation—from the fact of poverty, of misery.” (41)

“Proletariat and wealth are opposites. As such they form a single whole. They are both begotten by the world of private property. The question is what particular place each occupies within the antithesis. It is not sufficient to declare them two sides of a single whole.

“Private property as private property, as wealth, is compelled to maintain *itself*, and thereby its opposite, the proletariat, *in existence*. That is the *positive* side of the contradiction, self-satisfied private property.
"The proletariat, on the other hand, is compelled as proletariat to abolish itself and thereby its opposite, the condition for its existence, that which makes it the proletariat, i.e., private property. That is the negative side of the contradiction, its restlessness within its very self, dissolved and self-dissolving private property.

"The propertied class and the class of the proletariat present the same human self-alienation. But the former class feels happy and confirmed in this self-alienation, it recognises alienation as its own power, and has in it the semblance of human existence. The class of the proletariat feels annihilated in its self-alienation; it sees in it its own powerlessness and the reality of an inhuman existence. To use an expression of Hegel’s, the class of the proletariat is in abasement indignation at this abasement, an indignation to which it is necessarily driven by the contradiction between its human nature and its conditions of life, which are the outright, decisive and comprehensive negation of that nature.

"Within this antithesis the private property-owner is therefore the conservative side, the proletarian, the destructive side. From the former arises the action of preserving the antithesis, from the latter, that of annihilating it.

"In any case, in its economic movement private property drives towards its own dissolution, but only through a development which does not depend on it, of which it is unconscious and which takes place against its will, through the very nature of things, only inasmuch as it produces the proletariat as proletariat, misery conscious of its spiritual and physical misery, dehumanisation conscious of its dehumanisation and therefore self-abolishing. The proletariat executes the sentence that private property pronounced on itself by begetting the proletariat, just as it executes the sentence that wage-labour pronounced on itself by begetting wealth for others and misery for itself. When the proletariat is victorious, it by no means becomes the absolute side of society for it is victorious only by abolishing itself and its opposite. Then the proletariat disappears as well as the opposite which determines it, private property.

"When socialist writers ascribe this historic role to the proletariat, it is not, as Critical Criticism would have
one think, because they consider the proletarians as gods. Rather the contrary. Since the abstraction of all humanity, even of the semblance of humanity, is practically complete in the fully-formed proletariat; since the conditions of life of the proletariat sum up all the conditions of life of society today in their most inhuman and acute form; since man has lost himself in the proletariat, yet at the same time has not only gained theoretical consciousness of that loss, but through the no longer removable, no longer disguisable, absolutely imperative need—the practical expression of necessity—is driven directly to revolt against that inhumanity; it follows that the proletariat can and must free itself. But it cannot free itself without abolishing the conditions of its own life. It cannot abolish the conditions of its own life without abolishing all the inhuman conditions of life of society today which are summed up in its own situation. Not in vain does it go through the stern but steeling school of labour. It is not a question of what this or that proletarian, or even the whole proletariat, at the moment considers as its aim. It is a question of what the proletariat is, and what, in accordance with this being, it will historically be compelled to do. Its aim and historical action is irrevocably and clearly foreshadowed in its own life situation as well as in the whole organisation of bourgeois society today. There is no need here to show that a large part of the English and French proletariat is already conscious of its historic task and is constantly working to develop that consciousness into complete clarity.” (42-45)

CRITICAL GLOSS NO. 3

“Herr Edgar cannot be unaware that Herr Bruno Bauer based all his arguments on ‘infinite self-consciousness’ and that he also saw in this principle the creative principle of the gospels, which, by their infinite unconsciousness, appear to be in direct contradiction to infinite self-consciousness. In the same way Proudhon considers equality as the creative principle of private property, which is in direct contradiction to equality. If Herr Edgar compares French equality with German self-consciousness for an instant, he will see that the latter principle expresses in Ger-


man, i.e., in abstract thought, what the former says *in French*, that is, in the language of politics and of thoughtful observation. Self-consciousness is man’s equality with himself in pure thought. Equality is man’s consciousness of himself in the element of practice, i.e., therefore, man’s consciousness of other men as his equals and man’s attitude to other men as his equals. Equality is the French expression for the unity of human essence, for man’s consciousness of his species and his attitude towards his species, for the practical identity of man with man, i.e., for the social or human relation of man to man. As therefore destructive criticism in Germany, before it had progressed in *Feuerbach* to the consideration of *real man*, tried to solve everything definite and existing by the principle of *self-consciousness*, destructive criticism in France tried to do the same by the principle of *equality.*” (48-49)

“The opinion that philosophy is the abstract expression of existing conditions does not belong originally to Herr Edgar. It belongs to *Feuerbach*, who was the first to describe philosophy as speculative and mystical empiricism, and proved it.” (49-50)

“‘We always come back to the same thing... Proudhon writes in the interests of the proletarians.”* He does not write in the interests of self-sufficient criticism or out of any abstract, self-made interest, but out of a massive, real, historical interest, an interest that goes beyond *criticism*, that will go as far as a *crisis.* Not only does Proudhon write in the interests of the proletarians, he is himself a proletarian, un ouvrier. His work is a scientific manifesto of the French proletariat and therefore has quite a different historical significance from that of the literary botchwork of a Critical Critic.” (52-53)

“Proudhon’s desire to abolish non-owning and the old form of owning is exactly identical to his desire to abolish the practically alienated relation of man to his *objective essence*, to abolish the *political-economic* expression of human self-alienation. Since, however, his criticism of political economy is still bound by the premises of political economy, the reappropriation of the objective world

* Marx is quoting Edgar.
is still conceived in the political-economic form of possession.

“Proudhon indeed does not oppose owning to non-owning as Critical Criticism makes him do, but possession to the old form of owning, to private property. He declares possession to be a ‘social function.’ In a function, ‘interest’ is not directed however toward the ‘exclusion’ of another, but toward setting into operation and realising my own powers, the powers of my being.

“Proudhon did not succeed in giving this thought appropriate development. The concept of ‘equal possession’ is a political-economic one and therefore itself still an alienated expression for the principle that the object as being for man, as the objective being of man, is at the same time the existence of man for other men, his human relation to other men, the social behaviour of man in relation to man. Proudhon abolishes political-economic estrangement within political-economic estrangement.” (54-55)

This passage is highly characteristic, for it shows how Marx approached the basic idea of his entire “system,” sit venia verbo,* namely the concept of the social relations of production.

As a trifle, it may be pointed out that on p. 64 Marx devotes five lines to the fact that “Critical Criticism” translates maréchal as “Marschall” instead of “Hufschmied.”**

Very interesting are: pp. 65-67 (Marx approaches the labour theory of value); pp 70-71 (Marx answers Edgar’s charge that Proudhon is muddled in saying that the worker cannot buy back his product), 71-72 and 72-73 (speculative, idealistic, “ethereal” (ätherisch) socialism—and “mass” socialism and communism).

p. 76. (Section 1, first paragraph: Feuerbach disclosed real mysteries, Szeli—vice versa.)

p. 77. (Last paragraph: anachronism of the naïve relation of rich and poor: “si le riche le savait!”***)

pp. 79-85. (All these seven pages are extremely interesting. This is Section 2, “The Mystery of Speculative Con-

* if the Word may be allowed—Ed.

** “blacksmith”—Ed.

*** “if the rich only knew it!”—Ed.
structure”—a criticism of speculative philosophy using the well-known example of “fruit”—der Frucht—a criticism aimed directly against Hegel as well. Here too is the extremely interesting remark that Hegel “very often” gives a real presentation, embracing the thing itself—die Sache selbst—within the speculative presentation.)

pp. 92, 93—\textit{f r a g m e n t a r y} remarks against Degradierung der Sinnlichkeit.*

p. 101. “He” (Szeliga) “is unable ... to see that \textit{industry and trade} found universal kingdoms that are quite different from Christianity and morality, family happiness and civic welfare.”

p. 102. (End of the first paragraph—barbed remarks on the significance of notaries in modern society.... “The notary is the temporal confessor. He is a \textit{puritan} by profession and ‘honesty,’ Shakespeare says, is ‘no puritan.’ He is at the same time the go-between for all possible purposes, the manager of civil intrigues and plots.”)

p. 110. Another example of ridiculing abstract speculation: the “construction” of how man becomes master over beast; “beast” (das Tier) as an abstraction is changed from a lion into a pug, etc.

p. 111. A characteristic passage regarding Eugène Sue: owing to his hypocrisy towards the bourgeoisie, he idealises the grisette morally, evading her attitude to marriage, her “naïve” liaison with un étudiant** or ouvrier.*** “It is precisely in that relation that she” (grisette) “constitutes a really human contrast to the sanctimonious, narrow-hearted, self-seeking wife of the bourgeois, to the whole circle of the bourgeoisie, that is, to the official circle.”

p. 117. The “mass” of the sixteenth and of the nineteenth centuries was different “von vorn herein.”****

pp. 118-121. This passage (in Chapter VI: “Absolute Critical Criticism, or Critical Criticism in the Person of Herr Bruno.” 1) Absolute Criticism’s First Campaign.

* debasing of sensuousness—Ed.
** a student—Ed.
*** worker—Ed.
**** “from the outset”—Ed.
a) “Spirit” and “Mass”) is extremely important: a criticism of the view that history was unsuccessful owing to the interest in it by the mass and its reliance on the mass, which was satisfied with a “superficial” comprehension of the “idea.”

“If, therefore, Absolute Criticism condemns something as ‘superficial,’ it is simply previous history, the actions and ideas of which were those of the ‘masses.’ It rejects mass history to replace it by critical history (see Herr Jules Faucher on Topical Questions in England8).” (119)

“The ‘idea’ always exposed itself to ridicule insofar as it differed from ‘interest.’ On the other hand, it is easy to understand that every mass ‘interest’ that asserts itself historically goes far beyond its real limits in the ‘idea’ or ‘imagination’ when it first comes on the scene, and is confused with human interest in general. This illusion constitutes what Fourier calls the tone of each historical epoch” (119)—as an illustration of this the example of the French Revolution (119-120) and the well-known words (120 in fine*):

“With the thoroughness of the historical action, the size of the mass who perform it will therefore increase.”

How far the sharpness of Bauer’s division into Geist** and Masse*** goes is evident from this phrase that Marx attacks: “In the mass, not somewhere else, is the true enemy of the spirit to be sought.” (121)

Marx answers this by saying that the enemies of progress are the products endowed with independent being (verselbständigten) of the self-abasement of the mass, although they are not ideal but material products existing in an outward way. As early as 1789, Loustalot’s journal9 had the motto:

Les grands ne nous paraissent grands
Que parceque nous sommes à genoux.
Leuons-nous!****

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* at the end—Ed.
** spirit—Ed.
*** mass—Ed.
**** The great only seem great to us
Because we are on our knees
Let us rise!—Ed.
But in order to rise (122), says Marx, it is not enough to do so in thought, in the idea.

"Yet Absolute Criticism has learnt from Hegel's Phenomenology\(^\text{10}\) at least the art of converting real objective chains that exist outside me into merely ideal, merely subjective chains existing merely within me, and thus of converting all exterior palpable struggles into pure struggles of thought." (122)

In this way it is possible to prove, says Marx bitingly, the pre-established harmony between Critical Criticism and the censorship, to present the censor not as a police hangman (Polizeischehrde) but as my own personified sense of tact and moderation.

Preoccupied with its "Geist," Absolute Criticism does not investigate whether the phrase, self-deception and pithlessness (Kernlosigkeit) are not in its own empty (windig) pretensions.

"The situation is the same with 'progress.' In spite of the pretensions of 'progress,' continual retrogressions and circular movements are to be observed. Far from suspecting that the category 'progress' is completely empty and abstract, Absolute Criticism is instead so ingenious as to recognise 'progress' as being absolute, in order to explain retrogression by assuming a 'personal adversary' of progress, the mass." (123-124)

"All communist and socialist writers proceeded from the observation that, on the one hand, even the most favourable brilliant deeds seemed to remain without brilliant results, to end in trivialities, and, on the other, all progress of the spirit had so far been progress against the mass of mankind, driving it to an ever more dehumanised situation. They therefore declared 'progress' (see Fourier) to be an inadequate abstract phrase; they assumed (see Owen, among others) a fundamental flaw in the civilised world; that is why they subjected the real bases of contemporary society to incisive criticism. This communist criticism immediately had its counterpart in practice in the movement of the great mass, in opposition to which the previous historical development had taken place. One must be acquainted with the studiousness, the craving for knowledge, the moral energy and the unceasing urge for development of the French
and English workers to be able to form an idea of the human nobility of this movement.” (124-125)

“What a fundamental superiority over the communist writers it is not to have traced spiritlessness, indolence, superficiality and self-complacency to their origin but to have denounced them morally and exposed them as the opposite of the spirit, of progress!” (125)

“The relation between ‘spirit and mass,’ however, has still a hidden sense, which will be completely revealed in the course of the reasoning. We only make mention of it here. That relation discovered by Herr Bruno is, in fact, nothing but a critically caricatured culmination of Hegel’s conception of history; which, in turn, is nothing but the speculative expression of the Christian-Germanic dogma of the antithesis between spirit and matter, between God and the world. This antithesis is expressed in history, in the human world itself, in such a way that a few chosen individuals as the active spirit stand opposed to the rest of mankind, as the spiritless mass, as matter.” (126)

And Marx points out that Hegel’s conception of history (Geschichtsauffassung) presupposes an abstract and absolute spirit, the embodiment of which is the mass. Parallel with Hegel’s doctrine there developed in France the theory of the Doctrinaires 11 (126) who proclaimed the sovereignty of reason in opposition to the sovereignty of the people in order to exclude the mass and rule alone (allein).

Hegel is “guilty of a double half-heartedness” (127): 1) while declaring that philosophy is the being of the Absolute Spirit, he does not declare this the spirit of the philosophical individual; 2) he makes the Absolute Spirit the creator of history only in appearance (nur zum Schein), only post festum.* only in consciousness.

Bruno does away with this half-heartedness, he declares that Criticism is the Absolute Spirit and the creator of history in actual fact.

“On the one side stands the Mass, as the passive, spiritless, unhistorical material element of history, on the other—the Spirit, Criticism, Herr Bruno and Co. as the active ele-

* after the event—Ed.
ment from which all historical action arises. The act of the transformation of society is reduced to the brain work of Critical Criticism.” (128)

As the first example of “the campaigns of Absolute Criticism against the Mass,” Marx adduces Bruno Bauer’s attitude to the Judenfrage, and he refers to the refutation of Bauer in Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher.¹²

“One of the chief pursuits of Absolute Criticism consists in first bringing all questions of the day into their right setting. For it does not answer, of course, the real questions—but substitutes quite different ones.... It thus distorted the ‘Jewish question,’ too, in such a way that it did not need to investigate political emancipation, which is the subject-matter of that question, but could instead be satisfied with a criticism of the Jewish religion and a description of the Christian-German state.

“This method, too, like all Absolute Criticism’s originalities, is the repetition of a speculative verbal trick. Speculative philosophy, in particular Hegel’s philosophy, must transpose all questions from the form of common sense to the form of speculative reason and convert the real question into a speculative one to be able to answer it. Having distorted my questions and having, like the catechism, placed its own questions into my mouth, speculative philosophy could, of course, again like the catechism, have its ready answer to each of my questions.” (134-135)

In Section 2a (...“‘Criticism’ and ‘Feuerbach’—Damnation of Philosophy...”)—pp. 138-142—written by Engels, one finds Feuerbach warmly praised. In regard to “Criticism’s” attacks on philosophy, its contrasting to philosophy the actual wealth of human relations, the “immense content of history,” the “significance of man,” etc., etc., right up to the phrase: “the mystery of the system revealed,” Engels says:

“But who, then, revealed the mystery of the ‘system’? Feuerbach. Who annihilated the dialectics of concepts, the war of the gods known to the philosophers alone? Feuerbach. Who substituted for the old rubbish and for ‘infinite self-consciousness’ not, it is true, ‘the significance of man’—as though man had another significance than that of being
man—but still ‘Man’? Feuerbach, and only Feuerbach. And he did more. Long ago he did away with the very categories that ‘Criticism’ now wields—the ‘real wealth of human relations, the immense content of history, the struggle of history, the fight of the mass against the spirit,’ etc., etc.

“Once man is conceived as the essence, the basis of all human activity and situations, only ‘Criticism’ can invent new categories and transform man himself again into a category and into the principle of a whole series of categories as it is doing now. It is true that in so doing it takes the only road to salvation that remained for frightened and persecuted theological inhumanity. History does nothing, it possesses no immense wealth,’ it ‘wages no battles.’ It is man, and not ‘history,’ real living man, that does all that, that possesses and fights; ‘history’ is not, as it were, a person apart, using man as a means to achieve its own aims; history is nothing but the activity of man pursuing his aims. If Absolute Criticism, after Feuerbach’s brilliant reasoning, still dares to reproduce the old trash in a new form...” (139-140) etc.—then, Engels says, this fact alone is sufficient to assess the Critical naïveté, etc.

And after this, in regard to the opposition of Spirit and “Matter” (Criticism calls the mass “matter’), Engels says: “Is Absolute Criticism then not genuinely Christian-German? After the old contradiction between spiritualism and materialism has been fought out on all sides and overcome once for all by Feuerbach, ‘Criticism’ again makes a basic dogma of it in its ugliest form and gives the victory to the ‘Christian-German spirit.’” (141)

In regard to Bauer’s words: “To the extent of the progress now made by the Jews in theory, they are emancipated; to the extent that they wish to be free, they are free” (142), Marx says:

“From this proposition one can immediately measure the critical gap which separates mass profane communism and socialism from absolute socialism. The first proposition of profane socialism rejects emancipation in mere theory as an illusion and for real freedom it demands besides the idealistic ‘will,’ very tangible, very material conditions.
How low ‘the Mass’ is in comparison with holy Criticism, the Mass which considers material, practical upheavals necessary, merely to win the time and means required to deal with ‘theory’!” (142)

Further, (pp. 143-167), the most boring, incredibly caviling criticism of the *Literary Gazette*, a sort of word by word commentary of a “blasting” type; Absolutely nothing of interest.

The end of the section ((b) The Jewish Question No. II. Pp. 142-185)—pp. 167-185 provides an interesting answer by Marx to Bauer on the latter’s defence of his book *Judenfrage*, which was criticised in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*. (Marx constantly refers to the latter.) Marx here sharply and clearly stresses the basic principles of his entire world outlook.

“Religious questions of the day have at present a social significance” (167)—this was already pointed out in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*. It characterised the “real position of Judaism in civil society today.” “Herr Bauer explains the real Jew by the Jewish religion, instead of explaining the mystery of the Jewish religion by the real Jew.” (167-168)

Herr Bauer does not suspect “that real, worldly Judaism, and hence religious Judaism too, is being continually produced by present-day civil life and finds its final development in the money system.”

It was pointed out in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* that the development of Judaism has to be sought “in der kommerziellen und industriellen Praxis”* (169),—that practical Judaism “vollendete Praxis der christlichen Welt selber ist.”** (169)

“It was proved that the task of abolishing the essence of Judaism is in truth the task of abolishing Judaism in civil society, abolishing the inhumanity of the present-day practice of life, the summit of which is the money system.” (169)

In demanding freedom, the Jew demands something that in no way contradicts political freedom (172)—it is a question of political freedom.

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* “in commercial and industrial practice”—Ed.
** “is the perfected practice of the Christian world itself”—Ed.
“Herr Bauer was shown that it is by no means contrary to political emancipation to divide man into the non-religious citizen and the religious private individual.” (172)

And immediately following the above:

“He was shown that as the state emancipates itself from religion by emancipating itself from state religion and leaving religion to itself within civil society, so the individual emancipates himself politically from religion by regarding it no longer as a public matter but as a private matter. Finally, it was shown that the terroristic attitude of the French Revolution to religion far from refuting this conception, bears it out.” (172)

The Jews desire allgemeine Menschenrechte.*

“In the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher it was expounded to Herr Bauer that this ‘free humanity’ and the ‘recognition’ of it are nothing but the recognition of the selfish, civil individual and of the uncurbed movement of the spiritual and material elements which are the content of his life situation, the content of civil life today; that the Rights of Man do not, therefore, free man from religion but give him freedom of religion; that they do not free him from property, but procure for him freedom of property; that they do not free him from the filth of gain but give him freedom of choice of a livelihood.

“He was shown that the recognition of the Rights of Man by the modern state means nothing more than did the recognition of slavery by the ancient state. In fact, just as the ancient state had slavery as its natural basis the modern state has civil society and the man of civil society, i.e., the independent man connected with other men only by the ties of private interest and unconscious natural necessity, the slave of labour for gain and of his own as well as other men’s selfish need. The modern state has recognised this as its natural basis as such in the universal Rights of Man.” (175)

“The Jew has all the more right to the recognition of his ‘free humanity’” “as ‘free civil society’ is of a thoroughly commercial and Jewish nature and the Jew is a necessary link in it.” (176)

* the universal rights or man—Ed.
That the “Rights of Man” are not inborn, but arose historically, was known already to Hegel. (176)

Pointing out the contradictions of constitutionalism, “Criticism” does not generalise them (faßt nicht den allgemeinen Widerspruch des Konstitutionalismus*). (177-178)

If it had done so, it would have proceeded from constitutional monarchy to the democratic representative state, to the perfect modern state. (178)

Industrial activity is not abolished by the abolition of privileges (of the guilds, corporations, etc.); on the contrary it develops more strongly. Property in land is not abolished by the abolition of privileges of landownership, “but, rather, first begins its universal movement with the abolition of its privileges and through the free division and free alienation of land.” (180)

Trade is not abolished by the abolition of trade privileges but only then does it become genuinely free trade, so also with religion, “so religion develops in its practical universality only where there is no privileged religion (one calls to mind the North American States).”

...“Precisely the slavery of bourgeois society is in appearance the greatest freedom....” (181)

To the dissolution (Auflösung) (182) of the political existence of religion (the abolition of the state church), of property (the abolition of the property qualification for electors), etc.—corresponds their “most vigorous life, which now obeys its own laws undisturbed and develops to its full scope.”

Anarchy is the law of bourgeois society emancipated from privileges. (182-183)

... C) CRITICAL BATTLE AGAINST THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

“The ideas”—Marx quotes Bauer—“which the French Revolution gave rise to did not, however, lead beyond the order that it wanted to abolish by force.

* does not conceive the general contradiction or constitutionalism—Ed.
“Ideas can never lead beyond an old world order but only beyond the ideas of the old world order. Ideas cannot carry anything out at all. In order to carry out ideas men are needed who dispose of a certain practical force.” (186)

The French Revolution gave rise to the ideas of communism (Babeuf), which, consistently developed, contained the idea of a new Weltzustand.*

In regard to Bauer’s statement that the state must hold in check the separate egotistic atoms, Marx says (188-189) that the members of civil society are, properly speaking, by no means atoms, but only imagine themselves to be such, for they are not self-sufficient like atoms, but depend on other persons, their needs continually forcing this dependence upon them.

“Therefore, it is natural necessity, essential human properties, however alienated they may seem to be, and interest that hold the members of civil society together; civil, not political life is their real tie.... Only political superstition still imagines today that civil life must be held together by the state, whereas in reality, on the contrary, the state is held together by civil life.” (189)

Robespierre, Saint-Just and their party fell because they confused the ancient realistically-democratic society, based on slavery, with the modern, spiritualistically-democratic representative state, based on bourgeois society. Before his execution Saint-Just pointed to the table (Tabelle a poster? hanging) of the Rights of Man and said: “C’est pourtant moi qui ai fait cela.”** “This very table proclaimed the rights of a man who cannot be the man of the ancient republic any more than his economic and industrial relations are those of the ancient times.” (192)

On the 18th Brumaire,¹⁴ not the revolutionary movement but the liberal bourgeoisie became the prey of Napoleon. After the fall of Robespierre, under the Directorate, the prosaic realisation of bourgeois society begins: Sturm und Drang*** of commercial enterprise, the whirl (Taumel) of the new bourgeois life; “real enlightenment of the land

* world order—Ed.
** “Yet it was I who made that.”—Ed.
*** storm and stress—Ed.
of France, the feudal structure of which had been smashed by the hammer of revolution, and which the numerous new owners in their first feverish enthusiasm now put under all-round cultivation; the first movements of an industry that had become free—these are a few of the signs of life of the newly arisen bourgeois society.” (192-193)

CHAPTER VI. ABSOLUTE CRITICAL CRITICISM, OR CRITICAL CRITICISM IN THE PERSON OF HERR BRUNO

... 3) ABSOLUTE CRITICISM’S THIRD CAMPAIGN...

d) CRITICAL BATTLE AGAINST FRENCH MATERIALISM (195-211)

This chapter (subsection d in the third section of Chapter VI) is one of the most valuable in the book. Here there is absolutely no word by word criticism, but a completely positive exposition. It is a short sketch of the history of French materialism. Here one ought to copy out the whole chapter, but I shall limit myself to a short summary of the contents.

The French Enlightenment of the eighteenth century and French materialism are not only a struggle against the existing political institutions, but equally an open struggle against the metaphysics of the seventeenth century, namely, against the metaphysics of Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza and Leibnitz. “Philosophy was opposed to metaphysics as Feuerbach, in his first decisive attack on Hegel, opposed sober philosophy to drunken speculation.” (196)

The metaphysics of the seventeenth century, defeated by the materialism of the eighteenth century, underwent a victorious and weighty (gehaltvolle) restoration in German philosophy, especially in speculative German philosophy of the nineteenth century. Hegel linked it in a masterly fashion with the whole of metaphysics and with German idealism, and he founded ein metaphysisches Universalreich.* This

* a metaphysical universal kingdom—Ed.
was followed again by an “attack on speculative metaphysics and metaphysics in general. It will be defeated for ever by materialism, which has now been perfected by the work of speculation itself and coincides with humanism. Just as Feuerbach in the theoretical field, French and English socialism and communism in the practical field represented materialism coinciding with humanism.” (196-197)

There are two trends of French materialism: 1) from Descartes, 2) from Locke. The latter mündet direkt in den Socialismus.* (197)

The former, mechanical materialism, turns into French natural science.

Descartes in his physics declares matter the only substance. Mechanical French materialism takes over Descartes’ physics and rejects his metaphysics.

“This school begins with the physician Le Roy, reaches its zenith with the physician Cabanis, and the physician Lamettrie is its centre.” (198)

Descartes was still living when Le Roy transferred the mechanical structure of animals to man and declared the soul to be a modus of the body, and ideas to be mechanical movements. (198) Le Roy even thought that Descartes had concealed his real opinion. Descartes protested.

At the end of the eighteenth century Cabanis perfected Cartesian materialism in his book Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme.15

From the very outset the metaphysics of the seventeenth century had its adversary in materialism. Descartes—Gas-sendi, the restorer of Epicurean materialism, in England—Hobbes.

Voltaire (199) pointed out that the indifference of the Frenchmen of the eighteenth century to the disputes of the Jesuits and others was due less to philosophy than to Law’s financial speculations. The theoretical movement towards materialism is explained by the practical Gestaltung** of French life at that time. Materialistic theories corresponded to materialistic practice.

* flows directly into socialism—Ed.
** mould—Ed.
The metaphysics of the seventeenth century (Descartes, Leibnitz) was still linked with a positive (positivem) content. It made discoveries in mathematics, physics, etc. In the eighteenth century the positive sciences became separated from it and metaphysics war fad geworden.*

In the year of Malebranche’s death, Helvétius and Condillac were born. (199-200)

Pierre Bayle, through his weapon of scepticism, theoretically undermined seventeenth-century metaphysics. He refuted chiefly Spinoza and Leibnitz. He proclaimed atheistic society. He was, in the words of a French writer, “the last metaphysician in the seventeenth-century sense of the word and the first philosopher in the sense of the eighteenth century.” (200-201)

This negative refutation required a positive, anti-metaphysical system. It was provided by Locke.

Materialism is the son of Great Britain. Its scholastic Duns Scotus had already raised the question: “ob die Materie nicht denken könne?”** He was a nominalist. Nominalism is in general the first expression of materialism.\textsuperscript{16}

The real founder of English materialism was Bacon. (“The first and most important of the inherent qualities of matter is motion, not only as mechanical and mathematical movement, but still more as impulse, vital spirit, tension, or ... the throes (Qual) ... of matter.”—202)

“In Bacon, its first creator, materialism has still concealed within it in a naïve way the germs of all-round development. Matter smiles at man as a whole with poetical sensuous brightness.”

In Hobbes, materialism becomes \textit{one-sided}, menschenfeindlich, mechanisch.*** Hobbes systematised Bacon, but he did not develop (begründet) more deeply Bacon’s fundamental principle: the origin of knowledge and ideas from the world of the senses (Sinnenwelt).—P. 203.

Just as Hobbes did away with the \textit{theistic} prejudices of Bacon’s materialism, so Collins, Dodwell, Coward, Hartley, Priestley, etc., destroyed the last theological bounds of Locke’s sensualism.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{*} became insipid—Ed.
\textsuperscript{**} “whether matter can think?”—Ed.
\textsuperscript{***} misanthropic, mechanical—Ed.
Condillac directed Locke’s sensualism against seventeenth-century metaphysics; he published a refutation of the systems of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz and Malebranche. The French “civilised” (205) the materialism of the English.

In Helvétius (who also derives from Locke), materialism was given a properly French character.

Lamettrie is a combination of Cartesian and English materialism.

Robinet has the most connection with metaphysics.

“Just as Cartesian materialism passes into natural science proper, the other trend of French materialism flows directly into socialism and communism.” (206)

Nothing is easier than to derive socialism from the premises of materialism (reconstruction of the world of the senses—linking private and public interests—destroying the anti-social Geburtsstätten* of crime, etc.).

Fourier proceeds immediately from the teaching of the French materialists. The Babouvists were crude, immature materialists. Bentham based his system on the morality of Helvétius, while Owen takes Bentham’s system as his starting-point for founding English communism. Cabet brought communist ideas from England into France (populärste wenn auch flachste** representative of communism) 208. The “more scientific” are Dézamy, Gay, etc., who developed the teaching of materialism as real humanism.

On pp. 209-211 Marx gives in a note (two pages of small print) extracts from Helvétius, Holbach and Bentham, in order to prove the connection of the materialism of the eighteenth century with English and French communism of the nineteenth century.

Of the subsequent sections the following passage is worth noting:

“The dispute between Strauss and Bauer over Substance and Self-Consciousness is a dispute within Hegelian speculation. In Hegel there are three elements: Spinoza’s Substance, Fichte’s Self-Consciousness and Hegel’s necessary

* sources—Ed.
** the most popular, though most superficial—Ed.
and contradictory unity of the two, the Absolute Spirit. The first element is metaphysically disguised nature in separation from man; the second is metaphysically disguised spirit in separation from nature; the third is the metaphysically disguised unity of both, real man and the real human race” (220), and the paragraph with its assessment of Feuerbach:

“In the domain of theology, Strauss quite consistently expounded Hegel from Spinoza’s point of view, and Bauer did the same from Fichte’s point of view. Both criticised Hegel insofar as with him each of the two elements was falsified by the other, while they carried each of the elements to its one-sided and hence consistent development.—Both of them therefore go beyond Hegel in their Criticism, but both of them also remain within the framework of his speculation and each represents only one side of his system. Feuerbach was the first to bring to completion and criticise Hegel from Hegel’s point of view, by resolving the metaphysical Absolute Spirit into ‘real man on the basis of nature,’ and the first to bring to completion the Criticism of religion by sketching in a masterly manner the general basic features of the Criticism of Hegel’s speculation and hence of every kind of metaphysics.” (220-221)

Marx ridicules Bauer’s “theory of self-consciousness” on account of its idealism (the sophisms of absolute idealism—222), points out that this is a periphrasing of Hegel, and quotes the latter’s Phenomenology and Feuerbach’s critical remarks (from Philosophie der Zukunft,19 p. 35, that philosophy negates—negiert—the “materially sensuous,” just as theology negates “nature tainted by original sin”).

The following chapter (VII) again begins with a series of highly boring, caviling criticisms [1]. Pp. 228-235. In section 2a there is an interesting passage.

Marx quotes from the Literary Gazette the letter of a “representative of the Mass,” who calls for the study of reality of natural science and industry (236), and who on that account was reviled by “criticism”:

“Or”(!), exclaimed “the critics” against this representative of the Mass,—“do you think that the knowledge of historical reality is already complete? Or (!) do you know
of any single period in history which is actually known?"

"Or does Critical Criticism"—Marx replies—"believe that it has reached even the beginning of a knowledge of historical reality so long as it excludes from the historical movement the theoretical and practical relation of man to nature, natural science and industry? Or does it think that it actually knows any period without knowing, for example, the industry of that period, the immediate mode of production of life itself? True, spiritualistic, theological Critical Criticism only knows (at least it imagines it knows) the major political, literary and theological acts of history. Just as it separates thinking from the senses, the soul from the body and itself from the world, it separates history from natural science and industry and sees the origin of history not in vulgar material production on the earth but in vaporous clouds in the heavens." (238)

Criticism dubbed this representative of the mass a massenhafter Materialist.* (239)

"The criticism of the French and the English is not an abstract, preternatural personality outside mankind; it is the real human activity of individuals who are active members of society and who as human beings suffer, feel, think and act. That is why their criticism is at the same time practical, their communism a socialism in which they give practical, tangible measures, and in which they do not only think but even more act; it is the living real criticism of existing society, the discovery of the causes of ‘decay’." (244)

The whole of Chapter VII (228-257), apart from the passages quoted above, consists only of the most incredible captious criticisms and mockery, noting contradictions of the most petty character, and ridiculing each and every stupidity in the Literary Gazette, etc.

In Chapter VIII (258-333) we have a section on the “Critical Transformation of a Butcher into a Dog”—and further on Eugène Sue’s Fleur de Marie (evidently a novel with this title or the heroine of some novel or other) with certain “radical” but uninteresting observations by Marx.

* mass materialist—Ed.
Worth mentioning perhaps are only p. 285—a few comments on Hegel’s theory of punishment, p. 296—against Eugène Sue’s defence of the prison cell system (Cellularsystem).

(Apparently, Marx here attacks the superficial socialism propagated by Eugène Sue and which, apparently, was defended in the Literary Gazette.)

Marx, for example, ridicules Sue for the concept of state reward for virtue, just as vice is punished (pp. 300-301, giving even a comparative table of justice criminelle and justice vertueuse!).


307: But sometimes Hegel in his Phenomenology—in spite of his theory—gives a true description of human relations.

309: Philanthropy as a Spiel** of the rich. (309-310)

312-313: Quotations from Fourier on the humiliation of women, very striking contra the moderate aspirations of “Criticism” and of Rudolf—Eugène Sue’s hero?

×“According to Hegel, the criminal in his punishment passes sentence on himself. Gans developed this theory at greater length. In Hegel this is the speculative disguise of the old jus talionis*** that Kant expounded as the only juridical penal theory. For Hegel, self-judgment of the criminal remains a mere ‘Idea,’ a mere speculative interpretation of the current empirical penal code. He thus leaves the mode of application to the respective stages of development of the state, i.e., he leaves punishment just as it is. Precisely in that does he show himself more critical than his critical echoer. A penal theory that at the same time sees in the criminal the man can do so only in abstraction, in imagination, precisely because punishment, coercion, is contrary to human conduct. Besides, the practical realisation of such a theory would be impossible. Pure subjective arbitrariness would replace abstract law because in each

* criminal justice and justice for virtue!—Ed.

** plaything—Ed.

*** the law of the talion—an eye for an eye—Ed.
case it would depend on official ‘honest and decent’ men to adapt the penalty to the individuality of the criminal. Plato long ago had the insight to see that the law must be one-sided and must make abstraction of the individual. On the other hand, under human conditions punishment will really be nothing but the sentence passed by the culprit on himself. There will be no attempt to persuade him that violence from without, exerted on him by others, is violence exerted on himself by himself. On the contrary, he will see in other men his natural saviours from the sentence which he has pronounced on himself; in other words, the relation will be exactly reversed.” (285-286)

“The mystery of this” (305) (there was a quotation from Anekdota above) “courage of Bauer’s is Hegel’s Phenomenology. Since Hegel here puts self-consciousness in the place of man, the most varied human reality appears only as a definite form, as a determination of self-consciousness. But a mere determination of self-consciousness is a ‘pure category,’ a mere ‘thought’ which I can consequently also transcend in ‘pure’ thought and overcome through pure thought. In Hegel’s Phenomenology the material, sensuous, objective bases of the various alienated forms of human self-consciousness are left as they are. The whole destructive work results in the most conservative philosophy because it thinks it has overcome the objective world, the sensuously real world, by merely transforming it into a ‘thing of thought,’ a mere determination of self-consciousness, and can therefore dissolve its opponent, which has become ethereal, in the ‘ether of pure thought.’ The Phenomenology is therefore quite consistent in ending by replacing all human reality by ‘Absolute Knowledge’—Knowledge, because this is the only mode of existence of self-consciousness, and because self-consciousness is considered as the only mode of existence of man;—Absolute Knowledge for the very reason that self-consciousness knows only itself and is no more disturbed by any objective world. Hegel makes man the man of self-consciousness instead of making self-consciousness the self-consciousness of man, of the real man, and therefore of man living also in a real objective world and determined by that world. He stands the world
on its head and can therefore in his head dissolve all limitations, which nevertheless, of course, remain in existence for evil sensuousness, for real man. Moreover, everything which betrays the limitations of general self-consciousness—all sensuousness, reality, individuality of men and of their world—is necessarily held by him to be a limit. The whole of the Phenomenology is intended to prove that self-consciousness is the only reality and all reality....” (306)

...“Finally, it goes without saying that if Hegel’s Phenomenology, in spite of its speculative original sin, gives in many instances the elements of a true description of human relations, Herr Bruno and Co., on the other hand, provide only an empty caricature....” (307)

“...Thereby Rudolph unconsciously revealed the mystery, long ago exposed, that human misery itself, the infinite abjectness which is obliged to receive alms, has to serve as a plaything to the aristocracy of money and education to satisfy their self-love, tickle their arrogance and amuse them.

“The numerous charitable associations in Germany, the numerous charitable societies in France and the great number of charitable quixotic societies in England, the concerts, balls, plays, meals for the poor and even public subscriptions for victims of accidents have no other meaning.” (309-310)

And Marx quotes from Eugène Sue:

“Ah, Madame, it is not enough to have danced for the benefit of these poor Poles.... Let us be philanthropic to the end.... Let us have supper now for the benefit of the poor!” (310)

On pp. 312-313 quotations from Fourier (adultery is good tone, infanticide by the victims of seduction—a vicious circle.... “The degree of emancipation of woman is the natural measure of general emancipation....” (312) Civilisation converts every vice from a simple into a complex, ambiguous, hypocritical form), and Marx adds:

“It is superfluous to contrast to Rudolph’s thoughts Fourier’s masterly characterisation of marriage or the works of the materialist section of French communism.” (313)
P. 313 u. ff., against the political-economic projects of Eugène Sue and Rudolph (presumably the hero of Sue’s novel?), projects for the association of rich and poor, and the organisation of labour (which the state ought to do), etc.—e.g., also the Armenbank* — b) “The Bank for the Poor” pp. 314-318 = interest-free loans to the unemployed. Marx takes the figures of the project and exposes their meagreness in relation to need. And the idea of an Armenbank, says Marx, is no better than Sparkassen**, i.e., die Einrichtung*** of the bank “rests on the delusion that only a different distribution of wages is needed for the workers to be able to live through the whole year.” (316-317)

Section c) “Model Farm at Bouqueval” 318-320, Rudolph’s project for a model farm, which was praised by “Criticism,” is subjected to devastating criticism: Marx declares it to be a utopian project, for on the average one Frenchman gets only a quarter of a pound of meat per day, only 93 francs in annual income, etc.; in the project they work twice as much as before, etc., etc. ((Not interesting.))

320: “The miraculous means by which Rudolph accomplishes all his redemptions and marvellous cures is not his fine words but his ready money. That is what the moralists are like, says Fourier. One must be a millionaire to be able to imitate their heroes.

“Morality is ‘Impuissance mise en action.’**** Every time it fights a vice it is defeated. And Rudolph does not even rise to the standpoint of independent morality based at least on the consciousness of human dignity. On the contrary, his morality is based on the consciousness of human weakness. He represents theological morality.” (320-321)

...“As in reality all differences boil down more and more to the difference between poor and rich, so in the idea do all aristocratic differences become resolved into the opposition between good and evil. This distinction is the last form that the aristocrat gives to his prejudices....” (323-324)

* bank for the poor—Ed.
** savings-banks—Ed.
*** the institution—Ed.
**** “impotence in action”—Ed.
"Every movement of his soul is of infinite importance to Rudolph. That is why he constantly observes and appraises them...." (Examples.) "This great lord is like the members of ‘Young England,’ who also wish to reform the world, to perform noble deeds, and are subject to similar hysterical fits...." (326)

Has not Marx in mind here the English Tory philanthropists who passed the Ten Hours Bill?22
The book is rather strange in character: rather short sections with a few words on the content of doctrines and very long explanations given in small print, consisting three-quarters of names and titles of books moreover, out of date: bibliography up to the sixties and seventies. Something unleserliches!* A history of names and books!

Written in 1903
First published in 1930
in Lenin Miscellany XII, p. 347
Published according to the manuscript

* unreadable!—Ed.
Highly characteristic is the frank formulation of the question in the introduction: the task of modern philosophy is “to reconcile the religious world outlook and the scientific explanation of nature” (p. IV*). Sic! And this idea is developed most circumstantially: there is said to be a struggle on two fronts—against materialism and “Jesuitism” (both Catholic and Protestant). Materialism, of course, is understood (described?) as rein mechanisch, physikalisch u.s.w.**

The author also says directly that modern philosophy rests on Kant and is the representative of “idealistic monism.”

Up to p. 10 ...”Peace between science and faith...”

And p. 11: “The real corner-stone of Kant’s philosophy” (to create this peace) ...“is to give to both their due: to knowledge against the scepticism of Hume, to faith against its dogmatic negation in materialism—that is the sum-total of his undertaking.” (12)

“What is capable of disappointing this hopeful” (the hope of this peace) “expectation is the absolutely anti-religious radicalism that is at present becoming widespread in the broad mass of the population.... Thus atheism now appears” (as formerly among the bourgeoisie) “as an article of faith of Social-Democracy” (pp. 14-15). “It is the catechism turned inside out. And like the old dogmatism, this new, negative dogmatism, too, is hostile to science,
insofar as by its dogmas it puts fetters on the spirit of criticism and doubt.” (He recalls the term *Antipfaffen* and assures us that Christianity has no predilection for the rich, that it (Christianity) will go through the same struggle towards which Europe is advancing.)

Refuting materialism and defending the theory of All-beseelung** (which he interprets in an *idealist* sense), Paulsen ignores: 1) that he is not refuting materialism, but merely *some* arguments of *some* materialists; 2) that he *contradicts* himself in interpreting modern psychology in an idealist sense.

× Cf. p. 126. “A force ... is nothing but a tendency to a certain action, and hence in its general essence coincides with an unconscious will.”

(Ergo—Seelenvorgänge und Kraft*** are by no means so unüberbrückbar**** as it previously seemed to the author, p. 90 u. ff.*****)

Pp. 112-116: Why could not the Weltall****** be the bearer of Weltgeist?******* (because man and his brain are the highest development of mind, as the author himself admits.

When Paulsen criticises materialists—he counterposes the highest forms of mind to matter. When he defends idealism and interprets modern psychology idealistically—he approximates the lowest forms of mind to Kräfte,****** etc. That is the Achilles heel of his philosophy).

Cf. especially pp. 106-107, where Paulsen opposes the view that *matter* is something *dead*.

× Contra p. 86: “Motion has absolutely nothing of thought in it....”

The author seems to dispose too lightly of the concept that Gedanke ist Bewegung.****** His arguments

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* anti-clericalism—Ed.
** universal soul embodiment—Ed.
*** soul processes and force—Ed.
**** incompatible—Ed.
***** und folgende—et seq.—Ed.
****** universe—Ed.
******* universal spirit—Ed.
******** forces—Ed.
********* thought is motion—Ed.
amount only to “ordinary common sense: senseless,” “thought is not motion, but thought” (87). Perhaps heat, too, is not motion, but heat??

Quite stupid are the author’s arguments that a physiologist will not cease to speak about thoughts, instead of movements equivalent to these thoughts? And no one will ever cease to speak about heat.

One who has fallen in love does not speak to “his lady-love about the corresponding vascular-motor process.... That is obviously nonsense” (86-87). Precisely what is done by Herr Paulsen! And if we experience a lack of heat, we do not speak about heat being a form of motion, but of how to get some coal.

Paulsen considers that the statement that thought is Bewegung* is sinnlos.** But he himself is against dualism, and speaks about the “equivalent” (140 and 143)—“the physical equivalent of the psychical” (or Begleiterscheinung***). Is not that the same begriffliche Konfusion**** for which he contemptuously abuses Büchner?

When Paulsen declares that his parallelism is “not local” but “ideal” (p. 146), his dualist character shows still more clearly. That is no explanation of the matter, nor a theory, but a simple verbal trick.

Written in 1903
First published in 1930 in Lenin Miscellany XII

Published according to the manuscript

* motion—Ed.
** senseless—Ed.
*** accompanying phenomenon—Ed.
**** conceptual confusion—Ed.
NOTE ON A REVIEW OF THE WONDERS OF LIFE
AND THE RIDDLE OF THE UNIVERSE
BY E. HAECKEL

Frankfurter Zeitung, 1904, No. 348 (December 15).

First morning edition

A Feuilleton on New Biological Books

Ernst Haeckel: Lebenswunder (Gemeinverständliche Studien über biologische Philosophie). Stuttgart. (Alfred Kröner.)

(To Haeckel, “the spirit is a physiological function of the cerebral cortex.” P. 378 of his book. To be sure, the reviewer is against this opinion.)

Welträtseln by the same author ((published earlier)) (in which it is demonstrated that, properly speaking, there are no world riddles).

Written late in 1904

Published for the first time according to the manuscript
REMARKS ON BOOKS ON THE NATURAL SCIENCES AND PHILOSOPHY IN THE SORBONNE LIBRARY

Sorbonne. New books:

C. 819 (7)*
Richard Lucas, Bibliographie der radioaktiven Stoffe, Hamburg und Leipzig, 1908, 8°.
(A. 47. 191)*

Mach, Grundriss der Physik (bearbeitet von Harbordt und Fischer), Leipzig, 1905-8, 2 Volumes, 8°.
(A. 46. 979)* S. Ф. 587.*

Max Planck, Das Prinzip der Erhaltung der Energie, Leipzig, 1908 (2 Auflage) 12°.
(A. 47. 232)* S. Ф. 63.*

Eduard Riecke, Handbuch der Physik, 4 Auflage, Leipzig, 1908, 2 Volumes, 8°.
(A. 47. 338)* S. Ф. 301a.*

Fénelon Salignac, Questions de Physique générale et d’Astronomie, Toulouse, 1908, 4°.
(D. 55. 745)* C. 818 (2).*

J. J. Thomson, Die Korpuskulartheorie der Materie, Braunschweig, 1908, 8°.
S. D. e. 101 (25).*

In the Sorbonne library:

I. Vierteiljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie, p. 5 3 (8°) (A. 16. 404).*

II. Archiv für Philosophie, 2-te Abteilung, p. 4 8 . (A. 17, 027).*

* Letters and numbers denote press-marks—Ed.
Vierteiljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie, 1909, Heft I. Raoul Richter’s review (sympathetic, indeed laudatory) of:

Ludwig Stein, Philosophie Strömungen der Gegenwart, Stuttgart, 1908, (Enke) XVI+452 Seiten. (12 Mark.)

Seiten 1-293—philosophical trends—
294-445—philosophical problems
Ten trends in philosophy:
1) neo-idealism (voluntarist metaphysics)
2) neo-positivism (pragmatism) of W. James
3) “new movement in natural philosophy” (Ostwald and the “triumph” of energetics over materialism)
4) “neo-romanticism” (H. St. Chamberlain, etc.)
5) neo-vitalism
6) evolutionism (Spencer)
7) individualism (Nietzsche)
8) geisteswissenschaftliche Bewegung* (Dilthey)
9) philosophiegeschichtliche**
10) neo-realism (Eduard von Hartmann!!).

New books:

Max Schinz, Die Wahrheit der Religion nach den neuesten Vertretern der Religionsphilosophie, Zürich, 1908, 8°. (307 pages. 6. 50 Mark.)

Kr. Guenther, Vom Urtier zum Menschen, (Ein Bilderatlas.) Stuttgart, 1909. (7-19 issues = 1 Mark.)


Spaventa, La filosofia italiana nelle sue relazioni con la filosofia europea, 1908? 9? Ban (Laterza).

New books (1909):

L. Boltzmann, Wiener wissenschaftliche Abhandlungen, Leipzig, (Barth).


* humanities movement—Ed.
** philosophical-historical—Ed.
P. 48.

Archiv für Philosophie, 2 Abteilung = Archiv für systematische Philosophie, 1908, Heft 4. Vitalis Norström’s second article (Seiten 447-496) (interesting; almost all of it about Mach).

Where is the first??
Note—is it late??

Written in the first half of 1909
First published in 1933
in Lenin Miscellany XXV
Published according to the manuscript
CONSPECTUS OF FEUERBACH'S BOOK
LECTURES ON THE ESSENCE
OF RELIGION

Written not earlier than 1909
First published in 1930
in Lenin Miscellany XII
Published according
to the manuscript
The preface is dated 1. X. 1851.—Feuerbach speaks here of the reasons why he did not take part in the 1848 revolution, which had “such a shameful, such a barren end” (VII).* The revolution of 1848 had no Orts- und Zeitsinn,** the constitutionalists expected freedom from the word des Herrn,*** the republicans (VII-VIII) from their desire (“it was only necessary to desire a republic for it to come into being”).... (VIII)

“If a revolution breaks out again and I take an active part in it, then you can ... be sure that this revolution will be victorious, that Judgment Day for the monarchy and hierarchy has arrived.” (VII)

First lecture (1-11).

P. 2: “We have had enough of political as well as philosophical idealism; we now want to be political materialists.”

3-4—Why Feuerbach fled to the seclusion of the country: the break with the “gottesgläubigen Welt”**** p. 4

* Feuerbach, L., Sämtliche Werke, Bd. 8, Leipzig, 1851.—Ed.
** sense of place and time—Ed.
*** of the monarch—Ed.
**** “God-believing world”—Ed.
down with “Überspanntes”!

(Z. 7 v. u.*) (cf. p. 3 in f.**)—to live with “nature” (5), ablenden*** all überspannten**** ideas.


12-14—Bayle.

“sensuousness” in Feuerbach

15: 

Sinnlich***** is not only the Magen,****** but also the Kopf******* (15).

(16-20: Feuerbach’s work on Immortality: paraphrased.)

Third Lecture (21-30).

The objection was raised to my Essence of Christianity29 that for me man does not depend on anything, “there was opposition to this alleged deification of man by me.” (24) “The being, whom man presupposes ... is nothing other than nature, not your God.” (25) “The unconscious being of nature is for me the eternal being, without origin, the first being, but first in point of time, and not in point of rank, the physically but not morally first being....” (27)

My denial includes also affirmation.... “It is, of course, a consequence of my doctrine that there is no God” (29), but this

* Zeile 7 von unten—line 7 from bottom—Ed.
** at the end—Ed.
*** to discard—Ed.
**** “extravagant”—Ed.
***** sensuous—Ed.
****** stomach—Ed.
******* head—Ed.
follows from the conception of the essence of God (=an expression of the essence of nature, of the essence of man).

Fourth Lecture.
"The feeling of dependence is the basis of religion." (31) ("Furcht"* 33-4-5-6)
"The so-called speculative philosophers are ... those philosophers who do not construct their notions in accordance with things, but rather construct things according to their notions. (31)

(Fifth Lecture.)
—it is especially death that arouses fear, belief in God. (41)
"I hate the idealism that divorces man from nature; I am not ashamed of my dependence on nature." (44)
"As little as I have deified man in Wesen des Christenthums, a deification with which I have been stupidly reproached ... so little do I want to deify nature in the sense of theology ...." (46-47)

Sixth Lecture—The cult of animals (50 u. ff.**).
"What man is dependent on is ... nature, an object of the senses ... all the impressions which nature makes on man through the senses ... can become motives of religious veneration." (55)

(Seventh Lecture.)
By egoism I understand, not the egoism of the "philistine and bourgeois" (63), but the philosophical principle of conformity with nature, with human reason, against "theological hypocrisy, religious and speculative fantasy, political despotism." (63 i. f.) Cf. 64, very important.

Idem 68 i. f. and 69 i. f.—Egoism (in the philosophical sense) is the root of religion.

* "fear"—Ed.
** und folgende—et seq.—Ed.

cf. Marx und Engels 30

"egoism" and its significance
on the question of the word energy

(70: Die Gelehrten* can only be beaten with their own weapons, i.e., by quotations) ... “man die Gelehrten nur durch ihre eigenen Waffen, d. h. Zitate, schlagen kann....” (70)

Incidentally, on p. 78 Feuerbach uses the expression: Energie d. h. Thätigkeit.** This is worth noting. There is, indeed, a subjective moment in the concept of energy, which is absent, for example, in the concept of movement. Or, more correctly, in the concept or usage in speech of the concept of energy there is something that excludes objectivity. The energy of the moon (cf.) versus the movement of the moon.

107 i. f. ...“Nature is a primordial, primary and final being....”

111: ...“For me ... in philosophy ... the sensuous is primary; but primary not merely in the sense of speculative philosophy, where the primary signifies that beyond the bounds of which it is necessary to go, but primary in the sense of not being derived, of being self-existing and true.”

...“The spiritual is nothing outside and without the sensuous.”

NB in general p. 111 ... “the truth and essentiality (NB) of the senses, from which ... philosophy ... proceeds....”

112 ...“Man thinks only by means of his sensuously existing head, reason has a firm sensuous foundation in the head, the brain, the focus of the senses.”

See p. 112 on the veracity (Urkunden***) of the senses.

* the pundits—Ed.
** energy, i.e., activity—Ed.
*** evidence—Ed.
114: Nature = the primary, unableitbares, ursprüngliches Wesen.*

"Thus, Die Grundsätze der Philosophie is interconnected with the Wesen der Religion."³¹ (113)

"I deify nothing, consequently not even nature." (115)

116—Answer to the reproach that Feuerbach does not give a definition of nature:

"I understand by nature the totality of all sensuous forces, things and beings which man distinguishes from himself as not human.... Or, if the word is taken in practice: nature is everything that for man—dependent of the supernatural whisperings of theistic faith—proves to be immediate and sensuous, the basis and object of his life. Nature is light, electricity, magnetism, air, water, fire, earth, animal, plant, man, insofar as he is a being acting involuntarily and unconsciously—by the word 'nature' I understand nothing more than this, nothing mystical, nothing nebulous, nothing theological" (above: in contrast to Spinoza).

... "Nature is ... everything that you see and that is not derived from human hands and thoughts. Or if we penetrate into the anatomy of nature, nature is the being, or totality of beings and things, whose appearances, expressions or effects, in which precisely their existence and essence are manifested and consist, have their basis not in thoughts or intentions and decisions of the will, but in astronomical, or cosmic, mechanical, chemical, physical, physiological or organic forces or causes." (116-117)

* underivable primordial being—Ed.
Here too it amounts to opposing matter to mind, the physical to the psychical.

121—against the argument that there must be a prime cause (= God).

“It is only man’s narrowness and love of convenience that cause him to put eternity in place of time, infinity in place of the endless progress from cause to cause, a static divinity in place of restless nature, eternal rest instead of eternal movement.” (121 i. f.)

124-125. Owing to their subjective needs, men replace the concrete by the abstract, perception by the concept, the many by the one, the infinite $\Sigma$ of causes by the single cause.

Yet, “no objective validity and existence, no existence outside ourselves” must be ascribed to these abstractions. (125)

“Nature has no beginning and no end. Everything in it is in mutual interaction, everything is relative, everything at once effect and cause, everything in it is all-sided and reciprocal....” (129)

there is no place there for God (129-130; simple arguments against God).

...“The cause of the first and general cause of things in the sense of the theists, theologians and so-called speculative philosophers is man’s understanding....” (130) “God is ... cause in general, the concept of cause as essence personified and become independent....” (131)

“God is abstract nature, i.e., nature removed from sensuous perception, mentally conceived, made into an object or being

* summation—Ed.

** objective = outside ourselves—Ed.
of the understanding; nature in the proper sense is sensuous, real nature, as immediately manifested and presented to us by the senses.” (133)

The theists see in God the cause of the movement in nature (which they make into a dead mass or matter). (134) The power of God, however, is in reality the power of nature (Naturmacht: 135).

...“Indeed it is only through their effects that we perceive the properties of things....” (136)

Atheism (136-137) abolishes neither das moralische Über (= das Ideal)* nor das natürliche Über (= die Natur)**

...“Is not time merely a form of the world, the manner in which particular beings and effects follow one another? How then can I ascribe a temporal beginning to the world?” (145)

...“God is merely the world in thought.... The distinction between God and the world is merely the distinction between spirit and sense, thought and perception ....” (146)

God is presented as a being existing outside ourselves. But is that not precisely an admission of the truth of sensuous being? Is it not (thereby) “recognised that there is no being outside sensuous being? For, apart from sensuousness, have we any other sign, any other criterion, of an existence outside ourselves, of an existence independent of thought?” (148)

...“Nature ... in isolation from its materiality and corporeality ... is God....” (149)

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* the moral highest (= the ideal)—Ed.
** the natural highest (= nature)—Ed.
“To derive nature from God is equivalent to wanting to derive the original from the image, from the copy, to derive a thing from the thought of the thing.” (149)

Characteristic of man is Verkehrtheit (149 i. f.) verselbständigen abstractions*—for example, time and space (150):

“Although ... man has abstracted space and time from spatial and temporal things, nevertheless he presupposes those as the primary grounds and conditions of the latter’s existence. Hence he thinks of the world, i.e., the sum-total of real things, matter, the content of the world, as having its origin in space and time. Even Hegel makes matter arise not only in, but out of, space and time....” (150) “Also, it is really incomprehensible why time, separated from temporal things, should not be identified with God.” (151)

“In reality, exactly the opposite holds good, ...it is not things that presuppose space and time, but space and time that presuppose things, for space or extension presupposes something that extends, and time, movement, for time, is indeed only a concept derived from movement, presupposes something that moves. Everything is spatial and temporal....” (151-152)

“The question whether a God has created the world ... is the question of the relation of mind to sensuousness” (152—the most important and difficult question of philosophy (153), the whole history of philosophy turns on this question 153)—the conflict between the Stoics and the Epicureans, the Platonists and the Aristotelians, the Sceptics and the Dogmatists, in ancient philosophy; between the nominalists and

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* perversity of endowing abstractions with independence—Ed.
realists in the Middle Ages; between the idealists and the “realists or empiricists” (sic! 153) in modern times.

It depends in part on the nature of people (academic, versus practical types) whether they incline to one or another philosophy.

“I do not deny ... wisdom, goodness, beauty; I deny only that, as such generic notions, they are beings, whether in the shape of gods or properties of God, or as Platonic ideas, or as self-posed Hegelian concepts....” (158)—they exist only as properties of men.

Another cause of belief in God: man transfers to nature the idea of his own purposive creation. Nature is purposive—ergo it was created by a rational being. (160)

“That which man calls the purposiveness of nature and conceives as such is in reality nothing but the unity of the world, the harmony of cause and effect, the interconnection in general in which everything in nature exists and acts.” (161)

...“Nor have we any grounds for imagining that if man had more senses or organs he would also cognise more properties or things of nature. There is nothing more in the external world, in inorganic nature, than in organic nature. Man has just as many senses as are necessary for him to conceive the world in its totality, in its entirety.” (163)

important against agnosticism

168—Against Liebig on account of the phrases about the “infinite wisdom” (of God).... Feuerbach and natural science!! NB. Cf. Mach and Co. 33 today.
174-175-178—Nature = a republican; God = a monarch. [This occurs not only once in Feuerbach!]

188-190—God was a patriarchal monarch, and he is now a constitutional monarch: he rules, but according to laws.

Where does spirit (Geist) come from?—ask the theists of the atheist. (196) They have too disdainful (despektierliche: 196) an idea of nature, too lofty an idea of spirit (zu hohe, zu vornehme (!!) Vorstellung*).

Even a Regierungsrath** cannot be directly explained from nature. (197)

“The spirit develops together with the body, with the senses ... it is connected with the senses ... whence the skull, whence the brain, thence also the spirit; whence an organ, thence also its functioning” ((197): cf. above (197) “the spirit is in the head”).

“Mental activity is also a bodily activity.” (197-198)

The origin of the corporeal world from the spirit, from God, leads to the creation of the world from nothing—“for whence does the spirit get the matter, corporeal substances, if not from nothing?” (199)

...“Nature is corporeal, material, sensuous....” (201)

Jakob Boehme = a “materialistic theist” (202): he deifies not only the mind but also matter. For him God is material—therein lies his mysticism. (202)

...“Where the eyes and hands begin, there the gods end.” (203)

(The theists) have “blamed matter or the inevitable necessity of nature ... for the evil in nature” (212)
213 in the middle and 215 in the middle "natürliche" und "bürgerliche Welt."*

(226): Feuerbach says that he is ending the first part here (on nature as the basis of religion) and passing to the second part: the qualities of the human spirit are manifested in Geistesreligion.**

(232)—"Religion is poetry"—it can be said, for faith = fantasy. But do I (Feuerbach) not then abolish poetry? No. I abolish (aufhebe) religion “only insofar” (Feuerbach’s italics) “as it is not poetry, but ordinary prose.” (233)

Art does not require the recognition of its works as reality. (233)

Besides fantasy, of great importance in religion are das Gemüth*** (261), the practical aspect (258), the search for the better, for protection, help, etc.

(263)—In religion one seeks consolation (atheism is alleged to be trostlos****).———

“A concept, however, congenial to man’s self-love, is that nature does not act with immutable necessity, but that above the necessity of nature is ... a being that loves mankind.” (264) *A n d   i n   t h e   n e x t s e n t e n c e* “Naturnotwendigkeit”***** of the falling of a stone. (264)

p. 287 twice in the middle: likewise “Notwendigkeit der Natur.”******

Religion = childishness, the childhood of mankind (269), Christianity has made a god of morality, it has created a moral God. (274)

* the “natural” and “civil world”—Ed.
** spiritual religion—Ed.
*** feeling—Ed.
**** comfortless—Ed.
***** “natural necessity”—Ed.
****** “necessity of nature”—Ed.
Feuerbach against misuse of the word religion

Religion is rudimentary education—one can say: “education is true religion....” (275) “However, this is ... a misuse of words, for superstitious and inhuman ideas are always linked with the word religion.” (275)

Eulogy of education—277.

“Superficial view and assertion ... that religion is absolutely of no concern to life, namely to public, political life.” (281)

I would not give a farthing for a political freedom that allows man to be a slave of religion. (281)

Religion is innate in man (“this statement ... Simply means”) = superstition is innate in man. (283)

“The Christian has a free cause of nature, a lord of nature, whose will, whose word, nature obeys, a God who is not bound by the so-called causal nexus, by necessity, by the chain which links effect to cause and cause to cause, whereas the heathen god is bound by the necessity of nature and cannot save even his favourites from the fatal necessity of dying.” (301) (Thus Feuerbach says systematically; Notwendigkeit der Natur.)

“The Christian, however, has a free cause because in his wishes he is not bound by the interconnection of nature, nor by the necessity of nature,” (301) ((And three times on this page: Notwendigkeit der Natur.))

And p. 302; “…all the laws or natural necessities to which human existence is subjected....” (302)

cf. 307: “Lauf der Natur.”*

“To make nature dependent on God, means to make the world order, the necessity of nature, dependent on the will.” (312) And p. 313 (above)—“Naturnotwendigkeit”!!

* “course of nature”—Ed.
320: “necessity of nature” (der Natur)... In religious ideas “we have ... examples how in general man converts the subjective into the objective, that is to say, he makes that which exists only in his thought, conception, imagination, into something existing outside thought, conception, imagination....” (328)

“So Christians tear the spirit, the soul, of man out of his body and make this torn-out, disembodied spirit into their God.” (332)

Religion gives (332) man an ideal. Man needs an ideal, but a human ideal corresponding to nature and not a supernatural ideal:

“Let our ideal be no castrated, disembodied, abstract being, let our ideal be the whole, real, all-sided, perfect, developed man.” (334)

Mikhailovsky’s ideal is only a vulgarised repetition of this ideal of advanced bourgeois democracy or of revolutionary bourgeois democracy.

“Man has no idea, no conception, of any other reality, of any other existence, than sensuous, physical existence....” (334)

“If one is not ashamed to allow the sensuous, corporeal world to arise from the thought and will of a spirit, if one is not ashamed to assert that things are not thought of because they exist, but that they exist because they are thought of; then let one also not be ashamed to allow

* disembodied spirit—Ed.
** sensuous, physical—Ed.

what is the objective? (according to Feuerbach)
Entleibter Geist* = God
Sinnlich physisch** ((equating!))

NB
things to arise from the word; then let one also not be ashamed to assert that words exist not because things exist, but that things exist only because words exist.” (341-342)

A God without the immortality of the soul of man is only a God in name:

...“Such a God is ... the God of some rationalist natural scientists, who is nothing but personified nature or natural necessity, the universe, with which of course the idea of immortality is incompatible.”

The last (30th) lecture, pp. (358-370), could be put forward almost in its entirety as a typical example of an enlightening atheism with a socialist tint (concerning the mass that suffers want, etc., p. 365 middle), etc. Final words: it was my task to make you, my hearers,

“from friends of God into friends of man, from men of faith into thinkers, from men of prayer into workers, from candidates for the beyond into students of this world, from Christians, who, as they themselves acknowledge and confess, are ‘half-beast, half-angel,’ into men, whole men” (370 end).

Next follow Additions and Notes. (371-463)

Here there are many details, quotations, which contain repetitions. I pass over all that. I note only the most important of that which affords some interest: the basis of morality is egoism (392). (“Love of life, interest, egoism”)... “there is not only a singular or personal, but also a social egoism, a family egoism, a corporation egoism, a community, egoism, a patriotic egoism.” (393)
...“The good is nothing but that which corresponds to the egoism of all men....” (397)

“One has only to cast a glance at history! Where does a new epoch in history begin? Only wherever an oppressed mass or majority makes its well-justified egoism effective against the exclusive egoism of a nation or caste, wherever classes of men (sic!) or whole nations, by gaining victory over the arrogant self-conceit of a patrician minority, emerge into the light of historical glory out of the miserable obscurity of the proletariat. So, too, the egoism of the now oppressed majority of mankind must and will obtain its rights and found a new epoch in history. It is not that the aristocracy of culture, of the spirit, must be abolished; no indeed! it is merely that not just a handful should be aristocrats and all others plebeians, but that all should—at least should—be cultured; it is not that property in general should be abolished; no indeed! it is merely that not just a handful should have property, and all others nothing; all should have property.” (398)

These lectures were delivered from 1.XII.1848 to 2.III.1849 (Preface, p. V), and the preface to the book is dated 1.I.1851. How far, even at this time (1848-1851), had Feuerbach lagged behind Marx (The Communist Manifesto 1847, Neue Rheinische Zeitung, etc.) and Engels (1845: Lage37)

Examples from the classics of the use of the words God and nature without distinction. (398-399)
Pp. 402-411—an excellent, philosophical (and at the same time simple and clear) explanation of the essence of religion.

“In the final analysis, the secret of religion is only the secret of the combination in one and the same being of consciousness with the unconscious, of the will with the involuntary.” (402). The Ego and the non-Ego are inseparably connected in man.

“Man does not grasp or endure the depths of his own being and therefore splits it into an ‘Ego’ without a ‘non-Ego,’ which he calls God, and a ‘non-Ego’ without an ‘Ego,’ which he calls nature.” (406)

P. 408—an excellent quotation from Seneca (against the atheists) that they make nature into a god. Pray!—Work!38 (p. 411) Nature is God in religion, but nature as Gedankenwesen.* “The secret of religion is the identity of the subjective and objective,’ i.e., the unity of the being of man and nature, but as distinct from the real being of nature and mankind.” (411)

“Human ignorance is bottomless and the human force of imagination is boundless; the power of nature deprived of its foundation by ignorance, and of its bounds by fantasy, is divine omnipotence.” (414)

...“Objective essence as subjective, the essence of nature as different from nature, as human essence, the essence of man as different from man, as non-human essence—that is the divine being, that is the essence of religion, that is the secret of mysticism and speculation....” (415)

Speculation in Feuerbach = idealist philosophy. NB.

* thought entity—Ed.
A page from V. I. Lenin's manuscript:
1909
Reduced
A page from V. I. Lenin's manuscript:

Conspectus of Feuerbach's book Lectures on the Essence of Religion.—
1909
Reduced
“Man separates in thought the adjective from the substantive, the property from the essence.... And the metaphysical God is nothing but the compendium, the totality of the most general properties extracted from nature, which, however, man by means of the force of imagination—and indeed in just this separation from sensuous being, matter, nature—reconverts into an independent subject or being.”

The same role is played by Logic ((418)—obviously Hegel is meant)—which converts das Sein, das Wesen* into a special reality—“how stupid it is to want to make metaphysical existence into a physical one, subjective existence into an objective one, and again logical or abstract existence into all illogical real existence!” (418)

...“‘Is there, therefore, an eternal gulf and contradiction between being and thinking?’ Yes, but only in the mind; however in reality the contradiction has long been resolved, to be sure only in a way corresponding to reality and not to your school notions, and, indeed, resolved by not fewer than five senses.” (418)

428: Tout ce qui n’est pas Dieu, n’est rien, i.e., tout ce qui n’est pas Moi, n’est rien.**

431-435. A good quotation from Gassendi. A very good passage: especially 433 God = a collection of adjectival words (without matter) about the concrete and the abstract.

* being, essence—Ed.
** All that is not God is nothing, i.e., all that is not I is nothing.—Ed.
heads are stuffed with abstractions, Gattungsbegriffen,* then of course we derive (ableiten) “the individual from the universal, i.e., ... nature from God.”

436-437: (Note No. 16.) I am not against constitutional monarchy, but only the democratic republic is “‘immediately reasonable’ as the form of state ‘corresponding to the essence of man.’”

...“The clever manner of writing consists, among other things, in assuming that the reader also has a mind, in not expressing everything explicitly, in allowing the reader to formulate the relations, conditions and restrictions under which alone a proposition is valid and can be conceived.” (447)

Interesting is the answer to (Feuerbach’s) critic Professor von Schaden (448-449) and to Schaller. (449-450-463)

...“I do indeed expressly put nature in place of being, and man in place of thinking,” i.e., not an abstraction, but something concrete———die dramatische Psychologie.** (449)

That is why the term “the anthropological principle” in philosophy,39 used by Feuerbach and Chernyshevsky, is n a r o w. Both the anthropological principle and naturalism are only inexact, weak descriptions of m a t e r i a l i s m .

“Jesuitism, the unconscious original and ideal of our speculative philosophers.” (455)

* generic concepts—Ed.
** dramatic psychology—Ed.
“Thinking posits the discreteness of reality as a continuum, the infinite multiplicity of life as an identical singularity. Knowledge of the essential, inextinguishable difference between thought and life (or reality) is the beginning of all wisdom in thinking and living. Only the distinction is here the true connection.” (458)

End of Volume 8

Volume 9 = “Theogony” (1857). There does not seem to be anything of interest here, to judge from skimming over the pages. Incidentally, p. 320, Pars. 34, 36 (p. 334) and following should be read. NB Par. 36 (p. 334)—on looking through it, nothing appears of interest. Quotations, and again quotations, to confirm what Feuerbach has already said.
CONSPECTUS OF HEGEL'S BOOK

THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC

Written in September-December 1914
First published in 1930 in Lenin Miscellany IX
Published according to the manuscript
Bern: Log. I. 175

*Hegel's Werke*

Bd. I. *Philosophische Abhandlungen*
  " II. *The Phenomenology of Mind*
  " III-V. *The Science of Logic*
  " VI-VII. (1 and 2) *The Encyclopaedia*
  " VIII. *The Philosophy of Law*
  " IX. *The Philosophy of History*
  " X. (3 parts) *Aesthetics*
  " XI-XII. *The History of Religion*
  " XIII-XV. *The History of Philosophy*
  " XVI-XVII. *Miscellaneous Writings*
  " XVIII. *Philosophical Propaedeutic*
  " XIX. (1 and 2) *Hegel's Correspondence*
The cover of the first notebook containing Conspectus of Hegel’s Book *The Science of Logic*.—September-December 1914
*Reduced*
The cover of the first notebook containing Conspectus of Hegel's Book The Science of Logic.—September-December 1914.
Collected Works of G. W. Fr. Hegel,
Vol. III (Berlin, 1833)
(468 pages)

"The Science of Logic." \(^{43}\)


Section 1. The Doctrine of Being.

(Bern: Log. I. 175

Vol. III, * p. 5—a shrewd statement about logic: it is a “prejudice” that it “teaches how to think” (just as physiology “teaches ... to digest”??)

...“logical science, which is the true content of genuine metaphysics or pure speculative philosophy....” (6)

...“Philosophy cannot borrow its method from a subordinate science, such as mathematics....” (6-7)

...“But it can be only the nature of the content which stirs in scientific cognition, while at the same time it is this very reflection of the content which itself initially posits and produces its determination.” (7)

(The movement of scientific cognition—that is the essential thing.)

“Understanding (Verstand) makes deter-
minations” (bestimmt), Reason (Ver-nunft) is negative and dialectical because it dissolves into nothing (“in Nichts auflöst”) the determinations of Understanding. (7) The combination of these two—“Reason which understands or Understanding which reasons” (7) = the positive.

Negation of “the simple” ... “movement of Mind....” (7)

“It is along this path of self-construction alone that Philosophy can become objective, demonstrative science.” (7-8)

(The “path of self-construction” = the path (this is the crux, in my opinion) of real cognition, of the process of cognising, of movement from ignorance to knowledge.*

The movement of consciousness, “like the development of all natural and spiritual life,” rests on “the nature of the pure essentialities which make up the content of Logic” (Natur der reinen Wesenheiten**).

Turn it round: Logic and the theory of knowledge must be derived from “the development of all natural and spiritual life.”

Up to here: preface to the First Edition.

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* In the manuscript the words “from ignorance to knowledge” are struck out with a horizontal line, apparently instead of being underlined.—Ed.

** the nature of pure essentialities—Ed.
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

“To present the realm of thought in its philosophical aspect—that is, in its own (NB) immanent activity, or (which comes to the same thing) in its necessary (NB) development....” (10)

“The familiar forms of thought”—an important beginning, “die leblosen Knochen eines Skeletts.”* (11)

What is necessary is not leblose Knochen, but living life.

The connection between thought and language (the Chinese language, incidentally, and its lack of development: 11), the formation of nouns and verbs. (11) In the German language words sometimes have “entgegengesetzte Bedeutung”** (12) (not simply “different” but opposed meanings)—“a joy to thought...”

The concept of force in Physics—and of polarity (“the things distinguished inseparably (Hegel’s italics) bound up together”). (12) The transition from force to polarity—a transition to “higher Denkverhältnisse.”*** (12)

nature and "das Geistige"**** \[\text{NB also p. 11... “But if Nature in general is opposed, as physical, to what is mental, then it must be said that logic is rather something supernatural...”}\]

* “the lifeless bones of a skeleton”—Ed.
** opposed meanings—Ed.
*** relations of thought”—Ed.
**** “the mental”—Ed.
Logical forms Allbekanntes sind,* but ...
... "was bekannt ist, darum noch nicht
erkannt."** (13)

"Infinite progress”—“liberation” of “forms
of thought” from the matter (von dem
Stoffe), ideas, desires, etc., elaboration of
the general (Plato, Aristotle): the beginning
of Knowledge....

"It was only after nearly everything that
was necessary ... was available, that people
began to trouble themselves about philo-
sophic knowledge,” says Aristotle (13-14);
and the selfsame: the leisure of the Egyp-
tian priests, the beginning of the mathe-
matical sciences. (14) Preoccupation with
“pure thought” presupposes “a long stretch
of road already traversed by the mind
of man.” In this kind of thought
"those interests are hushed which move
the lives of peoples and individuals.”
(14)

The categories of Logic are Abbreviati-
ren*** ("epitomiert”**** in another pas-
sage) for the “endless multitude” of “par-
ticulars of external existence and of ac-
tion....” (15) In turn, these categories d i e-
n e n***** people in practice (“in the
intellectual exercise of living content, in
production and interchange”). (15)

"We do not say of our feelings, impulses
and interests that they serve us—rather,
they are regarded as independent faculties
and powers... all this is just what we are.”(15)

And concerning forms of thought (Denk-
formen) it cannot be said that they serve

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* are familiar to all—Ed.
** “what is familiar is not on that account necessarily known”—Ed.
*** abbreviations—Ed.
**** epitomised—Ed.
***** s e r v e—Ed.
us, for they permeate “all our ideas” (16), they are “the Universal as such.”

Objectivism: the categories of thought are not an auxiliary tool of man, but an expression of laws both of nature and of man—compare further the antithesis—

of “subjective thinking” and “the objective concept of the very essence of things.”

We cannot “get beyond the nature of things.” (16)

“Also the remark against the “Critical Philosophy.”” (17) It conceives the relation between “three terms” (We, Thought, Things) so that thoughts stand “in the middle” between things and us, and so that this middle term “separates” (abschließt) “rather than ... connects” (zusammenschließen) us. This view may be met, says Hegel, by the “simple observation” that “these very things which are supposed to stand beyond (jenseits) our thoughts ... are themselves thought entities (Gedankendinge)” ... and “the so-called Thing-in-itself is only ein Gedankendende der leeren Abstraktion.”

In my opinion, the essence of the argument is: (1) In Kant, cognition demarcates (divides) nature and man; actually it unites them; (2) In Kant, “the empty abstraction” of the Thing-in-itself instead of living Gang, Bewegung, ** deeper and deeper, of our knowledge about things.

* a thought entity of empty abstraction—Ed.
** progress, the movement—Ed.
In Kant, Ding an sich* is an empty abstraction, but Hegel demands abstractions which correspond to der Sache**: “der objective Begriff der Dinge die Sache selbst ausmacht,”*** which correspond—speaking materialistically—to the real deepening of our knowledge of the world.

It is incorrect to say that Denkformen are only “Mittel,” “zum Gebrauch.”**** (17)

It is also incorrect to say that they are “äußere Fomen,”***** “Formen, die nur an dem Gehalt, nicht der Gehalt selbst seien” (forms which are merely forms attached to the content, and not the content itself). (17)...

What Hegel demands is a Logic, the forms of which would be ge-haltvolle Formen,****** forms of living, real content, inseparably connected with the content.

And Hegel draws attention to “thoughts of all natural and spiritual things,” to the “substantial content....” (18)
—“To bring into clear consciousness this logical character, which gives soul to mind and drives and operates in it, this is our problem.” (18)

Logic is the science not of external forms of thought, but of the laws of development “of all material, natural and spiritual

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* the Thing-in-itself—Ed.
** the essence—Ed.
*** “the objective concept of things constitutes their very essence”—Ed.
**** a “means,” “for use”—Ed.
***** “external forms”—Ed.
****** forms with content—Ed.
things,” i.e., of the development of the entire concrete content of the world and of its cognition, i.e., the sum-total, the conclusion of the History of knowledge of the world.

“Instinctive action” (instinktartiges Tun) “is broken up ... into an infinitely diverse matter.” On the other hand, “intelligent and conscious action” brings out “the content of that which motivates” (den Inhalt des Treibenden) “out of its immediate unity with the subject” and makes it “an object for it” (for the subject).

“In this web, strong knots are formed now and then, which are foci of the arrest and direction of its” the spirit’s, or the subject’s “life and consciousness....”

How is this to be understood?
Man is confronted with a web of natural phenomena. Instinctive man, the savage, does not distinguish himself from nature. Conscious man does distinguish, categories are stages of distinguishing, i.e., of cognising the world, focal points in the web, which assist in cognising and mastering it.

...“Truth is infinite” (19)—its finiteness is its denial, “its end.” The forms (Denkformen*), if one regards them as forms, “distinct from the substance and merely attached to it” (19), are incapable of embracing truth. The inaneness of these forms of formal logic makes them deserving of “contempt” (19) and “derision.” (20) The

* forms of thought—Ed.
Law of Identity, \( A = A \),—vacuousness, “unerträglich.”* (19)

It is unfair to forget that these categories “have their place and validity in cognition.” (20) But as “indifferent forms” they can be “instruments of error and sophistry” (20), not of truth.

“Contemplative thought” should include “der Inhalt”** as well as the “external form.” (20)

...“With this introduction of Content into logical consideration,” the subject becomes not Dinge but die Sache, der Begriff der Dingo.***

not things, but the laws**** of their movement, materialistically

...“the logos, the reason of that which is.” (21)

And on page (22) at the beginning, the subject of logic is expressed in the words:

...“Entwicklung des Denkens in seiner Notwendigkeit.”

The categories have to be derived (and not taken arbitrarily or mechanically) (not by “exposition,” not by “assurances,” but with \( \text{proofs} \)) (24) proceeding from the simplest, most fundamental (Being, Nothing, Becoming (das Werden)) (without taking others)—here, in them, “in this germ, the whole development.” (23)

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* “insufferable”—Ed.
** “content”—Ed.
*** things, but the essence, the concept of things—Ed.
**** The word “laws” is linked by an arrow with the word “logos” in the next Paragraph—Ed.
INTRODUCTION: GENERAL CONCEPT OF LOGIC

Logic is usually understood as being the “science of thinking,” the “bare form of cognition.” (27)

Hegel refutes this view. He is against Ding an sich* as “something beyond thought.” (29)

Forms of thinking apparently “have no applicability to Things-in-themselves.” (31) Ungereimt wahre Erkenntnis,** which does not cognise the Thing-in-itself. But is not Verstand*** also a Thing-in-itself? (31)

“Transcendental idealism, carried more consistently to its logical conclusion, has perceived the nullity of the spectre of the Thing-in-itself left over from the critical philosophy—that abstract shadow detached from all content—and has had the aim of demolishing it altogether. Also, this philosophy (Fichte?) made a beginning of making reason develop its own determinations out of itself. But the subjective attitude of this attempt did not admit of its being carried to completion.” (32)

Logical forms are tote Formen****—for they are not regarded as an “organic unity,” (33) as “their living concrete unity” (ibidem).

* Thing-in-itself—Ed.
** True cognition is absurd.—Ed.
*** understanding—Ed.
**** dead forms—Ed.
In the Phenomenology of Mind I have examined the movement of consciousness, from the first direct contradiction (Gegensatz) between itself and the object, up to absolute knowledge. (34) This path goes through all the forms of the relation of consciousness to the object...."

"Truth, as science, is pure self-consciousness unfolding itself..." (35) "objective thinking" ... "the concept, as such, is that which exists in and for itself." (35) (36: clericalism, God, the realm of truth, etc., etc.)

37: Kant imparted "an essentially subjective signification" to "logical determinations." But "thought determinations" have "an objective value and existence." (37)

The old logic has fallen into Verachtung.* (38) It requires transformation....

39—The old, formal logic is exactly like a child’s game, making pictures out of jig-saw pieces (in Verachtung gekommen**: (38))

40 Philosophy must have its own method (not that of mathematics, contra Spinoza, Wolff und Andere***).

40-41: "For method is the consciousness of the form taken by the inner spontaneous movement of its content,” and the rest of page 41 gives a good explanation of dialectics

..."es ist der Inhalt in sich, die Dialektik, die er an ihm selbst hat, welche ihn fortbewegt.” (42)

“The given sphere of phenomena is moved forward by the content itself of this sphere, the dialectic, which

* disrepute—Ed.
** It has fallen into disrepute.—Ed.
*** and others—Ed.
it (this content) has *in* (an) itself* (i.e., the dialectic of its own movement).* 

“The negative is to an equal extent positive” (41)—negation is something definite, has a definite content, the inner contradictions lead to the replacement of the old content by a new, higher one.

In the old logic there is no transition, development (of concept and thought), there is not “*es innere, not wendigen Zusammenhang*” of all the parts and “Übergang” of some parts into others.

And Hegel puts forward two basic requirements:

1) “The necessity of connection” and

2) “the immanent emergence of distinctions.”

Very important!! This is what it means, in my opinion:

1. *Necessary* connection, the objective connection of all the aspects, forces, tendencies, etc., of the given sphere of phenomena;

2. The “immanent emergence of distinctions”—the inner objective logic of evolution and of the struggle of the differences, polarity.

Shortcomings of the Platonic dialectics in Parmenides.44

“Dialectic is generally regarded as an external and negative procedure, that does not belong to the subject-matter itself, that is based on pure vanity, as a subjective craving to shake and break down what is fixed and true,—or that at best leads

* “an inner, necessary connection”—Ed.
** “transition”—Ed.
to nothing but the inaneness of the dialectically treated matter.” (43)

(44)—The great merit of Kant was that he removed “den Schein von Willkür”* from dialectics.

Two important things:

(1) Die Objektivität (NB: unclear, return to it!!) des Scheins**

(2) die Notwendigkeit des Widerspruchs***

selbstbewegende Seele****... (“inherent negativity”) ... “the principle of all physical and spiritual life,” (44)

Is not the thought here that semblance also is objective, for it contains one of the aspects of the objective world? Not only Wesen,***** but Schein, too, is objective. There is a difference between the subjective and the objective, BUT IT, TOO, HAS ITS LIMITS.

The dialectical = “comprehending the antithesis in its unity...”

45 Logic resembles grammar, being one thing for the beginner and another thing for one who knows the language (and languages) and the spirit of language. “It is one thing to him who approaches Logic and the Sciences in general for the first time and another thing for him who comes back from the sciences to Logic.”

Then logic gives “the essential character of this wealth” (des Reichtums der Welt-

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* “the semblance or arbitrariness”—Ed.
** the objectivity of semblance—Ed.
*** the necessity of contradiction—Ed.
**** self-moving soul
***** essence—Ed.
vorstellung*), “the inner nature of spirit and of the world....” (46)
“Not merely an abstract universal, but a universal which comprises in itself the wealth of the particular.” (47)

A beautiful formula: “Not merely an abstract universal, but a universal which comprises in itself the wealth of the particular, the individual, the single” (all the wealth of the particular and single)!! Très bien!

“—Just as one and the same moral maxim in the mouth of a youth who understands it quite accurately does not have the significance and scope which it has in the mind of a man of years and experience, for whom it expresses the full force of its content.

Thus, the value of logic only receives due appreciation when it is the result of experience of the sciences; then it presents itself to the mind as universal truth, not as a particular department of knowledge alongside other departments and realities, but as the essence of all this other content....” (47)

“The system of logic is the realm of shades” (47), free from “all sensuous concreteness....”

* the wealth of the world view—Ed.
(50)—...“not abstract, dead and immobile, but concrete...”
[This is characteristic! The spirit and essence of dialectics!]

(52) Note ... the results of Kant’s philosophy...: “that reason can cognise no valid content, and with regard to absolute truth must be referred to faith...”

(53) Once again, that Ding an sich = an abstraction, the product of thinking that abstracts.
BOOK ONE:
THE DOCTRINE OF BEING
BOOK ONE

THE DOCTRINE OF BEING
WITH WHAT SHOULD ONE BEGIN SCIENCE?

(59) * ...(en passant)
   “the nature of cognition” (idem p. 61)

(60) ...“There is nothing (Hegel’s italics) in Heaven, Nature, Spirit, or anywhere else, which does not contain immediacy as well as mediacy....”

2) Everything is vermittelt = mediated, bound into One, connected by transitions. Away with Heaven—law-governed connection of the whole (process) of the world.

(62) “Logic is pure science, that is, pure knowledge in the WHOLE extent of its DEVELOPMENT....”

* Hegel, Werke, Bd. III, Berlin, 1833.—Ed.
made,” the beginning. “Not hold in itself any content....” “to be mediated by nothing....”

(66) ...“The advance” (des Erkennens*)... “must be determined by the nature of the subject and the content itself....”

(68) Beginning contains both “Nichts”** and “Sein,”*** it is their unity:
...“that which is beginning, as yet is not: it is merely advancing towards Being ....” (from not-Being to Being: “not-Being, which is also Being”).

Nonsense about the absolute (68-69). I am in general trying to read Hegel materialistically: Hegel is materialism which has been stood on its head (according to Engels46)—that is to say, I cast aside for the most part God, the Absolute, the Pure Idea, etc.

(70-71) One cannot begin philosophy with the “Ego.” There is no “objective movement.” (71)

* of knowledge—Ed.
** “nothing”—Ed.
*** “being”—Ed.
CONSPECTUS OF HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC

SECTION ONE:
DETERMINATENESS (QUALITY)

(77) Pure Being—“without any further determination.”

(Bestimmung* is already Qualität.*)

Transition of Sein—into Dasein

Sein—Nichts—Werden****

“Pure Being and pure Nothing are ... the same.” (78)

(81: This seems to be a “paradox.”) Their union is Werden.

“Movement of immediate disappearance of the one into the other....”

Nichts is opposed to dem Etwas.***** But Etwas is already a determinate Being distinguished from another Etwas, but it is a question here of simple Nichts. (79)

(The Eleatics and Parmenides, especially the former, arrived at this abstraction of Being.) According to Heraclitus “all things flow” (80)...., i.e., “everything is Becoming.”

* determination—Ed.
** quality—Ed.
*** Existent Being—Ed.
**** Being—Nothing—Becoming—Ed.
***** Something—Ed.
Ex nihilo nihil fit?* Out of Nichts comes Sein (Werden)....

(81): “It would not be difficult to demonstrate this unity of Being and Nothing ... in every (Hegel’s italics) example, in every fact and thought” ... “neither in heaven nor on earth is there anything not containing both Being and Nothing.” Objections presume bestimmtes Sein** (I have 100 taler or not) 82 i. f.***,—but that is not the question....

“A determinate or finite Being is such as refers itself to another; it is a content which stands in a relation of necessity with other content or with the whole world. In view of the mutually determinant connection of the whole, metaphysics could make the assertion—which is really a tautology—that if the least grain of dust were destroyed the whole universe must collapse.” (83)

(86): “What is first in science has had to show itself first, too, historically.”

It sounds very materialistic!

(91): “Becoming is the subsistence of Being as much as of not-Being....”
“Transition is the same thing as Becoming....” (92 i. f.)

(94) “Parmenides, equally with Spinoza, will not admit transition from Being, or the absolute Substance, to the negative, finite.”

For Hegel, however, the unity or indivisibility (p. 90 this term is sometimes better than unity) of “Being” and “Nothing” gives the transition, Werden.

* Out or nothing comes nothing?—Ed.
** D e t e r m i n a t e Being—Ed.
*** in fine—at the end—Ed.
The absolute and the relative, the finite and the infinite = parts, stages of one and the same world. So etwa?*

(92: "We shall reserve for such Being as is mediated the term Existence.")

102: According to Plato in the "Parmenides," the transition from Being and the One = "äußere Reflexion."**

104: It is said that darkness is the absence of light. But "as little is seen in pure light as in pure darkness...."

107—Reference to infinitely small magnitudes, which are taken in process of disappearing...

"There exists nothing that is not a mean condition between Being and Nothing."

"Unbegreiflichkeit des Anfangs"***—if Nothing and Being exclude each other, but that is not dialectics, but Sophisterei.****

(108)

"For sophistry is an argument proceeding from a baseless supposition which is allowed without criticism or reflection; while we term dialectic that higher movement of Reason where terms appearing absolutely distinct pass into one another through themselves, through what they are, and the assumption of their separateness cancels itself." (108)

Werden. Its Moments: Entstehen und Vergehen.***** (109)

Das Aufheben des Werdens*****—das Dasein. concrete, determinate Being (?)

* Perhaps so.—Ed.
** "external reflection"—Ed.
*** "incomprehensibility of the beginning"—Ed.
**** sophistry—Ed.
***** arising and passing away—Ed.
****** The superseding of Becoming.—Ed.
110: aufheben = ein Ende machen  
= erhalten  
(aufbewahren zugleich)*

112: Dasein ist bestimmtes Sein** (NB 114 “ein Konkretes”***),—Quality, separate from Anderes,—v e r ä n d e r l i c h e n  
and finite.****

114 “Determinateness, taken thus isolated and by itself as existent determinateness, is Quality...,” “Quality, which is to count as something separately existing, is Reality.” (115)

117 “Determinateness is negation....” (Spinoza) Omnis determinatio est negatio,***** “this statement is of immeasurable importance....”

120: “Something is the first negation of negation....”

125—...Two pairs of determinations: 1) “Something and Other”; 2) “Being-for-Other and Being-in-Self.”

127—Ding an sich******—“a very simple abstraction.” The proposition that we do not know what Things-in-themselves are seems sagacious. The Thing-in-itself is an abstraction from all determination  
[Sein-für-Anderes*****]

* supersede = terminate-maintain (simultaneously to preserve)—Ed.
** Existent Being is Determine Being—Ed.
*** “concrete”—Ed.
**** an other—v a r i a b l e a n d f i n i t e —Ed.
***** every determination is negation—Ed.
****** abstract and obscure Hegelianism.—Ed.
******* Thing-in-itself—Ed.
******** being-for-other—Ed.
from all relation to Other, i.e., a
Nothing. Consequently, the Thing-in-itself is “nothing but an abstraction, void of truth and content.”

This is very profound: the Thing-in-itself and its conversion into a Thing-for-others (cf. Engels). The Thing-in-itself is altogether an empty, lifeless abstraction. In life, in movement, each thing and everything is usually both in itself” and “for others” in relation to an Other, being transformed from one state to the other.

129 En passant: dialectical philosophy, which is unknown to “metaphysical philosophy, which includes also the critical philosophy.”

Dialectics is the teaching which shows how Opposites can be and how they happen to be (how they become) under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another,—why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another. En lisant Hegel....

134: “Limit (is) simple negation or first negation” (das Etwas.*** Every Something has its Limit “while Other is at the same time negation of negation....”

* the question, in thoughtlessness, is so put as to render an answer impossible—Ed.
** in reading Hegel—Ed.
*** Something—Ed.
137: “Etwas mit seiner immanenten Grenze gesetzt als der Widerspruch seiner selbst, durch den es über sich hinausgewiesen und getrieben wird, ist das \textit{Endliche}.”

("\textit{Something}, taken from the point of view of its immanent Limit—from the point of view of its self-contradiction, a contradiction which drives it beyond its limits, is the \textit{Finite}.\)

When things are described as finite,—that is to admit that their not-Being is their nature ("not-Being constitutes their Being").

“They” (things) “\textit{are}, but the truth of this being is their \textit{end}.”

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\textbf{NB}

Shrewd and clever! Hegel analyses concepts that usually appear to be dead and shows that there \textit{is} movement in them. Finite? That means \textit{moving} to an end! Something?—means \textit{not that} which is Other. Being in general?—means such indeterminateness that \textit{Being} = \textit{not-Being}. All-sided, universal flexibility of concepts, a flexibility reaching to the identity of opposites,—that is the essence of the matter. This flexibility, applied subjectively = eclecticism and sophistry. Flexibility, applied \textit{objectively}, i.e., reflecting the all-sidedness of the material process and its unity, is dialectics, is the correct reflection of the eternal development of the world.

139—The Infinite and the Finite, it is said, are opposite to one another? (see p. 148) (cf. p. 151).
141—*Sollen* und *Schranke*—Moments of des Endlichen.**

143—"At Ought the transgression beyond finitude, Infinity, begins."

143—It is said that reason has its bounds. "When this assertion is made it is not seen that by the very fact that something has been determined as a boundary, it has already been surpassed."

144: A stone does not think, therefore its restrictedness (Beschränktheit) is no bound (Schranke) *for it*. But the stone also has its bounds, for instance its oxydisability, if it "is a base capable of being oxydised."

**Evolution*** of the stone

144-145:—Everything (human) passes beyond its bounds (Trieb, Schmerz,**** etc.), but *Reason*, if you please, "cannot pass beyond its bounds"!

"It is true that not every passage beyond the bound is a veritable emancipation from it!"

A magnet, if it had consciousness, would consider its turning to the north as freely made (Leibnitz).—No, it would know then *all* directions of space, and it would consider the *one* direction as a *boundary* to its freedom, a limitation of it.

148 ..."It is the nature of the finite to pass beyond itself, to negate its negation and to become infinite...." Not *external* (fremde) power (Gewalt) (149) converts the finite into the infin-

* Ought, or Should-be; and Bound or Boundary—Ed.
** the Finite—Ed.
*** In the MS., the Russian letter "и" appears above the last letter of the word for "evolution". In Russian, the ending "и" forms the plural of the word—Ed.
**** impulse, pain—Ed.
To be applied to atoms versus electrons.

In general the infiniteness of matter deep within...

The connection (of all parts) of infinite progress

ite, but its (finite's) nature (seine Natur).

151: “Schlechte Unendlichkeit”—infinity qualitatively counterposed to finitude, not connected with it, separated from it, and if the finite were diesseits,** and the infinite jenseits,*** as if the infinite stood above the finite, outside it....

153: In fact, however, sind sie**** (the finite and the infinite) untrennbar.***** They are a unity. (155)

158-159: ..."The unity of finite and infinite is not an external juxtaposition of these terms, nor an improper connection contrary to their determination, and binding together entities separate and opposed and mutually independent and hence incompatible; on the contrary, each in itself is this unity, and is so only in transcending itself, neither excelling the other in Being-in-Self and affirmative Existent Being. It has been demonstrated above that finitude exists only as a passing beyond itself; it thus contains infinity, which is its Other...."

..."The infinite progress, however, asserts more than this" (than the mere comparison of the finite with the infinite): "in it is also posited the connection (Hegel’s italics) of terms which also are distinct...." (160)

167 “The nature of speculative thought ... consists solely in seizing the opposed moments in their unity.”

The question how the infinite arrives at finite is sometimes considered as

* “bad infinity”—Ed.
** on this side—Ed.
*** on that side—Ed.
**** they are—Ed.
***** inseparable—Ed.
the essence of philosophy. But this question amounts to elucidating their connection....

168 ..."In the other subjects, too, the art of *putting questions* demands some education; still more so in philosophical subjects, if a better answer is to be received than that the question is idle."

The relation to the *Other* has disappeared; what has remained is the relation to *Self*.

173-174: *Fürsichsein*—Being-for-Self—infinitive Being, consummated qualitative Being. The relation to the *Other* has disappeared; what has remained is the relation to *Self*. Quality reaches its climax (auf die Spitze) and becomes quantity. The idealism of Kant and Fichte... (181) "remains in the dualism" ((unclear)) "of existent Being and Being-for-Self...,”

i.e., that there is no *transition* of the Thing-in-itself (mentioned in the following sentence) to the appearance? of the object to the subject?

Why *Fürsichsein* is *Eins* is not clear to me. Here Hegel is extremely obscure, in my opinion.

The *One* is the old principle of the äτο−μον (and the void). The void is considered *Quell der Bewegung* (185) not only in the sense that space is not filled, but also enthüllt "this profounder thought,

* One—Ed.
** atom (indivisible)—Ed.
*** source of motion—Ed.
**** contains—Ed.
***** self-movement—Ed.

Bien dit!

NB: Selbstbewegung.****
that the negative in general contains the ground of Becoming, the unrest of self-movement.” (186)

183: “The ideality of Being-for-Self as totality thus, first, passes into reality, and into the most fixed and abstract of all, as One.”

The thought of the ideal passing into the real is profound: very important for history. But also in the personal life of man it is clear that this contains much truth. Against vulgar materialism. NB. The difference of the ideal from the material is also not unconditional, not überschwenglich.*

189—Note: The monads of Leibnitz. The principle of Eins** and its incompleteness in Leibnitz.

Obviously, Hegel takes his self-development of concepts, of categories, in connection with the entire history of philosophy. This gives still a new aspect to the whole Logic.

193 ...“It is an old proposition that One is Many, and more especially that the Many are One....”

195 ...“The distinction of One and Many has determined itself to be that of their relation to one another; this is divided into two relations, Repulsion and Attraction....”

* inordinate—Ed.
** the One—Ed.
In general, all this Fürsichsein* was, probably, in part required by Hegel to deduce the transition of quality into quantity” (199)—quality is determinateness, determinateness for self, Ge-setzte,* it is the One—this gives the impression of being very far fetched and empty.

Note, page 203, the remark, which is not devoid of irony, against that “procedure of knowledge reflecting on experience, which first perceives determinations in the phenomenon, next makes them the basis, and assumes for their so-called explanation corresponding fundamental materials or forces which are supposed to produce these determinations of the phenomenon....”

* Being-for-self—Ed.
** the posited—Ed.
SECTION TWO:
MAGNITUDE (QUANTITY)

Kant has four “antinomies.” In fact, every concept, every category is similarly antinomous. (217)

“The old scepticism did not shrink from the labour of demonstrating this contradiction or antinomy in every concept which it found in the sciences.”

Analysing Kant very captiously (and shrewdly), Hegel comes to the conclusion that Kant simply repeats in his conclusions what was said in the premises, namely he repeats that there is a category of Kontinuität* and a category of Diskretion.**

From this it follows merely “that, taken alone, neither determination has truth, but only their unity. This is the true dialectic consideration of them, and the true result.” (226)

229: “Die Diskretion like die Kontinuität [continuity (?), successiveness (?),**** continuity] is a moment of Qua n t i t y....”

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* continuity—Ed.
** discreteness—Ed.
*** true dialectics—Ed.
**** In the MS., the word “separateness” is crossed out.—Ed.
***** In the MS., the words “contiguity, successiveness” are crossed out.—Ed.
232: "Quantum—which, first, means quantity having any determinateness or limit at all—is, in its complete determinateness, Number...."

234: "A n z a h l amount enumeration? and Unit constitute the moments of Number."

248—On the problem of the role and significance of number (much about Pythagoras, etc., etc.)

Among other things, an apt remark:

"The richer in determinateness, and hence in relation, thoughts become, the more confused, on the one hand, and the more arbitrary and senseless, on the other hand, becomes their representation in such forms as numbers." (248-249) ((Valuation of thoughts: richness in determinations a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y in relations.))

In regard to Kant's antinomies (world without beginning, etc.) Hegel again demonstrates des Längeren* that the premises take as proved that which has to be proved. (267-278)

Further the transition of quantity into quality in the abstract-theoretical exposition is so obscure that nothing can be understood. Return to it!!

283: the infinite in mathematics. Hitherto the justification has consisted o n l y in the correctness of the results ("welche aus sonstigen Gründen erwiesen ist"**),... and not in the clearness of the subject [cf. Engels48].

* in detail—Ed.
** "demonstrated on other grounds"—Ed.
285: In the infinitesimal calculus a certain inexactitude (conscious) is ignored, nevertheless the result obtained is not approximate but absolutely exact!

285: Notwithstanding this, to demand Rechtfertigung* here is "not as superfluous" "as to ask in the case of the nose for a demonstration of the right to use it." 49

Hegel’s answer is complicated, abstruse,** etc., etc. It is a question of higher mathematics; cf. Engels on the differential and integral calculus. 50

Interesting is Hegel’s remark made in passing—"transcendently, that is really subjective and psychological"... "transcendental, that is, in the subject." (288)

Pp. 282-327 u. ff.—379

A most detailed consideration of the differential and integral calculus, with quotations—Newton, Lagrange, Carnot, Euler, Leibnitz, etc., etc.,—showing how interesting Hegel found this “vanishing” of infinitely small magnitudes, this “intermediate between Being and non-Being.” Without studying higher mathematics all this is incomprehensible. Characteristic is the title Carnot: "Réflexions sur la Métaphysique du calcul infinitésimal"!!!***

The development of the concept Verhältnis**** (379-394) extremely obscure. Note

* justification—Ed.
** abstruse—Ed.
*** Reflections on the Metaphysics of the Infinitesimal Calculus—Ed.
**** relation—Ed.
only, p. 394, the remark on symbols, that there is nothing to be said against them in general. But “against all Symbolism” it must be said that it sometimes is “a convenient means of escaping from comprehending, stating and justifying the conceptual determinations” (Begriffsbestimmungen). But precisely this is the concern of philosophy.

“The common determinations of force, or substantiality, cause and effect, and others, are themselves too only symbols used to express, for example, vital and spiritual relations; that is, they are untrue determinations of those relations.” (394)
SECTION THREE:

MEASURE

"In Measure, to put it abstractly, Quality and Quantity are united. Being as such is the immediate self-identity of determinateness. This immediacy of determinateness has transcended itself. Quantity is Being which has returned upon itself in such a manner that it is simple self-identity as indifference to determinateness."

The third term is Measure.

Kant introduced the category of modality (possibility, actuality, necessity) and Hegel remarks that in Kant:

"This category means that it is the relation of the object to thought. In the sense of this idealism, thought in general is essentially external to the Thing-in-itself ..., objectivity, which is a quality of the other categories, is lacking in the categories of modality."

En passant:

Indian philosophy, in which Brahma passes to Siva (change = disappearance, arising)....

The peoples deify Measure. (Regarding the question of Measure it is not without interest to note the remark made in passing by Hegel that "in devel-
oped civil society aggregates of individuals belonging to different trades are in a certain relation to one another.”) (402)

On the question of the category of Gradualness (Allmählichkeit), Hegel remarks:

“Recourse is so readily made to this category in order to render intelligible to the eye or to the mind the disappearance of a Quality or of Something; for thus the illusion is created that one can almost be eye-witness of disappearance; for, Quantum being posited as limit external and variable by its very nature, change (as a change of Quantum only) needs no explanation. But in fact nothing is thereby explained; the change is also essentially the transition of one Quality into another, or (a more abstract transition) of one existence into a non-existence; and this contains a determination different from that of gradual, which is only a decrease or increase and a one-sided retention of magnitude.

“But already the ancients were aware of the connection by which a change appearing as merely quantitative turns into one which is qualitative, and they illustrated the confusions which arise from ignorance of this connection by popular examples...” (405-406) (“bald”—the removal of one hair from a head; a “heap”—the removal of one grain...) “what” (here) “is refuted is” das einseitige Festhalten an der abstrakten Quantumsbestimmtheit (“the one-sided clinging to abstract quantitative determinateness,” i.e., “without taking account of the manifold changes and concrete qualities,” etc.). ...“Therefore those changes are no idle and pedantic joke; they are in themselves correct and the product of a consciousness which takes an interest in the phenomena which occur in thought.

NB
“Quantum when it is taken as indiffer- 
ent limit is that side from which an Exis-
tent Being can unsuspectedly be attacked 
and destroyed. It is the cunning of the 
Notion to seize it from this side, where its 
Quality does not appear to come into play; 
and this so much so that the aggrandise-
ment of a state or of a property, and so on, 
which leads in the end to disaster for the 
state or the owner of the property, may 
at first actually appear as their good for-
tune.” (407)

“It is a great merit to become acquainted 
with the empirical numbers of nature (as 
the distances of the planets from one 
another), but an infinitely greater merit 
to cause the empirical Quanta to disappear 
and to raise them into a universal form of 
quantitative determinations, so that they 
become moments of a law or Measure”; 
the merit of Galileo and Kepler... “They 
de demonstrated the laws which they discov-
ered by showing that the totality of details 
of perception corresponds to these laws.” 
(416) But höheres Beweisen** of these laws 
must be demanded in order that their 
quantitative determinations be known from 
Qualitäten oder bestimmten Begriffen, die 
bezogen sind (wie Baum und Zeit).***

The development of the concept des 
Maßes,**** as a spezifische Quantität****
and as reales Maß***** (including Wahl-
verwandtschaften******—for example,
chemical elements, musical tones), very obscure.

A lengthy note on chemistry, with a polemic against Berzelius and his theory of electro-chemistry. (433-445)

The “nodal line of measure relations” (Knotenlinie von Maßverhältnissen)—transitions of quantity into quality... Gradualness and leaps.

In Hegel’s note as always, factual material, examples, the concrete (hence Feuerbach said jestingly on one occasion that Hegel banished nature to his notes, Feuerbach, Works, II, p. ?).51

Pp. 448-452, a note included in the table of contents (not in the text!! pedantry!!): “Examples of such Nodal Lines; in this connection, that there are no leaps in nature.”

Examples: chemistry; musical tones; water (steam, ice)—p. 449—birth and death.

Abbrechen der Allmählichkeit, p. (450)

“It is said that there are no leaps in nature; and ordinary imagination, when it has to conceive an arising or passing away, thinks it has conceived them (as was mentioned) when it imagines them as a gradual emergence or disappearance. But we saw that the changes of Being were in general not only a transition of one magnitude into another, but a transition from the qualitative into the quantitative, and conversely: a process of becoming other which
breaks off graduality and is qualitatively other as against the preceding Existent Being. Water on being cooled does not little by little become hard, gradually reaching the consistency of ice after having passed through the consistency of paste, but is suddenly hard; when it already has quite attained freezing-point it may (if it stands still) be wholly liquid, and a slight shake brings it into the condition of hardness.

“The gradualness of arising is based upon the idea that that which arises is already, sensibly or otherwise, actually there, and is imperceptible only on account of its smallness; and the gradualness of vanishing is based on the idea that not-Being or the Other which is assuming its place equally is there, only is not yet noticeable;—there, not in the sense that the Other is contained in the Other which is there in itself, but that it is there as existence, only unnoticeable. This altogether cancels arising and passing away; or the In-itself, that inner thing in which something is before it attains its existence, is transmuted into a smallness of external existence, and the essential or conceptual distinction into a difference external and merely magnitudinal.—The procedure which makes arising and passing away conceivable from the gradualness of change is boring in the manner peculiar to tautology; that which arises or passes away is prepared beforehand, and the change is turned into the mere changing of an external distinction; and now it is indeed a mere tautology. The difficulty for such Understanding which attempts to conceive consists in the qualitative transition of Something into its Other in general and its op-
posite; Understanding, on the other hand, fancies identity and change to be of that indifferent and external kind which applies to the quantitative.

"In the moral sphere, insofar as it is considered in the sphere of Being, the same transition from quantitative to qualitative takes place, and different qualities appear to base themselves on differences in magnitude. A 'more' or 'less' suffices to transgress the limit of levity, where something quite different, namely, crime, appears; whereby right passes over into wrong, and virtue into vice.—Thus too do states—other things being equal—derive a different qualitative character from magnitudinal difference...." (450-452)

Further:
Transition of Being into Essence (Wesen), expounded extremely obscurely.
End of Volume I.
BOOK TWO:

ESSENCE
SECTION ONE:

ESSENCE AS REFLECTION IN ITSELF

"The truth of Being is Essence." (3)*

Such is the first sentence, sounding thoroughly idealistic and mystical. But immediately afterwards, a fresh wind, so to speak, begins to blow: "Being is the immediate. Knowledge seeks to understand that truth** which Being, in and for itself, is, and therefore it does not halt" (does not halt NB) "at the immediate and its determinations, but penetrates (NB) through (NB) it, assuming that behind (Hegel's italics) this Being there is something other than Being itself, and that this background constitutes the truth of Being. This cognition is mediated knowledge, for it is not lodged immediately with and in Essence, but begins at an Other, at Being, and has to make a preliminary passage, the passage of transition beyond Being, or rather of entrance into it...."

This Bewegung*** the path of knowledge, seems to be the "activity of cognition" theory of knowledge

"passage"

* Hegel, Werke, Bd. IV, Berlin, 1834.—Ed.

** Incidentally, Hegel more than once pokes fun at the passages cited above on gradualness the word (and the concept) erklären (explanation), obviously opposing to the metaphysical solution once for all ("it has been explained"!!) the eternal process of cognition penetrating deeper and deeper. Cf. Volume III, p. 463: "can be cognised or, as they say, explained."

*** movement—Ed.
“However, this movement is the movement of Being itself.”

“Essence ... is what it is ... by virtue of its own infinite movement of Being.” (4)

“Absolute Essence has no Determinate Being. Into this, however, it must pass.” (5)

Essence stands midway between Being and the Notion, as the transition to the Notion (=Absolute).

Subdivisions of Essence: Semblance or Show (Schein), Appearance (Erscheinung), Actuality (Wirklichkeit).

Das Wesentliche und das Unwesentliche.* (8) Der Schein. (9)

In the unessential, in Semblance, there is a moment of not-Being. (10)

i.e., the unessential, seeming, superficial, vanishes more often, does not hold so “tightly,” does not “sit so firmly” as “Essence.” Etwa**: the movement of a river—the foam above and the deep currents below. But even the foam is an expression of essence!

Semblance and scepticism, Kantianism, respectively:

“Semblance then is the phenomenon of scepticism; or again the appearance of idealism, such an immediacy, which is neither Something nor Thing, and, generally, is not an indifferent Being which could be outside its determinateness and relation to the subject. Scepticism did not dare to

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* The Essential and the Unessential.—Ed.
** approximately—Ed.
affirm 'it is'; modern idealism did not dare to regard cognition as a knowledge of the Thing-in-itself; with the former, Semblance was supposed to have no basis at all in any Being; with the latter, the Thing-in-itself was supposed incapable of entering into cognition. But at the same time scepticism admitted manifold determinations of its Semblance, or rather its Semblance had for content all the manifold riches of the world. In the same manner the appearance of idealism comprehends the whole range of these manifold determinatenesses."

You include in Schein* all the wealth of the world and you deny the objectivity of Schein!!

"Semblance and appearance are immediately determined so diversely. The content may then have no basis in any Being nor in any thing nor Thing-in-itself; for itself it remains as it is: it has only been translated from being into Semblance; thus Semblance contains these manifold determinatenesses, which are immediate, existent and reciprocally other. Semblance itself is, then, immediately determinate. It may have this or that content; but whatever content it has is not posited by itself but belongs to it immediately. The idealism of Leibnitz, Kant or Fichte, like any other form of idealism, did not reach beyond Being as determinateness, beyond this immediacy any more than scepticism. Scepticism allows the content "that which is immediately given"!! of its Semblance to be given

* Semblance or Show—Ed.
to it; for it, it is immediate, whatever content it is to have. The monad of Leibnitz develops its presentations out of itself; but it is no creative and connecting force,—the presentations arise in it like bubbles; they are indifferent and immediate relative to one another, and therefore to the monad itself. Similarly Kant’s phenomenon is a given content of perception; it presupposes affections, determinations of the subject which are immediate to one another and to the subject. The infinite limitation or check of Fichte’s idealism refuses, perhaps, to be based on any Thing-in-itself, so that it becomes purely a determinateness in the Ego. But this determinateness is immediate and a limit to the Ego, which, transcending its externality, incorporates it; and though the Ego can pass beyond the limit, the latter has in it an aspect of indifference by virtue of which it contains an immediate not-Being of the Ego, though itself contained in the Ego.” (10-11)

...“Determinations which distinguish it” (den Schein) “from Essence are determinations of Essence....” (12)

It is the immediacy of not-Being which constitutes Semblance; in Essence, Being is not-Being. Its nullity in itself is the negative nature of Essence itself....” (12)

...“These two moments thus constitute Semblance: Nullity, which however persists, and Being, which however is Moment; or again negativity which is in itself, and reflected immediacy. Consequently these moments are the moments of Essence itself....”

“Semblance is Essence itself in the determinateness of Being....” (12-13)
Semblance is (1) nothing, non-existent (Nichtigkeit) which exists
—(2) Being as moment

"Thus Semblance is Essence itself, but Essence in a determinateness, and this in such a manner that determinateness is only its moment: Essence is the showing of itself in itself." (14)

That which shows itself is essence in one of its determinations, in one of its aspects, in one of its moments. Essence seems to be just that. Semblance is the showing (Scheinen) of essence itself in itself.

..."Essence ... contains Semblance within itself, as infinite internal movement...." (14)
..."In this its self-movement Essence is Reflection. Semblance is the same as Reflection." (14)

Semblance (that which shows itself) is the Reflection of Essence in (it) itself.

..."Becoming in Essence—its reflective movement—is hence the movement from Nothing to Nothing and through Nothing back to itself...." (15)

This is shrewd and profound. Movements “to nothing” occur in nature and in life. Only there are certainly none "from nothing.” Always from something.

"Commonly Reflection is taken in the subjective meaning of the movement of judgment which passes beyond a given immediate presentation, seeking universal de-
terminations for it or comparing them with it." (21) (Quotation from Kant—*Critique of the Power of Judgment*... “Here, however, **neither the reflection of consciousness** nor the more determinate reflection of understanding, which has the particular and the universal for its determinations, is in question, but only Reflection in general....”

Thus here, too, Hegel charges Kant with **subjectivism**. This *NB*. Hegel is for the “objective validity” (sit venia verbo*) of Semblance, “of that which is immediately given” [the expression “*t h a t   w h i c h   i s   g i v e n*” is generally used by Hegel, and here see p. 21 i. f.; p. 22]. The more petty philosophers dispute whether essence or that which is immediately given should be taken as basis (Kant, Hume, all the Machists). Instead of or, Hegel puts and, explaining the concrete content of this “and.”

“Die Reflexion is the showing of Essence into itself” (27) (translation? Reflectivity? Reflective determination? Рефлексия is not suitable).**

...“It” (das Wesen) “is a movement through different moments, absolute self-mediation....” (27)

Identity — Difference — Contradiction

(+ **Gegensatz*** ) (Ground)... in particular antithesis

Therefore Hegel elucidates the one-sidedness, the incorrectness of the “law of identity” (A=A), of the category (all determin-

* If it may be called that—*Ed.*

** Variants of the translation of the German word “die Reflexion” into Russian are given within the parentheses.—*Ed.*

*** The word Gegensatz is crossed out in the MS.—*Ed.*
nations of that which is are categories—pp. 27-28).

“If everything is self-identical it is not distinguished: it contains no opposition and has no ground.” (29)

“Essence is ... simple self-identity.” (30)

Ordinary thinking places resemblance and difference next to (“daneben”) each other, not understanding “this movement of transition of one of these determinations into the other.” (31)

And again, against the law of identity (A=A): its adherents

“since they cling to this rigid Identity which has its opposite in Variety, they do not see that they are thereby making it into a one-sided determinateness, which as such has no truth.” (33)

(“Empty tautology”: 32)

(“It contains only formal truth, which is abs tract and incomplete.” (33)

Kinds of reflection: external, etc.; expounded very obscurely.

The principles of difference: “All things are different....” “A is also not A....” (44)

“There are no two things which are entirely alike....”

There is a difference in one or another aspect (Seite), Rücksicht, etc., “insofern,”* etc.

bien dit!!

“The customary tenderness for things, whose only care is that they shall not contradict one another, forgets here as elsewhere that this is no solution of the contradiction, which is merely planted elsewhere, namely, into subjective or external reflection; and that the latter does in fact

* consideration, etc., “insofar as,” etc.—Ed.
contain the two moments—which this removal and transplantation proclaim to be a mere positedness—in one unity as transcended and related to each other.” (47)

(This irony is exquisite! “Tenderness” for nature and history (among the philistines)—the endeavour to cleanse them from contradictions and struggle....)

The result of the addition of plus and minus is nought. “The result of contradiction is not only nought.” (59)

The solution of the contradiction, the reduction of positive and negative to “only determinations” (61) converts *Essence* (das Wesen) into *Ground* (Grund) (ibidem)

...“Resolved Contradiction is, then, Grund, that is, Essence as unity of Positive and Negative....” (62)

“Even a slight experience in reflective thought will perceive that, if anything has just been determined as Positive, it straightway turns into Negative if any progress is made from that base, and conversely that a Negative determination turns into Positive; that reflective thought becomes confused in these determinations and contradicts itself. Insufficient acquaintance with the nature of these determinations leads to the conclusion that this confusion is a fault which should not occur, and attributes it to a subjective error. And in fact this transition does remain mere confusion insofar as the necessity for this *metamorphosis* is not present to consciousness.” (63)

...“The opposition of Positive and Negative is especially taken in the meaning that the former (although etymologically it expresses being posited or positedness) is to be an objective entity, and the latter subjective, belonging only to external
reflection and in no way concerned with the objective, which is in and for itself and quite ignores it.” (64) “And indeed if the Negative expresses nothing but the abstraction of subjective caprice...” (then it, this Negative, does not exist “für das objective Positive”*)....

“Truth, too, is the Positive, as knowledge, corresponding with its object but it is this self-equality only insofar as knowledge has already taken up a negative attitude to the Other, has penetrated the object, and transcended that negation which the object is. Error is a Positive, as an opinion affirming that which is not in and for itself, an opinion which knows itself and asserts itself. But ignorance is either indifference to truth and error, and thus determined neither as positive nor as negative,—and if it is determined as a deficiency, this determination belongs to external reflection; or else, objectively and as proper determination of a nature, it is the impulse, which is directed against itself, a negative which contains a positive direction.—It is of the greatest importance to recognise this nature of the Determinations of Reflection which have been considered here, that their truth consists only in their relation to each other, and therefore in the fact that each contains the other in its own concept. This must be understood and remembered, for without his understanding not a step can really be taken in philosophy.” (65-66) This from the Note 1.———


Hegel quotes this proposition of the excluded middle. “Something is either A or not A; there is no third” (66) and “a n a l -

* “for the objective positive”—Ed.
If this implies that "alles ein Entgegengesetztes ist,"* that everything has its positive and its negative determination, then it is all right. But if it is understood as it is generally understood, that, of all predicates, either a given one, or its not-Being, applies, then this is a "triviality"!! Spirit ... sweet, not sweet? green, not green? The determination should lead to determinateness, but in this triviality it leads to nothing.

And then—Hegel says wittily—it is said that there is no third. There is a third in this thesis itself. A itself is the third, for $A$ can be both $+A$ and $-A$. “The Something thus is itself the third term which was supposed to be excluded.” (67)

This is shrewd and correct. Every concrete thing, every concrete something, stands in multifarious and often contradictory relations to everything else, ergo it is itself and some other.

Note 3 (at the end of Chapter 2, Section 1 of Book II of the Logic). “The Law of Contradiction.”

“If now the primary Determinations of Reflection—Identity, Variety and Opposition—are established in a proposition, then the determination into which they pass over as into their truth (namely Contradiction) should much more so be comprehended and expressed in a proposition: all things are contradictory in themselves, in this meaning, that this proposition as opposed to the others expresses much better the truth and essence of things.—Contradiction,

* “everything is a term of an opposition”—Ed.
which emerges in Opposition, is no more than developed Nothing; and this is already contained in Identity, and occurred in the expression that the law of identity states nothing. This negation further determines itself into Variety and into Opposition, which now is posited Contradiction.

"But it has been a fundamental prejudice of hitherto existing logic and of ordinary imagination that Contradiction is a determination having less essence and immanence than Identity; but indeed, if there were any question of rank, and the two determinations had to be fixed as separate, Contradiction would have to be taken as the more profound and more fully essential. For as opposed to it Identity is only the determination of simple immediacy, or of dead Being, while Contradiction is the root of all movement and vitality, and it is only insofar as it contains a Contradiction that anything moves and has impulse and activity.

"Ordinarily Contradiction is removed, first of all from things, from the existent and the true in general; and it is asserted that there is nothing contradictory. Next it is shifted into subjective reflection, which alone is said to posit it by relating and comparing it. But really it does not exist even in this reflection, for it is impossible to imagine or to think anything contradictory. Indeed, Contradiction, both in actuality and in thinking reflection, is considered an accident, a kind of abnormality or paroxysm of sickness which will soon pass away.

"With regard to the assertion that Contradiction does not exist, that it is non-existent, we may disregard this statement. In every experience there must be an ab-
solute determination of Essence—in every actuality as well as in every concept. The same remark has already been made above, under Infinity, which is Contradiction as it appears in the sphere of Being. But ordinary experience itself declares that at least there are a number of contradictory things, arrangements and so forth, the contradiction being present in them and not merely in an external reflection. But it must further not be taken only as an abnormality which occurs just here and there; it is the Negative in its essential determination, the principle of all self-movement, which consists of nothing else but an exhibition of Contradiction. External, sensible motion is itself its immediate existence. Something moves, not because it is here at one point of time and there at another, but because at one and the same point of time it is here and not here, and in this here both is and is not. We must grant the old dialecticians the contradictions which they prove in motion; but what follows is not that there is no motion, but rather that motion is existent Contradiction itself.

“And similarly internal self-movement proper, or impulse in general (the appetitive force or nisus of the monad, the entelechy of absolutely simple Essence), is nothing else than the fact that something is in itself and is also the deficiency or the negative of itself, in one and the same respect. Abstract self-identity has no vitality but the fact that Positive in itself is negativity causes it to pass outside itself and to change. Something therefore is living only insofar as it contains Contradiction, and is that force which can both comprehend and endure Contradiction. But
if an existent something cannot in its positive determination also encroach on its negative, cannot hold fast the one in the other and contain Contradiction within itself, then it is not living unity, or Ground, but perishes in Contradiction. Speculative thought consists only in this, that thought holds fast Contradiction and itself in Contradiction and not in that it allows itself to be dominated by it—as happens to imagination—or suffers its determinations to be resolved into others, or into Nothing.”
(67-70)

Movement and “self-movement” (this NB! arbitrary (independent), spontaneous, internally-necessary movement), “change,” “movement and vitality,” “the principle of all self-movement,” “impulse” (Trieb) to “movement” and to “activity”—the opposite to “dead Being”—who would believe that this is the core of “Hegelianism,” of abstract and abstrusen (ponderous, absurd?) Hegelianism?? This core had to be discovered, understood, hinüberretten,* laid bare, refined, which is precisely what Marx and Engels did.

The idea of universal movement and change (1813 Logic) was conjectured before its application to life and society. In regard to society it was proclaimed earlier (1847) than it was demonstrated in application to man (1859).53

“In movement, impulse, and the like, the simplicity of these determinations conceals the contradiction from imagination; but this contradiction immediately stands revealed in the determinations of relation. The most trivial examples—above and below, right and left, father and son, and so

* rescued—Ed.
on without end—all contain Contradiction in one term. That is above which is not below; 'above' is determined only as not being 'below,' and is only insofar as there is a 'below,' and conversely: one determination implies its opposite. Father is the Other of son, and son of father, and each exists only as this Other of the other; and also the one determination exists only in relation to the other: their Being is one subsistence........ (70)

"Thus although Imagination everywhere has Contradiction for content, it never becomes aware of it; it remains an external reflection, which passes from Likeness to Unlikeness, or from negative relation to intro-reflectedness of the different terms. It keeps these two determinations external to each other, and has in mind only these and not their transition, which is the essential matter and contains the Contradiction.—On the other hand, intelligent reflection, if we may mention this here, consists in the understanding and enunciating of Contradiction. It does not express the concept of things and their relations, and has only determinations of imagination for material and content; but still it relates them, and the relation contains their contradiction, allowing their concept to show through the contradiction.—Thinking Reason, on the other hand, sharpens (so to speak) the blunt difference of Variety, the mere manifold of imagination, into essential difference, that is, Opposition. The manifold entities acquire activity and vitality in relation to one another only when driven on to the sharp point of Contradiction; thence they draw negativity, which is the inherent pulsation of self-movement and vitality...." (70-71)
NB

(1) Ordinary imagination grasps difference and contradiction, but not the transition from the one to the other, this however is the most important.

(2) Intelligence and understanding. Intelligence grasps contradiction, enunciates it, brings things into relation with one another, allows the "concept to show through the contradiction," but does not express the concept of things and their relations.

(3) Thinking reason (understanding) sharpens the blunt difference of variety, the mere manifold of imagination, into essential difference, into opposition. Only when raised to the peak of contradiction, do the manifold entities become active (regsam) and lively in relation to one another, they receive* acquire that negativity which is the inherent pulsation of self-movement and vitality.

Subdivisions:
Der Grund—(ground)
(1) Absolute Ground—die Grundlage (the foundation). "Form and Matter." "Content."

(2) Determinate Ground (as the ground for a determinate content)

Its transition to Conditioning Mediation
die bedingende Vermittelung


* The word "received" is crossed out in the MS.—Ed.
Customary proposition: “Everything has its sufficient Ground.”

“In general this just means that what is must be considered not as an existent immediate, but as a posited entity. We must not remain at immediate Determinate Being or at determinateness in general, but must pass back to its Ground....” (76)

It is superfluous to add: sufficient Ground. What is insufficient, is not Ground.

Leibnitz, who made the law of sufficient ground the basis of his philosophy, understood this more profoundly. “Leibnitz especially opposed the sufficiency of Ground to causality in its strict meaning of mechanical efficacy.” (76) He looked for “Beziehung” der Ursachen* (77),— —“the whole as essential unity.”

He looked for ends, but teleology does not belong here, according to Hegel, but to the doctrine of the Notion.

...“The question cannot therefore be asked, how Form is added to Essence; for Form is only the showing of Essence in itself—it is its own immanent (sic!) Reflection....” (81)

Form is essential. Essence is formed. In one way or another also in dependence on Essence....

Essence as formless identity (of itself with itself) becomes matter. (82)

“...It” (die Materie**) “is the real foundation or substratum of Form....” (82)

“If abstraction is made from every determination and Form of a Something,

* “relation” of causes—Ed.
** matter—Ed.
indeterminate Matter remains. Matter is a pure abstract. (—Matter cannot be seen or felt, etc.—what is seen or felt is a determinate Matter, that is, a unity of Matter and Form).” (82)

Matter is not the Ground of Form, but the unity of Ground and Grounded. (83) Matter is the passive, Form is the active (tätiges). (83) “Matter must be formed, and Form must materialise itself....” (84) “Now this, which appears as the activity of Form, is equally the proper movement of Matter itself....” (85-86)

...“Both—the activity of Form and the movement of Matter—are the same.... Matter is determined as such or necessarily has a Form; and Form is simply material, persistent Form.” (86)

Note: “Formal Method of Explanation from Tautological Grounds.”

Very often, Hegel says, especially in the physical sciences, “Grounds” are explained tautologically: the movement of the earth is explained by the “attractive force” of the sun. And what then is attractive force? It is also movement!! (92) Empty tautology: why does this man go to town? Because of the attractive force of the town! (93) It also happens in science that at first molecules, the ether, “electrical matter” (95-96), etc., are put forward as “ground and then it turns out “that they” (these concepts) “are determinations deduced from that for which they are meant to be the grounds—hypotheses and figments derived by an uncritical reflection....” (96) Or it is said that we “do not know the inner nature itself of these forces and classes of matter...” (96) then there remains indeed nothing to “explain,” but one must simply limit oneself to the facts....
Der reale Grund*... is not tautology, but already “some other determination of Content.” (97)

On the question of “Ground” (Grund), Hegel remarks inter alia:

“If it is said of Nature that it is the ground of the world, then what is called Nature is identical with the world, and the world is nothing but Nature itself.” (100) On the other hand, “if Nature is to be the world, a manifold of determinations is added externally....”

Since everything has “mehrere”—“Inhaltsbestimmungen, Verhältnisse und Rücksichten,”** so any number of arguments for and against can be put forward. (103)

That is what Socrates and Plato called sophistry. Such arguments do not contain “the whole extent of the thing,” they do not “exhaust” it (in the sense “of constituting its connections” and “containing all” its sides).

The transition of Ground (Grund) into condition (Bedingung).

If I am not mistaken, there is much mysticism and leeres*** pedantry in these conclusions of Hegel, but the basic idea is one of genius: that of the universal, all-sided, vital connection of everything with everything and the reflection of this connection—materialistisch auf den Kopf gestellter Hegel****—in human concepts, which must likewise be hewn, treated, flexible, mobile, relative, mutually connected, united in opposites in order to embrace the world.

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* real Grund—Ed.
** “multiple”—“content determinations, relations and considerations”—Ed.
*** empty—Ed.
**** Hegel materialistically turned upside down—Ed.
***** It coincides.—Ed.
Continuation of the work of Hegel and Marx must consist in the *dialytic* elaboration of the history of human thought, science and technique.

A river and the *drops* in this river. The position of every drop, its relation to the others; its connection with the others; the direction of its movement; its speed; the line of the movement—straight, curved, circular, etc.—upwards, downwards. The sum of the movement. Concepts, as *registration* of individual aspects of the movement, of individual drops (=“things”), of individual “streams,” etc. There you have à peu près* the picture of the world according to Hegel’s *Logic*,—of course minus God and the Absolute.

“When all the Conditions of a thing are present, it enters into existence....” (116)

Very good! What has the Absolute Idea and idealism to do with it?

Amusing, this “derivation” of ... existence....
SECTION TWO:
APPEARANCE

The first phrase: "Essence must appear...." (119) The appearance of Essence is (1) Existenz (Thing); (2) Appearance (Erscheinung). ("Appearance is what the Thing is in itself, or its truth" p. 120. "The intro-reflected self-existent world stands opposed to the world of Appearance...." (120) (3) Verhältnis (relation) and Actuality.

Incidentally: “Demonstration in general is mediated cognition....” (121).

...“The various kinds of Being demand or contain their own kind of mediation; consequently the nature of demonstration too is different for each...." (121)

And again ... on the existence of God!! This wretched God, as soon as the word existence is mentioned, he takes offence.

Existence differs from Being by its mediation (Vermittlung: 124). [By concreteness and Connection?]

...“The Thing-in-itself and its mediated Being are both contained in Existence, and each is an Existence; the Thing-in-itself exists and is the essential Existence of the Thing, while mediated Being is its unessential Existence....” (125)
The Thing-in-itself is related to Being as the essential to the non-essential?

..."The latter" (Ding-an-sich) "is not supposed to contain in itself any determinate multiplicity, and consequently obtains this only when brought under external reflection, but remains indifferent to it (—The Thing-in-itself has colour only in relation to the eye, smell in relation to the nose, and so forth.)..." (126)

..."A Thing has the Property of effecting this or that in an Other, and of disclosing itself in a peculiar manner in its relation to it...." (129) "The Thing-in-itself thus exists essentially...." (131)

The Note deals with "The Thing-in-itself of Transcendental Idealism...."

..."The Thing-in-itself as such is no more than the empty abstraction from all determinateness, of which it is admitted that nothing can be known just because it is meant to be the abstraction from all determination...." (131)

Transcendental idealism ... places "all determinateness of things (both with regard to form and to content) in consciousness..." (131) "accordingly, from this point of view, it falls within me, the subject, that I see the leaves of a tree not as black but as green, the sun as round and not as square, and taste sugar as sweet and not as bitter; that I determine, the first and second strokes of a clock as successive and not as simultaneous, and determine the first to be neither the cause nor the effect of the second, and so forth" (131).... Hegel further makes the reservation that he has here investigated only the question of the
The essential inadequacy of the standpoint at which this philosophy halts consists in this, that it clings to the abstract Thing-in-itself as to an ultimate determination; it opposes Reflection, or the determinateness and multiplicity of the Properties, to the Thing-in-itself; while in fact the Thing-in-itself essentially has this External Reflection in itself, and determines itself as an entity endowed with its proper determinations, or Properties; whence it is seen that the abstraction of the Thing, which makes it pure Thing-in-itself, is an untrue determination.” (132)

"Many different Things are in essential Reciprocal Action by virtue of their Properties; Property is this very reciprocal relation, and apart from it the Thing is nothing...." (133)

Die Dingheit** passes over into Eigenschaft.*** (134) Eigenschaft into “matter” or “Stoff”**** (“things consist of substance”), etc.

“Appearance at this point is Essence in its Existence....” (144) “Appearance is the unity of semblance and Existence....” (145)

Unity in appearances: “This unity is the Law of Appearance. Law therefore is the positive element in the mediation of the Apparent.” (148)

Here in general utter obscurity. But there is a vital thought, evidently: the concept of law is one of the stages of the cognition by man of...
unity and connection, of the reciprocal dependence and totality of the world process. The “treatment” and “twisting” of words and concepts to which Hegel devotes himself here is a struggle against making the concept of law absolute, against simplifying it, against making a fetish of it. NB for modern physics!!]

“This enduring persistence which belongs to Appearance in Law....” (149)

“Law is the Reflection of Appearance into identity with itself.” (149) (Law is the identical in appearances: “the Reflection of Appearance into identity with itself.”)

...“This identity, the foundation of Appearance, which constitutes Law, is the peculiar moment of Appearance....” (150)

“Hence Law is not beyond Appearance, but is immediately present in it; the realm of Laws is the quiescent (Hegel’s italics) reflection of the existing or appearing world....”

This is a remarkably materialistic and remarkably appropriate (with the word “ruhige”*) determination. Law takes the quiescent—and therefore law, every law, is narrow, incomplete, approximate.

* “quiescent”—Ed.
“Existence passes back into Law as into its Ground; Appearance contains them both—simple Ground and the dissolving movement of the appearing universe, of which Ground is the essentiality.”

“Hence law is essential appearance.”

Ergo, law and essence are concepts of the same kind (of the same order), or rather, of the same degree, expressing the deepening of man’s knowledge of phenomena, the world, etc.

The movement of the universe in appearances (Bewegung des erscheinenden Universums), in the essentiality of this movement, is law.

“The realm of Laws is the quiet content of Appearance; Appearance is this same content, but presents itself in unquiet change and as Reflection into other.... Appearance, therefore, as against Law is the totality, for it contains Law, but also more, namely the moment of self-moving Form.”

But further on, although unclearly, it is admitted, it seems, p. 154, that law can make imp for this Mangel* and embrace both the negative side and the Totalität, der Erscheinung** (especially 154 i. f.). Return to this!

The World in and for itself is identical with the World of Appearances, but at the

* deficiency—Ed.
** Totality of Appearance—Ed.
same time it is opposite to it. (158) What is positive in the one is negative in the other. What is evil in the World of Appearances is good in the world which is in and for itself, Cf.—Hegel says here—The Phenomenology of Mind, p. 121 et seq.

“The Appearing and the Essential World are each ... the independent whole of Existence. One was to have been only reflected Existence, and the other only immediate Existence; but each continues itself in the other, and consequently in itself is the identity of these two moments.... Both in the first instance are independent, but they are independent only as totalities, and they are this insofar a each essentially has in itself the moment of the other....” (150-160)

The essence here is that both the world of appearances and the world in itself are moments of man’s knowledge of nature, stages, alterations or deepenings (of knowledge). The shifting of the world in itself further and further from the world of appearances—that is what is so far still not to be seen in Hegel. NB. Have not Hegel’s “moments” of the concept the significance of “moments” of transition?

...“Thus Law is Essential Relation.” (160) (Hegel’s italics)

(Law is relation. This NB for the Machists and other agnostics, and for the Kantians, etc. Relation of essences or between essences.

The term world expresses the formless totality of multifariousness....” (160)

And the third chapter (“Essential Relation”) begins with the proposition: “The
truth of Appearance is Essential Relation....” (161)

Subdivisions:
The relation of Whole to Parts; this relation passes into the following one (sic!! (p. 168)):—of Force to its Manifestation;—of Inner to Outer.—The transition to Substance, Actuality.

...“The truth of the relation consists, then, in mediation....” (167)

“Transition” to Force: “Force is the negative unity into which the contradiction of Whole and Parts has resolved itself; it is the truth of that first Relation.” (170)

((This is one of 1,000 similar passages in Hegel, which arouse the fury of naïve philosophers like Pearson, the author of The Grammar of Science.54—He quotes a similar passage and exclaims in fury: What a galimatias is being taught in our schools!! And in a certain limited sense he is right. To teach that is stupid. One must first of all extract the materialistic dialectics from it. Nine-tenths of it, however, is chaff, rubbish.))

Force makes its appearance as “belonging” (als angehörig) (171) “to the existing Thing or Matter....” “When therefore it is asked how the Thing or Matter comes to have a Force, then the Force appears as connected with it externally, and impressed on the Thing by all alien power.” (171)

...“This is apparent in all natural, scientific, and, in general, intellectual development; and it is essential to understand that the First, when as yet Something is internal, or in its concept, is, for this reason, only its immediate and passive existence....” (181)
The beginning of everything can be regarded as inner—passive—and at the same time as outer. But what is interesting here is not that, but something else: Hegel’s criterion of dialectics that has accidentally slipped in: “in all natural, scientific and intellectual development”: here we have a grain of profound truth in the mystical integument of Hegelianism!

Example: the germ of a man, says Hegel, is only internal man, dem Anderssein Preisgegebenes,* the passive. Gott** at first is not yet Spirit. “Immediately, therefore, God is only Nature.” (182)

(This is also characteristic!!)

Feuerbach
daran
“knüpft an.”***
Down with Gott, there remains Natur.****

---

* something given up to otherness—Ed.
** God—Ed.
*** “links up to this”—Ed.
**** nature—Ed.
SECTION THREE: 
A C T U A L I T Y

...“Actuality is the unity of Essence and Existence....” (184)


“In it itself” (dem Absoluten) “there is no Becoming” (187)—and other nonsense about the Absolute....

The Absolute is the absolute Absolute...
The Attribute is a relative Absolute...

In a “note” Hegel speaks (all too generally and obscurely) of the defects of the philosophy of Spinoza and Leibnitz.

usually: from one extreme to the other totality = (in the shape of) dispersed completeness

Inter alia note:
“The one-sidedness of one philosophic principle is generally faced by its opposite one-sidedness, and, as everywhere, totality at least is found as a dispersed completeness.” (197)

Actuality is higher than Being, and higher than Existence.

(1) Being is Immediate “Being is not yet actual.” (200)

It passes into other.

* Here Lenin’s manuscript gives the list of chapters of Section III: 1) “The Absolute”; 2) “Actuality”; 3) “The Absolute Relation.”—Ed.
(2) Existence (it passes into Appearance) —arises out of Ground, out of conditions, but it still lacks the unity of “Reflection and immediacy.”

(3) Actuality unity of Existence and Being-in-Self (Ansichsein)

...“Actuality also stands higher than Existence” (200)....

...“Real Necessity is a relation which is full of content”.... “But this Necessity is at the same time relative....” (211)

“Absolute Necessity then is the truth into which Actuality and Possibility in general pass back, as well as Formal and Real Necessity.” (215)

(Continued)*...

(End of Volume II of the Logic, the Doctrine of Essence)...

It is to be noted that in the small Logic (the Encyclopaedia) the same thing is expounded very often more clearly, with concrete examples. Cf. idem Engels and Kurio Fischer.

On the question of “possibility,” Hegel notes the emptiness of this category and says in the Encyclopaedia:

“Whether a thing is possible or impossible depends on the content, i.e., on the sum-total of the moments of Actuality which in its unfolding discloses itself to be Necessity.” (Encyclopaedia, Vol. VI, p. 287,** § 143, Addendum.)

“...The sum-total, the entirety of the moments of Actuality, which in its unfolding discloses itself to be Necessity.”

* At this point Lenin’s manuscript continues in a new notebook.—Ed.

** Hegel, Werke, Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840.—Ed.
The unfolding of the sum-total of the moments of actuality \( NB = \) the essence of dialectical cognition.

Cf. in the same Encyclopaedia, Vol. VI, p. 289, the eloquent words on the vanity of more delight at the wealth and flux of the phenomena of nature and on the necessity

...“of advancing to a closer insight into the inner harmony and uniformity of nature....” (289) (CLOSENESS TO MATERIALISM.)

Ibidem, Encyclopaedia, p. 292: “Developed Actuality, as the coincident alternation of Inner and Outer, the alternation of their opposite motions combined in a single motion, is Necessity.”

Encyclopaedia, Vol. VI, p. 294: “Necessity is blind only insofar as it is not understood....”

Ibidem, p. 295 “it happens to him” (dem Menschen*)... “that from his activity there arises something quite different from what he had meant and willed....”

Ibidem, p. 301 “Substance is an essential stage in the process of development of the Idea....”

Read: an important stage in the process of development of human knowledge of nature and matter.

Logik,** Vol. IV

...“It” (die Substanz) “is the Being in all Being....” (220)***

The Relation of Substantiality passes over into the Relation of Causality. (223)

* to man—Ed.
** Logic—Ed.
*** Hegel, Werke, Bd. IV, Berlin, 1834.—Ed.
"Substance attains ... Actuality only when it has become Cause...." (225)

On the one hand, knowledge of matter must be deepened to knowledge (to the concept) of Substance in order to find the causes of phenomena. On the other hand, the actual cognition of the cause is the deepening of knowledge from the externality of phenomena to the Substance. Two types of examples should explain thus: 1) from the history of natural science, and 2) from the history of philosophy. More exactly: it is not "examples" that should be here—comparaison n'est pas raison,*—but the quintessence of the history of both the one and the other + the history of technique.

"Effect contains nothing whatever which Cause does not contain..." (226) und umgekehrt**....

Cause and effect, ergo, are merely moments of universal reciprocal dependence, of (universal) connection, of the reciprocal concatenation of events, merely links in the chain of the development of matter.

NB:
"It is the same fact which displays itself first as Cause and then as Effect,—here as peculiar persistence and there as positedness or determination in an Other." (227)

The all-sidedness and all-embracing character of the interconnection of the world, which is only one-

* comparison is not proof—Ed.
** and vice versa—Ed.
sidedly, fragmentarily and incompletely expressed by causality.

“But we may here and now observe that, insofar as the relation of cause and effect is admitted (although in an improper sense), effect cannot be greater than cause; for effect is nothing further than the manifestation of cause.” (230)

And further about history. Hegel says that it is customary in history to quote anecdotes as the minor “causes” of major events—in fact they are only occasions, only äußere Erregung,* which “the inner spirit of the event would not have required.” (230) “Consequently, these arabesques of history, where a huge shape is depicted as growing from a slender stalk, are a sprightly but a most superficial treatment.” (Ibidem)

This “inner spirit”—cf. Plekhanov—^57— is an idealistic, mystical, but a very profound indication of the historical causes of events. Hegel subsumes history completely under causality and understands causality a thousand times more profoundly and richly than the multitude of “savants” nowadays.

“Thus a stone in motion is cause; its movement is a determination which it has, while besides this it contains many other determinations of colour, shape, and so on, which do not enter into its causal nature.” (232)

Causality, as usually understood by us, is only a small particle of universal interconnection, but (a materialist ex-

* external stimulus—Ed.
tension) a particle not of the subjective, but of the objectively real interconnection.

“But the movement of the Determinate Relation of Causality has now resulted in this, that the cause is not merely extinguished in the effect, and with it the effect too (as happens in Formal Causality),—but the cause in its extinction, in the effect, becomes again; that effect vanishes into cause, but equally becomes again in it. Each of these determinations cancels itself in its positing and posits itself in its cancellation; what takes place is not an external transition of causality from one substratum to another, but this its becoming other is at the same time its own positing. Causality, then, presupposes or conditions itself.” (235)

“The movement of the relation of causality” = in fact: the movement of matter, respective the movement of history, grasped, mastered in its inner connection up to one or other degree of breadth or depth....

“At this point Reciprocity presents itself as a reciprocal causality of presupposed substances conditioning each other; each is, in relation to the other, at once active and passive substance.” (240)

“In Reciprocity, original Causality presents itself as an arising out of its negation (or passivity) and as a passing away into it—as a Becoming....

“Necessity and Causality have, then, vanished in it; they contain both the immediate identity (as connection and relation) and the absolute substantiality of dis-
“unity of substance in the distinct”

mediation

unity of substance in the distinct

mediation

necessity does not disappear, when it becomes freedom

“unity of substance in the distinct,” and therefore their absolute contingency,—the original unity of substantial variety, hence absolute contradiction. Necessity is Being, because it is;—the self-unity of Being, which has itself for ground; but, conversely, because it has a ground, it is not Being, it is nothing whatever but Semblance, relation or mediation. Causality is this posited transition of original Being, or cause, into Semblance or mere positedness, and conversely of positedness into originality; but the identity itself of Being and Semblance is, still, inner Necessity. This internality (or Being-in-Self) transcends the movement of Causality; and concurrently, the substantiality of the sides which are in relation is lost—Necessity reveals itself. Necessity does not become Freedom because it vanishes, but only because its identity (as yet an inner identity) is manifested.” (241-242)

When one reads Hegel on causality, it appears strange at first glance that he dwells so relatively lightly on this theme, beloved of the Kantians. Why? Because, indeed, for him causality is only one of the determinations of universal connection, which he had already covered earlier, in his entire exposition, much more deeply and all-sidedly; always and from the very outset emphasising this connection, the reciprocal transitions, etc., etc. It would be very instructive to compare the “birth-pangs” of neo-empiricism (respective “physical idealism”) with the solutions or rather with the dialectical method of Hegel.

It is to be noted also that in the Encyclopedia Hegel stresses the inadequacy
and emptiness of the bare concept of “reciprocal action.”

Vol. VI, p. 308*:
Reciprocity is undoubtedly the proximate truth of the relation of cause and effect, and stands, so to say, on the threshold of the Notion, nevertheless, precisely on this account one should not rest content with applying this relation, insofar as it is a matter of conceptual cognition. If one gets no further than considering a given content merely from the point of view of reciprocity, then such an attitude is in fact quite without concept; it is then merely a matter of a dry fact, and the requirement of mediation, which is the point of immediate concern in applying the relation of causality, still remains unsatisfied. On closer examination, the deficiency in the application of the relation of reciprocal action is seen to be that this relation, instead of being the equivalent of the Notion, has itself to be grasped first of all. And this occurs through its two sides not being left as an immediate datum but, as was shown in the two preceding paragraphs, being recognised as moments of a third, higher determination, which is precisely the Notion. If, for example, we regard the customs of the Spartans as the effect of their constitution, and the latter, conversely, as the effect of their customs, such a view may perhaps be correct, but it is a conception that gives no final satisfaction, because in point of fact it enables neither the constitution nor the customs of this people

* Hegel, Werke, Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840.—Ed.
all the “special aspects” and the whole (Begriff”*) to be understood. Such understanding can only come about when these two aspects, and likewise all the other special aspects of the life and the history of the Spartans are recognised to be grounded in this Notion.” (308-309)

At the end of the second volume of the *Logic, Vol. IV, p. 243*, in the transition to the “Notion,” the determination is given: “the Notion, the realm of Subjectivity, or of Freedom....”

| NB Freedom = Subjectivity (“or”) |
| End, Consciousness, Endeavour     |
| NB                              |
BOOK THREE:

SUBJECTIVE LOGIC

OR THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION
BOOK THREE:
SUBJECTIVE LOGIC OR THE DOCTRINE
OF THE NOTION
In the first two parts, says Hegel, I had no Vorarbeiten,* but here, on the other hand, there is "verknöchertes Material"** (which it is necessary "in Flüssigkeit bringen"***...) (3)****

"Being and Essence are the moments of its becoming" (= des Begriffs).***** (5)

Should be inverted: concepts are the highest product of the brain, the highest product of matter.

"Accordingly Objective Logic, which considers Being and Essence, really constitutes the genetic exposition of the Notion." (6)

9-10: The great significance of the philosophy of Spinoza as the philosophy of substance (this standpoint is very advanced, but it is incomplete and not the most advanced: in general the refutation of a philosophic system does not mean discarding it, but developing it further, not replacing it by another, one-sided opposed system, but incorporating it into something

* previous works—Ed.
** "ossified material”—Ed.
*** “to render fluid”—Ed.
**** Hegel, Werke, Bd. V, Berlin, 1834.—Ed.
***** of the Notion—Ed.
more advanced). In Spinoza’s system there is no free, independent, conscious subject (it lacks “the freedom and independence of the self-conscious subject”) (10), but in Spinoza also *t h o u g h t* is an attribute of substance (10 i. f.*).

13 i. f.: Incidentally—just as at one time it was the fashion in philosophy “das Schlimme nachzusagen” der Einbildungskraft und den Gedächtnisse**—so now it is the fashion to belittle the significance of the “notion” (= “das höchste des Denkens”*** and to praise “das Unbegriefliche”**** [allusion to Kant].

Passing to criticism of *K a n t i a n i s m*, Hegel regards as Kant’s great merit (15) the advancement of the idea of the “transcendental unity of apperception” (the unity of the consciousness in which the Begriff is created), but he reproaches Kant for his *o n e - s i d e d n e s s* and *s u b j e c t i v i s m*:

“The object is truly in and for itself only as it is in thought; as it is in intuition or ideation, it is appearance....” (16) (Hegel raises Kant’s idealism from being subjective to being objective and absolute)....

Kant admits the objectivity of concepts (Wahrheit***** is their object), but all the same leaves them subjective. He makes Gefühl und Anschauung****** precede understanding (Ver-
stand). Hegel speaks of this as follows:

"Now, first, with regard to this relation of the understanding or the Notion to the stages which are supposed to precede it, it is of importance what science it is that is being treated, in order to determine the form of these stages. In our science, since it is pure logic, these stages are Being and Essence. In psychology, sensation and intuition and also ideation in general precede understanding. In the Phenomenology of Mind, since it is the doctrine of consciousness, the ascent was made through the stages of sensuous consciousness and, next, perception, to understanding." (17)

In Kant the exposition is very "incomplete" here.

After that—the CHIEF THING—

..."The Notion must not here be considered as an act of self-conscious understanding, or as subjective understanding: what we have to do with is the Notion in and for itself, which constitutes a STAGE AS WELL OF NATURE AS OF SPIRIT. LIFE, OR ORGANIC NATURE, IS THAT STAGE OF NATURE AT WHICH THE NOTION EMERGES." (18)

There follows a very interesting passage (pp. 19-27) where Hegel refutes Kant, precisely epistemologically (Engels probably had this passage in mind when he wrote in Ludwig Feuerbach58 that the main point against Kant had already been made by Hegel, insofar as this was possible from an idealistic standpoint),—exposing Kant’s duality and inconsistency, his, so to speak, vacillation between empiricism (= materialism) and idealism, Hegel himself arguing wholly and exc lu -
Kant belittles the power of reason the more consistent idealist clings to God!

Begriff is still not the highest concept: still higher is the $I \, d \, e \, a = $ the unity of Begriff and Reality.

"It is only a notion" is a thing commonly said; and not only the Idea, but sensuous, spatial, and temporally palpable existence is opposed to the Notion, as something which is more excellent than it. And the abstract is counted of less worth than the concrete, because from the former so much of that kind of material has been omitted. To those who hold this view, the process of abstraction means that for our subjective needs one or another characteristic is taken out of the concrete in such a manner that, while so many other properties and modifications of the object are omitted, it loses nothing in value or dignity. They are the real and are reckoned as counting in full, only they are left on the other side; and it is only the incapacity of understanding to absorb such riches that forces it to rest content with meagre abstraction. But if the given material of intuition and the manifold of ideation are taken as the real in opposition to that which is thought and to the Notion, then this is a view the renunciation of which is not only a condition of philosophy, but is assumed even by religion; for how can these be needed and have significance if the fugitive and superficial appearance of the sensuous and the individual are taken for the truth?.. Consequently, abstracting thought must not be considered as a mere setting-aside of the sensuous material, whose reality is
Essentially, Hegel is completely right as opposed to Kant. Thought proceeding from the concrete to the abstract—provided it is correct (NB) (and Kant, like all philosophers, speaks of correct thought)—does not get away from the truth but comes closer to it. The abstraction of matter, of a law of nature, the abstraction of value, etc., in short all scientific (correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature more deeply, truly and completely. From living perception to abstract thought, and from this to practice,—such is the dialectical path of the cognition of truth, of the cognition of objective reality. Kant disparages knowledge in order to make way for faith: Hegel exalts knowledge, asserting that knowledge is knowledge of God. The materiatist exalts the knowledge of matter, of nature, consigning God, and the philosophical rabble that defends God, to the rubbish heap.

“A principal misapprehension here is that the natural principle or the beginning, which is the starting-point in natural development or in the history of the individual in its formation, is taken as the true and as that which is first also in the Notion.” (21) (—It is correct that people begin with that, but truth lies not in the beginning but in the end, or rather, in the continuation. Truth is not the initial impression). “But, philosophy is not
meant to be a narrative of what happens, but the cognition of what is true in happen-
ings.” (21)

In Kant there is “psychological ideal-
ism” (22): Kant’s categories “are only
determinations which are derived from self-
consciousness.” (22) Rising from under-
standing (Verstand) to reason (Vernunft),
Kant belittles the significance of thought,
denying it the capacity to “reach perfected
truth.” (23)

“It is declared” (Kant) “to be an abuse if
logic, which ought to be merely a canon
of judgment, is regarded as an organ for
the production of objective discoveries. The
notions of Reason, in which a higher
force (an idealistic phrase!) and a deeper
corrections!!) content were of necessity
divined, are less Konstitutives* [it should
be: Objektives** than even the categories;
they are mere ideas. Their use may cer-
tainly be permissible, but these intelligible
essences, which should wholly unlock the
truth, are to signify no more than hypothe-
ses; and it would be completely arbitrary
and reckless to ascribe any truth to them
in and for themselves, since they can occur
in no kind of experience. Could it ever have
been thought that philosophy would gain-
say the validity of the intelligible essences
because they are without the spatial and
temporal material of sensuousness?” (23)

Here, too, Hegel is essentially right:
value is a category which entbehrt des
Stoffes der Sinnlichkeit,* but it is
treuer than the law of supply and
demand.

* constitutive—Ed.
** objective—Ed.
*** dispenses with the material of sensuousness—Ed.
Only Hegel is an idealist: hence the nonsense of “constitutives,” etc.

Kant, on the one hand, quite clearly recognises the “objectivity” (24) of thought (“des Denkens”) (“an identity of the Notion and the thing” (24))—but, on the other hand, “the assertion is made again that we surely cannot know things as they are in and for themselves, and that truth does not allow cognising reason to approach it; that truth which consists in the unity of object and Notion is after all only appearance, and the reason now is that content is only the manifold of intuition. Of this argument it has been remarked that this manifoldness, insofar as it belongs to intuition as opposed to the Notion, is transcended precisely in the Notion, and that the object is led back by the Notion into its non-contingent essentiality; the latter enters into appearance, and for this very reason the appearance is not merely non-essential, but manifestation of Essence.” (24-25)

“It will always remain a matter for astonishment how the Kantian philosophy knew that relation of thought to sensuous existence, where it halted, for a merely relative relation of bare appearance, and fully acknowledged and asserted a higher unity of the two in the Idea in general, and, for example, in the idea of an intuitive understanding; but yet stopped dead at this relative relation and at the assertion that the Notion is and remains utterly separated from reality;—so that it affirmed as truth what it pronounced to be finite knowledge, and declared to be superfluous, improper, and figments of thought that which it recognised as truth, and of which it established the definite notion.” (26)

*constitutive—Ed.
In logic, the Idea “becomes the creator of Nature.” (26)

Logic is “formelle Wissenschaft”* (27) as against the concrete sciences (of nature and mind), but its object matter is “die reine Wahrheit”**.... (27)

Kant himself, in asking what truth is (27) (the Critique of Pure Reason, p. 83) and giving a trivial answer (“correspondence of knowledge with its object”), strikes at himself, for “the fundamental assertion of transcendental idealism” is

— that “cognition is not capable of apprehending Things-in-themselves” (27)—

—and it is clear that all this is “an untrue idea.” (28)

In arguing against the purely formal conception of logic (which Kant, too, is said to have)—saying that from the ordinary standpoint (truth is the correspondence [“Übereinstimmung”] of knowledge with the object) correspondence “essentially demands two sides” (29), Hegel says that the formal element in logic is “pure truth” (29) and that

...“this formal element must therefore be thought of as being in itself much richer in determinations and content, and as having infinitely more influence upon the concrete, than it is generally held to have....” (29)

...“But, even if the logical forms are to be regarded as nothing more than formal functions of thought, yet this character would make them worthy of an investigation as to how far they correspond to the truth in themselves. A system of logic which neglects this can claim at most

* “formal science”—Ed.

** “pure truth”—Ed.
Thus, not only a description of the forms of thought and not only a natural-historical description of the phenomena of thought (wherein does that differ from a description of the forms?) but also correspondence with truth, i.e., the quintessence or, more simply, the results and outcome of the history of thought? Here Hegel is idealistically unclear, and fails to speak out fully. Mysticism.

In this conception, logic coincides with the theory of knowledge. This is in general a very important question.

Cf. Encyclopaedia, Vol. VI, p. 319*; “But in point of fact they” (die logischen Formen**), “turned round as forms of the notion, constitute the living spirit of the actual....”

Begriff in its development into “adäquaten Begriff,”*** becomes the Idea. (33)**** “Notion in its objectivity is the object which is in and for itself.” (33)

= objectivism + mysticism and betrayal of development

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* Hegel, Werke, Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840.—Ed.
** the logical forms—Ed.
*** “adequate notion”—Ed.
**** Hegel, Werke, Bd. V, Berlin, 1834.—Ed.
SECTION ONE:
SUBJECTIVITY

The dialectical movement of the “Notion”—from the purely “formal” notion at the beginning—to the Judgment (Urteil), then—to the Syllogism (Schluß) and—finally to the transformation of the subjectivity of the Notion into its objectivity. (34-35)*

The first distinguishing feature of the Notion is Universality (Allgemeinheit). NB: The Notion grew out of Essence, and the latter out of Being.

The further development of the Universal, the Particular (Besonderes) and the Individual (Einzelnies) is in the highest degree abstract and “abstruse.”

En lisant...
These parts of the work should be called: a best means for getting a headache!**

Kuno Fischer expounds these “abstruse” considerations very poorly, taking up the lighter points—examples from the Encyclopedia, and adding banalities (against the French revolution. Kuno Fischer, Vol. 8, 1901, p. 530), etc., but not showing the reader how to look for the key to the difficult transitions, nuances, ebbs and flows of Hegel’s abstract concepts.

* Hegel, Werke, Bd. V, Berlin, 1834.—Ed.
** Lenin wrote this in English.—Ed.
Obviously, here too the chief thing
for Hegel is to trace the transitions.
From a certain point of view, under
certain conditions, the universal is the
individual, the individual is the uni-
versal. Not only (1) connection, and
inseparable connection, of all concepts
and judgments, but (2) transitions from
one into the other, and not only transi-
tions, but also (3) identity of opposites—
that is the chief thing for Hegel. But
this merely “glimmers” through the fog of
extremely abstruse exposition. The his-
tory of thought from the standpoint
of the development and application of
the general concepts and categories of
the Logic—voilà ce qu’il faut!**

Quoting, on p. 125, the “famous” syl-
logism—“all men are mortal, Gaius is a man,
therefore he is mortal”—Hegel shrewdly
adds: “Boredom immediately descends when
such a syllogism is heard approaching”—
this is declared to be due to the “unnützen
Form,”*** and Hegel makes the profound
remark:

“All things are a Syllogism, a universal
which is bound together with individuality
through particularity; but of course they
are not wholes consisting of three propo-
sitions.” (126)

Very good! The most common logical
“figures”—(all this in the Par. on the
“First Figure of the Syllogism”) are the
most common relations of things, set
forth with the pedantic thoroughness of
a school textbook, sit venia verho.****

Or is this after all a tribute to old
formal logic?
Yes! And another trib-
ute—a tribute to mys-
ticism = idealism

Voilà, an abundance of
determinations” and of
Begriffsbestimmungen* in this part
of the Logic!

True!

“All things
are a syl-
logism”...

NB

* notion-determinations—Ed.
** That’s what is needed!—Ed.
*** “otiose form”—Ed.
**** If I may be allowed to say so.—Ed.
Marx applied Hegel's dialectics in its rational form to political economy. The formation of (abstract) notions and operations with them already includes idea, conviction, consciousness of the law-governed character of the objective connection of the world. To distinguish causality from this connection is stupid. To deny the objectivity of notions, the objectivity of the universal in the individual and in the particular, is impossible. Consequently, Hegel is much more profound than Kant, and others, in tracing the reflection of the movement of the objective world in the movement of notions. Just as the simple form of value, the individual act of exchange of

On Kant

Inter alia: “Kant’s Antinomies of Reason are just this, that first one determination of a notion is made the foundation of the Notion, and next, and with equal necessity, the other....” (128-129)
one given commodity for another, already includes in an undeveloped form all the main contradictions of capitalism,—so the simplest generalisation, the first and simplest formation of notions (judgments, syllogisms, etc.) already denotes man’s ever deeper cognition of the objective connection of the world. Here is where one should look for the true meaning, significance and role of Hegel’s Logic. This NB.

Two aphorisms:

1. Plekhanov criticises Kantianism (and agnosticism in general) more from a vulgar-materialistic standpoint than from a dialectical-materialistic standpoint, insofar as he merely rejects their views a limine,* but does not correct them (as Hegel corrected Kant), deepening, generalising and extending them, showing the connection and transitions of each and every concept.

2. Marxists criticised (at the beginning of the twentieth century) the Kantians and Humists more in the manner of Feuerbach (and Büchner) than of Hegel.

...“An experience which rests upon induction is taken as valid although admittedly the perception is not completed; but no more can be assumed than that no example

* from the threshold—Ed.
can be produced contrary to this experience, insofar as the latter is true in and for itself.” (154)

This passage is in the §: “The Syllogism of Induction.” The simplest truth obtained in the simplest inductive way is always incomplete, for experience is always unfinished. Ergo: the connection of induction with analogy—with *surmise* (scientific foresight), the relativity of all knowledge and the absolute content in each step forward in cognition.

*Aphorism:* It is impossible completely to understand Marx’s *Capital*, and especially its first chapter, without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Hegel’s *Logic*. Consequently, half a century later none of the Marxists understood Marx!!

The *transition* from the syllogism of analogy (about analogy) to the syllogism of necessity,—from the syllogism of induction to the syllogism of analogy,—the syllogism from the universal to the individual—the syllogism from the individual to the universal,—the exposition of *connection* and *transitions*, that is Hegel’s task. Hegel actually *proved* that logical forms and laws are not an empty shell, but the *reflection* of the objective world. More correctly, he did not prove, but *made a brilliant guess.*
In the *Encyclopædia* Hegel remarks that the division of Understanding and Reason, of *Notions* of one kind or the other must be understood in such a way “that our mode of behaviour is either to stop short at the merely negative and abstract form of the Notion, or to conceive the latter, in accordance with its true nature, as that which is at once positive and concrete. Thus, for example, if freedom is regarded as the abstract opposite of necessity, this is merely the Notion of understanding of freedom, whereas the true and rational Notion of freedom contains necessity as transcended within it.” (Pp. 347-348, Vol. VI*)

Ibidem p. 349: Aristotle described the logical forms so completely that “essentially” there has been nothing to add. Usually the “figures of the syllogism” are regarded as empty formalism. “They” (these figures) “have, however, a very fundamental meaning, based on the necessity that every moment, as determination of the Notion, itself becomes the whole and the mediating Ground.” (352, Vol. VI)

Encyclopaedia (Vol. VI, pp. 353-354)

“The objective meaning of the figures of the syllogism is in general that everything rational is manifested as a threefold syllogism, such that each of its members assumes the position of one of the extremes as well as that of the mediating middle. Such, for example, is the case with the three branches of philosophy, i.e., the Logical Idea, Nature and Mind. Here it is Nature that is first of all the middle, connecting member. Nature, this immediate totality, unfolds itself in the two extremes of the Logical Idea and Mind.”

* Hegel, *Werke*, Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840.—Ed.
Hegel "only" deifies this "logical idea," obedience to law, universality.  

Nature, this immediate totality, unfolds itself in the Logical Idea and Mind. Logic is the science of cognition. It is the theory of knowledge. Knowledge is the reflection of nature by man. But this is not a simple, not an immediate, not a complete reflection, but the process of a series of abstractions, the formation and development of concepts, laws, etc., and these concepts, laws, etc. (thought, science = "the logical Idea") embrace conditionally, approximately, the universal law-governed character of eternally moving and developing nature. Here there are actually, objectively, three members: 1) nature; 2) human cognition = the human brain (as the highest product of this same nature), and 3) the form of reflection of nature in human cognition, and this form consists precisely of concepts, laws, categories, etc. Man cannot comprehend = reflect = mirror nature as a whole, in its completeness, its "immediate totality," he can only eternally come closer to this, creating abstractions, concepts, laws, a scientific picture of the world, etc., etc.

In regard to analogy an acute observation: It is the instinct of reason which allows one to divine that one or another empirically found determination has its roots in
the inner nature or genus of an object, and which bases itself further on this determination.” (357) (Vol. VI, p. 359)

And p. 358: justifiable contempt for the philosophy of nature has been evoked by the futile play with empty analogies.

In ordinary logic* thought is formalistically divorced from objectivity.

“Thought is held here to be a mere subjective and formal activity, and what is objective is held to be, in contrast to thought, something firm and present for itself. This dualism, however, is not the truth, and it is thoughtless procedure to accept the determinations of subjectivity and objectivity in this way without further question, and without inquiring into their origin....” (359-360) In reality, subjectivity is only a stage of development from Being and Essence—whereupon this subjectivity “dialectically ‘breaks through its Barrier’” and “opens out into objectivity by means of the syllogism.” (360)

Very profound and clever! The laws of logic are the reflections of the objective in the subjective consciousness of man.

Vol. VI, p. 360

“The realised Notion” is the object.
This transition from the subject, from the notion, to the object is said to seem “strange,” but by the object one should understand not simply Being, but some-

* The word “logic” in the manuscript is linked to the word “here” in the following quotation from Hegel.—Ed.
thing definitive, “something independent, concrete and complete in itself....” (361)

“The world is the other being of the Idea.”

Subjectivity (or the Notion) and the object—*are the same* and *not the same*.... (362)

Nonsense about the ontological argument, about God!

...“It is wrong to regard subjectivity and objectivity as a fixed and abstract antithesis. Both are wholly dialectical....” (367)
SECTION TWO:
OBJECTIVITY

(Logic) V, 178: *

The twofold significance of objectivity: ...“similarly a twofold significance appears for Objectivity: it stands opposed to the independent Notion, but also is that which is in and for itself....” (178)

...“The knowledge of truth is placed in the cognition of the object ‘as object without the addition of any subjective reflection...” (178)

Discourses on “mechanism”—further on—extremely abstruse and almost complete nonsense.

Further, idem about chemism, the stages of “judgment,” etc.

The paragraph entitled “L a w” (198-199) does not give what could be expected from Hegel on such an interesting question. It is strange why “law” is referred to “mechanism”?

The concept of law approximates here the concepts “order” (Ordnung); uniformity (Gleichförmigkeit); necessity; the “soul” der objective’s Totalität,** the “principle of self-movement.”

* Hegel, Werke, Bd. IV, Berlin, 1834.—Ed.
** of objective reality—Ed.
All this from the standpoint that mechanism is the other-being of spirit, of the Notion, etc., of the soul, of individuality.... Obviously, playing with empty analogies!

To be noted: on p. 210 the concept of ‘Naturnotwendigkeit’* is encountered—“both Mechanism and Chemism are, then, comprehended under natural necessity”... for we see here “its” (des Begriffs) “submersion into externality” (ibidem).

“nature = submersion of the Notion into externality” (ha-ha!)

“It was mentioned that the opposition between Teleology and Mechanism is, in the first instance, the more general opposition between freedom and necessity. Kant sets out the opposition in this form under the Antinomies of Reason, as the ‘Third Conflict of Transcendental Ideas.’” (213) Briefly repeating Kant’s proofs, thesis and antithesis, Hegel notes the hollowness of these proofs and directs attention to the result of Kant’s considerations:

“Kant’s solution of this Antinomy is the same as the general solution of the others: that reason can prove neither of these propositions, since we can have no determinant principle a priori about the possibility of things according to mere empirical laws of nature; consequently the two must not be regarded as objective propositions but as subjective maxims; on the one hand I ought always to reflect

* “natural necessity”—Ed.
upon all natural events according to the principle of pure natural mechanism; but this does not prevent me from investigating certain forms of nature, should the occasion be given, according to another maxim, namely, that of final causes;—as though these two maxims (which further are supposed to be required only by human reason) were not in the same opposition in which the propositions stand.—As was observed above, from this whole standpoint the only question which is demanded by philosophic interest is not looked into, namely, which of these two principles is true in and for itself; but, for this point of view, it is irrelevant whether the principles are to be considered as objective determinations of nature (that is here, as determinations existing externally) or as mere maxims of a subjective cognition.—But in fact this is a subjective, that is, a contingent, cognition, which applies one or the other maxim as the occasion may suggest according to whether it thinks it appropriate to the given objects, but otherwise does not ask about the truth of these determinations themselves, whether both are determinations of the objects or of cognition.” (215-216)

**H e g e l:**

...“The End has turned out to be the third term with respect to Mechanism and Chemism; it is their truth. Since it still stands within the sphere of Objectivity or of the immediacy of the total Notion, it is still affected by externality as such; an objective world to which

**M a t e r i a l i s t  D i a l e c t i c s:**

The laws of the external world, of nature, which are divided into mechanical and chemical (this is very important) are the bases of man’s purposive activity. In his practical activity, man is confronted with the objective world, is depend-
it relates itself still stands opposed to it. From this side mechanical causality (in which generally Chemistry must be included) still appears in this End-relation (which is external), but as subordinated to it and as transcended in and for itself.” (216-217)

...“From this results the nature of the subordination of the two previous forms of the objective process: the Other, which in them lies in the infinite progress, is the Notion which at first is posited as external to them, which is End; not only is the Notion their substance, but also externality is the moment which is essential to them and constitutes their determinateness. Thus mechanical or chemical technique spontaneously offers itself to the End-relation by reason of its character of being determined externally; and this relation must now be further considered.” (217)

From this aspect, from the aspect of the practical (purposive) activity of man, the mechanical (and chemical) causality of the world (of nature) appears as though something external, as though something secondary, as though something hidden.

Two forms of the objective process: nature (mechanical and chemical) and the purposive activity of man. The mutual relation of these forms. At the beginning, man’s ends appear foreign (“other”) in relation to nature. Human consciousness, science (“der Begriff”), reflects the essence, the substance of nature, but at the same time this consciousness is something external in relation to nature (not immediately, not simply, coinciding with it).

MECHANICAL AND CHEMICAL TECHNIQUE serves human ends just because its character (essence) consists in its being determined by external conditions (the laws of nature).

((TECHNIQUE and the OBJECTIVE world. TECHNIQUE and ENDS))

...“It” (der Zweck*) “has before it an

* the End—Ed.
objective, Mechanical and Chemical world, to which its activity relates itself as to something already given....” (219-220) “To this extent it still has a truly extra-mundane existence, namely, insofar as this objectivity stands opposed to it....” (220)

In actual fact, men’s ends are engendered by the objective world and presuppose it,—they find it as something given, present. But it seems to man as if his ends are taken from outside the world, and are independent of the world (“freedom”).

((NB. All this in the § on “The Subjective End.” NB)) (217-221)

“The End binds itself with objectivity through a Means, and in objectivity with itself.” (221 §: “The Means.”)

“Further, since the End is finite it has a finite content; accordingly it is not absolute or utterly in and for itself reasonable. The Means however is the external middle of the syllogism which is the realisation of the End; in it therefore reasonableness manifests itself as such—as preserving itself in this external Other and precisely through this externality. To that extent the Means is higher than the finite Ends of external usefulness: the plough is more honourable than those immediate enjoyments which are procured by it, and serve as Ends. The instrument is preserved, while the immediate enjoyments pass away and are forgotten. IN HIS TOOLS MAN POSSESSES POWER OVER EXTERNAL NATURE, ALTHOUGH AS REGARDS HIS ENDS, HE FREQUENTLY IS SUB-JECTED TO IT.” (226)
Vorbericht, i.e., preface, of the book dated: Nuremberg, 21. VII. 1816

This is in the §: “The Realised End”

HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AS ONE OF THE APPLICATIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS OF THE IDEAS OF GENIUS—SEEDS EXISTING IN EMBRYO IN HEGEL.

“The teleological process is the translation into objectivity of the Notion (sic!) which exists distinctly as Notion....” (227)

When Hegel endeavours—sometimes even huffs and puffs—to bring man’s purposive activity under the categories of logic, saying that this activity is the “syllogism” (Schluß), that the subject ‘(man) plays the role of a “member” in the logical “figure” of the “syllogism,” and so on,—THEN THAT IS NOT MERELY STRETCHING A POINT, A MERE GAME. THIS HAS A VERY PROFOUND, PURELY MATERIALISTIC CONTENT. It has to be inverted: the practical activity of man had to lead his consciousness to the repetition of the various logical figures thousands of millions of times in order that these figures could obtain the significance of axioms. This nota bene.

“...The movement of the End has now achieved that the moment of externality is posited not only in the Notion, and the Notion is not only Ought and tendency, but, as concrete totality, is identical
with immediate Objectivity.” (235) At the end of the § on “The Realised End,” at the end of the section (Chapter III: Teleology)—of Section II: “Obj ect i v e t y,” the transition to Section III: “The Idea.”

Remarkable: Hegel comes to the “Idea” as the coincidence of the Notion and the object, as *truth*, *through* the practical, purposive activity of man. A very close approach to the view that man by his *practice* proves the objective correctness of his ideas, concepts, knowledge, science.

From the subjective Notion and subjective end to *objective* truth.
SECTION THREE:
The Idea

The beginning of Section III: "The Idea"

..."The Idea is the adequate Notion: objective truth, or the truth as such." (236)

In general, the introduction to Section III ("The Idea") of Part II to the Logic ("Subjective Logic") Volume V, pp. 236-243 and the corresponding §§ of the Encyclopaedia (§§ 213-215)—ARE PERHAPS THE BEST EXPOSITION OF DIALECTICS. Here too, the coincidence, so to speak, of logic and epistemology is shown in a remarkably brilliant way.

The expression "Idea" is used also in the sense of a simple representation. Kant.

"Kant has claimed the expression idea again for the Notion of reason. Now according to Kant the Notion of reason is to be the Notion of the unconditioned, and, with respect to phenomena, to be transcendental, which means that it is impossible to make any adequate empirical use of it. Notions of reason (according to Kant) are to serve for the conceptual comprehension, and Notions of understanding for the bare understanding, of perceptions. But, in fact, if the latter really are Notions then they are Notions,—con-
ceptual comprehension takes place through them....” (236)  

See also below on Kant

It is equally incorrect to regard the Idea as something “unreal”—as people say: “it is merely an idea.”

...“If thoughts are merely subjective and contingent they certainly have no further value; but in this they are not inferior to temporal and contingent actualities, which also have no further value except that which is proper to contingencies and phenomena. And if conversely the Idea is not to be rated as true because, with respect to phenomena, it is transcendental, and no object can be assigned to it, in the sensuous world, coinciding with it, this is a strange lack of understanding,—for so the Idea is denied objective validity because it lacks that which constitutes appearance, or the untrue being of the objective world.” (237-238)

In relation to practical ideas, Kant himself admits that the appeal to experience against ideas is pöbelhaft*: he holds ideas as a Maximum to which one should endeavour to bring actuality closer. And Hegel continues:

“But, the result having been reached that the Idea is the unity of the Notion and Objectivity, the truth, it must not merely be considered as a goal which must be approached while it still remains a kind of beyond; it must be held that whatever is actual is only insofar as it contains and expresses the Idea. The object, and the objective and subjective world, not

* vulgar—Ed.
** “beyond”—Ed.

Hegel against “Jenseits”** of Kant
The conformity of concepts with objects is not subjective merely ought to conform to the Idea, but are themselves the conformity of Notion and reality; that reality which does not correspond to the Notion is mere appearance, or that subjective, contingent, capricious entity which is not the truth.” (238)

“It” (die Idee) “is, first, simple truth, the identity of the Notion and Objectivity as a universal.... (242)

"Secondly, it is the relation of the Subjectivity, which is for itself, of the simple Notion to its Objectivity which is distinct from it, the former is essentially the impulse to transcend this separation...."

"As this relation, the Idea is the process in which it sunders itself into individuality and its inorganic nature, and again brings the latter back under the power of the subject, returning to the first simple universality. The self-identity of the Idea is one with the process; and the thought which frees actuality from the semblance of purposeless changeability and transfigures it into the Idea must not imagine this truth of actuality as a dead repose or bare picture, matt, without impulse or notion, or as a genius, number, or abstract..."

The Idea (read: man’s knowledge) is the coincidence (conformity) of notion and objectivity (the “universal”). This—first.

Secondly, the Idea is the relation of the subjectivity (= man) which is for itself (= independent, as it were) to the objectivity which is distinct (from this Idea)....

Subjectivity is the impulse to destroy this separation (of the idea from the object).

Cognition is the process of the submersion (of the mind) in an inorganic nature for the sake of subordinating it to the power of the subject and for the sake of generalisation (cognition of the universal in its phenomena)....

The coincidence of thought with the object is a process: thought (= man) must not imagine truth in the form of dead repose, in the form of a bare picture (image), pale (matt), without impulse, without...
thought. In the Idea the Notion reaches freedom, and because of this the Idea contains also the *harshest opposition*; its repose consists in the security and certainty with which it eternally creates and eternally overcomes it, coinciding in it with itself."

Cognition is the eternal, endless approximation of thought to the object. The *reflection* of nature in man’s thought must be understood not “lifelessly,” not “abstractly,” not *devour* of movement, *not without contradictions*, but in the eternal *process* of movement, the arising of contradictions and their solution.

“The Idea is ... the Idea of the True and of the Good, as Cognition and Volition.... The process of this finite cognition and (NB) *action* (NB) makes the universality, which at first is abstract, into a totality, whence it becomes *perfected objectivity*.” (243)

Also in the *Encyclopædia* (Vol. VI).* *Encyclopædia* § 213 (p. 385)

...“The Idea is *truth*, for truth is the correspond-
The totality of all sides of the phenomenon, of reality and their (reciprocal) relations—that is what truth is composed of. The relations (= transitions = contradictions) of notions = the main content of logic, by which these concepts (and their relations, transitions, contradictions) are shown as reflections of the objective world. The dialectics of things produces the dialectics of ideas, and not vice versa.

This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics: approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions of one notion with objectivity with the Notion.... But also everything actual, insofar as it is true, is the Idea.... The individual Being is some one aspect of the Idea; hence it requires also other actualities, which likewise appear as existing specially for themselves; it is only in all of them together and in their relation that the Notion is realised. The individual by itself does not correspond to its Notion; this limitation of its determinate existence constitutes its finitude and its downfall...."

Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts # indeed divined, not more

* existing specially for themselves.—Ed.
tion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel brilliantly divined PRECISELY THIS RELATION OF THINGS, OF NATURE.

what constitutes dialectics?

mutual dependence of notions without exception transitions of notions from one into another without exception.

The relativity of opposition between notions...

the identity of opposites between notions.

"Truth is first of all taken to mean that I know how something is. This is truth, however, only in reference to consciousness, or formal truth, bare correctness. (§ 213, 386) Truth in the deeper sense, on the contrary, consists in the identity between objectivity and the Notion....

"A bad man is an untrue man, i.e., a man who does not behave in conformity with the notion of him, or his position. Nothing, however, can exist entirely devoid of identity between the notion and reality. Even what is bad and untrue has being only insofar as its reality still, somehow, conforms to its notion....

"...Everything deserving the name of philosophy has always been based on the consciousness of an absolute unity of that which the understanding accepts as valid only in its separation...."
The differences between Being and Essence, between Notion and Objectivity, are relative. "The stages of Being and Essence hitherto considered, as well as those of Notion and of Objectivity, are not, when so distinguished, something permanent, resting upon themselves. But they have proved to be dialectical, and their truth consists only in being moments of the idea." (387-388)

The moments of the cognition (= of the "idea") of nature by man—these are the categories of logic.

Vol. VI, p. 388 (214):
"The Idea may be described in many ways. It may be called reason (this is the proper philosophical signification of reason); also subject-object; the unity of the ideal and the real, of the finite and the infinite, of soul and body; the possibility which has its actuality in its own self; that whose nature can be conceived only as existent, etc. All these descriptions apply, because the Idea contains all the relations of understanding, but contains them in their infinite self-return and self-identity.

"It is easy work for the understanding to show that everything said of the Idea is self-contradictory. But that can quite as well be rendered to the understanding or rather it is already accomplished in the idea. And this work, which is the work of reason, is certainly not so easy as that of the understanding.—The understanding may demonstrate that the Idea is self-contradictory, because, for instance, the subjective is only subjective and is always confronted by the objective; that Being is something
quite different from the notion and therefore cannot be extracted out of it; and that likewise the finite is only finite and the exact antithesis of the infinite, and therefore not identical with it; and so on with all the determinations. Logic, however, demonstrates the opposite of all this, namely, that the subjective, which is to be subjective only, the finite, which is to be finite only, the infinite, which is to be infinite only, and so on, have no truth, but contradict themselves, and pass into their opposites. Thus, this transition, and the unity in which the extremes are included as transcended, as appearance or moments, is revealed as their truth. (388)

“The understanding, when it tackles the Idea, falls into a double misunderstanding. First, it takes the extremes of the Idea (be they expressed as they will, so long as they are in their unity) still in that sense and determination in which they are not in their concrete unity, but remain abstractions outside of the Idea. “It” (der Verstand*) “no less mistakes the relation between them, even when it has been expressly stated; thus, for example, it overlooks even the nature of the copula in the judgment, which affirms that the individual, the subject, is just as much not individual, but universal.—In the second place, the understanding believes its reflection,—that the self-identical Idea contains its own negative, the contradiction,—to be an external reflection which does not lie within the Idea itself. In fact, however, this is not the understanding’s own wisdom. The Idea itself is the dialectic which for ever sepa-

NB: Abstractions and the “concrete unity” of opposites.

A beautiful example: the simplest and clearest. The dialectic of notions and its material—its roots

The dialectic is not in man’s understanding, but in the “idea,” i.e., in objective reality

* the understanding—Ed.
VI, § 215, p. 390: “The Idea is essentially a process, because its identity is the absolute and free identity of the notion, only insofar as it is absolute negativity and for that reason dialectical.”

Hence, Hegel says, the expression “unity” of thinking and being, of finite and infinite, etc., is falsch,* because it expresses “quietly persisting identity.”** It is not true that the finite simply neutralises (“neutralisiert”) the infinite and vice versa. Actually, we have a process.

If one calculates ... every second more than ten persons in the world die, and still more are born. “Movement” and “moment”; catch it. At every given moment ... catch this moment, Idem in simple mechanical motion (contra Chernov).59

、“The idea as a process runs through three stages in its development. The first form of the idea is Life.... The second form is ... the idea in the form of Knowledge, which appears under the double aspect of the theoretical and practical idea. The process of knowledge results in the restoration of unity enriched by difference, and this gives the third form, that of the Absolute Idea....” (391)

* false—Ed.
The idea is “truth” (p. 365, § 213). The idea, i.e., truth as a process—
for truth is a process—passes in its
development (Entwicklung) through three
stages: 1) life; 2) the process of knowl-
edge, which includes human practice
and technique (see above); 3) the stage
of the absolute idea (i.e., of complete
truth).

Life gives rise to the brain. Nature
is reflected in the human brain. By
checking and applying the correctness
of these reflections in his practice and
technique, man arrives at objective
truth.

Truth is a
process. From
the subjective
idea, man
advances
towards objec-
tive truth
“practice”
(and
technique).

Logic. Volume V.
Section III. Idea. Chapter I. Life.

The question of Life does not belong to
“logic as it is commonly imagined.” (Bd.
V, p. 244*) If, however, the subject-mat-
ter of logic is truth, and “t r u t h   a s
s u c h   w e s e n t l i c h   i m   E r k e n n e n
i s t,”** then cognition has to be dealt
with—in connection with cognition it is
already (p. 245) necessary to speak of
life.

Sometimes so-called “pure logic” is fol-
lowed by “applied” (angewandte) logic, but
then...

...“every science must be absorbed in
logic, since each is an applied logic in-
sofar as it consists in apprehending its
object in forms of thought and of the
Notion.” (244)

* Hegel, Werke, Bd. V, Berlin, 1834.—Ed.
** essentially is in cognition—Ed.
The idea of including *life* in logic is comprehensible—and brilliant—from the standpoint of the *process* of the reflection of the objective world in the (at first individual) consciousness of man and of the testing of this consciousness (reflection) through practice—see:

...“Consequently, the original *judgment* of Life consists in this, that it separates itself as individual subject from the objective....” (248)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Encyclopaedia*</th>
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<td>§ 216: Only in their connection are the individual limbs of the body what they are. A hand, separated from the body, is a hand only in name (Aristotle).</td>
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| Life = individual subject separates itself from the objective |

If one considers the relation of subject to object in logic, one must take into account also the general premises of Being of the *concrete* subject (*life of man*) in the objective surroundings.

Subdivisions:**
1) Life, as “the living *individual*” (§ A)
2) “The Life-process”
3) “The Process of Kind” (Gattung), reproduction of man, and transition to cognition.

(1) “subjective totality” and “indifferent” “objectivity”
(2) The unity of subject and object


...“This objectivity of the Living Entity is Organism; the objectivity is the means and instrument of the End....” (251)

Encyclopaedia § 219: ...

...“Inorganic nature which is subdued by the living being suffers this because it is in itself the same as life is for itself.”

Invert it = pure materialism. Excellent, profound, correct!! And also NB: shows how extremely correct and apt are the terms “an sich” and “für sich”!!!

Further, the “subsumption” under logical categories of “sensibility” (Sensibilität), “irritability” (irritabilität)—this is said to be the particular in contrast to the universal!!—and “reproduction” is an idle game. Forgotten is the nodal line, the transition into a different plane of natural phenomena. And so on. Pain is “actual existence” of contradiction in the living individual.

Or again: reproduction of man ... “is their” (of two individuals of different sex) “realised identity, is the negative unity of the kind which intro-reflects itself out of the division....” (261)

Logic. Volume V.

Section III. The Idea.

Chapter II. The Idea of Cognition (pp. 262-327)

...“Its” (des Begriffs**) “reality in general is the form of its determinate existence, and what matters is the determination

* “in itself” and “for itself”!!!—Ed.

** the Notions—Ed.
and its sub-
mersion in objectivity... "Spirit not only is infinitely richer than Nature, but the absolute unity of opposites in the Notion constitutes its essence...." (264)

He
gel
against Kant

? i.e., that in Kant the "Ego" is an empty form ("self-extraction") without concrete analysis of the process of cognition.

(p. 265)

"In his" (= Kant's) "criticism of these determinations" (namely: absrakte einseitige Bestimmungen "der vormaligen—pre-Kantian—Metaphysik"* concerning the "soul") "he" (Kant) "simply followed Hume's sceptical manner: holds fast to that which appears as Ego in self-consciousness, from mysticism! NB

* abstract one-sided determinations of "former—pre-Kantian—metaphysics"—Ed.
which however everything empirical must be omitted, since the aim is to know its essence, or the Thing-in-itself. Now nothing remains but the phenomenon of the \textit{I think} which accompanies every idea; and nobody has the slightest notion of this ‘I think.’” (266) ""

Apparently, Hegel perceives scepticism here in the fact that Hume and Kant do not see the appearing Thing-in-itself in “phenomena,” divorce phenomena from objective truth, doubt the objectivity of cognition, remove, weglassen, alles Empirische\footnote{everything empirical—\textit{Ed.}} from the Ding-an-sich...\footnote{Thing-in-itself—\textit{Ed.}} And Hegel continues:

...“It must certainly be admitted that it is impossible to have the slightest notion of Ego or anything else (the Notion included), if \textit{no Notion is formed} and a halt is made at the simple, fixed, general idea and name.” (266)

In order to understand, it is necessary empirically to begin understanding, study, to rise from empiricism to the universal. In order to learn to swim, it is necessary to get into the water.

According to Hegel, the old metaphysics, in the endeavour to cognise \textit{truth}, divided objects in accordance with the characteristic of truth into substances and phenomen-
Kant restricts himself to "phenomena" Kant’s Critique rejected the investigation of truth .... (269) “But to stand fast at appearance and what proves to be mere sensuous representation in everyday consciousness is tantamount to a renunciation of the Notion and of philosophy.” (269)

§ A:
“The Idea of the True. At first the subjective Idea is impulse.... Consequently, the impulse has the determinateness of cancelling its own subjectivity, of making concrete its reality (which was abstract at first), and of filling it, for content, with the world which is presupposed by its subjectivity.... As Cognition is the Idea as End or as subjective idea, so the negation of the world which is presupposed as being in itself is first negation....” (274-275)

i.e., the first stage, moment, beginning, approach of cognition is its finitude (Endlichkeit) and subjectivity, the negation of the world-in-itself—the end of cognition is at first subjective....

“Strangely enough this side of finitude has latterly” (obviously Kant) “been seized upon and has been taken to be the absolute relation of Cognition—as though the finite as such was to be the absolute! From this point of view the Object is assigned the unknown property of being a Thing-in-itself beyond cognition, which, together with truth, is considered an absolute. Beyond for Cognition.

Hegel against Kant:

Kant elevated one side to the Absolute

in Kant, the Thing-in-itself is an absolute “Jenseits”*

* “Beyond”—Ed.
The determinations of thought in general, the categories and the determinations of reflection as well as the formal Notion and its moments, are here given the position not that they are finite determinations in and for themselves, but that they are so in the sense that they are subjective as against that empty Thinghood-in-itself; the error of taking this relation of the untruth of Cognition as valid has become the universal opinion of modern times.” (276)

Kant took the finite, transitory, relative, conditional character of human cognition (its categories, causality, etc., etc.) as subjectivism, and not as the dialectics of the idea (= of nature itself), divorcing cognition from the object.

...“But cognition must by its own process resolve its finitude and therefore its contradiction.” (277)

...“It is one-sided to imagine analysis in such a manner as though nothing were in the object except what has been put into it; and it is equally one-sided to think that the determinations which result are simply taken out of it. The former idea is, as is known, the thesis of subjective idealism, which in analysis takes the activity of Cognition only as a one-sided positing, beyond which the Thing-in-itself remains hidden; the latter idea belongs to so-called realism, which takes the subjective Notion as an empty identity that absorbs the thought determinations from without.” (280)

...“But the two moments cannot be separated; in its abstract form, into which

Kant’s subjectivism

But the process of cognition leads it to objective truth

Hegel against subjective idealism and “realism”
The Objectivity of logic

analysis elaborates it, the logical is certainly present only in Cognition; while conversely it is not only something *posed* but also something which *is in itself.*” (280)

Logical concepts are subjective so long as they remain “abstract,” in their abstract form, but at the same time they express also the Things-in-themselves. Nature is *both* concrete and abstract, *both* phenomenon and essence, *both* moment and relation. Human concepts are subjective in their abstractness, separateness, but objective as a whole, in the process, in the sum-total, in the tendency, in the source.

Very good is § 225 of the *Encyclopædia* where “cognition” (“theoretical”) and “will,” “practical activity,” are depicted as two sides, two methods, two means of abolishing the “one-sidedness” both of subjectivity and of objectivity.

And further 2 8 1 - 2 8 3 very important on the *transition* of the categories into one another (and against Kant, p. 282).

Logic, Vol. V, p. 282 (the end)*

...“Kant ... takes up the determinate connection (the relation-notions and the synthetic principles themselves) from *formal logic* as given. They ought to have been deduced by the exposition of the transition of this simple unity of self-consciousness into these its determinations and distinctions; but Kant spared himself the trouble of demonstrating this veritably synthetic *progress, that of the self-producing Notion.*” (282)

* At this point Lenin’s manuscript continues in a new notebook “Hegel. Logic. Section III”—Ed.
Kant did not show the transition of the categories into one another.

280-287—Turning once more to higher mathematics (showing, inter alia, that he is familiar with Gauss' solution of the equation $X^m - 1 = 0^{60}$), Hegel again touches on the differential and integral calculus, and says that:

"to this day mathematics by itself, that is, in a mathematical manner, has failed in justifying these operations, which are based upon this transition" (from one magnitude to another), "for the transition is not of a mathematical nature." Hegel says that Leibnitz, to whom is ascribed the honour of having discovered the differential calculus, effected this transition "in a most inadequate manner, a manner both thoroughly notionless and unmathematical...." (287)

"Analytic cognition is the first premise of the whole syllogism,—the immediate relation of the Notion to the Object. Consequently, identity is the determination which it recognises as its own: it is only the apprehension of what is. Synthetic Cognition endeavours to form a Notion of what is, that is, to grasp the multiplicity of determinations in its unity. Hence it is the second premise of the syllogism in which terms various as such are related. Its goal is therefore necessity in general." (288)

Regarding the practice in certain sciences (e.g., physics) of taking various "forces," etc., for "explanation," and of pulling in (stretching), adjusting the facts, etc., Hegel makes the following clever remark:

"It is now seen that the so-called explanation and proof of the concrete element
which is brought into Propositions is partly a tautology and partly a confusion of the true relationship; partly, too, it is seen that this confusion served to disguise the trick of Cognition, which takes up the data of experience one-sidedly (the only manner in which it could reach its simple definitions and formulas), and does away with refutation from experience by proposing and taking as valid experience not in its concrete totality but as example, and only in that direction which is serviceable for the hypotheses and the theory. Concrete experience being thus subordinated to the presupposed determinations, the foundation of the theory is obscured, and is exhibited only from that side which is in conformity with the theory.” (315-316)

The old metaphysics (e.g., of Wolff [example: ridiculous pomposity over trivialities, etc.]) was overthrown by Kant and Jacobi. Kant showed that “strict demonstration” led to antinomies, “but he” (Kant) “did not reflect upon the nature of this demonstration, which is bound to a finite content; yet the two stand and fall together.” (317)

Synthetic cognition is still not complete, for “the Notion does not become unity with itself in its object or its reality.... Hence in this Cognition the Idea does not yet reach truth because of the inadequacy of the object to the subjective Notion.—But the sphere of Necessity is the highest point of Being and of Reflection: in and for itself it passes over into the freedom of the Notion, while the inner identity passes over into its manifestation, which is the Notion as Notion....”

...“The Idea, insofar as the Notion is now for itself the Notion determinate in
and for itself, is the *Practical* Idea, or Action.” (319) And the following § is headed “B: The Idea of the Good.”

Theoretical cognition ought to give the object in its necessity, in its all-sided relations, in its contradictory movement, an- und für-sich.* But the human notion “definitively” catches this objective truth of cognition, seizes and masters it, only when the notion becomes “being-for-itself” in time sense of practice. That is, the practice of man and of mankind is the test, the criterion of the objectivity of cognition. Is that Hegel’s idea? It is necessary to return to this.

Why is the transition from practice, from action, only to the “good,” das Gute? That is narrow, one-sided! And the *useful*?

There is no doubt the useful also comes in. Or is this, according to Hegel, also das Gute?

All this in the chapter “The Idea of Cognition” (Chapter II)—in the transition to the “Absolute Idea” (Chapter III)—i.e., undoubtedly, in Hegel practice serves as a link in the analysis of the process of cognition, and indeed as the transition to objective (“absolute,” according to Hegel) truth. Marx, consequently, clearly sides with Hegel in introducing the criterion of practice into the theory of knowledge: see the Theses on Feuerbach.\(^61\)

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* in and for itself—*Ed.
Practice in the theory of knowledge:

(320) “As subjective It” (der Begriff) “has again the presupposition of an otherness which is in itself; it is the impulse to realise itself, or the end which tries to give itself objectivity in the objective world, and to carry itself out, through itself. In the Theoretical Idea the subjective Notion stands opposed, as the universal which is indeterminate in and for itself, to the objective world, from which it draws determinate content and fulfilment. But in the Practical Idea it stands opposed as actual to the actual. But the self-certainty which the subject has in the fact of its determinateness in and for itself, is a certainty of its own actuality and of the non-actuality of the world;....”

......

Alias:

Man’s consciousness not only reflects the objective world, but creates it.

The notion (＝ man), as subjective, again presupposes an otherness which is in itself (= nature independent of man). This notion (＝ man) is the impulse to realise itself, to give itself objectivity in the objective world through itself, and to realise (fulfil) itself.

In the theoretical idea (in the sphere of theory) the subjective notion (cognition?), as the universal and in and for itself indeterminate, stands opposed to the objective world, from which it obtains determinate content and fulfilment.

In the practical idea (in the sphere of practice) this notion as the actual (acting?) stands opposed to the actual.

The self-certainty which the subject here suddenly instead of “Notion” has in its being in and for itself, as a determinate subject, is a certainty of its own actuality and of the non-actuality of the world.
... "This determinateness, which is contained in the Notion, and is equal to it, and includes within itself the demand of the individual external actuality, is the Good. It appears with the dignity of absoluteness, because it is the totality of the Notion within itself—the objective in the form simultaneously of free unity and subjectivity. This Idea is higher than the Idea of Cognition which has already been considered, for it has not only the dignity of the universal but also of the simply actual...." (320-321)

"Consequently, the activity of the end is not directed against itself, for the purpose of absorbing and assimilating a given determination; it aims rather at positing its own determination, and, by transcending the determinations of the external world, at giving itself reality in the form of external actuality...." (321)

... "The realised Good is good by virtue of what it is already in the Subjective End, in its Idea; realisation gives...

The essence: The "good is a "demand of external actuality," i.e., by the "good" is understood man's practice = the demand (1) also of external actuality (2).
it an external existence....” (322) Presupposed to it (the Good) is the \textit{objective world}, in the presupposition of which the subjectivity and finitude of the Good consists and which, as being other, pursues its own course; and in it even the realisation of the Good is exposed to obstacles, and may even be made impossible.....” + (322-323)

The “objective world” “pursues its own course,” and man’s practice, confronted by this objective world, encounters “obstacles in the realisation” of the End, even “impossibility....”

+ ...“Thus the Good remains an \textit{Ought}; it is in and for itself, but Being, as last and abstract immediacy, remains determined against it as a not-Being too.... ++ (323)

The Good, welfare, well-meaning aspirations remain a \textbf{SUBJECTIVE OUGHT}....

++ ...“Although the Idea of the perfected Good is an absolute postulate, it is no more than a postulate,—that is, the absolute infected with the \textit{determinateness of subjectivity}. There are still two worlds in opposition: one a realm of \textit{subjectivity} in the \textit{pure} spaces of \textit{transcendent} thought, the other a realm of \textit{objectivity} in the element of an externally \textit{manifold actuality}, which is an unexplored realm of darkness. The complete development of the unresolved contradiction, of that absolute end which the barrier of this actuality insuperably opposes, has been considered more closely in \textit{Phänomenologie des Geistes}, p. 453 et seq....” (323)

Two worlds:
subjective and
objective
A gibe at the pure “spaces of transparent thought” in the realm of subjectivity, which is confronted by the “darkness” of “objective,” “manifold” actuality.

...“In the latter” (= der theoretischen Idee* in contrast to der praktischen Idee**) ...

Cognition knows itself only as apprehension, as the self-identity of the Notion, which for itself is indeterminate; fulfilment, that is, objectivity determined in and for itself, is given to it, and that which truly is is the actuality that is present independently of subjective positing. The Practical Idea on the other hand counts this actuality (which at the same time opposes it as an insuperable barrier) as that which in and for itself is null, which is to receive its true determination and sole value through the ends of the Good. Will itself consequently bars the way to its own goal insofar as it separates itself from Cognition and external actuality does not, for it, retain the form of that which truly is; consequently the Idea of the Good can find its complement only in the Idea of the True.” (323-324)

Cognition ... finds itself faced by that which truly is as actuality present independently of subjective opinions (Setzen***). (This is pure materialism!) Man’s will, his practice, itself blocks the attainment of its end ...in that it separates itself from cognition and does not recognise external actuality for that which truly is (for

Nota bene

* the Theoretical Idea—Ed.
** the Practical Idea—Ed.
*** positing—Ed.
objective truth). What is necessary is the *union of cognition and practice*.

And immediately following this:

...“But it makes this transition through itself” (the transition of the idea of truth into the idea of the Good, of theory into practice, and vice versa). “In the syllogism of action one premise is the immediate relation of the *good end to actuality*, of which it makes itself master, directing it (in the second premise) as *external means* against external actuality.” (324)

The “syllogism of action” ... For Hegel *action, practice, is a logical syllogism,*” a figure of logic. And that is true! Not, of course, in the sense that the figure of logic has its other being in the practice of man (= absolute idealism), but vice versa: man’s practice, repeating itself a thousand million times, becomes consolidated in man’s consciousness by figures of logic. Precisely (and only) on account of this thousand-million-fold repetition, these figures have the stability of a prejudice, an axiomatic character.

First premise: The *good end* (subjective-end) versus actuality (“external actuality”).

Second premise: The external *means* (instrument), (objective).

Third premise or conclusion: The coincidence of subjective and objective, the test of subjective ideas, the criterion of objective truth.

...“The realisation of the Good in the
teeth of an opposing and other actuality is the mediation which is essential for the immediate relation and actualisation of the Good....” (325)

...“If now in spite of this” (through activity) “the end of the Good should not be realised, then this is a relapse of the Notion to the standpoint which the Notion has before its activity—the standpoint of that actuality which was determined as null and yet was presupposed as real. This relapse becomes a progress to bad infinity; it has its only ground in the fact that in the transcendence of this abstract reality the transcendence is equally immediately forgotten, or that it is forgotten that this reality has already been presupposed as non-objective actuality which is null in and for itself.” (325)

The non-fulfilment of ends (of human activity) has as its cause (Grund) the fact that reality is taken as non-existent (nichtig), that its (reality’s) objective actuality is not being recognised.

“By the activity of the objective Notion external actuality is altered, and its determination is accordingly transcended; and by this very process it loses merely apparent reality, external determinability, and nullity, and it is thus posited as being in and for itself....” (326)

The activity of man, who has constructed an objective picture of the world for himself, changes external actuality, abolishes its determinateness (= alters some sides or other, qualities, of it), and thus removes from it the features of Semblance, externality and
nullity, and makes it as being in and for itself (= objectively true).

+ ...“Presupposition in general is here transcended,—that is, the determination of the Good as an end which is merely subjective and restricted in its content, the necessity of realising it by subjective activity, and this activity itself. In the result mediation transcends itself; the result is an immediacy which is not the reconstitution of the presupposition but rather the fact of its transcendedness. The Idea of the Notion which is determined in and for itself is thus posited no longer merely in the active subject, but equally as an immediate actuality; and the latter conversely is posited as it is in Cognition, as objectivity which truly is.” (326)

The result of activity is the test of subjective cognition and the criterion of OBJECTIVITY WHICH TRULY IS.

...“In this result then Cognition is reconstructed and united with the Practical Idea; the actuality which is found as given is at the same time determined as the realised absolute end,—not however (as in inquiring Cognition) merely as objective world without the subjectivity of the Notion, but as objective world whose inner ground and actual persistence is the Notion. This is the Absolute Idea.” (327)

(End of Chapter II. Transition to Chapter III: “The Absolute Idea.”)

Chapter III: “The Absolute Idea.” (327)

...“The Absolute Idea has turned out to be the identity of the Theoretical and the Practical Idea; each of these by itself is one-sided....” (327)
The unity of the theoretical idea (of knowledge) and of practice—this NB—and this unity precisely in the theory of knowledge, for the resulting sum is the “absolute, idea” (and the idea = “das objektive Wahre”*).

What remains to be considered is no longer Inhalt,** but ... “the universal element of its form—that is, the method.” (329)

“In inquiring cognition the method is likewise in the position of a tool, of a means which stands on the subjective side, whereby the subjective side relates itself to the object.... But in true cognition the method is not merely a quantity of certain determinations; it is the fact that the Notion is determined in and for itself, and is the middle member” (in the logical figure of the syllogism) “only because it equally has the significance of objective....” (331)

...“The absolute method” (i.e., the method of cognition of objective truth) “on the other hand does not behave as external reflection; it draws the determinate element directly from its object itself, since it is the object’s immanent principle and soul.—It was this that Plato demanded of cognition, that it should consider things in and for themselves, and that while partly considering them in their universality, it should also hold fast to them, not catching at externals, examples and comparisons, but contemplating the things alone and bringing before consciousness what is immanent in them....” (335-336)

This method of “absolute cognition is analytic... “but equally it is synthetic”.... (336)

* “the objectively true”—Ed.
** content—Ed.
One of the definitions of dialectics

„Dieses so sehr synthetische als analytische Moment des Urteils, wodurch das anfängliche Allgemeine aus ihm selbst als das Andere seiner sich bestimmt, ist das dialektische zu nennen”... (336) (+ see the next page).*

“This equally synthetic and analytic moment of the Judgment, by which (the moment) the original universality [general concept | determines itself out of itself as other in relation to itself, must be called dialectical.”

A determination which is not a clear one!!

1) The determination of the concept out of itself [the thing itself must be considered in its relations and in its development];

2) the contradictory nature of the thing itself (das Andere seiner**), the contradictory forces and tendencies in each phenomenon;

3) the union of analysis and synthesis.

Such, apparently, are the elements of dialectics.

One could perhaps present these elements in greater detail as follows:

1) the objectivity of consideration (not examples, not divergences, but the Thing-in-itself)

×

2) the entire totality of the manifold relations of this thing to others.

3) the development of this thing,

* In the manuscript, there is an arrow from the parenthesis pointing to the paragraph: “Dialectics is ....” located on the following page of the manuscript. (See p. 223 of this volume.)—Ed.

** the other of itself—Ed.
(phenomenon, respectively), its own movement, its own life,
4) the internally contradictory *ten d e n - c i e s* (and sides) in this thing.
5) the thing (phenomenon, etc.) as the sum *a n d*

#

**unity of opposites**

6) the *s t r u g g l e*, respectively unfolding, of these opposites, contradictory strivings, etc.
7) the union of analysis and synthesis—the break-down of the separate parts and the totality, the summation of these parts.
8) the relations of each thing (phenomenon, etc.) are not only manifold, but *general, universal*. Each thing (phenomenon, process, etc.) is connected with *e v e r y o t h e r*.
9) not only the unity of opposites, but the *t r a n s i t i o n s* of *e v e r y* determination, quality, feature, side, property into *e v e r y* other [into its opposite]
10) the endless process of the discovery of *n e w* sides, relations, etc.
11) the endless process of the deepening of man’s knowledge of the thing, of phenomena, processes, etc., from appearance to essence and from less profound to more profound essence.
12) from co-existence to causality and from one form of connection and reciprocal dependence to another, deeper, more general form.
13) the repetition at a higher stage of certain features, properties, etc., of the lower and
In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics, but it requires explanations and development.

+ (continuation. See the previous page.)*

...“Dialectics is one of those ancient sciences which has been most misjudged in modern metaphysics [here obviously = theory of knowledge and logic] and in the popular philosophy of ancients and moderns alike....” (336) Diogenes Laertius said of Plato that he was the father of dialectics, the third philosophical science (as Thales was the father of natural philosophy and Socrates of moral philosophy) but that those who are particularly loud in talking about this merit of Plato’s give little thought to it....

...“Dialectics has often been considered an art, as though it rested upon a subjective talent and did not belong to the objectivity of the Notion....” (336-337)

It is an important merit of Kant’s to have re-introduced dialectics, to have recognised it as “necessary” (a property) “of reason” (337) but the result (of the application of dialectics) must be “opposite” (to Kantianism). See below.

* See p. 220 of this volume.—Ed.
There follows a very interesting, clear and important outline of dialectics.

...“Besides generally appearing as contingent, dialectics usually has this more detailed form, that when in respect of any particular object, e.g., the world, motion, point etc., it is shown that it has any particular determination—e.g. (in the order of the above-mentioned objects) finitude in space or time, presence at this place, absolute negation of space—it is, however, shown further that it has with equal necessity the opposite determination, e.g., infinity in space and time, non-presence at this place, and a relation to space, consequently spatiality. The older Eleatic school applied its dialectics chiefly against motion; Plato frequently against contemporary ideas and concepts (especially those of the Sophists), but also against pure categories and reflection-determinations; the developed later scepticism extended it not only to the immediate so-called data of consciousness and maxims of ordinary life, but also to all the concepts of science. The conclusion which is drawn from such dialectics is contradiction and the nullity of the assertions made. But it may occur in a double sense,—in the objective sense, the object which thus contradicts itself being held to cancel itself and to be null (—this was, for instance, the Eleatic conclusion, by which, for example, the world, motion, and the point were deprived of truth), or in the subjective sense, cognition being held to be defective. The latter conclusion is sometimes understood to mean that it is only this dialectics that effects the trick of an illusive show. This is the ordinary view of so-called sound common
sense, which holds fast to the evidence of the senses and to customary ideas and expressions....” (337-338)

Diogenes the Dog, for example, proved movement by walking up and down, “a vulgar refutation” (338), says Hegel.

...“Or again the result reached—that of subjective nullity—relates, not to the dialectic, itself, but rather to the cognition against which it is directed, and in the sense of scepticism and likewise of the Kantian philosophy, to cognition in general....” (338).

...“The fundamental prejudice here is that the dialectic has only a negative result.” (338)

Among other things, it is said that it is a merit of Kant’s to have drawn attention to dialectics and to the consideration “of the determinations of thought in and for themselves.”* (339)

“The object in its existence without thought and Notion is an image or a name: it is what it is in the determinations of thought and Notion....”

...“It must not therefore be considered the fault of an object, or of cognition, that they manifest themselves as dialectical by their nature and by an external connection....”

...“Thus all opposites which are taken as fixed, such as, for example, finite and infinite, or individual and universal, are contradictory not by virtue of some external connection, but rather are transitions in and for themselves, as the consideration of their nature showed....” (339)

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* nothing else—Ed.
“Now this is the standpoint which was referred to above, in which a universal first term considered in and for itself shows itself to be its own Other....” (340)

...“But the Other is essentially not the empty negative or Nothing which is commonly taken as the result of dialectics, it is the Other of the first, the negative of the immediate; it is thus determined as mediated—and altogether contains the determination of the first. The first is thus essentially contained and preserved in the Other.—To hold fast the positive in its negative, and the content of the presupposition in the result, is the most important part of rational cognition; also only the simplest reflection is needed to furnish conviction of the absolute truth and necessity of this requirement, while with regard to the examples of proofs, the whole of Logic consists of these.” (340)

Not empty negation, not futile negation, not sceptical negation, vacillation and doubt is characteristic and essential in dialectics,—which undoubtedly contains the element of negation and indeed as its most important element—no, but negation as a moment of connection, as a moment of development, retaining the positive, i.e., without any vacillations, without any eclecticism.

Dialectics consists in general in the negation of the first proposition, in its replacement by a second (in the transition of the first into the second, in the demonstration of the connection of the first with the second, etc.). The second can be made the predicate of the first—
— "for example, the finite is infinite, one is many, the individual is the universal...." (341)

..."The first or immediate term is the Notion *in itself*, and therefore is the negative only *in itself*; the dialectical moment with it therefore consists in this, that the *distinction* which it *implicitly* contains is posited in it. The second term on the other hand is itself the *determinate entity*, the *distinction* or relation; hence with it the dialectical moment consists in the positing of the *unity* which is contained in it...."—(341-342)

(In relation to the simple and original, "first," positive assertions, propositions, etc., the "dialectical moment," i.e., scientific consideration, demands the demonstration of difference, connection, transition. Without that the simple positive assertion is incomplete, lifeless, dead. In relation to the "second," negative proposition, the "dialectical moment" demands the demonstration of "*unity*," i.e., of the connection of negative and positive, the presence of this positive in the negative. From assertion to negation—from negation to "unity" with the asserted—without this dialectics becomes empty negation, a game, or sceptics.)

... —"If then the negative, the determinate, the relation, judgment, and all determinations which fall under this second moment, do not of themselves appear as contradictory and dialectical, this is a mere fault of thought which does not confront its thoughts one with another. For the materials—*opposite* determinations in *one relation*—are *posed* already and are at hand for thought. But formal thought makes identity its law, and allows the

*in itself* = potentially, not yet developed, not yet unfolded
contradictory content which lies before it to drop into the sphere of sensuous representation, into space and time, where the contradictory terms are held apart in spatial and temporal juxtaposition and thus come before consciousness without mutual contact.” (342)

“Come before consciousness without mutual contact” (the object)—that is the essence of anti-dialectics. It is only here that Hegel has, as it were, allowed the ass’s ears of idealism to show themselves—by referring time and space (in connection with sensuous representation) to something lower compared with thought. Incidentally, in a certain sense, sensuous representation is, of course, lower. The crux lies in the fact that thought must apprehend the whole “representation” in its movement, but for that thought must be dialectical. Is sensuous representation closer to reality than thought? Both yes and no. Sensuous representation cannot apprehend movement as a whole, it cannot, for example, apprehend movement with a speed of 300,000 km. per second, but thought does and must apprehend it. Thought, taken from sensuous representation, also reflects reality; time is a form of being of objective reality. Here, in the concept of time (and not in the relation of sensuous representation to thought) is the idealism of Hegel.

...“In this connection this thought* makes it its fixed principle that contradiction is unthinkable; but in truth the thinking of contradiction is the essential moment of the Notion; in point of fact formal

* formal thought—Ed.
thought does think contradiction, but immediately disregards it, and with the assertion of that principle” (the statement that contradiction is unthinkable) “passes over to abstract negation.” (342)

“The negativity which has just been considered is the turning-point of the movement of the Notion. It is the simple point of negative self-relation, the internal source of all activity, vital and spiritual self-movement, the dialectic soul which all truth has in it and through which it alone is truth; for the transcendence of the opposition between the Notion and Reality, and that unity which is the truth, rest upon this subjectivity alone.—The second negative, the negative of the negative, which we have reached, is this transcendence of the contradiction, but is no more the activity of an external reflection than the contradiction is; it is the innermost and most objective moment of Life and Spirit, by virtue of which a subject, the person, the free, has being.” (342-343)

Important here is: 1) the characterisation of dialectics: self-movement, the source of activity, the movement of life and spirit; the coincidence of the concepts of the subject (man) with reality; 2) objectivism to the highest degree (“der objektiviste Moment”*).

This negation of the negation is the third term, says Hegel (343)—“if number is applicable”—but it can also be taken as the fourth (Quadruplicität**), (344) counting two negations: the “simple” (or

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* “the most objective moment”—Ed.
** quadruplicity—Ed.
The difference is not clear to me, is not the absolute equivalent to the more concrete?

"That this unity, as well as the whole form of the method, is a triplicity is wholly, however, the merely superficial and external side of the manner of cognition" (344)

—but, he says, that is already "an infinite merit of Kant's philosophy" that it at least (even if ohne Begriff*) demonstrated this.

"Formalists, it is true, have also seized upon triplicity, and have held fast to its empty framework; and this form has been rendered tedious and of ill-repute by the shallow misuse and the barrenness of modern so-called philosophic construction, which consists simply in attaching the formal framework without concept and immanent determination to all sorts of matter and employing it for external arrangement. But its inner value cannot be diminished by this vapid misuse, and it must still be deemed of high value that the outward form of the rational has been discovered, albeit not understood." (344-345)

The result of the negation of the negation, this third term is "not a quiescent third term, but, as this unity (of contradictions), "is self-mediating movement and activity...." (345)

The result of this dialectical transformation into the "third" term, into the synthesis, is a new premise, assertion, etc., which in turn becomes the source of a further analysis. But into it, into this "third"

* without any concept—Ed.
stage has already entered the \textit{content} of cognition ("the content of cognition as such enters within the sphere of contemplation") — and the method is extended into a \textit{system}. (346)

The beginning of all consideration, of the whole analysis — this first premise — now appears indeterminate, "imperfect"; the need arises to prove, "derive" (ableiten) (347) it and it turns out that "this may seem equivalent to the demand for an infinite backward progress in proof and derivation" (347) — but, on the other hand, the new premise drives \textit{forward}....

..."Thus, cognition rolls forward from content to content. This progress determines itself, first, in this manner, that it begins from simple determinatenesses and that each subsequent one is \textit{richer} and \textit{more concrete}. For the result contains its own beginning, and the development of the beginning has made it the richer by a new determinateness. The universal is the foundation; the progress therefore must not be taken as a flow from Other to Other. In the absolute method the Notion \textit{preserves} itself in its otherness, and the universal in its particularisation, in the Judgment and in reality; it raises to each next stage of determination the whole mass of its antecedent content, and by its dialectical progress not only loses nothing and leaves nothing behind, but carries with it all that it has acquired, enriching and concentrating itself upon itself...." (349)

This extract is not at all bad as a kind of summing up of dialectics.

But \textit{expansion} requires also \textit{deepening} ("In-sich-gehen")* "and greater extension is also higher intensity." (349)

* Going into itself — Ed.
"The richest consequently is also the most concrete and subjective, and that which carries itself back into the simplest depth is also the most powerful and comprehensive." (349)

"In this manner it comes about that each step in the progress of further determination in advancing from the indeterminate beginning is also a rearward approach to it, so that two processes which may at first appear to be different (the regressive confirmation of the beginning and its progressive further determination) coincide and are the same." (350)

It is impermissible deprezieren* this indeterminate beginning:

"..."It requires no apology that it" (the beginning) "may be admitted merely as provisional and hypothetical. Any objections which might be advanced—about the limits of human cognition, or the need of a critical investigation of the instrument of cognition before the problem is attacked—are themselves suppositions which, as concrete determinations, imply the need for their mediation and proof. Formally then they are no better than that beginning against which they protest, and rather require a derivation by reason of their more concrete content; so that it is sheer presumption to demand that they should have preferential consideration. Their content is untrue, for they make incontrovertible and absolute what is known to be finite and untrue (namely, a restricted cognition which is determined as form and instrument as against its

* to depreciate—Ed.
content); and this untrue cognition is itself form and regressive confirmation.—The method of truth too knows the beginning to be incomplete because it is beginning, but also knows this incomplete term in general as necessary, because truth is only the coining to itself through the negativity of immediacy....” (350-351)

By reason of the nature of the method which has been demonstrated, science is seen to be a circle which returns upon itself, for mediation bends back its end into its beginning, simple ground. Further, this circle is a circle of circles.... The various sciences ... are fragments of this chain....” (351)

“The method is the pure Notion which is related only to itself; it is therefore the simple self-relation which is Being. But now it is also Being fulfilled, the self-comprehending Notion, Being as the concrete and also thoroughly intensive totality....” (352)

...“Secondly, this Idea” ((die Idee des absoluten Erkennens**)) “still is logical, it is enveloped in pure thought, and is the science only of the divine Notion. The systematic development is itself a realisation, but is maintained within the same sphere. Since the pure Idea of Cognition is to that extent enclosed in subjectivity, it is an impulse to transcend the latter, and pure truth, as the last result, also becomes the beginning of another sphere and science. This transition need here only be intimated.

* “fulfilled Being”—Ed.
** the idea of absolute cognition—Ed.
"For the idea posits itself as the absolute unity of the pure Notion and its Reality, and thus gathers itself into the immediacy of Being; and in doing so, as totality in this form, it is Nature.”

(352-353)

This sentence on the last (353) page of the Logic is highly noteworthy. The transition of the logical idea to nature. It brings one within a hand’s grasp of materialism. Engels was right when he said that Hegel’s system was materialism turned upside down. This is not the last sentence of the Logic, but what comes after it to the end of the page is unimportant.

End of the Logic. 17.XII.1914.

It is noteworthy that the whole chapter on the “Absolute Idea” scarcely says a word about God (hardly ever has a “divine” “notion” slipped out accidentally) and apart from that — this NB — it contains almost nothing that is specifically idealism, but has for its main subject the dialectical method. The sum-total, the last word and essence of Hegel’s logic is the dialectical method — this is extremely noteworthy. And one thing more: in this most idealistic of Hegel’s works there is the least idealism and the most materialism. “Contradictory,” but a fact!

Vol. VI, p. 399
The Encyclopaedia § 227 — excellent on

* addendum — Ed.
** Hegel, Werke, Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840.— Ed.
*** “but this Idea which has firing is Nature” — Ed.
**** Hegel, Werke, Bd. VI, Berlin, 1840.— Ed.
the *analytical* method (to “analyse” the “Given concrete” phenomenon—“to give the form of abstraction” to its individual aspects and “herausheben”—“to bring into relief”—“the genus, or force and law” p. 398—and on its application:

It is not at all “an arbitrary matter” (398) whether we apply the analytical or the synthetical method (as man pflegt zu sprechen*)—“it is the form of the very objects that have to be cognised upon which it depends” (399)

Locke and the empiricists adopt the standpoint of analysis. And they often say that “in general cognition cannot do more.” (398)

“It is, however, at once apparent that this turns things upside down, and that cognition which wishes to take things as they are thereby falls into contradiction with itself.” The chemist, for example, “martert”** a piece of flesh and discovers in it nitrogen, carbon, etc. “But then these abstract substances have ceased to be flesh.”

There can be many definitions, for objects have many aspects.

“The richer the object to be defined, i.e., the more numerous the aspects which it offers to one’s notice, the more various also are the definitions framed from them” (400 § 229)—for example, the definition of life, of the state, etc.

In their definitions, Spinoza and Schelling present a mass of “speculation” (Hegel here obviously uses this word in the good sense) but “in the form of assurances.”

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* is usually said—Ed.
** “tortures”—Ed.
Philosophy, however, must prove and derive everything, and not limit itself to definitions.

Division (Einteilung) must be "natural and not merely artificial, i.e., arbitrary." (401)

Pp. 403 - 404—anger at "construction" and the "play" of construing, whereas it is a question of Begriff, of "Idee," of "Einheit des Begriffs und der Objektivität...."* (403)

In the small Encyclopaedia § 233, section b is entitled Das Wollen** (which in the large Logic is "Die Idee des Guten"***).

Activity is a "contradiction"—the purpose is real and not real, possible and not... etc.

"Formally, however, the disappearance of this contradiction consists in activity abolishing the subjectivity of the purpose and along with it the objectivity, the opposite, in virtue of which both are finite, and abolishing not merely the one-sidedness of this subjectivity, but the subjectivity as a whole." (406)

The standpoint of Kant and Fichte (especially in moral philosophy) is the standpoint of purpose, of subjective ought (407) (without connection with the objective)....

Speaking of the Absolute Idea, Hegel ridicules (§ 237, Vol. VI, p. 409) "declaration" over it, as if everything were revealed in it, and he remarks that "the absolute idea"... is... "the universal," "but the universal not merely as ab-

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* the Notion, the "idea," "the unity of the Notion and objectivity"—Ed.
** v o l i t i o n—Ed.
*** "The Idea of the Good"—Ed.
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stray form, to which (sic!) the particular content stands contrasted as an Other, but, as the absolute form into which all determinations, the whole fullness of the content posited by it, have retreated. In this respect the absolute idea can be compared to an old man, who utters the same statements of religion as a child, but for whom they have the significance of his whole lifetime. Even if the child understands the religious content, it is for him still only something outside of which the whole of life and the whole of the world lie.” (409)

...“The interest lies in the whole movement...” (§ 237, 409)

...“The content is the living development of the idea...” “Each of the stages hitherto reviewed is an image of the absolute, but at first in a limited way...” (401)

§ 238, Addendum:

“The philosophical method is both analytical and synthetical, but not in the sense of a bare juxtaposition or a mere alternation of these two methods of finite cognition, but rather in such a way that it holds them transcended in itself, and in every one of its movements, therefore, it proves itself simultaneously analytical and synthetical. Philosophical thought proceeds analytically, insofar as it only accepts its object, the Idea, allows the latter its own way and, as it were, only looks on at its movement and development. To this extent philosophising is wholly passive. Philosophic thought, however, is equally synthetic and shows itself to be the activity of the Notion itself. That, however, involves the effort to refrain from our own fancies and private...
opinions, which always seek to obtrude themselves....” (411)

(§ 243, p. 413)... “Thus the method is not an external form, but the soul and notion of the content....”

(End of the Encyclopaedia; see above on the side the extract from the end of Logic.*)
NOTES ON REVIEWS
OF HEGEL'S LOGIC

Preußische Jahrbücher (Bd. 151) 1913, March, an article by Dr. Ferd. J. Schmidt: "Hegel and Marx." The author hails the return to Hegel, reviles "theoretico-cognitive scholasticism," quotes the neo-Hegelians Constantin Rössler and Adolf Lasson (of the Preußische Jahrbücher) and, in connection with Plenge's book, states that Marx did not understand the significance of the "national idea" as a synthesis. Marx's merit—that of organising the workers—was a great one, but ... one-sided.

An example of the "liberal" (or rather bourgeois, worker-loving—for the author is probably a conservative) castration of Marx.

MacTaggart, Ellis M'Taggart: Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic, Cambridge, 1896 (259 pp.). Review in Zeitschrift für Philosophie, Bd. 119 (1902), S. 185— — —, says that the author is an expert on Hegel's philosophy, which he defends against Seth, Balfour, Lotze, Trendelenburg, etc. (the author MacTaggart is obviously an arch-idealist).

Review in *Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, Bd. 148 (1912), p. 95. Says that the book contains rather good observations on “the reappearance of post-Kantian idealism at the present time,” that Windelband is an agnostic (p. 96), etc., but that the author completely failed to understand Hegel’s “absolute idealism,” as incidentally also Riehl, Dilthey and other “stars.” The author is said to have undertaken a task beyond his powers.


The author is said to defend Hegel against Kant. (Laudatory in general.)

*Stirling: The Secret of Hegel.* Review in the same journal, Bd. 53 (1868), p. 268. The author is said to be an exceptionally fervent worshipper of Hegel, whom he interprets for English readers.

Bertrando Spaventa: *Da Socrate a Hegel*, Bari, 1905. (432 pp. 4,50 lire). Review ibidem, Bd. 129 (1906)—the book is said to be a *collection of articles*, inter alia about Hegel, of whom Spaventa is a faithful adherent.

*Stirling: The Secret of Hegel.*

Italian:

*Spaventa: Da Socrate a Hegel.*
*Ralf. Mariano.*

German:

*Schmitt. Das Geheimnis der Hegelschen Dialektik* (1888).
Regarding recent literature on Hegel. Neo-Hegelians: Caird, Bradley.

J. B. Bailly: The Origin and Significance of Hegel’s Logic, London, 1901 (375 pp.). A review in Revue Philosophique, 1902, 2, S 31 2. Says that he does not merely repeat Hegelian terminology (like Véra), but tries to examine and explain historically. Incidentally, Chapter X: the relation of logic to nature (Hegel is said not to have achieved his aim). Hegel’s significance is that he “demonstrated the objective character of knowledge.” (p. 314)


“Mr. Wallace accurately expounds the Hegelian conception of this science (logic) ... a science which governs both the philosophy of nature and that of mind, since pure thought or the idea is the common basis both of material reality and psychical reality.”

By the same author: 1894 a translation of The Philosophy of Mind, with an explanatory chapter. Review ibid.

On Wallace, a laudatory but shallow review in Zeitschrift für Philosophie, Bd. 111 (1898), p. 208.

Among other things ... "Bradley's neo-Hegelian conception of an invisible energy transferred from one manifestation to another, present and operative in all changes and all particular activities."70

J. G r i e r H i b b e n: Hegel’s Logic, an Essay in Interpretation, New York, 1 9 0 2 (313 pp.). Review in Revue Philosophique, 1904, Vol. I, p. 430: “In spite of its title, the work of M. H. is not an interpretative commentary but rather an almost literal summary.” The author has compiled something in the nature of a dictionary of the terms used in Hegel’s Logic. But this, it is said, is not the essence of the matter: “The commentators are still in dispute over the very position taken by Hegel over the fundamental meaning and true aim of his dialectic. The celebrated criticisms of S e t h are opposed by recent exegeses which attribute a quite different significance to the Logic, taken as a whole, notably such as those of M a c T a g g a r t and G. N o ë l.” (431)

According to Hibben, Hegel’s Logic “n’est pas on simple système spéculatif, une plus ou moins savante combinaison de concepts abstraits; elle est en même temps ‘une interprétation de la vie universelle dans toute la plénitude de sa signification concrète.’”** (p. 430)

The writer of the review* notes in general “the rebirth of Hegelian-ism in the Anglo-Saxon countries” ... “in recent years.”

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* L. Weber—Ed.
** "is not a simple peculstive system, a more or less scientific combination of abstract concepts; it is at the same time "an interpretation of universal life in all the fullness of its concrete significance."— Ed.

NB

Published according to the manuscript
Written in December 1914
First published in 1930 in Lenin Miscellany XII

NB
CONSPECTUS OF HEGEL’S BOOK

LECTURES

ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

Written in 1915
First published in 1930
in Lenin Miscellany XII

Published according to the manuscript
"If the truth is abstract it must be untrue. Healthy human reason goes out towards what is concrete.... Philosophy is what is most antagonistic to abstraction, it leads back to the concrete...."

p. 40: comparison of the history of philosophy with a circle—"a circle ... which, as periphery, has very many circles...."

"I maintain that the sequence in the systems of philosophy in history is the same as the sequence in the logical deduction of the Notion-determinations of the Idea. I maintain that if the fundamental

* Hegel, Werke, Bd. XIII, Berlin, 1833—Ed.
conceptions of the systems appearing in the history of Philosophy be entirely divested of that which pertains to their outward form, their relation to the particular and the like, the various stages in the determination of the Idea itself are found in its logical Notion.” (43)

“Conversely in the logical progression taken for itself, there is, so far as its principal elements are concerned, the progression of historical manifestations; but it is necessary, of course, to be able to discern these pure Notions in what the historical form contains.” (43)

P. 56—ridicule of the chasing after fashion,—after those who are ready “auch jedes Geschwöge (?) für eine Philosophie auszuschreien.”* Pp. 57-58—excellent for strict historicity in the history of philosophy, so that one should not ascribe to the ancients a “development” of their ideas, which is comprehensible to us but which in fact was not present in the ancients.

Thales, for example, did not possess the conception $\alpha \gamma \chi$** (as a principle), did not possess the concept of cause...

...“Thus there are whole nations which have not this concept” (of cause) “at all; indeed it involves a great step forward in development....” (58)

Extremely lengthy, empty and tedious on the relation of philosophy to religion. In general, an introduction of almost 200 pages—impossible!!

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* "to all every twaddle (?) a philosophy”—Ed.
** beginning—Ed.
...“Hence the determinations are dry, destitute of process, undialectical, and stationary....” (244)

This refers to the general ideas of the Pythagoreans;—“number” and its significance, etc. Ergo: it is said in regard to the primitive ideas of the Pythagoreans, their primitive philosophy; their “determinations” of substance, things, the world, are “dry, destitute of process (movement), undialectical.”

Tracing predominantly the dialectical in the history of philosophy, Hegel cites the views of the Pythagoreans: ...“one, added to even, makes odd (2 + 1 = 3);—added to odd, it makes even (3 + 1 = 4);—it” (Eins*) “has the property of making gerade (= even), and consequently it must

* one—Ed.
Musical harmony and the philosophy of Pythagoras:

“The subjective, and, in the case of hearing, simple feeling, which, however, exists inherently in relation, Pythagoras has attributed to the understanding, and he attained his object by means of fixed determinations.” (262)

Pp. 265-266: the movement of the heavenly bodies—their harmony—the harmony of the singing heavenly spheres inaudible to us (in the Pythagoreans): Aristotle, De coelo, II, 13 (and 9):74:

...“Fire was placed by the Pythagoreans in the middle, but the Earth was made a star that moved around this central body in a circle....” But for them this fire was not the sun.... “They thus rely, not on sensuous appearance, but on grounds.... These ten spheres” ten spheres or orbits or movements of the ten planets: Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Sun, Moon, Earth, the Milky Way and the Gegenerde* (—antipode?) invented “for an even number,” for 10 “like all that is in motion, make a sound; but each makes a different tone, according to the difference in its size and velocity. This is determined by the different distances, which bear a harmonious relationship to one another, in accordance with musical intervals; by this means a harmonious sound (music) arises in the moving spheres (world)....”

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* Antichthon—Ed.
Concerning the soul, the Pythagoreans thought “die Seele sei: die Sonnenstäubchen”* (p. 268) (= dust particle, atom) (Aristotle, De anima, I, 2).  

In the soul—seven circles (elements) as in the heavens. Aristotle, De anima, I, 3—p. 269.  

And here immediately are recounted the fables that Pythagoras (who had taken from the Egyptians the doctrine of the immortality of the soul and the transmigration of souls) related about himself, that his soul had dwelt 207 years in other people, etc., etc. (271)  

NB: the linking of the germs of scientific thought with fantasy à la religion, mythology. And nowadays! Likewise, the same linking but the proportions of science and mythology are different.  

More on the theory of numbers of Pythagoras.

“Numbers, where are they? Dispersed through space, dwelling in independence in the heaven of ideas? They are not things immediately in themselves, for a

* “the soul is solar dust”—Ed.
thing, a substance, is something quite other than a number—a body bears no resemblance to it.” 254

Quotation from Aristotle?—Metaphysik, I, 9, is it not? From Sextus Empiricus? Unclear.

Pp. 279-280—the Pythagoreans accept the ether (…”A ray penetrates from the sun through the dense and cold ether,” etc.)

Thus the conjecture about the ether has existed for thousands of years, remaining until now a conjecture. But at the present time there are already a thousand times more subsurface channels leading to a solution of the problem, to a scientific determination of the ether.

THE ELEATIC SCHOOL

In speaking of the Eleatic school, Hegel says about dialectics:

"We here" (in der eleatischen Schule*) “find the beginning of dialectics, i.e., simply the pure movement of thought in Notions; likewise we see the opposition of thought to outward appearance or sensuous Being, or of that which is implicit to the being-for-another of this implicitness, and in the objective existence we see the contradiction which it has in itself, or dialectics proper....” (280) See the next page.**

* In the Eleatic school—Ed.

** The next page of the manuscript contains the text given below.—Ed.
Here are essentially two determinations (two characteristics, two typical features, Bestimmungen, keine Definitionen*) of dialectics78:

α) “the pure movement of thought in Notions”;

β) “in the (very) essence of objects (to elucidate) (to reveal) the contradiction which it (this essence) has in itself (dialectics proper).”

In other words, this “fragment” of Hegel’s should be reproduced as follows:

Dialectics in general is “the pure movement of thought in Notions” (i.e., putting it without the mysticism of idealism: human concepts are not fixed but are eternally in movement, they pass into one another, they flow into one another, otherwise they do not reflect living life. The analysis of concepts, the study of them, the “art of operating with them” (Engels)79 always demands study of the movement of concepts, of their interconnection, of their mutual transitions).

In particular, dialectics is the study of the opposition of the Thing-in-itself (an sich), of the essence, substratum, substance—from the appearance, from “Being-for-Others.” (Here, too, we see a transition, a flow from the one to the other: the essence appears. The appearance is essential.) Human thought goes endlessly deeper from appearance to essence, from essence of the first order, as it were, to essence of the second order, and so on without end.

Dialectics in the proper sense is the

* determinations, not definitions—Ed.
the comparison is a tempting one...

study of contradiction in the very essence of objects: not only are appearances transient, mobile, fluid, demarcated only by conventional boundaries, but the essence of things is so as well.

Sextus Empiricicus presents the point of view of the Sceptics as follows:

"Let us imagine that in a house in which there are many valuables, there were those who sought for gold by night; each would then think that he had found the gold, but would not know for certain whether he had actually found it. Thus philosophers come into this world as into a great house to seek the truth, but were they to reach it, they could not tell whether they had really attained it...."

(288-289)

Xenophanes (the Eleatic) said:

"Did beasts and lions only have hands, Works of art thereby to bring forth, as do men, They would, in creating divine forms, give to them What in image and size belongs to themselves...." (289-290)

"What especially characterises Zeno is dialectics, which ... begins with him...." (302)

"We find in Zeno likewise true objective dialectics." (309)

(310: on the refutation of philosophic systems: "Falsity must not be demonstrated as untrue because the opposite is true, but in itself....")

"Dialectics is in general α) external dialectics, in which this movement is different from the comprehension of this movement; β) not a movement of our intelligence only, but what proceeds from the
nature of the thing itself, i.e., from the pure Notion of the content. The former is a manner of regarding objects in such a way that reasons are revealed and aspects of them shown, by means of which all that was supposed to be firmly fixed, is made to totter. There may be reasons which are altogether external too, and we shall speak further of this dialectics when dealing with the Sophists. The other dialectics, however, is the immanent contemplation of the object: it is taken for itself, without previous hypothesis, idea or obligation, not under any external conditions, laws, grounds. We have to put ourselves right into the thing, to consider the object in itself and to take it in the determinations which it has. In regarding it thus, it” (er) (sic!) “shows from itself that it contains opposed determinations, and thus transcends itself; this dialectics we more especially find in the ancients. Subjective dialectics, which reasons from external grounds, does justice when it is granted that: ‘in the correct there is what is not correct, and in the false the true as well.’ True dialectics leaves nothing whatever to its object, as if the latter were deficient on one side only; but it disintegrates in the entirety of its nature....” (p. 311)

With the “principle of development” in the twentieth century (indeed, at the end of the nineteenth century also) “all are agreed.” Yes, but this superficial, not thought out, accidental, philistine “agreement” is an agreement of such a kind as stifles and vulgarises the truth—if everything develops, then everything passes from one into another, for development as is well known is not a simple, universal and eternal growth, enlargement (respective dim-
If that is so, then, in the first place, evolution has to be understood more exactly, as the arising and passing away of everything, as mutual transitions.—And, in the second place, if everything develops, does not that apply also to the most general concepts and categories of thought? If not, it means that thinking is not connected with being. If it does, it means that there is a dialectics of concepts and a dialectics of cognition which has objective significance.+

...“Zenos treatment of motion was above all objectively dialectical....” (p. 313)

...“Movement itself is the dialectic of all that is....” It did not occur to Zeno to deny movement as “sensuous certainty,” it was merely a question “nach ihrer (movement’s) Wahrheit” (of the truth of movement). (313) And on the next page, where he relates the anecdote how Diogenes the Cynic, of Sinope, refuted movement by walking, Hegel writes:

...“But the anecdote continues that, when a pupil was satisfied with this refutation, Diogenes beat him, on the ground that, since the teacher had disputed with reasons,
the only valid refutation is one derived from reasons. Men have not merely to satisfy themselves by sensuous certainty but also to understand....” (314)

Zeno has four ways of refuting motion:
1. That which is moving to an end must first cover half of the path. And of this half, again first its half, and so on ad infinitum.

Aristotle replied: space and time are infinitely divisible (δνναμεί *) (p. 316), but not infinitely divided (ἐνεργεία **), Bayle (Dictionnaire, Vol. IV, article Zeno) calls this reply of Aristotle's pitoyable *** and says:...

...“if one drew an infinite number of lines on a particle of matter, one would not thereby introduce a division that would reduce to an actual infinity that which according to him was only a potential infinity....”

And Hegel writes (317): “Dies si ist gut!” ****

i.e., if one carried out the infinite division to the end!!

...“The essence of space and time, is motion, for it is universal; to understand it means to express its essence in the form correct!

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* in potentiality—Ed.
** in actuality—Ed.
*** pitiful—Ed.
**** “This if is good!”—Ed.
of the Notion. As unity of negativity and continuity, motion is expressed as the Notion, as thought; but neither continuity nor discontinuity is to be posited as the essence....” (pp. 318-319)

“To understand means to express in the form of notions.” Motion is the essence of space and time. Two fundamental concepts express this essence: (infinite) continuity (Kontinuität) and “punctuality” (= denial of continuity, *discontinuity*). Motion is the unity of continuity (of time and space) and discontinuity (of time and space). Motion is a contradiction, a unity of contradictions.

Überweg-Heinze, 10th edition, p. 63 (§ 20), is wrong when he says that Hegel “defends Aristotle against Bayle.” Hegel refutes both the sceptic (Bayle) and the anti-dialectician (Aristotle).

Cf. Gomperz, *Les penseurs de la Grèce*, p. ..., the forced recognition, under the lash, of the unity of contradictions, without recognising dialectics (owing to cowardice of thought)....

2. Achilles will not overtake the tortoise. “First the half” and so on endlessly. Aristotle answers: he will overtake it if he be permitted “to overstep the limits.” (320)

And Hegel: “This answer is correct and contains all that can be said” (p. 321)—for actually the half here (at a certain stage) becomes the “limit”....
"If we speak of motion in general, we say that the body is in one place and then it goes to another; because it moves it is no longer in the first, but yet not in the second; were it in either it would be at rest. If we say that it is between both, this is to say nothing at all, for were it between both, it would be in a place, and this presents the same difficulty. But movement means to be in this place and not to be in it; this is the continuity of space and time—and it is this which first makes motion possible.” (Pp. 321-322)

Movement is the presence of a body in a definite place at a given moment and in another place at another, subsequent moment—such is the objection which Chernov repeats (see his Philosophical Studies) in the wake of all the “metaphysical” opponents of Hegel.

This objection is incorrect: (1) it describes the result of motion, but not motion itself; (2) it does not show, it does not contain in itself the possibility of motion; (3) it depicts motion as a sum, as a concatenation of states of rest, that is to say, the (dialectical) contradiction is not removed by it, but only concealed, shifted, screened, covered over.

“What makes the difficulty is always thought alone, since it keeps apart the moments of an object which in their separation are really united.” (322)

We cannot imagine, express, measure, depict movement, without interrupting continuity, without simplifying, coarsening, dismembering, strangling that which is living. The representation of movement by means of thought always makes coarse,
Kant and his subjectivism, skepticism, etc. kills,—and not only by means of thought, but also by sense-perception, and not only of movement, but every concept.

And in that lies the essence of dialectics. And precisely this essence is expressed by the formula: the unity, identity of opposites.

3. “The flying arrow rests.” And Aristotle’s answer: the error arises from the assumption that “time consists of the individual Nows” (ἐκ τῶν νῦν) p. 324.

4. Half is equal to the double: motion measured in comparison with all unmoving body and in comparison with a body moving in the opposite direction.

At the end of the § on Zeno, Hegel compares him to Kant (whose antinomies, he says, “do no more than Zeno did here”). (p. 326)

The general conclusion of the dialectic of the Eleatics: “the truth is the one, all else is untrue”—“just as the Kantian philosophy resulted in ‘We know appearances only.’ On the whole the principle is the same.” (p. 326)

But there is also a difference.

“In Kant it is the spiritual that destroys the world; according to Zeno, the world of appearance in itself and for itself has no truth. According to Kant, it is our thought, our spiritual activity that is had;—it shows excessive humility of mind to believe that knowledge has no value....” (327)

The continuation of the Eleatics in Leucippus and among the Sophists...
THE PHILOSOPHY OF HERACLITUS

After Zeno (who lived after Heraclitus?) Hegel passes on to Heraclitus and says:

“It” (Zeno’s dialectics) “may, to that extent, also be called subjective dialectics, insofar as it rests in the contemplative subject, and the one, without this dialectics, without this movement, is one abstract identity....” (328)

but it was previously said, see the passage quoted from p. 309, and others, that Zeno’s dialectics is objective dialectics. Here is some kind of superfine “distinguo.” Cf. the following:

| α) subjective dialectics. |
| β) in the object there is dialectics, but I do not know, perhaps it is Schein,* merely appearance, etc. |
| γ) fully objective dialectics, as the principle of all that is |

(In Heraclitus): “Here we see land; there is no proposition of Heraclitus which I would not have adopted in my Logic....” (328)

“Heraclitus says: Everything is becoming; this becoming is the principle."

* semblance, show—Ed.
This is contained in the expression: Being no more *is* than not-Being....” (p. 333)

“The recognition of the fact that Being and not-Being are only abstractions devoid of truth, that the first truth is to be found only in Becoming, forms a great advance. The understanding comprehends both as having truth and validity in isolation; reason on the other hand recognises the one in the other, and sees that in the one its other’, (NB “its other’) “is contained—that is why the All, the Absolute is to be determined as Becoming.” (334)

“Aristotle says (*De mundo*, 86 Chapter 5) that Heraclitus ‘joined together the complete whole and the incomplete’ (part)” ... “what coincides and what conflicts, what is harmonious and what discordant; and from out of them all (the opposite) comes one, and from one, all.” (335)

Plato, in his *Symposium*, 87 puts forward the views of Heraclitus (inter alia in their application to music: harmony, consists of opposites), and the statement: “The art of the musician unites the different.”

Hegel writes: this is no objection against Heraclitus (336), for difference is the essence of harmony:

“This harmony is precisely absolute Becoming, change,—not becoming other, now this and then an other. The essential thing is that each different thing, each particular, is different from another, not abstractly so from any other, but from *its* other. Each particular only is, insofar as its other is implicitly contained in its Notion....” (336)

“So also in the case of tones; they must be different, but so that they can also be united....” (336) P. 337: incidentally
Sextus Empiricus (and Aristotle) are reckoned among the ... "best witness"....

Heraclitus said: "die Zeit ist das erste körperliche Wesen"* (Sextus Empiricus)—p. (338)
körperliche**—an "unfortunate" expression (perhaps, Hegel says (NB), it was chosen by a sceptic (NB)),—but time, he says, is "das erste sinnliche Wesen"***....
..."Time is pure Becoming, as perceived...." (338)

In regard to the fact that Heraclitus considered fire as a process, Hegel says: 
"Fire is physical time, it is this absolute unrest" (340)—and further, in regard to the natural philosophy of Heraclitus:

..."It" (Natur) "is process in itself...." (344) "Nature is the never-resting, and the All is the transition out of the one into the other, from division into unity, and from unity into division...." (341)

"To understand Nature means to represent it as process...." (339)

Here is what is said to be the narrowness of natural scientists:

..."If we listen to their account" (Naturforscher****), "they only observe and say what they see; but this is not true, for unconsciously they transform what is immediately seen by means of the Notion. And the strife is not due to the opposition between observation and the absolute Notion, but between the limited rigid notion and the Absolute Notion. They show that changes are non-existent...." (344-345)

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* "Time is the first corporeal existence"—Ed.
** corporeal—Ed.
*** "the first sensuous existence"—Ed.
**** of natural scientists—Ed.
...“Water in its decomposition reveals hydrogen and oxygen: these have not arisen for they were already there as such, as the parts of which the water consists” (346) (thus Hegel mimics the natural scientists)....

“As we find in all expression of perception and experience; as soon as men speak, there is a Notion present, it cannot be withheld, for in consciousness there is always a touch of universality and truth.” (346)

Quite right and important—it is precisely this that Engels repeated in more popular form, when he wrote that natural scientists ought to know that the results of natural science are concepts, and that the art of operating with concepts is not, inborn, but is the result of 2,000 years of the development of natural science and philosophy.\(^8^8\)

The concept of transformation is taken narrowly by natural scientists and they lack understanding of dialectics.

...“He” (Heraclitus) “is the one who first expressed the nature of the infinite, and who first understood nature as infinite in itself, i.e., its essence as process....” (346)

On the “concept of necessity”—cf. p. 347. Heraclitus could not, see truth in “sensuous certainty” (348), but in “necessity” (ἐἰμαχμένη\(^*\))—((λόγος\(^**\))).

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{“absolute connection”} & \Rightarrow \text{“absolute mediation” (348) || NB} \\
\text{“absol ute”} & \Rightarrow \text{“absolut e m e d i a t i o n” (348) || NB}
\end{align*}
\]

* fate—Ed.
** logos—Ed.
“The rational, the true, that which I know, is indeed a withdrawal from the objective as from what is sensuous, individual, definite and existent; but what reason knows within itself is just as much necessity or the universal of being; it is the essence of thought as it is the essence of the world.” (352)

NB: Necessity = “the universal of Being” (the universal in Being) (connection, “absolute mediation”)

LEUCIPPUS

368: “The development of philosophy in history must correspond to the development of logical philosophy; but there will still be passages in the latter which are absent in historical development.”

Here there is a very profound and correct, essentially materialist thought (actual history is the basis, the foundation, the Being, which is followed by consciousness).

Leucippus says that atoms are invisible “because of the smallness of their body” (369)—Hegel, however, replies that this is “Ausrede”* (ibid.), that “Eins”** cannot be seen, that “das Princip des Eins” “ganz ideell”*** (370), and that Leucippus is no “empiricist,” but an idealist.

* “subterfuge”—Ed.
** “One”—Ed.
*** “the principle of the One” is “altogether ideal”—Ed.
materialism  
(Hegel is afraid of the word: keep away from me) versus atomism

([Straining to make Leucippus conform to his logic, Hegel expatiates on the importance, the "greatness" of the principle (368) Fürsichsein,* descrying it in Leucippus. It savours in part of stretching a point.])**

But there is also a grain of truth in it; the nuance (the "moment) of separateness; the interruption of gradualness; the moment of the smoothing out of contradictions; the interruption of continuity—the atom, the one. (Cf. 371 i.f.):—"The one and continuity are opposites...."

Hegel’s logic cannot be applied in its given form, it cannot be taken as given. One must separate out from it the logical (epistemological) nuances, after purifying them from Ideenmystik***: that is still a big job.)

The Atomists are, therefore, generally speaking, opposed to the idea of the creation and maintenance of the world by means of a foreign principle. It is in the theory of atoms that natural science first feels released from the need for demonstrating a foundation for the world. For if nature is represented as created and held together by another, then it is conceived of as not existent in itself, and thus as having its Notion outside itself, i.e., its basis is foreign to it, it has no basis as such, it is only conceivable from the will of another—as it is, it is contingent, devoid, of necessity and Notion in itself. In the idea of the atomists, however, we have the conception of the inherency of nature, that is to say, thought finds itself in it...." (372-373)

* Being-for-itself—*Ed.*
** In Lenin’s manuscript these five lines have been crossed out—*Ed.*
*** mysticism of ideas—*Ed.*
In the presentation—according to Diogenes Laertius, IX, § 31-33—of the atomism of Leucippus, the “vortex” (Wirbel—δίνην)* of atoms, Hegel finds nothing of interest (“no interest,” ...“empty representation,” “dim, confused ideas”—p. 377 i.f.).

Hegel’s blindness, the one-sidedness of the Idealist!!

DEMOCRITUS

Democritus is behandelt** by Hegel in a very stiefmütterlich*** fashion, in all pp. 378-380! The spirit of materialism is intolerable to the idealist!! The words of Democritus are quoted (p. 379):

> “Warmth exists according to opinion (νόµϕ) and so do cold and colour, sweet and bitter; only the indivisible and the void are in accordance with truth (ἐτεÑ)” (Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos, VII, § 135).^89

And the conclusion is drawn:

> “We see this much, that Democritus expressed the difference between the moments of Being-in-itself and Being-for-other more distinctly....” (380)

By this “the way is at once opened up” to “the bad idealism,” that... “meine Empfindung, mein...”***

> “bad idealism” (my feeling) Cf. E. Mach^90

...“A sensuously notionless manifold of feeling is established, in which there is no reason, and with which this idealism has no further concern.”

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* Diogenes Laertius (p. 235)—“vertiginem”—Latin translation.
** treated—Ed.
*** step-motherly—Ed.
**** “my feeling, mine”—Ed.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF ANAXAGORAS

Anaxagoras. Νοῦς*—"the cause of the world and of all order", and Hegel elucidates this: ...

"Objective thought ... reason in the world, also in nature—or as we speak of genera in nature, they are the universal. A dog is an animal, this is its genus, its substantial; the dog itself is this. This law, this understanding, this reason is itself immanent in nature, it is the essence of nature; the latter is not formed from without as men make a chair."

"Νοῦς is the same as soul" (Aristotle on Anaxagoras)—p. 394

and ...** the elucidation of this leap from the general in nature to the soul; from objective to subjective, from materialism to idealism. C'est ici que ces extrêmes se touchent (et se transforment!)

On the homoeomeriae⁹¹ of Anaxagoras (particles of the same kind as the whole body) Hegel writes:

"Transformation is to be taken in a double sense, according to existence and according to the Notion...." (403-404)

Thus, for instance, it is said that water can be removed—the stones remain; blue colour can be removed, red, etc., will remain.

"This is only according to existence; according to the Notion, they only inter-penetrate, it is inner necessity." Just as one cannot remove the heart by itself from

* reason—Ed.
** A word has remained undeciphered here.—Ed.
*** It is here that these extremes come into contact (and are transformed!)—Ed.
the living body without the lungs perishing, etc.

“Nature likewise exists only in unity, just as the brain exists only in unity with the other organs” (404)

whereby some conceive transformation in the sense of the presence of small qualitatively determined particles and their growth (respective diminution) combination and separation. The other conception (Heraclitus)—the transformation of the one into an other. (403)

Existence and Notion—are to be distinguished in Hegel approximately as follows: fact (Being) taken separately, torn from its connection, and connection (the Notion), mutual relation, concatenation, law, necessity.

415: ...“The Notion is that which things are in and for themselves....”

Hegel speaks of grass being the end for animals, and the latter for men, etc., etc., and concludes:

“It is a circle which is complete in itself, but whose completion is likewise a passing into another circle; a vortex whose midpoint, that into which it returns, is found directly in the periphery of a higher circle which swallows it up....” (414)

So far the ancients are said to have furnished little: “Universal is a meagre determination: everyone knows of the universal, but not of it as essence.” (416)

...“But here we have the beginning of a more distinct development of the relationship of consciousness to Being, the development of the nature of knowledge as a knowledge of the true.” (417) “The mind

NB: the “universal” as “essence”
“development of the nature of knowledge”
has gone forth to express essence as thought.”

(418)

“We see this development of the universal, in which essence goes right over to the side of consciousness, in the so much decried worldly wisdom of the Sophists.” (418)

((End of the first volume))

The second volume begins with the Sophists.
Speaking of the Sophists, Hegel in extreme detail chews over the thought that sophistry contains an element common to all culture (Bildung) in general, our own included, namely, the adducing of proofs (Gründe) and Gegengründe*—"reflecting reasoning";—the finding of the most diverse points of view in everything; ((subjectivity—lack of objectivity)). In discussing Protagoras and his famous thesis (man is the measure of all things) Hegel places Kant close to him:

..."Man is the measure of everything,—man, therefore, is the subject in general; the existent, consequently, is not in isolation, but is for my knowledge—consciousness is essentially the producer of the content in what is objective, and subjective thinking is thereby essentially active. And this view extends even to the most modern Philosophy, as when, for instance, Kant says that we only know phenomena, i.e., that what seems to us to be objective, to be reality, is only to be considered in its relation to consciousness, and does not exist without this relation...." (31)**

*counterproofs—Ed.
**Hegel, Werke, Bd. XIV, Berlin, 1833.—Ed.
The second “moment” is objectivity (das Allgemeine*), “it is posited by me, but is likewise in itself objectively universal, not posited by me....” (32)

Diese “Relativität”** (32) “Everything has a relative truth only” (33), according to Protagoras.

...“Kant’s phenomenon is no more than an external impulse, an x, an unknown, which first receives these determinations through our feeling, through us. Even if there were an objective ground for our calling one thing cold and another warm, we could indeed say that they must have diversity in themselves, but warmth and cold first become what they are in our feeling. Similarly ... things are, etc. ... thus experience was called a phenomenon....” (34)

“The world is consequently not only phenomenal in that it is for consciousness, and thus that its Being is only one relative to consciousness, but, it is likewise phenomenal in itself.” (35)

...“This scepticism reached a much deeper point in Gorgias....” (35)

...“His dialectics ... that of Gorgias, the Sophist [many times: p. 36, idem p. 37.]

Tiedemann said that Gorgias went further than the “common sense” of man. And Hegel makes fun of this: every philosophy goes further than “common sense” for common sense is not philosophy. Prior to Copernicus it was contrary to common sense to say that the earth goes round the sun. (36)

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* the universal—Ed.
** the “relativity”—Ed.
“It” (der gesunde Menschenverstand*)
“is the mode of thought of its time, containing all the prejudices of this time.”

(36)

2) Assuming that Being is, it cannot be known.
3) Even if it is knowable, no communication of what is known is possible.

...“Gorgias is conscious that they” (Being and not-Being, their mutual sublation)
“are vanishing moments; the unconscious conception has this truth also, but knows nothing about it.....” (40)

"Vanishing moments" = Being and not-Being. That is a magnificent definition of dialectics!!

...“Gorgias α) justly argues against absolute realism, which, because it has a notion, thinks it possesses the very thing itself, when actually it possesses only something relative; β) falls into the bad idealism of modern times: ‘what is thought is always subjective, and thus not the existent, since through thought an existent is transformed into what is thought....’” (41)

(and further below (p. 41 i.f.) Kant is again mentioned).

To be added on Gorgias**: He puts “either— or” to the fundamental questions. “But that is not true dialectics; it would be necessary to prove that the object must

* common sense—Ed.
** This excerpt was made by Lenin somewhat later in outlining the philosophy of Socrates (pp. 43-44 of Hegel; see p. 273 of this volume).—Ed.
be necessarily in one or another determination, not in and for itself. The object resolves itself only into those determinations; but from that nothing follows regarding the nature of the object itself.” (39)

To be added further on Gorgias*

In the exposition of his view that the existent cannot be imparted, communicated:

“Speech, by which the existent has to be expressed, is not the existent, what is imparted is thus not the existent, but only words.” (Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos. VII. § 83-84)—p. 41—Hegel writes: “The existent is also comprehended as non-existent, but the comprehension of it is to make it universal.” (42)

...“This individual cannot be expressed....” (42)

Every word (speech) already universalises cf. Feuerbach⁹⁴

The senses show reality; thought and word — the universal.

Final words of the section on the Sophists: “The Sophists thus also made dialectic, universal Philosophy, their object, and they were profound thinkers....” (42)

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCRATES

Socrates is a “world-famed personage” (42), the “most interesting” (ibid.) in the philosophy of antiquity—“subjectivity of
thought” (42) “freedom of self-consciousness” (44).

“Herein lies the ambiguity of dialectics and sophistry; the objective disappears” (43): is the subjective contingent or is there in it (“an ihm selhst”*) the objective and universal? (43)**

“True thought thinks in such a way that its content is as truly objective as subjective” (44)—and in Socrates and Plato we see, Hegel says, not only subjectivity (“the reference of any judgment to consciousness is held by him—Socrates—“in common with the Sophists”)—but also objectivity.

“Objectivity has here” (in Socrates) “the sense of the universal, existent in and for itself, and not external objectivity” (45)—idem 46: “not external objectivity but the spiritual universal.”

And two lines further down:

“Kant’s ideal is the phenomenon, not objective in itself....” (46)

Socrates called his method Hebammenkunst***—(p. 64) (derived from his mother, he said) ((Socrates’ mother = midwife))—to help in bringing thoughts to birth.

Hegel’s example: everyone knows, he says, what Werden is, but it surprises us if we analyse (reflektierend) and find that it is “the identity of Being and not-Being”—“so great a distinction.” (67)

Meno (Plato’s “Meno”) examined Socrates to an electric eel (Zitteraal), which makes anyone who touches it “narkotisch”****

* “in it itself”—Ed.

** Following this paragraph in the MS. is an excerpt on Gorgias’ philosophy, beginning with the words: “To be added on Gorgias....” (See p. 271 of this volume.)—Ed.

*** the art of midwifery—Ed.

**** Becoming = not-Being and Being.—Ed.

***** “drugged”—Ed.
Intelligent idealism is closer to intelligent materialism than stupid materialism. Dialectical idealism instead of intelligent; metaphysical, undeveloped, dead, crude, rigid instead of stupid.

To be elaborated:

Plekhanov wrote on philosophy (dialectics) probably about 1,000 pages (Beltov + against Bogdanov + against the Kantians + fundamental questions, etc., etc.) Among them, *abou t* the large Logic, *in connection with it*, *its thought* (i.e., dialectics *proper*, as philosophical science) nil!!

** Protagoras: “man is the measure of all things.” Socrates: “man, as thinking, is the measure of all things.” (75)

* Following this paragraph in the MS. is an excerpt on Gorgias’ philosophy, beginning with the words: “To be added further on Gorgias...” (See p. 272 of this volume.)—Ed.

** very well put—Ed.  

très bien

**very well put—Ed.**
THE SOCRATICS

In connection with the sophisms about the “heap” and “bald,” Hegel repeats the transition of quantity into quality and vice versa: dialectics. (Pp. 139-140)

143-144: At length about the fact that “language in essence expresses only the universal; what is meant, however, is the special, the particular. Hence what is meant cannot be said in speech.” (“It”? The most universal word of all.)

Who is it? I. Every person is an I. Das Sinnliche?* It is a universal, etc., etc. “This”? Everyone is “this.”

Why can the particular not be named? One of the objects of a given kind (tables) is distinguished by something from the rest.

“That the universal should in philosophy be given a place of such importance that only the universal can be expressed, and the ‘it’ which is meant, cannot, indicates a state of consciousness and thought which the philosophical culture of our time has not yet reached.” (143)

Hegel includes here “the scepticism of our times” (143)—Kant’s? and those who assert that ‘sensuous certainty is the truth.” (143)

For das Sinnliche “is a universal.” (143)

Thereby Hegel hits every materialism except dialectical materialism. NB

* the sensuous—Ed.
To call by name?—but the name is a contingent symbol and does not express
\[ S a c h e s e l b s t \] (how can the particular be expressed?) (144)

Hegel seriously “believed,” thought, that materialism as a philosophy was impossible, for philosophy is the science of thinking, of the *universal*, but the universal is a thought. Here he repeated the error of the same subjective idealism that he always called “bad” idealism. Objective (and still more, absolute) idealism came *very close* to materialism by a zig-zag (and a somersault), even partially became transformed into it.

The Cyrenaics\(^98\) held sensation for the truth, “the truth is not what is in sensation, the content, but is itself sensation.” (151)

“The main principle of the Cyrenaic school, therefore, is sensation, which should form the real criterion of the true and the good....” (153)

“Sensation is the indeterminate unit” (154), but if thinking is added, then the universal appears and “simple subjectivity” disappears.

(Phenomenologists à la Mach & Co. *inevitably* become idealists on the question of the *universal*, “law,” “necessity,” etc.)

Another Cyrenaic, Hegesias, “recognised” “this incongruity between sensation and universality....” (155)

\* *the very essence of the thing—Ed.*

\** Cf. Überweg-Heinze, § 38, p. 122 (10th edition)—and also about them in Plato’s *Theaetetus*.\(^99\) Their (the Cyrenaics’) scepticism and subjectivism—*Ed.*
They confuse sensation as a principle of the theory of knowledge and a principle of ethics. This NB. But Hegel *separated* the theory of knowledge.

**THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO**

In regard to Plato's plan by which philosophers ought to rule the state:

..."The territory of history is different from that of philosophy...."

We must recognise that action represents at the same time the endeavours of the subject as such for particular ends.... All those particular ends are really only means for bringing forth the Idea, because *it* is the absolute power." (193)

Concerning Plato’s doctrine on ideas:

..."because sensuous perception shows nothing purely, or as it is in itself" (*Phaedo*)—p. 213—therefore the body is a hindrance to the soul.

The significance of the *universal* is contradictory: it is dead, impure, incomplete, etc., etc., but it alone is a *stage* towards knowledge of the *concrete*, for we can never know the concrete completely. The *infinite* sum of general conceptions, laws, etc., gives the *concrete* in its completeness.

The movement of cognition to the object can always only proceed dialectically: to retreat in order to hit
In analysing Plato's dialectics, Hegel once again tries to show the difference between subjective, sophistic dialectics and objective dialectics:

"That everything is one, we say of each thing: 'it is one and at the same time we show also that it is many, its many parts and properties'—but it is thereby said: 'it is one in quite another respect from that in which it is many'—we do not bring these thoughts together. Thus the conception and the words merely go backwards and forwards from time one to the other. If this passing to and fro is performed with consciousness, it is empty dialectics, which does not unite the opposites and does not come to unity.” (232)

Plato in the "Sophistes":

"The point of difficulty, and what we ought to aim at, is to show that what

* to fall back, the better to leap (to know?)—Ed.
** nodal point—Ed.
is other is the same, and what is the same is other, and indeed in the same regard and from the same point of view.” (233)

“But we must be conscious of the fact that the Notion is neither merely the immediate in truth, although it is the simple—but it is of spiritual simplicity, essentially the thought which has returned into itself (immediately is only this red, etc.); nor that it is only that which reflects itself in itself, the thing of consciousness; but is also in itself, i.e., it is objective essence....” (245)

The concept is not something immediate (although the concept is a “simple” thing, but this simplicity is “spiritual,” the simplicity of the Idea)-what is immediate is only the sensation of “red” (“this is red”), etc. The concept is not “merely the thing of consciousness”; but is the essence of the object (gegenständliches Wesen), it is something an sich, “in itself.”

...“This conviction of the nature of the Notion, Plato did not express so definitely....” (245)

Hegel dilates at length on Plato’s “Philosophy of Nature,” the ultra-nonsensical mysticism of ideas, such as that “triangles form the essence of sensuous things” (265), and such mystical nonsense. That is highly characteristic! The mystic-idealist-spiritualist Hegel (like all official, clerical-idealist philosophy of our day) extols and expatiates on mysticism, idealism in the history of philosophy, while ignoring and slight-
THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

Incorrect, says Hegel, is the generally held opinion that the philosophy of Aristotle is “realism” (299), id. p. 311 “empiricism”) in contrast to the idealism of Plato ((Here again, Hegel clearly squeezes in a great deal under idealism.))

In presenting Aristotle’s polemic against Plato’s doctrine on ideas, Hegel suppressed its materialistic features. (Cf. 322-323 and others.)

He has let the cat out of the bag: “The elevation of Alexander” (Alexander of Macedon, Aristotle’s pupil) “... into ... a god is ... not matter for surprise ... God and man are not at all so very wide asunder ....” (305)

Hegel perceives the idealism of Aristotle in his idea of god. (326) ((Of course, it is idealism, but more objective and further removed, more general than the idealism of Plato, hence in the philosophy of nature more frequently = materialism.))
Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s “ideas” is a criticism of idealism as idealism in general: for whence concepts, abstractions, are derived, thence come also “law” and “necessity,” etc. The idealist Hegel in cowardly fashion fought shy of the undermining of the foundations of idealism by Aristotle (in his criticism of Plato’s ideas).

“When Leucippus and Plato accordingly say that motion has always existed, but they give no reason for the assertion.” (Aristoteles, *Metaphysik*, XII, 6 and 7.) p. 328

Aristotle thus pitifully brings forward god against the materialist Leucippus and the idealist Plato. There is eclecticism in Aristotle here. But Hegel conceals the weakness for the sake of mysticism!

Hegel, the supporter of dialectics, could not understand the dialectical transition from matter to motion, from matter to consciousness—especially the second. Marx corrected the error (or weakness?) of the mystic.

When one idealist criticises the foundations of idealism of another idealist, materialism is always the gainer thereby. Cf. Aristotle versus Plato, etc., Hegel versus Kant, etc.

Not only is the transition from matter to consciousness dialectical, but also that from sensation to thought, etc.
What distinguishes the dialectical transition from the undialectical transition? The leap. The contradiction. The interruption of gradualness. The unity (identity) of Being and not-Being.

The following passage shows especially clearly how Hegel conceals the weakness of Aristotle’s idealism:

“Aristotle makes objects into thoughts; hence, in being thoughts, they exist in truth; that is their αὐσία.*

“The meaning of this is not, however, that natural objects have themselves the power of thinking, but as they are subjectively thought by me, my thought is thus also the Notion of the thing, which therefore constitutes its substance. But in nature the Notion does not exist as thought in this freedom, but has flesh and blood; yet it has a soul, and this is its Notion. Aristotle recognises what things in and for themselves are; and that is their αὐσία. The Notion does not exist for itself, but it is stunted by externality. The ordinary definition of truth is: ‘truth is the harmony of the conception with the object.’ But the conception itself is only a conception, I am still not at all in harmony with my conception (with its content); for when I represent to myself a house, a beam, and so on, I am by no means this content—‘I’ is something other than the conception of house. It is only in thought that there is present a true harmony between objective and subjective; that constitutes me (Hegel’s italics). Aristotle therefore finds himself at the most advanced standpoint; nothing more profound can one desire to know.”

(332-333)

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* substance—Ed.
“In nature” concepts do not exist “in this freedom” (in the freedom of thought and the fantasy of man!!). “In nature” they (concepts) have “flesh and blood.” — That is excellent! But it is materialism. Human concepts are the soul of nature — thus is only a mystical way of saying that in human concepts nature is reflected in a distinctive way (this NB: in a distinctive and dialectical way!!).

Pp. 318-337 solely on the Metaphysics of Aristotle!! Everything essential that Lie has to say against Plato’s idealism is suppressed!! In particular, there is suppressed the question of existence outside man and humanity!!! = the question of materialism!

Aristotle is an empiricist, but a thinking one. (340) “The empirical, comprehended in its synthesis, is the speculative Notion....” (341) (Hegel’s italics.)

The coincidence of concepts with “synthesis,” with the sum, summing up of empiricism, sensations, the senses, is indubitable for the philosophers of all trends. Whence this coincidence? From God (I, the idea, thought, etc., etc.) or from (out of) nature? Engels was right in his formulation of the question.¹⁰¹

...“The subjective form constitutes the essence of the Kantian philosophy....” (341)
On the teleology of Aristotle.
...“Nature has its means in itself and these means are also end. This end in nature is its λόγος,* the truly rational.” (349)

...“Understanding is not only thinking with consciousness. There is contained in it also the whole, true, profound Notion of nature, of life....” (348)

Reason (understanding), thought, consciousness, without nature, not in correspondence with nature is falsity = materialism!

It is repulsive to read how Hegel extols Aristotle for his “true speculative notions” (373 of the “soul,” and much more besides), clearly spinning a tale of idealistic (= mystical) nonsense.

Suppressed are all the points on which Aristotle wavers between idealism and materialism!!!

Regarding Aristotle’s views on the “soul,” Hegel writes:
“All that is universal is in fact real, as particular, individual, existing for another” (375)—in other words, the soul.

Aristotle. *De anima*, II, 5:
“The difference” (between Empfinden, and Erkennen**) “is: that which causes the sensation is external. The cause of this is that perceptive activity is directed on the particular, while knowledge has as its object the universal; but the universal is

* logos—*Ed.*
** sense-perception (sensation) and cognition—*Ed.*
to a certain extent, in the soul itself as substance. Everyone can therefore think if he wishes but sense-perception does not depend on him, since the necessary condition is that the object perceived be present.” (377)

The crux here—“außen ist”*—o u t - s i d e man, independent of him. That is materialism. And this foundation, basis, kernel of materialism, Hegel begins wegschwatzen**:

“This is an entirely correct view of sense-perception,” writes Hegel, and he goes on to explain that there is undoubtedly “passivity in sense-perception: “it is a matter of indifference whether subjectively or objectively; in both there is contained the moment of passivity.... With this moment of passivity, Aristotle does not fall short of idealism, sense-perception is always in one aspect passive. That is, however, a bad idealism which thinks that the passivity and spontaneity of the mind depend on whether the determination given is from within or from without, as if there were freedom in sense-perception; the latter is a sphere of limitation”!!...

NB!!

((The idealist stops up the gap leading to materialism. No, it is not gleichgültig*** whether from without or from within. This is precisely the point! “From without”—that is materialism. “From within” = idealism. And with the word “passivity,” while keeping silent about the term ("from without") in Aristotle, Hegel described in a different way the same f r o m w i t h o u t t.)

* “is external”—Ed.
** to talk out of existence—Ed.
*** a matter of indifference—Ed.
Passivity means precisely from without!! Hegel replaces the idealism of sense-perception by the idealism of thought, but equally by idealism.}

...“Subjective idealism declares that there are no external things, they are a determination of our Self. This must be admitted in respect to sense-perception. I am passive in sense-perception, sense-perception is subjective; it is existence, a state, a determination in me, not freedom. Whether the sense-perception is external or in me, is a matter of indifference, it exists....” (378)

Then follows the famous analogy of the soul with wax, causing Hegel to twist and turn like the devil confronted with holy water, and to cry out about it having “so often occasioned misapprehension.” (378-379)

Aristotle says (De anima, II, 12): “Sense-perception is the receiving of sensible forms without matter” ... “as wax receives only the impress of the golden signet ring, not the gold itself, but merely its form.”

Hegel writes: ...“In sense-perception only the form reaches us, without matter. It is otherwise in practical life—in eating and drinking. In the practical sphere in general we behave as single individuals, and as single individuals in a determinate Being, even a material determinate Being, we behave towards matter in a material way. Only insofar as we are of a material nature, are we able to behave in such a way; the point is that our material existence comes into play.” (379)

((A close approach to materialism—and equivocation.))

Hegel gets angry and scolds on account of the “wax,” saying: “everyone can under-
stand it” (380), “we do not get beyond the crude aspect of the analogy,” (379) etc. “The soul should by no means be passive wax or receive determinations from without...” (380) ...“It” (die Seele*) “changes the form of the external body into its own....” (381)

*Aristotle, *De anima*, III, 2: ...“The effect of being perceived and of sense-perception is exactly one and the same; but their existence is not the same....” (381)

And Hegel comments: ...“There is a body which sounds and a subject which hears: their existence is twofold....” (382)

But he leaves aside the question of Being outside man!!! A sophistical dodge from materialism!

Speaking about thinking, and about reason (νόης), Aristotle (*De anima*, III, 4) says: ...“There is no sense-perception independent of the body, but νόης is separable from it....” (385) “νόης is like a book upon whose pages nothing is actually written” (38)—and Hegel again becomes irate: “another much-decried illustration” (386), the very opposite of what he means is ascribed to Aristotle, etc., etc. ((and the question of Being *in dependent of* mind and of man is suppressed!!))—all that for the sake of proving “Aristotle is therefore not a realist.” (389)

*Aristotle:*

“In this way he who perceives nothing by his senses learns nothing and understands nothing; when he discerns anything

* the soul—*Ed.
Aristotle and materialism...he must necessarily discern it as a pictorial conception, for such conceptions are like sense-perceptions, only without matter....” (389) ...“Whether the understanding thinks actual objects when it is abstracted from all matter requires special investigation....” (389) And Hegel scrapes out of Aristotle that ostensibly “νοος** and νοητόν*** are one and the same” (390), etc. A model example of the idealistic misrepresentations of an idealist!! Distorting Aristotle into an idealist of the eighteenth-nineteenth century!!

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE STOICS

In regard to the “criterion of truth” of the Stoics—“the conception that is laid hold of” (444-446)—Hegel says that consciousness only compares conception with conception (not with the object—(446): “truth ... is the harmony of object and consciousness” = “the celebrated definition of the truth”) and, consequently, the whole question is one of the “objective logos, the rationality of the world.” (446)

“Thought yields nothing but the form of universality and identity with itself; ...hence everything may harmonise with my thought.” (449)

“Reasons, however, prove to be a humbug; for there are good reasons for everything....” (449) “Which reasons should be esteemed as good thereby depends on the end and interest....” (ibidem)
THE PHILOSOPHY OF EPICURUS

Speaking of Epicurus (342-271 B. C.), Hegel immediately (before describing his views) adopts a hostile attitude to materialism and declares:

“It is already (!!) self-evident (!!) that if sense-perceived Being is regarded as the truth, the necessity for the Notion is altogether abrogated, in the absence of speculative interest everything falls apart, and, on the contrary, the vulgar view of things prevails; in point of fact it does not go beyond the view of ordinary human understanding, or rather, everything is lowered to the level of ordinary human understanding”!! (473-474)

Slander against materialism!! “Necessity for the Notion” is not in the slightest “abrogated” by the theory of the source of cognition and the concept!! Disagreement with “common sense” is the foul quirk of an idealist.

Epicurus gave the name of Canonic* to the theory of knowledge and the criterion of truth. After a brief exposition of it, Hegel writes:

“It is so simple that nothing can well be simpler—it is abstract, but also very trivial; more or less on the level of ordinary consciousness that begins to reflect. It consists of ordinary psychological conceptions; they are quite correct. Out of sense-perceptions we make conceptions as the universal; thanks to which it becomes lasting. The conceptions themselves (bei

* In the manuscript the word “Canonic” is linked by an arrow with the word “It” at the beginning of the following paragraph.—Ed.
der δόξα, Meinung*) are tested by means of sensations, as to whether they are last-
ing, whether they repeat themselves. That is quite correct on the whole, but quite superficial; it is the first beginning, the mechanics of conception with respect to the first sense-perceptions....” (483)

The “first beginning” is forgotten and distorted by idealism. Di-

材料主义 alone linked the “beginning” with the continuation and the end.

NB: p. 481—on the significance of words according to Epicurus:

Everything has its evidence, energy, distinctness, in the name first conferred on it” (Epicurus: Diogenes Laertius, X, § 33). And Hegel: The name is something universal, belongs to thinking, makes the manifold simple.” (481)

“On the objective manner in general in which the images of external things enter into us, and on our relation to external things, by which conceptions arise—Epicurus has evolved the following metaphysical explanation:

“From the surfaces of things there passes off a constant stream, which cannot be detected by our senses ... and this because, by reason of the counteracting replenishment, the thing itself in its solidity long preserves the same arrangement and disposition of the atoms; and the motion through the air of these surfaces which detach themselves is of the utmost rapidity, because it is not necessary that what is detached should have any thickness.” “The

* in opinion—Ed.
sensation does not contradict such an idea, when we consider” (zusehe) “how images produce their effects; they bring us a correspondence, a sympathetic link with external things. Therefore something passes out from them which within us is like something external.” “And since the emanation passes into us, we know of the definiteness of a sensation; the definite lies in the object and thus flows into us” (pp. 484-485, Diogenes Laertius, X, § 48-49).

The genius of Epicurus’ conjecture (300 B.C., i.e., more than 2,000 years before Hegel), e.g., on light and its velocity.

Hegel completely concealed (NB) the main thing: (NB) the existence of things outside the consciousness of man and independent of it—all that Hegel suppresses and merely says:

...“This is a very trivial way of representing sense-perception. Epicurus elected to take the easiest criterion of the truth—a criterion still in use—inasmuch as it is not apprehended by sight, namely: that it does not contradict what we see or hear. For in truth such matters of thought as atoms, the detachment of surfaces, and so forth, are beyond our powers of sight and hearing; [certainty we manage to see and to hear something different] but there is abundance of room for what is seen and what is conceived or imagined to exist alongside of one another. If the two are allowed to fall apart, they do not contradict each other; for it is not until we relate them that the contradiction becomes apparent....” (485-486)

A model of distortion and slander against materialism by an idealist

* The words in brackets are missing in Lenin’s manuscript.—Ed.
Hegel has avoided Epicurus’ theory of cognition and begun to speak of something-t h i n g e l s e, which Epicurus does not touch on here and w h i c h i s c o m p a t i b l e with materialism!!
This avoids the essence of materialism and materialist dialectics.

“In Epicurus there is no... final end in the world, wisdom of a Creator; everything consists of events, which are determined by the chance (??) external (??) coming together of configurations of atoms....” (491)

And Hegel simply hurls abuse at Epicurus: “His thoughts on particular aspects of Nature are, however, in themselves feeble....” (492)

And immediately afterwards is a polemic against the “Naturwissenschaft” heute,* which, like Epicurus, allegedly judges “by analogy,” and “explains” (492)—e.g., light as “vibrations of the ether....” This is an analogy quite in the manner of Epicurus....” (493)

((Modern natural science versus Epicurus,—against (NB) Hegel.))

In Epicurus, “the kernel of the matter, the principle, is nothing else than the principle of our usual natural science....” (495) ... “it is still the manner which lies at the basis of our natural science....” (496)

Correct is only the reference to the ignorance of dialectics in general and of the dialectics of concepts. But the criticism of materialism is schwach.**

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* “natural science” today—Ed.
** feeble—Ed.
“Of this method (of Epicurean philosophy) we may say in general that it likewise has a side on which it possesses value. Aristotle and the more ancient philosophers took their start in natural philosophy from universal thought a priori, and from this developed the Notion. This is the one side. The other side is the necessary one that experience should be worked up into universality, that laws should be determined; that is to say, that the result which follows from the abstract Idea should coincide with the general conception to which experience and observation have led. The a priori is with Aristotle, for instance, most excellent, but not sufficient, because it lacks connection with and relation to experience and observation. This development of the particular to the general is the discovery of laws, natural forces and so on. It may be said that Epicurus is the inventor of empirical natural science, of empirical psychology. In contrast to the Stoic ends, conceptions of the understanding, is experience, the sensuous present. There we have abstract, limited understanding, without truth in itself; and therefore without the presence and reality of nature; here we have this sense of nature, which is more true than these other hypotheses.”

(496-407)

The importance of Epicurus—the struggle against Aberration of the Greeks and Romans (498)—and modern priests?? all this nonsense about whether a hare ran across the path (493), etc. (and the good Lord?).

*suppositions—Ed.
“And from it” (the philosophy of Epicurus), “more than anything, those conceptions which have altogether denied the supersensuous have proceeded.” (498)

But this is good only for “endlichen”*.... “With superstition there also passed away self-dependent Connection and the world of the Ideal.” (499)

This NOTA BENE.

P. 499: Epicurus on the soul: the *finite* (NB) atoms, their more *rapid* (NB) motion, their *connection* (NB) etc., etc., with the body (D i o g e n e s L a e r t i u s, X, § 66; 63-64)—very naïve and good!—but Hegel becomes irate, he *hurls abuse*: “meaningless talk,” “empty words,” “no thoughts.” (500)

The Gods, according to Epicurus, are “das Allgemeine”** (506) in general—“they consist partly in number” as number, i.e., abstraction from the sensuous....

“In part, they” (the gods) “are the perfected type of man, which, owing to the similarity of the images, arises from the continuous confluence of like images on one and the same subject.” (507)

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SCEPTICS104

Speaking of Scepticism, Hegel points to its apparent “invincibility” (Ünbezwinglichkeit) (538):

“If anyone actually desires to be a Sceptic, he cannot be convinced, or be brought to a positive philosophy, any more than he who is paralysed can be made to stand.” (539)

“Positive philosophy in relation to it” (den denkenden Skeptizismus***) “may

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* “finite” things—Ed.
** “the universal”—Ed.
*** thinking scepticism—Ed.
have this consciousness: it contains in itself the negative of Scepticism; Scepticism is not opposed to it, nor outside it, but is a moment of it; but it contains the negative in its truth, as it is not present in Scepticism.” (539)

(The relation of philosophy to Scepticism:)

“Philosophy is dialectical, this dialectic is change; the Idea, as abstract Idea, is the inert and existent, but it is only true insofar as it grasps itself as living; this is that it is dialectical in itself, in order to transcend that quiescence and inertness. Hence the philosophic idea is dialectical in itself and not contingent; Scepticism, on the contrary, exercises its dialectic contingently—for just as the material, the content comes before it, it shows that it is negative in itself....” (540)

The old (ancient) Scepticism has to be distinguished from the new (only Schulze of Göttingen is named). (540)

Ataraxie (imperturbability?) as the ideal of the Sceptics:

“Pyrrho once pointed out to his fellow-passengers on hoard a ship, who were frightened during a storm, a pig, which remained quite indifferent and peaceably ate on, saying to them: in such imperturbability the wise man must also abide” (Diogenes Laertius, IX, 68)—pp. 551-552.

“Scepticism is not doubt. Doubt is just the opposite of the tranquillity that is the result of scepticism.” (552).

...“Scepticism, on the contrary, is indifferent to the one as well as to the other....” (553)

Schulze-Aenesidemus passes off for Scepticism the statement that everything sensuous is truth (557), but the Sceptics did
not say so: one must sich danach richten, orientate oneself by the sensuous, but that is not the truth. The new Scepticism does not doubt the reality of things. The old Scepticism does doubt the reality of things.

Tropes (turns of speech, arguments, etc.) of the Sceptics:

a. The diversity of animal organisation. (558)
Differences in sensations: the jaundiced (dem Gelbsüchtigen) sees as yellow what to others appears white, etc.

b. The diversity of mankind. “Idiosyncrasies.” (559)
Whom to believe? The majority? Foolish, for all men cannot be interrogated. (560)
Diversity of philosophies: Stupid reference, Hegel waxes indignant: ... “such men see everything in a philosophy excepting Philosophy itself, and this is overlooked....” “However different the philosophic systems may be, they are not as different as white and sweet, green and rough, for they agree in the fact that they are philosophies and this is what is overlooked.” (561)

...“All tropes proceed against the ‘is,’ but the truth is all the same not this dry ‘is,’ but essentially process....” (562)

c. The diversity in the constitution of the organs of sense: the various sense organs perceive differently (on a painted panel something appears erha-
ben* to the eye but not to the touch).

d. The diversity of circumstances in the subject (rest, passion, etc.).

e. The diversity of distances, etc.

| the earth going round
| the sun or vice versa, etc.,

f. Intermixture (scents in strong sunshine and without it, etc.).

g. The composition of things (pounded glass is not transparent, etc.).

h. The “relativity of things.”

i. The frequency, rarity of happenings, etc.; habit.

k. Customs, laws, etc., their diversity....

These (10) are all old tropes and Hegel: this is all “empirical”—“do not have to do with the Notion....” (566) This is “trivial”..., but....

“In fact, as against the dogmatism of the common human understanding they are quite valid....” (567)

The five new tropes (are said by Hegel to be much more advanced, they contain dialectics, concern concepts)—also according to Sextus:

- a. The diversity of the opinions ... of philosophers...
- b. The falling into an infinite progression (one thing depends on another and so on without end).
- c. Relativity (of premises).
- d. Presupposition. The dogmatists put forward unprovable presuppositions.
- e. Reciprocity. Circle (vicious)...

* raised—Ed.
“These sceptical tropes, in fact, concern that which is called a dogmatic philosophy (and in accordance with its nature such a philosophy must display itself in all these forms) not in the sense of its having a positive content, but as asserting something determinate as the absolute.” (575)

Hegel against the absolute! Here we have the germ of dialectical materialism.

“To the criticism which knows nothing in itself, nothing (not nichts) (sic!!)* absolute, all knowledge of Being-in-itself, as such, is held to be dogmatism, while it is the worst dogmatism of all, because it maintains that the ‘I,’ the unity of self-consciousness, opposed to Being, is in and for itself, and that what is ‘in itself’ in the outside world is likewise so, and therefore that the two absolutely cannot come together.” (570)

“These tropes hit dogmatic philosophy, which has this manner of representing one principle in a determinate proposition as determinateness. Such a principle is always conditioned; and consequently contains dialectics, the destruction within it of itself.” (577) “These tropes are a powerful weapon against the philosophy of reason.” (ib.)

Sextus, for example, reveals the dialectics of the concept of a point (der Punkt). A point has no dimensions? That means that it is outside space! It is the limit of space in space, a negation of space, and at the same time “it touches space”—“but at same time it is also in itself something dialectical.” (570)

* Lenin’s remark in parentheses was evoked by a misprint in the German text, which had nicht (not) instead of nichts (nothing) before the word “absolute.”—Ed.
“These tropes ... are powerless against speculative ideas, because the latter contain within themselves a dialectical moment and the abrogation of the finite.” (580)

End of Volume XIV (p. 586).
"The return to God...." (5), "self-consciousness is absolute Essence"..., "the world-spirit"... (7), "Christian religion".... (8) And a mass of thin porridge ladled out about God.... (8-18)

But this philosophical idealism, openly, "seriously" leading to God, is more honest than modern agnosticism with its hypocrisy and cowardice.

A. Philo—(about the time of the birth of Christ), a Jewish savant, a mystic, "finds Plato present in Moses" (19), etc. The main point is "the knowledge of God" (21), etc. God is λόγος,** "the epitome of all Ideas," "pure Being" (22) ("according to Plato").... (22) Ideas are "angels" (messengers of God).... (24) The sensuous world, however, "as with Plato" = οὐχ ὄν*** = = not-Being. (25)

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* Hegel, Werke, Bd. XV, Berlin, 1836.—Ed.
** logos—Ed.
*** non-existent—Ed.
B. Cabbala, the Gnostics ————

C. Alexandrian philosophy (= eclecticism) (= Platonists, Pythagoreans, Aristotelians). (33, 35)

Eclectics are either uncultured men, or cunning (die klugen Leute*—they take the good from every system, but...

They developed Plato....

“The Platonic universal, which is in thought, accordingly receives the signification of being as such absolute essence” (33)....
CONSPECTUS OF HEGEL’S BOOK
LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY
OF HISTORY

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HEGEL. WORKS, VOL. IX (BERLIN, 1837)
LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

(Edition of E. Gans)

Materials: Notes of the lectures 1822-1831. Hegel’s manuscript up to p. 73, etc.

P. 5* ...“Speeches ... are transactions between people”... (hence these speeches are not mere talk).

7—The French and English are more educated (“they have more ... national culture”),—but we Germans rack our brains to discover how history ought to be written, rather than writing it.

9—History teaches “that peoples and governments of a people have never learned anything from history; each period is too individual for that.”

“But what experience and history teach is this—that peoples and governments have never learned anything from history, or acted according to the lessons that could have been drawn from it. Each period has such peculiar circumstances, it is a state of things so unique that one must and can judge of it only on the basis of itself.”

* Hegel, Werke, Bd. IX, Berlin, 1837.—Ed.
The substance of Matter is Gravity.
The substance of Spirit is Freedom.

"World history is the progress of the consciousness of freedom—a progress which we have to know in its necessity...."

(approach to historical materialism). What guides the actions of men? Above all, "Selbstsucht"—motives of love, etc., are rarer and their sphere narrower. What, then, is the outcome of this interweaving of passions, etc.? of needs, etc.?

"Nothing great in the world has been accomplished without passion...." Passion is the subjective and "therefore; the formal side of energy...."

i.f.—History does not begin with a conscious aim.... What is important is that which appears unconsciously for mankind as the result of its action....

"In this sense "Reason governs the world."

...In history through human actions "something else results in addition beyond that which they aim at and obtain, beyond that which they directly know and desire."

"They" (die Menschen) "gratify their own interest, but something further is thereby brought about, which was latent in their interest, but which was not in their consciousness or included in their intention."

* feeble—Ed.
** "self-interest"—Ed.
*** in fine—at the end—Ed.
**** human beings—Ed.
"Such are the great men in history, whose own particular aims contain that substantial element which is the will of the World Spirit...."

— the religiousness and virtue of a shepherd, a peasant, etc., is highly honourable (examples!! NB), but "the right of the World Spirit stands above all special rights...."

Here in Hegel is often to be found—about God, religion, morality in general—extremely trite idealistic nonsense.

"the gradual abolition of slavery is better than its sudden removal...."

The constitution of a state together with its religion, philosophy, thought, culture, "external forces" (climate, neighbours...) comprise "one substance, one Spirit...."

In nature movement takes place only in a cycle (!!)—in history, something new arises....

Language is richer among peoples in an undeveloped, primitive state—language becomes poorer with the advance of civilisation and the development of grammar.

"World history develops on a higher ground than that on which morality has its position (Stätte)...."

An excellent picture of history: the sum of individual passions, actions, etc. ("everywhere something akin to ourselves, and therefore everywhere something that excites our interest for or against"), sometimes the mass of
Sehr wicht!* see below this passage more fully**

some general interest, sometimes a multitude of “minute forces” (“an infinite exertion of minute forces which produce a tremendous result from what appears insignificant”).
The result? The result is “exhaustion.”
P. 74. *End of the “Introduction.”*

P. 75—“The Geographical Basis of World History” (a characteristic heading):
(75-101).

NB cf. Plekhanov111

75—Under the mild Ionic sky,” a Homer could more easily arise—but this is not the only cause.—“Not under Turkish rule,” etc.

82—Emigration to America removes “discontent,” and the continued existence of the contemporary civil order is guaranteed (but this Zustland***—”riches and poverty” 81)....

82. In Europe there is no such outlet: had the forests of Germany still been in existence, the French Revolution would not have occurred.

102: Three forms of world history: 1) despotism, 2) democracy and aristocracy, 3) monarchy.

Subdivisions: The Oriental World—The Greek—The Roman—The German World. Empty phrase-mongering about morality, etc., etc.

China. Chapter 1 (113 to 139). Description of the Chinese character, institutions, etc., etc. Nil, nil, nil!

India—to 170—To...

Persia (and Egypt)—to 231. Why did the Persian Empire fall, but not China or India? Dauer**** is not as such

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* very important!—Ed.
** See p. 313 of this volume.—Ed.
*** order—Ed.
**** duration—Ed.
vortreffliches* (229)—“The imperishable mountains are not superior to the rose that quickly loses its petals in its fleeting existence.” (229) Persia fell because the “spiritual view of things” began here (230), but the Greeks proved superior, “higher principle” of organisation, “self-conscious freedom.” (231)

232: “The Greek World” ... the principle (of “pure individuality”—the period of its development, flowering and decline, “encounter with the succeeding organ of world history” (233)—Rome with its “substance” (ibidem).

234: The geographical conditions of Greece: the diversity of its nature (in contrast to the monotony of the East).

242—The colonies in Greece. Amassing of wealth. Want and poverty “always” bound up with it....

246. “The natural, as explained by men, its internal, essential element, is the beginning of the divine in general” (in connection with the mythology of the Greeks).

251: “Man with his requirements behaves in a practical way in relation to external nature; in making it serve for his satisfaction, he wears it away, thereby setting to work as an intermediary. For natural objects are powerful and offer resistance in many different ways. In order to subdue them, man introduces other natural objects, thus turning nature against itself, and he invents tools for this purpose. These human inventions belong to the spirit, and such a tool must be regarded as

* something excellent—Ed.
Hegel and Marx

higher than a natural object.... The honour of human invention for subjugating nature is ascribed to the Gods” (among the Greeks).

264: Democracy in Greece was bound up with the small size of the states. *Speech*, living speech, united the citizens, created *Erwärmung*.

“Hence” in the French Revolution there was never a republican constitution.

322-323. “He” (Caesar) “removed the internal contradiction” (by abolishing the republic, which had become a “shadow”) “and created a new one. For world rule had hitherto reached only to the rim of the Alps, but Caesar opened a new arena: he founded the theatre which was now to become the centre of world history.”

And then on the murder of Caesar: ...“In general, a political revolution is, as it were, sanctioned in man’s opinion if it is repeated” (Napoleon, the Bourbons).... “By repetition that which at first appeared merely a matter of chance and possibility becomes something real and confirmed.” (323)

“Christianity.” (328-346) Banal, clerical, idealistic chatter about the greatness of Christianity (with quotations from the Gospels!!). Disgusting, stinking!

420-421: Why was the Reformation limited to a few nations? Among other reasons—“the Slav nations were agricultural” (421) and this brings with it “the relation of lords and serfs,” less “Betriebsamkeit,” etc. But why

* ardour—Ed.
** “industriousness”—Ed.
the Romanic nations? Their character (Grundcharakter* 421 i.f.)

429: ...“Polish freedom likewise was nothing but the freedom of the barons against the monarchs.... Hence the people had the same interest against the barons as the kings.... When freedom is mentioned, one must always be careful to see whether it is not really private interests that are being spoken of.” (430)

439: On the French Revolution... Why did the French pass “immediately from the theoretical to the practical,” but not the Germans? Among the Germans, the Reformation had “schon Alles gebessert,”** abolished “das unsägliche Unrecht,”*** etc.

441: For the first time (in the French Revolution) humanity had arrived at the conclusion “that man bases himself on the head, i.e., on thought, and builds reality accordingly....” “This was ... a glorious dawn....”

In considering further the “course of the Revolution in France” (441) Hegel stresses in freedom in general—freedom of property, and of industry (ibid.). ...The promulgation of laws? The will of all.... “The few should represent the many, but they often merely repress them....” “The power of the majority over the minority is to no less degree a great inconsistency” (ibid).

444: ...“In its content this event” (the French Revolution) “is world historical....”

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* fundamental character—Ed.
** “already changed everything for the better”—Ed.
*** “unspeakable injustice”—Ed.
“Liberalism,” (444) “liberal institutions” (443) spread over Europe.

446: “World history is nothing but the development of the notion of freedom....”

In general the philosophy of history yields very, very little—this is comprehensible, for it is precisely here, in this field, in this science, that Marx and Engels made the greatest step forward. Here most of all, Hegel is obsolete and antiquated.

(see the next page**)  

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* introduction—*Ed.*  
** On the next page of the manuscript the excerpt “Hegel on World History” begins—*Ed.*
“If then, finally, we regard world history from the standpoint of the category through which it should be considered, we have before us an endless picture of human life and activity under the most varied circumstances, with all kinds of aims and the most diverse events and destinies. In all these occurrences and events we see human action and effort in the forefront; everywhere something akin to ourselves, and therefore everywhere something that excites our interest for or against. Sometimes it attracts us by beauty, freedom and richness, sometimes by energy, sometimes even vice succeeds in making itself important. Often there is the comprehensive mass of some general interest that cumbrously moves forward, but still more often the infinite exertion of minute forces, which produce a tremendous result from what appears insignificant; everywhere the motleyest spectacle, and as soon as one vanishes another takes its place.

“But the immediate result of this consideration, however attractive it may be, is exhaustion, such as follows after a very varied spectacle, a magic lantern show; and even if we accord to each individual
representation its true worth, the question nevertheless arises in our minds, what is the final aim of all these particular events, is each one exhausted by its special aim, or ought one not rather think of a single ultimate aim of all these events; behind the loud noises at the surface is there not going on the labour and production of a work, an internal quiet, secret work in which the essential force of all those transitory phenomena is stored up? But if one does not bring thought, rational cognition, to world history from the beginning, one must at least approach it with the firm unshakable faith that it has reason in it, or at least that the world of the intellect and self-conscious will is not a victim of chance but must reveal itself in the light of the self-knowing idea.” (73-74)*
((NB. In the Preface, p. XVIII, the publisher, i.e., the editor, Ed. Gans, states that up to p. 73 the text was written by Hegel in 1830; the manuscript is an “Ausarbeitung.”**))

** “elaboration”—Ed.
PLAN OF HEGEL’S DIALECTICS
(LOGIC) 114

CONTENTS OF THE SMALL LOGIC (ENCYCLOPAEDIA)

I. The Doctrine of Being.
   A) Quality
      a) Being;
      b) Determinate Being;
      c) Being-for-self.
   B) Quantity
      a) Pure quantity;
      b) Magnitude (Quantum);
      c) Degree.
   C) Measure

II. The Doctrine of Essence.
   A) Essence a Ground of Existence.
      a) Identity—Difference—Ground;
      b) Existence;
      c) The Thing.
   B) Appearance.
      a) The World of Appearance;
      b) Content and Form;
      c) Relation.
   C) Actuality.
      a) Relationship of Substantiality;
      b) Relationship of Causality;
      c) Reciprocal Action.

III. The Doctrine of the Notion.
   A) The Subjective Notion.
      a) The Notion;
      b) The Judgment;
      c) The Syllogism.
B) The Object.
   a) Mechanism;
   b) Chemism;
   c) Teleology.

C) The Idea.
   a) Life;
   b) Cognition;
   c) The Absolute Idea.

The concept (cognition) reveals the essence (the law of causality, identity, difference, etc.) in Being (in immediate phenomena)—such is actually the general course of all human cognition (of all science) in general. Such is the course also of natural science and political economy and history. Insofar Hegel’s dialectic is a generalisation of the history of thought. To trace this more concretely and in greater detail in the history of the separate sciences seems an extraordinarily rewarding task. In logic, the history of thought must, by and large, coincide with the laws of thinking.

It is strikingly evident that Hegel sometimes passes from the abstract to the concrete (Sein* (abstract)—Das E an** (concrete)—Fürsichsein***) and sometimes the other way round (the subjective Notion—the Object—Truth (the Absolute Idea)). Is not this the inconsistency of an idealist (what Marx called the Ideenmystik**** in Hegel)? Or are there deeper reasons? (e.g., Being = Nothing—the idea of Be-

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* Being—Ed.
** Determinate Being—Ed.
*** Being-for-self—Ed.
**** mysticism of ideas—Ed.
coming, of development). First of all impressions flash by, then Something emerges, afterwards the concepts of quality (the determination of the thing or the phenomenon) and quantity are developed. After that study and reflection direct thought to cognition of identity—of difference—of Ground—of the Essence versus the Phenomenon—of causality, etc. All these moments (steps, stages, processes) of cognition move in the direction from the subject to the object, being tested in practice and arriving through this test at truth (= the Absolute Idea).

# Quality and sensation (Empfindung) are one and the same, says Feuerbach. The very first and most familiar to us is sensation, and in it there is inevitably also quality....

If Marx did not leave behind him a "Logic" (with a capital letter), he did leave the logic of Capital, and this ought to be utilised to the full in this question. In Capital, Marx applied to a single science logic, dialectics and the theory of knowledge of materialism [three words are not needed: it is one and the same thing] which has taken everything valuable in Hegel and developed it further.

Commodity—money—capital

production of absolute Mehrwert**

production of relative Mehrwert

* everything flows—Ed.
** surplus-value—Ed.
The history of capitalism and the analysis of the concepts summing it up.

The beginning—the most simple, ordinary, mass, immediate “Being”: the single commodity (“Sein” in political economy). The analysis of it as a social relation.

A double analysis, deductive and inductive—logical and historical (forms of value).

Testing by facts or by practice respectively, is to be found here in each step of the analysis.

Cf. concerning the question of Essence versus Appearance
— price and value
— demand and supply versus Wert
  (= krystallisjerte Arbeit*)
— wages and the price of labour-power..

Written in 1915
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* value (=crystallized labour)—Ed.
The author is an *idealist* and a shallow one. A re-writing of Hegel, a defence of Hegel against "modern philosophers," a comparison with Kant, etc. Nothing of interest. Nothing profound. Not a word about *materialist* dialectics: the author evidently has no notion of it.

Note the *translations* of Hegel's terms:

- *Être* [Being] — *Essence* — *Notion* (Mesure, etc. [Measure]).
- *Devenir* (das Gewordene) [Becoming].
- L'être déterminé (Dasein) [Determinate Being, Existent Being].
- Être pour un autre (Sein-für-anderes) [Being-for-other].
- Quelque chose (Etwas) [Something].
- Limite (Grenze) [Limit].
- Borne (Schranke) [Boundary].
- Devoir être (Sollen) [Ought].
- Être pour soi (Für-sich-Sein) [Being-for-itself].
- Existence hors de soi (Außer-sich-Sein) [Being outside itself].
- La connaissance (dos Erkennen) [Cognition].
Note also the amusing attempts of the author to justify Hegel as it were* against accusations of “realism” (read: materialism). According to Hegel “philosophy as a whole is a syllogism. And in this syllogism, logic is the universal, nature the particular, and spirit the individual” (p. 123). The author “analyses” (= rehashes) the last sentences of the Logic on the transition from the Idea to Nature. It transpires that through nature (in nature) the understanding cognises the Idea = uniformity, abstractions, etc.... Help! Almost materialism!!

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* These three words are in English in the original.—Ed.
is only provisional. It is a point of view that has to be superseded.” (129)

“That realism has its relative truth is indisputable. A point of view so natural and universal is not an aberration of the human mind.... In order to supersede realism, it” (dialectics) “will have to give it first its full development and only thus will it demonstrate the necessity of idealism. Hence Hegel will put time and space as the most general determinations of nature and not as forms of the mind. On this point he seems to disagree with Kant, but this is only in appearance and in words....

...“That is why he” (Hegel) “speaks of sensuous qualities as if they were really inherent in the body. It is surprising that on this account Herr Wundt accuses him of ignorance. Does the learned philosopher believe that Hegel had never read Descartes, Locke or even Kant? If he is a realist, it is due neither to ignorance nor inconsistency, but only tentatively and as a method of approach.” (130)

Comparing Hegel with Spinoza, the author says: “In short, Hegel and Spinoza agree in submitting nature to logic” (p. 140), but in Hegel logic is not mathematical logic but the logic of contradictions, of the transition “from pure abstraction to reality” (etc.). Of Spinoza it is said “with him” (Spinoza) “we are at the antipodes of idealism” (138); for “the world of spirits” (in Spinoza) “exists side by side with the world of bodies: it does not stand above it....”

...“The idea of evolution so characteristic of Hegelianism has no meaning for Spinoza....” (138)

Hegel develops the dialectics of Plato (“he recognises with Plato the necessary
coexistence of opposites” 140)—Leibnitz is close to Hegel. (141)

Noël defends Hegel against the charge of pantheism.... (here, he says, is the basis of this charge):

...“Absolute spirit, the final point of his” (Hegel’s) “dialectics, is it basically other than the idealised and deified spirit of man himself? Does his God exist anywhere but in nature and humanity?” (142)

Noël’s “defence” consists in stressing (chewing over) the fact that Hegel is an idealist.

Hegel not a “sceptic”

Is Hegel not a “dogmatist”? (Chapter VI: “The Dogmatism of Hegel”). Yes, in the sense of non-scepticism, in the sense of the ancients (p. 147). But according to Kant that = cognisability of “Things-in-themselves.” Hegel (just like Fichte) denies Things-in-themselves.

NB “Agnostic realism” according to Kant (p. 148 i.f.).

...“Kant defines dogmatism from the point of view of agnosticism. A dogmatist is one who claims to determine the Thing-in-itself, to know the unknowable. Moreover, dogmatism can take two forms....”

(149) Either it is mysticism, or

...“it can also naively raise sensuous reality to absolute reality, identify the phenomenon with the noumenon. It is then empirical dogmatism, that of the common mass and of the savant who is alien to philosophy. The materialists fall into this second error; the first was that of Plato, Descartes and their disciples....”

In Hegel, it is stated, there is not a trace of dogmatism, for “he will certainly
not be accused of not recognising the relativity of things with respect to thought, since his whole system rests on this principle. Nor will he be accused of applying the categories undiscriminatingly and uncritically. Is not his logic precisely a critique of the categories, a critique incontestably more profound than the Kantian critique?” (150)

...“There is no doubt that by the very rejection of noumena he” (Hegel) “puts reality in the phenomenon, but this reality in the phenomenon as such is only an immediate reality, consequently relative and intrinsically incomplete. It is true reality only implicitly and on condition of its further development....” (151)

...“Moreover, between the intelligible and the sensuous there is no absolute opposition, no hiatus, no unbridgeable gulf. The sensuous is the intelligible in anticipation; the intelligible is the sensuous understood....” (152)

(Even you, a shallow idealist, have derived some benefit from Hegel!)

...“Sensuous being contains the absolute implicitly and it is through a continuous gradation that we raise ourselves from the one to the other.” (153)

...“Thus, whatever may have been said about it, Kant’s philosophy retains the fundamental vice of mystical dogmatism. We find in it the two characteristic features of this doctrine: absolute opposition between the sensuous and the supersensuous, and an immediate transition from the one to the other.” (156)

In Chapter VII: “Hegel and Modern Thought,” Noël takes the positivism of Auguste Comte and, analysing it, calls it “an agnostic system.” (166)

(Idem 169: “positivist agnosticism”)
In criticizing positivism as agnosticism, the author sometimes castigates it not at all badly for its half-heartedness,—saying, for example, that the question of the source of laws or of the “permanence” of facts (“des faits permanents,”* 170) cannot be evaded:

...“Depending on whether one regards them” (les faits permanents) “as uncognisable or cognisable, one is brought back either to agnosticism or to dogmatic philosophy....” (170 i.f.).

The neo-criticism of M. Renouvier is described as eclecticism, something midway between “positivist phenomenalism and Kantianism proper.” (175)

Chattering about morality, freedom, etc., Noël, the vulgariser of Hegel, has not the slightest word to say about freedom as the understanding of necessity.


Ch. Bénard: Aesthetics and Poetics

Works on Hegelianism:

E. Beaussire: Antécédents de l’hégélianisme.

P. Janet: La dialectique dans Hégl et dans Platon. 1860.

Mariano: La Philosophie contemporaine en Italie.

Véra: Introduction à la Philosophie de Hégel.
J. PERRIN.

TREATISE ON PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY.

PRINCIPLES

PARIS, 1903

Note J. Perrin: Traité de chimie physique. Les principes (300 pp.). Paris, 1903. Review by Abel Rey in Revue Philosophique, 1904, 1, entitled: “Philosophical Principles of Physical Chemistry.” (Perrin analyses the notions of force, etc., cause, etc., energy, etc.—against “the view of energy as a mysterious entity” (p. 401).... Abel Rey calls Perrin an opponent of “neo-sceptic systems.”)

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This purely amateurish work consists almost exclusively of quotations from Feuerbach’s collected works Jodl edition. It can be useful only as a collection of quotations, and incomplete at that.

the author has far from worked out his subject

The author quotes mainly:
Vol. II, especially “Thesen und Grundsätze,” and then “Wider den Dualismus.”
X, especially “Über Spiritualismus und Materialismus.”

NB VIII, Vorlesungen über das Wesen der Religion (Feuerbach himself wrote in 1848 that this was a more mature work of his than The Essence of Christianity; published in 1841) VIII, SS. 26, 29; 102-109; 288; 329 and others.

VII. Das Wesen der Religion (1845: Feuerbach regards it as important).

IV. “Leibnitz” with the notes of 1847 (NB) IV, SS. 261; 197; 190-191; 274.

VII. Addenda to Wesen des Christentums.

The author quotes (in the spirit of Feuerbach):
Ebbinghaus: Experimentelle Psychologie, SS.
110 und 45.

Lange (II Buch, S. 104) against Feuerbach, he says, is obviously wrong (S. 83 and 88), distorting (and denying) Feuerbach’s materialism.
At the beginning the author gives a sketch of Feuerbach’s philosophical evolution,—*Todesgedanken* (1830)—still a Hegelian; *Der Schriftsteller und der Mensch* (1834)—beginning of the rupture; *Kritik des Antihegel* (1835)—against the enemies of Hegel, but not in favour of Hegel (cf. de Grün,²¹ Bd. II, 409; I, 390 and 398).—*The Critique of Hegelian Philosophy*** (1839).—*The Essence of Christianity* (1841)—the rupture—*Theses and Principles of the Philosophy of the Future* (1842 and 1843).—*The Essence of Religion* (1845).—*Lectures on the Essence of Religion* (1847).

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* Here the author was “not a pantheist, but a polytheist” (S. 15); “more a Leibnitzian than a Hegelian” (S. 15).

** The German titles of Feuerbach’s works are: *Kritik der Hegel-schen Philosophie; Wesen des Christentums; Vorläufige Thesen zur Reform der Philosophie; Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft; Wesen der Religion; Vorlesungen über das Wesen der Religion.*—Ed.
The author is an eclectic and vulgariser in philosophy, especially when speaking against Haeckel, about Buckle, etc., etc. Nevertheless, the tendency is materialist, e.g., p. 35*—“The question whether we dictate concepts to nature, or nature to us” is, he says, a combination of both points of view. Mach, he says, is right (p. 38), but I counterpose to it (Mach’s point of view) the “objective” point of view:

“Thus I hold that logic in us has its origin in the uniform course of things outside us, that the external necessity of natural events is our first and most real schoolmistress” (p. 39).

He rebels against phenomenology and modern monism,—but completely fails to understand the essence of materialist and idealist philosophy. In fact, he reduces the matter to “methods” of natural science in a general positivist sense. He is not even capable of raising the question of the objective reality of nature outside the consciousness (and sensations) of mankind.

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* Volkmann, P., Erkenntnistheorische Gründzüge der Naturwissenschaften, Leipzig-Berlin, 1910.—Ed.
The author expounds a special theme concerning "living substance" and its chemical metabolism. A special theme.

A bibliography is provided on this question. P. 112—a "working hypothesis," this, he says, is the essence. For example, he says that materialism in the nineteenth century was of great benefit to the natural sciences,—but now "no philosophical natural scientist any longer considers the materialist conception to be adequate" (112). There are no eternal truths. The significance of ideas, their Fruchtbarkeit,** their role as a "ferment"—"which creates and acts." (113)

Characteristic here is the naïve expression of the view that "materialism" hinders! Not the haziest conception of dialectical materialism and complete inability to distinguish materialism as a p h i l o s o p h y from the individual hide-bound views of the philistines of the day who call themselves materialists.

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* Verworn, M., Die Biogenhypothese, Jena, 1903.—Ed.
** fruitfulness—Ed.
The aim of the author is a “mechanical analysis of the phenomena of life” (p. 1, Preface)—a reference to the last chapter of the Allgemeine Physiologie.

Instead of “living protein” (p. 25)—said to be an unclear concept, and instead of the “living protein molecule” (“since a molecule cannot be alive”), the author proposes to speak of the “biogen-molecule.” (25)

The conversion of the chemical into the living—that, evidently, is the crux. In order to move more freely in this new, still obscure, hypothetical, down with “materialism,” down with antiquated “shackling” ideas (the “molecule”), let us invent a new term (biogen), in order to seek new knowledge more freely! *NB.* Concerning the question of the sources and vital impelling motives of modern “idealism” in physics and natural science in general.
In this pamphlet the author gives a kind of summary of his four-volume work: "Nat ur w i s s e n s c h a f f-ten i n i h r e r E n t w i c k l u n g u n d i n i h r e r m Z u s a m m e n h a n g e"...

About 5,000 years of the development of civilisation from ancient Egypt to our time. According to Homer, the world was only the Mediterranean Sea and surrounding countries. (P. 8)*

In Egypt the clear nights facilitated the pursuit of astronomy. They observed the stars and their movement, the moon, etc.

At first the month was reckoned as 30 days, and the year as 360 (p. 31). The ancient Egyptians already had 365 days. (P. 32) Eratosthenes (276 B. C.) determined the circumference of the earth as 250,000 "stadia" = 45,000 km. (instead of 40,000).

Aristarchus guessed that the earth revolved round the sun, p. 37 (1,800 years before Copernicus, 1473-1543). (Third century B.C.) he considered the moon to be

* Dannemann, Fr., Wie unser Weltbild entstand? Stuttgart, 1912.—Ed.
work it is 30 (instead of 48) times smaller than the earth, and the sun to be 300 (instead of 1,300,000) times larger than the earth....

Pythagoras (sixth century B.C.) the world is governed by number and measure....

The four elements, substances, of the ancient philosophers: earth, fire, water, air....

Democritus (fifth century B.C.): atoms...

seventeenth century: chemical elements.

Spectral analysis (1860)
Electricity, etc.

Law of conservation of force.

the telescope and so forth of the earth
((discovery at the poles of more than \(1/229\) dia-
20 million meter [instead of \(1/299\)])

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Determination of the velocity of light:

1676: Olaf Römer (from the eclipse of Jupiter): 40,000 geographical miles (less than...300,000) km. per sec.
(less than...298,000 km.)

1649: Fizeau (toothed wheel and mirror): 42,219 geographical miles = 313,000 km. per sec.

1854: Foucault (2 revolving mirrors, etc.): 40,160 geographical miles = 298,000 km. per sec.

1874: Alfred Cornu (à la Fizeau) 300,400 km. per sec.

1902: Perrotin (idem) 299,900 (± 80 m.)

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“Cannon killed feudalism. Ink will kill modern society (p. 43)....

— — —“In every battle there comes a moment when the bravest soldiers, after the greatest tension, feel inclined to take to flight. This terror arises from a lack of confidence in their courage: it needs only an insignificant event, some pretext, to return this confidence to them: the great art consists in bringing this about” (pp. 79-80).

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ARTUR ERICH HAAS.  
THE SPIRIT OF HELLENISM IN MODERN PHYSICS  
LEIPZIG, 1914 (32 pp.) (VEIT & CO.)

Reviewed in Kant-Studien, 1914, No. 3 (Vol. XIX), pp. 391-392, the author is described as a professor of the history of physics (P. Volkmann pays particular attention to this history), is said to emphasise the special connection between Heraclitus and Thomson, etc., etc.

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Published according to the manuscript
THEODOR LIPPS.

NATURAL SCIENCES
AND WORLD OUTLOOK

(SPEECH AT THE 78TH CONGRESS OF GERMAN NATURAL
Scientists in Stuttgart), HEILELBERG, 1906

(Bern Library, Nat. Varia. 160)

An idealist of the Kant-Fichte persuasion, who empha-
sisizes that both phenomenology (modern—“only phenomena.”
P. 40) and energetics and vitalism (ibidem) work in the
spirit of idealism.

Matter—x
“Materiality”—“a conventional mode of expression”...
(p. 35)
“Nature is a product of the mind” (37), etc.
“In short, materialism is primarily nothing but a new
name for the task of natural science.” (32)

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to the manuscript
CONSPECTUS OF LASALLE'S BOOK
THE PHILOSOPHY
OF HERACLITUS THE OBSCURE
OF EPHESUS

Written in 1915
First published in 1930
in Lenin Miscellany XII

Published according to the manuscript
Reading Hall of the Berlin Library
V. I. Lenin worked here in 1914-16
F. LASALLE.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HERACLITUS

THE OBSCURE OF EPHESUS,

TWO VOLUMES

BERLIN, 1858 (pp. 379 + 479)

(Bern: Log. 119. 1)

In the epigraph, inter alia, from Hegel—from his History of Philosophy—that there is not a single proposition of Heraclitus that he would not have adopted in his Logic.


My quotation from Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie.**

One can understand why Marx called this work of Lassalle’s “school boyish” (see the letter to Engels of ...131): Lassalle simply repeats Hegel, copies from him, re-echoing him a million times with regard to isolated passages from Heraclitus, furnishing his opus with an incredible heap of learned ultra-pedantic ballast.

The difference with respect to Marx: In Marx there is a mass of new material,

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* Hegel, Werke, Bd. XIII, Berlin, 1833.—Ed.

** Reference is being made to the conspectus of Hegel’s work Lectures on the History of Philosophy, in which Lenin makes this quotation. (See p. 259 of this voluine.)—Ed.
and what interests him is only the movement forward from Hegel and Feuerbach, from idealistic to materialistic dialectics. In Lassalle there is a rehash of Hegel on the particular theme selected: essentially transcribing from Hegel with respect to quotations from Heraclitus and about Heraclitus.

Lassalle divided his work into two parts: “General Part. Introduction” (Vol. 1, pp. 1-68), and “Historical Part. Fragments and Evidence” (the remainder). Chapter III in the general part: “Short Logical Development of the System of Heraclitus” (pp. 45-68)—gives the quintessence of the method, of Lassalle’s conclusions. This chapter is sheer plagiarism, slavish repetition of Hegel concerning Heraclitus! Here too (and still more in the historical part) there is a mass of erudition, but it is erudition of the lowest kind: the exercise set was to seek out the Hegelian element in Heraclitus. The Strebsamer* pupil performs it “brilliantly,” reading through everything about Heraclitus in all the ancient (and modern) authors, and putting a Hegelian construction on everything. Marx in 1844-47 went from Hegel to Feuerbach, and further beyond Feuerbach to historical (and dialectical) materialism. Lassalle in 1846 began (Preface, p. III), in 1855 resumed, and in August 1857 (Preface, p. XV) finished a work of sheer, empty, useless, “learned” rehashing of Hegelianism!!

Some chapters of the second part are interesting and not without use solely for the translations of fragments from Heraclitus and for the popularisation of He-

* industrious—Ed.
gel, but that does not do away with all the above-mentioned defects.

The philosophy of the ancients and of Heraclitus is often quite delightful in its childish naïveté, e.g., p. 162—how is it to be explained that the urine of persons who have eaten garlic* smells of garlic?” and the answer:

“is it not that, as some of the followers of Heraclitus say, one and the same fiery process of transformation takes place both in the universe and in (organic) bodies, and then after cooling appears there (in the universe) as moisture, and here takes the form of urine, but the transformation (Ἀναθνµίασις**) from the food causes the smell of that from which it has arisen by mixing with it?...” (162-163)

On p. 221 ff.*** Lassalle quotes Plutarch, who says with regard to Heraclitus:

...“in the same way as everything is created by transformation out of fire, so also fire out of everything, just as we obtain things for gold and gold for things....”

In this connection, Lassalle writes about value (Werth) (p. 223 NB) [and about Function des Geldes****], expounding it in the Hegelian manner (as “separated abstract unity”) and adding: ...“that this unity, money, is not something actual, but something merely ideal (Lassalle’s italics) is evident from the fact...,” etc.

(But all the same NB that this was written in a book that appeared in 1858, the preface being dated August 1857.)

* V. I. Lenin wrote the word “garlic” above the word “Knoblauch.”—Ed.

** evaporation—Ed.

*** et seq.—Ed.

**** function of money—Ed.
In note 3 on p. 224 (pp. 224-225) Lassalle speaks in still greater detail about money, saying that Heraclitus was no “political economist,” that money is ((only(??))) a Wertzeichen,* etc., etc. (“all money is merely the ideal unity or expression of value of all real products in circulation”) (224), etc.

Since Lassalle here speaks vaguely of moderne Entdeckungen auf diesem Gebiet**—the theory of value and money, it can be assumed that he has precisely in mind conversations with Marx and letters from him.

On pp. 225-228. Lassalle reproduces a long passage from Plutarch, proving further (convincingly) that it is indeed Heraclitus who is referred to, and that Plutarch here expounds “the basic features of the speculative theology of Heraclitus” (p. 228).

The passage is a good one: it conveys the spirit of Greek philosophy, the naïveté, profundity, the flowing transitions.

Lassalle reads into Heraclitus even a whole system of theology and “objective logic” (sic!!), etc.—in short, Hegel “apropos of” Heraclitus!!

An infinite number of times (truly wearisomely) Lassalle emphasises and rehashes the idea that Heraclitus not only recognises motion in everything, that his principle is motion or becoming (Werden), but that the whole point lies in understanding “the processing identity of

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* token of value—Ed.

** modern discoveries in this field—Ed.
absolute (schlechthin) opposites” (p. 289 and many others). Lassalle, so to speak, hammers into the reader’s head the Hegelian thought that in abstract concepts (and in the system of them) the principle of motion cannot be expressed otherwise than as the principle of the identity of opposites. Motion and Werden, generally speaking, can be without repetition, without return to the point of departure, and then such motion would not be an “identity of opposites.” But astronomical and mechanical (terrestrial) motion, and the life of plants, animals and man—all this has hammered into the heads of mankind not merely the idea of motion, but motion precisely with a return to the point of departure, i.e., dialectical motion.

This is naively and delightfully expressed in the famous formula (or aphorism) of Heraclitus: “it is impossible to bathe twice in the same river”—actually, however (as had already been said by Cratylus, a disciple of Heraclitus), it cannot be done even once (for before the whole body has entered the water, the latter is already not the same as before).

(NB: This Cratylus reduced Heraclitus’ dialectics to sophistry, pp. 294-295 and many others, by saying: nothing is true, nothing can be said about anything. A negative (and merely negative) conclusion from dialectics. Heraclitus, on the other hand, had the principle: “everything is true,” there is (a part of) truth in everything. Cratylus merely “wagged his finger” in answer to everything, thereby showing that everything moves, that nothing can be said of anything.
Lassalle in this work has no sense of moderation, absolutely drowning Heraclitus in Hegel. It is a pity. Heraclitus in moderation, as one of the founders of dialectics, would be extremely useful: the 850 pages of Lassalle should be compressed into 85 pages of quintessence and translated into Russian: “Heraclitus as one of the founders of dialectics (according to Lassalle).” Something useful could result!

The basic law of the world, according to Heraclitus (λόγος,* sometimes εἰμαρμένη**), is “the law of transformation into the opposite” (p. 327) (＝ ἑναντιοτροπή, ἑναντιοδρομία).

Lassalle expounded the meaning of εἰμαρμένη as the “law of development” (p. 333), quoting, inter alia, the words of Nemesius: “Democritus, Heraclitus and Epicurus assume that neither for the universal nor for the particular does foresight exist” (ibidem).

And the words of Heraclitus: “The world was created by none of the Gods or men, but is eternally living fire and will always be so” (ibidem).

It is strange that, in rehashing the religious philosophy of Heraclitus, Lassalle does not once quote or mention Feuerbach! What was Lassalle’s attitude in general to Feuerbach? That of an idealist Hegelian?

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* logos—Ed.
** necessity—Ed.
Hence Philo said of Heraclitus’ doctrine, ...
“that it” (die Lehre*), “like that of the Stoics, derives everything from the world, and brings it into the world, but does not believe that anything came from God.” (334) An example of “touching up” as Hegelian:

Lassalle translates the famous passage of Heraclitus (according to Stobaeus) on “(Das) Eine Weise”** (ἐν σοφόν) as follows: “However many discourses I have heard, no one has succeeded in recognising that the wise is that which is separated from all (i.e., from all that exists)” (344) —considering that the words “beast or god” are an insertion, and rejecting the translations of Ritter (“wisdom is remote from all”) (344) and Schleiermacher “the wise is separated from all,” in the sense of “cognition” distinct from the knowledge of particulars.

According to Lassalle the meaning of this passage is as follows: that “the absolute (the wise) is alien to all sensuous determinate being, that it is the negative” (349)—i.e., Negative = the principle of negation, the principle of motion. A clear misrepresentation as Hegelian! Reading Hegel into Heraclitus.

A mass of details on the (external) connection between Heraclitus and Persian theology, Ormazd-Ahriman,132 and the theory of magic, etc., etc., etc.

* the doctrine—Ed.
** “the One Wise”—Ed.
Heraclitus said: “time is a body” (p. 358)... this, Lassalle says, is in the sense of the unity of being and nothing. Time is the pure unity of Being and not-Being, etc.!

*Fire* for Heraclitus, it is said = the principle of motion [and not simply fire], something similar is fire in the teaching of Persian philosophy (and religion)! (362)

If Heraclitus was the *first* to use the term λόγος (“word”) in the objective sense (law), this, too, is said to be taken from the Persian religion.... (364)

— A quotation from the Zend-Avesta. 133 (367)

In § 17 on the relation between Δίκη* and είµαρµένη, Lassalle interprets these ideas of Heraclitus in the sense of “necessity,” “connection.” (376)

| NB: “the bond of all things” (δεσµὸς ἀπάντων) (p. 379) |

Plato (in the *Theaetetus*) is alleged to express the Heraclitean philosophy when he says:

“Necessity binds together the essentiality of Being....”

“Heraclitus is ... the source of the conception, common among the Stoics, that είµαρµένη, rerum omnium necessitas,** expresses bond and ligation, illigatio....” (376)

Cicero:

“I, however, call fate what the Greeks call είµαρµένη, i.e., the order and sequence of causes, when one cause linked with another produces the phenomenon out of itself” (p. 377).

* justice—Ed.
** necessity of all things—Ed.
Thousands of years have passed since the time when the idea was born of “the connection of all things,” “the chain of causes.” A comparison of how these causes have been understood in the history of human thought would give an indisputably conclusive theory of knowledge.

Volume II.
Speaking of “fire,” Lassalle proves, by repeating himself a thousand times over, that this is a “principle” for Heraclitus. He insists especially on the idealism of Heraclitus (p. 25—that the principle of development, des Werdens,* in Heraclitus is logisch-präexistent,** that his philosophy = Idealphilosophie.*** Sic!!) (p. 25).

((Squeezing into Hegelian!))
Heraclitus accepted “pure and absolutely immaterial fire” (p. 28 Timaeus, on Heraclitus).

On p. 56 (Vol. II) Lassalle introduces a quotation from Clemens Al.,**** Stromata V; Chapter 14 about Heraclitus, which, translated literally, reads:
“The world, an entity out of everything, was created by none of the gods or men, but was, is and will be eternally living fire, regularly becoming ignited and regularly becoming extinguished....”

A very good exposition of the principles of dialectical materialism. But on p. 58

* of becoming—Ed.
** logically pre-existent—Ed.
*** idealistic philosophy—Ed.
**** Clement of Alexandria—Ed.
Lassalle provides the following “freie Übersetzung”* of this passage:

“The world — — was, is and will be continuous becoming, being constantly, but in varying measure, transformed from Being into (proceeding) not-Being, and from the latter into (proceeding) Being.”

An excellent example how Lassalle verballhornt* Heraclitus, representing him as Hegelian, spoiling the liveliness, freshness, naïveté and historical integrity of Heraclitus by misrepresenting him as Hegelian (and in order to achieve this misrepresentation Lassalle presents a rehash of Hegel for dozens of pages).

The second section of the second part (“Physics,” pp. 1 - 262!!!, Vol. II) is absolutely intolerable. A farthingsworth of Heraclitus, and a shillingsworth of rehash of Hegel and of misrepresentation. One can only leaf through the pages—in order to say that it should not be read!

From Section III (“The Doctrine of Cognition”) a quotation from Philo:

“For the One is that which consists of two opposites, so that when cut into two the opposites are revealed. Is not this the proposition which the Greeks say their great and famous Heraclitus placed at the head of his philosophy and gloried in as a new discovery....” ((265))

And the following quotation also from Philo:

...“In the same way, too, the parts of the world are divided into two and mutually counterposed: the earth—into mountains and plains, water—into fresh and salt.... In the same way, too, the atmos-

* free translation—Ed.
** corrects (ironic)—Ed.
phere into winter and summer, and likewise spring and autumn. And this served Heraclitus as the material for his books on nature: borrowing from our theologian the aphorism about opposites, he added to it innumerable and laboriously worked-out examples (Belege)” (p. 267).

According to Heraclitus the criterion of truth is not the consensus omnium, not the agreement of all (p. 285)—in that case he would be a subjectiver Empiriker* (p. 284). No, he is an objectiver Idealist** (285). For him, the criterion of truth, independent of the subjective opinion of all men, is agreement with the ideal law of the identity of Being and not-Being (285).

Cf. Marx 1845 in his theses on Feuerbach!134 Lassalle is here reactionary.

Here it is clearly seen that Lassalle is a Hegelian of the old type, an idealist.

On p. 337, quoting, inter alia, Büchner (note 1), Lassalle says that Heraclitus expressed a priori “the very same thought” as “modern physiology” (“thought is a movement of matter”).

An obvious exaggeration. In the quotations about Heraclitus it is merely said that the soul is also a process of transformation—that which moves is known by that which moves.

* subjective empiricist—Ed.
** objective idealist—Ed.
A quotation from Chalcidius (in Timaeus):
...“Heraclitus, however, links our reason with the divine reason that guides and rules the world, and says that, on account of inseparable accompaniment, it, too, possesses knowledge of the governing decree of reason and, when the mind rests from the activity of the senses, it predicts the future” (p. 342).

From Clemens (Stromata V.):
...“owing to its incredibility it—namely, the truth—escapes from becoming cognised....” (347)

Heraclitus, Lassalle says, is “the father of objective logic” (p. 351), for in him “natural philosophy” umschlägt* into the philosophy of thought, “thought is recognised as the principle of existence” (350), etc., etc. à la Hegel.... The moment of subjectivity is said to be lacking in Heraclitus....

§ 36. “Plato's Cratylus”, pp. 373-396

In the § on “Cratylus,” Lassalle proves that in this dialogue of Plato's Cratylus is represented (not yet as a sophist and subjectivist as he subsequently became, but) as a true disciple of Heraclitus, who really expounded his, Heraclitus', theory of the essence and origin of words and language as an imitation of nature (“imitation of the essence of things,” p. 388), the essence of things, “the imitation and copy of God,” “imitation of God and the universe” (ibidem).

* is transformed—Ed.
**Ergo:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Greek Philosophy indicated all these moments</th>
<th>these are the fields of knowledge from which the theory of knowledge and dialectics should be built</th>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;&quot; the separate sciences</td>
<td>kurz,* the history of cognition in general</td>
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<td>&quot;&quot; the mental development of the child</td>
<td>the whole field of knowledge</td>
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<td>&quot;&quot; the mental development of animals</td>
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...“We have shown—says Lassalle—that the” (above-mentioned) “conceptual identity (precisely identity, and not merely analogy) between word, name and law is in every respect a principled view of the Heraclitean philosophy and of fundamental importance and significance in it....” (393)

...“Names are for him” (Heraclitus) “laws of being, they are for him the common element of things, just as for him laws are the ‘common element of all’”.... (394)

And it is precisely Heraclitean ideas that Hippocrates *ex p r e s s e s* when he says:

“Names are the laws of nature.”

“For both laws and names are for the Ephesian ... equally merely products and realisations of the universal, both are for

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* briefly—Ed.
him the achieved, purely universal, ideal being, freed from the stain of sensuous reality...." (394)

Plato analyses and refutes the philosophy of Heraclitus in his "C r a t y l u s" and "T h e a e t e t u s," and in so doing (especially in the latter) he confuses Heraclitus (the objective idealist and dialectician) with the subjective idealist and sophist Protagoras (man is the measure of all things). And Lassalle proves that in the development of ideas there has actually stemmed from Heraclitus 1) sophistry (Protagoras) and 2) Platonism, the “ideas” (objective idealism).

One gets the impression that Lassalle, the idealist, left in the shade the materialism or materialistic tendencies of Heraclitus, misrepresenting him as Hegelian.

(IV. Ethik, pp. 427-462.)
In the section on ethics—nil.
On pp. 458-459 Lassalle writes that Nemesios said that Heraclitus and Democritus denied prevision (προνοίαν), whereas Cicero (De Fato) said that Heraclitus, as also Democritus and others (including Aristotle), recognised fatum—necessity.

...“This fatum is intended to signify only the immanent natural necessity belonging to the object, its natural law....” (459)

(The Stoics, according to Lassalle, took e v e r y t h i n g from Heraclitus, making him banal and one-sided, p. 461.)

* natural necessity—Ed.
The index to Lassalle’s book is compiled in a learned, pedantic manner, but senselessly; a heap of names of the ancients, etc., etc.

In general, ΣΣ,* Marx’s judgment is correct, Lassalle’s book is not worth reading.

* summa summarum—Ed.
ON THE QUESTION OF DIALECTICS

Written in 1915
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in the magazine Bolshevik, No. 5-6
Publishes according to the manuscript
A page from V. I. Lenin’s manuscript

On the Question of Dialectics.—1915

Reduced
ON THE QUESTION OF DIALECTICS

The splitting of a single whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts (see the quotation from Philo on Heraclitus at the beginning of Section III, “On Cognition,” in Lassalle’s book on Heraclitus*) is the essence (one of the “essentials,” one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristics or features) of dialectics. That is precisely how Hegel, too, puts the matter (Aristotle in his *Metaphysics* continually grapples with it and combats Heraclitus and Heraclitean ideas).

The correctness of this aspect of the content of dialectics must be tested by the history of science. This aspect of dialectics (e.g., in Plekhanov) usually receives inadequate attention: the identity of opposites is taken as the sum-total of e x a m p l e s “for example, a seed,” “for example, primitive communism.” The same is true of Engels. But it is “in the interests of popularisation...” and not as a l a w o f c o g n i t i o n (and as a law of the objective world).


The identity of opposites (it would be more correct, perhaps, to say their “unity,”—although the difference between the terms identity and unity is not particularly important here. In a certain sense both are correct) is the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive,

* See p. 348 of this volume.—Ed.
opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature (including mind and society). The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their “self-movement,” in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the “struggle” of opposites. The two basic (or two possible? or two historically observable?) conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease and increase, as repetition, and development as a unity of opposites (the division of a unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal relation).

In the first conception of motion, self-movement, its driving force, its source, its motive, remains in the shade (or this source is made external—God, subject, etc.). In the second conception the chief attention is directed precisely to knowledge of the source of “self”-movement.

The first conception is lifeless, pale and dry. The second is living. The second alone furnishes the key to the “self-movement” of everything existing; it alone furnishes the key to the “leaps,” to the “break in continuity,” to the “transformation into the opposite,” to the destruction of the old and the emergence of the new.

The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute.

___

NB: The distinction between subjectivism (scepticism, sophistry, etc.) and dialectics, incidentally, is that in (objective) dialectics the difference between the relative and the absolute is itself relative. For objective dialectics there is an absolute within the relative. For subjectivism and sophistry the relative is only relative and excludes the absolute.

In his Capital, Marx first analyses the simplest, most ordinary and fundamental, most common and everyday relation of bourgeois (commodity) society, a relation encountered billions of times, viz. the exchange of commodities. In this very simple phenomenon (in this “cell” of bourgeois society) analysis reveals all the contradictions (or
the germs of all the contradictions) of modern society. The subsequent exposition shows us the development (both growth and movement) of these contradictions and of this society in the $\Sigma^*$ of its individual parts, from its beginning to its end.

Such must also be the method of exposition (or study) of dialectics in general (for with Marx the dialectics of bourgeois society is only a particular case of dialectics). To begin with what is the simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., with any proposition: the leaves of a tree are green; John is a man; Fido is a dog, etc. Here already we have dialectics (as Hegel's genius recognised): the individual is the universal (cf. Aristotle's, Metaphysik, translation by Schwengler, Bd. II, S. 40, 3. Buch, 4. Kapitel, 8-9: "denn natürlich kann man nicht der Meinung sein, daß es ein Haus (a house in general) gebe außer den sichtbaren Häusern," "οû γάρ ἀν θείηµεν εἰναί τινα οἰκίαν παρά τας τινας οἰκίας"). Consequently, the opposites (the individual is opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes), etc. Here already we have the elements, the germs, the concepts of necessity, of objective connection in nature, etc. Here already we have the contingent and the necessary, the phenomenon and the essence; for when we say: John is a man, Fido is a dog, this is a leaf of a tree, etc., we disregard a number of attributes as contingent; we separate the essence from the appearance, and counterpose the one to the other.

Thus in any proposition we can (and must) disclose as in a "nucleus" ("cell") the germs of all the elements of dia-

* summation—Ed.

** "for, of course, one cannot hold the opinion that there can be a house (in general) apart from a visible house."—Ed.
lectics, and thereby show that dialectics is a property of all human knowledge in general. And natural science shows us (and here again it must be demonstrated in any simple instance) objective nature with the same qualities, the transformation of the individual into the universal, of the contingent into the necessary, transitions, modulations, and the reciprocal connection of opposites. Dialectics is the theory of knowledge of (Hegel and) Marxism. This is the “aspect” of the matter (it is not “an aspect” but the essence of the matter) to which Plekhanov, not to speak of other Marxists, paid no attention.

* * *

Knowledge is represented in the form of a series of circles both by Hegel (see Logic) and by the modern “epistemologist” of natural science, the eclectic and foe of Hegelianism (which he did not understand!), Paul Volkmann (see his Erkenntnistheoretische Grundzüge,* S.)

“Circles” in philosophy: is a chronology of persons essential? No!

Ancient: from Democritus to Plato and the dialectics of Heraclitus.
Renaissance: Descartes versus Gassendi (Spinoza?)

Dialectics as living, many-sided knowledge (with the number of sides eternally increasing), with an infinite number of shades of every approach and approximation to reality (with a philosophical system growing into a whole out of each shade)—here we have an immeasurably rich content as compared with “metaphysical” materialism, the fundamental misfortune of which is its inability to apply dialectics to the Bildertheorie,** to the process and development of knowledge.

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* P. Volkmann, Erkenntnistheoretische Grundzüge der Naturwissenschaften, Leipzig-Berlin, 1910, p. 35.—Ed.
** theory of reflection—Ed.
Philosophical idealism is *only* nonsense from the standpoint of crude, simple, metaphysical materialism. From the standpoint of *dialectical* materialism, on the other hand, philosophical idealism is a *one-sided*, exaggerated, überschwengliches (Dietzgen)¹³⁷ development (inflation, distention) of one of the features, aspects, facets of knowledge into an absolute, *divorced* from matter, from nature, apotheosised. Idealism is clerical obscurantism. True. But philosophical idealism is ("*more correctly*" and "*in addition*") a road to clerical obscurantism through *one of the shades* of the infinitely complex *knowledge* (dialectical) of man.

Human knowledge is not (or does not follow) a straight line, but a curve, which endlessly approximates a series of circles, a spiral. Any fragment, segment, section of this curve can be transformed (transformed one-sidedly) into an independent, complete, straight line, which then (if one does not see the wood for the trees) leads into the quagmire, into clerical obscurantism (where it is *anchored* by the class interests of the ruling classes). Rectilinearity and one-sidedness, woodenness and petrification, subjectivism and subjective blindness—voilà the epistemological roots of idealism. And clerical obscurantism (= philosophical idealism), of course, has epistemological roots, it is not groundless; it is a *sterile flower* undoubtedly, but a sterile flower that grows on the living tree of living, fertile, genuine, powerful, omnipotent, objective, absolute human knowledge.
CONSPECTUS OF ARISTOTLE'S BOOK

METAPHYSICS

Written in 1915
First published in 1930
in Lenin Miscellany XII

Published according to the manuscript
ARISTOTLE. THE METAPHYSICS
TRANSLATED BY A. SCHWEGLER
TWO VOLUMES
TÜBINGEN, 1847

See above, quotation about “house.”*

A mass of extremely interesting, lively, 

_n a i v e_ (fresh) matter which introduces philosophy and is replaced in the expositions by scholasticism, by the result without movement, etc.

Clericalism killed what was living in Aristotle and perpetuated what was dead.

“But man and horse, etc., exist as individuals, a universal for itself does not exist as an individual substance, but only as a whole composed of a definite concept and definite matter” (p. 125, Book 7, Chapter 10, 27-28).

Ibidem, p. 126, § 32-33:

...“Matter is in itself unknowable. Some matter is sensible and some intelligible; sensible, such as bronze and wood, in a word, all movable matter; intelligible, that which is present in sensible things not qua sensible, e.g., the objects of mathematics....”

Highly characteristic and profoundly interesting (in the beginning of the _Metaphysics_) are the polemic with Plato and

* See p. 359 of this volume.—Ed.
the "puzzling" questions, delightful for their naïveté, and Bedenken* regarding the nonsense of idealism. And all this along with the most helpless confusion about the fundamental, the concept and the particular.

NB: At the beginning of The Metaphysics the stubborn struggle against Heraclitus, against his idea of the identity of Being and not-Being (the Greek philosophers approached close to dialectics but could not cope with it). Highly characteristic in general, throughout the whole book, passim,** are the living germs of dialectics and inquiries about it....

In Aristotle, objective logic is everywhere confused with subjective logic and, moreover, in such a way that everywhere objective logic is visible. There is no doubt as to the objectivity of cognition. There is a naïve faith in the power of reason, in the force, power, objective truth of cognition. And a naïve confusion, a helplessly pitiful confusion in the dialectics of the universal and the particular—of the concept and the sensuously perceptible reality of individual objects, things, phenomena.

Scholasticism and clericalism took what was dead in Aristotle, but not what was living; the investigations, the searchings, the labyrinth, in which man lost his way.

Aristotle's logic is an inquiry, a searching, an approach to the logic of Hegel—and it, the logic of Aristotle (who everywhere, at every step, raises precisely the question of dialectics), has been made into a dead scholasticism by reject-

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* doubts—Ed.
** everywhere—Ed.
ing all the searchings, waverings and modes of framing questions. What the Greeks had was precisely modes of framing questions, as it were tentative systems, a naïve discordance of views, excellently reflected in Aristotle.

...“Hence it is clear that no universal exists next to and in separation from its particulars. The exponents of the Forms are partly right in their account when they make the Forms separate; for the Forms are particular substances, but they are wrong in considering the one-over-many as form. The reason for this is that they cannot explain what are the imperishable substances of this kind which exist beside and outside particular sensible substances; so they make the forms the same in kind as perishable things (for these we know); i.e., they make Ideal Man and Ideal Horse, adding the word ‘Ideal’ to the names of sensible things. However, I presume that even if we had never seen the stars, nonetheless there would be eternal substances besides those which we knew; and so in the present case even if we cannot apprehend what they are, still they must be in existence. It is clear, then, both that no universal term is particular substance and that no particular substance is composed of particular substances (οὐσία)” (— § 13 at the end of the chapter).

Delightful! There are no doubts of the reality of the external world. The man gets into a muddle precisely over the dialectics of the universal and the particular, of concept and sensation, etc., of essence and phenomenon, etc.
...“There is a difficulty in the question (ἀπορία) how the matter of the individual is related to the contraries. For example, if the body is potentially (δυνάµει) healthy, and the contrary of health is disease, is not the body potentially both healthy and diseased?...

...“Further, is not the living man potentially (δυνάµει) dead?”

(P. 181), Book 11, Chapter 1, § 12-14:

...“They” (the philosophers) “posit the objects of mathematics as intermediate between the Forms and sensible things, as a third class besides the Forms and the things of our world. But there is no third man or horse besides the Ideal one and the particulars. If on the other hand it is not as they make out, what sort of objects are we to suppose to be the concern of the mathematician? Not surely the things of our world; for none of these is of the kind which the mathematical sciences investigate....”

Ibidem, Chapter 2, § 21-23:

...“Again, is there anything besides the concrete whole (I mean by this matter and the material) or not? If not, all things are perishable, at least everything material is perishable; but if there is something, it must be the form or shape. It is hard to determine in what cases this is possible and in what it is not....”

Pp. 185-186, Book 11, Chapter 3, § 12—mathematics sets aside heat, weight and other “sensible contrarieties,” and has in mind “only quantity”... “it is the same with regard to Being.”
Here we have the point of view of dialectical materialism, but accidentally, not consistently, not elaborated, in passing.


An approach to God:

**Book 12**, Chapter 6, § 10-11:

...“For how can there be motion if there is no actual cause? Wood will not move itself—carpentry must act upon it; nor will the menses or the earth move themselves—the seeds must act upon the earth, and the semen on the menses....”

Leucippus (idem, § 14) accepts eternal motion, but he does not explain why (§ 11).

Chapter 7. § 11-19—*God* (p. 213). ...“eternal motion must be excited by something ... eternal” (Chapter 8, § 4).

**Book 12, Chapter 10**—again a “re-examination” of the fundamental questions of philosophy; “interrogation marks.” so to speak. A very fresh, naïve, doubting exposition (often hints) of various points of view.

* “In as many ways as categories are stated, in so many ways do they denote being.”—Ed.
In Book 13 Aristotle again returns to a criticism of Pythagoras’ theory of numbers (and Plato’s theory of ideas), independent of sensible things.

Primitive idealism: the universal (concept, idea) is a particular being. This appears wild, monstrously (more accurately, childish) stupid. But is not modern idealism, Kant, Hegel, the idea of God, of the same nature (absolutely of the same nature)? Tables, chairs and the ideas of table and chair; the world and the idea of the world (God); thing and “noumen,” the unknowable “Thing-in-itself”; the connection of the earth and the sun, nature in general—and law, λόγος,* God. The dichotomy of human knowledge and the possibility of idealism (=religion) are g i v e n already in the first, elementary abstraction

“house” in general and particular houses

The approach of the (human) mind to a particular thing, the taking of a copy (= a concept) of it is not a simple, immediate act, a dead mirroring, but one which is complex, split into two, zig-zag-like, which includes in it the possibility of the flight of fantasy from life; more than that: the possibility of the transformation (moreover, an unnoticeable transformation, of which man is unaware) of the abstract concept, idea, into a fantasy (in letzter Instanz** = God). For even in the simplest generalisation, in the most elementary general idea (“table” in general), t h e r e i s a certain bit of fantasy.

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* logos—Ed.
** in the final analysis—Ed.
(Vice versa: it would be stupid to deny the role of fantasy, even in the strictest science: cf. Pisarev on useful dreaming, as an impulse to work, and on empty daydreaming.)

Naïve expression of the “difficulties” of the “philosophy of mathematics” (to use modern language): Book 13, Chapter 2, § 23:

...“Further, body is a kind of substance, since it already in some sense possesses completeness; but in what sense are lines substances? They could not be that, neither as form or shape as, for instance, the soul, nor as matter, like the body; for it does not appear that anything can be composed either of lines or of planes or of points....” (p. 224)

Book 13, Chapter 3 solves these difficulties excellently, distinctly, clearly, materialistically (mathematics and other sciences abstract one of the aspects of a body, phenomenon, life). But the author does not consistently maintain this point of view.

Schwegler in his commentary (Vol. IV, p. 303) says: Aristotle gives here a positive exposition of “his view of the mathematical: the mathematical is the abstraction from the sensuous.”

Book 13, Chapter 10 touches on the question, which is better expounded by Schwegler in the commentary (in connection with Metaphysik VII, 13, 5): science is concerned only with the universal (cf. Book 13, Chapter 10, § 6), but only the particular is actual (substantial). Does that mean that there is a gulf between science and reality? Does it mean that Being and thought are incommensurable? “Is true knowledge
of reality impossible?” (Schwegler, Vol. IV, p. 338.) Aristotle answers: potentially knowledge is directed to the universal, actually it is directed to the particular. Schwegler (ibidem) describes as höchst beachtenswert* F. Fischer’s work: Die Metaphysik, von empirischem Standpunkte aus dargestellt [year of publication (1847)], who speaks of Aristotle’s “realism.”

Book 14, Chapter 3, § 7: “why is it that while the mathematical is in no way present in sensible things, its attributes are present in sensible things?”... (p. 254) (The last sentence of the book, Book 14, Chapter 6, § 21, has the same meaning.)

End of The Metaphysics.

Friedrich Fischer (1801-1853), Professor of philosophy in Basle. An article about him by Prantl (Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, Vol. 7, p. 67) gives a disparaging account of him and says that “through a complete rejection of subjective idealism he nearly fell into the opposite extreme of an un-ideal empiricism.”

* most valuable—Ed.
NOTE ON THE COLLECTED WORKS
OF FEUERBACH AND HEGEL*

Collected Works of Feuerbach, Bolin’s edition
Vol. I. Thoughts on Death and Immortality
II. Critical Philosophical Notes and Basic Propositions
III. The History of Modern Philosophy
IV. The Philosophy of Leibnitz
V. Pierre Bayle
VI. The Essence of Christianity
VII. Notes and Supplements to this book
VIII. Lectures on the Essence of Religion
IX. Theogony
X. Letters on Ethics and Posthumous Aphorisms.

Collected Works of Hegel
III, IV and V. Logic
XIX, 1 and 2—Hegel’s Correspondence.

Written in September 1914
First published in 1930
in Lenin Miscellany XII, p. 24
Published according to the manuscript

Log. I. 175

* Lenin wrote the list in German on a separate sheet.—Ed.
CONSPECTUS OF FEUERBACH’S BOOK
EXPOSITION, ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE
OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF LEIBNITZ

Written between September
and November 4 (17), 1895
First published in 1930
in Lenin Miscellany XII
Published according
to the manuscript
In the brilliant exposition of Leibnitz some especially outstanding passages should be mentioned (this is not easy, for the whole—i.e., the first part (§ 1-13) is outstanding), and then the supplements of 1847.

The book on Leibnitz was written by Feuerbach in 1836, when he was still an idealist.

P. 27—The feature that distinguishes Leibnitz from Spinoza: in Leibnitz there is, in addition to the concept of substance, the concept of force "and indeed of active force..." the principle of "self-activity" (29)—

Ergo, Leibnitz through theology arrived at the principle of the inseparable (and universal, absolute) connection of matter and motion. So, it seems to me, Feuerbach is to be understood?

p. 32: "Spinoza’s essence is unity, that of Leibnitz is difference, distinction."
p. 34: The philosophy of Spinoza is a telescope, that of Leibnitz a microscope.141

“Spinoza’s world is an achromatic lens of divinity, a medium through which we see nothing but the colourless celestial light of the single substance; Leibnitz’s world is a many-faceted crystal, a diamond, which by its specific nature multiplies the simple light of the substance into an infinitely varied wealth of colours and darkens it.” (Sic!)

p. 40: “Consequently, for Leibnitz, corporeal substance is no longer, as for Descartes, a merely extended dead mass, brought into motion from outside, but as substance it has within it an active force, a never-resting principle of activity.”

For this, to be sure, Marx valued Leibnitz,142 despite his, Leibnitz’s, “Lassallean” features and his conciliatory tendencies in politics and religion.

The monad is the principle of Leibnitz’s philosophy. Individuality, movement, soul (of a special kind). Not dead atoms, but the living, mobile monads, reflecting the whole world in themselves, possessing (vaguely) the capacity of sensuous representation (souls of a certain kind)—such are the “ultimate elements” (p. 45).

Each monad is different from the others. “It would be quite contradictory to the beauty, order and reason of nature if the principle of life or of its own internal actions were to be linked only with a small or special part of matter” (Leibnitz—p. 45).
“Hence the whole of nature is full of souls, as the ancient philosophers already correctly recognised, or at any rate of beings analogous to souls. For, by means of the microscope, one finds that there are a multitude of living beings not visible to the naked eye, and that there are more souls than grains of sand and atoms” (Leibnitz—p. 45).

cf. electrons!

Qualities of monads: Vorstellung,* Repräsentation.

“Sensuous representation itself, however, is nothing more than the representation (reproduction in the mind and presentation) of the complex or the external, i.e., of multiplicity in the simple”... or ...

“the transitory state, which contains and reproduces multiplicity in unity or simple substance” (p. 49, Leibnitz)—verworrene** (p. 50) (confuse,*** p. 52) Vorstellung in the monads (man also has many unconscious, verworrene, feelings, etc.).

Every monad is “a world for itself, each is a self-sufficient unity” (Leibnitz, p. 55).

“A mixture of vague conceptions, the senses are no more than that, matter is no more than that” (Leibnitz, p. 58). “Hence matter is the bond of the monads” (ibidem).

My free interpretation:
Monads = souls of a certain kind.
Leibnitz = idealist. And matter is something in the nature of an other-

* sensuous representation—Ed.
** confused—Ed.
*** vague—Ed.
being of soul, or a jelly linking them by a worldly, fleshly connection.

“Absolute reality lies only in the monads and their conceptions” (Leibnitz, p. 60). Matter is only a phenomenon.

“Clarity is only spirit” (p. 62)... matter, however, is “unclearness and unfreedom.” (64)

Space “in itself is something ideal” (Leibnitz, pp. 70-71).

... “The material principle of the diversity of matter is motion....” (72)

“Similarly—Newton and his adherents to the contrary—there is no empty space in material nature. The air pump by no means proves the presence of a vacuum, for the glass has pores through which all kinds of fine matter can penetrate” (Leibnitz, 76-77)....

“Matter is a phenomenon” (Leibnitz, 78).

“The Being-for-itself of the monads is their soul, their Being-for-others is matter” (Feuerbach, 78). The human soul—the central, higher monad, entelechy, etc., etc.

“Hence every body is affected by everything that goes on in the universe” (Leibnitz, 83).

“The monad represents the whole universe” (Leibnitz, 83).

“The monad, despite its indivisibility, possesses a complex impulse, i.e., a multiplicity of sensuous representations, which individually strive for their special changes and which, by virtue of their essential connection with all other things, at the same time are found within it....” “Individuality contains the infinite within it, as it were, in the germ” (Leibnitz, 84).
Here is dialectics of a kind, and very profound, despite the idealism and clericalism.

“Everything in nature is analogical” (Leibnitz, 6).

“In general, there is nothing absolutely discrete in nature; all opposites, all boundaries of space and time, and kind, vanish in the face of the absolute continuity, the infinite interconnection of the universe” (Feuerbach, 87).

“Owing to its peculiar nature, consisting solely of nerves and not of flesh and blood, the monad is influenced and affected by everything that takes place in the world....” Nevertheless “it is only a spectator of the world drama, not an actor. Therein lies the chief defect of the monads” (Feuerbach, 90).

The conformity of soul and body is a harmonie préétablie* by God.

“The weak side of Leibnitz” (Feuerbach, 95).144

“The soul is a kind of spiritual automaton” (Leibnitz, 98). (And Leibnitz himself said once that the transition from Occasionalism145 to his philosophy is an easy one, Feuerbach, 100.) But in Leibnitz this is deduced from the “nature of the soul”.... (101)

In his Theodicée146 (§ 17) Leibnitz essentially repeats the ontological argument147 for the existence of God.

In his Nouceaux essais sur l’entendement,148 Leibnitz criticised Locke’s empiricism,—

* harmony pre-established—Ed.
saying nihil est in intellectu, etc., nisi intellectus ipse* (!) (152).

(Feuerbach in the first edition also idealistically criticises Locke.149)

The principle of “necessary truths” lies “with us” (Leibnitz, 148).

Cf. Kant likewise

The ideas of substance, change, etc., lie within us (Leibnitz, 150).

“To be determined towards the best through reason is the highest degree of freedom” (Leibnitz, 154).

“The philosophy of Leibnitz is idealism” (Feuerbach, 160), etc., etc.

...“The cheerful, lively polytheism of Leibnitz’s monadology passed into the severe, but for that reason more spiritual and intense monotheism of ‘transcendental idealism’” (Feuerbach, 188).

Pp. 188-220: supplements of 1847.

P. 188: “Idealistic, a priori philosophy....”

“But, of course, what for man is a posteriori is for a philosopher a priori; for when man has gathered experiences and has embraced them in general concepts, then he is, of course, in a position to make ‘synthetic judgments a priori.’ Hence what for an earlier time is a matter of experience is for a later time a matter of reason.... Thus, earlier, electricity and magnetism were only empirical, i.e., here accidental, properties perceived only in particular bodies, whereas now, as the result of comprehensive observations, they are recognised to be properties of all bodies, essential properties of a body.... Hence the history of mankind is the sole standpoint that

* there is nothing in the intellect except the intellect itself.—Ed.
yields a positive answer to the problem of the origin of ideas....” (191-192)

The soul is not wax, it is no tabula rasa*. “The creation of a sensuous representation requires the addition of something distinct from the object, hence it would be sheer folly for me to seek to derive this distinct element, which is the basis of the real essence of the sensuous representation, from the object. But what is this then? The form of universality; for even the individual idea or sensuous representation is, as Leibnitz remarked, at least in comparison with the real individual object, originally universal, i.e., in this case undetermined, wiping out differences, destructive. Sensuousness is massive, uncritical, luxurious; but the idea, the sensuous representation, is restricted solely to the universal and necessary.” (192)

“The basic thought, therefore, of the Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain is already, as in Der Kritik der reinen Vernunft, that universality, and the necessity which is inseparable from it, express the essence belonging to the understanding or apperceiving being, and therefore cannot come from the senses, or from experience, i.e., from outside....” (193)

This idea occurs already among the Cartesians—Feuerbach quotes C l a u b e r g, 1 6 5 2.150

“Undoubtedly this axiom” (that the whole is greater than the part) “owes its certainty not to induction, but to the understanding, for the latter has no other aim and vocation than to generalise the data of the senses, in order to save us the tedious

* smoothed tablet—Ed.
trouble of repetition, to anticipate, replace, spare, sensuous experience and perception. But does the understanding do this by itself, without a basis for it being present in sense-perception? Is then the individual case shown me by the senses an individual case in abstracto? Is it not a qualitatively determined case? But does not this quality, however, contain so much as an identity of the individual cases that is perceptible by the senses?... Do the senses show me only leaves and not also trees?... Is there no feeling of identity, likeness and difference? Is there no difference for my senses between black and white, day and night, wood and iron?... Are not the senses the unconditional affirmation of what is? Consequently, is not the highest law of thought, the law of identity, also a law of sensuousness; indeed, does not this law of thought rest on the truth of sense-perception?”.... (193-194)

Leibnitz in *Nouveaux essais*: “Generality consists in the resemblance to each other of individual things, and this resemblance is a reality” (Book III, Chapter 3, § 12). “But is this resemblance then not sensuous truth? Do not the beings which the understanding refers to a single class, a single genus, affect also my senses in an identical, equal manner?... Is there for my sexual sense—a sense which theoretically also is of the greatest importance, although in the theory of the senses it is usually left out of account—no difference between an animal and a human female? What then is the difference between the faculty of understanding and that of sensuous perception or sensation? The senses present the thing, but the understanding adds the name to it. There is nothing in the under-
standing that is not in sensuous perception, but what is found in the sensuous perception in fact is in the understanding only in name. The understanding is the highest being, the ruler of the world, but only in name, not in fact. What, however, is a name? It is a mark of difference, a striking characteristic, which I make the character, the representative, of the object in order thereby to represent it to myself in its totality.... (195)

..."The senses tell me just as well as the understanding that the whole is greater than the part; but it tells me so not by words, but by examples, for instance, that the finger is smaller than the hand.... (196-197)

..."Hence the certainty that the whole is greater than the part indubitably does not depend on the senses. But on what then? On the word: the whole. The statement that the whole is greater than the part says absolutely nothing more than the word ‘whole’ itself says.... (197)

..."Leibnitz, on the other hand, as an idealist or spiritualist, makes the means into an end, the denial of sensuousness into the essence of the mind.... (198)

..."That which is conscious of itself exists and is, and is called soul. We are, therefore, certain of the existence of our soul before we are certain of the existence of our body. Of course, consciousness is primary, but it is only primary for me, it is not primary in itself. In the sense of my consciousness, I am, because I am conscious; but in the sense of my life I am conscious, because I am. Which of these two is right? The body, i.e., nature, or consciousness, i.e., I? I, of course, for how could I admit myself wrong? But can I then in fact sepa-
rate consciousness from my body and think by myself?... (201)

..."The world is the object of the senses and the object of thought. (204)

"In a sensuous object, man distinguishes the essence as it really is, as an object of sense-perception, from the essence of it in thought, abstracted from sensuousness. The former he calls the existence or also the individual, the latter the essence or the genus. The latter is defined by him as necessary and eternal—because, although a sensuous object may have vanished from the sensible world, it still remains as an object of thought or sensuous representation—but existence as accidental and transitory.... (205)

"Leibnitz is half-Christian, he is a theist, or Christian and a naturalist. He limits the goodness and power of God by wisdom, by the understanding; but this understanding is nothing but a cabinet of natural objects, it is only the idea of the interconnection of nature, of the universe; hence he limits his theism by naturalism; he affirms and defends theism by that which abolishes it...." (215)

P. 274 (from the supplement of 1847):

"How much has been said of the deception of the senses, how little of the deception of speech, from which, however, thought is inseparable! Yet how clumsy is the betrayal of the senses, how subtle that of language! How long have I been led by the nose by the universality of reason, the universality of Fichte’s and Hegel’s Ego, until finally, with the support of my five senses, I recognised for the salvation of my soul that all the difficulties and mysteries of the logos, in the sense of reason, find their solution in the meaning of
the word! For that reason Haym's statement 'the critique of reason must become the criticism of language' is for me in a theoretical respect a soul-inspired statement.— As regards, however, the contradiction between me as a perceiving, personal being and me as a thinking being, it reduces itself in the sense of this note and the dissertation quoted" (of Feuerbach himself) 151 to the sharp contradiction: in sensation I am individual, in thinking I am universal. However, in sensation I am not less universal than I am individual in thinking. Concordance in thinking is based only on concordance in sensation." (274)

"All human communion rests on the assumption of the likeness of sensation in human beings." (274)

Spinoza and Herbart (1836). 152 P. 400 ff.*

A defense of Spinoza against the banal attacks of the "moralist" Herbart.
The objectivism of Spinoza, etc., is stressed. NB.

Verhältnis zu Hegel (1840 and später). S. 417 ff.**

Not very clear, intermittently emphasised that he was a disciple of Hegel.

From the notes:
"What is a dialectic that is in contradiction to natural origin and development? What is its necessity?..." (431)


End of Volume IV.

* et seq.—Ed.

** Relation to Hegel (1840 and later), p. 417 et seq.—Ed.
extremely vulgar!

Plenge fails to understand how "materialism" can coincide with \textit{revolution} (calling the latter "idealism," etc.) and \textit{waxes angry} over his lack of understanding!!

A good example of how bourgeois professors vulgarise the fundamentals of Marxism, its theoretical fundamentals!!

Ad notam of the imperialist economists' and Co.!!

After a pretentious introduction (How I, I, I "read" Hegel and Marx) follows an essay of the Hegelian "doctrine" that is extremely shallow (idealism is not distinguished from "speculation," very, very few things have been grasped; still there is some good in this essay as compared with Kantianism, etc.). Then, comes a criticism of Marx which is altogether nonsensical.

Marx = ideologist"... Marx is being accused of "pure ideology," when by "actual" proletarian he means a representative of a class. (82)

"Now the strong language of the apostate, who decisively renounced any sort of idealism ... now the ideal demand of the political enthusiast—such is the actuality of Karl Marx." (81-82)
"It is passing strange that this Jewish radical healer should have known all his life just one universal remedy for all social conditions that are in need of cure; criticism and political struggle." (56)

Marx's historical materialism is actually "nothing but ... a pathetical gesture," an extremely rationalistic doctrine," "in its most profound basis an idealist examination of society," etc., etc. ... (83)

..."agitational motives"... (84) (id. 86, 92 et al. (115 et al.)

Marx borrowed "this natural-scientific empiricism" (88), "Marx naturalises, social science" (ibid.).

..."His" (Marx's) "path is not that of the thinker, but ... of the prophet of freedom...."!! (94-95)

Socialist revolution = subjectivist hope to present it as "an objectively scientific cognition" "is an illusion of an ecstatic dreamer, an illusion which degenerated into charlatanry" (p. 110).

..."Marx ... was dominated by the passionate will of a radical apostle of freedom...."!! (111)

Marx "agitationally whipping up all the instincts of hatred...." (115)

"Marxism ... becomes ethics of abstract negative, fanatical enthusiasm" (just like Mohammedanism according to Hegel!).... (120)

..."Temperament of a fanatic" of Marx (and his "hot head")—that's the point. (120)

And more of such vulgar gibberish!

Whence this quotation? The author did not give chapter and verse.

* "just"!!—Ed.

** hence the ire!!—Ed.
Without revolution socialism cannot be realised. It stands in need of a political act, inasmuch as it stands in need of destruction and dissolution. But wherever its organic activity begins and its end-in-itself bares its soul, socialism casts off its political integument.

—After quoting this passage without giving its source Plenge continues: “The political integument’ that will be hurled aside is of course the whole of Marxism.” (129)

How Plenge seeks out “contradictions”: Marx, he says, wrote in Rheinische Zeitung: “The same spirit which constructs railways with the help of industry, constructs philosophical systems in the minds of philosophers’ (p. 143). And then these means of production are emancipated from the spirit which created them and begin, in turn, sovereignly, to determine the spirit.”

Example of how Plenge criticises Mehrwertstheorie*:

“By its gross exaggeration it brings to a white heat the hard fact of capitalism that the urge for profit lowers wages and worsens working conditions. But then it suffers from the elementary mistake of duplication of concepts veiled by the terminology used....” (157)

...“Agitational requirements dictate that the inflammatory theory of surplus-value be given the most prominent place in the entire system....” (164)

* theory of surplus-value—Ed.
...“Marx is a revolutionary Jew of the nineteenth century who has re-tailored the garment borrowed from our great philosophy to suit his ends.” (171)

(This Plenge is an extreme vulgariser; the scientific value of his trashy book is zero.)

A pearl!!

Written not later than June 1916
First published in 1933 in *Lenin Miscellany* XXII

Published according to the manuscript

FROM MARX TO MAO

★

NOT FOR COMMERCIAL DISTRIBUTION
NOTES ON BOOKS


Perrin, Les atomes, Paris (Alcan).\textsuperscript{157}

Written not earlier than 1912
First published in 1938
in Lenin Miscellany XXXI

Published according to the manuscript
From books on *philosophy* in the Zürich *Cantonal Library*¹⁵⁸

*Gideon Spicker*, Über das Verhältnis der Naturwissenschaft zur Philosophie (especially versus Kant and Lange’s *History of Materialism*). Octavo. Berlin, 1874. *IV. W. 57 K.*

Hegel, *Phänomenologie* (hrs. Bolland, 1907), *IV. W. 165 g.*

Written in 1915
First published in 1933
Published according to the manuscript

in *Lenin Miscellany XXII*

((A very sharp criticism of Paulsen from the standpoint of Feuerbach. A “Mohican” of the bourgeois) )

Written in 1915
First published in 1933
in Lenin Miscellany XXII

Published according to the manuscript
Section III. ("Works of informative and scientific content")\textsuperscript{160}:

Theories of Origin... 1914. (Present-day Culture III, IV). 

\textit{Uhde, Feuerbach}, Leipzig, 1914 ... XVI. 906.

A. Zart, \textit{Bausteine des Weltalls: Atome, Moleküle...}
Stuttgart, 1913.

Written in 1916
First published in 1934
Published according to the manuscript
in \textit{Lenin Miscellany XXVII}
Ruttmann, *Die Hauptergebnisse der modernen Psychologie*, Pe. VII. 3551.

Suter, *Die Philosophie von Richard Avenarius*, 1910 (Diss). St. Bro. 1 1. 3 4 1

Written in 1916
First published in 1936 in *Lenin Miscellany XXIX* Published according to the manuscript
ON THE REVIEW OF JOH. PLENGE’S BOOK

*Marx and Hegel* 161

(184 SS.) (Mk. 4).
{An unfavourable review by O. Bauer in Vol. III, 3rd number of *Archiv für Geschichte des Sozialismus*.}

Written in 1913

First published in 1938

in *Lenin Miscellany XXXI*

Published according to the manuscript
ON THE REVIEW OF R. B. PERRY'S BOOK
PRESENT PHILOSOPHICAL TENDENCIES


Schiller is against Perry's "realism" and makes the charge that "his mind is so preoccupied with the metaphysical antithesis between realism and idealism that he is always trying to reduce all other issues to this."

It is to be noted that Schiller quotes the following passage from Perry: "The organism is correlated with an environment, from which it evolved and on which it acts. Consciousness is a selective response to a pre-existing and independently existing environment. There must be something to be responded to, if there is to be any response" (p. 323 in Perry's book). And Schiller raises the objection: "Unless the question is begged in the 'independently existing environment’” (Schiller’s italics), “nothing is here proved except the correlation of the mind and its ‘environment’”... (p. 284).

Written in 1913
First published in 1938
in *Lenin Miscellany XXXI*

Published according to the manuscript
ON THE REVIEW OF A. ALIOTTA’S BOOK

THE IDEALIST REACTION AGAINST SCIENCE

163


“He” (Aliotta) “shows us in agnosticism all the latest sources of contemporary reaction; he shows how it develops through German (Riehl) and French (Renouvier) neo-criticism, the empirio-criticism of Mach and Avenarius, and English neo-Hegelianism; he describes and exposes the intuitionism of Bergson and Schmitt, the Anglo-American pragmatism of W. James, Dewey and Schiller, the philosophy of values and the historicism of Rickert, Croce, Münsterberg and Royce,” etc. (645), and so on up to Schuppe, Cohen and others.

In the second part the author examines the energetics of Ostwald and “the new physics des qualités”* of Duhem and the “theory of models” of Hertz, Maxwell and Pastore. The author particularly dislikes, he says, mysticism (including that of Bergson), etc.

The point of view of the author is stated to be “the spirit of the happy mean of truly rational intellectualism, that of M. Aliotta and of M. Chiapelli.” (645)

Written in 1913
First published in 1938 in Lenin Miscellany XXXI
Published according to the manuscript

* of qualities—Ed.
REMARKS ON HILFERDING’S VIEWS ON MACH
(IN FINANCE CAPITAL) \(^{164}\)

**Hilferding: Finance Capital.** (“The Latest Phase in the Development of Capitalism”). Moscow, 1912

Published in German in 1910 (III Band Marx-Studien)

muddle... p. 13—”According to E. Mach” “the ‘ego’ is only the focus in which the infinite threads of sensation meet most closely....

incorrect In exactly the same way money is the focal point in the network of social connections....”

not “in the same way” p. 71 note. “Only our perception gives things the form of space” (a Kantian).

Written not later than June 1916

First published in 1934 in *Lenin Miscellany XXVII*

Published according to the manuscript
REMARKS IN BOOKS
The idealists first convert thought into an independent essence, independent of man ("subject for itself"), and then declare that in it, in this essence, the contradiction between being and thought is resolved precisely because it, essence independent of matter, possesses a separate, independent being. And the contradiction is in fact resolved in it, for what is this essence after all? Thought. And this thought exists—is—indepedently of anything else. But this solution of the contradiction is a purely formal solution. It is attained only because—as we have already stated above—one of its elements is eliminated: that is, being independent of thought. Being proves to be a simple property of thought, and when we say that a given object exists, it means only that it exists in thought....

To be does not mean to exist in thought. In this respect Feuerbach’s philosophy is far clearer than the philosophy of Dietzgen. “The proof that something exists,” Feuerbach remarks, “has no other meaning than that something exists not in thought alone.”

The materialist explanation of history was primarily of methodological significance. Engels understood this perfectly when he wrote: “we need not so much bare results as study (das Studium); results are nothing without the development leading up to them.”

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* Werks, X, 187.
** Nachlass, I, 477.
...Generally speaking, one of the greatest services rendered by Marx and Engels to materialism is their elaboration of a correct method. Concentrating on the struggle against the speculative element in Hegelian philosophy, Feuerbach did not appreciate its dialectical method and made little use of it. He says: “True dialectics is by no means a monologue of a solitary thinker with himself; it is a dialogue between I and You.”* But, first, in Hegel, too, dialectics does not signify “a dialogue of a solitary thinker with himself”; secondly, Feuerbach’s remark correctly defines the starting-point of philosophy, but not its method. This deficiency was made good by Marx and Engels, who understood that it would be wrong, in combating Hegel’s speculative philosophy, to ignore its dialectics....

...Many people confuse dialectics with the theory of development, and it is in fact such a theory. But dialectics differs substantially from the vulgar “theory” of evolution, which is wholly constructed on the principle that neither nature nor history makes leaps, and that all changes in the world take place only gradually. Hegel had already pointed out that the theory of development understood in this way is ridiculous and untenable....

...In general, the right to dialectical thought is confirmed by him** from the dialectical properties of being. Here too being determines thought....

...Thus the feature of the geographical environment determine the development of the productive forces; the development of the productive forces in turn determines the development of economic relations and, then, all other social relations....

...Each given stage of development of the productive forces has its corresponding definite type of weapons, military art, and, finally, of international—more exactly: Inte r-soc ial, i.e., also, incidentally, inter-

* Werke, II, 345.
** Engels—Ed.
tribal—law. Hunting tribes cannot create large-scale political organisations precisely because the low level of their productive forces compels them, in the ancient Russian expression, to wander separately, in small social groups, in search of the means of subsistence...

[46-47]...According to Marx, the geographical environment influences man through the production relations arising in the given locality on the basis of the given productive forces, the primary condition for the development of which is this environment's features....

[65-66]...The character of the “economic structure” and the direction in which it changes do not depend on man's will, but on the state of the productive forces and on the changes that arise in production relations and become necessary to society due to the continued development of these forces. Engels explains this as follows: “Men make their history themselves, but not as yet with a collective will according to a collective plan or even in a definite, delimited given society. Their aspirations clash, and for that very reason all such societies are governed by necessity, the complement and form of appearance of which is accident.” Here human activity itself is determined not as free, but as necessary, i.e., as in accordance with law, i.e., as being capable of becoming an object of scientific investigation. Thus, historical materialism, while not ceasing to point out that circumstances are changed by people, also gives us an opportunity for the first time of looking upon the process of this change from the standpoint of science. And that is why we are fully entitled to say that the materialist explanation of history provides the necessary prolegomena for any theory of human society that desires to come forward as science....

[68]...In primitive society which knew no division into classes, man’s productive activity directly influences his outlook on the world and his aesthetic taste....

[81-82]...If we were to state briefly the view of Marx and Engels on the relation between the now famous “basis” and the no less famous
"superstructure," the result would be the following:

1) The state of the productive forces;

2) The economic relations determined by it;

3) The socio-political system which has grown up on the economic "basis" in question;

4) The psychology of social man as determined in part directly by the economy and in part by the socio-political system which has grown up on it;

5) Different ideologies reflecting the properties of this psychology...

[98]...Let us take as an example our agrarian problem as it stands today. To the intelligent Constitutional Democratic landlord, "the compulsory alienation of land" may seem to be more or less, i.e., in inverse proportion to the amount of "fair compensation," a sad historical necessity. But to the peasant, who is eager to come by "a bit of land," it is only this "fair compensation" that will seem to be a more or less sad necessity, while "compulsory alienation" is bound to appear to him to be an expression of his free will and the most valuable guarantee of his freedom.

In saying this, we touch perhaps on the most important point in the doctrine of freedom, a point not mentioned by Engels, of course, only because it is self-explanatory to one who has passed through the Hegelian school....

Feuerbach and Dietzgen. 24*

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* The reference is in page 24 of Plekhanov's book (see p. 403 of this volume).—Ed.
PREFACE

[6]*...Science, the creation of the intellect and reason, serves only to ensure our effective power over nature. It only teaches us how to utilise things, but tells us nothing about their essence....

[7]...Thus my essential task in this study has been to contrast two points of view: the positive, "scientific" and the "pragmatic". I have tried to be as impartial as possible in outlining these two points of view, since I am well aware of a third and serious danger in this kind of work: that of not giving one's adversaries their due. I do not flatter myself that I have fully achieved my aim. Such perfect "neutrality" is impossible....

CHAPTER I

THE MODERN CENTRE
OF PHILOSOPHIC DISCUSSIONS

§ 5. BASIC CONTRADICTION OF MODERN PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT

[28-29]...But contemporary systems of philosophy still oppose one another, battling over a fundamental contradiction that arises from the manner in which the philosophical problem is posed in our epoch. The form of the antithesis is therefore simultaneously the form taken by the succession of philosophical views at different times and the form taken by the views existing at the same time.

* Rey A., La Philosophie Moderne, Paris, 1908.—Ed.
What, in the present position of the philosophical problem in general, are the possible alternatives? There can be only one, for it is a matter of keeping science and practice in the closest possible unity, without sacrificing one to the other, without opposing one to the other. This means either that practice will be the consequence of science or, on the other hand, science will be the consequence of practice. In the first case, science covers practice; in the second, practice covers science. It is a question of preserving a logical connection between the two terms, and it can only be varied by reversing them, making the first dependent on the second, or the second on the first. In the one case we get rationalistic, intellectualist, and positivist systems: the dogmatism of science. In the other, we get systems of pragmatism, fideism or active intuition (like that of Bergson): the dogmatism of action. According to the first systems, one has to know in order to act: cognition produces action. According to the second, knowledge follows the requirements of action: action produces cognition.

It should not be thought that these latter systems resurrect contempt for science and the philosophy of ignorance. It is after serious investigation, scientific erudition often of the most excellent kind, after profound critical thinking about science, and even through thoroughly "thinking out this science," as certain of these philosophers like to put it, that they arrive at the derivation of science from practice. If in so doing they belittle science, it is only indirectly; for many of them, on the contrary, believe that they are revealing its full value....

§ 6. THE INTEREST OF CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHICAL DISCUSSIONS

[33-35]...Let as, however, allow for a moment that the thesis of pragmatism is correct and that science is only a particular art, an appropriate technique for satisfying certain requirements. What results from that?

First of all, truth is reduced to an empty word. A true affirmation appears as the recipe for an artifice that will prove successful. And since there are several artifices capable of ensuring our success
in the same circumstances, since different individuals have extremely different requirements, we shall have to accept the pragmatist thesis: all propositions and arguments which lead us to the same practical results are of equal value and are equally true, all ideas which yield practical results are equally legitimate. From this new meaning of the word "truth," it follows that our sciences are purely contingent and fortuitous structures, that they could have been totally different and yet just as true, that is to say, just as suitable as means of action.

The bankruptcy of science, as a real form of knowledge, as a source of truth, there you have the first conclusion. The legitimacy of other methods differing considerably from the methods of intellect and reason, such as mystical feeling, there you have the second conclusion. It is for the sake of these conclusions that this entire philosophy, which to all appearance is crowned by them, was actually constructed....

What a good argument it is, therefore, to pay back these powerful thinkers in their own coin! Scientific truths! But they are only truths in name. They, too, are beliefs, and beliefs of a lower order, beliefs that can be utilised only for material action; they have only the value of a technical instrument. Belief for the sake of belief, religious dogma, metaphysical or moral ideology, are far superior.

In any case, they need not be embarrassed before science, because its privileged position has crumbled.

Indeed, the bulk of the pragmatist army, in the face of scientific experience, hastens to rehabilitate moral experience, metaphysical experience and, particularly, religious experience. All these types of experience develop side by side with one another and can in no way hinder one another, because they are directed towards different needs, quite distinct aspects of practice (satisfaction of material needs, of moral consciousness or religious sentiments), and create different values....

[37]...The metaphysicians would not be slow to take advantage of such a windfall. Besides restoring religion, pragmatism helps to restore metaphysics. Since Kant and Comte positivism during the nineteenth century has invaded almost the entire sphere of cognition....
...Thus, the pragmatist attitude and those others which, while not being so philosophical, original and interesting, lead to similar conclusions, always have as their consequence the rehabilitation of obsolete guiding forms of human thought which since the middle of the eighteenth century had been victoriously displaced by scientific positivism: religion, metaphysics, moral dogmatism, i.e., basically social authoritarianism.

That is why it is one of the two poles, between which all contemporary thinking, all contemporary philosophy, vacillates. It is the pole of dogmatic reaction, of the spirit of authority in all its forms. This attitude is the more dangerous since it is at first presented, by its greatest adherents too, as the boldest and latest revolt of the free spirit, a revolt against the only barrier still remaining and which hitherto served as a lever for overthrowing all the rest: science and scientific truth.

On the other hand, the opposite pole of modern philosophical thought, the purely scientific attitude—since in making practice the consequence of knowledge it subordinates everything to science—is characterised above all by an endeavour towards emancipation and liberation. It is here that one finds the innovators. They are the inheritors of the Renaissance spirit; their fathers and direct teachers are especially the philosophers and scientists of the eighteenth century, the great century of liberation, of which Mach so truly said: "He who, if only through books, has had the opportunity of participating in this upsurge and liberation, will throughout his life preserve a feeling of melancholy regret for the eighteenth century." For thinkers of this type a truth exists which, if not immutable, is one that can continually be approached. It cannot be reached except by scientific methods, and it cannot be found anywhere outside science; truth, science are the necessary and sufficient conditions for all human activity....

§ 8. THE METHOD.—RÉSUMÉ AND CONCLUSIONS

It is a matter of its [science's] objective significance. Some will think that it is insufficient to exhaust the reality which comprises its object, even though they admit, from a certain viewpoint, that it is necessary....
CHAPTER II

THE PROBLEM OF NUMBER AND EXTENSION. QUANTITATIVE PROPERTIES OF MATTER

§ 2. THE OLD ARGUMENT BETWEEN EMPIRICISM AND APRIORISM

[55]...But is not the elimination of all empirical element also an unattainable limit? The mathematician, the rationalists note, could continue to increase the wealth of his science even if the material world were suddenly annihilated. Yes, undoubtedly, if it were annihilated now, but could he create mathematics if the material world had never existed?...

§ 3. THE CONTEMPORARY FORM OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM OF NUMBER AND EXTENSION. THE "NOMINALIST" AND "PRAGMATIST" ATTITUDE

[61]...Bergson, who perhaps more than any other helped to propagate these ideas in philosophical literature, would not accept without reservation the word "artifice." He believes that science is greater and higher than merely an artifice, in relation to matter. But for him matter is not true reality; it is reality that is diminished, regressive and dead. And in relation to true reality, which is living, spiritual and creative, mathematics and science as a whole can hardly have more than an artificial and symbolical character. In any case, the fact remains that it was for action on matter, and not for cognition of its essence, that mathematics was created by the intellect, that first instrument forged under the pressure of practical requirements in relation to matter....

[62]...Is it not mathematics which, of all the sciences, has in our day most strongly inclined certain minds towards pragmatism, and towards that sophistry of pragmatism, namely scientific agnosticism? In point of fact, it is in mathematics that we feel furthest from the concrete and real, nearest to the arbitrary playing with formulas and symbols, so abstract that it appears empty....
[62-63]...All the truths, more relative and less exact, which other sciences try to express mathematically and with which they endeavour to supplement mathematics, gravitate towards this absolute, as planets to the sun.

§ 4. RATIONALISM, LOGICISM AND INTELLECTUALISM

[65]...The rigid and homogeneous space of geometry is not sufficient; the mobile and heterogeneous space of physics is required. The universal mechanism of nature does not signify that matter contains nothing but geometry. According to modern hypotheses it can signify that there also exists the release or transformation of energy or the movement of electrical masses.....

§ 5. GENERAL IMPORTANCE OF THE PROBLEM OF QUANTITY: BASICALLY IT IS A PROBLEM OF REASON

[74]...It is, in the first place, incontestable that reason, no matter how disinterested, has a utilitarian function. Scientists are neither mandarins nor dilettantes. And pragmatism is not wrong in emphasising the usefulness of reason, its pre-eminent usefulness. Only, has it the right to assert that reason has only a utilitarian function? Cannot the rationalists reply very plausibly that the usefulness of reason results only from the fact that, in deducing propositions from propositions, it simultaneously deduces from one another the relations between the facts of nature? It thus allows us to act on these facts; not that this is its aim, but this follows from it. Logic and the science of quantity created by the mind, insofar as it simply analyses the relations it perceives, extend their power to things themselves because quantitative relations are simultaneously the laws of things, and of the mind. If to know is to be able, then it is not, as the pragmatists think, because science was created by our practical requirements and for their sake, so that reason is of no value apart from its usefulness, but because our reason, in learning to cognise things, provides us with the means for acting on them....
§ 6. IDEAS OF POINCARÉ. THE MATHEMATICIAN

[75-76]...The great mathematician, Poincaré,* insists particularly on this arbitrary nature of mathematics.

Of course, our mathematics fully corresponds to reality, in the sense that it is adapted to the symbolic expression of certain relations of the real; strictly speaking, it was not prompted by experience; experience merely gave the mind the occasion for creating it. But, our mathematics, as it gradually became constituted for conveniently expressing what we needed to express, is only one of the infinitely numerous possible mathematics or, rather, a particular case of some much more general mathematics which the mathematicians of the nineteenth century have tried to attain. Having got this clearly in mind, we at once realised that mathematics, by its essence and nature, is absolutely independent of its application in experience and, consequently, absolutely independent of experience. It is the free creation of the mind, the most striking manifestation of its own creative power.

Axioms, postulates, definitions, conventions are, in essence, synonymous terms. Therefore, every imaginable mathematics can lead to conclusions which, when properly expressed by a suitable system of conventions, would permit us to discover absolutely identical applications to the real....

[77-79]...This theory is a good criticism of absolute rationalism and even of the attenuated rationalism of Kant. It shows us that it was not inevitably necessary for the mind to have elaborated just that mathematics which is so well adapted for describing our experience; in other words, mathematics is not the expression of a universal law of reality, whether our conception of reality (of the kind that is given us, of course) is the Cartesian, Kantian or some other. But Poincaré presents this conclusion in quite a different way from that of pragmatism.

Some pragmatists, and even all the commentators on Poincaré that I have had occasion to read, seem to me to have very largely failed to under-

stand his theory. We have here an excellent example of distortion by interpretation. They have made of Poincaré—on this point as also on others, where their error is still greater—a pragmatist without the name. But who can fail to see that true pragmatism makes mathematics indirectly dependent upon experience? It is a decree of the mind, as with Poincaré, but a decree of the mind directed towards practical action, the free will of active thought, as the new philosophy conceives it. For the pragmatist there is no purely contemplative and disinterested thought; there is no pure reason. There is only thought which desires to understand things and to this end alters the representation that it makes of them, for its greatest convenience. Science and reason are the servants of practice. For Poincaré, on the other hand, thought has to be taken to a certain degree in the Aristotelian sense of the word. Thought thinks, reason reasons, for its own satisfaction; and then, over and above this, it turns out that certain results of its inexhaustible creative power can be useful to us for other ends than purely spiritual satisfaction.

But, in that case, practice is the servant of science and reason, which go far beyond the bounds of usefulness. “Thought is only lightning, but this lightning is everything.” *

One may not fully accept Poincaré’s theory; but it should not be distorted in order to invoke its authority. Insufficient attention has been paid to its connection with Kantianism, from which it fully borrows the theory of synthetic judgments a priori, with the proviso (and it is here that Kant’s rationalism seems to Poincaré too rigid) that these synthetic judgments a priori, on which our mathematics (Euclidean) rests, are not to be considered the only possible and necessary postulates of rational mathematics....

§ 7. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES AND THE OTHER NATURAL SCIENCES

[80]...Does Poincaré’s theory assign to experience the role which seems to be its due? Strange!

* Poincaré, La Valeur de la Science (conclusion).
I would like to tell the pragmatists, who have constantly enlisted it for their own ends and used it author’s name like an artillery piece, that I find very little of the pragmatic in it....

§ 8. INDICATIONS RELATIVE TO THE GENERAL EVOLUTION OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD AND KNOWLEDGE

[87]...And if science then develops thanks to its material usefulness, it should not be forgotten that only owing to its intellectual usefulness and the disinterested satisfaction of the mind that desires to cognise things did it free itself at the outset from a crude empiricism in order to become true science. It first enables us to cognise reality, prior to allowing us to act on it. And it is necessary that it should first enable us to cognise in order later to allow us to act....

§ 9. MACH’S IDEAS, REASON AND THE ADAPTATION OF THOUGHT

[90-91]...Does this not give us a valuable indication of the nature and scope of logic and rational thought, of which mathematics has always been considered the pure emanation? And perhaps, also, of the nature and scope of reason? Here we are not far from the thought of Mach, who was also frequently made out to be a pragmatist without the name.

He seems to us to be much closer to rationalism in the sense which, in our opinion, should henceforth be put into that term—a rationalism which by no means excludes a psychological history of reason with its opportunities and temporary contingencies and, above all, does not in any way belittle the role of experience; reason being only codified experience and, reciprocally, the necessary and universal code of every kind of experience, taking into account simultaneously both the moment of evolution and the psychological organisation of man....

[93-94]...Hence one sees that reason, subjected to abstract analysis in the consciousness of the rational being, is capable, with the help of the principles discovered in it and the ideal development of these principles, of agreeing with the laws of the environment and expressing them. One sees, further, that, given what we are and
what the environment is, reason cannot be different from what it is: it is then, as the rationalists claim, necessary and universal. In a certain sense, it is even absolute, but not in the sense that this word is understood by traditional rationalism. For this latter it means that things exist as reason conceives them. From our point of view, on the contrary, we do not know how things exist in themselves, and to this extent Kantian or positivist relativism has its raison d'etre. But we have the right to say that if, in a being of a totally different constitution, the needs of evolution had established a conformity with the environment different from our own (since one of the two factors of which it is the product would be different), one would always be able to establish a system of translation that would make these two kinds of conformity coincide with each other. There is nothing absurd in this hypothesis, because to a certain degree this should occur between domestic animals and ourselves....

[95-96]...Number and extension, despite their abstractness, arise from the nature of the real, because reality is multiplicity and extension, and because relations in space are real relations arising from the nature of things.

In that case, does it not appear that extremely important conclusions could be deduced from these initial propositions? Scientific abstraction was often considered synonymous with non-reality. Increased abstractness would then signify continual movement beyond the limits of the real, further and further removal from it. Is that correct?

Mathematics, in progressively moving away from sensuous space in order to rise to geometrical space, does not become removed from real space, i.e., from the real relations between things. Rather does it come closer to them. According to the data of modern psychology, each of our senses seems to give us extension and duration (i.e., definite connections and relations of the real) in its own fashion. Perception begins to eliminate this subjectivity which depends on the individual or on accidental peculiarities of the structure of the species: it builds up a homogeneous and uniform
space, as well as a uniform duration—those syntheses of all our various sensuous notions of space. Why should not scientific work pursue this progress towards objectivity? In any case, its strictness, its exactitude, its universality (or its necessity, they are one and the same) are so many arguments in favour of the objectivity of its results. Consequently number, order and extension, in spite of our critical and subjective habits of thought, can be regarded as properties of things, i.e., real relations;—the more real because science has gradually freed them from the individual and subjective distortions, with which they were originally presented to us in concrete and immediate sensations. Should we not, therefore, rightly consider that what remains after all these abstractions is the real and permanent content, which imposes itself on every species with equal necessity, for it depends neither on the individual nor the moment of time, nor the point of view?...

§ 10. WHAT DOES MATHEMATICS TEACH ITS?

[97]...Psychology, for its part, teaches that all our sensations (which are the direct and ultimate data of experience) possess one property: extensiveness or extension. This property is totally unlike geometrical extension, particularly if we consider the sensations that affect us most.....

[98]...Geometrical, space is the result of an abstract interpretation of optical space, which de-individualises, generalises, and makes more manageable for the mind the relations implied by this optical space. We would willingly supplement Mach’s thought by saying that the aim of this operation has been to give these relations their most exact and precise expression, a universal and necessary expression, hence their objective expression. Thus geometrical space is the outcome of an evolution, which has made our thought increasingly better adapted to certain properties of the environment. This was a prolonged and continuous experience, the success of which has constantly strengthened certain habits of thought that have become the principles of our geometry....
Thus, what mathematics teaches us are the relations between things from the point of view of order, number and extension.

By analysing the real relations that exist between things, our mind naturally acquires the capacity to form similar relations from them, thanks to associations by resemblance. It can, therefore, also imagine combinations which are not found in reality, basing itself on those which are found in it. After having formed conceptions that are copies of the real, we can form ideas that are models, as Taine says, in a slightly different sense.

§ 11. RÉSUMÉ AND CONCLUSIONS

Absolute rationalism would seem to have sufficiently good grounds for asserting, by a kind of idealist realism, that, the laws of reason coincide with the laws of things. But is it not at all wrong in separating reason from things, and in thinking that reason by itself alone, in splendid isolation, obtains cognition of the laws that govern things? It would have to be admitted, then, that by virtue of some sort of agreement or miraculous grace, we possess intuitive knowledge of these laws or at least a germ of it. Revived in this way, the Platonic myth of reminiscence seems to be an extremely gratuitous and extremely uneconomical hypothesis.

Yes, the analysis of reason becomes co-extensive with the analysis of nature. Yes, mathematics, in being concerned with the former, is at the same time concerned with the latter, or, if you prefer, provides some of the elements necessary for the latter. But is it not simpler to suppose that this is because our psychological activity is gradually formed through adaptation to the environment and to the practical conditions in which it has to be exercised?

Hence, despite very great differences between absolute rationalism and the theory outlined here our the question of genesis and history, we reach, on the other hand, very similar conclusions on the question of the value and scope of mathematics: this value and this scope are absolute, in the human sense of the word. As regards the superhuman sense
and a transcendental point of view, I confess I that
I have not yet unearthed the secret of it, and am
very little concerned to do so. The possibility
of attaining human understanding of things and
of translating them truthfully into human language
is enough for me.

Is not this conclusion superficial and too petty?
In my view, pragmatism goes to the other extreme,
diametrically opposed to that of traditional ration-
alism. The latter took the end point for the point
depture and transferred the properties of the
result to the beginning. Pragmatism, on the con-
trary, approximates the end point to the point of
depture to the extent of confusing the two and
ascribes to the result the properties of the beginning.
Is it not more rational to think that mathematics,
after emerging from a utilitarian anthropomor-
phism, gradually burst through the subjective
limits of this initial horizon? By constantly improv-
ing its analysis, it arrived at certain real, objec-
tive, universal and necessary relations of things.

[107]...It has its foundation in the nature of
things, just like our reason and our logic, of which
it is a particular application and which are
basically formed in a similar fashion.

It does not matter what path has been taken
to arrive at reality if, by investigating it more
and more closely, we finally envelop it from all
sides.

CHAPTER III

THE PROBLEM OF MATTER

§ 1. THE HISTORY AND PRESENT STATUS
OF THE PROBLEM OF MATTER

[109-110]...First of all, after the failures of the
"physicist" philosophers, the great philosophical
tradition of the Greeks, headed by the Eleatics
and Plato throws doubt on the very existence of
matter. Matter is only appearance or, at any
rate, the barest minimum of existence; the science
of material things, in its turn, can only be a purely
relative science, and there is no true science but
that of spiritual things. Thus the problem of matter
begins to be solved by suppressing the problem
itself. Matter can only exist as the indefinable
boundary of the mind and as a function of the mind, and everything relating to matter is of a lower order....

Thus disputes about the reality of the external world, idealism, spiritualism, materialism, mechanism, dynamism, increasingly appear to be an outdated and sterile game which must be left to classic philosophy, understanding this expression in the sense in which Taine did, philosophy for the classroom....

[111]...Vulgar materialism borrows from it [physics] all that is basic as well as all that is exaggerated and monstrous in it. What a lucky chance for the religious spirit, if it can show that physics knows nothing about the things on which it allows us to act, and that its explanations are not explanations at all!

§ 2. THE CRISIS IN PHYSICS AT THE END OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY:
ENERGETISTIC PHYSICS

In point of fact, at the time when this philosophical hope was born and growing strong in the minds of educated and sincere believers, everything in physics seemed destined to justify and realise it.

[114]...The new physics, energetistic physics, come into opposition with this traditional mechanistic physics. “Come into opposition”—is this phrase quite correct? As regards a large number of physicists, one would be tempted to say, rather: “is used interchangeably” (according to the case in hand) with the mechanistic method.

[115-116] Indeed, energy is nothing but the ability to perform work, it is a mechanical concept and can always be measured mechanically, i.e., with the aid of motion and the science of motion. Helmholtz, Gibbs and many others by no means broke with the mechanistic tradition when they added to mechanics the new chapter, generalising it in its application to physical realities. They wished for nothing more, and in fact they did nothing more than correct and further develop mechanical conception in line with the progress...
of physics, as had always been done since the time of Galileo and Descartes. Side by side with the principles of mechanics and within the mechanical interpretation of reality, they put forward the principle of the conservation of force or of energy, the principle of Carnot and the principle of least action, one which had already played an important role since the time of Maupertuis.

Thus, the word "energetics" has primarily the meaning which makes it part of the science of physics, as recognised by all scientists. Let us add that in France this part of physics is more usually called *thermodynamics*, and although, etymologically, this word has too restricted a meaning for the content implied by it, it has the advantage of eliminating all the misunderstandings caused by the other uses of the word "energetics."

The second use of this word relates not to a part of physics, but to a general theory of physics as a whole...

[117]...This law was not incompatible with the mechanical conception. The latter had good reasons for claiming that the different manifestations of energy were basically only different appearances caused by one and the same basic reality—motion....

[120-122]...But if everything can be reduced to the principles of classical mechanics, then, in the opinion of the energeticists there was no explanation for this increasing waste of force, this diminution of usable energy. Nature ought to be capable of going back, as it were, and endlessly recommencing the same cycle of transformations; for classical mechanics is essentially the science of reversible transformations, for which time is of no account, and which, like happy peoples, have no history. In reality, however, the systems would be no happier than peoples. They would all the same have a history. That is why certain physicists have refused to regard physics simply as the continuation of classical mechanics. They have wanted to throw off the yoke of tradition, finding it, like all good revolutionaries, too narrow and too tyrannical. Hence the trivial criticism and later the revision of the basic principles of mechanics. From these efforts there arose a new conception of physics perhaps not so much in opposition to the former,
as was sometimes asserted, but in any case containing profound modifications.

In general it can be said that, finding classical mechanics to be an insufficient basis for physics, the latter has ceased to see in physical phenomena that which until then was always seen in them: the various kinds of motion, forming precisely the science of classical mechanics. Until then, to explain a physical phenomenon, to study it, meant reducing it to forms of motion: the motion of material masses, of atoms, or vibrations of the universal transmitting medium—the ether. Thus, every physical explanation could be represented diagrammatically with the aid of the geometry of motion.

The new conception, which, it was proposed, should replace the former, consisted in the first place in the absolute rejection of all the figurative representations, of those “mechanical models,” as the English say, without which at one time there was no real physics. Mach severely accuses them of being nothing but “mythology.” Like all mythology, it is childish; it could be useful when we did not know how to look at things directly; but he who can walk without crutches is not likely to make use of them. Let us throw away the crutches of atomism and vortices in the ether. Having reached the age of maturity, physics no longer has need of crude images for worshipping its gods. The abstract language of mathematics is alone capable of suitably expressing the results of experience. It alone will be able to tell us what actually is, without adding and concealing anything, with the strictest accuracy. Magnitudes, defined algebraically and not geometrically, and even less mechanically, numerical variations measured with the aid of a conventional scale, and no longer perceptible changes measured by displacements in space in relation to a local origin—there you have the materials of the new physics: conceptual physics in opposition to mechanistic or figurative physics....

[123]...This new general theory of physics, which Rankin already had in mind in 1855, was elaborated particularly by Mach, Ostwald and...
Duhem. "The aim of every science is to replace experience by the shortest possible operations of the mind," says Mach; this formula could be the motto of scientific energetics.

§ 3. THE PHILOSOPHICAL INTERPRETATION OF ENERGETICS

[127]...It is clear how philosophy, desiring to silence the arguments drawn from science against certain particular dogmas and against the religious standpoint in general, could use this ingenious interpretation. Do you put forward certain physical truths in opposition to certain beliefs? Well, the new physics desires only one thing, to return to the ideas of the great epoch of faith. After the stormy onslaught of three centuries, it returns, like a new prodigal son, to the paternal bosom of the most orthodox Thomism.

What is the most serious of all is that a scientist renowned for the mathematical precision and elegance of his works, particularly known for his active propagation of the new physics, for the limpid, admirably French form in which he has expounded it, and for his splendid generalisations in the sphere of energetistic mechanics—this scientist himself considered it possible to align himself with this philosophical interpretation of the new scientific theories. We refer to Duhem. Of course, in doing so he has tried carefully to draw a strict line between his scientific and his metaphysical conceptions....

[130]...Developing this point of view, the new philosophy could almost immediately deduce from the contemporary attempts at reforming physics the purely descriptive character of this physics, which made no pretence of explaining anything. And this played into the hands of "fideism." Science is powerless to go beyond the limit of qualities; therefore it has to restrict itself to describing them. It has to be a simple analysis of sensations, to use Mach's expression which, however, our new philosophy fears to borrow from him in its true sense, which is of a completely "scientific-like" character.

[131-134]...In contemporary literature, one can quite often encounter ideas of this kind in exposi-
tions varying considerably in quality: the sciences of matter tell us nothing about the real, for matter, as they understand it, matter itself, in the popular sense of the word, does not exist. Simple, everyday perception already distorts external reality. It builds it up wholly according to the requirements of our activity. Science then further processes these raw materials. What it shows us under the name of matter is only a rough scheme in which all the living wealth of the real is lost through the sieve of scientific laws, or a heterogenous mixture of abstract elements, arbitrarily isolated or combined, and entirely fabricated by us. Thus the road lies open for justifying the most mystical forms of idealism...

Without dwelling on these extreme misconceptions one can nevertheless note that even among serious and well-informed thinkers there remains a tendency to apply to the physical sciences a criticism analogous to that which Poincaré applied to the mathematical sciences, despite the energetic protestations of Poincaré himself. From this point of view physics, like mathematics, is a symbolic language intended simply to make things more intelligible, by making them simpler and clearer, more communicable and, above all, more flexible in practice. To make something intelligible evidently means systematically to distort and alter the ideas we obtain directly from reality, in order to be able to make better use of the latter for satisfying our needs.

Intelligibility, rationality have nothing to do with the nature of things. They’re merely instruments of action. Moreover, every new discovery seems to directly contradict our reason, for it upsets our old habits. The mind has to adapt itself to it (just as the body first has to learn to ride a bicycle), for the new law in its turn to appear to us as rational, arising from our apparent need of intelligibility. We grossly deceive ourselves when we think that this arbitrary symbolism teaches us anything that could satisfy our pure curiosity, our need for disinterested knowledge. For knowledge, for cognition in the full sense of the word, it is necessary to turn elsewhere....
§ 4. CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY CRITICISM
OF PHYSICS

Although the attitude of the vast majority of physicists to this interpretation of physical science has been one of silence or contempt, it cannot be disregarded by philosophical criticism. Though scientists have the right to say: the dogs bark, the caravan goes on, philosophical criticism which is necessarily interested in the social and educational significance of doctrines, is compelled to stop and take notice.

The majority of the adherents of the new philosophy have addressed themselves exclusively to the scientists, supporters of energetistic physics and resolute opponents of mechanistic physics. But among physicists, the extreme supporters of energetistic physics are altogether a small minority. In the main, physicists continue to be mechanistic of course, they are changing their mechanical conceptions in order to bring them into accord with the new discoveries, for they are not scholastics. But they always seek to depict and explain physical phenomena with the aid of movements open to sensuous perception.

On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that, while energetics has produced a number of elegant theories and expositions, almost all the great discoveries of recent times are due to mechanistic physicists and are connected with attempts to present a picture of the material structure of phenomena. It is worth giving some thought to this circumstance.

In order to provide theoretical physics with geometrical rigour, energetics decided to make it simply a more concise and economically-worded exposition of experimental data; but can the theory of physics be reduced to a mere instrument of economically-worded exposition? Can it totally ban hypotheses from a science that has always been made fertile by hypotheses? Should it not constantly orientate itself for the discovery of the real with the help of theories which, like the mechanis-
tic theories, are always anticipations of experience, attempts to obtain a clear idea of the real? Does it not follow then that to construct the philosophy of physics by relying exclusively on purely energetistic physics amounts to a peculiar narrowing of the basis on which this philosophy should be built? The new philosophy in essence turns for confirmation of its ideas only to those who can be well-disposed towards it, and they are only a small minority. This is a convenient ruse, but a ruse nevertheless.

Besides, are they favourably inclined towards it as it imagines? This is more than doubtful. Almost all the scientists appealed to by pragmatism or so-called nominalism have made serious reservations, including Poincaré. Let us now turn to them.

§ 5. WHAT CONTEMPORARY PHYSICISTS THINK

[138]...Thus, physics is a science of the real, and even if it seeks to express this reality in a “convenient” fashion, it is nevertheless always reality that it expresses. The “convenience” is only in the means of expression. What is concealed behind these means of expression which the mind can vary in searching always for the most convenient, is the “necessity” of the laws of nature. This necessity is not arbitrarily decreed by the mind. On the contrary, it constrains the mind, confines its means of expression within narrow limits. Within the limits close to the approximations of experience, and the small differences which physical phenomena, governed by one and the same law, retain because they are never identical, but only very similar—within these limits the law of nature is dictated to us from outside and by things themselves: it expresses a real relation between things.

[139]...Duhem will say, too, that one should not take the experience of the physicist as a copy of reality. Every physical experiment consists of measurements, and these measurements presuppose a multitude of conventions and theories....
NOTES ON REY’S MODERN PHILOSOPHY

[140]...Duhem will never deny this truth to the propositions of physics: they are the description of reality. Moreover, physical theory is not only an exact description of the real, it is a well-arranged description, for it always strives for a natural classification of physical phenomena—a natural classification, hence one which reproduces the order of nature. No dogmatist, whether Descartes, Newton or Hegel, has ever demanded more....

[141]...Moreover, even if the latter [Duhem] believes in the necessity for metaphysics side by side with science, then why does he adhere to Thomist metaphysics? Because it seems to him that it is in better agreement with the results of physical science....

[142-143]...Ostwald’s “scientism” is very close to that of the great Viennese mechanist, Mach, who on these grounds even refuses to be called, a philosopher.

Sensation is absolute. Through our sensations we cognise reality. But science is the analysis of our sensations. To analyse sensations is to discover the exact relations between them, in short, to discover the order of nature, giving this expression its most objective sense, for the order of nature is nothing but the order of our sensations.

[144]...In the criticisms of Mach by the rationalists, he was sometimes reproached for a tendency towards pragmatism. He was accused of sceptical relativism. Is it because this brilliant historian of science often traces for us its humble beginnings in the primitive arts of our ancestors? After all, these were only a first attempt at adaptation. To give it a precise evaluation, it is necessary to take a look at the result, at the final point reached. Or is it because his biological theory of science makes truth into human truth? But human truth remains truth; moreover, it is the only truth for man. Sensation is evidently something human. Nevertheless it is the absolute, and human truth is absolute truth, because for man it is the whole truth and the only truth, the necessary truth. The properties of man and the universe being what they are, it is based on the nature of things. It is, in
human terms, the cognition of everything that exists....
[147]...It is possible to imagine the existence of microbes even though they were invisible up to the moment when some reagent reveals them. Why then should we not have the right to imagine matter as having a certain structure, which experience will some day reveal?

§ 6. MATTER ACCORDING TO CONTEMPORARY PHYSICS: GENERAL REVIEW

[148]...In that case what is the sense of the campaign begun by Brunetière and continued by religious-minded people, who were certainly sincere, but who desired to destroy everything that could be a stumbling-block; a campaign which, if it did not lead to pragmatism, at any rate led to some definite form of pragmatism?...

[149-150]...Just as in mathematics we use terms of order, number and extension to denote certain groups of relations on which our sensations depend, and just as mathematics takes these relations for its subject, so, further, we denote by the extremely general name of “matter” a very large number of relations—far more complex—on which our sensations also depend. Physics makes a study of these relations. This is all we wish to express when we say that physics is the science of matter....

[152]...To many people it might seem natural that physics should have as its subject the elements capable of entering into these relations and giving them a real content, and filling them up as it were. This was Spencer’s idea in his classification of the sciences. However, this idea cannot be considered a happy one. We register the elements of reality directly, immediately, just as they are, and as they cannot help being.

Their existence requires no justification. One cannot ask whether it is possible for them to be other than they are. To assert that would mean restoring the old metaphysical idol of the thing-in-itself, i.e., in essence, idle verbalism in one form or another. Experience should be simply accepted. It is its own justification, because in the scientific sphere it is for the positive mind the justification of every proposition.
Is then agnostic criticism of science correct? And is there a thing-in-itself which is out of the reach of science? etc., etc. Here, surely, we have metaphysics and its inevitable playing with words! Let us try to see clearly into this matter.

If the *relative* signifies something that deals with *relations*, then physics is *relative*. But if the relative means something that has not penetrated to the basis of things, then physics, as we understand it, is not relative, but absolute, because the basis of things, that at which analysis inevitably arrives in order to explain them, consists of relations or, rather, the system of relations on which our sensations depend. Sensations, the given, are permeated with subjectivity: these fleeting, lightning flashes are what they are made by a system of relations which will probably never be repeated in exactly the same form and which determines my state and the state of the environment at the moment under consideration. But here the scientist steps in to separate out the universal which is part of the composition of the individual moment, those laws of which it is the complex expression, those relations which made it what it is.

All scientific laws in effect tell us why and how the given thing is what it is, by what it was conditioned and created, because they analyse the relations on which it depends. And they will reveal to us *absolute human truth* when this analysis has been completed, if ever it can be.

§ 7. THE CONCRETE DATA OF CONTEMPORARY PHYSICS

All the relations on which the transformation and reduction, the diffusion or dispersion of energy, depend are grouped in the general physical theory called energetics. This theory tells us nothing about the nature of the energies considered and, consequently, about the nature of physico-chemical phenomena. It simply describes how, at the expense of what, and in what direction, physical or chemical changes of the state of a given body take place.
The energeticists claim that it is not possible to go further, that energetics gives us the complete, necessary and sufficient explanation of material phenomena, that is to say, the sum-total of the relations on which they depend. In order to give more objectivity to their view, some even raise energy to a sort of substance which is alleged to be the true material substance, the real and acting cause of all our sensations, the model according to which we should build our idea of nature.

Here energy takes the place of the corpuscles of the atomic theories. It plays the same role and has the same kind of existence: it is the basis of things their final nature the absolute. According to Ostwald, for example, the description of the transformations of energy gives us absolute knowledge of the material universe. "When you are struck with a stick, what do you feel: the stick or its energy?" Energy—that is the substantial reality which lurks beneath all material phenomena...

[158]...The mechanists claim, on the other hand, that it is possible to proceed further. Energetics, in their opinion, remains as it were on the surface of things, but its laws should either be reducible to other, more profound laws or, at any rate, supplement them, by presuming their existence.

As already said, the vast majority of physicists, and particularly the experimental physicists to whom physics owes its latest successes, belong to the mechanistic school.

The supporters of this school criticise in the first place the conception of energy and show that one cannot raise it, as some people do, to a physical or metaphysical entity.

The energy of a system signifies only the capacity of the system to perform work: potential when it does not result in detectable work, actual or kinetic in the opposite case. Consequently, the concept of energy is co-relative with the concept...
of work, which is a mechanical concept. Hence, it does not seem possible to represent energy experimentally without turning to mechanics and motion. But, in that case, to provide an intelligible explanation of physico-chemical phenomena, should not energetics be joined with mechanics, be established as its continuation and, consequently, be reconciled with the consideration of mechanical ideas?...

[159-161]...From this point of view, mechanics, physics and chemistry form a vast theoretical system, and mechanics represents the fundamental basis of this system, just as motion is the ultimate essence of physico-chemical phenomena.

Of course, modern mechanists no longer claim that the mechanics of today, any more than the laws governing transformations of energy, have reached their final form, that science has found its unshakable foundation. Having encountered the criticism of the energeticists—and that is one of the advances which modern physics certainly owes to it—they abandoned the rather narrow dogmatism of the old mechanistic and atomic views. They think that the new discoveries should broaden the scientific horizon and introduce constant changes in the idea of the external world. Have we not been witnessing during the last fifty years the reconstruction, almost the overthrow, of classical mechanics? The old framework was smashed first of all by the principle of the conservation of energy (Helmholtz) and Carnot's principle. The phenomena of radioactivity, which allowed us to penetrate more deeply into the nature of the atom, led to the idea of the possibility of an electrical structure of matter and of the necessity of supplementing the principles of classical mechanics by those of electro-magnetism.

Indeed, the mechanistic viewpoint now tends to adopt the form which is termed the electron theory. Electrons are the ultimate elements of all physical reality. Simple electrical charges, or else modifications of the ether, symmetrically distributed around one point, by virtue of the laws of the electro-magnetic field, perfectly represent inertia, i.e., the basic property of matter. The
latter, therefore, is nothing but a system of electrons. Depending on the nature of the modifications of the ether (modifications as yet unknown) electrons are positive or negative; a material atom consists of an equal quantity of each of them, or at least, possesses positive and negative charges of equal size, the positive charge apparently occupying the centre of the system. The negative electrons, or perhaps only part of them, revolve round the remainder like planets round the sun. Thus, molecular and atomic forces are only manifestations of the movement, of electrons, just like the various forms of energy (light, electricity, heat).

Hence, the remarkable conclusion: the concept of the conservation of mass (or of the quantity of matter), which, together with the concept of inertia, formed the basis of mechanics, cannot, apparently, be retained in electro-magnetic mechanics: gravitational mass remains constant only at moderate velocities, less than one-tenth of that of light; but, being a function of velocity, it increases together with it, and the more rapidly the closer we approach the velocity of light. This hypothesis presupposes either the existence of various electrical charges and the ether, or the ether alone, of which the electron is only a modification.

Finally, at the present time, the works of Dr. Le Bon* and certain English physicists lead us, apparently, to the conclusion that neither the quantity of matter nor even the quantity of energy remains constant. They are both only relations depending on the state of the ether and on its motion. **

* Gustave Le Bon: L’Evolution de la Matière.—L’Evolution des Forces. (Flammarion, éditeur.)

** Apparently, matter is converted into energy and energy into matter. By matter, of course, one should understand only gravitational matter, and by energy—only the capacity to perform detectable work. If by matter is meant the unknown basis of things, from which everything originates and into with everything returns, the ether, for example, or some other primordial entity, then Le Bon’s conclusions by no means refute its eternal nature and constancy; they lead neither to creation out of nothing nor to absolute destruction.
Today nothing remains, nor should anything remain, of this idea. We have arrived at the diametrically opposite viewpoint. All physicists are prepared to revise the fundamental principles of their science or to restrict their application as soon as new experimental data provide the necessary motive for doing so.

The experimental method consists in rising from particular facts to general laws, and from the latter to still more general laws, constantly deepening the nature of the given thing by this ascending movement. It deduces particular laws from general laws in its systematising theories only to the extent that it encounters these general laws on its path; and it encounters them by means of particular experiments and by hypotheses which these experiments are called upon to verify.

But should it be concluded from this that physicists thereby abandon the hope of arriving at basic principles and increasingly deep-seated elements that will explain and embrace an ever greater part of the given thing? Such a conclusion, even though it opposes the mistake of the ancient mechanists, would be a no less dangerous error. The present-day spirit of the physico-chemical sciences, the scientific modern spirit, is not such as to retreat before the unknown. It advances more and more boldly towards conquest of it, but by increasingly reliable methods. The stability of the principles of physics will be assured only at the end of the task. That is why we are witnessing today, and will witness more than once again, so many revolutions produced in former, or in future, ideas by the unforeseen discoveries which have already thrown light on the path or are destined to do so in the future. Progressive physicists, as we have seen, are no longer frightened by doubt being cast on the principles of the conservation of mass or of gravitational matter.

Truth is not given ready-made; every day something more is added to it. That is the conclusion which should be constantly repeated. Thanks to scientific work, our mind daily becomes adapted more closely to its subject, penetrating
more deeply into it. The assertions which we believed we could put forward after studying the mathematical sciences present themselves here, too, in an almost necessary way, and at least in a very natural way. Every moment scientific progress establishes between things and ourselves a conformity which is at once closer and deeper.

We are comprehending more and better. And we invariably see that a result established by scientific experiment, i.e., carried through methodically, may no longer, in the light of new results, have the same degree of importance but yet continues to exist by itself, intact and indelible, eternal as truth, for it is a truth. He who would claim that this effort is fruitless, or that it will always be only strictly limited, is very daring and is refuted in advance by everything that the history of science reveals to us.

The dispute between energeticists and mechanists, a dispute often extremely lively, particularly on the part of the energeticists, is properly only a moment of the progress of the physico-chemical sciences and, moreover, a necessary moment. Far from breaking the unity of development which all historians have noted in these sciences, it would rather seem to have its natural place there, like the old disputes between Cartesians and atomists, between Cartesians and Newtonians or Leibnitzians, between the kineticists and the dynamists. And just as in the case of the old theoretical disputes, the encounter between the two great contemporary theories or, better still, their parallel development, has rather had fruitful results. It has promoted the forward movement of science.

In the first place, energetics has put us on our guard against certain abuses of mechanist models, against the temptation of taking these models for objective reality. Further, it has deepened thermodynamics and shown very well the universal significance of its basic laws which, instead of being restricted to researches relating to heat, have a legitimate and necessary application to the whole field of the physico-chemical sciences. By extending the scope of these laws, energetics has greatly contributed to making their formulas more exact. More than this, while energetics has
shown itself to be less fruitful than mechanism, from the viewpoint of discoveries, it nevertheless always represents a splendid instrument of exposition—sober, elegant and logical. Finally, and this is particularly notable in such chemists as Van’t Hoff, Van der Waals and Nernst, but is more and more frequently encountered also among the physicists, both theories are readily accepted; in each case that theory which best lends itself to the investigation is selected. They are used concurrently; scientists start out from the general equations of mechanics or from the general equations of thermodynamics, depending on whether the path thus followed appears simpler or more successful. The point is that physical theories are essentially hypotheses, instruments of investigation and exposition, or organisation. They are forms, frameworks, which have to be filled in by the results of experiment. And it is these results alone that constitute the true, real content of the physical sciences.

It is on these that all physicists agree, and their constantly increasing quantity, ever more concurrent and harmonious, characterises the progress of physics, its unity and its lasting nature. They are the touchstone of the theories and hypotheses which served to discover them and which endeavour to organise them, while respecting their real affinities, reproducing as closely as possible the order of nature. And these theories, although they are always hypothetical and, it follows, are always losing something—at times a great deal—to the extent that experience brings us new discoveries, never, however, die completely. They become integrated by becoming transformed into more comprehensive, more adequate new theories. It was so with the Cartesian theory and with the atomic theory and, from the latter, with Newton’s theory. Evidently it will be so with energetics and the old mechanism. And are not the kinetic hypotheses of the present day preparing for this integration and this reconciliation?

“The chronicler should note the fact that the majority of modern results in the field of physical chemistry were achieved by means of a successful combination of thermodynamic methods and the views of the molecular theory, in exactly the same way as the creators of the modern theory of
heat simultaneously devoted their best efforts to the development of atomistics, in particular the kinetic theory.

"...We should regard, as an outstanding result of the latter, the transference of atomistics to the science of electricity.... Through this marvellous widening of its horizon, atomistics threw a totally new light on a number of physical and chemical processes...."*

§ 8. RÉSUMÉ AND CONCLUSIONS

If the unknown is boundless, it would nevertheless be wrong in our day to call it incognisable, as was done a few years ago. The repeated and irreparable setbacks of metaphysical attempts led physics to constitute itself as a science by resolutely eliminating the problem of matter. Thereafter it sought only the laws of individual phenomena. This was "physics without matter." But the growing successes due to this new method permit us, it seems, to assert today, contrary to the too narrow positivism of the Auguste Comte kind, that it changed only the method and not the subject or significance of physics. Instead of approaching the problem of matter in all its generality and from its most difficult and basic sides, it approached it, on the contrary, through superficial details and from the most accessible side. This was putting common sense before audacious pride. Common sense was rewarded, for nowadays, as a result of so much work in approaching, we are beginning to comprehend the problem in all its generality and in all its depth.

In conformity with history, invariably repeated by the human mind ever since it has been striving to know things, science has taken a new subject of study from the world of metaphysical chimeras. The nature of matter is no longer a metaphysical problem because it is becoming a problem of an experimental and positive order. True, this problem has not been solved scientifically; there is still room for many surprises; but one thing now seems

certain: it is science and not metaphysics that will solve it.

Furthermore, I think, and I have tried in another place to demonstrate it, that kinetic ideas will always be closely linked with the progress of physics, because they constitute an eminently useful, if not indispensable instrument of discovery, and because they are best adapted to the conditions of our knowledge. That is why I see the future of physics in the continuation of mechanistic theories.

That is why I have said that the energetics theory will probably be absorbed, as was the old mechanism, into a kinetic theory which is more flexible and stricter from the viewpoint of the admission of hypotheses. But mechanistic hypotheses, despite the repugnance felt for them by abstract minds too preoccupied with mathematical rigour, will probably always remain necessary for the progress of physics, because they are hypotheses, while the deliberate aim of the energetics theory is to exclude hypotheses. More than this: they are hypotheses that above all appear capable of becoming the object of experiments, because they are expressed in objective terms, in terms of perceptions, which if not real are at any rate possible. Indeed, science cannot do without guiding hypotheses.

CHAPTER IV

THE PROBLEM OF LIFE

§ 1. HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

[173-174]...With the problem of life we come to the basic differences which can separate philosophy from science. Up to now the argument has been, one might say, above all theoretical. The majority of the philosophers worthy of the name admit that, practically speaking, scientific results are valid for matter. If from the speculative point of view they were able to raise some objections to this validity, they nevertheless recognise that everything takes place as though the conclusions of science were, if not based on right, at least applicable in fact to material reality. To some extent this reality can be expressed by mathematical, mechanical and physico-chemical relations.
For matter, therefore, geometrism and mechanism remain a good formula of study....

[177] Animism, which was in former times partly supported by Plato and Aristotle, considers that all the phenomena of life are due to a rational force, hence to the soul. In contradistinction to the Greek physicians who sought the causes of health or sickness (the theory of humours) in the data of observation, in contradistinction to Descartes who absolutely separates the thinking soul from organic and material facts, Leibnitz and particularly Stahl support the view that the inner life processes, although they have nothing in common with conscious and rational actions, are nonetheless manifestations of the soul.

Barthez and the Montpellier school, persisting in the belief that the phenomena of life can be due only to a special cause, refer them to a vital force distinct both from material forces and the soul: hence the name vitalism given to this theory....

§ 3. THE DEMARCATION LINE BETWEEN MECHANISM AND NEO-VITALISM

[189-190] If we try in some way to synthesise neo-vitalism according to its chief representatives, scientists or philosophers, it seems we arrive at the following: the criticism which the neo-vitalists make of biological mechanism is closely linked with that which the pragmatist, anti-intellectualist or agnostic philosophies made of the mathematical and physico-chemical sciences. It appears to us that we change the problem when we pass from matter to life. Essentially, we are once more faced, as we surmised at the outset, with the same basic problem, and that problem is again the problem of the value of science insofar as it is knowledge. Only the particular terms in which it is essentially raised are changed.

With what, in fact, did the new philosophy reproach the mathematical or physico-chemical sciences? With being an arbitrary and utilitarian symbolism created for the practical requirements of our mind, our reason, which are faculties of
action and not of cognition. Thus, when we extend the physico-chemical method to biological facts we naturally also transfer in the results that it allows us to attain the consequences it implies, as regards the value of these results. Hence the physico-chemical mechanism will be an excellent formula for giving us a practical grasp of living things; it will be totally powerless to enlighten us as to what life itself is. As with the physico-chemical sciences in the sphere of matter, physico-chemical mechanism in the sphere of life will allow us to act, but never to know....

[192-194]...The neo-Thomists restore force, aspiration, desire in matter, re-animate it with the spirit, although heathen, of hylozoism, from which the Greeks, and in particular Aristotle, seem never to have fully departed. Incidentally they distort the Hellenic doctrine. For them matter has no other activity but the force which the creator put into it: the memory, so to speak, of its creation and the indelible impression of it which it bears. Hence its activity is not essential but borrowed, it is creative only by authorisation. But precisely thanks to that, it does not escape at all from the complete grasp of mechanism. Moreover, the nominalists, who have a close affinity to this neo-scholastic movement,* and the pragmatists, pursuing a regular flirtation with

* The neo-scholastics or neo-Thomists seek above all to rehabilitate the scholastic interpretations of Aristotelianism and therefore the philosophical doctrines of Saint Thomas.—The nominalists insist on the symbolic, artificial and abstract nature of science, on the huge abyss between reality an its formulas.—The pragmatists have a similar doctrine, but one which rests on a more general metaphysics. All cognition is directed towards action; consequently we know only what interests our way of acting. All these philosophies are agnostic in the sense that they deny that we can reach, with the help of our intellectual faculties, an adequate and precise knowledge of reality. Despite the fact that Bergson formulated a metaphysics close to pragmatism—and prior to it—he arrived at much less agnostic conclusions. Science, reason, attains part of the real, that which lends itself to being reduced to complete determinism and to being fully represented in the form of spatial multiplicity, in a word, that which is the object of the mathematical and physico-chemical sciences. It is only for the remainder that reason and science are inadequate and have to be supplemented by intuition and philosophy. Incidentally, all these doctrines are very shadowy and it is very difficult to define them.
these philosophies of belief (all too often one has rather to call them philosophies of believers), considered that they had the right to say that the content of their subject is not exhausted by the science of matter. In order truly to know, it is necessary “to proceed further.” A fortiori, will they support the view that when we approach life the limits of science become still more restricted? Physico-chemical mechanism will be applicable only to the material conditions of life, but not to life itself.

To sum up, for the pure disciples of Bergson it will be all the material conditions of life, only these, but all of them, that mechanism will be able to attain. For the others, it will not even be all the material conditions of life, but, insofar as matter is already to a certain degree living and stamped with finality, only that which is mechanical and inert that we can abstract from it, only that which we can adapt from it for our practical needs. And these formulas can already serve for answering the question that has been raised and for fixing exactly the part of vitalism in mechanism.

Is it not possible to find a more expressive formula of demarcation? For the vitalist life plays the part of a creative force; but precisely because it depends besides on material conditions, it is not at all a creation ex nihilo. As a result of its operation it will certainly give something new and unpredictable, but in order to arrive at that, it will operate on pre-existing elements which it will have combined, and above all starting from pre-existing elements to which it will have added.

The mutations observed by the botanist De Vries who, as a mechanist, interprets them differently would here be the manifestation itself and the proof of these creative additions.

§ 4. NEO-VITALISM AND MECHANISM DIFFER ONLY IN PHILOSOPHICAL HYPOTHESES WHICH SUPPLEMENT SCIENCE

[204]...But in the vitalist method the entelechies and dominants have nothing in common with described elements: the ends cannot be described because they do not exist materially—at any rate they do not yet exist, for they are in the
process of becoming, of a progressive realisation.

Their influence is not perceptible to the senses. That is why it is more dangerous to turn to them in science than to turn to mechanical models—and the history of all the sciences proves it. The teleological hypotheses by their very nature escape experimental control and can only be harmful if they are chimerical.

§ 6. MECHANISM, TOO, IS ONLY A HYPOTHESIS

...But it would be contrary to all the lessons of experience to assert that in the phenomena of life everything can be reduced to physico-chemical laws and that mechanism in its whole scope has been verified experimentally. On the contrary, we know very little about life. Experimental biology has to its credit a number of important results, if they are taken in themselves, but they are very insignificant when compared with all the results that we still have to obtain.

Why, then, concern ourselves with mechanist theories, one is led to think. Should not these very general hypotheses, the verification of which presupposes the complete achievement of science, be banned from science? Here again we find an opinion that we have already seen expressed by a number of physicists regarding physics and, in particular, mechanistic theories in physics. Let us recall that some energeticists were in favour of banning mechanist hypotheses from physics as being unverifiable, useless and even dangerous generalisations. Among biologists, too, we find some scientists who adopt the same attitude and align themselves directly with these energeticists. In their opinion biology should be restricted to a description of the phenomena of life, without going beyond what experience allows us to affirm. While using the energetic scheme, it will restrict itself, when seeking general formulas for systematising its laws, to measuring exchanges of energy between the organism and its environment in the performance of various organic functions, and to the enunciation of the laws governing these exchanges.
But is not this already an admission that there is a basic analogy between the physico-chemical sciences and biology, at any rate from the standpoint of the description of facts and experimental verification? The energetics school in biology is less clearly differentiated from the mechanistic school than in physics. It is rather only a timid aspect of mechanism, for it opposes teleology and postulates a conformity between the phenomena of life and inorganic phenomena.

And this again brings us to our previous conclusions: every time it is possible to make a scientific analysis of a biological phenomenon, we again find ourselves up against the relations between biological activity and physico-chemical activity. Hence everything takes place as though, in connection with these facts, the mechanical hypothesis, or at least the physico-chemical theory of life, had been partially verified....

§ 7. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS: BIOLOGICAL INDICATIONS

[223-224]...Living matter is clearly conditioned by habit and heredity: everything takes place as though it remembered all its preceding states. It is said, however, that inanimate matter never manifests this property. It would even be a contradiction to imagine anything of the kind. All material phenomena are reversible. All biological phenomena are irreversible.

In these conclusions one forgets that the second principle of thermodynamics could have been called the principle of evolution or heredity.** One forgets about all the phenomena of “residual” electricity and hysteresis. One forgets that physics will not retreat even in the face of this conclusion; no phenomenon of reality is absolutely reversible, which, however, does not prevent this irreversibility of partial systems, when transposed in the infinity of time and space, i.e., in the total universe, from being conditioned by reversible phenomena—just as chance and coincidence are, probably, only a sign of our ignorance of necessary, very

* timid aspect of mechanism—Ed.
** Clausius called it the principle of entropy which exactly corresponds to the word “evolution,” though derived from Greek rather than from Latin.
complex laws. However that may be, and no matter which way one looks at irreversibility, heredity cannot be an insurmountable obstacle for mechanist biology.

[227]...Scientific discipline tries primarily to find, beneath the appearances which our direct sensations of objects and living beings give us, the relations which link them together, the bonds of dependence which explain their appearance or disappearance, or their variations. The mechanistic theory of evolution is nothing but the effort to determine these relations of dependence as regards the aspects, forms and characters in which life and living beings appear to us.

Scientific discipline further tries to link every particular sphere it studies with the other spheres in which it is applied. Science cannot resolve to consider as isolated for all time the various orders of facts for whose sake it is divided into particular sciences. This division has entirely subjective and anthropomorphic causes. It proceeds solely from the requirements of research which compel the serialisation of questions, the concentration of attention on each of them separately, starting with the particular in order to arrive at the general. Nature is of itself one whole.

C H A P T E R V

THE PROBLEM OF MIND

§ 2. ANCIENT EMPIRICISM AND ANCIENT ANTI-METAPHYSICAL CONCEPTIONS: PSYCHO-PHYSIOLOGICAL PARALLELISM

[242-243] Although metaphysical rationalism constituted the great philosophical tradition, its ancient affirmations a priori could not fail to evoke objections from critical minds. Indeed, in all times we see philosophers trying to resist the rationalist and metaphysical trends. These were in the first place the sensualists and materialists, then the associationists and phenomenists. In a general sense they may be called empiricists.

Instead of opposing mind to nature, they try anew to put mind in nature. Only, they continue to understand mind in the same simplified and
intellectualist manner as those whom they are combating....

[244]...The empiricist theory regarded mind in approximately the same way as atomism regards matter. This is the psychological atomism in which atoms are replaced by states of consciousness: sensations, ideas, feelings, emotions, sensations of pleasure and pain, movements, volitions, etc. ...

[245-246]...Thus our psychological states are only the sum-total of elementary consciousnesses, corresponding to the atoms of which our nerve centres are composed. Mind is parallel to matter. It expresses in its own form, in its own language, what matter, in turn, expresses in its own form, and in a different language. Mind, on the one hand, matter on the other, are two mutually-reversible translations of one and the same text.

For the idealists, the original text is mind; for the materialists, it is matter; for the dualist-spiritualists both texts are equally the original, since nature is written simultaneously in both languages; for the pure monists, we are concerned with two translations of an original text that, eludes us....

§ 3. THE MODERN CRITICISM OF PARALLELISM

[248-249]...When it is said that consciousness is one and continuous, one must beware of thinking that the theory of the unity and identity of the "Ego," the corner-stone of ancient rationalism, is being revived. Consciousness is one, but it does not always remain identical with itself, as is the case, moreover, with all living beings. It is constantly changing; not as something created once and for all, which remains what it is, but as a being that is being constantly created: evolution is creative. There would only be a need for the notion of identity and permanence if it were necessary, in order to discover the real appearances, to impose the link of syntheses and unity on the multiple states which seem to be revealed behind these appearances. But if one supposes that reality is essentially continuous, and that the gaps in it, are artificial, then there is no longer any need to appeal to the principle of unity and permanence.
The theories of Anglo-American pragmatism are extremely close to these. These theories are very
diverse, particularly in the moral and logical applications that it has been sought to deduce from them. But what gives them their unity and allows us to group them together are precisely the
general features of the solution they have given to the problem of consciousness. William James,
the great psychologist of pragmatism, gave this solution its clearest and most complete form. His conception opposes at one and the same time,
and for almost the same reasons, both the conception of metaphysical rationalism and that of empiricism.

[251-252]...William James claims also that to arrive at this theory he needed only to follow
with the utmost rigour the teaching of experience; hence he calls it “the theory of radical empiricism”
or of “pure experience.” For him the old empiricism
remained impregnated with metaphysical and rationalist illusions. He tried to free it from them completely.

Indubitably, these new theories of consciousness won very great favour in a very short space of time: the Englishmen—Schiller and Peirce, the Americans—Dewey and Royce, scientists like Poincaré, Hertz, Mach and Ostwald in France and Germany,
and, on the other hand, almost everyone who wanted to reform Catholicism, while remaining faithful to it, could be associated with the trend of ideas which have been most systematically presented by Bergson and James. It is also incontestable that this favour seems to be largely merited.

[254-255]...True, rationalism claimed that empiricism, i.e., the explanation of the progress of
the mind by experience alone, destroys all science or, if you prefer, all truth. The theory of innate
or a priori reason was, above all, a legitimisation of the rights of science. We shall see, in connection with the problem of knowledge and truth, that pragmatism has in fact often led to sceptical conclusions, but these conclusions are by no means
necessary. James himself, who at times seems to
stand extremely close to sceptical irrationalism, has pointed out that in a strict interpretation of experience it should not be considered as giving us only an idea of isolated facts, but as giving us in addition, and in particular, an idea of the relations existing between the facts.

But does it not then become impossible to say with the rationalists that the empiricists have no guarantee that tomorrow’s experience will be identical with yesterday’s or, in other words, that phenomena always follow one another in the same order since it is precisely the order of phenomena that is the subject of experience? When we come into contact with nature, the mind actually perceives not isolated phenomena, the terms between which it will later establish some relation or other, but the relations themselves, a definite continuity in which we then arbitrarily mark out the terms themselves, rather as we mark points on a line.

Thus, it seems that the new orientation which has appeared in philosophy and which has been given the name of pragmatism marks an indisputable advance in the scientific and philosophical conceptions of the mind.

§ 4. GENERAL CONCEPTION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIVITY

[256-258]...One would now have to establish accurately what constitutes the relations which form the psychological world and how they differ from the relations which comprise the rest of nature and experience. Perhaps the Viennese physicist, Mach, has made the clearest points on this subject.* In every experience that which is given depends on a multitude of relations which in the first place are divisible into two groups: those which have been verified in an identical way by all organisms externally analogous to our own, i.e., by all witnesses, and those which differ according to the witness. It is all the latter that are the subject of psychology and together they form what we call psychological activity. More exactly, the former are independent of our orga-

* Année psychologique 1906, XIIe année. (Paris, Schleicher.)
nism and biological activity. The latter do depend on them, intimately and inevitably.

If we take a piece of sulphur, their the geometrical, mechanical, physical and chemical properties are relations which are independent of our organism. Psychology has nothing to do with them. If a living being is concerned new relations are added to the previous ones: biological properties which, too, are independent of our organism. If it is a matter of our own organism itself, it also possesses properties which to a certain extent are independent of the conditions in which it is given to us in the experience; these are physicochemical and biological properties. Mathematics, mechanics, physics, chemistry and biology are so many sciences, each of which takes a group of relations from the sum-total of relations included in the given thing, and which are independent and should be examined independently of our organisation. These are objective relations, the subject of the natural science, the ideal of which is to exclude from what is given all relations which make this given dependent on our organism....

[259-261] Experience shows us the reciprocal influence of the biological and the psychological, the system of relations between them. Why should not each of these two orders of facts be regarded as two orders of facts of nature, which act and react on each other, like all the other orders of natural facts: heat, electrical, optical, chemical and other phenomena? There is no more and no less difference between all these orders than between the biological order and the psychological. All phenomena should be regarded on one and the same plane and as able to condition one another.

Against this conception the objection will no doubt be raised that it fails to explain why there is experience and knowledge by the organism of this experience. But does it not seem that one could and should reply that this question, like all metaphysical questions, is badly framed, non-existent? It arises from an anthropomorphical illusion which always opposes mind to the universe. One cannot say why there is experience, for experience is a fact and as such imposes itself.

So as to depart from abstractions and generali-
ties, let us try to develop in a more concrete form the definition of psychology that we have just given—and which appears to us the simplest and most scientific. Let us try to imagine the general conception of psychological activity to which it leads us.

Experience or, to use a less ambiguous term, the given, has up to now seemed to us to be dependent on mathematical, mechanical, physical and other relations. When we analyse these conditions, it appears to us, in addition, to be dependent on certain relations concerning which one can say, in general, that they distort it according to the individual to whom it is given: these distortions constitute the subjective, the psychological. Can we establish—of course very roughly and preliminarily—the general meaning of these new relations, of these distortions, i.e., the direction in which scientific analysis, in its progress through the centuries, dares to reveal the most general relations (principles) which they imply?

Why, in other words, is the given subjectively distorted, instead of being identical for all individuals, instead of being a direct datum, forming a single unity with the knowledge that we have of it? It is distorted to such a degree that a fairly large number of philosophers and common sense have gone so far as to smash the unity of experience, and to advance the irreducible dualism of things and the mind, which is nothing but the dualism of experience as had by all, to the extent that the sciences correct it, and experience as distorted in the individual consciousness....

[271-272]...Images are not identical with sensations as subjectivism has maintained, if this word, ambiguous in the scope of its meaning, is given the sense of immediate experiences. On this point Bergson’s analysis has been by no means fruitless. The image is the result of certain relations already involved in immediate experience, i.e., in sensations. Only the latter involve quite a number of others. Let there be given only the relations which form the system of the “image” (a partial system, if compared with the whole system of sensations and immediate experience)—more exactly, let there be given only those rela-
tions of the whole system which involve the dependence of what is given on the organism, and then we have precisely the image, the recollection.

In defining recollection in this way we have done no more than express the latest results of experimental psychology as well as the older ideas of common sense: recollection is an organic habit. All that is common to recollection and primitive sensation are the organic conditions. The former lacks all the extra-organic relations with what we call the external environment involved in sensation.

This complete dependence of the image and partial dependence of sensations on organic conditions also enables one to understand illusions, errors of the senses, dreams and hallucinations, when relations with the external environment are to some degree abnormally cut off, and experience becomes reduced for the individual to that which is taking place in his organism, i.e., to the relations which depend on the latter, hence to the purely psychological, the purely subjective....

§ 5. THE PROBLEM OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

[280]...Our life, fully conscious, is only an extremely limited part of the sum-total of our psychological activity. It is as it were the centre of an illuminated area, around which extends a much larger semi-shaded region that gradually passes into absolute darkness. Ancient psychology made a very serious mistake in regarding fully conscious activity alone as psychological activity. Although it is difficult to exaggerate the extent of the unconscious in our organisation, one should not, as is very frequently done by a certain kind of pragmatist psychology, exaggerate the qualitative importance of this unconscious.

According to some pragmatists, clear consciousness, intellectual and rational consciousness, is the most superficial and insignificant part of our activity....
§ 6. PSYCHOLOGY AND THE CONCEPT OF FINAL CAUSE

[285-286]...To immediate and superficial observation, the higher psychological life, of course, seems heavily stamped with final cause. In generalising by a familiar procedure from the known to the unknown, one sees that from the earliest times attempts have equally been made at interpreting in a teleological way the entire lower psychological life. The simplest reflex, like blinking an eye when the light is too strong, the simplest physical pleasures and sufferings, the primitive emotions—do not all these facts appear to be required to maintain and advance the species, or to maintain and advance the individual? Beginning with the amoeba, that embryonic blob of protoplasm which stretches out to some light irradiations and tries to avoid others, has not all activity which can be called conscious always belonged to the category of tendency, and is not tendency purpose in action? Nor should one be surprised that James, Tarde and many others conclude from these that psychological laws have a totally different character from the other laws of nature. They are teleological laws....

The teleological conception of psychological law is in essence nothing but a scientific facing for metaphysical conceptions, which make tendency, the will to live, instinct, the will, and action, the basis of everything that exists. Moreover, it has been accepted, elucidated and developed by the pragmatists, the adherents of the primacy of action. For them functional psychology and teleological psychology are synonymous terms....

§ 7. THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY

[294-296]...The antithesis of activity, reality, which cannot be analysed, on the one hand, and of relation on the other, disappears and, both as regards mind and matter, should be left on the dump-heap of obsolete metaphysics. All the given is merely a synthesis, whose analysis is the concern of science, which traces it to its conditions and, further, resolves it into relations.

But in that case what becomes of the immortality of the soul, particularly its personal immortal-
ity, since for two thousand years now we have valued this above everything. Not to follow the law of things, not to follow the law of everything living, not to disappear, not to be superseded by something else! To run this fine risk, belatedly invented by the bad gambler, that is man, the bad gambler who wants to win the prize and demands that the dice be loaded in his favour!

To be sure a system of relations can hardly seem eternal or immortal. However, there is no absolute impossibility about it. Improbable—yes! Impossible—no! Only, on the ground on which we now stand, it would be necessary for experience to destroy the improbability or, at any rate, to convert it into probability.

It would be necessary for experience to force us to discover, beyond the subjective, the conditions which would exist after the disappearance of the organism, the relations which would make it partially dependent on something other than that organism. It is for experience to decide. It alone is capable of dispelling doubts. A priori there is nothing to stop certain conditions, certain relations, from being discovered which would involve—at least partially—the indestructibility of one part of what is given, for example consciousness.

But need this be said? Experience has so far never shown us anything of the kind. I am aware that spiritualists claim the opposite. But that is mere assertion. Their experiments, at least those that are not based on trickery or deception (and are not these a minority?), in the present state of things can at most induce us to think that there exist some forces of nature, some kinds of mechanical motion, of whose manifestations we know very little, and the conditions and laws—still less. It even seems probable that they depend on the human organism and are simply related to the unconscious psychological and biological activity.

Moreover, in the face of the poverty of the sham experimental verifications of the life beyond the grave, the theory of the immortality of the soul can only retain the form which Socrates and Plato already gave it: it is a risk one has to take—it is an appeal to the unknown and an appeal to which there hardly seems any chance of getting a reply....
CHAPTER VI
THE PROBLEM OF MORALITY

§ 1. IRRATIONAL MORALITY: MYSTICISM OR TRADITIONALISM

The new philosophies are, therefore, primarily moral doctrines. And it appears that these doctrines can be defined as: a mysticism of action. This attitude is not new. It was the attitude adopted by the sophists, for whom there was also neither truth nor error, but only success. It was the attitude adopted by the post-Aristotelian probabilists and sceptics, the attitude of some nominalists at the time of scholasticism, the attitude of the subjectivists of the eighteenth century, notably Berkeley.

The doctrines of the intellectual anarchists like Stirner and Nietzsche rest on these same premises. Thus, in the stock of modern nominalism and pragmatism the words are newer than the things....

When some modernists, like Le Roy, derive from pragmatism a justification for Catholicism, they perhaps do not derive from it what some philosophers—the founders of pragmatism—wanted to obtain. But they draw from it conclusions which can legitimately be drawn and which, incidentally, were drawn or almost so, by outstanding pragmatists like William James and the philosophers of the Chicago school. I think I can say even more than this. I believe that Le Roy draws the only conclusions that should legitimately be drawn from this way of thinking....

It is characteristic of pragmatism that everything is true that succeeds and, in one way or another, is adapted to the moment: science, religion, morality, tradition, custom, routine. Everything must be taken seriously, and that which realises an aim and permits one to act must be taken just as seriously....

What has caused the downfall of traditions and dogmas up to now? Science, or if one prefers to consider the instrument rather than the product—reason. Science lives by freedom;
reason in the final analysis is nothing but free examination. Moreover, science and reason are, above all, revolutionary, and the Greco-Western civilisation founded on them was, is and will remain a civilisation of men in revolt. Revolt has so far been our only means of liberation and the only form in which we have been able to get to know liberty. I have in mind the spiritual revolt of reason that is master of itself, and not the brutal revolt that has been only the covering—often useful, sometimes necessary—for the precious metal constituting the former.

Thus, the chief aid that can be given to tradition, to the preservation of the ancient moral values, to use a fashionable term, is the depreciation of science. That is why pragmatism, nominalism, should have had as logical consequence—as was very well seen by the majority of those who adhered to it, with a rational understanding of the cause—the justification of certain motives of action: religious, sentimental, instinctive, traditional. On the same plane as the motives of action borrowed from scientific cognition or, still more logically, on a higher plane, for science aims only at industrial action, the new philosophy should have led to the legitimisation of an irrational morality: passionate impulses or submission to authority, mysticism or traditionalism. Traditionalism sometimes even goes so far that some (William James, for example) do not hesitate in regard to morality to return to the absolute of rationalist doctrines of morality....

§ 4. THE SCIENCE OF MORALS

[314]...For this conception of morality as a rational art to be possible, it is clearly necessary that a science of morals should be possible. Here metaphysics renews its high hopes. In fact, sociology, of which this science of morals is only a section, has hardly come into being. Like psychology, only much less advanced than this, it is still in the period where it is necessary to argue against the metaphysicians concerning the method, the subject of science and its right to exist. It seems, however, that here as elsewhere the question will finally be decided in favour of scientific effort. One cannot prevent the metaphysicians from chattering, but one can allow them freedom of
speech and action. And so sociology, thanks to the work of Durkheim and his school, has been working and acting....

CHAPTER VII
THE PROBLEM OF COGNITION AND TRUTH

§ 1. TRADITIONAL SOLUTIONS

[325-326]...Actually, scientists, pure scientists, concern themselves very little with this question of truth. For them it is enough to arrive at statements which receive universal assent and which, therefore, appear to be necessary. For them every experiment methodically carried out and properly controlled is true. Experimental verification—that they say, is the criterion of truth. And the scientists are perfectly right, for practice has always justified this attitude. To suppose that it will not always justify it would be to imagine the absurd, to doubt for the pleasure of doubting....

[328-332]...The modern rationalists energetically defended themselves against the attacks of pragmatism, when the latter claimed that the reason of rationalists amounted, in the final analysis, to guaranteeing to our mind a true copy of reality. And, indeed, pragmatism reproached rationalism for dividing cognition into two synchronised parts: the objects or things-in-themselves and the ideas which the mind makes of them....

§ 2. THE PRAGMATIST CRITICISM

In the rationalism of the nineteenth century, as in evolutionary empiricism and also among the modern rationalists, we, of course, already find this idea that the mind is not a mirror, nor truth a faithful image of things. Usually it is claimed that truth is the result of the work of the mind on things. But this again means putting things in opposition to mind. Pragmatism goes further. All experience, all knowledge, is at the same time action: to live means to act, and only to act. From which it follows—and it is this that caused the name of pragmatism to be given to this system, which essentially defines it in the general view—that truth is defined as a function of action, i.e.,
a function of its practical results. This is success. Every experiment that is successful, i.e., that allows the expected result to be achieved, determines a truth. In order to get away from philosophical abstractions, let us note that in the final analysis this conclusion is merely a generalised expression of the faith of scientists in experimentation. At what moment does the scientist say that the hypothesis advanced by him is true? The moment the result he expected to see in the operation undertaken by him is actually apparent. Since this operation corresponds to the hypothesis or, more correctly, to the chain of hypotheses which he had in his mind and the result obtained corresponds to the conclusion from this chain of hypotheses, his idea was successful; it has been verified by experiment.

To be sure, if one identifies success with experimental verification, then the pragmatist proposition appears to be true; it merely conveys the essence of the experimental method. But the trouble is that the word success is used sometimes in this limited sense and sometimes in its broad, popular sense, depending on the occasion and the philosopher. This is particularly noticeable in the case of William James. He claims that truth applies to everything that is verified experimentally, and, at other times, to everything that ensures any sort of success for our activity. Hence, if one adopts this latter proposition, one is almost necessarily brought to the conclusion that truth no longer exists. For what is successful today may not be successful tomorrow—a thing that often happens in practice, as proved by changes in laws and jurisprudence, moral rules and religious faiths, and scientific opinions. The truth of today is the error of tomorrow, truth on this side of the Pyrenees is error on the other side. The theme is commonplace. And these conclusions, which Peirce—the founder of pragmatism—firmly set aside and combated, and from which the great pragmatist philosophers, William James in particular, tried to escape by means of the most subtle evasions, are in general accepted by the majority of the epigones. Moreover, in regard to the problem of truth, pragmatism has become synonymous with scepticism, just as, in regard to morality or faith, it has become synonymous with irrational traditionalism.
And yet, as in all criticism, there is, of course, an element of truth in the pragmatist criticism of rationalism. One can say of it what frequently has to be said of critical theories: the destructive part is excellent, but the constructive part leaves much to be desired. Certainly the theory of mind as a mirror of things and of truth as a copy, is crudely superficial. The evolution of scientific truths through all the mistakes which strew the path of science proves this.

On the other hand, when we regard ourselves as an organism operating in the environment of the universe, it is true that we cannot separate the realm of practice from that of truth for, in accordance with all that we have said above, and in accordance with all the lessons of science, we cannot separate truth from experimental verification. Only those concepts that succeed are true. But one has yet to discover whether they are true because they succeed or whether they succeed because they are true. Pragmatism is always inclined to choose between these alternatives in favour of the first. Common sense, apparently, can only choose the second....

§ 3. AN INDIRECT INDICATION OF A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH

[332-334]...The given, the experience, is evidently that which is known. Consequently, it is necessary to assume complete unity between the given and the means by which it is cognised, to make a determined break with all dualism at the point of departure—but only at the point of departure. This is an important limitation. Does it not in itself already contain the key to the solution of the problem of truth?

At the point of departure the only possible method of cognition, i.e., the only method of discovery, is the experimental method, the elimination of all a priori methods, all dialectical reasoning.

Modern science fully confirms this proposition and thereby postulates the first statement which we have just advanced. The mathematical sciences themselves have experience for their point of departure; reasoning comes later, as we have seen, and always remains to a certain extent subordinate to experience.
But experience is not merely the immediate experience of the given; it includes also—and this in our view is James' great philosophical innovation—the relations implied by the given, and which form a rigid fabric between all immediate experience and past or future experience. If experience consisted only of immediate experience, we would have only sensations and not science; we would not even have perception in the full sense of the word. The object of science, and even of perception, is precisely to analyse immediate experience in order to arrive at the experience which has prepared it, or which prolongs it. To perceive and above all to note, to draw attention and to reflect—this is the beginning of this protracted experience.

From this second remark we can draw the following conclusion: all knowledge that experience gives us is interconnected and becomes systematised. But it does not become systematised, as in rationalism, as the result of an activity that is superior to it and which would impose its forms on it. While seeking to guarantee the stability of science, this concept on the contrary leads to scepticism, for it makes cognition a creation of the mind, and this dualism inevitably raises the question as to whether or not this creation of the mind, cognition, distorts the given. Here, on the other hand, our knowledge becomes systematised in exactly the same way as it is given to us, and the relations of the given have the same value as the given itself. In reality, the immediately given and the relations it involves form a unity and are indivisible. The acts of cognition are all of the same kind and of the same value.

§ 4. THE PROBLEM OF ERROR

In the absolute realism in which we have thus far been moving there is apparently no place for error. But let us recall that we made experience and cognition identical only at the point of departure. The time has come to show what this limitation implies.

It is a fact established by experience that cognition by different individuals is not exactly the same.
same. This can be explained in two ways: either there exist as many different realities as there are individuals (which is absurd: we should be falling into subjectivism), or—and we are consequently forced to adopt this alternative since the given is unique and the same for all—the difference between the cognitions which individuals obtain about the given arises from the conditions in which they were and are situated, in other words, from certain individual relations which exist between them and the given, and which scientific analysis can reveal. This is the conclusion to which we were led by other considerations in connection with the problem of consciousness. We saw that the given involved relations independent of the cognising individual—objective relations—and relations in which the given depends on the cognising organism—subjective relations.

Once this is admitted, we see that in experience, and not now at the point of departure but in the measure that analyse it, bifurcation takes place between the cognising agent and the object of cognition. This relation, in accordance with what we have said, has the same value as the given itself. It imposes itself on us with the same justification as does the given; from which it follows that the difference between the mind and the object should not be regarded as something primary, but as the product of analysis, as two very common relations which analysis discovers in the given ... (W. James); and this distinction derives its value from the value given at the outset to experience taken as a whole, single and indivisible experience.

But in that case mistakes and errors have a very natural explanation: they are the changes, the distortions, which depend on the individual and subjective conditions of cognition. While science, thanks to experience, makes an increasingly complete analysis of the given, it should, no matter how prolonged and arduous the task, gradually exclude all these “personal equations,” which are far more complex than those which astronomers assign to the visual perceptions of the individual observer. It should draw a dividing line between objective and subjective relations. It was for just this purpose that it was created.
Do these considerations not lead us to a convenient and practical definition of truth? **Truth** is the objective. The objective is the sum-total of observations which are independent of the observer. In practice, it is that which everyone admits, which is the subject of universal experience universal agreement using these words in a scientific sense. In analysing the conditions of this universal agreement, in seeking behind this fact the law it conceals, its cause, we arrive at this conclusion: scientific work aims to “de-subjectivise,” de-personalise, experience, methodically prolonging and continuing it. Hence scientific experience is the continuation of crude experience, and there is no difference in character between a scientific fact and a crude fact.

It has sometimes been said that scientific truth is nothing but an abstraction. Of course it is only an abstraction if one is considering crude experience, i.e., subjective and individual experience, for it excludes from this experience everything that depends solely on the individual who cognises through experience. But, on the other hand, this abstraction aims at discovering the given as it really is, independent of the individuals and circumstances which change it; it aims at discovering the objective, the concrete par excellence, the real.

It would be interesting to try to verify this general theory by analysing some famous errors. Ptolemy’s system, for instance, shows its experience encumbered with individual ideas which depend on the terrestrial conditions of astronomical observation: it is the stellar system as seen from the earth. The system of Copernicus and Galileo is much more objective, since it does away with the conditions which depend on the fact that the observer is situated on the earth. In a more general sense, Painlevé has pointed out that causality in mechanics, in the science of the Renaissance and in the science of our day, embraced the conditions of the appearance of phenomenon independent of space and time. But the point is that the conditions of the situation in space and time embrace, particularly in mechanics, almost the totality of
truth and error (approach to dialectical materialism)

the subjective conditions which are no longer sufficiently crude to be eliminated by summary consideration.

An important conclusion: error is not the absolute antithesis of truth. As very many philosophers have already claimed, it is not positive; on the contrary, it is negative and partial, it is in a sense a lesser truth. In ridding it—thanks to experience—of the subjective that it involves, we progressively approach the truth. Once the truth has been reached, it is in the full sense of the word absolute and a limit, for it is objective, necessary and universal. However, this limit is far removed from us in almost all cases. It appears to us almost like a mathematical limit, which one approaches closer and closer without ever being able to reach. The history of science, moreover, shows us the truth in the becoming of development; the truth is not yet formed, but is rather in the process of formation. Perhaps it never will be formed, but it will always be more and more formed.

A final question may perhaps be raised: Instead of being satisfied with what is, are we not still obsessed by the old metaphysical illusion of trying to discover why things exist? Why does experience have subjective conditions? Why is its cognition not immediately one and the same for all? It would appear that we have the right to refuse to reply; but here thanks to psychology it seems one could indicate in the positive. If full experience had to any degree knowledge of itself, like the god of the pantheists, this knowledge would indeed be immediately one and the same. But in experience, as it presents itself to us, the cognition of experience is given in a fragmentary way and it is only to those fragments of experience that we are ourselves.

Biology and psychology tell us that we are what we are, or rather have been shaped into what we are, by adaptation, a continuous equilibrium with the environment. From which, in general, it can be concluded that our cognition should above all correspond to the requirements of organic life. Moreover, it is at first restricted, vague, extremely subjective, as in instinctive life.
But once consciousness appears in the play of universal energies, it is preserved and strengthened because of its practical utility. Increasingly complex beings are evolved and develop. Consciousness becomes more exact, more precise. It becomes intelligence and reason. And at the same time (adaptation, adequacy in relation to experience,) becomes more complete. Science is merely the highest form of this process. Even if it never attains it, science has the right to hope for a cognition which will rather be at one with the given, which will be absolutely adequate to the object: objective, necessary and universal. Theoretically its claim is justified, because it is in line with the evolution that has taken place up to now. In practice this claim will most probably never be satisfied, for it marks the limit of evolution, and to attain it would require a state of the universe quite different from that at present, and a kind of identification between the universe and the experience of cognition.

In any case, one conclusion impresses itself: scepticism in relation to science conceals the most complete and clearest metaphysical illusion that ever deceived philosophical thought. It consists in raising non-existent problems, in seeking a non-existent reality beyond reality in order to explain the latter. It is the result of the dualistic abstractions in which philosophy has always been only too willing to engage.

In particular, is it not overthrowing all experience to see in the embryonic, instinctive, vague, almost wholly subjective and instantaneous cognition of awakening consciousness, original and real experience, as Bergson, Le Roy and some pragmatists are inclined to do. Primitive experience, wholly stamped with subjectivity—yes, but also wholly stamped with error and unreality. This vague, nebulous experience is only the covering of experience. True experience of the real, on the contrary, is in the increasingly lucid limit towards which the human mind makes its way, and towards the increasingly rational form which it tends to adopt, towards reason. The most artificial of all abstractions is that which excludes from experience the results of rational labour and the progress of evolution.

* experience = environment?—Ed.
This evolution has been definitely guided by practice and towards practice, for it is transmitted and realised owing to the constant adaptation of the being to its environment. Who would attempt to deny this today? That is one of the most decisive victories of pragmatism over a now fossilised rationalism. But it does not mean that truth is defined as a function of utility and success. On the contrary, it means that the utility and success are a consequence of the acquisition of truth. Why and how did cognition appear in nature? Because some beings were incapable of acting blindly. They had to know the circumstances of their action. And that is why, having taken from pragmatism everything that seemed to us to be excellent in its criticism of the old metaphysics, we resolutely turn our backs on it in the name of absolute positivism.

To express sensibly and accurately the relations between practice and truth, it seems, therefore, that one should not say that what is successful is true, but rather that which is true is successful, i.e., what is in conformity with reality, insofar as it concerns attempted action. Direct action is the result of exact knowledge of realities, in the environment of which it takes place. We act correctly in the measure that we know truly.

§ 5. THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Everyone will agree, I think, that we affirm as true and objective that which is independent of the individual coefficient which is to be found in every individual in the act of cognition. But when divergencies appear it is a matter of saying at what moment the individual coefficient disappears. Confronted by any kind of experimental confirmation, can I draw a line between that which has been universally noted and that which has been noted only by me?

We said, in a general way, that the effort of science is in all cases directed precisely toward drawing this line. Basically, science has no other aim. It could be defined by this characteristic. In practice, then, we already have a primary means of distinguishing what is true and objective from what is subjective and illusory. That which
has been acquired by means of rigorously applied scientific methods will be true. Scientists have the duty of elaborating, perfecting and defining these methods. This primary criterion is more strict than the very vague rule given thus far: universal agreement. For universal agreement may be only universal prejudice. And a priori there is nothing to bar the hypothesis that such prejudices may exist in a truly universal manner during a particular period, although one could hardly cite any of them. But if we replace the expression “universal agreement” by the expression scientific control, then the objection collapses, for, insofar as it is a question of prejudice, it is impossible to indicate the reasons for it, whereas scientific control only exists when these reasons are manifest. Obviously, we see scientific control only where hypotheses are excluded, and we admit that it can just as well establish the limits of an approximation as a strictly exact truth.

However, scientists will not engage in a search for any other criterion. And from the practical point of view they are perfectly right. But from the speculative and theoretical point of view one may find—and this is the opinion of all metaphysicians who have been engaged in creating a theory of knowledge—that the indicated criterion is unsufficient. Let us summarise in their crudest form all the objections that can be raised from this new point of view: is not all science, in its turn, with its methods and its control, a universal prejudice and, to use Bacon's expression, an idola tribus?* Indeed, one can imagine that no matter what efforts we make to draw a line between the subjective and the objective, we always remain enclosed, at least to a certain extent, in the subjective. Our cognition would always depend on our individual structure and, consequently, would also always distort its object. Taking the psychological hypothesis which we advanced in connection with consciousness, can it not be said that since cognition is the result of the adaptation of our being to the actions which it has to carry out in its environment, all cognition will always be, without our being able to take this into account, a distortion of the environment in accordance with the structure and the requirements of the human race?

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* idol of the tribe—Ed.
It seems one could certainly reply: yes. But precisely because we cannot take this into account, the problem is insoluble and futile. It must be granted: the truth that man can attain is human truth. By this we do not mean to say that it is relative in the sceptical sense of the word. But we do mean to say that it depends on the structure of the human species, and is valid only for that species. Here, with some correction, one must repeat the famous words of Gorgias: we know nothing that is not human. If by chance we were to know something that had nothing of the human in it, we would be unable to take account of it; and if, which is impossible, we were able to take account of it, then we would be unable to inform others of it. Consequently, in looking for a sign and definition of truth, it is not a question of finding a sign and definition that would be valid for anything other than the human race, but simply a sign and definition that would be absolutely and identically valid for all representatives of the human race. It is in this sense that the criterion already referred to—scientific control—is sufficient.

Moreover, once and for all an end must be put to certain sophisms: truth, valid for the whole human race, human truth, is absolute truth for man, because if it is supposed, as the adherents of an extra-human absolute suppose, that it is not a copy of the real, it is still, at any rate for man, the only possible exact translation the absolute equivalent....

[351]...Perhaps, those who try to find reasons for doubting scientific results may still say: we are ready to allow that properly controlled experience gives us effectively and fully the transformation of a cause into a given effect and, it follows, an indubitable relation between the condition and the conditioned. But what can prove to us that this relation will manifest itself identically in a second experience? Leibnitz claimed that all facts differ, if only a little, from one another because we can distinguish them from one another (the principle of the indiscernible: in all the forests of the earth no two identical leaves are to be found). A modern scientist, Poincaré, claimed...
also that physics never deals with identical facts, but simply with facts that closely resemble one another. In that case, what use is science to us; for if it wants to be strictly exact, then every new fact requires a new law.

This objection is of the same character as the following: every fact embraces infinity. Consequently, we would have to have complete science in order to have the very minimum exact knowledge of the smallest object. It is overcome in the same way and almost of itself ....

To sum up, the given is the subject of science, because it is analysable, and because this analysis reveals to us the conditions of its existence. Science is certain because every analysis it makes gradually brings us to experimental intuitions which have the same value as the given; hence science has the same degree of certainty as the existence of the universe which it explains and my own existence which is likewise known to me through experimental intuition.

CHAPTER VIII
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS: THE PHILOSOPHY OF EXPERIENCE

Up to now philosophy has been above all a system of values, to use an expression now in vogue. It sought to establish a hierarchy of things and to make laws about the good, the true and the beautiful in the name of this hierarchy. In general, one can say that it never conceived natural facts on one and the same plane, impartially and objectively; on the contrary it arranged them on different planes in the name of wholly subjective personal preferences or collective prejudices, human of course but equally subjective for that very reason.

All Greek philosophy and scholasticism, the heir of Aristotelianism, present us with typical scales by which the value of things is measured. Both the philosophy of the Renaissance and all modern philosophy, despite the isolated efforts of a Spinoza, were crystallised in one and the same mould. Moreover, leaving aside Spinoza’s system, since it represents an excellent attempt to conceive things from a viewpoint as little human and
subjective as possible, we always find, from the very beginnings of Greek philosophical thought, the same two or three general orientations along metaphysical lines. These are the orientations according to which all the textbooks still usually classify philosophical systems under the names of materialism, spiritualism and idealism.

In essence—considering things from the very general standpoint that we adopt here, i.e., the standpoint of the “particular scale of values” offered by each of these orientations—since spiritualism and idealism often present the closest analogies, it can be said that metaphysics has always confronted us with two great scales of value: the materialist scale and the idealist-spiritualist scale. These two scales oppose each other and each is almost the reverse image of the other.

In the idealist-spiritualist scale, mind occupies the topmost position: it gives all the rest its sense and value either because, as in the case of idealism, it represents the sole reality, material appearances being created by it or existing only through it, or because, as in the case of spiritualism, it offers above material reality which is merely its support or its environment, the higher reality in which nature culminates and through which nature is explained.—In the materialist scale, on the other hand, everything derives from matter and everything returns to it. It is the eternal and immutable creator of all the spectacles of the universe, including the spectacle of life and of consciousness. Life is only one particular variety—among an infinite number of others—of the combinations which blind chance has evoked from the original matter. Consciousness, thought are only phenomena of life; the brain secretes them as the liver secretes bile. Basically, all the phenomena that we can observe—amber which electrifies, iron which heats, steam which vaporises, liquid which solidifies, light or sound, life or thought—are all nothing but the appearances embellished by the various combinations of vortices of a homogeneous fluid which fills all space, or of the atoms which collide in the infinite void.

It seems to me that one could represent the manner in which spiritualism and idealism argue
approximately in the same way: motion is inconceivable without a force to animate the moving body. Force is unintelligible except in relation to the effort we ourselves feel in muscular movement, in the tendency of life; it follows that effort presupposes life. But vital effort, in turn, is always directed to an end; bearing the stamp of purpose, it is conceivable only by the consciousness which directs it. Consequently, thought or, at least, something of the order of immaterial and free spirit is necessary both as the supreme principle of explanation and as the essential principle of existence and creation. Allow the spirit and everything in nature becomes clear. Suppress it, and nature becomes incomprehensible. It vanishes into nothingness.

Materialism on the other hand, claims—if I may use the same summary procedure—that every experiment that explains a psychological fact for us reduces it to organic facts. Organic matter comes closer and closer to inorganic matter. Force is nothing but a shock impulse; it is motion combined with something else. Hence at the basis of things we find only sheer, blind motion.

And soon it will be three thousand years during which these systems of value have been taken up by generation after generation, elaborated, sometimes made more precise, and very often obscured by the subtleties of thought which is never ready to admit itself conquered. And we are hardly any further advanced than we were at the beginning.

Does this not mean, then, that the questions these conflicting systems are debating are idle questions and badly formulated? Is not the desire to establish an explanatory hierarchy between things a purely anthropomorphic prejudice? And is not this prejudice derived much more from the aspirations of individual sentiment than from rational discussion? Basically, it is for ends totally different from objective cognition that these systems are put forward and opposed to one another, and concern for them has nothing in common with the impartial search for truth. Thus, since they are incompatible with a positive discussion, we shall not consider them any further.
Either I am greatly mistaken or modern philosophy in its vital and powerful trends—positivism and pragmatism—is tending towards this conclusion*....

[358-362]...Thus, all the preceding seems to show not only that contemporary philosophy is coming closer and closer to science and becoming an increasingly elegant part of it, but also that it is possible to arrive at a scientific conception of philosophy: it would be no more than the necessary complement to science. By setting aside the metaphysical poems of the individual imagination, it would initiate the collective collaboration of scientists, historians and critics.

All facts are subject to scientific explanation; none of them can be cognised objectively, that is in truth, otherwise than through the sciences. Evidently, science is still very limited and very superficial, but it can only be developed by those who seek to know; without it all speculation is barren.

Is philosophy therefore condemned? Is it nothing but a word devoid of sense and content? A few years ago many scientists would have said so. And it is true to say that if we mean by philosophy those speculations which, beyond experience or on this side of it, seek the origin, end, and nature of things, the useless foundations of science or action, burdening everything immediately known by an unknowable which ought to justify it, if, in a word, we mean by it the old dialectics, whether rational or sceptical, idealist materialist, individualist or pantheist, then those scientists have apparently scored a victory. All this metaphysics has only an aesthetic interest which, incidentally, can be a passionate one for those who have a predilection for it: it represents the individual dreams of lofty but hardly practical minds.

But as this philosophy began to find fewer and fewer adherents, scientists created from it something else or other, and in the past few years

* In defining pragmatism, William James insists on the idea that it is a system which turns away from a priori explanations, from dialectics and metaphysics, in order constantly to turn to the facts and experiment.
the most outstanding fact in the field of philosophical knowledge has been the appearance of a large number of philosophies drafted by scientists in connection with their science, with it and for it. It is true that there have been learned philosophers before. Almost all great systems of philosophy are their work. But particularly in their methods and conclusions these systems lagged considerably behind and stand apart from the scientific works of their authors. Contemporary scientists, on the contrary, instead of seeking a general conception of the world, simply seek to supplement and clarify scientific experience by partial hypotheses that are much more exact and closely linked with this experience.

So, in a different way but to achieve almost identical results, Comte’s idea is being vindicated: a section of scientific work is being collectively organised with the object of scientific generalisation and the synthesis of the sciences.

The manner in which scientific work is conducted makes this conception of philosophy clearer and more exact. Science is composed at once of the totality of experimental results and of the theories of this totality which are always hypotheses in one respect or another. But these hypotheses are indispensable to science, because it is precisely by their anticipation of future experience and the unknown that science advances. They systematise all that is known in such a way as to throw light on the unknown. Why should not philosophy, therefore, in the same way, be a general synthesis of all scientific knowledge, an effort to represent the unknown as a function of the known, in order to aid in discovering it and to keep the scientific spirit in its true orientation? It would differ from science only in the greater generality of the hypothesis; instead of being the theory of a group of isolated and very circumscribed facts, philosophical theory would be the theory of the totality of the facts that nature presents us with, the system of nature, as it used to be called in the eighteenth century, or at any rate a direct contribution to a theory of this kind.

The philosophical standpoint is not opposed to the scientific standpoint; it stands side by side with it. Even when a scientist is making every effort to attain positivity he is a philosopher, for positivity is itself a philosophy....
Science should not differ from philosophy either in subject (it is the same: to give an account of experience), or in method (it should be the same, for the scientific discipline is by its very definition the only discipline which can satisfy our intelligence). No, the only difference between them is one of standpoint, and what distinguishes, and is the only thing that should distinguish, the scientific from the philosophical standpoint is that the latter is far more general and always appears somewhat of an adventure.

...History shows us that when science becomes too far removed from the most common human concerns, forming the basis of most philosophical questions, when it leaves the burden of replying to these concerns to various speculations or traditional beliefs, out of necessity or excessive prudence, it vegetates or begins to decline. It is necessary, absolutely necessary, therefore, for the gains of science and the scientific spirit to be defended, in case of need in spite of themselves, against excessive presumption or adventurism, when they overstep their rights. For excessive temerity—seen, for instance, in some materialist generalisation—is no less dangerous for science in the case of sane and straightforward minds, than is timidity and lack of spirit in the case of ordinary people. Hence, one of the essential tasks of philosophy is to maintain the general atmosphere required for the development of science, for the normal maintenance and dissemination of the scientific spirit.

But philosophy, of course, will only be able to fulfil the dual mission which we feel it is called upon to fulfil—to co-ordinate the efforts of scientists, to provide hypotheses which inspire discoveries, on the one hand, and, on the other, to create the necessary atmosphere for scientific advance—if it seeks to be nothing but the organising synthesis of the sciences, regarded and understood in the way scientists regard and understand them, in short, a synthesis established in an exclusively scientific spirit.

It is gratifying to see—to a lesser extent, of course, in pragmatism, but all the same to a sufficiently great extent—that philosophical research today, having decisively broken away from
the metaphysical errors of the preceding period, is extremely well informed regarding scientific works, seeks to conform to them and derives its inspiration from them.

Without doubt, a very vital and pronounced scientific sentiment is taking shape today which, in some people, is developing parallel with religious and moral sentiments and, as it were, on a different plane where conflict is impossible, while in others it has replaced the religious sentiment and fully satisfies their needs. For these, as Renan has beautifully expressed it, science has provided a symbol and a law. They have adopted a truly positive attitude which retains from ancient rationalism its unshakable faith in human reason, while at the same time acquiring from the incontestable triumph of the experimental method the incontestable conclusion that reason is nothing but the constant effort of the mind to adapt itself to experience and to cognise it more and more deeply, the reciprocal penetration of objective reality and subjective thought.

I believe that the future of philosophy lies on this side, because it is on this side that truth is to be found. As in all prophecies, this is nothing but an act of faith. It is for the future to say whether it will be justified or not. And as this is an act of faith, I consider legitimate all other acts of faith, on condition that the attitude of those who perform them is the same towards me. I even consider that it is fortunate that one ideological trend is confronted by trends of opposing ideas; it is by the criticism of its opponents that it is refined, developed, corrected and made precise.

The philosophical attitude which has been outlined in these brief studies could be called rationalist positivism, absolute positivism or scientism. To avoid any ambiguity it would, perhaps, be better to call it experimentalism; this would indicate simultaneously that it rests wholly on experience—but, contrary to the old empiricism, on controlled experience, the fruit of scientific experiment—and that it refuses in its absolute realism and its experimental monism to go beyond the bounds of experience.
Experience is primarily and immediately the totality of our sensations, what we call phenomena. But it begins with analysis of itself as soon as attention, thought is applied to it, for this totality of sensations is nothing but a crude and very superficial view of the given. Almost immediately there is to be discerned in it and beneath it some of the relations that it involves and which form its true basis. Science strives to carry this analysis progressively forward, penetrating ever more deeply into the nature of the given. If the immediate given is represented by a point then, in order to obtain a picture of the real given, one has to imagine that this point is merely a projection of the straight line extending beyond it. This straight line can be broken up into several segments, each of which will embrace, without there being any impenetrable partitions between them, families of relations on which the immediate given depends. Each of these families will be formed by virtue of a definition which will be based on the natural affinities by which these relations are joined together. These will be relations of number and position, mechanical, physical relations, etc., and, finally, psychological relations determined by their dependence on the organism to which the given is related. There will be as many particular sciences as there are such groups of relations.

Philosophy, on the other hand, tries to conceive the straight line in its entire length and continuity. But the line in its totality, just as much as the point which is the projection of it, the immediate given, as also the relations which supplement it to the extent of its analysis, are of one and the same character.

These are the data of experience. And their totality comprises a single experience: human experience. It is our psychological constitution, and not the nature of things, which distinguishes the world from perception, the universe from science; and this distinction is temporary and contingent.

* summation—Ed.
** “Thing-in-itself”?—Ed.
Experience, therefore, needs only to be explained. To explain it means simply to formulate the relations it involves, and which it itself brings to our attention if we know how to grasp its lessons. And science is beginning to concern itself with them. But, being all reality, experience is not in need of justification: it exists.

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* Written by Lenin on the cover of Rey’s book.—Ed.
As a world outlook, dialectical materialism provides an answer—not an absolute one, of course—to the question of the structure of matter, of the world; it serves as the basis of a most brilliant historical theory; on the basis of dialectical materialism, politics and morality become in a certain sense exact sciences. Being foreign to all dogmatism, dialectical materialism—correctly understood, of course—introduces everywhere a fresh stream of theoretico-cognitive criticism.

In this article we intend to call the reader’s attention only to the theoretico-cognitive aspect of dialectical materialism, which in this case does not, as a method, as a guiding principle of investigation, provide absolute solutions to problems, but primarily assists in their proper framing. As a theory of knowledge, dialectical materialism falls into a formal, or logical, part and a real, or material, one.

In the case of primeval, primitive cognition, experience is identical with the object of experience, and the phenomenon with being, with the thing-in-itself. For primitive man, the world of inner experiences also constitutes the world of things. He knows no distinction between the internal and the external world. At a certain stage of cultural development, this primitive form of cognition comes into conflict with the social man’s desire to subdue the forces of nature, with the new, higher stage of culture. The contrast between perceptions and things, between the world of inner experiences and the world of things, becomes more and more marked as man’s requirements multiply,


[experimental] evidence grows and accumulates, and clashes between perceptions and the external world become more frequent. That is when the necessity arises for new forms of cognition.

...What we are interested in directly is the logical process which in modern philosophy has led to dialectical materialism.— The psychologism of Hume, Berkeley and others operates chiefly psychically, in the sensuous world. Sensuous images are the objects of cognition. The result of the development of [British empiricism] is, Esse=per-ception, i.e., that exists which is given in perception, and all that is given in perception, has an objective being, exists.

[41]...Kant understood that genuinely scientific cognition is possible only through the medium of “mathematical contemplation.” Sense-perception does not contain the conditions necessary for universally obligatory cognition. Sensuous images are not capable of embracing the totality of phenomena to be cognised. And Kant, passes from psychologism to transcendentalism....

[43]...Hegelian philosophy represents the last and closing link of this chain. We have seen that Hume, Kant, and Fichte placed the subject above the object, which they declared to be something inseparable from the subject....

[48]...Categories, i.e., pure universal concepts, such as time, space, or causality, are, from the point of view dialectical materialism, logical definitions, on the one hand, and real forms of things, on the other....

[49]...The limitation of transcendentalism consists in the fact that it does not extend its rights to the real sphere of things and considers that categories are merely subjective, and furthermore a priori, forms of consciousness. Transcendentalism embraces phenomena in categorical, i.e., logically-universal forms, making it possible to formulate strictly mathematical laws of nature, and to give them a universal character. But transcendentalism, as also sensualistic phenomenalism, is concerned only with phenomena. For them, being, things-in-themselves, are inaccessible....

[50]...Dialectical materialism attains the “absoluteness” and universality of cognition by declar-
ing the forms to be *universal, objectively real* “perceptions.” On this rests the possibility of mathematical, or “geometrical” if you will, i.e., exact, cognition of reality. “Geometrical” space and “pure time” are universally real perceptions, and constitute the premise for the “mathematical” cognition of the sensuous world....

[51]...But at the same time dialectical consciousness shows an ability to rise to the “conception” of nature as a “whole,” to the conception of the necessity, of the inherency, of the universal order of nature....

[52]...Man *cognises* to the extent that he *acts on*, and he himself is subject to the action of, *the external world*. Dialectical materialism teaches that man is impelled to reflect chiefly by the sensations he experiences as he acts on the external world.... Proceeding from the consideration that it is possible to dominate nature only by submitting to her, dialectical materialism calls upon us to coordinate our activity with the universal laws of nature, with the necessary order of things, with the universal laws of development of the world....

[53]...Thus Parmenides saw the true essence of things (“the One”) in that which can be cognised by thought or reason and which lies behind fluctuating and mutable phenomena. Thereby, be divorced sense-perceptions from their basis, the phenomenal world from the meta-phenomenalistic....

[54]...Whereas for the rationalistic metaphysicists true reality is given in the concept, for the sensualists the real is that which is given in sense-perception or perception. That which lies beyond the senses is inaccessible to cognition. The objects of cognition are phenomena, which are raised to the level of absolute reality. The content of empirical consciousness is changeable and fluctuating. *Phenomenalism* denies the real substratum of qualities. Given is diversity, the multiplicity of phenomena, but no unity of substance....

[55]...Kant contrived to combine the phenomenalistic doctrine of incognisability of things in and for themselves with the rationalistic metaphys-
The French materialists, headed by Holbach, counterposed nature, as the metaphysical essence of a thing, to its properties. This antithesis in a certain sense denotes the same dualism as that between Kant’s “thing-in-itself” and “phenomena.”

However, we would be unjust to French materialism if we identified it with Kantianism. After all, eighteenth-century materialism recognises the relative cognisability even of the essence of things.

French materialism, taking as its point of departure the same consideration, that matter acts on our external senses, admits, however, that certain properties of things in and for themselves are cognisable. But French materialism is insufficiently consistent, since it teaches that only certain properties of things are cognisable, while the “essence” itself or the “nature” of them is concealed from us and is not fully cognisable.

Kant borrowed this counterposing of the properties of the things to their “nature” from the agnostics, from the sensualistic phenomenalists (directly from Hume)....

In contrast to phenomenalism and sensualism, materialism regards the impressions which we receive from things in and for themselves as having objective significance. Whereas phenomenalism (and Kantianism) sees no points of contact between the properties of things and their “nature,” i.e., the external world, the French materialists emphasise specifically that things in and for themselves, at least in part, are cognisable precisely through the impressions they produce upon us, that the properties of things are, to a certain extent, objectively real.

Dialectical materialism puts material substance, the real substratum, at the basis of being. It has looked upon the world “as a process, as a substance, which is developing continuously” (Engels). The metaphysicists’ immutable and absolute being becomes mutable being. Substantial

* the highest degree.—Ed.
Correct truths are outlined in a diabolically pretentious, abstruse form. Why did Engels not write such gibberish?

* N. Beltov, *Criticism of Our Critics*, p. 199.
The metaphysicists and the phenomenalists racked their brains so much.

[62]...The unity of being and not-being is becoming, dialectics teaches. Put into concrete materialist language, this thesis implies that at the basis of all that exists is substance, matter, which is developing continuously...

[64]...Hence the body does not consist only in its perceptibility, as the sensualistic phenomenalists believe, but exists quite independently of our perceptions, exists “for itself,” as a “subject.” But while the body exists independently of our perceptions, our perceptions, on the other hand, fully depend on the body acting on us. Without the latter, there are no perceptions, no notions, concepts or ideas. Our thinking is determined by being, i.e., by the impressions we receive from the external world. That being so, our ideas and concepts, too, have objectively real significance.

[65]...The body, acting on our senses, is regarded as the cause of the action it produces, i.e., perception. The phenomenalists dispute the very possibility of framing the question in this way. The immanenists hold that the external world is not only inaccessible to perception, but also inconceivable, even if such a world existed....

[67]...It has to be assumed also that our perceptions, as a result of the action of two factors—the external world and our sensuousness”—are not identical in content as well with the objects of the external world, which is immediately intuitively* inaccessible to us....

[69]...From the point of view of dialectical materialism, the thing-in-itself is an object such as it exists in itself, and “for itself.” It is in this sense that Plekhanov defines matter “as the totality of things-in-themselves, since these things are the source of our sensations.”** This thing-in-itself,

* The sign indicates that the words “immediately intuitively” should be transposed.—Ed.
** “Das Bild dieses Seins außer dem Denken ist die Materie, das Substrat der Realität!” L. Feuerbach, Werke, Bd. 2, S. 289.
or matter, is not an abstract concept, which lies
behind the concrete properties of things, but a
"concrete" concept. The being of matter is not
divorced from its essence or, vice versa, its essence
is not divorced from its being.

...An object, devoid of all qualities or prop-
erties, cannot even be conceived by us, cannot
exist, cannot have any being. The external world
is [constructed] by us out of our perceptions,
on the basis of those impressions evoked in us
by the external world, by things in and for them-
selves.... Between the external and internal world
there exists a certain distinction, and at the same
time a definite similarity, so that we arrive at the
cognition of the external world through impres-
sions, but they are precisely impressions produced
by objects of the external world. On the strength
of the impressions produced upon us by the action
of an object, we attribute definite properties to
the latter. An impression is the resultant of two
factors, and as such it is inevitably conditioned
by the nature of these two factors and includes
something which constitutes the nature of one
and the other factor, something which is common
to both....

...Only on the basis of dialectical material-
ism, with its recognition of the external world,
is the possibility presented of building a purely
scientific theory of knowledge. He who rejects
the external world also rejects the cause of our
sensations and arrives at idealism. But the external
world is also the [principle] of uniformity. And
if, in our perceptions, we are confronted with
a definite, regular connection between them, this
only occurs because the cause of our sensations,
i.e., the external world, constitutes the basis of
this uniform connection....

...Without the possibility of provision it is
impossible scientifically to cognise the phenomena
of nature and human life. ...But the objects of the
external world are in causal relation not only to
us, but also to one another, i.e., between the

...a clumsy, absurd word!
objects of the external world themselves there exists a definite interaction, a knowledge of whose conditions, for its part, makes it possible to foresee and predict not only the action to be exercised upon us by objects, but also their objective relations and actions, which are independent of us, i.e., the objective properties of things....

[73]...Dialectical materialism by no means predetermines the question of the structure of matter in the sense of an obligatory recognition of the atomistic or corpuscular theory, or of any third hypothesis. And if the new theories of the structure of atoms are triumphant, dialectical materialism will not only not be confuted but, on the contrary, will be most brilliantly confirmed. What, indeed, is the essence of the new trend in the sphere of natural science? It is, above all, the fact that the atom, which physicists used to regard as immutable and most simple, i.e., an elementary and indivisible “body,” is found to consist of still more elementary units or particles. It is assumed that the electrons constitute ultimate elements of being. But does dialectical materialism assert that the atom is the absolute limit of being?...

[74]...It would be erroneous to think, as our Machists do, that with the recognition of the electron theory matter disappears as a reality, and hence, together with matter, also dialectical materialism, which considers matter as the sole reality and the only suitable tool for systematising experience.... Whether all atoms consist of electrons is an undecided question; it is a hypothesis that may not be confirmed. But apart from this, does the electron theory eliminate the atom? It only proves that the atom is relatively stable, indivisible and immutable.... But the atom, as the real substratum is not eliminated by the electron theory....

[75]...To sum up. From the formal aspect, dialectical materialism, as we have seen, makes universally obligatory and objective cognition possible thanks to the fact that, from its point of view, the forms of being are also forms of
thinking, that to every change in the objective world there corresponds a change in the sphere of perceptions. As for the material aspect, dialectical materialism proceeds from the recognition of things-in-themselves or the external world or matter. "Things-in-themselves" are cognisable. The unconditional and absolute is rejected by dialectical materialism. Everything in nature is in the process of change and motion, which are based on definite combinations of matter. According to dialectics, one "form" of being changes into another through leaps. Modern theories of physics, far from disproving, fully confirm the correctness of dialectical materialism.

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...In intellectual circles a traditional attitude has been established towards philosophy.... Philosophical ideas are presented with too little and too feeble connection with any sort of class substratum....

Very many Marxists adhere to the same view. They are convinced that a variegated medley of philosophical views is permissible in the ranks of the proletarian vanguard, that it has no great significance whether ideologists of the proletariat profess materialism or energeticism, neo-Kantianism or Machism....

...To maintain such a viewpoint means falling into a naïve, most grievous error.... Without exception, all philosophical terms and formulas used by it**.... serve **to denote social classes, groups, sections and their mutual relations. When dealing with the philosophical system of this or that bourgeois thinker, we are dealing with a picture of the class structure of society, depicted by means of conventional symbols and reproducing the social profession de foi of a definite bourgeois group....

...These pictures must not be accepted as being something that could be utilised and brought

* The page references are to Shulyatikov’s book.—Ed.
** philosophy—Ed.
into line with the proletarian world outlook. That would mean falling into opportunism, trying to combine what cannot be combined....

...the first brilliant attempt at this sort of reappraisal took place as far back as several years ago. Comrade A. Bogdanov’s article “Authoritarian Thought”* undoubtedly opens up a new era in the history of philosophy: after the appearance of this article, speculative philosophy lost the right to employ its two fundamental concepts of “mind” and “body”; it was established that these concepts were formed against the background of authoritarian relations and the antithesis between them reflected a social antithesis—the antithesis of the organising “top strata” and the executive “lower strata.” With amazing consistency bourgeois critics ignored the work of the Russian Marxist....

[8]...In these circumstances, a social and genetic analysis of philosophical concepts and systems is not only desirable, but definitely necessary. It is a task which is extremely difficult and complicated.... Contemporary fashionable systems, e.g., neo-Kantianism or Machism...

[9-10]...Our essay is not intended for a limited circle of experts.... Demos is revealing an interest in philosophy ... our exposition is of a somewhat elementary character.... The viewpoint we are defending ... can be more easily mastered if illustrated not by unwieldy, but by economically selected material....

I

THE ORGANISING AND ORGANISED “PRINCIPLES”

[11]...Economic inequality arose: the organisers were gradually transformed into the owners of the instruments of production,** which had once belonged to society....

* Included in the symposium of his articles “From the Psychology of Society.”

** In the present case, we disagree somewhat with the explanations proposed by comrade Bogdanov. He
now the nonsense is clear!!

Fiction and empty phrases. Indeed, very "general"!! Words. The savage and primitive communism are slurred over. Materialism and idealism in Greece as well.

nothing but idealism!

[11-12]...Production relations of "authoritarian" society... The primitive savage everywhere begins to see the manifestation of organizational will. "...the executor is accessible to external senses—this is the physiological organism, the body; the organiser is not accessible to them, he is presumed inside the body; this is the spiritual personality....

[13]...The concept of the mind acquires an increasingly abstract character.

[14]...When in the history of Greek philosophy the famous question was raised: flow is it possible for the multifarious transient phenomena of the material world to have been derived from pure, immutable, non-material substance? What is the relation of "being" to "becoming"?—it was not, contrary to the assertions of all kinds of historians of philosophy, the highest flight of noble human thought, a most altruistic effort aimed at solving

does not attach to this last circumstance the importance it undoubtedly had; he does not even advance it. We had occasion to speak about the question elsewhere "From the History and Practice of the Class Struggle" (in the chapters devoted to the genesis of the ruling classes). Edition of S. Dorovatsky and A. Charushnikov.
the greatest mystery of the universe and thereby giving joy to the human race for all time. The matter was much simpler! To frame the question in that manner merely pointed to the fact that in the Greek towns the process of social stratification had gone a long way, that the gulf between the "upper" and the "lower strata" of society had become deeper, and the old ideology of the organisers, corresponding to less differentiated social relations, had lost its right to existence. Earlier, in spite of all the distinctions between substance and the world of phenomena, the direct connection between them had not been doubted. Now, the existence of this connection is denied. Substance and the world of phenomena are declared to be incommensurable magnitudes. Relations between them are only possible through a series of intermediary links. Or, in more philosophical language, we cannot establish their reciprocal relations either by means of the senses or by means of ordinary thought: to do so requires the assistance of some special "idea," some special intuition.

II

ORGANISING AND ORGANISED "PRINCIPLES" IN THE PERIOD OF MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION

[15]...This very question—the question of the incommensurability of the mental and material "principles," of the absence of a direct connection between them, was put forward and solved by the originators of the new philosophy....

[16]...The spiritualistic sympathies of the Renaissance and subsequent epochs are usually mentioned in passing, but they are very characteristic.*

[17]...The medieval artisan, while being an organiser, at the same time fulfilled executive functions—he worked together with his apprentices. The bourgeois manufacturer knows only one

* It will be recalled that Marx in Vol. I of Capital and K. Kautsky note the dependence between abstract religious views and the development of commodity production.
type of function: he is purely an organiser. In the first case, it is true, a basis is provided for that dualistic "mode of presenting the facts explained by Comrade Bogdanov; nevertheless, the antithesis of organiser and executor is somewhat veiled. Hence the corresponding antithesis of mental and corporeal, active and passive, principles, in the sphere of ideology, could not take a sharp form....

[17]...In the workshop of the medieval artisan there was no place for representatives of so-called untrained, unskilled labour. Work is found for them in the manufacturing workshop. They constitute the "lower stratum." Above them are other strata, other groups of workers, each differing according to the degree of skill. Among them certain organising layers are already formed. Going further up ascending scale, we see groups of administrators and technical managers of the enterprises. The owner of the enterprise is thus "freed" not only from every kind of physical labour, but also from many purely organisational duties....

[19]...In contrast to the medieval thinkers, the "fathers" of the new philosophy devote very much attention in their systems to the world of transient phenomena, make a detailed study of its structure and development, the laws governing the relations between its parts; they create a natural philosophy. The very same "elevated" position of the leaders of the manufacturing enterprises which inspired in the fathers of the new philosophy the "pure" idea of organising will, suggested to them, similarly, a mechanical explanation of the processes of material reality, i.e., the processes taking place among the organised mass.

The point is that the leader of the manufacturing enterprise is merely the final link in a fairly long chain of organising links. In relation to him, the other organisers are subordinate and, in turn, stand in opposition to him as organised persons. ...But insofar as their role differs from that of the chief leader, insofar as it consists in taking part in the technical work from which the chief leader is "freed," to that extent their "mental" character is blurred and their activity is appraised as activity of "matter"....
The bourgeois system in general is a two-faced Janus.... True, we find a definite formulation of dualism only in Cartesianism,—in the system created just at the dawn of the new economic era; true, subsequent philosophical systems, beginning with that of Spinoza, declare that the Cartesian counterposing of God and the world, of mind and body, is contradictory. The materialist and positivist systems of bourgeois philosophy, in turn, by no means testify to a triumph over the dualistic viewpoint. The difference between bourgeois metaphysics and the bourgeois “positive world outlook” is not as great as it may appear at first glance. The attack made by materialism is not directed against the fundamental premise put forward by metaphysics; the concept of the organising will is not done away with by materialism. It merely figures under another name: for example, “force” takes the place of “spirit”....

In the seventeenth century, at the time of its “storm and stress,” the English bourgeoisie preached the doctrine that everything in the world should be explained as a motion of material particles taking place from mechanical necessity. The English bourgeoisie were laying the foundations for large-scale capitalist economy.... They imagined the whole world in the form of an organisation of material particles united in accordance with immanent laws....

In the second half of the eighteenth century, the French bourgeoisie flooded the book market with similar treatises.... But we know what is meant by the internal structure of enterprises: it is the realm of matter and mechanical processes. Hence the generalisation: man is a machine, nature is a machine....

...The motion of matter is conditioned by itself, or rather by its own force (Holbach). The organisatory will, it is seen, has again become extremely transformed, but its presence is noted and is admitted to be absolutely essential.
and what about their struggle against clericalism? Shulyatikov has distorted history!

The manufacturers did not act as revolutionary representatives of “Sturm and Drang”.

III

CARTESIANISM

[25]...The organised require an organiser....

[26]...The intermediary organisatory links—“individual minds” can only fulfil their organising role if there exists a superior organisatory centre. Only, the latter brings them into contact with the proletariat—“matter”—within the framework of organised whole, a manufacturing workshop....

[27]...The Cartesian concept of man is nothing but the further propagation of a definite form of thinking, “a definite mode of presenting the facts, a definite type of their union in the psyche.”

We have seen that the world in Descartes’ system is organised on the lines of a manufacturing enterprise....

...We are dealing with the cult of mental labour....

[28]...I am an organiser and, as such, can exist only by fulfilling organisatory and not executive functions: this is the meaning of the Cartesian assertion, if it is translated into the language of class relations....

...The common, naïve viewpoint sees the external world as it appears through the prism of the senses....

[29]...The concept of the worker as merely a saddler or merely a paper-hanger gives way to the concept of the worker in general. Trade no longer constitutes the “essence” of labour-power....

[31]...Time, Descartes explains, must not be considered a property of matter: it is “a mode of
thinking,” a generic concept created by the latter....

[32-33] Henceforth philosophy is the faithful servant of capital. ...The revaluation of philosophical values was determined by changes in the organising upper strata and organised lower strata. New organisers, new organised—new concepts of God and spirit, new concepts of matter....

IV

SPINOZA

[37] All relations between mind and body are only through God. All relations between the intermediary organisatory links and the organised mass are only with the sanction of the supreme organiser!

...The motion of matter and the activity of the mind are only two aspects of one and the same process. There can be no question of any interaction between mind and matter.

[41] Experience, sensuous perception, is for him an imperative condition for cognising things....

[42] But ... when Spinoza died, as is well known, the fine fleur of the Dutch bourgeoisie with great pomp accompanied the hearse that carried his remains. And if we become more closely acquainted with his circle of acquaintances and correspondents, we again meet with the fine fleur of the bourgeoisie—and not only of Holland but of the entire world. ...The bourgeoisie revered Spinoza their bard.

Spinoza’s conception of the world is the song of triumphant capital of all-consuming, all-centrallising capital. There is no being, there are no things, apart from the single substance; there can be no existence for producers apart from the large-scale manufacturing enterprise....

V

LEIBNITZ

[45] Leibnitz’s God is the owner of an exemplarily organised enterprise and is himself the supreme organiser....
VI
BERKELEY

[51]...Hobbes’ materialism corresponded to the Sturm-und-Drang period of the English capitalist bourgeoisie. The way was paved for manufacture, quieter times began for the manufacturers: Hobbes’ materialism gave place to the half-hearted system of Locke. The further consolidation of the position of manufacture determined the possibility of anti-materialist utterances.

[56]...“The attraction and repulsion of workers should take place without any obstacles”: in perceptual complexes there are decidedly no absolute elements. Everything is relative.

VII
HUME

[61]...His kinship to all the thinkers who appear in the foregoing chapters is beyond doubt.... The position of philosophical scepticism adopted by Hume corresponds precisely to such a conception of the capitalist organism.

IX
FICHTE, SCHELLING, HEGEL

? What about Fichte? [81]...There arise systems of so-called objective idealism....
Fichte? \[88\]...objective idealists....
Nonsense.
What about the concept of “motion”?

what nonsense!

Fichte—an objective idealist!!!

what nonsense!

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[100]...Speculative philosophy loses prestige in bourgeois society. True, this does not occur all at once. But neither did the machine conquer the territory of industry all at once....

[101]...How can the positive nature of the new ideological systems be explained? By the
“simple” law of contrasts, the simple endeavour "to do the opposite” of what constituted the “symbol of faith of yesterday?...

Individualised “complexes”—Ivan, Peter, Jacob vanish. In their place there appears in the workshops the worker in general. “Matter” is given back the “qualities that were expropriated from it....

[102]...Matter is rehabilitated. Bourgeois society introduces the cult of the new idol—"environment.” True, in doing so, the fact is not lost sight of that nevertheless matter remains matter, i.e., the organised mass, and, as such, cannot exist without a “manager.” And “force,” as a specialist in organisatory duties, is assigned to matter. Treatises about Stoff und Kraft ("matter and force") are written....

[104] A comparison between the most recent organisation of the factories and the internal structure of manufacture already a priori dictates the reply: the new variety of bourgeois philosophy should reproduce substantial features of the philosophy of the manufacturing epoch....

[106] Neo-Kantianism gives way to a “turn” towards systems of “pre-Kantian” thought.

XI
W. WUNDT

[108]..."the object can never be separated from the idea, or the idea from the object...."

[113]...The considerations that have been given are already sufficient to define Wundt clearly as a philosopher who sets himself the task of combating materialism or, to use the fashionable term, "Überwindung” des Materialismus,” “overcoming materialism,” and who, in so doing, does not declare himself to be on the side of the school which is regarded as the traditional opponent of materialism....
[114]...Such an equalisation of the intermediary organising links and representatives of “physical” labour, the “lower executives,” is indicated in the sphere of philosophy precisely by the endeavour to characterise “subject” and “object,” “psychical” and “physical,” as comprising an “indivisible” whole, the endeavour to reduce the antithesis between the phenomena mentioned to a cognitive fiction. Avenarius’ theory on principal coordination, Ernst Mach’s theory on the relation of the psychical and physical, Wundt’s theory on ideas-objects—these are all theories of the same order....

[116]...Hitherto, Wundt’s [monist] views could not be denied a certain consistency. Nor can he any more be suspected of idealist sympathies....

[118]...Wundt takes just such a leap when, on the heel of his theory on “ideas-objects,” he puts forward his views on “psycho-physical parallelism”....

[121]...“Attributes” are transformed into “series,” but this reform, in essence, is more of a verbal character....

[123]...Primacy is asserted for the spiritual principle....

[123-124]...Everything corporeal has necessarily its psychical correlation. No single worker, however simple the function he fulfils, can produce any products, can find any application for his labour-power, can exist, without his being under the direct, detailed “guidance” of a definite organiser....

...But the psychical series constitutes the “organisers” and the “concomitance” of the latter signifies for the “physical series”—for the workers—nothing but dependence....

[128]...Thus, according to Wundt, philosophy should transcend the bounds of experience, “supplement” the latter. The philosophical analysis needs to be continued until we obtain the idea of a unity which embraces both series that are independent of each other. Having expressed this view, Wundt immediately hastens to make an important reservation for himself: he declares that we can conceive of the unity of the world either as a material unity...
or as a mental unity: a third solution of the problem does not exist...

[129]...Wundt refuses to give the name substance to his idea of universal unity. He defines it as the idea of pure reason, i.e., in the Kantian sense. Just as Kant’s God is the idea of the supreme “forming,” non-substantial principle, so also Wundt’s universal unity is the idea of non-substantial unity, thanks to which all phenomena acquire vital meaning, indisputable value. In the light of this idea, there disappears the “empty and cheerless” philosophy which sees in the outward order of phenomena, in their mechanical connection, the true essence of the latter. In its place we obtain the view of the cosmic mechanism as the external covering of spiritual activity and creation....

[130]...In this connection, Wundt strongly emphasises the element of actuality. He reduces the idea of universal unity, of the “foundation of the world, to the idea of a universal will....

[131]...We shall not enter on an analysis of his proposed formulation, nor shall we explain his theory of “voluntarism”....

...Consequently, the ideologists of the modern vanguard of the capitalist bourgeoisie cannot speak of any “permanent” organised principles but, on the contrary, have to describe the latter as something extremely changeable, something that is eternally in a state of motion....

XII

EMPIRIO-CRITICISM

[133]...Wundt’s criticism had no crushing force; it struck at an imaginary target. Wundt’s appearance on the scene and the subsequent reaction from the camp of Avenarius’* disciples did not signify a conflict between the philosophies of two different classes or two large groups of one and the same class. The socio-economic background

* Carstanjen was the first to reply.
of the philosophical contest in question was, in this case, the comparatively insignificant difference between the most advanced and the somewhat less advanced types of modern capitalist organisations....

[134]...We should say more: the empirio-critical philosophy should be understood primarily as an apologia for the idea in question. The concept of functional dependence is a denial of causal dependence....

[135-136]...Høffding’s conclusion must, in general, be considered correct. Only his reference to “motives of expediency” is unfortunate: these motives are vague and indefinite.

Avenarius, in this case, was merely making a concession to materialist phraseology, a concession determined by his social position. To many people the views of the “parallelists” might appear to be materialist in comparison with vulgar spiritualism. The same applies to the views of empirio-criticism. The possibility of their coming close to materialism is particularly strong. ...And wide sections of the reading public have formed the opinion that empirio-criticism is a materialist school of thought. More than that, even expert philosophers judge it erroneously: Wilhelm Wundt himself, the patriarch of modern philosophy, called it “materialism”. Finally, what is most interesting of all, the empirio-critics, too, while dissociating themselves from materialism, at the same time sometimes use its terminology, and sometimes even begin as it were to waver in their anti-materialist views....

[137]...Such is the real background that inspired empirio-criticism with the idea of classifying human cognition on the basis of the principle of “biological” classification. But this sort of “biology,” we repeat, has nothing in common with materialism....
[138-139]...dualism—according to Avenarius—is the fruit of a certain process of our abstracting thought—"introjection"....

But the antithesis of the "external" and "internal" world is the purest fiction.

An analysis of this antithesis is extremely important; it should lead to substantiating the monist world outlook. Commentators of Avenarius' system of philosophy strongly stress this point. "By exposing the impermissibility of introjection, one of them says,* "two aims are achieved ...."

[140]...the subordinate organiser, if his "absolute" viewpoint is adopted, i.e., if he is regarded as an organiser independent of the "will" controlling him, is confronted also merely by a "thing," or "body," in the shape of the workers. But let us take another case: for the supreme "will," the subordinate organiser is not only one who is organised, but one who organises.... The former "object," now converted into "subject," "organises" matter: man assimilates a tree, but a tree transformed, the "notion" of tree....

[141-142]..."the fullness of human experience" is also proved in Avenarius' theory of principal co-ordination....

In Avenarius, like in Wundt, the "series" turn out, in essence, to be "incommensurable." And instead of the materialist world outlook that one would expect after the categorical statements about "the fullness of experience," views are expressed testifying to the idealist sympathies of empirio-criticism....

But Wundt and Avenarius part company on the road of idealist constructions. The author of The System of Philosophy reveals a fancy for "Kantian" motives. The author of The Human Concept of the World proclaims views which bring him close to the position once taken by Berkeley.

Let us hasten to make a reservation. We do not at all intend to assert that the works of the Bishop of Cloyne determined Avenarius' viewpoint, that they had a direct influence on him. But the similarity of the idealist positions of both philosophers is indubitable. The afore-mentioned theory of

* Rudolph Wlassak; quoted by Mach in The Analysis of Sensations, p. 52.
principal co-ordination, taken as a whole, is evidence of this similarity.

With the same straightforwardness as Berkeley, Avenarius presents the thesis that there are no objects outside the subject. Each “thing” must necessarily “be related” to the central nervous system, which plays the role of functional centre.

[144]...The supreme “leader” does not figure, not even in the shape of the Kantian idea of reason, Kant’s “form,” or in the shape of Wundt’s “universal unity.” Nevertheless, he is there, and is moreover the chief element of the philosophical system. All phenomena are regarded precisely from his point of view. His “invisible presence is postulated by the unusually high appraisal of the organisatory principle, presented parallel with the conception of organised organisers. And in the general picture of the world resulting from Avenarius’ philosophical discourses, it is precisely the organisatory character of the organising factors that comes into the forefront.

For Avenarius the world represents an agglom- erate of central nervous systems. “Matter” is absolutely deprived of all “qualities,” whether “primary” or “secondary,” which at one time were considered its inalienable property. Absolutely everything in matter is determined by the “spirit” or, to use the terminology of the author of the Critique of Pure Experience, by the central nervous system.

[145] The viewpoint of idealism in the style of Berkeley is put forward with great consistency by the author of the Critique of Pure Experience.

[146]...Mach’s theory of the “ego” as a logical symbol.

Mach, like Avenarius, knows two “series”—the psychical and the physical (two kinds of combinations of elements). As with Avenarius, these series are incommensurable and at the same time represent nothing but a fiction of our thought. Alternately, the monist and the dualist viewpoint is put forward: alternately the intermediary organisatory links are described as the organised, and as the organising principle. And, as with Avenarius, in the final analysis the dictatorship of “the organisatory will” is proclaimed. An idealistic
picture of the world is drawn: the world is a complex of "sensations."

[147]...Mach's objection cannot be called valid. The central concept of his philosophical system, the famous "sensation," is by no means a denial either of the organisatory principle or of the supreme organisatory principle.... Mach was prompted in his criticism of the conception of the "ego" by the view of the subordinate organisers as the organised "mass"....

[148-149]...Besides dealing with the speculative constructions of Wundt, Avenarius and Mach, we could, for example, subject to analysis the views of such prominent representatives of modern West-European philosophy as Renouvier, Bradley and Bergson....

The sphere of philosophy is a veritable "Bastille of bourgeois ideology.... It is necessary to bear in mind that, for their part, the bourgeois ideologists are not sleeping, but are strengthening their position. At the present time, they are even imbued with the conviction that their position is absolutely impregnable. The "idealist" sympathies of certain literary writers who take their stand under the banner of Marxism in turn, create particularly favourable soil for such a conviction....

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X1. Wundt Ostwald . . . .107 not in the book

The entire book is an example of extreme vulgarisation of materialism. Instead of a concrete analysis of periods, formations, ideologies—empty phrases about "organisers" and ridiculously strained, absurdly false comparisons.

A caricature of materialism in history. And it is a pity, for there is an attempt made in the direction of materialism.

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INTRODUCTION

[51]...The unfortunate outcome [52] of the Crimean War compelled the Government to make a few concessions to educated society and effect at least the more pressing reforms that had long since become indispensable. Soon the problem of freeing the peasants was placed on the order of the day, a problem plainly affecting the interests of all social-estates. Needless to say, Nikolai Gavrilovich** eagerly set about elaborating the problem. His excellent articles on the peasants' cause were written in 1857 and 1858. The mutual relations of our social forces in the epoch of the abolition of serfdom are now fairly well known. We shall therefore mention them only in passing, only insofar as it may be necessary to elucidate the role adopted in this matter by our advanced publicists, chief of whom then was N. G. Chernyshevsky. It is well known that these writers zealously defended the interests of the peasants. Our author wrote one article after another, advocating the emancipation of the peasants and giving them land, and maintaining that the Government would find no difficulty whatever in redeeming the lands allotted to the peasants. He supported this thesis both with general theoretical considerations and with the most detailed estimates. "Indeed, in

* Here and elsewhere, a NB underscored with two slanting lines implies that Lenin's NB is in the corner of the page and apparently refers to all of it. The full text of the page in question is therefore given in such cases.—Ed.

** Chernyshevsky—Ed.
what way can the redemption of land prove difficult? How can it be too much for the people to bear? That is improbable,” he wrote in the article “Is Land Redemption Difficult?” “It runs counter to the fundamental concepts of economics. Political economy teaches clearly that all the material capital which a certain generation takes over from previous generations is not too considerable in value compared with the mass of values produced by the labour of that generation. For example, all of the land belonging to the French people, together with all the buildings and their contents, together with all the ships and cargoes, all the livestock and money and other riches belonging to that country, is hardly worth a hundred thousand million francs, while the labour of the French people produces fifteen or more thousand million francs’ worth of values annually, i.e., in no more than seven years the French people produce a mass of values equal to that of the whole of France from the Channel to the Pyrenees. Consequently, if the French had to redeem all France, they could do so in the lifetime of one [53] generation, using only one-fifth of their revenue for the purpose. And what is the point at issue in our country? Is it the whole of Russia that we must redeem with all her riches? No, only the land. And is it to be all the Russian land? No, the redemption would affect only those gubernias of European Russia alone where serfdom is deep-rooted,” etc.* After showing that the lands to be redeemed would constitute no more than one-sixth of the area of European Russia, he puts forward as many as eight plans for carrying out redemption. According to him, if the Government were to accept any one of these plans, it could redeem the allotted lands not only without burdening the peasants, but also to the great advantage of the state treasury. Chernyshevsky’s plans were all based on the concept that it is “necessary to fix the most moderate prices possible in determining the amount of redemption payments.” We know now how much consideration the Government gave to the interests of the peasantry in the abolition of serfdom and how much it heeded Chernyshevsky’s

advice regarding moderation in fixing redemption payments. Whereas our government, in freeing the peasants, never for a moment forgot the benefits to the state treasury, it thought very little about the interests of the peasants. In the redemption operations fiscal and landlord interests were exclusively borne in mind.

...[57] It was not on economic problems alone that Chernyshevsky had to wage a fierce polemic. Neither were his opponents only liberal economists. As the influence of the Sovremennik circle in Russian literature grew, the greater were the number of attacks launched from the most varied quarters both on that circle in general and on our author in particular. The contributors to Sovremennik were regarded as dangerous people who were prepared to destroy all time notorious “foundations.” Some of “Belinsky’s friends,” who at first considered it possible to go along with Chernyshevsky and those holding his views, repudiated the Sovremennik as an organ of the “Nihilists,” and began to exclaim that Belinsky would never have approved of its trend. Such, was I. S. Turgenev’s attitude.* Even Herzen grumbled at the “clowns, in his Kolokol. He warned them that: “while exhausting all their ridicule over the literature of exposures, our dear clowns forget that on this slippery path they may not merely ‘whistle’ themselves into becoming like Bulgarin and Grech, but even into being decorated with the Stanislav Order.” Herzen affirmed that there were excellent things in the “literature of exposures” that the “clowns” were ridiculing. “Do you imagine that all the tales of Shchedrin and others can just be hurled into the water together with Oblomov on their necks? You indulge yourselves too much, gentlemen!**.... The reference to Shchedrin was extremely unfortunate since Chernyshevsky himself was well able to appreciate his work. In general, everything shows that Herzen was misled by his liberal friends, such as Kavelin. The

*Sotsial-Demokrat No. 1, p. 152

**Sotsial-Demokrat No. 1, p. 152

Up to here Sotsial-Demokrat No. 1, p. 152

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NB

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Chernyshevsky relates that Turgenev could still tolerate him to some extent but had no patience at all with Dobrolyubov. You’re just a snake but Dobrolyubov is a cobra,” he said to Chernyshevsky (see the letter already quoted: “By Way of an Expression of Gratitude.” Collected Works, Vol. IX, p. 103).

**

The article “Very Dangerous!!” in Kolokol, No. 44.
“clowns”—or “whistlers,” as they were called in Russia—were not ridiculing the exposures, but the naïve people who could not or would not go beyond innocent exposures, forgetting the moral of Krylov’s fable *The Cat and the Cook*....

Herzen himself was to see very soon how bad in a political sense were those liberal friends who kept questioning his relations with Chernyshevsky. When he had to break with K. D. Kavelin he perhaps told himself that the “jaundiced ones were not entirely wrong.” [59]

Incidentally, the majority of the articles in *Svistok* which evoked the especial dissatisfaction of the well-bred liberals did not belong to the pen of N. G. Chernyshevsky. Only rarely did he contribute to it, as he was overwhelmed with other work. In the closing years of his literary activity he contributed regularly to every issue of *Sovremennik*; what is more, every issue usually contained several articles by him. As a general rule, his articles were distributed among the various sections of the journal as follows: first of all, he contributed an article on some general theoretical problem, then he wrote a political survey, reviewed several new books, and, lastly, by way of relaxation and diversion, as it were, he made polemical sorties against his opponents. The *Sovremennik* of 1861 was particularly rich in polemical articles written by him. It was at that time that he wrote his well-known “Polemical Gems,” “National Tactlessness” (attacking *Slovo* of Lvov), “Popular Muddleheadedness” (attacking Aksakov’s *Den*; we shall speak of this article later), and numerous other polemical notes in the section of Russian and foreign literature.

What is now especially interesting in “Polemical Gems” is our author’s views on his own literary activity. We shall cite them here. Chernyshevsky was very well aware that he held a prominent place in Russian literature. His opponents dreaded him, and occasionally even paid him compliments. But his growing renown did not make him happy

* Regarding the article “Very Dangerous” and its more or less conjectural consequences, see, among others, Vetrinsky’s book *Herzen*, St. Petersburg, 1908, p. 354.

** The history of this break may be followed in the letters of K. D. Kavelin and I. S. Turgenev to A. I. Herzen, published by M. Dragomanov in Geneva in 1892.
in the least. He had too low an opinion of Russian literature to consider the prominent place he occupied in it to be honourable. He was “completely cold to his literary reputation.” The only thing he was interested in was whether he would be able to preserve the freshness of his thought and feeling till those better days when our literature would become really useful to society. “I know that better times will come for literary activity, when it will be of real benefit to society, and when he who possesses talent will really earn a good name. And so I am wondering whether when the time comes I shall still be able to serve society properly. Fresh strength and fresh convictions are needed for this. But I see that I am beginning to join the company of ‘respected’ writers, that is to say, of those writers who have been wrung dry, who lag behind the movement of social requirements. This rouses a feeling of bitterness. But what is there to be done? Age takes its toll. Youth does not come twice, [60] I can’t help envying those who are younger and fresher than I....”*

[61] Meanwhile, feelings were rising at least in a section of Russian “society.” The student youth were filled with unrest and secret revolutionary organisations were springing up which printed their own manifestoes and programmes and awaited an imminent peasant uprising. We already know that Chernyshevsky fully recognised the possibility of impending “troubled times”** in Russia and we shall yet see how strongly the rise of the social mood was reflected in his activity as a publicist. But was he in any way connected with the secret societies? It is not yet possible to reply with certainty to this question, and who knows whether we shall ever have the facts to answer it. In the opinion of M. Lemke, who made an excellent study of the N. C. Chernyshevsky case, “it can be presumed (his italics) that he was the author of the proclamation ‘To the Manorial Peasants,’ which the court found him guilty of having written.” Mr. Lemke supports his conjecture by pointing to the style and content of the proclamation. We find these arguments not without foundation. But we hasten to repeat with Mr. Lem-

** i.e., the possibility of a revolution—Ed.
We also consider fairly well founded Mr. Lemke’s opinion that the famous paper Velikoruss was, in part, the work of Chernyshevsky. Mr. Lemke supports his hypothesis by quoting Mr. Stakhevich, who for several years lived with Chernyshevsky in Siberia: “I noticed that Chernyshevsky was obviously sympathetically inclined towards the paper which appeared at irregular intervals under the title of Velikoruss; I recall three issues coming out. As I listened to Nikolai Gavrilovich’s conversation, I sometimes noticed that both his thoughts and the way he expressed them [62] strongly reminded me of the paper Velikoruss, and I decided in my own mind that he was either the author or, at least, co-author of the paper which advocated the need for constitutional reforms.” We are in full agreement with Mr. Stakhevich: the style and content of Velikoruss are indeed very reminiscent of Chernyshevsky’s journalistic articles. And if Chernyshevsky was in fact the author, then that, of course, explains the circumstance that Velikoruss was far wiser and more tactful than other such papers of the time.

Simultaneously with the rise of the extreme party in Russia, there was a growth of the revolutionary movement in Poland. Had Chernyshevsky any formal relations with the Polish revolutionaries of whom there were not a few in St. Petersburg at that time? Again, there are no data on this point. Not wishing to indulge in conjectures, we shall limit ourselves, in clarifying Chernyshevsky’s general sympathies towards the Polish cause, to data obtainable from his writings; however, even such data are not numerous.

We know that the Slavophils very much approved of the struggle of the Galician Ruthenians against the Poles. Chernyshevsky was always sympathetically inclined towards the Little Russians. He regarded Belinsky’s negative attitude to the emerging Little Russian literature to be a great mistake. In the January issue of Sovremennik for 1861 he published a very sympathetic article


on the occasion of the appearance of *Osnova*, the organ of the Little Russians. But his attitude towards the struggle of the Galician Ruthenians against the Poles could not be one of unconditional approval. First of all, he did not like the fact that the Ruthenians sought the support of the Viennese Government. Neither did he like the influential role of the clergy in the movement of the Galician Ruthenians. “Lay affairs,” he wrote, “should be the concern of laymen.” Finally, Chernyshevsky did not like the exclusively national formulation of this question, which he regarded as primarily an economic one. In an article entitled “National Tactlessness” (*Sovremennik*, July 1861) attacking the Lwow *Slovo*, Chernyshevsky [63] sharply criticised the excessive nationalism of that organ. “It is very possible that a careful examination of existing relations,” he wrote, “would show the Lwow *Slovo* that at the basis of the matter there is a question that is far removed from the racial question—the question of social-estates. It is very possible that it would see Ruthenians and Poles on each of the two sides—people differing in race, but of the same social position. We do not believe that the Polish peasant should be hostile to the alleviation of the obligations and, in general, of the living conditions of the Ruthenian settlers. We do not believe that the sentiments of the Ruthenian landowners should differ very much in this matter from the sentiments of the Polish landowners. If we are not mistaken, the root of the Galician question lies not in relations of race, but of social-estate.”

The mutual hostility of the peoples composing Austria ought to have appeared even more tactless to Chernyshevsky, in that the Viennese Government then, as previously, derived great advantages from it. “When one reflects carefully, one is not surprised at the many years of existence of the Austrian Empire,” he wrote in a political review in the same issue of *Sovremennik* that published the article “National Tactlessness”; “and why should it not maintain itself when there is such excellent political tact on the part of the nationalities embraced within its borders.” To Chernyshevsky the Austrian Germans, Czechs, Croats and, as we have seen, Ruthenians seemed equally slow-witted.” He was afraid that the Slav “slow-wittedness” which was particularly evident in 1848-49 would again go very far. At the beginning of the sixties Hungary was waging a stubborn
struggle against the Viennese reactionary centralists. The discontent of the Hungarians was running so high that at one time it could have been expected that there would be a revolutionary outburst in their country. In his political reviews, our author repeatedly expressed the fear that, in the event of a revolutionary movement in Hungary, the Austrian Slavs would again become obedient tools of reaction. The tactics of many Slav races in Austria at that time could only strengthen such fears, since the Austrian Slavs even ventured to boast of the disgraceful role they had played in the 1848-49 events. Chernyshevsky strongly condemned these tactics and showed that it would have been more to their advantage if, on the contrary, they had supported the enemies of the Viennese Government, enemies from whom they could have obtained substantial concessions. He said this concerning the attitude of the Croats to the Hungarians [64], and repeated this to the Ruthenians. “The social-estate party, hostile to the Ruthenians,” we read in his article “National Tactlessness,” “is now ready for concessions.... It would do no harm for the Lvov Slovo to give this some thought; perhaps the concessions which people who seem to it to be enemies are sincerely prepared to make, perhaps these concessions are so great that they would thoroughly satisfy the Ruthenian settlers; in any event these concessions are without doubt far greater and far more important than the concessions the Ruthenian settlers can get from the Austrians....”

[65]...Finally, the first part of the novel Prologue\textsuperscript{173} depicts the friendly attitude of Volgin to Sokolovsky (Sierakowski). Volgin likes Sokolovsky’s utter devotion to his [66] convictions, the absence of conceited pettiness, his self-control, combined with the passionate zeal of the true agitator. Volgin calls him a real man and thinks that our liberals could learn a great deal from him. All this is very interesting,* but it too in no way explains Chernyshevsky’s practical relations with the Polish affair.\textsuperscript{174}

\* Volgin particularly prized in Sokolovsky his “balanced judgment which he displayed in 1848 when of all his companions-in-arms in Volhynia Region he was the only one not to lose his head and to weigh coolly the chances of the armed insurrection. These proved to be all but nil.
At that time Chernyshevsky was about 34 years of age. He was in the prime of his mental powers, and who knows to what heights he might not have risen in his development! But he had not long to live in freedom. He was the recognised leader of the extreme party, a highly influential exponent of materialism and socialism. He was considered the "ringleader" of the revolutionary youth, and was blamed for all their outbursts and agitation. As always happens in such cases, rumour exaggerated the affair and ascribed to Chernyshevsky intentions and actions which were foreign to him. In "Prologue to a Prologue," Chernyshevsky himself describes the liberal sympathetic gossip spread in St. Petersburgh concerning Volgin's (i.e., his own) alleged relations with the London circle of Russian exiles. The gossip was occasioned by the most insignificant incidents that had absolutely nothing to do with politics. And, as usual, things did not stop at mere gossip. The police-inspired press had long been engaged in literary denunciations of Chernyshevsky. In 1862, Sovremennik was suspended for some time. Then came non-literary denunciations as well. "The Director of the Third Department of His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancellery," said the indictment of Chernyshevsky, "has received an anonymous letter warning the Government against Chernyshevsky, 'that youth ringleader and wily socialist'; 'he himself has said that he will never be convicted'; he is said to be a pernicious agitator, and people ask to be spared from such a man; 'all of Chernyshevsky's former friends, seeing that his tendencies were finding expression in deeds and not merely in words, liberal-minded people... have dissociated themselves from him. Unless you remove Chernyshevsky, writes the author of the letter [67], there will be trouble and bloodshed; they are a band of rabid demagogues, of reckless people.... Perhaps they will eventually be eliminated, but just think how much innocent blood will be shed because of them.... There are committees of such socialists in Voronezh, Saratov, Tambov and elsewhere, and everywhere they inflame the youth.... Send Chernyshevsky away wherever you like, but be quick to deprive him of the opportunity to act.... Deliver us from Chernyshevsky for the sake of public peace"....

[71]...What is the secret of the extraordinary success of What Is To Be Done? It is the same as
is generally responsible for the success of literary works, the fact that this novel gave a living and universally understood answer to questions in which a considerable section of the reading public was keenly interested. In themselves, the thoughts expressed in it were not new; Chernyshevsky had taken them wholly from West-European literature. In France,* George Sand had much earlier advocated free and, most important, sincere and honest relations in the love of a man for a woman. As regards the moral demands she puts on love, Lucrezia Florianì differs in no way from Vera Pavlovna Lopukhova-Kirsanova. And as for the novel Jacques [72], it would be simple to copy out a fairly large number of passages from it to show that in the novel What Is To Be Done? the thoughts and reasonings of George Sand’s** freedom-loving, selfless hero are at times reproduced almost in their entirety. And George Sand was not the only one to advocate freedom in relations of this kind. It is well known that they were also advocated by Robert Owen and Fourier, who had a decisive

* Let us note in passing that Goethe’s Wahiververschaffen also represents a word in defence of such relations. This is well understood by some German historians of German literature who, while not daring to decry such on authoritative writer, and at the same time not daring to agree with him because of their own philistine virtuousness, usually mutter something totally unintelligible about the apparently strange paradoxes of the great German.

** On March 26, 1853, Chernyshevsky recorded in his diary the following conversation with his fiancée: “‘Can you possibly think that I will deceive you?’ ‘I don’t think that, I don’t expect it, but I have considered such an event too.’ ‘What, then, would you do?’ I told her of George Sand’s Jacques. ‘Then you, too, would shoot yourself?’ ‘I don’t think so’; and I told her I would try to obtain George Sand for her (she had not read it, or at any rate does not remember the ideas in it)” (Collected Works, Vol. X, Part 2, Section 3, p. 78). We consider that it is not superfluous to note another passage from Chernyshevsky’s conversations with his fiancée: “But what these relations would be like—the day before yesterday she said: ‘We would have separate halves of the house and you ought not to come to me without permission’; I would have liked to arrange things that way myself, perhaps I think more seriously about it than she does;—she probably only means that she doesn’t want me to bore her, while I understand it to mean that in general every husband should be extremely considerate to his ‘wife in his matrimonial relations” (ibid., p. 82). Almost literally the same conversation takes place between Vera Pavlova and Lopukhov in the novel What Is To Be Done?

* These numbers, inserted by Lenin, correspond to the lines on p. 72 of Plekhanov’s book.—Ed.
influence on Chernyshevsky’s outlook.*** And as early as the forties all these ideas met with warm sympathy in our country. In his articles Belinsky often called passionately for freedom and sincerity in relations of love. The reader will recall, of course, how bitterly the “impetuous Vissarion” reproached Pushkin’s Tatyana because, while loving Onegin, she did not follow the dictates of her heart; she belonged to “another,” her aged husband, whom she did not love but continued to live with. In their attitude to women, the best people of the “forties” adhered to the same principles as those of Lopukhov and Kirsanov. However, prior to the appearance of the novel *What Is To Be Done?*, these principles were shared only by a “select” handful; the mass of the reading public did not understand them at all. Even Herzen hesitated to expound them fully and clearly in his [73] novel *Who Is To Blame?*. A. Druzhinin handles the question more resolutely in his story *Polenka Saks.* But this story is too colourless, and its characters, belonging to so-called high society—officials and titled personages—did not at all appeal to the non-gentry, who after the fall of Nicholas regime formed the left wing of the reading public. With the appearance of *What Is To Be Done?* everything changed, everything became clear, precise and definite. There was no more room left for doubt. Thinking people were faced with the alternative of being guided in love by the principles of Lopukhov and Kirsanov, or of bowing to the sanctity of marriage and resorting, should a new sentiment arise, to the old, tested method of secret amorous adventures, or else completely subduing all affection in their hearts in view of the fact that they belonged to a marriage partner, whom they no longer loved. And the choice had to be made quite consciously. Chernyshevsky dealt with the issue in such a way that what had been natural instinctiveness and sincerity in love relations became utterly impossible. Mind control extended to love, and the general public adopted a conscious view of the relations

* It seems hardly necessary to recall what an energetic advocate Robert Owen was in this respect. As for Fourier, we quote here his very profound words: “les coutumes en amour ... ne sont que formes temporaires et variables, et non pas fond immuable” (*Oeuvres complètes de Ch. Fourier*, tome IV, p. 84).

** *Sovremennik*, No. 12, 1847.
between man and woman. And this was particularly important in our country in the sixties. The reforms which Russia had undergone turned upside down both our social and family relations. A ray of light reached into recesses that had been in complete darkness. Russian people were compelled to examine themselves, to take a sober view of their relation to their kin, to society and family. A new element came to play a big role in family relations, in love and friendship: viz., convictions, which formerly only the very smallest handful of “idealists” had possessed. Differences of conviction led to unexpected ruptures. A woman “given in marriage” to a certain man often discovered with horror that her lawful “lord” was an obscurantist, a bribe-taker, a flatterer grovelling before his superiors. A man who had enjoyed the “possession” of his beautiful wife, and unexpectedly was affected by the current of new ideas, often realised in dismay that what his charming play-thing was interested in was not at all “new people” or “new views,” but new dresses and dances, and also [74] the title and salary of her husband....

[75]...In Vera Pavlovna’s dreams we see that side of Chernyshevsky’s socialist views to which, unfortunately, Russian socialists up to now have not paid sufficient attention. That which attracts us in these dreams is the fact that Chernyshevsky fully realised that the socialist system can only be based on the broad application to production of the technical forces developed by the bourgeois period. In Vera Pavlovna’s dreams huge armies of labour are jointly engaged in production passing from Central Asia to Russia, from hot climate countries to the cold countries. All this, of course, could have been conceived with the aid of Fourier as well, but it is evident even from the subsequent history of so-called Russian socialism that the Russian reading public was not aware of this. In their ideas of socialist society our revolutionaries frequently went so far as to conceive it in the form of a federation of peasant communities cultivating their fields with the same antiquated plough as that used to scrape the soil in the time of Basil the Blind. But obviously such “socialism” cannot be recognised as socialism. The emancipation of the proletariat can come about only through the emancipation of man from the “power of the land” and nature in general. And this
emancipation has made absolutely indispensable those [76] armies of labour and that extensive application of modern productive forces to production which Chernyshevsky spoke of in Vera Pavlovna’s dreams and which we have completely forgotten in our desire to be “practical.”

Chernyshevsky was present at the birth of the new type of “new people” in our country. He has drawn this type in the shape of Rakhmetov. Our author joyfully welcomed the emergence of this new type could not deny himself the satisfaction of depicting at least a vague profile of him. At the same time he foresaw with sorrow how many trials and sufferings there were in store for the Russian revolutionary whose life must be one of severe struggle and great self-sacrifice. And so, in Rakhmetov, Chernyshevsky presents us with the true ascetic. Rakhmetov positively tortures himself. He is completely “merciless towards himself,” as his landlady says. He even decides to test whether he can bear torture by spending a whole night lying on a length of felt with nails sticking through it. Many people, including Pisarev, regarded this as mere eccentricity. We agree that some aspects of Rakhmetov’s character could have been drawn differently. But the character as a whole nevertheless remains completely true to life. Almost every one of our prominent

1—“the revolutionary” in *Sotsial-Demokrat* (No. 1, p. 173)\(^78\)

2—”Russian revolutionaries”

3—“enormous” (*Sotsial-Demokrat* No. 1, p. 174)

We should like to say in closing our introduction that Chernyshevsky’s significance in Russian literature has yet to be appraised properly. How much he is misunderstood in our country even by many of those who think very well of him can be seen from V. G. Korolenko’s reminiscences of him. This gifted and intelligent author portrays him as a sort of “rationalistic economist” who, moreover, believes “in the power of Comte’s organising reason.”* if the words about “organising

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* Korolenko, *Those Who Are Gone*, p. 78.
reason” mean anything at all, then they mean that Chernyshevsky regarded social phenomena from an idealistic standpoint, from which they were considered by Comte himself. But he who looks on social phenomena from an idealistic standpoint cannot be called an economist for the simple reason that this name is applied, even if not very properly, to those who, while not believing [77] in the power of organising reason, do believe in the organising power of economics. An “economist” who believed in the power of organising reason would be like a Darwinist who accepted the cosmogony of Moses. But this is not the most important thing here. What is most important is the fact that Mr. Korolenko counterposes the sociological views of our “subjectivists” to the “economism” of Chernyshevsky. “We, too, did not stand still when we ceased to be ‘rationalistic economists.’ Instead of purely economic patterns, the literary trend, represented chiefly by N. K. Mikhailovsky, has opened to us a veritable vista of laws and parallels of a biological character, while the play of economic interests was assigned a subordinate role.”

“Did not stand still,” indeed! The “vista of laws and parallels of a biological character,” revealed by Mikhailovsky, was an enormous step backwards in comparison with Chernyshevsky’s social views. N. K. Mikhailovsky was a disciple of P. L. Lavrov, whose views on the course of social development corresponded to those of Bruno Bauer, as we have shown in the book The Development of the Monist View of History. Hence whoever would like to understand the relation between N. G. Chernyshevsky’s world outlook and that of our “subjectivists” should first of all try to understand the relation between Feuerbach’s philosophy, to which Chernyshevsky adhered, and Bruno Bauer’s views. And this is clear and simple: Feuerbach is far ahead of Bruno Bauer.

As an epigraph to our first article on Chernyshevsky, written while the news of his death was still fresh in mind, and completely revised in the present edition we have taken the following

* Korolenko, op. cit., pp. 79-80.
** No wonder Chernyshevsky’s attitude to those “laws and parallels” was entirely negative, according to the selfsame Mr. Korolenko.
words from Chernyshevsky's letter to his wife: “My life and yours belong to history; hundreds of years will pass and our names will still be dear to people who will recall them with gratitude when those who lived with us are no more.” This letter was written on October 5, 1862, i.e., when the author was already incarcerated.
PART ONE

N. G. CHERNYSHEVSKY’S PHILOSOPHICAL, HISTORICAL AND LITERARY VIEWS

SECTION ONE

N. G. CHERNYSHEVSKY’S PHILOSOPHICAL VIEWS

Chapter One

CHERNYSHEVSKY AND FEUERBACH

[81]...In the first edition of this work, the first article of which, dealing, inter alia, with Chernyshevsky’s philosophical views, was written in late 1899, we expressed the conviction that in his philosophical views our author was a follower of Feuerbach. Naturally, this conviction of ours was based above all on a comparison of those ideas of Chernyshevsky which had a more or less direct bearing on philosophy, with Feuerbach’s views.

Chapter Three

POLEMIC WITH YURKEVICH AND OTHERS

...[101] Yurkevich ascribes to Chernyshevsky the idea that there is no difference at all between material and psychical phenomena, and inquires triumphantly how it is that sensations arise from the movement of a nerve. This is the old nonsense that has long been flung at materialists and from which it merely follows that the people who want to “criticise” materialism do not even know the ABC of materialism. Nowhere in his article does Chernyshevsky say that there is no difference at all between so-called [102] physical phenomena, on the one hand, and psychical phenomena, on the other. On the contrary, he categorically admits the existence of this difference; but he believes that it in no way justifies attributing psychical phenomena to a particular non-material factor. We are already acquainted with his remark to the effect that there are very many different qualities in every object. Now we shall discuss
it in more detail. “For example,” Chernyshevsky says, “a tree grows and burns; we say it has two qualities: the power of growth and combustibility. What similarity is there between these two qualities? They are totally different; there is no concept under which one could put both these qualities, except the general conception—quality; there is no concept under which we could put both series of phenomena corresponding to these qualities, except the concept—phenomenon. Or, for example, ice is hard and sparkles; what is there common to hardness and sparkle? The logical distance from one of these qualities to the other is immeasurably great or, it would be better to say, there is no logical distance between them, whether near or far, because there is no logical relation between them. From this we see that the combination of quite heterogeneous qualities in one object is the general “law of things.” The same also with the quality we call the capacity for sensation and thought. Its distance from the so-called physical qualities of the living organism is immeasurably great. But this does not prevent it being a quality of the same organism which, at the same time, possesses extension and capacity for movement ....

[103]. ...Even J. Priestley remarked in his Disquisitions that the idea that brain vibrations are identical with perception would be a very great abuse of materialist doctrine. “It is easy to form an idea of there being vibrations without any perceptions accompanying them. But it is supposed that the brain, besides its vibrating power, has superadded to it a perceiving power, likewise; there being no reason that we know why this power may not be imparted to it.”* This is precisely the point of view held by all the prominent materialists of modern times, including, of course, Feuerbach and Chernyshevsky. The opponents of materialism—the consistent or inconsistent, conscious or unconscious idealists—ought, in their criticism of this doctrine, to convince us above all that they know more about it than Priestley does, and show us what grounds specifically prevent them from recognising, together with Priestley, that

the brain, besides having the ability to vibrate, may also be capable of perceiving. They undoubtedly have such grounds. But these amount to the spiritualistic prejudice that by itself, i.e., unless animated by spirit, matter is dead and incapable not only of perception, but even of motion. To refer, in arguing with the materialists, to such grounds means to commit an obvious petitio principii, i.e., to argue from the very same proposition which has to be proved. The opponents of materialism themselves more or less vaguely sense this. Therefore, they are usually very careful not to show the grounds which hinder them from recognising the capacity for perceiving one of the properties of matter, and prefer to refute what no single prominent materialist has ever stated, at least in modern times, i.e., that perception is the same as motion.* We leave it to the reader to judge of this sort of criticism, a criticism which is more widespread in our country than anywhere else, and is more so now than ever before....

[105] ...It stands to reason,” Chernyshevsky admits, “that when we speak of the difference in the state of the body during a chemical process and at a time when it is not in that process, we mean only the quantitative distinction between a vigorous, rapid course of that process and a very feeble slow course of it. Properly speaking, every body is constantly going through a chemical process. For example, a log, even if it is not set on fire or burnt in a stove but lies quietly, seemingly undergoing no changes, in the wall of a house, will nevertheless come in time to the same end to which burning brings it: it will gradually decay, and nothing will be left of it, too, but ashes (the dust of decayed wood, of which in the end nothing remains but the mineral particles of ash). But if this process—e.g., in the case of the ordinary decay of a log in a house wall—takes place very slowly and feebly, then qualities which are proper to a body going through the process manifest themselves with a microscopic feebleness that is completely imperceptible under ordinary conditions.

* We allow that among the ancient materialists—Democritus and Epicurus for example—there could have been a certain lack of clarity on this account although this is far from having been proved it has to be remembered that the views of these thinkers have only reached us in an incomplete form.
For example, the slow decay of a piece of wood in a house wall also generates heat; but that quantity of it which in burning would have been concentrated into a few hours, in this case becomes diluted, so to speak, into several decades, so that it does not achieve any result that is easily perceptible in practice; the existence of this heat is negligible for practical purposes. It is the same as the taste of wine in a whole pond of water into which one has let fall a drop of wine: from the scientific point of view, the pond contains a mixture of water and wine, but to all practical purposes it can be assumed that there is no wine at all in it.”

[106] This brilliant passage allows one to surmise that for Chernyshevsky in this respect too there was no cleavage between organised matter on the one hand and unorganised matter, on the other. To be sure, the organism of the animal (and even more so of the animal at the top of the zoological tree, that is, man) displays in the respect that is of interest to us such properties as are altogether alien to unorganised matter. But, after all, the burning of a piece of wood, too, is accompanied by a number of phenomena that are not to be observed during the process of its slow decay. However, there is no essential difference between these two processes. On the contrary, this is one and the same process, with this difference only that in the one case it is very rapid and in the other, extremely slow. Therefore, in the one case the properties which belong to a body undergoing this process manifest themselves with great force, while in the other case they do so “with microscopic feebleness that is completely imperceptible under ordinary conditions.” In regard to the question of psychical phenomena this means that in an unorganised form also, matter is not devoid of the basic capacity for “sensation,” which provides such rich “spiritual” fruits among the higher animals. But in unorganised matter this capacity exists to an extremely small extent. Therefore it is totally imperceptible to the investigator and, without risk of committing any appreciable error, we can equate it to nil. Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that this capacity in general is inherent in matter and that in consequence there are no grounds for regarding it as something miraculous where it manifests itself particularly strongly, as
can be seen, for example, among the higher animals in general, and pre-eminently in man. In expressing this idea—with the caution necessary under the conditions of our press at that time—Chernyshevsky came close to such materialists as Lamettrie and Diderot who, in turn, adopted the view of Spinozism, freed of the unnecessary theological appendages....

[107]...Yurkevich also asserted that quantitative differences are transformed into qualitative differences not in the object itself but in its relation to the sentient subject. But this is a very gross logical mistake. In order to become changed in its relation to the sentient subject the object must undergo a preliminary change in itself.

If for us ice does not have the same properties as steam, it is because the mutual relations of the water particles in the former case are entirely different from those in the latter. But enough of this....

We know how contemptuous Chernyshevsky was of Yurkevich’s arguments. He did not analyse these arguments—and had no possibility of doing so under the conditions of the censorship—but simply declared them to be obsolete and not in the least convincing.

“I am a seminarian myself,” he wrote in his Polemical Gems. “I know from my own experience the position of people who get their education as Yurkevich did. I have seen people in the same position as he is. I therefore find it hard to laugh at him; it would mean laughing at the impossibility of having decent books available, laughing at the complete helplessness in the matter of developing oneself, at a situation that is unimaginably restricted in all possible respects.

“I don’t know Mr. Yurkevich’s age; if he is no longer a young man, it is too late to worry about him. But if he is still young, I gladly offer him the small collection of books in my possession.”

Mr. Volynsky still finds this reply highly unsatisfactory. He thinks that Chernyshevsky replied in this way solely because of his inability to decisively refute Yurkevich. Evidently some journalists at the beginning of the sixties also reasoned in this manner. For example, Dudyshkin, enumerating Yurkevich’s allegedly irrefutable arguments point by point, wrote the following in
Otechestvenniye Zapiski, addressing himself to Chernyshevsky:

“The matter would appear to be clear; it now concerns not someone else, but you; not philosophy or physiology in general, but your ignorance of these sciences. Why drag in the red herring of seminary philosophy? Why confuse totally different things and say that you knew all that when you were in the seminary and even now remember it all by heart?”

To this Chernyshevsky replied that Dudyshkin’s lack of acquaintance with seminary notebooks prevented him from understanding what was at issue. “If you took the trouble to look through these notebooks,” he continues, “you would see that all the shortcomings which Mr. Yurkevich discovers in me, these notebooks discover in Aristotle, Bacon, Gassendi, Locke, etc., etc., in all the philosophers who were not idealists.

Consequently, these reproaches by no means apply to me as an individual writer: they apply properly to the theory which I consider it useful to popularise. If you are incredulous, take a look at the Philosophical Dictionary, published by Mr. S. G., which takes the same line as Mr. Yurkevich, and you will see that the same thing is said there of every non-idealist: he does not know psychology, he is not acquainted with the natural sciences, he rejects inner experience, he is overwhelmed by facts, he confuses metaphysics with the natural sciences, he degrades man, etc., etc....”

Chapter Four
THE DOCTRINE OF MORALITY

[111]...In general, very noticeable in Chernyshevsky’s view of rational egoism is the endeavour, characteristic of all “periods of enlightenment” (Aufklärungsperioden), to seek support for morality in reason, and in the more or less well-founded calculations of the individual an explanation of his character and behaviour. Sometimes Chernyshevsky’s arguments in this connection are as similar as two peas in a pod to the arguments of Helvétius and those who shared his ideas. They recall almost as strongly the arguments of Socrates, the typical representative of the epoch of enlightenment in ancient Greece, who, in coming forward as a champion of friendship, showed that it is
advantageous to have friends because they may [112] be of some use in times of misfortune. The explanation for such extremes of rationality is that the enlighteners were usually incapable of adopting the viewpoint of development.*

We know that, according to Chernyshevsky’s theory, man is by nature neither good nor evil but becomes good or evil depending on circumstances.** Were we to recognise that man is always prompted by calculation in his behaviour, then we should have to formulate Chernyshevsky’s view on human nature differently; we should have to say that man is by nature neither good nor evil but only calculating, this property of his becoming more or less marked depending on circumstances. But such a formulation would hardly be to our author’s liking.

What is good, and what is evil, according to his theory? This question is answered by the same article, “The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy”—a very informative one, as the reader can see. “Individuals,” says Chernyshevsky in it, “regard as good the actions of other people that are beneficial to them; society holds as good, what is good for the whole of society, or for the majority of its members. Lastly people in general, irrespective of a nation or a class, describe as good that which is beneficial for mankind in general.” It often happens that the interests of different nations or estates run counter to one another or to human interests generally; it is also a frequent occurrence that the interests of one estate are opposed to those of the whole nation. How is one to decide in this case what is good and what is bad?

* See for particulars in our book Beiträge zur Geschichte des Materialismus—Holbach, Helvetius und Karl Marx, Stuttgart, 1896.

** It is worth noting, however, that in the past our author expressed a different view of human nature. According to that view, man is a being which by nature is inclined to respect and love truth and good, and to abhor all that is bad, a being capable of violating the laws of good and truth only through ignorance, error or under the influence of circumstances stronger than his character and reason, but a being never capable of preferring evil to good of his own free will.” (See the article on Shchedrin’s Provincinal Sketches in Sovremennik, No. 6, 1857, reprinted in The Complete Works, Vol. III. The lines quoted are on pp. 221-222 of the volume.) This is closer to Socrates than to the present-day doctrine of development.
SECTION TWO

N. G. CHERNYSHEVSKY’S VIEWS ON HISTORY

Chapter Two

MATERIALISM IN CHERNYSHEVSKY’S VIEWS ON HISTORY

[159]...Chernyshevsky applied Feuerbach’s views to aesthetics and in this, as we shall see below, he achieved results that in a certain sense are most remarkable. But here, too, his conclusions were not quite satisfactory because the perfectly correct idea of the aesthetic development of mankind implies the preliminary elaboration of a general conception of history. As regards this general conception of history, Chernyshevsky succeeded in making only a few, if very correct, steps towards its elaboration. One may cite as examples of such steps the large quotations from his writings that we have just made [160]....

Chapter Three

IDEALISM IN CHERNYSHEVSKY’S VIEWS ON HISTORY

Here is what we read in his article dealing with V. P. Botkin’s well-known book Letters of Spain (Sovremennik, 1857, Book 2):

“The division of a people into hostile castes is one of the greatest obstacles to the improvement of its future; in Spain, there is no such disastrous division, no irreconcilable enmity between social-estates every one of which would be prepared to sacrifice the most precious historical achievements if only it could do harm to another estate; in Spain the entire nation feels itself a single whole. This peculiarity is so extraordinary among the peoples of Western Europe that it deserves the greatest attention and may in itself be considered an earnest of the country’s happy future.”*

This is not a slip of the pen, because, several pages further below in the same article, Chernyshevsky says: “The Spanish people have an indisputable advantage over most civilised nations in one, exceedingly important respect: the Spanish estates are not divided either by deep-rooted hatred or by substantial conflicting interests; they

do not constitute castes inimical to one another, as is the case in many other West European countries; on the contrary, in Spain, all the estates may strive jointly for a common goal....*

[163]...Utopian socialists took an idealist view of the entire future of contemporary society. They were convinced that the fate of that society would be decided by the “views” held by its members, i.e., the standpoint which they took, with regard to social reorganisation plan put forward by a particular reformer. They did not ask themselves why it was that the dominant views in that particular society were such and not others. That is why they were not eager for a further elaboration of those elements of a materialist interpretation of history which their doctrines undoubtedly were replete with. In fact, they were prone to look on mankind’s past history as well from an idealist standpoint. For this reason, in their statements about that history we very often encounter the most undoubted and, it would seem, most obvious contradictions: facts which have apparently been interpreted in an entirely materialist sense are suddenly given an entirely idealist explanation; and, on the other hand, idealist interpretations are every now and again upset by perfectly materialist eruptions. This lack of stability, this recurrent shift from materialism to idealism and from idealism to materialism, a shift perceptible to the modern reader, but imperceptible to the author, makes itself felt also in the historical statements of Chernyshevsky, who in this respect is very reminiscent of the great utopians of the West. In the final analysis he inclines like them, we repeat, to idealism.

This can be clearly seen from his interesting article “On the Causes of the Fall of Rome (an Imitation of Montesquieu),” published in Sovermennik for 1861 (Book 5). In it he vigorously opposes the very widespread opinion that the Roman Empire in the West [164] fell because of its inherent inability to develop further, whereas the barbarians who put an end to its existence brought new seeds of progress with them....

No mention is made here either of the internal social relations in Rome, which accounted for its weakness and which were pointed out even by

* Ibid., p. 44.
Guizot in his first article “Essais sur l’histoire de France,” or of the forms of communal life to which the German barbarians owed their strength at the time of the fall of the Roman Empire in the West. Chernyshevsky forgot even the famous words of Pliny, which he himself quotes elsewhere: latifundia perdidere Italiam (“latifundia were the undoing of Italy”). In his “formula of progress,” as the phrase went in our country afterwards, there is no room for the internal relations in the country concerned. Everything is reduced to intellectual development. Chernyshevsky states emphatically that progress is based on intellectual development and that “its fundamental aspect consists precisely in the successes and development of knowledge.” It does not occur to him that “the successes and development of knowledge” may depend on social relations, which in some cases are conducive to those successes and that development and in others hinder them. He depicts social relations as a mere corollary of the spread of certain views. We have just read this: “historical knowledge is broadened; this reduces the number of false notions that prevent people from organising their social life, which is, therefore, organised more successfully than before.” This is very unlike what our author said in his article on Roscher’s book. From what he said there it followed, moreover, that it is impossible, and indeed ridiculous, to judge scholars as if they were schoolboys, saying that a particular scholar was unfamiliar with a particular science and therefore came to hold erroneous views. It also followed from what he said there that what matters is not the amount of knowledge acquired by a particular scholar, but the interests of the group which he represents. In short, it followed from what he said there that social views are determined by social interests; and social thought, by social life. Now, it is the other way round. Now, it appears that social life is determined by social thought and that if a social system has certain shortcomings, it is because society, like a schoolboy, has studied poorly or little and therefore has conceived erroneous notions. It would he hard to think of a more striking contradiction.

[170]...Herzen formed his view of Russia’s attitude to the “old world” under the strong influence of Slavophils and this view was wrong. But one can arrive at an erroneous view even when one employs a more or less correct method,
just as a correct view may result from the employment of a more or less erroneous method. It is therefore fair to ask oneself how the method by which Herzen formed his erroneous view was related to the method which led Chernyshevsky to a completely justified repudiation and ridicule of that view.

Chapter Five

CHERYSHEVSKY AND MARX

[188]...We may be reminded that, as we have remarked, the reviews by Chernyshevsky which we have examined appeared after the historical views of Marx and Engels shaped themselves into a harmonious whole. We are not forgetful of this. But we believe that this matter cannot be settled by mere reference to chronology. The main writings of Lassalle, too, did not appear until after the historical views of Marx and Engels assumed a harmonious form, and yet, in ideological content, those writings, too, belong to the period of transition from historical idealism to historical materialism. The point is not when a particular work appeared but rather what was its content.

If in previous historical periods the advance of knowledge depended on the character of economic relations, in passing to our own period Chernyshevsky should have asked himself: what are the economic peculiarities of it that led to the discovery of social truth and ensured the future realisation of the latter. But in order to ask himself that question, he should have broken resolutely with idealism and firmly adopted a materialist interpretation of history. We shall not reiterate that Chernyshevsky was still far from a break with idealism and that his conception of the further trend of social development was completely idealist. We merely ask the reader to note that Chernyshevsky’s historical idealism compelled him in his considerations of the future to give first place to “advanced” people—to the intellectuals, as we now call them—who should disseminate the ultimately discovered social truth among the masses. The masses are allotted the role of backward soldiers in the advancing army. Of course, no sensible materialist will assert that the average “man in the street,” just because he is an ordinary person, i.e., “one of the masses,” knows no less
than the average "intellectual." Of course he
knows less. But it is not a matter of the knowledge
of the "man in the street," but of his actions.
The actions of people are not always determined
by their knowledge and are never determined only
by their knowledge but also—and chiefly—by
their position, which is merely made clear and
comprehensible by the knowledge they possess.

Here again one has to remember the fundamental
proposition of materialism in general, and of the
materialist explanation of history in particular:
it is not being that is determined by consciousness,
but consciousness by being. The "consciousness"
of a man from the "intelligentsia" is more highly
developed than the consciousness of a man from the
"masses." But the "being" of a man from the masses
prescribes to him a far more definite method of
action than that which the social position of the
intellectual prescribes to the latter. That is why
the materialist view of history allows one only
in a certain and, moreover, very limited sense to
speak of the backwardness of the man from the
"masses," compared with the man from the inter-
gentsia; in a certain sense, the "man in the street"
undoubtedly lags behind the "intellectual," but
in another sense he undoubtedly is in advance of
him. And precisely because this is so, an adherent
of the materialist interpretation of history, while
by no means repeating the absurd attacks on the
intelligentsia that are coming from the Black-
Hundred and syndicalist camp, would never agree
to assign the intelligentsia the role of a demiurge
of history which is generally assigned to it by
idealists. There are various kinds of aristocratical-
ness. Historical idealism is guilty of an "aristocratical-
ness of knowledge."

What in Chernyshevsky's historical views was

a shortcoming resulting from the insufficient

elaboration of Feuerbach's materialism later

became the basis of our subjectivism, which had

nothing in common with materialism and vigor-
ously opposed it not only in the field of history

but also in the field of philosophy. The subjectivists

boastfully called themselves continuers of the

best traditions of the sixties. In reality, they

continued only the weak aspects [190] of the

world outlook peculiar to that period....
Chapter Six
LAST HISTORICAL WORKS OF CHERNYSHEVSKY

[199]...Had Chernyshevsky consistently elaborated the idea expressed here, he would have had to renounce completely the idealist views expressed by him in the article—now familiar to us—concerning the causes for the fall of Rome. But the point is that he expresses such ideas only in passing, he does not enlarge on them. In expressing them, he does not at all find it necessary to repudiate historical idealism, and this is not due to a predilection for idealism as a philosophical theory. Chernyshevsky’s attitude to this theory was in general extremely negative. While expounding the idealist view of the trend of historical development, he continues to regard himself as a consistent materialist. He is wrong. But the root of his error lies in one of the chief shortcomings of Feuerbach’s materialist system. Marx expressed it rather aptly: “Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really differentiated from the thought objects, but he does not conceive of human activity itself as being objective activity. Hence, in the *Essence of Christianity*, he regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude....” ...Like his teacher, Chernyshevsky directs his attention almost exclusively to the “theoretical” activity of mankind and, as a result, mental development becomes for him the most basic cause of historical movement....

[205]...It follows from Chernyshevsky that in history vice is always punished as it deserves. In reality, however, the historical facts known to us do not at all warrant this view, which may be comforting but is certainly naïve. The only question of interest to us is how it came to be held by our author. This question can be answered by reference to the period when Chernyshevsky lived. It was a period of social upsurge, a period having a moral need, so to speak, for such views as would bolster faith in the inevitable defeat of evil....

* See his *Theses on Feuerbach*, written as early as the spring of 1845.
SECTION THREE

N. G. CHERNYSHEVSKY'S VIEWS ON LITERATURE

Chapter One

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LITERATURE AND ART

[221]...The view of art as play, supplemented by the view of play as a "child of labour," sheds a very bright light on the essence and history of art. It makes it possible for the first time to view them from a materialist standpoint. We know that, at the very beginning of his literary activity, Chernyshevsky made an attempt, which was most successful in its own way, at applying Feuerbach's materialist philosophy to aesthetics. We have devoted a special work to describing that attempt.* So we shall merely say here that although it was most successful in its own way, that attempt is affected, in the same way as Chernyshevsky's views on history, by the main shortcoming of Feuerbach's philosophy: insufficient elaboration of its historical, or to be more exact, dialectical aspect. And it is just because this aspect was not elaborated in the philosophy assimilated by him that Chernyshevsky could overlook the great importance of the concept of play for a materialist interpretation of art....

Chapter Two

BELINSKY, CHERNYSHEVSKY AND PISAREV

[236]..."Lasting enjoyment is afforded to man by reality alone; only those desires are of serious importance which are based on reality; success may be expected only from hopes evoked by reality, and only from those deeds which are accomplished with the help of forces and circumstances offered by reality."**

Such was the new notion of "reality." Chernyshevsky had Feuerbach in mind when he said that it had been formed by modern thinkers from the obscure allusions of transcendental philosophy. And he expounded Feuerbach's concept of reality quite correctly. Feuerbach said that sensuousness

* See the article "Chernyshevsky's Aesthetic Theory" in the collection *In Twenty Years*.
or actuality is identical truth, i.e., that the object in its true sense is given only by sensation.

Speculative philosophy supposed that ideas of objects based only on sense experience do not correspond to the real nature of the objects and must be verified with the aid of pure thought, i.e., thought not based on sense experience. Feuerbach decisively rejected this idealistic view. He asserted that conceptions of objects based on our sense experience fully correspond to the nature of these objects. The only trouble is that our imagination frequently distorts these conceptions, which, therefore, come into contradiction with our sense experience. Philosophy should drive out from our conceptions the fantastic element that distorts them; it should bring them into accord with sense experience. It must return mankind to a contemplation of real objects undistorted by fancy, such as prevailed in ancient Greece. And insofar as mankind passes to such contemplation, it returns to itself, because people who submit to figments of the imagination can themselves be only imaginary and not real beings. In the words of Feuerbach, the essence of man is sensuousness, i.e., actuality, and not imagination and not abstraction. The task of philosophy and science in general is to restore reality to its rightful place. But if that is so, it follows of itself that the tasks of aesthetics as a branch of science are also to restore reality to its rightful place and combat the imaginary element in man’s notions. It was on this conclusion from Feuerbach’s philosophy that Chernyshevsky’s aesthetic views were based; it constituted the main idea of his dissertation. And there is no doubt that Belinsky had the same conclusion in mind when, in his [238] second but last annual review of literature, he described the concept of “reality” as a new one. . . .

[242] . . . Everyone knows that the criticism of the sixties, the criticism of Dobrolyubov for example, often crossed over into journalism. Hence, in speaking of Chernyshevsky, we shall not so much present proofs of this thought as illustrations of it. In 1858 Chernyshevsky’s article “The Russian at a Rendezvous. Reflections on Turgenev’s story Asya” appeared in the review section of Atheneum, No. 3. This article is one of the most brilliant examples of journalistic criticism. Very little, almost nothing, is said in
the article about Turgenev’s actual story, which Chernyshevsky calls “practically the only good new story.” The author merely draws attention to the scene in which the hero of the story makes his declaration of love to Asya, and, in connection with this scene, he indulges in “reflections.” The reader will recall, of course, that at the critical moment Turgenev’s hero turned coward and withdrew. It is this circumstance that caused Chernyshevsky to “reflect.” He notes that indecision and cowardice are the distinctive features not only of this hero, but of most of the heroes of our best literary works. He recalls Rudin, Beltov, and the tutor of Nekrasov’s Sasha, and sees the same features in all of them. He does not blame the authors of the novels on this account since they were only recording what is met with at every step in real life. There is no manliness in Russian people, therefore the characters in the novels have none either. And Russian people have no manliness because they are not in the habit of taking part in public affairs. “When we go into society, we see around us people in uniforms and civilian morning or evening dress; these people are five and a half or six feet tall, and sometimes even more; they grow or shave the hair on their cheeks, above their upper lip and [243] on their chin; and we imagine we are looking at men. This is a total error, an optical illusion, a hallucination, nothing more. Without acquiring the habit of elementary participation in civil affairs, without acquiring the feelings of a citizen, the male child grows up and becomes middle-aged, and then an elderly being of the masculine gender, but he does not become a man or, at any rate, not a man of a noble character.* Among humane, educated people, the absence of noble manliness strikes one still more than among ignorant people, because the humane, educated man likes to talk about important matters. He talks with enthusiasm and eloquence, but only until it becomes a matter of passing from words to deeds. “So long as there is no question of action, but merely the need to fill up empty hours, an empty mind, or an empty heart, with talk and dreams, the hero is very glib; but once it is a matter of expressing his feelings plainly and exactly, the majority of the heroes

*Sotsial-Demokrat
No. 1, p. 143

immediately begin to waver and feel tongue-tied. A few, the most courageous, somehow contrive to muster their forces and stammer something that provides a vague idea of their thoughts. But just attempt to take their wishes at face value and say to them: ‘you want so-and-so; we’re very glad; begin to do something about it and you’ll have our support’—if such a remark is made one half of the very brave heroes faint, the other begin to gruffly reproach you for putting them in an awkward position; they begin to say that they did not expect such proposals from you, they are quite at a loss and cannot think properly because it is not possible to do so at a moment’s notice and, moreover, they are honest people, and not only honest but very mild, and they do not want to cause you any unpleasantness, and that, in general, it is not possible, really, to trouble oneself about all that is said merely from having nothing to do, and that it is best not to undertake anything at all, because everything involves trouble and inconvenience, and at present nothing good can come of it, because, as already said, they never for a moment expected, or anticipated, and so on and so forth.”

One can say that the portrait is painted with a master’s hand. However, the master was not a literary critic, but a journalist.

[245]...As for the requirements of the period, they consisted, to his mind, [246] in concessions to the peasantry. Chernyshevsky exhorted the “estimable” gentlemen with this quotation from the Gospel: “Agree with thine adversary quickly, whiles thou art in the way with him; lest at any time the adversary deliver thee to the judge, and the judge deliver thee to the officer, and thou be cast into prison. Verily I say unto thee, thou shalt by no means come out thence, till thou hast paid the uttermost farthing.” (Mat., Ch. V, verses 25 and 26).

It is self-evident that every theoretical conclusion concerning the capacity of a given social class or stratum for definite practical action always requires a certain degree of verification by experience, and that, consequently, it can be considered

** Ibid., p. 102.
trustworthy a priori only within certain, more or
less broad limits. Thus, for example, it was possible
with complete assurance to foretell that even the most educated section of the nobility would refuse to sacrifice their interests for the sake of the peasants. Such a prediction in no way required practical verification. But when it was necessary to determine to what extent the educated nobility were capable of making concessions to the peasantry in their own interests, then no one could say in advance with absolute certainty: they will not go in that direction beyond such-and-such a limit. Here it was always possible to assume that under certain circumstances the educated nobility would go a little further, after arriving at a somewhat more correct understanding of its own interests. Being practical, as Chernyshevsky was in this case, he not only could but had to endeavour to persuade the nobility that certain concessions to the freed peasants were required in its own interests. Thus, what might have seemed to constitute a contradiction in his article—the demand for a judicious and resolute step on the part of people whose incapacity for decision and wisdom is here admitted and explained as a necessary product of circumstances—was actually no contradiction at all. Such imaginary contradictions can also be found in the political practice of people who take their stand on the firm ground of the materialist explanation of history. However, here it is necessary to make a very essential reservation. When a materialist applies his theoretical conclusions in practice with a certain amount of caution, he can nevertheless guarantee that his conclusions contain a certain element of the most indisputable certainty. And this is because, when he says: “everything depends on circumstances,” he knows from what side one must expect the appearance of the new circumstances that will change the will of people in the direction he desires; he knows quite well that, in the final analysis, they are to be expected from the side of “economics,” and that the truer his analysis of the socio-economic life of society, the more trustworthy his prediction concerning the future development of society. Not so with the idealist, who is convinced that “opinions rule the world.” If “opinions” are the basic cause of social movement, then the circumstances on which the further devel-
opment of society depends are linked chiefly to the conscious activity of people, while the possibility of any practical influence on this activity is dependent on the greater or lesser ability of people to think logically and master the new truths discovered by philosophy or science. But this ability depends itself on circumstances. Thus, the idealist who recognises the materialist truth that the character and also, of course, the views of man, depend on circumstances, finds himself in a vicious circle: views depend on circumstances, circumstances on views. The thought of the "enlightener" in theory has never broken out of this vicious circle. In practice the contradiction was usually solved by a strong appeal to all thinking people, independently of the circumstances under which such people were living and acting. What we are now saying may appear unnecessary and for that reason a boring digression. But in point of fact this digression was essential for us. It will help us to understand the nature of the journalistic criticism of the sixties.

Since the hopes of the "enlightener" are pinned on the intellect and good will of thinking people, i.e., in effect of the "enlighteners" themselves, it is obvious that critics desiring to support these people will demand from fiction above all an exact depiction of social life with all its pros and cons, with its "positive" and "negative" phenomena. Only an exact portrayal of all aspects of life can furnish an "enlightener" with the factual data needed by him for passing judgment on that life....

[253]...However, N. Uspensky used to express himself even more emphatically. For example, he wrote: “Nothing is to be expected from the present-day peasants who not so long ago were the victims of serfdom:—they will not be resurrected!... It is unlikely that medicine will ever cure atrophy, because the disease is based on organic damage....”* It was quite difficult for the "people of the seventies" to agree with this. It was chiefly this that gave rise to the unfavourable attitude of the critics of that epoch towards N. V. Uspensky.

The reader will perhaps ask: but was it easy for Chernyshevsky himself to agree with N. V. Uspen-

sky’s completely hopeless view of “the present-day peasants,” since Chernyshevsky evidently considered possible at that time a broad movement of the people who were dissatisfied with the conditions of the abolition of serfdom. To this reply that, obviously, this would not have been easy for him if he considered himself bound to agree unconditionally with N. V. Uspensky. But that is precisely the point—he did not agree unconditionally with him. He considered N. V. Uspensky’s essays quite truthful; but he did not draw a hopeless conclusion from them. He said: “Routine dominates the ordinary course of life of common people; and among the plain folk, like in all other social-estates, the routine is just as dull and banal as in all other social-estates. Mr. Uspensky’s merit is to have had the courage to depict for us, without concealment or adornment, the routine thoughts and actions, feelings and customs of plain people. The picture is not at all attractive: at every step nonsense and dirt, pettiness and dullness.

“But do not be in a hurry to draw conclusions from this regarding the validity or non-validity of your hopes, if you wish to alleviate the lot of the people; or of your misgivings, if you were so far concerned about the dullness and inertia of the people. Take the commonest, most colourless, weak-willed, shallow person; no matter how drab and petty the life he leads, it has in it moments of a totally different shade, moments of energetic efforts, courageous decisions. The same is also encountered in the history of every nation.”

The circumstances, on which everything depends in the last resort, may take such a turn that even an apathetic mass will become capable of vigorous effort and courageous decision. While waiting for the moment when the circumstances take a favourable turn, one must attentively study the backward mass. The initiative in taking courageous decisions will never come from the mass of the populace; but one has to know the character of the people making up this mass “in order to know in what way initiative may stimulate them.”

And the more accurately fiction represents the character of the mass of the people, the more it will facilitate the task of those who, under favourable circumstances, will have to take the initiative in making great decisions.

Now we shall ask the reader to recall that in one of the theses of his dissertation Chernyshevsky, emphasising the portrayal of life as the chief characteristic of art, adds: “works of art often have another significance—they explain life; often they also provide a verdict on the phenomena of life.” What we have quoted, if only from one article “Is This Not the Beginning of a Change?”, clearly shows to what extent literary criticism in the person of Chernyshevsky was inclined to value the portrayal of life chiefly as material for interpreting it and judging it (for passing a verdict on the phenomena of life). The same tendency of Chernyshevsky manifests itself definitely in all his other literary articles. Here is what he says, for example, in a review of a collection of poetry by A. N. Pleshcheyev (Sovremennik, 1861, No. 3).

He recalls with displeasure the time when our critics treated Pleshcheyev with scorn and even ill-will. “It seems monstrous now,” he says. “Surely the noble sentiments and noble ideas which breathed from every page of Mr. Pleshcheyev’s booklet were not so commonplace in the Russian poetry of the time as to be dismissed with scorn. When, indeed, is such a thing possible and permissible?” Pleshcheyev, according to him, had no great poetic talent and his aspirations [255] and hopes were quite vague. But he did possess great sincerity and as for expressing his hopes with greater precision, he could not do so for reasons beyond his control.

[262]...Pisarev possessed tremendous literary talent. But for all the enjoyment that the unprejudiced reader derived from the literary brilliancy of Pisarev’s articles, it must be admitted that “Pisarevism” was a sort of reductio ad absurdum of the idealism of our “enlighteners....”

[266]...Some of Mikhailovsky’s sociological articles have now been translated into French and, if we are not mistaken, also into German. Presumably, however, they will not make his name very well known in Europe. But it is very possible that they will earn praise from one or two of those European thinkers who are going “back to Kant!”
out of hatred of Marxism. In spite of the opinion of our latest historian of literature, there can be nothing flattering in these praises. But extremely worth noting is time irony of history which makes a theoretical weapon of reaction out of what was an innocent theoretical mistake in a more or less progressive utopism.
[280]... His article goes on to tell of the strange and often ridiculous acts to which the Saint-Simonists were driven in their extreme exaltation. He calls them drawing-room heroes overcome by a fit of philanthropy. But he qualifies this severe judgment of them. The Saint-Simonist movement was the first expression of the concept of transforming society, and that first expression is of great [281] historic significance. It indicates that it is high time society concerned itself with the ideas of reform that first appeared in the unsatisfactory form of Saint-Simonism.

In conclusion, Chernyshevsky says of reformist ideas: "We shall soon see that they have begun to appear in more reasonable forms and to reach people for whom they are no longer a delightful amusement but a matter of necessity, and when that class which the Saint-Simonists wished to humbug begins reasonably to concern itself about its own well-being, then probably, life on earth will be better for it than it is at present.* This is a highly important remark. It shows that in his views on the future of West European socialism Chernyshevsky came very close to the theory of the class struggle. But we know already of the role which this theory has played in his views on history. Sometimes it helped him to explain very successful-

ly certain isolated historical phenomena; but he looked on it as a rather serious obstacle to progress instead of a necessary condition for it in a society divided into classes. The reader will recall that Chernyshevsky saw the weak development of the class struggle in Spain as an earnest of that country's progressive development in the future. In his comments on events in France in 1848, as well as in the passage we have just quoted, he seems to incline to the idea that the emancipation movement of the proletariat is now becoming the motive force of social progress in Western Europe. But with him this idea remains one of the germs of a materialist interpretation of history to which we have repeatedly called the reader's attention in dealing with our author's views on history....

[282]...He explains the backwardness of the "ordinary people" of Europe as being due to the fact that well-known scientific conceptions have not yet reached the people. When they do, when "ordinary people" become acquainted with philosophical views "corresponding to their needs," then the triumph of the new principles in the social life of Western Europe will not be far off.* Chernyshevsky does not ask himself the question whether any phenomena exist in this life that could provide an objective guarantee that the new philosophical ideas will, in fact, ultimately reach the "ordinary people." He has no need for such a guarantee because, as he sees it, the very nature of these principles, and also the nature of man, quite sufficiently guarantee the triumph of the new principles....

Chapter Two
UTOPIAN SOCIALISM

(Continuation)

[289]...Chernyshevsky regards the question of socialism, as he does all the other general questions of historical development, from the point of view of idealism. And this idealist attitude to the most important historical phenomena was typical of the socialism of all countries in the utopian period of its development. This feature of utopian

socialism is of such tremendous importance that it is necessary to dwell on it—without fear of a certain amount of repetition, which may very well occur in the process.

Chapter Three

CHERNYSHEVSKY’S “OWN” PLAN
AND THE QUESTION OF THE LAND COMMUNE

[313]...“Let us suppose,” he says, turning to his favourite method of explanation by means of a “parable”—“let us suppose that I was interested in taking steps to preserve the provisions from the store of which your dinner is prepared. Obviously, if I did so out of affection for you, then my zeal would be based on the assumption that the provisions belong to you and that the dinner being prepared from them is nourishing and good for you. Just imagine my feelings when I learn that the provisions do not really belong to you and that for every dinner prepared from them you pay money which is not only more than the dinner itself is worth but which, in general, you cannot pay without extremely embarrassing yourself. What ideas will enter my head in the face of such strange discoveries?... How stupid I was to bother about a matter when the conditions for its usefulness were not guaranteed! Who but a dolt can bother about the preservation of property in certain hands, without first being assured that the property will remain in those hands and on advantageous terms?... Rather let all these provisions, which only cause harm to the person I love, be lost! Rather let the whole matter, which only causes your ruin, vanish! Sorrow for you, shame on account of my own stupidity—that is what I feel.”*

[315]...Credit is due to Chernyshevsky for the fact that, at the very beginning of his literary activity, he displayed, in his comments on the land commune, far more consideration than many a “Russian socialist” even in the mid-nineties, when to all appearances, only the blind could fail to see that our vaunted “age-long foundations” were crumbling. As far back as April 1857 he wrote: but “there is no concealing the fact that Russia, which until now has had a small share in

economic progress, is being rapidly swept along with it, and our way of life, until now scarcely affected by the economic laws which reveal their power only in times of increased economic and commercial activity, is beginning rapidly to be subjected to them. Perhaps it will not be long before we, too, are drawn into the sphere of full operation of the law of competition."

This is precisely what the theoreticians of our Narodism ever since sought to conceal from themselves and their readers for so long and with so much care. What the Scriptures say is true: star differs from star in glory .... Being convinced that our country lacks the conditions for making communal land tenure a source of well-being for the people, Chernyshevsky was to see that his sympathetic attitude to the commune bore in fact very little similarity to the Slavophils' sympathetic view of it. In his article "On the Causes of the Fall of Rome," he says that although the commune could contribute to the further development of Russia, it was nonetheless ridiculous to take pride in it, because it was after all a sign of our economic backwardness. He offers an example: European engineers, he says, now use applied mechanics to construct suspension bridges. But it appears that in a backward Asiatic country—does not quite remember which one—local engineers have long since been building suspension bridges on suitable sites. Does that mean that applied mechanics in Asia may be placed on a footing with that in Europe? There are bridges and bridges, and the Asian engineers' suspension bridge is infinitely inferior to its European counterpart. To be sure, when European engineers arrive in the Asiatic country which has long been familiar with suspension bridges, they will find it all the easier to convince a mandarin that the suspension bridge of today is not a godless invention. But nothing more than that. Despite its suspension bridges, the Asiatic country will remain a backward country all the same while Europe will still be its preceptor. The same holds true for the Russian commune. Perhaps the latter will promote the development of our country; but the chief stimulus will come nonetheless from the West, and it does not really befit us to renovate the world, even by means of the commune....

Chapter Four
SOCIALISM AND POLITICS

[317]...He who tries to obtain in idea of Chernyshevsky’s political views on the basis of his writings, at first feels a little embarrassed, that is, if he himself is not indifferent [318] to politics. Indeed, the man who next to Belinsky was the most colourful exponent of progressive tendencies in our literature, at first glance appears to be politically indifferent. And it is not because he has employed a few unfortunate expressions, nor because of a slip of the pen, but on account of the general principles by which he is sometimes guided in judging the more important phenomena of West-European life. For evidence of this we refer to the article “Party Struggles in France Under Louis XVIII and Charles X” (Sovremennik, 1858, Nos. 8 and 9). There we read:

“The fundamental desires, the basic urges, of liberals and democrats are essentially different. Democrats intend to abolish as far as possible the predominance of the upper classes over the lower in the state structure; on the one hand to reduce the power and wealth of the upper social-estates, on the other to give more weight and well-being to the lower social-estates. How to change the laws in this sense and to support the new structure of society is almost a matter of indifference to them. On the other hand, the liberals cannot at all agree to give the predominance in society to the lower social-estates because owing to their lack of education and material poverty, these social-estates are indifferent to the interests that are of the utmost importance to the liberal party, namely, the right of free speech and a constitutional system. For the democrat, our Siberia, where the ordinary people are well off, stands far higher than England, where the majority of the people suffer great privations. Out of all political institutions, the democrat is irreconcilably hostile to only one—aristocracy; the liberal almost always finds that only with a certain degree of aristocracy can society attain the liberal system. Therefore the liberals are usually the mortal enemies of the democrats, and say that democracy leads to despotism and is fatal to freedom.”

*Cf. Sotsial-Demokrat No. 1, p. 124

Chernyshevsky then explains his ideas by arguments which bear out even more forcefully our supposition that by democrats he means socialists. He says: “From the theoretical aspect, liberalism may seem attractive to one whom good fortune has delivered from want: freedom is a very good thing. But liberalism takes a very narrow, purely formal view of freedom. To it freedom consists of abstract right, of formal permission of the absence of legal restraint. It refuses to see that legal right is of value to a person only when he has the material means of exercising that right.* The people have no material opportunity for availing themselves of political freedom. The majority of them are illiterate almost in all countries. So why should they treasure their right to free speech? Want and lack of education doom them to complete ignorance [320] of affairs of state. So why should they take any interest in parliamentary debates?” Chernyshevsky states emphatically that “there is no European country where the vast majority of the people is not completely indifferent to the decrees which are the object of the aspirations and concern of liberalism”**

In the political survey published in No. 6 of Sovremennik for 1859, Chernyshevsky remarks, after stating that the movement which insists on intervention by the German Union in Austria’s favour is growing stronger in Germany: “we have not been speaking of ordinary people, but actually of classes in which public opinion is concentrated, classes which engage in political affairs, read the newspapers and influence the course of affairs—that crowd which everywhere is a plaything of self-interest and intrigue.”***

The “ordinary people” do not read newspapers, do not occupy themselves with political affairs and have no influence on their course. That is the situation now, while their consciousness is still fast asleep. But when it awakens under the influence of the vanguard of the active historical army, consisting of the “best people,” who have learned the lessons of modern science, then the “ordinary people” will understand that their task consists in the radical reconstruction of society, and then they will undertake the work of this re-

** Ibid., p. 158.
construction, which has no direct relation to questions of the forms of political structure. Such were Chernyshevsky’s predominant views, which are to be found in the majority of his numerous political reviews.* If at times this essentially idealist view of politics makes way for a different view, the germ, as it were, of a materialist understanding, this is only an exception, quite like that which we encountered in studying Chernyshevsky’s historical views: the reader will remember that in these views which are also essentially idealist, there are also germs of the materialist view of history. Let us now elucidate with the help of two examples the character that Chernyshevskys political reviews had taken under the influence of his aforementioned predominant views regarding the relation of politics to the chief tasks of the working class.

First example. In January 1862, in his political review, he enters into a controversy with the Prussian liberal National Zeitung regarding Austria’s internal policy. The National Zeitung wrote: “Let the fate of Austria be a lesson to other states not to undertake expenditures that exceed their financial strength. The cause of Austria’s ruin is her excessive army expenditures.” Chernyshevsky does not like these reflections of the National Zeitung.

[331]...Such arguments, which led to the conclusion that the despotic Austrian Government is acting perfectly correctly, should have astonished and in fact did astonish a large number of the readers of Sovremennik. They produced [332] an impression not so much of indifference to questions of political freedom as of direct sympathy with the obscurantists. Chernyshevsky’s opponents frequently accused him of such sympathies. It was just because of accusations of this kind that at the end of his political review in March 1862 he made the ironical confession: “for us there is no better amusement than liberalism—and we

NB NB NB

Cf. Sotsial-Demokrat
No. 1, p. 144¹⁸¹ changed!!

* These reviews take up at least two volumes of his Collected Works.
** Этого обозрения состоят из обзора, на крайней жертве, два тома полного собрания его сочинений.

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A page from G. V. Plekhanov's book *N. G. Chernyshevsky* with V. I. Lenin's notes
have an irresistible desire to look about for liberals in order to poke fun at them." But as a matter of fact, of course, he did not write his paradoxical reviews in order to "poke fun" at the liberals, nor to defend despotic governments. Basically the thought was that, while the given social relations existed, things could not proceed otherwise than they were doing and that anyone who wanted them to proceed differently should devote his efforts to a radical change in social relations. To act differently would be a waste of time. The liberals evoked Chernyshevsky's ridicule precisely because they proposed palliatives where a radical cure was necessary.*

Second example. In April of the same year, Chernyshevsky again appeared to take the side of absolutism in its struggle with liberalism in the Prussian Government's conflict with the Prussian Diet. According to him, the liberals should not have been surprised that the Prussian Government did not make voluntary concessions to them but preferred to agitate the country by dissolving the Diet "We find," he says, "that the Prussian Government acted as it should have."** This again was bound to astonish the naïve reader and seem to him a betrayal of the cause of freedom. It is clearly understandable, however, that here, too, our author was not at all taking up the cudgels in defence of despotism, but only wanted [333] to utilise the Prussian events in order to communicate to the more astute of his readers the correct view of the chief condition on which, in the final analysis, the outcome of all broad social conflicts depends. Here is what he says on this point:

"Just as quarrels between different states are

* In his Essays on Political Economy Chernyshevsky, pointing to the lack of agreement between the existing economic system and "the demands of a sound theory," sometimes interrupts his exposition with the question: "Should a system continue which allows such disagreement?" (See, for instance, Collected Works, Vol. VII, p. 513.) The reader of Chernyshevsky must have asked himself the same question on reading his political surveys, especially those leading to the "incongruous" conclusion that the apologists of despotism, and not its opponents, were in the right. In Chernyshevsky such a conclusion was just another argument against the contemporary life. But the liberals often failed to understand this.

** Collected Works, Vol. IX, p. 236.
at first carried on by diplomatic means, so the struggle for principles inside the state itself is at first carried on by means of civilian influence or so-called legal means. But just as a quarrel between different states, if it is sufficiently important, always leads to military threats, so too with the internal affairs of states, if the affair is not of minor importance. If the quarrelling states are very unequal in power, then the affair is usually solved by military threats alone: the weaker state succumbs to the will of the stronger, and this prevents open warfare. In just the same way, in important internal affairs, war is only prevented if one of the conflicting sides feels too weak compared with the other: then it submits as soon as it sees that the opposing party has really decided to resort to military measures. But if two quarrelling states are not so unequal in power that the weaker of them cannot hope to repulse an attack, then the affair may pass from threats to war. The defending side has a very big advantage on its side and, therefore, if it is not too weak, it does not lose heart at the decision of the stronger opponent to attack it.**

It was from this point of view that he examined what was then taking place in Prussia. He defended and praised the Prussian Government—this must be noted—solely because “it was acting in the best possible way in favour of national progress” by destroying the political illusions of those naïve Prussians who, for no obvious reason, imagined that a system of genuinely constitutional rule would be instituted in their country of itself, without a struggle against the old order. And if he revealed not the slightest sympathy for the Prussian liberals and even poked fun at them, the explanation is that, in his just opinion, they too wanted to achieve their aims [334] without a determined struggle against their political enemies.

system find themselves too weak for military struggle and are ready to yield at the first determined threat from the government that it will resort to military measures."* And so it turned out Chernyshevsky was right in his contempt for the Prussian liberals. They indeed wanted constitutional order to be instituted in Prussia of itself. Not only did they not take determined action—for that they could not be blamed since, with the prevailing relation of social forces, this was not possible—but they condemned in principle every idea of such action, i.e., they hampered, insofar as it depended on them, a change in social forces that would have made it possible to resort to such action in the future. Chernyshevsky could not forgive them that, just as Lassalle could not. It is noteworthy that just when Chernyshevsky was ridiculing the Prussian liberals in his political articles, Lassalle was tearing them to pieces in his speeches. And it is even more noteworthy that in those speeches the German agitator sometimes used the same words as Chernyshevsky to describe the relation of social forces as the foundation of the political system in a particular country. Lassalle had in many respects the same mentors as Chernyshevsky. It is natural, therefore, that the political thinking of both tended in the same direction, and achieved results that coincided in part. We say "in part" because, in noting the great similarity of Lassalle’s views to Chernyshevsky’s, one must not close one’s eyes to the differences between them. Lassalle does not confine himself to concluding that the constitution of any country is the juridical expression of the prevailing correlation of social forces. He seeks the causes which determine this correlation, and finds them in the social economy. Those of Lassalle’s speeches which bear on this question are permeated with a materialist spirit, which is more than can be said, for instance, of his speech [335] on the philosophy of Fichte, or his “System of Acquired Rights.” Neither does Chernyshevsky ignore the question of the causes determining the relation of social forces, but in his analysis he stops at social self-consciousness, i.e., not crossing the boundary separating historical

idealism from historical materialism. In contrast to Lassalle, he is a far more consistent idealist in his comments on Prussian affairs than in many of his other articles dealing with politics or history. This difference, too, should be attributed completely to the "relation of social forces." In Prussia, no matter how weak Prussian capitalism was compared with what it is at present, a working-class movement in the modern sense of the word had nevertheless already begun; but in Russia the movement of the "nongentry," which is usually called the movement of the intelligentsia, had only just begun to flourish. Influenced by the requirements of the working-class movement, even idealists are often compelled to reason materially. (Joe can find many examples in present-day France of how the requirements of the working-class movement exert their influence. The movement of the intelligentsia, on the contrary, sometimes drives even materialists to purely idealist reasoning. This is particularly marked in Russia today.

Chernyshevsky's political reviews were intended for the "best people," who had to know what they should teach the backward masses. The work of the "best people" amounted, in the main, to propaganda. But not exclusively. The "ordinary people," generally speaking, do not figure on the political stage. And what takes place on that stage—again speaking generally—little affects their interests. But there are exceptional epochs during which the masses of the people awaken from their customary hibernation and make energetic, although often hardly conscious, efforts to improve their destiny. In such exceptional epochs the activity of the "best people" more or less loses its predominantly propaganda character and becomes agitational. This is what Chernyshevsky says of such epochs:

"Historical progress takes place slowly and arduously..." [336], so slowly that, if we limit ourselves to very short periods, the fluctuations produced in the advancing course of history by accidental circumstances may blind us to the action of the general law. In order to convince oneself of its immutability, it is necessary to con-
Consider the course of events over a fairly long time. Compare the state of the social institutions and laws of France in 1700 and today—the difference is extremely great, and it is all to the advantage of the present day; and yet almost all this century and a half was very arduous and gloomy. The same also in England. Whence comes the difference? It was being constantly prepared for by the fact that the best people of each generation found life in their time extremely difficult; little by little at least a few of their desires became comprehensible to society, and then, at some time many years later, on propitious occasions, society for six months, a year, or hardly more than three or four years, worked for the fulfilment of at least a few of this small number of desires which had penetrated to it from the best people. The work was never successful: when half the work was done society's zeal would be exhausted, its strength would give out, and once again the practical life of society would fall into a long period of stagnation; and, as before, the best people, if they survived the work inspired by them, saw that their desires were far from having been carried out and as before had to bemoan life's burdens. But in the brief period of noble enthusiasm much was reconstructed. Of course, the reconstruction took place hurriedly, there was no time to think about the elegance of the new structures, which remained unfinished, there was no time to bother about the subtle requirements of architectural harmony between the new parts and the surviving remains, and the period of stagnation inherited the reconstructed edifice with a multitude of petty incongruities and hideosities. But that period of indolence afforded leisure to examine carefully every detail and since the improvement of the details that it disliked did not require any particular effort, it was done little by little; and while an exhausted society busied itself with trivia, the best people were saying that the reconstruction was incomplete, and argued that the old parts of the building were becoming more and more dilapidated, and that it was necessary to resume work on a big scale. At first a tired society refused to heed them, regarding their jarring cry as interference with its rest; then, having recovered its energy, society began to defer more and more to an opinion which had previously aroused its indignation. [337] So-
ciety gradually became convinced that there was some truth in it, came to recognise that truth more and more from year to year, and finally was prepared to go along with those progressive people who argued that reconstruction was necessary; and, then, at the earliest opportunity it set to work with renewed fervour, again left it unfinished, and once more fell into a slumber, only to resume the effort later on.”

Chernyshevsky’s political articles were aimed at showing the “best people” that the old structure of the contemporary social system was crumbling more and more and that there was a need to “resume work on a big scale.” And everything points to the fact that towards the end of the first, i.e., pre-Siberian period of his literary activity, it began to appear to him that society was more and more heeding his opinion, and falling in with him. In other words, he began to think that in Russian history too there was approaching one of those beneficial leaps which rarely occur in history, but which push far ahead the process of social development. The spirits of the advanced sections of Russian society were indeed rapidly rising, and with them Chernyshevsky’s spirits also rose. At one time he had found it possible and useful to make clear to the government its own interests in the matter of freeing the peasants; now he does not even think of addressing himself to the government. To count on it at all seems to him harmful self-delusion. In the article “The Russian Reformer” (Sovremennik, October 1861), which he wrote in connection with the publication of M. Korf’s book The Life of Count Speransky, Chernyshevsky argues at length that no reformer should delude himself with such calculations in our country. Speransky’s enemies called him a revolutionary. This opinion amused Chernyshevsky. Speransky indeed had very broad plans for changes, but it is ludicrous to call him a revolutionary, judging by the extent of the means he intended using to carry out his intentions. He could maintain his position only because he had managed to earn the trust of the tsar Alexander I. With this trust to support him, he intended to carry out his plans. That is why Chernyshevsky called him a dreamer....
Only he who constantly remembers that the course of social life is determined by the relationship of social forces does not succumb to harmful delusions in politics, he who wishes to act in accordance with this basic principle has sometimes to go through a difficult moral struggle. Chernyshevsky tries to warn the “best people” of his time on this score, in view of what he thought was the imminent leap. Thus, as far back as January 1861, in analysing a book by the well-known American economist, Carey, whose insignificance, incidentally, he brilliantly exposes, he unexpectedly passes to the well-known Jewish heroine, Judith, and strongly justifies her action. He says: “The path of history is not paved like Nevsky Prospekt; it runs across fields, either dusty or muddy, and cuts across swamps or forest thickets. He who fears being covered with dust or muddy his boots, should better not engage in social activity, for this is a noble occupation when one is really concerned with the good of the people, but it is not exactly a tidy one. It is true, however, that moral purity may be understood differently; others, for example, may feel that Judith did not tarnish herself.... Broaden your considerations and on many individual questions you will have obligations that are different from those resulting from an isolated examination of the same questions*.

At the beginning of the sixties the government conceived the idea of lifting censorship restrictions to some extent. It was decided that new censorship rules should be drawn up, and the press was allowed to express itself on the question of its own repression. Chernyshevsky lost no time in stating his personal views, which as usual strongly differed from the usual liberal views. [339] True, Chernyshevsky himself maliciously ridicules the people who suppose that the printing press has some specific power like belladonna, sulphuric acid, fulminate of silver, etc. “Our personal opinion is not inclined towards expecting unnaturally harmful results from objects and actions which do not possess the power to produce such calamities. We think the printing press is too weak to produce social misfortune. After all, it does not contain so much ink that the latter could come pouring out somehow and flood our country; nor has it springs

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that, after jumping out somehow and thumping the type, could fire it as case shot.” However, Chernyshevsky admits that there are epochs when the press can be no less dangerous than case shot to the government of a country. These are the epochs when a government’s interests differ from the interests of society and a revolutionary upheaval is imminent. A government in such a position has every ground for restricting the press, because the press, together with other social forces, is preparing its downfall. Almost all the successive French governments of this century have been continuously in this situation. All this is very painstakingly and calmly expounded by Chernyshevsky. Nothing is said in the article, until the very end, about the Russian Government. But in conclusion Chernyshevsky suddenly asks his reader—suppose it should turn out that the press laws are really necessary in our country? “Then we should again deserve to be called obscurantists, enemies of progress, haters of freedom, panegyrists of despotism, etc., just as we have already many times laid ourselves open to such censure.” He therefore does not want to investigate the question of whether there is a need for special press laws in our country. “We fear,” he says, “that a conscientious investigation would lead us to reply: yes, they are necessary.”* The conclusion is clear they are necessary because the time for a “leap” is also approaching in Russia.

In the same March issue of Sovremennik that printed the article we have just quoted, there appeared a polemical article entitled “Have We Learned the Lesson?”, concerning the well-known student demonstrations of 1861. In it Chernyshevsky defends the students, who were reproached by our “guardians” for allegedly not wanting to study [340]; and, incidentally, he also tells the government many home truths. The immediate cause for this polemic was an anonymous article in the St. Petersburg Academic Bulletin entitled “To Study or Not To Study?” Chernyshevsky replies that in regard to students this question has no sense, since they have always wanted to study, but the restricting university regulations hindered them. The university regulations would have

dealt with students—people of an age when by our laws a man may marry, be taken into the civil service, or “command an army unit”—as children. It is not surprising that they protested. They were even barred from having such completely harmless organisations as mutual aid societies, which were undoubtedly essential in view of the material insecurity of the majority of the students. Students could not but revolt against such regulations, because it was a question of “a crust of bread and the possibility of attending lectures. This bread, this opportunity was being withdrawn.” Chernyshevsky declared outright that the people who made the university regulations actually wanted to deprive the majority of those who entered the university of any possibility of studying. “If the author of the article and those who agree with him consider it necessary to prove that this was not the aim in view when the regulations were drawn up, let them publish the documents relating to the meetings at which the regulations were decided on.” The anonymous writer of the article “To Study or Not To Study?” directed his charge of unwillingness to study not only against the students but against the whole of Russian society. Chernyshevsky took advantage of this to carry the controversy about the unrest at the university on to a more general field. His opponent allowed that there were certain signs of the desire of Russian society to study. Proof of this, in his opinion, was the “hundreds” of new periodicals, the “dozens” of Sunday schools for adults that were appearing in our country. “Hundreds of new periodicals, but where did he count the hundreds?” exclaims Chernyshevsky. “And hundreds would really be necessary, but does the author want to know why hundreds of new periodicals are not being founded, as they should? It is because under the conditions of our censorship it is impossible for any lively periodical to exist anywhere, except in a few large towns. Every rich commercial town should [341] have several, even if only small, newspapers; several local news-sheets should be published in every province. They do not exist, because they are not allowed to.... Dozens of Sunday schools for adults.... Now that is no exaggeration, it is not the same as with the hundreds of new periodicals: in an empire with a population of over 60 million, the Sunday schools for adults are indeed to be counted only in dozens. Yet there should have been tens of thousands of them, and it would have
been possible to establish quickly tens of thousands of them, and for at least many thousands to be now in existence. How is it that there are only dozens? Because they are so suspect, so hampered, so circumscribed, that the people who are most loyal to the work of teaching in them have all desire to teach driven out of them.”

After referring to the existence of “hundreds” of new periodicals and “dozens” of Sunday schools for adults as apparent signs of the desire of society to study, the author of the article which Chernyshevsky was analysing hastened to add that these signs were deceptive. “You hear shouting in the streets,” he proclaims mournfully, “something or other is said to have happened somewhere, and you involuntarily hang your head and are disillusioned....” “Excuse me, Mr. Author of the article,” objects Chernyshevsky, “what is the shouting you hear in the streets? The shouting of constables and police officers—we hear their shouting too. Are you speaking of that shouting? You are told something or other has happened somewhere....—what sort of thing, for example? There a theft has occurred, here authority has been exceeded, there the rights of the weak have been violated, here there has been connivance with the strong—we are incessantly being told this sort of thing. Because of this shouting which everyone hears, and this constant talk, one does indeed involuntarily hang one’s head and become disillusioned.”

The accuser of the students attacked them for their apparent intolerance of the opinions of others, for having recourse in their protests to whistling, pickled apples and similar “street weapons.” Chernyshevsky replies that “whistling and pickled apples are not used as street weapons: street weapons take the form of bayonets, rifle-butts and sabres.” He asks his opponent to recall “whether it was the students who used these street weapons against anyone, or whether they were used against the students... and whether there was any need to use them against the students.”

It is easy to understand the impression such article of Chernyshevsky’s were bound to make on the Russian students. When [342], subsequently, student demonstrations occurred again at the end of the sixties, the article “Have We Learned the Lesson?” was read at student gatherings as being the best defence of their demands. It is also easy to understand what the attitude of the “guardians” must have been to such defiant articles. The great
We know already how that influence was removed. Holding a utopian socialist point of view, Chernyshevsky believed that the plans which those of like mind in the West sought to realise could be carried out under the most varied political forms. That’s how it was according to theory. And as long as he did not step out of this sphere, he expressed this view without mincing words. When he started on his literary career, our social life seemed to furnish some confirmation, if only indirect, of the correctness of this view; hope arose among the advanced men of the day that the government would take the initiative in reaching a just solution of the peasant question. It was a vain hope, which Chernyshevsky abandoned almost before anyone else. And while in theory he did not, even afterwards, clearly see the connection between economics and politics, in his practical activity—and by this we mean his journalistic efforts—he was an uncompromising enemy of our old order, although his peculiar irony continued to mislead many liberal-minded readers on that score. In deeds, if not in theory, he became a man of irreconcilable political struggle and the thirst for struggle is felt in almost every line of each of his articles relating to the year 1861 and, in particular, to the year 1862, a fateful one for him.
NOTES
Conspectus of the book “The Holy Family” by Marx and Engels was written by Lenin in 1895 during his first stay abroad when he left Russia to establish contact with the Emancipation of Labour group.

The Holy Family, or Critique of Critical Criticism. Against Bruno Bauer and Co.—the first joint work of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. It was written between September and November 1844 and was published in February 1845 in Frankfort-on-Main.

“*The Holy Family*” is a mocking reference to the Bauer brothers and their followers grouped around the *Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung* (General Literary Gazette). While attacking the Bauers and the other Young Hegelians (or Left Hegelians), Marx and Engels at the same time criticised the idealist philosophy of Hegel.

Marx sharply disagreed with the Young Hegelians as early as the summer of 1842, when the club of “The Free” was formed in Berlin. Upon becoming editor of the *Rheinische Zeitung* (Rhine Gazette) in October 1842, Marx opposed the efforts of several Young Hegelian staff members from Berlin to publish inane and pretentious articles emanating from the club of “The Free,” which had lost touch with reality and was absorbed in abstract philosophical disputes. During the two years following Marx’s break with “The Free,” the theoretical and political differences between Marx and Engels on the one hand and the Young Hegelians on the other became deep-rooted and irreconcilable. This was not only due to the fact that Marx and Engels had gone over from idealism to materialism and from revolutionary democratism to communism, but also due to the evolution undergone by the Bauer brothers and persons of like mind during this time. In the *Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung*, Bauer and his group denounced “1842 radicalism” and its most outstanding proponent—the *Rheinische Zeitung*. They slithered into vulgar subjective idealism of the vilest kind—propagation of a “theory” according to which only select individuals, bearers of the
“spirit,” of “pure criticism,” are the makers of history, while the masses, the people, serve as inert material or ballast in the historical process.

Marx and Engels decided to devote their first joint work to the exposure of these pernicious, reactionary ideas and to the defence of their new materialist and communist outlook.

During a ten-day stay of Engels in Paris the plan of the book (at first entitled *Critique of Critical Criticism. Against Bruno Bauer and Co.*) was drafted, responsibility for the various chapters apportioned between the authors, and the “Preface” written. Engels wrote his chapters while still in Paris. Marx, who was responsible for a larger part of the book, continued to work on it until the end of November 1844. Moreover, he considerably increased the initially conceived size of the book by incorporating in his chapters parts of his economic and philosophical manuscripts on which he had worked during the spring and summer of 1844, his historical studies of the bourgeois French Revolution at the end of the 18th century, and a number of his excerpts and conspectuses. While the book was in the process of being printed, Marx added the words *The Holy Family* to the title. By using a small format, the book exceeded 20 printer’s sheets and was thus exempted from preliminary censorship according to the prevailing regulations in a number of German states.

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3 *Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung (General Literary Gazette)—* a German monthly published in Charlottenburg from December 1843 to October 1844 by Bruno Bauer, the Young Hegelian.

4 *Umriss zu einer Kritik der Nationalökonomie (Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy)* was first published by Engels at the beginning of 1844 in *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher (Franco-German Annals)—* see Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844.* Moscow, 1959, pp. 175-209.

5 *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher (Franco-German Annals)—* a magazine published in German in Paris and edited by Karl Marx and Arnold Ruge. The only issue to appear was a double number published in February 1844. It included Marx’s articles “A Critique of the Hegelian Philosophy of Law (Introduction)” and “On the Jewish Question,” and also Engels’ articles “Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy” and “The Position of England. Thomas Carlyle, ‘Past and Present.’” These works mark the final transition of Marx and Engels to materialism and communism. Publication of the magazine was discontinued chiefly as a result of the basic differences between Marx’s views and the bourgeois-radical views of Ruge.

6 This refers to Proudhon’s work of 1840 *Qu’est-ce que la propriété? ou Recherches sur le principe du droit et du gouvernement (What...*
Is Property? or Studies on the Principle of Law and Government). Marx presents a critique of this work in a letter to Schweitzer dated January 24, 1865 (see Marx and Engels, Selected Correspondence, Moscow, 1955, pp. 185-192).

7 This refers to Eugene Sue’s novel Les mystères de Paris (Mysteries of Paris), which was written in the spirit of petty-bourgeois sentimentality. It was published in Paris in 1842-43 and was very popular in France and abroad.

8 Marx is referring here to articles by Jules Faucher entitled Englische Tagesfragen (Topical Questions in England), which were published in Nos. VII and VIII (June and July 1844) of the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung.

9 Loustallot’s journal of 1789—a weekly publication entitled Révolutions de Paris (Parisian Revolutions), which appeared in Paris from July 1789 to February 1794. Until September 1790 it was edited by Elisée Loustallot, a revolutionary publicist.

10 Phanomenologie des Geistes (Phenomenology of Mind) by G. W. F. Hegel was first published in 1807. In working on The Holy Family, Marx made use of Vol. II of the second edition of Hegel’s works (Berlin, 1841). He called this first large work of Hegel, in which the latter’s philosophical system was elaborated, “the source and secret of Hegel’s philosophy.”

11 Doctrinaires—members of a bourgeois political grouping in France during the period of the Restoration (1815-30). As constitutional monarchists and rabid enemies of the democratic and revolutionary movement, they aimed to create in France a bloc of the bourgeoisie and landed aristocracy after the English fashion. The most celebrated of the Doctrinaires were Guizot, a historian, and Royer-Collard, a philosopher. Their views constituted a reaction in the field of philosophy against the French materialism of the 18th century and the democratic ideas of the French bourgeois revolution.

12 The refutation of the views expounded by Bruno Bauer in his book Die Judenfrage (The Jewish Question), Braunschweig, 1843, was made by Marx in an article entitled “Zur Judenfrage” (“On the Jewish Question”), published in 1844 in Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher.
The Universal Rights of Man—the principles enunciated in the “Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen” and proclaimed during the time of the French bourgeois revolution of 1789-93. p. 38

The 18th Brumaire (9 November 1799)—the day of the coup d’état of Napoleon Bonaparte, who overthrew the Directorate and established his own dictatorship. p. 40

Cartesian materialism—the materialism of the followers of Descartes (from the Latin spelling of Descartes—Cartesius). The indicated book—Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme (Relation of the Physical to the Spiritual in Man) by P. J. G. Cabanis—was published in Paris in 1802. p. 42

Nominalism—the trend in medieval philosophy that considered general concepts as merely the names of single objects in contrast to medieval “realism,” which recognised the existence of general concepts or ideas independent of things. Nominalism recognised objects as primary and concepts as secondary. Thus, as Marx says in The Holy Family, nominalism represents the first expression of materialism in the Middle Ages (see Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, Moscow, 1956, p. 172). p. 43

Sensualism—the philosophical doctrine that recognises sensation as the sole source of cognition. p. 43

Babouvists—adherents of Gracchus Babeuf, who in 1796 led a utopian communist movement of “equals” in France. p. 44

Lenin is referring to Feuerbach’s Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft (Principles of the Philosophy of the Future), 1843, which constitutes a continuation of the latter’s aphorisms Vorläufige Thesen zu einer Reform der Philosophie (Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy), 1842, in which the author expounds the basis of his materialist philosophy and criticises Hegel’s idealist philosophy. p. 45

Fleur de Marie—heroine of Eugène Sue’s novel Mysteries of Paris. p. 46

Anekdota zur neuesten deutschen Philosophie und Publizistik. Von Bruno Bauer, Ludwig Feuerbach, Friedrich Köppen, Karl Nauwerk,
Arnold Ruge und einigen Ungenannten (Unpublished Recent German Philosophical and Other Writings of Bruno Bauer, Ludwig Feuerbach, Friedrich Köppen, Karl Nauwerk, Arnold Ruge and Several Anonymous Writers)—a collection of articles that were banned for publication in German magazines. Published in 1843 in Zurich by Ruge and included Marx as one of its contributors. p. 48

22 Tory philanthropists—a literary-political group—“Young England.” This group was formed in the early 1840s and belonged to the Tory Party. It voiced the dissatisfaction of the landed aristocracy with the increased economic and political might of the bourgeoisie, and resorted to demagogic methods to bring the working class under its influence and use it in its fight against the bourgeoisie. “In order to arouse sympathy,” Marx and Engels wrote in the Manifesto of the Communist Party, “the aristocracy were obliged to lose sight, apparently, of their own interests, and to formulate their indictment against the bourgeoisie in the interest of the exploited working class alone.”

Ten Hours’ Bill—a law on the 10-hour working day for women and juveniles, adopted by the English Parliament in 1847. p. 51

23 The note on Fr. Überweg’s book “Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie.” (Bearbeitet von Max Heinze). 3 Vls. 1876-1880, Leipzig (Fr. Überweg, Outline of the History of Philosophy, revised by Max Heinze, 3 Vols., 1876-1880, Leipzig) is recorded in the same notebook containing the remarks on Paulsen’s book Introduction to Philosophy. These entries were made in Geneva in 1903. p. 52


25 Note on a Feuilleton in the newspaper “Frankfurter Zeitung” of November 15, 1904, which comments on two books by E. Haeckel—Lebenswunder (Gemeinverständliche Studien über biologische Philosophie) [The Wonders of Life (Elementary Studies in Biologist Philosophy)], Stuttgart (Alfred Kröner) and Welträtsel (The Riddle of the Universe)—was written on a separate sheet, which also contained a list of a number of foreign books on the agrarian question. The entry was made at the end of 1904. Lenin gave an evaluation of The Riddle of the Universe by E. Haeckel in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (see V. I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Moscow, 1960, pp. 364-372). p. 56
Remarks on Books on the Natural Sciences and Philosophy in the Sorbonne Library were written on separate sheets during the first half of 1909.

Ten Trends in Philosophy—a list of ten chapters in the first part of the book Modern Philosophical Trends by L. Stein.

Conspectus of Feuerbach’s book “Vorlesungen über das Wesen der Religion” (Lectures on the Essence of Religion) is contained in a separate notebook whose cover was not preserved. On the first page in abbreviated form is written L. Feuerbach, Sämtliche Werke, Band 8, 1851; also indicated is the press-mark—8°. R. 807. There is no indication exactly when the Conspectus was worked out by Lenin.

V. Adoratsky has suggested that it was written in 1909 (Lenin Miscellany XII). The following arguments speak in favour of this hypothesis. It has been established that the press-mark on the first page of the Conspectus is that of the French National Library (Paris) in which Lenin worked from January 13 to June 30, 1909. The contents of Lectures on the Essence of Religion borders upon those works of Feuerbach that were used by Lenin in 1908 in writing his book Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, and some of Lenin’s remarks in the Conspectus are related to propositions formulated in his book. In the Conspectus, for example, Lenin notes: [(Feuerbach and natural science!! NB. Cf. Mach and Co. today)] (see p. 71 of this volume), and in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism he writes: “The philosophy of the scientist Mach is to science what the kiss of the Christian Judas was to Christ. Mach likewise betrays science into the hands of fideism by virtually deserting to the camp of philosophical idealism.” (V. I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Moscow, 1960, p. 303.) Certain remarks in Lenin’s Conspectus are also related to theses in his article “On the Attitude of a Working-Class Party to Religion,” written in May 1909. (See Lenin, pres. ed., Vol. 15.)

Das Wesen des Christentums (The Essence of Christianity)—L. Feuerbach’s chief philosophical work. Its first edition came out in Leipzig in 1841. The book, which, as Engels said, proclaimed the triumph of materialism, exerted enormous influence on the ideological education of progressive intellectuals in Germany and other countries, including Russia. The first Russian translation of the book came out in 1861.

The reference is to The Holy Family by Frederick Engels and Karl Marx, in which the authors wrote that Feuerbach outlined “in a masterly manner the general basic features of Hegel’s speculation.

31 *Das Wesen der Religion* (*The Essence of Religion*) by L. Feuerbach was published in 1846. *Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft* (*Principles of the Philosophy of the Future*) was published in 1843.


33 Lenin contrasts here the attitude toward natural science of Feuerbach, the materialist, and of Mach, the subjective idealist. A critical evaluation of Mach’s attitude toward natural science is given by Lenin in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (see V. I. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Moscow, 1960, pp. 363-364).

34 Josef Dietzgen developed analogous ideas. For example, in the book *The Nature of the Workings of the Human Mind* (*Sämtliche Werke*, Bd. I, Stuttgart, 1922), in the paragraph “Spirit and Matter,” he wrote: “Long ago, mainly during early Christianity, it became customary to look with disdain upon material, sensual and carnal things, which become moth-eaten and rusty” (p. 53).

35 Josef Dietzgen wrote as follows in *The Nature of the Workings of the Human Mind* (*Sämtliche Werke*, Bd. I, Stuttgart, 1922), in the chapter “Pure Reason or the Capacity to Think in General”: “Thinking is a function of the brain, just as writing is a function of the hand” (p. 11) and further “... the reader will not misunderstand me when I call the capacity to think a material power, a sensuous phenomenon” (p. 13).

36 See Lenin’s notations in Plekhanov’s book *N. G. Chernyshevsksy* (pp. 534-536, 538, 543, 544, 549-550 and 552 of this volume).

37 *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* (*New Rhine Gazette*) was published by Marx in Cologne from June 1, 1848 to May 19, 1849.

38 Lenin is referring to the following passage in Feuerbach’s book *Vorlesungen über das Wesen der Religion. Werke*, Bd. 8, 1851, S. 411 (Lectures on the Essence of Religion, Works, Vol. 8, 1851, p. 411): “...godliness consists, so to speak, of two component parts, of which one belongs to man’s fantasy, the other to nature. Pray!—says one part, i.e., God, distinct from nature; work!—says the other part, i.e., God, not distinct from nature, but merely expressing its essence; for nature is the working bee, Gods—the drones.” p. 78

39 *The Anthropological Principle*—the main thesis of Feuerbach’s philosophy that it is neccessary to consider man as part of nature, as a biological being.

The anthropological principle was directed against religion and idealism. However, by considering man apart from the concrete historical and social relations, the anthropological principle leads to idealism in the understanding of the laws of historical development.

Nikolai Chernyshevsky, in struggling against idealism, also took the anthropological principle as his starting-point and devoted a special work to this question under the title “The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy” (see N. G. Chernyshevsky, Selected Philosophical Essays, Moscow, 1953, pp. 49-135). p. 82

40 The reference is to L. Feuerbach’s *Theogonie nach den Quellen des klassischen, hebräischen und christlichen Altertums. Sämtliche Werke*, Bd. 9, 1857 (Theogony Based on Sources of Classical, Hebrew and Christian Antiquity, Collected Works, Vol. 9, 1857). Page 320—beginning of § 34, which is headed “Christian’ Natural Science”; page 334 is in § 36, which is headed “The Theoretical Basis of Theism.” p. 83

41 *Conspectus of Hegel’s book* “The Science of Logic” consists of three notebooks, which have a common pagination from 1 to 115. On the cover of the first notebook, in addition to the inscription “Hegel. Logic I,” there is the entry: “Notebooks on Philosophy. Hegel, Feuerbach and others.” On the cover of the second notebook, to the pagination 49-88, there is the appendage: NB p. 76 (pp. 192-193 of this volume). At the bottom of page 111, there is written: “End of Logic. 17.XII.1914.” The conspectus was probably begun during the first half of September 1914, when Lenin moved from Poronin to Bern, Switzerland. p. 85

42 The first edition of Hegel’s works in German consists of 18 volumes (1832-45) and an additional volume in two parts (1887). p. 87.
Wissenschaft der Logik (The Science of Logic) consists of two parts (three books). p. 87

Parmenides—the name of one of Plato’s dialogues, in which the philosophical views of Parmenides, the ancient Greek Eleatic philosopher, are discussed. p. 97

Lenin is apparently referring to the following well-known statement by Kant in the preface to the second edition of Critique of Pure Reason: “I would have to restrict the field of knowledge to make place for faith.” p. 100


See F. Engels, Anti-Dühring, Moscow, 1959, pp. 74-76, 186. p. 117

An allusion to the couplet “The Question of Right,” from Schiller’s satirical poem “The Philosophers,” which may be translated as follows:

Long have I used my nose for sense of smell
Indeed, what right have I to this, pray tell? p. 118

See F. Engels, Anti-Dühring, Moscow, 1959, pp. 186, 189. p. 118

The reference is to a remark made by Feuerbach in his work Vorläufige Thesen zur Reform der Philosophie (Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy), appearing in Vol. II, p. 257, of Feuerbach’s Works published in German in 1846. p. 123

The reference is to Die Kritik der Urteilskraft by Kant. p. 134

Lenin is referring to the appearance of the following three works: Hegel’s Science of Logic (the first two books were published in 1812 and 1813, respectively); Marx and Engels’ Manifesto of the Commu-
niss Party (written at the end of 1847 and published in February 1848); and Darwin's *Origin of Species* (published in 1859). p. 141

The reference is to K. Pearson's work *The Grammar of Science*, London, 1892. p. 154

The reference is to *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*. Hegel, *Werke*, Bd. 6, Berlin, 1840 (*Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline*, Hegel, *Works*, Vol. 6, Berlin, 1840). "Logic" constitutes Part I of the *Encyclopaedia* and is referred to by Lenin as "small" to distinguish it from the "large" *Science of Logic*, which consists of three volumes. p. 157

Lenin is referring to remarks by Engels on Hegel's *Encyclopaedia*. See Engels' letter to Marx dated September 21, 1874. Also see Engels' letter to Conrad Schmidt dated November 1, 1891 (Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 519-520).

Kuno Fischer—a German bourgeois historian of philosophy and the author of *The History of Modern Philosophy*, one of whose volumes (Vol. 8) is devoted to Hegel. p. 157


The solution of this equation was given by Gauss in his work *Disquisitiones arithmeticae* (*Arithmetical Studies*), 1801. p. 209


The reference is to Diogenes of Sinope, a representative of the Cynic school who was nicknamed the "Dog," probably because of his beggarly life and disregard for public morals. p. 224

See K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1959, Chapter VII, p. 179. In footnote 1, Marx quotes from Hegel's *Encyclopaedia*: “Reason is just as cunning as she is powerful. Her cunning consists principally in her mediating activity, which, by causing objects to act and react on each other in accordance with their own nature, in this way, without any direct interference in the process, carries out reason’s intentions.” (Hegel, *Enzyklopädie*, Erster Theil, “Die Logik,” Berlin, 1840, S. 382.)

*Notes on Reviews of Hegel’s “Logic”—written after December 17, 1914 at the end of the third notebook of the conspectus of Hegel’s *Science of Logic.*

*Preußische Jahrbücher* (*Prussian Annals*)—German conservative monthly on problems of politics, philosophy, history and literature, published in Berlin from 1858 to 1935.

The reference is to *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik* (*Journal of Philosophy and Philosophical Criticism*), which was founded in 1837 by Immanuel Hermann Fichte, German idealist philosopher. Originally it was called *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie* (*Journal of Philosophy and Speculative Theology*). It was edited by German idealist philosophy professors. Publication ceased in 1918.

*Revue Philosophique* (*Philosophical Review*)—a journal founded in Paris in 1870.

*Philosophy of Mind*—English translation of the third part of Hegel’s *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, which consists of three parts—”Logic,” “Philosophy of Nature,” and “Philosophy of Mind.”


*Conspectus of Hegel’s book “Lectures on the History of Philosophy”* consists of two notebooks on whose covers is written: Hegel. The conspectus was made in 1915 in Bern.
The Ionic school, or Miletian school (from the town of Miletus, trading and cultural centre of the ancient world on the coast of Asia Minor), was the earliest school of naturalistic materialism (6th century B.C.) in the history of Greek philosophy. (See F. Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, Moscow, 1954, p. 250.)

Pythagorean philosophy (6th-4th century B.C.)—an idealist philosophy that considered the essence of all things to lie in numbers. Named after Pythagoras, the founder of a philosophical, religious and political league in Crotona (Southern Italy) that fought for the supremacy of the aristocracy.

Aristotle’s work *De coelo* (*On the Heavens*) belongs to his natural-philosophic writings and consists of four books that are subdivided into chapters. In modern editions, these books are designated by Roman numerals and the chapters by Arabic ones.

The number ten was viewed by the Pythagoreans as sacred, as the most perfect number, embracing the entire nature of numbers.

Aristotle’s work *De anima* (*On the Soul*) belongs to his natural-philosophic writings and consists of three books.

The Eleatic school (end of 6th-5th century B.C.) was named after the town of Elea in Southern Italy. In contradistinction to the natural dialectic teachings of the Miletian school, and of Heraclitus, regarding the changeable nature of things, the Eleatic school believed in their indivisible, immovable, unchangeable, homogeneous, continuous, eternal essence. At the same time, some of the propositions of representatives of the Eleatic school, and particularly the proofs advanced by Zeno concerning the contradictoriness of motion (the so-called paradoxes of Zeno), despite their metaphysical conclusions, played a positive role in the development of ancient dialectics, having raised the problem of expressing in logical concept the contradictory character of the processes of motion.

Determination is the comprehensive conception of the object which characterises its essential aspects and connections with the surrounding world, its internal development. Definition, in this case, is the abstract formal-logical determination that takes into account only the external features of the object.


The reference is to the work of Sextus Empiricus, *Basic Tenets of Pyrrhonism*, in three books.

The reference is to Pierre Bayle, *Dictionnaire historique et critique* (*Historical and Critical Dictionary*), 4 Vols., Amsterdam and Leyden, 1740.

Lenin has in mind the French translation of the first volume of Théodore Gomperz’s work *Griechische Denker* (*Greek Thinkers*).

The reference is to § 1 of the book by V. Chernov, *Philosophical and Sociological Studies*, Moscow, 1907.

Heraclitus (c. 530-470 B.C.) lived prior to Zeno of Elea (c. 490-480 B. C.). Hegel discusses Heraclitus after the Eleatics because his philosophy, especially his dialectics, was superior to that of the Eleatics, in particular, the dialectics of Zeno. Whereas Eleatic philosophy embodied, in Hegel’s view, the category of being, Heraclitus’ philosophy was an historical expression of the higher, more concrete and genuine category of becoming. This is an example of how Hegel “adapted” the history of philosophy to fit the categories of his logic. At the same time Hegel’s treatment of Heraclitus and the Eleatics reflected the actual law-governed nature of the history of philosophy as a science. Such deviations from the chronological order are quite legitimate in examining the history of individual aspects or categories of philosophy, since in this case their development emerges in a form free from historical accident. Lenin wrote the following in his fragment *On the Question of Dialectics* about the “circles” in philosophy: “Ancient: from Democritus to Plato and the dialectics of Heraclitus” and remarks: “Is a chronology of persons essential? No!” (See present volume, p. 360.)

The work *De mundo* (*On the Universe*), included in Aristotle’s collected works, was written after Aristotle’s death by an unknown author at the end of the 1st or beginning of the 2nd century A. D.

*Symposium* (*Feast*)—a dialogue by Plato.
The reference is to the work of Sextus Empiricus, *Against Mathematicians*, consisting of 11 books, six of which are devoted to a critique of grammar, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy and music, and five (*Against Dogmatists*) to a critique of logic, physics and ethics.

A critique of the subjective idealist teachings of Mach on sensations was presented by Lenin in his book *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Chapter 1, §§ 1 and 2 (V. I. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Moscow, 1960, pp. 32-61).

*Homoeomeriae*—according to Aristotle, a term used by Anaxagoras to denote tiny material elements consisting in their turn of an infinite number of smaller particles and containing all existing properties ("all in everything"). The elements themselves are inert and set in motion by νοûς (mind, reason), believed by Anaxagora to be a kind of fine and light matter. He explained any emergence and destruction by the junction and separation of elements. In the extent fragments of Anaxagoras' work these elements are called "seeds" or "things"; the term homoeomeriae was introduced by Aristotle.

*Sophists* (from the Greek *sophos*—a wise man)—the designation (since the second half of the 5th century B.C.) for professional philosophers, teachers of philosophy and rhetoric. The Sophists did not constitute a single school. The most characteristic feature common to Sophists was their belief in the relativity of all human ideas, ethical standards and values, expressed by Protagoras in the following famous statement: "Man is the measure of all things, of what is, that it is, and of what is not, that it is not." In the first half of the 4th century B.C., sophism disintegrated and degenerated into a barren play with logical conceptions.

*Phenomenologism*—a branch of subjective idealism that considers phenomena to be only the totality of man's sensations. The Machists were phenomenalists. An important role in the Marxist criticism of phenomenologism was played by Lenin's book *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (*Collected Works*, Vol. 14).

See § 27 of Feuerbach's *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future* for his views on being and essence.
The reference is to the following statement of Feuerbach: “At the beginning of phenomenology we immediately come across a contradiction between the word which represents the universal, and the thing, which is always a particular.” (See § 28 of Feuerbach’s Principles of the Philosophy of the Future.)

Meno—Plato’s dialogue directed against the Sophists. It is considered to be one of Plato’s early works.

Lenin is referring to the following philosophical works by Plekhanov: N. Beltov, The Development of the Monist View of History, published as a separate volume in 1895 in St. Petersburg (see Selected Philosophical Works, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1900, pp. 542-782); articles against Bogdanov appearing in Social-Democratic periodicals and published in the collection entitled “From Defence to Attack” (1910); articles against the Kantians E. Bernstein, C. Schmidt and others appearing in the journal Die Neue Zeit and published in the collection: N. Beltov, “Criticism of Our Critics,” St. Petersburg, 1906; and “Fundamental Questions of Marxism,” published as a separate volume in 1908 in St. Petersburg.

Cyrenaics—adherents of an ancient Greek school of philosophy, founded in the 5th century B. C. by Aristippus of Cyrene (North Africa). In the theory of knowledge, the Cyrenaics adhered to sensualism. They asserted that objective truth does not exist and that, with certainty, one can only speak of subjective sensations. In Cyrenaicism, the sensualist theory of knowledge is supplemented by sensualist ethics—the doctrine of sensual satisfaction as the basis of morality. The Cyrenaic school produced a number of representatives of ancient atheism.


In the dialogue Theaetetus, Plato expounds his mystical theory of knowledge, calling cognition the rise of reason into the realm of ideas; this rise is like recollection since, according to Plato, reason, the soul, by their origin, belong to this supersensual world of ideas.

See L. Feuerbach, Against Dualism of Body and Soul, Flesh and Spirit.

See F. Engels, Anti-Dühring, Moscow, 1959, p. 54.
Stoics—adherents of an ancient Greek school of philosophy arising about the 3rd century B.C. and existing until the 6th century A.D. The Stoics recognised two elements in the universe: an enduring element—matter without quality; and an active one—reason, logos, god. In logic, the Stoics proceeded from the assumption that the source of all cognition is sensuous perception and that a conception can be true only if it is a faithful and full impression of the object. The Stoics taught, however, that perceptual judgment arises only as a result of agreement between the mind and a true conception. This the Stoics called “catalepsy” (or “seizure”) and viewed it as a criterion for truth.


Sceptics—in this case, adherents of the ancient Greek philosophical school founded by Pyrrho (c. 365-275 B.C.). The best-known of the ancient Sceptics were Aenesidemus and Sextus Empiricus (2nd century A.D.).

Tropes—the designation for the reasons for doubt advanced by the ancient Sceptics (ten tropes) and later supplemented (five tropes) by Agrippa. By means of these reasons the Sceptics tried to prove the impossibility of cognising things and the absolute relativity of all perceptions.

Neo-Platonists—followers of the mystical philosophical doctrine, the basis of which was Plato’s idealism. Neo-Platonism (Plotinus was the head of this school) developed during the period from the 3rd to the 5th centuries and was a combination of the Stoic, Epicurean and Sceptical doctrines with the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. The influence of neo-Platonism was strong in the Middle Ages; it was expressed in the doctrines of the leading medieval theologians and is also to be seen in certain trends of modern bourgeois philosophy.

Cabbala—a medieval mystical religious “doctrine” prevalent among the most fanatical followers of Judaism, as well as among adherents of Christianity and Islam. The basic thought of this doctrine is the symbolic interpretation of the Holy Scripture, whose every word and number acquires special mystical importance in the eyes of the Cabbalists.

Gnostics—followers of mystical, religious-philosophical doctrines during the early centuries of our era. They tried to unite Christian
theology and various theses of Platonic, Pythagorean and Stoic philosophy.

108 **Alexandrian philosophy**—several philosophical schools and trends that arose during the early centuries of our era in Alexandria, Egypt. Their distinguishing feature was their attempt to unite Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophy and the mystical Eastern cults.

Conspectus of Hegel’s book “Lectures on the Philosophy of History” consists of a separate notebook on whose cover is written “Hegel.” On the reverse side of the cover, in pencil, there is a list of Plato’s dialogues with references to pages in Vol. XIV of Hegel, which contains the second book of Lectures on the History of Philosophy.


Regarding the influence of geographical conditions on the development of society see G. V. Plekhanov, “Fundamental Questions of Marxism,” Chapter VI, and “N. G. Chernyshevsky,” Chapter II.

Lenin is evidently comparing the formulations of Hegel and Feuerbach, who approach the question of the origin of religion from opposite standpoints. See, for example, Feuerbach’s thesis: “in a deified being, he (i.e., man—Ed.) objectifies solely his own being.”

Lenin is probably referring to the following passage in Marx’s work *The Civil War in France*: “Instead of deciding once in three or six years which member of the ruling class was to misrepresent the people in Parliament, universal suffrage was to serve the people, constituted in Communes...” (See Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1955, p. 520.)

Plan of Hegel’s Dialectics (Logic)—contained in a notebook directly following the conspectus of Georges Noël’s book *Hegel’s Logic* and a list of “writings on Hegelianism”; written in 1915.

The remarks on Georges Noël’s book *La logique de Hegel* (*Hegel’s Logic*), Paris, 1897, are contained in a notebook on whose cover Lenin wrote the word “Philosophy.” Probably written in Geneva in 1915.
Noumena and phenomena—terms used by Kant in his theory of knowledge. Noumenon means a thing-in-itself, while phenomenon means a thing as it appears to us. According to Kant, phenomena are formed as a result of the action on man of something unknown (a thing-in-itself). Noumena are supposed to lie beyond phenomena, and their essence to be unknowable.

Note on J. Perrin’s book “Traité de chimie physique: les principes” (Treatise on Physical Chemistry: Principles), Paris, 1903 is contained in a notebook following the conspectus of Hegel’s Science of Logic and was written at the end of 1914.

Lenin’s remarks on Peter Genov’s book “Feurbachs Erkenntnistheorie und Metaphysik.” Zürich, 1911 (Berner Dissertation) (S. 89) [Peter Genov, Feuerbach’s Theory of Knowledge and Metaphysics, Zurich, 1911 (Bern Dissertation) (p. 89)] were written December 29-30, 1914, in Bern.

“Thesen und Grundsätze” (“Theses and Principles”) refers to two works by Feuerbach: Vorläufige Thesen zur Reform der Philosophie (Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy) and Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft (Principles of the Philosophy of the Future) contained in Vol. II of Feuerbach’s works, published by Bolin and Jodl. This volume also contains the work Wider den Dualismus von Leib und Seele, Fleisch und Geist (Against Dualism of Body and Soul, Flesh and Spirit). The phrase “particular über Spiritualismus und Materialismus” refers to Über Spiritualismus und Materialismus in besonderer Beziehung auf die Willensfreiheit (On Spiritualism and Materialism with Particular Reference to Free Will) contained in Vol. X.

The reference is to Fr. A. Lange’s book “Geschichte des Materialismus” (F. A. Lange, History of Materialism) in which the history of materialism is given in distorted form.

The reference is to K. Grün’s book “Ludwig Feuerbachs Briefwechsel und Nachlass” (K. Grün, Ludwig Feuerbach’s Correspondence and Literary Heritage).


On page 9 of his book, M. Verworn defines “enzyme” as follows: “Enzymes are products of living substance distinguished by the fact that they can cause a large number of specific chemical compounds to decompose, without themselves being destroyed in the process.” p. 329

The remarks on Fr. Dannemann’s book “Wie unser Weitbild entstand” (Kosmos). Stuttgart, 1912 [F. Dannemasin, How Did Our Picture of World Arise (Cosmos), Stuttgart, 1912] were written by Lenin in a notebook preceding the conspectus of G. Noël’s Hegel’s Logic. p. 331

The excerpts from Ludwig Darmstaedter’s book “Handbuch zur Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften und der Technik,” Berlin, 1908 (Ludwig Darmstaedter, Handbook on the History of the Natural Sciences and Technique, Berlin, 1908) were entered in a notebook directly preceding the conspectus of G. Noël’s Hegel’s Logic. p. 333

The excerpts from Napoléon’s book “Pensées,” Paris, 1913, Bibliothèque miniature No. 14. (Napoleon, Thoughts, Paris, 1913, Miniature Library No. 14) were made in Bern in 1915. They were entered at the bottom of the first page of the notebook containing the conspectus of Noël’s Hegel’s Logic. p. 334


Conspicuus of Lassalle’s book “Die Philosophie Herakleitos des Dunklen von Ephesos.” Berlin, 1858 (The Philosophy of Heraclitus the Obscure of Ephesus, Berlin, 1858) is contained in a notebook following the note on Lipps’ book Natural Science and World Outlook. Following the conspicious of Lassalle’s book, there is a fragment in the notebook entitled “On the Question of Dialectics.” p. 337
Lenin is referring to a letter from Marx to Engels dated February 1, 1858 (see Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Moscow, 1955, pp. 121-123).  

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Ahriman—the Greek name for the ancient Persian God personifying the source of evil, an eternal and irreconcilable enemy of his brother Ormazd, the Good Spirit.

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Zend-Avesta—the designation for the ancient Persian religious books expounding the Zoroastrian religion founded, according to legend, by the prophet Zarathustra (Zoroaster).

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Cratylus—Plato’s dialogue, directed against the Sophists.

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The fragment *On the Question of Dialectics* is contained in a notebook between the conspectus of Lassalle’s book on Heraclitus and the conspectus of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. Written in 1915 in Bern.

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The reference is to the use by Josef Dietzgen of the term “überschwenglich,” which means: exaggerated, excessive, infinite; for example, in the book *Kleinere philosophische Schriften* (*Minor Philosophical Writings*), Stuttgart, 1903, p. 204, Dietzgen uses this term as follows: “absolute and relative are not infinitely separated.”

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Conspectus of Aristotle’s book “Metaphysics” is contained in a notebook directly following the fragment “On the Question of Dialectics.” The book was published by Schwegler in Greek with a German translation.

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Lenin is referring to the article “Blunders of Immature Thought” by D. I. Pisarev, well-known democratic writer and literary critic.

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tained in a separate notebook on whose cover is written: “Feuerbach.” The conspectus was made in Bern at the end of 1914 or the beginning of 1915.

141 In the passage referred to by Lenin, Feuerbach states; “Spinoza’s philosophy is like a telescope which makes objects visible to the human eye that are otherwise invisible owing to their remoteness; Leibnitz’ philosophy is like a microscope which makes objects visible that are unnoticeable owing to their minuteness and fineness.” (See L. Feuerbach, *Sämtliche Werke*, Bd. IV, 1910, S. 34.)

142 See Marx’s letter to Engels dated May 10, 1870.

143 *Entelechy*—a term in idealist philosophy, used by Aristotle to denote the aim inherent in an object—an aim which through its activity is transformed from the possible to the actual. According to Leibnitz, entelechy is the urge of the monad towards realisation of the perfection potentially contained in it.

144 Lenin is referring to the following statement by Feuerbach: “Pre-established harmony is Leibnitz’ weak point, despite the fact that it is his pet creation.... Pre-established harmony, understood in a purely external sense in relation to the monad, basically contradicts the spirit of Leibnitz’ philosophy.” (See L. Feuerbach, *Sämtliche Werke*, Bd. IV, 1910, S. 95.)

145 Occasionalism—an idealist, religious trend in 17th-century philosophy which distorted the teachings of Descartes in the spirit of clericalism and mysticism. The Occasionalists held the reactionary view that all physical and mental activity, and the reciprocal action between them, is due to the intervention of God.


147 The ontological argument for the existence of God was first advanced by Anselm, Bishop of Canterbury and medieval scholastic. It can be summarised as follows: God is the totality of perfection. Perfection includes existence. Therefore God exists.

On the essence of the ontological argument see F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Part I, Chapter IV.
Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain (New Essays on Human Understanding) by Leibnitz (written 1700-05 and published in 1765)—directed against the materialist trend of Locke’s sensualist theory of knowledge. p. 381

The first edition of L. Feuerbach’s book Darstellung, Entwicklung und Kritik der Leibniz’schen Philosophie (Exposition, Analysts and Critique of the Philosophy of Leibnitz) was published in 1837. p. 382

The reference is to the work by Clauberg, German Cartesian philosopher: Defensio Cartesiana, Amsterdam, 1652 (Defence of Cartesianism). p. 383


Lenin is referring to Feuerbach’s work Spinoza and Herbart (1836), appearing in Vol. IV (1910) of Feuerbach’s works in German; Bolin and Jodl edition. p. 387

The reference is to Feuerbach’s letter to Marx in 1843 in which Feuerbach sharply criticises Schelling’s philosophy (see L. Feuerbach, Sämtliche Werke, Bd. IV, 1910, S. 434-440). Feuerbach’s letter was written in answer to Marx’s letter of October 20, 1843. p. 387

The remarks on Johann Plenge’s book “Marx und Hegel.” Tübingen, 1911 (J. Plenge, Marx and Hegel, Tübingen, 1911) are contained in the second notebook on imperialism (notebook “β”). p. 388

Imperialist economists—Lenin’s designation for the opportunist Bukharin, Pyatakov and Bosh in the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks) during the First World War. The “imperialist economists” demanded that the Party delete the programmatic statement on the right of nations to self-determination. They also came out against the entire minimum programme of the R.S.D.L.P., which envisaged a struggle for democratic reforms that would facilitate the preparation and transition to the socialist revolution. Lenin laid bare the opportunistic essence of the position of Bukharin and those sharing his views, its kinship with “economism”—the opportunistic trend in Russian Social-Democracy at the end of the
19th century and the beginning of the 20th. Like the old “economists,” who could not understand the need for the political struggle of the working class under conditions of capitalism, the “imperialist economists” did not understand the significance of the struggle for democratic reforms under, conditions of imperialism.

Certain views of the “imperialist economists” were shared by Left Social-Democrats of Holland, America, Poland, etc. That is why Lenin called “imperialist economism” an “international disease” (Vol. 35, letter to Inessa Armand of November 30, 1916).


The reference is to the Rheinische Zeitung für Politik, Handel und Gewerbe (Rhine Gazette on Problems of Politics, Trade and Industry)—a daily newspaper that appeared in Cologne from January 1, 1842 to March 31, 1843. It was founded by representatives of the Rhine-land bourgeoisie who were opposed to Prussian absolutism. Marx joined its staff in April 1842 and became one of its editors in October of the same year. During Marx’s editorship, the revolutionary-democratic character of the newspaper became more and more marked. The newspaper was ultimately banned by the Prussian Government.

The entry on the books by Raab and Perrin was made in a notebook entitled “Austrian Agricultural Statistics, etc.” not earlier than 1912.

The entry on the books under the heading From Books on Philosophy in the Zürich Cantonal Library was made in the first notebook (notebook “α”) on imperialism in 1915.

The entry under the heading Cantonal Library in Zürich was made in the first notebook on imperialism (notebook “α”) in 1915.

The entry under the general heading Section III. (Works of informative and scientific content), containing reference to the books by Haeckel, Uhde and Zart, was made in a notebook on imperialism (notebook “ε”) in 1916.

Note on the Review of Johann Pleage’s book “Marx and Hegel” was written in 1913, amidst bibliographical excerpts on various questions, in the notebook “Austrian Agricultural Statistics, etc.”


Remarks on Hilferding’s Views on Mach (in “Finance Capital”)—contained in notebook “ϑ” on imperialism.  p. 400


Lenin is referring to the well-known characterisation of agnosticism given by Engels in Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy (see Marx and Engels, Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 371).  p. 433

A. Deborin’s article “Dialectical Materialism” is contained in the collection Na Rubezhe, St. Petersburg, 1909.  p. 475

Lenin’s Remarks in G. V. Plekhanov’s book “N. G. Chernyshevsky,” St. Petersburg, 1910—written not earlier than October 1909 (the actual date of the book’s appearance) and not later than April 1911. They were first published in 1933 in Lenin Miscellany XXV.

Many of Lenin’s comments are devoted to a comparison of statements by Plekhanov in his book published in 1910 with his articles on Chernyshevsky published in 1890 and 1892 in Sotsial-Demokrat, a literary and political review (see Sotsial-Demokrat, Book 1, London, 1890; Book 2, Geneva, 1890; Book 3, Geneva, 1890; Book 4, Geneva, 1892).

These four articles by Plekhanov were brought together in the book N. G. Chernyshevsky appearing in Germany in 1894 in German. Plekhanov’s book, which gave, in the main, a correct characterisation of Chernyshevsky’s views and which sharply attacked the Narodniks, was favourably commented upon by Lenin in the article “A Retrograde Trend in Russian Social-Democracy” (see pres. ed., Vol. 4, Moscow, 1961, p. 271).

Plekhanov’s book N. G. Chernyshevsky published in 1910 was written at a time when he had already gone over to Menshevism.
It was in effect directed against Bolshevism, against the Bolshevist evaluation of the world outlook and activity of Chernyshevsky and the revolutionary democrats of the 19th century. In this book, Plekhanov abandons a number of basic propositions in his earlier evaluation of Chernyshevsky, obscuring his revolutionary democracy, his resolute struggle against liberalism and his backing of the peasant revolution.

Lenin carefully collates the text of the book published in 1910 with Plekhanov’s articles in Sotsial-Demokrat, noting which of Plekhanov’s basic formulations remained unchanged and which underwent radical change.

Lenin’s remarks and notations in Plekhanov’s book are inseparably linked with his numerous statements on Chernyshevsky—in the writings published before he became acquainted with Plekhanov’s book (What the “Friends of the People” Are and How They Fight the Social-Democracy, The Heritage We Renounce, On “Vekhi” and Materialism and Empirio-Criticism) as well as in those written afterwards (Peasant Reform and Proletarian Peasant Revolution, In Memory of Herzen, From the Past of the Workers’ Press in Russia, etc.)

The Sovremennik circle included, among others, the revolutionary democrats N. G. Chernyshevsky, N. A. Dobrolyubov, N. A. Nekrasov, M. I. Mikhailov.

Sovremennik (Contemporary)—a monthly scientific-political and literary journal founded by A. S. Pushkin in 1836. In 1847 the journal was taken over by N. A. Nekrasov. From the mid-fifties on the journal became a militant organ of the revolutionary democrats, who advocated a peasant revolution and the overthrow of tsarism. Chernyshevsky was a most prominent contributor until his arrest in 1862. In 1866 Sovremennik was closed down by the tsarist government.

In 1859-62 the satirical magazine Svistok (Whistle) appeared as a supplement to Sovremennik. It wittily ridiculed the vain hopes of the liberals for bringing about a change in the political system of Russia through literary denunciations of government officials, and without resorting to revolutionary struggle.

The title of a well-known novel by the Russian author A. I. Goncharov which depicts the corruption of the serf-owning system in 19th century Russia.
Slavophils represented a trend of social thought arising in mid-19th-century Russia, which held that Russia’s development would take place along a distinct path of its own. This, according to them, stemmed from the communal system in Russia and its orthodoxy. The Slavophils were confirmed opponents of the revolutionary movement in Russia and the West.

Chernyshevsky wrote the novel Prologue while serving at hard labour in 1865-70. With great difficulty, his friends smuggled the manuscript to St. Petersburg and then to London where it was published in 1877.

The novel describes Russia in the late fifties. A revolutionary situation was maturing in the country and the tsarist government, preferring to free the peasants “from above” rather than wait till they took action “from below,” was preparing for the abolition of serfdom (the so-called Peasant Reform). The book describes the sharp struggle between various classes and groups over the reform and portrays real people of the day under fictitious names. Thus, Chernyshevsky himself, who headed the revolutionary party, appears under the name of Volgin; Kavelin, the liberal, appears under the name of Ryazantsev; Sierakowski, a prominent figure in the Polish liberation movement—under the name of Sokolovsky, etc.

The reference here is to the uprising in Poland in 1863-64, one of the organisers of which was Zygmunt Sierakowski. The uprising against tsarist autocracy aimed at Polish national liberation. Broad support for the uprising came from the szlachta intelligentsia, students, clergy, artisans, workers and some sections of the peasantry. The Russian revolutionary democrats also sympathised with the uprising. Members of the secret organisation Zemlya i Volya, which had connections with Chernyshevsky, sought to render help to the insurrection. A. I. Herzen published a number of articles in Kolokol supporting the struggle of the Polish people.

However, the insurrection was ruthlessly suppressed by the tsarist government, and its leaders, including Sierakowski, were executed.

Prologue to a Prologue—the title of the first part of the novel Prologue.

The circle of Russian revolutionary emigrants in London who were grouped around A. I. Herzen and N. A. Ogaryov.

The reference is to Chernyshevsky’s novel which exerted great influence on several generations of Russian revolutionary youth.
Chernyshevsky wrote the novel in 1862-63 in the Peter and Paul Fortress, where he was imprisoned in the summer of 1862. The novel was published in *Sovremennik* in 1863.

Vera Pavlovna, Lopukhov, Kirsanov and Rakhmetov mentioned by Plekhanov are the chief characters in the novel.

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**178** Lenin is referring to the following passage in *Sotsial-Demokrat* (Book I, London, 1890, pp. 173-174):

“Chernyshevsky was present at the birth of the new type of ‘new people’ in our country—the revolutionary. He joyfully welcomed the emergence of this new type and could not deny himself the satisfaction of depicting at least a vague profile of him. At the same time, he foresaw with sorrow how many trials and sufferings there were in store for the Russian revolutionary, whose life must be one of severe struggle and great self-sacrifice. And so, in Rakhmetov, Chernyshevsky presents us with the true ascetic. Rakhmetov positively tortures himself. He is completely ‘merciless towards himself,’ as his landlady says. He even decides to test whether he can bear torture by spending a whole night lying on a length of felt with nails sticking through it. Many people, including Pisarev, regarded this as mere eccentricity. We agree that some aspects of Rakhmetov’s character could have been drawn differently. But the character as a whole nevertheless remains completely true to life. Every prominent Russian revolutionary possessed much of the Bakhmetov spirit.”

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**179** *Our “Subjectivists”—supporters of the Narodnik doctrine which denied the existence of objective laws of social development and held that individual outstanding personalities, not the masses, make history. The chief exponents of this trend were P. L. Lavrov and N. K. Mikhailovsky.*

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**180** Lenin is referring to the following passage in Plekhanov’s article in *Sotsial-Demokrat*: “We have never had occasion to read such malicious and at the same time such a highly accurate characterisation of Russian liberalism.” (*Sotsial-Demokrat*, Book I, London, 1890, p. 144.)

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**181** Lenin is referring to the following passage, subsequently radically changed by Plekhanov, in an article in *Sotsial-Demokrat* (Book I, London, 1890, p. 144):

“For the sake of impartiality, however, it must be added that our author was not only contemptuous of Russian liberals. In excellent political reviews that he wrote in *Sovremennik* until the very end of his free life, our author constantly displayed the most merciless contempt for all European liberals in general—particularly, the liberals of Austria (i.e., the Liberal Party of Austrian Germans),
Prussia and Italy. As is well known, in articles on the history of France, he also did not manifest much respect for the liberal party. All this, naturally, could not be pleasing to the spokesmen of Russian liberalism and, in their fight with him, they resorted to the method so often used by liberals of all countries in their clashes with people further advanced than themselves politically; they accused him of disliking freedom and even of sympathies for despotism. Of course, such accusations from liberals could only amuse Chernyshevsky. He had so little fear of them that at times he aroused his opponents to new accusations by making believe that he recognised their complete fairness. ‘For us there is no better amusement than liberalism,’ he says in one of his last political reviews, ‘and we have an irresistible desire to look about for liberals in order to poke fun at them.’ He then begins to poke fun at the Prussian liberals who, as he aptly puts it, were angered by the fact that political freedom in Prussia ‘does not become established by itself.’

“This mockery did not prevent the attentive reader from understanding that it was not a lack of love for freedom that made Chernyshevsky contemptuous of liberalism. It was sufficient to read only a few of his political reviews to see how passionately he sympathised with every liberation movement, no matter where it began: in France or in Italy, in America or in Hungary. He simply believed that the role of the liberals in such movements is usually very ugly. They themselves do very little and often even impede the efforts of others by attacking people who are more daring and resolute than they.”

Lenin is referring to the following passage in Plekhanov’s article in Sotsial-Demokrat (Book I, London, 1890, p. 161):

“In the article ‘The Russian Reformer,’ written on the occasion of the appearance of Baron M. Korf’s book The Life of Count Speransky, Chernyshevsky demonstrates conclusively that no reformer in our country could depend on the government as regards important social reforms. Revolutionaries can depend on it even less. Enemies called Speransky a revolutionary, but such an evaluation appears laughable to Chernyshevsky. Speransky indeed had very extensive reform plans, but ‘it is ludicrous to call him a revolutionary judging by the extent of the means he intended using to carry out his intentions.’ He could maintain his post only because he had managed to earn the trust of the tsar Alexander I. With this trust to support him, he intended to carry out his plans. Precisely for this reason, Chernyshevsky considered him to be a dangerous dreamer. Dreamers are often simply ridiculous and their delusions trivial, but they can be dangerous to society when their delusions concern important matters. In their rapturous bustle off the track, they appear to achieve a measure of success, thus confusing many who, as a result of this illusory success, get it into their heads to follow them. From this standpoint, Speransky’s activity may be called dangerous.”
The statement in Plekhanov’s article on Chernyshevsky appearing in *Sotsial-Demokrat* (Book I, London, 1890, p. 162), but omitted by Plekhanov in the 1910 edition of his book on Chernyshevsky, is the following: “With respect to the Russian Government, Chernyshevsky’s tone becomes more and more defiant.” p. 553.
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Chernov, V. M. (1876-1952)—a leader and theoretician of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, bitter foe of Marxism, eclectic and agnostic—200, 257

Chernyshevsky, Nikolai Gavrilovich (1828-1889)—outstanding Russian revolutionary democrat, utopian socialist, materialist philosopher, writer and literary critic, leader of the revolutionary democratic movement of the sixties in Russia; developed
Feuerbach’s materialist philosophy, sought to revise Hegel’s dialectics along materialist lines; his philosophical views mark a high point in pre-Marxist materialist philosophy. “But Chernyshevsky did not succeed in rising, or, rather, owing to the backwardness of Russian life, was unable to rise to the level of the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels” (Lenin)—77, 82, 502-514, 516-526, 528-533, 535, 536, 538-547, 549, 550, 552, 553-557

Chiapelli, Alessandro (1857-1913)—Italian bourgeois philosopher, neo-Kantian, author of works on history of philosophy, literature, arts and religion; criticised scientific socialism—399

Cicero, Marcus Tullius (106-43 B.C.)—Roman orator, statesman and philosopher, eclectic—346, 352

Clauberg, Johann (1622-1665)—German philosopher, professor of philosophy at Duisburg; Cartesian, was close to occasionalists—383

Clausius, Rudolf Julius Emmanuel (1822-1888)—German physicist, together with Carnot, Mayer and Joule laid the basis for the science of thermodynamics—442

Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-215 A.D.)—Christian theologian, idealist philosopher—347, 350

Cohen, Hermann (1842-1918)—German philosopher, subjective idealist, headed Marburg school of neo-Kantians—399

Collins, John Anthony (1676-1729) English deist philosopher, follower of Locke—43

Comte, Auguste (1798-1857)—French reactionary bourgeois philosopher and sociologist, agnostic, founder of positivism—323, 409, 436, 469, 513, 514

Condillac, Étienne Bonnot (1715-1780)—French philosopher, deist, sensationalist, follower of Locke—42, 43

Copernicus (Kopernik), Nikolaus (1473-1543)—Polish astronomer, founded the heliocentric system of the universe—270, 331, 333, 460

Cornu, Marie Alfred (1841-1902)—French physicist, known for his works on optics; refined Fizeau’s method of determining the velocity of light—333

Coward, William (c. 1656-1725)—English physician and deist philosopher—43

Cratylus (5th century B.C.)—ancient Greek idealist philosopher, disciple of Heraclitus and teacher of Plato; arrived at sophism by drawing extreme relativistic conclusions from Heraclitus’ dialectics—343, 350, 351

Croce, Benedetto (1866-1952)—Italian philosopher, historian, literary critic and political figure; in his works interpreted Hegel’s dialectics in the spirit of subjective idealism; opponent of Marxism—399

D

Dannemann, Friedrich (b. 1859)—German historian of natural science—399

Darmstaedter, Ludwig (1846-1927)—German chemist, author of works on the history of chemistry—333

Darwin, Charles Robert (1809-1882)—English materialist biology, founder of a scientific
theory of the development of the organic world—141

Deborin (Ioffe), Abram Moiseyevich (b. 1881)—Soviet philosopher, Member of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences; Bolshevik from 1903; Menshevik in 1907-17; member of the C.P.S.U. from 1928; in the thirties supported Menshevik idealist views; author of works on history of philosophy and dialectical materialism—475, 482

Democritus of Abdera (c. 460-370 B.C.)—great materialist philosopher of ancient Greece, one of the founders of the atomistic theory—265, 280, 332, 344, 352, 360, 518

Descartes, René (in Latin—Cartesins) (1596-1650)—French dualist philosopher, mathematician and naturalist—41, 42, 43, 321, 322, 360, 378, 421, 427, 438, 484, 490

Destutt de Tracy, Antoine Louis Claude (1754-1836)—French vulgar economist, sensationalist in his philosophic views, protagonist of constitutional monarchy—25

Dewey, John (1859-1952)—American philosopher, sociologist and pedagogue, the chief representative of pragmatism—399, 445

Désamy, Théodore (1803-1850)—French publicist, outstanding representative of the revolutionary trend in utopian communism—44

Diderot, Denis (1713-1784)—French materialist philosopher, atheist, one of the ideologists of the French revolutionary bourgeoisie of the 18th century, a leading Encyclopaedist—520

Dietzgen, Josef (1828-1888)—German worker and Social-Democrat; philosopher, independently arrived at some fundamental principles of dialectical-materialism—72, 361, 403, 406

Dilthey, Wilhelm (1833-1911)—German idealist philosopher, professor at Berlin University, a founder of the “Lebens odor Erlebnis Philosophie” (life or experience philosophy), a reactionary irrationalist trend in bourgeois philosophy during the epoch of imperialism; his works include a book on the youth of Hegel (Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels)—58, 239

Diogenes, Laertius (3rd century A.D.)—ancient Greek historian of philosophy, author of a ten-volume work on ancient philosophers—223, 255, 265, 290, 291

Diogenes of Sinupu (c. 404-323 B.C.)—ancient Greek philosopher, one of the founders of the Cynic school of philosophy—224, 254

Dobrolyubov, Nikolai Alexandrovich (1836-1861)—Russian literary critic and publicist, materialist philosopher, revolutionary democrat—503, 530

Dodwell, Henry (1700-1784)—English materialist philosopher—43

Druzhinin, A. V. (1824-1864)—Russian author and liberal critic, advocated idealist theory of “art for art’s sake”—511

Dudyshkin, S. S. (1820-1866)—Russian journalist and liberal literary critic—521

Duhem, Pierre Maurice Marie (1861-1916)—French theoretical physicist; philosopher and historian of natural science—399, 422, 423, 426, 427

Duns Scotus, John (c. 1265-1308)—medieval Scottish scholastic philosopher, repre-
sentative of nominalism, the earliest expression of materialism in the Middle Ages; author of “Opus Oxoniense”—43

**Durkheim, Emile** (1858-1917)—French positivist sociologist—454

**E**

**Ebbinghaus, Hermann** (1850-1909)—German bourgeois psychologist, idealist, a leading representative of experimental psychology; famous for his research concerning the nature of man’s memory—326

**Edgar**—see Baiter, Edgar.


**Epicurus** (c. 341-270 B. C.)—famous thinker of ancient Greece, materialist philosopher, atheist—289, 295, 344, 518

**Eratosthenes** (c. 276-194 B. C.)—ancient Greek mathematician, astronomer and geographer; first to determine the approximate size of the meridian—331

**Euler, Leonhard** (1707-1783)—mathematician, physicist and astronomer; member of the Berlin and Petersburg Academies of Sciences; spent most of his life in Russia—118

**F**

**Faucher, Julius** (1820-1878)—German publicist, Young Hegelian—32

**Feuerbach, Ludwig Andreas** (1804-1872)—German materialist philosopher and atheist; Feuerbach’s materialism, in spite of its limited contemplative character, provided a theoretical source of Marxist philosophy—29, 30, 35, 36, 41, 44, 45, 61-67, 70-80, 82, 83, 123, 155, 169, 212, 272, 283, 295, 309, 317, 326, 327, 340, 344, 349, 360, 373, 375, 377, 381-383, 387, 394, 395, 403, 404, 406, 514, 516, 517, 523, 528-530

**Fichte, Johann Gottlieb** (1762-1814)—German philosopher, subjective idealist, representative of classical German philosophy—95, 113, 236, 322, 476, 492-493, 549

**Fischer, Friedrich** (1801-1853)—professor of philosophy at Basle—57, 372

**Fischer, Kuno** (1824-1907)—German historian of philosophy, Hegelian, author of the fundamental Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, professor of philosophy at Jena and Heidelberg—157, 176

**Fizeau, Armand Hippolyte Louis** (1819-1896)—French physicist, known for his works on optics, determined the velocity of light in air by means of a rapidly revolving gear wheel specially designed for this purpose—333

**Forel, Auguste** (1848-1931)—Swiss neuropathologist, psychiatrist and entomologist—326

**Forster, Friedrich Christoph** (1791-1868)—German historian and writer, Hegelian, together with L. Boumann edited Volumes XVI and XVII of the posthumous edition of Hegel’s works, containing articles on various themes—87

**Foucault, Jean Bernard Léon** (1819-1868)—French physicist, known for his pendulum experiment by which he demon-
strated the diurnal motion of the earth; by means of a revolving mirror, determined the velocity of light in air and water—333

Fourier, Charles (1772-1837)—French utopian socialist—32, 33, 44, 48, 49, 50, 510, 512

G

Galilei, Galileo (1564-1642)—Italian physicist and astronomer, a founder of classical mechanics—122, 332, 421, 460

Gans, Eduard (c. 1798-1839)—professor of Roman law at Berlin University, Hegelian; edited Philosophy of Right and Lectures on the Philosophy of History for the posthumous edition of Hegel’s works—46, 87, 305, 314

Gassendi, Pierre (1592-1655)—French materialist philosopher, elaborated the Epicurean doctrines of atomism and ethics; also known for his works on astronomy, mathematics, mechanics, and history of science—42, 81, 360, 521

Gauss, Karl Friedrich (1777-1855)—German mathematician, author of outstanding works on theoretical astronomy, geodesy, physics and earth magnetism—207

Gay, Jules (1807-c. 1876)—French utopian communist—44

Genov, Peter—Bulgarian historian of philosophy—326, 327

Goethe, Johann Wolfgang (1749-1832)—German, poet and thinker—510

Gomperz, Theodor (1832-1912)—German historian of philosophy, philologist, positivist, author of the three-volume Griechische Denker—256

Gorgias of Leontini (a. 483-375 B. C.)—sophist philosopher of ancient Greece, partisan of democratic, slave-owning system—270-272, 464

Grech, Nikolai Ivanovich (1787-1867)—Russian reactionary journalist and man of letters, bitter foe of progressive Russian writers, whom he denounced to the police—503

Grüner, Karl (1817-1887)—German petty-bourgeois publicist, exponent of “true socialism”—327

Guenther, Konrad (1874-1955)—German zoologist, professor at Freiburg University, compiled the atlas Vom Urtier zum Menschen—58

Guizot, François-Pierre Guillaume (1787-1874)—French bourgeois historian and statesman—525

H

Haas, Arthur Erich (1884-1941)—Austrian physicist, specialised in atomic physics—335

Haeckel, Ernest Heinrich (1834-1919)—German naturalist, professor of zoology at Jena University, evolutionist and natural-historical materialist, supported and popularised Darwin’s teaching—56, 328, 394, 395

Hammacher, Emil (1885-1916)—German philosopher, objective idealist and mystic—238, 239

Harbordt—German scientist—57

Haring, Georg Wilhelm Heinrich—German philosopher, together with Michelet wrote Historisch-Kritische Darstellung der dialektischen Methode Hegels—239
Hartley, David (1705-1757)—English physician, bourgeois psychologist and materialist philosopher—43

Hartmann, Eduard (1842-1906)—German reactionary idealist, mystic, militant defendant of the Junker-bourgeois Germany—58

Haym, Rudolf (1821-1901)—German historian of literature and philosophy, positivist—387


Hegesias (end of 4th-beginning of 3rd century B.C.)—Greek philosopher of the Cyrenaic or Hedonistic school—276

Heinze, Max (1835-1909)—German historian of philosophy, specialised in ancient Greek philosophy; edited, beginning with the 6th edition, Überweg's course of history of philosophy—52, 256, 276

Helmholtz, Hermann von (1821-1894)—great German materialist; a founder of the law of conservation of energy; his philosophical views were close to the Kantians—420, 431

Helvétius, Claude-Adrien (1715-1771)—French materialist philosopher, atheist, an ideologist of the French revolutionary bourgeoisie of the 18th century—42, 43, 44, 522

Henning, Leopold (1791-1866)—professor of philosophy at Berlin University, Hegelian; edited Science of Logic and the first part of Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences ("Logic") for the posthumous edition of Hegel's works—87

Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 530-470 B.C.)—ancient Greek materialist philosopher, one of the founders of dialectics—105, 259, 262, 267, 335, 337, 339, 352, 357, 360, 366

Herbart, Johann Friedrich (1776-1841)—German idealist philosopher, psychologist and pedagogue—387

Hertz, Heinrich Rudolf (1857-1894)—German physicist, specialised in electrodynamics, inconsistent materialist—399, 445

Herzen, Alexander Ivanovich (1812-1870)—Russian revolutionary democrat, materialist philosopher, author and publicist—503, 504, 511, 526

Hibben, John Grier (1861-1933)—American logician, professor at Princeton University—241

Hilferding, Rudolf (1877-1941)—an opportunist leader of German Social-Democracy and
the Second International; in his work *Das Finanzkapital* described imperialism from an anti-Marxist viewpoint, concealing its main contradictions—400

**Hippocrates (c. 460-377 B.C.)**—great physician and naturalist of ancient Greece, a founder of ancient medicine—353

**Hobbes, Thomas (1588-1679)**—outstanding English philosopher, representative of mechanistic materialism—42, 43, 492

**Hoffing, Harald (1843-1931)**—Danish positivist philosopher and psychologist—497

**Holbach, Paul Henri (1723-1789)**—French materialist philosopher, atheist, an ideologist of the French revolutionary bourgeoisie of the 18th century—44, 360, 478, 489

**Homer**—great epic poet of Greece, legendary author of the Iliad and the Odyssey, is believed to have lived between 12th and 8th century B.C.—308, 331

**Hotho, Heinrich Gustav (1802-1873)**—historian of the arts, professor at Berlin University aesthete of Hegelian school; edited Lectures on Aesthetics for the posthumous edition of Hegel’s works—87

**Hume, David (1711-1776)**—English philosopher, subjective idealist, agnostic, historian and economist—53, 132, 203, 360, 476, 478, 492

**J**

**Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich (1743-1819)**—German idealist philosopher, metaphysician and theist; opponent of rationalism, advocated faith and intuition, considering these the most trustworthy paths to knowledge—210

**James, William (1842-1910)**—American philosopher and psychologist, subjective idealist, a founder of pragmatism—58, 399, 445, 446, 450, 452, 453, 455, 457, 458, 468

**Janet, Paul (1823-1899)**—French eclectic philosopher—324

**Jodl, Friedrich (1849-1914)**—professor of philosophy at Prague and Vienna, follower of Feuerbach; together with Bolin published the second edition of Feuerbach’s works—326

**K**


**Kautsky, Karl (1854-1938)**—opportunist leader of German Social-Democracy and the Second International, ideologist of Centrisin and revisionism; in the eighties and nineties, when he supported Marxism, Kautsky wrote several works popularising Marx’s teachings—487
idealist and eclectic in his philosophical views—337, 339, 352, 357, 526, 549, 550

Lasson, Adolf (1832-1917)—German philosopher, professor at Berlin University, prominent representative of neo-Hegelianism—238

Lavrov, Pyotr Lavrovich (1823-1900)—Russian sociologist and publicist, ideologist of the Narodniks, advocated an anti-scientific idealist, subjective method of sociology—514

Law, John (1671-1729)—English bourgeois economist and financier; contrôleur général des finances in France (1719-1720); known for issuing large amounts of paper currency which ended in financial collapse—42

Le Bon, Gustave (1841-1931)—French physician, psychologist and sociologist, idealist—432

Leibnitz, Gottfried Wilhelm (1646-1716)—German mathematician, versatile scientist, outstanding rationalist philosopher, objective idealist; his philosophy, containing dialectical ideas, greatly influenced the development of German classical philosophy—41-43, 64, 111, 114, 118, 131, 132, 144, 156, 209, 322, 326, 373, 375, 379-386, 438, 465, 491

Lemke, M. K. (1872-1923)—historian of Russian literature and the Russian revolutionary movement, collected historical and literary documents—505, 506

Léon, Xavier (1868-1935)—President of Société Française de Philosophie, editor of Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, idealist philosopher, author of works on Fichte’s philosophy—319
Le Roy, Edouard (1870-1954)—French philosopher, mathematician, professor at Collège de France, pragmatist and neopositivist, tried to achieve an "organic synthesis" of philosophy, science and religion, a leader of Catholic modernism—452, 462

Le Roy, Hendrik de (De Roy in Dutch, Regius in Latin) (1508-1679)—Dutch physician, philosopher, mechanistic materialist and sensualist, founder of a school of materialist followers of Descartes—42

Leucippus (5th century B.C.)—materialist philosopher of ancient Greece, founder of the atomistic theory—258, 263-265, 281, 369

Liebig, Justus von (1803-1873)—German scientist, a founder of agricultural chemistry, President of Bavarian Academy of Sciences—71

Lipps, Theodor (1851-1914)—German psychologist and philosopher, subjective idealist, supported phenomenologism—336

Locke, John (1632-1704)—English philosopher, metaphysical materialist, worked out a sensualist theory of knowledge—42, 43, 233, 292, 321, 381, 382, 492, 521

Loria, Achille (1857-1943)—Italian vulgar sociologist and economist, distorted Marxism—492

Lotze, Rudolf Hermann (1817-1881)—German physioloist and idealist philosopher—237

Loustallot, Elisée (1762-1790)—French publicist, revolutionary democrat, active in the French bourgeois revolution—32

Lucas, Richard—author of Bibliographie des radioaktiven Stoffes—57

Mach, Ernst (1838-1916)—Austrian philosopher, subjective idealist, physicist; like Avenarius, leading representative of empirio-criticism—57, 59, 71, 265, 270, 276, 328, 399, 400, 410, 415, 416, 417, 422, 423, 427, 445, 446, 474, 484, 495, 498, 499, 500

MacTaggart, John M'Taggart Ellis (1866-1925)—English philosopher, neo-Hegelian; author of the commentary to Hegel's Logic—238, 240, 241

Malebranche, Nicolas (1638-1715)—French idealist philosopher, metaphysician, a representative of occasionalism—41, 42, 43

Marheineke, Philip Konrad (1780-1846)—German Protestant theologian and historian of Christianity, professor at Berlin University, Hegelian; edited Lectures on Philosophy of Religion for the posthumous edition of Hegel's works—87

Mariano, Raffaele (1840-1912)—Italian philosopher and publicist, Hegelian, professor of church history at Naples—239, 324


Maupertuis, Pierre Louis Moreau de (1698-1750)—French physicist, astronomer and geodesist, originated the principle of Least Action—421

Maxwell, James Clerk (1831-1879)—English physicist, advanced the theory of electro-
magnetic field and the electromagnetic theory of light—439

Michelet, Karl Ludwig (1801-1893)—professor of philosophy at Berlin University, Hegelian; edited Philosophische Abhandlungen, Part II of Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences ("Philosophy of Nature") and Lectures on the History of Philosophy for the posthumous edition of Hegel’s works—87, 239

Mikhailovsky, Nikolai Konstantinovich (1842-1904)—Russian sociologist, publicist and literary critic, ideologist of liberal Narodniki, editor of the magazines Otechestvenniye Zapiski and Russkoye Bogatstvo—75

Montesquieu, Charles Louis (1689-1755)—French representative of 18th-century Enlightenment, ideologist of constitutional monarchy, author of L’Esprit des Lois (The Spirit of the Law)—524

Müller, Iwan (1830-1917)—German philologist, professor of classical philology at Erlangen University—369

Münsterberg, Hugo (1863-1916)—German psychologist, professor at Harvard University, advocated voluntarism in his works on psychology—399

N

Napoleon I. Bonaparte (1769-1821)—French Emperor (1804-1814 and 1815)—40, 310, 334

Nauwerck, Karl (1810-1891)—German publicist; member of “The Free,” a Young Hegelian circle in Berlin—24

Nemesius (c. 4th century A. D.)—bishop of Emesa in Phoenicia, author of the treatise “On Human Nature” where he sought to combine neo-Platonism with the Christian teaching of immortality of the soul, freedom of will and divine providence—344, 352

Nernst, Walter Hermann (1864-1941)—German physicist and physical chemist—435, 436

Newton, Isaak (1642-1727)—English physicist, astronomer and mathematician, founder of classical mechanics—118, 332, 380, 427

Nietzsche Friedrich (1844-1900)—German philosopher, voluntarist and irrationalist, his ideology was a forerunner of fascism—58, 452

Nikolai Gavrilovich—see Chernyshevsky Nikolai Gavrilovich

Noël, Georges (1856-1916)—French idealist philosopher, professor of philosophy, author of La Logique de Hegel—240, 241, 319-324

Norström, Vitalis (1856-1916)—Swedish philosopher, subjective idealist, professor at Göteborg—59

O

Ostwald, Wilhelm Friedrich (1853-1932)—German natural scientist and idealist philosopher, founder of the “energetic” theory, a variety of “physical” idealism—58, 399, 422, 427, 430, 445, 500

Owen, Robert (1771-1858)—great English utopian socialist—33, 44, 510

P

Parmenides of Elea (end of 6th-beginning of 5th century B. C.)—ancient Greek philosopher of
the Eleatic school, disciple of Xenophanes—97, 105, 106, 107, 302, 477

Phaedo—ancient Greek philosopher, disciple of Socrates—277

Philo of Alexandria (c. 25 B. C.-50 A. D.)—ancient philosopher chief representative of Judaic religious philosophy at the beginning of 1st century A. D., sought to combine Judaic religion with Platonism and stoicism; his mysticism greatly influenced Christian theology—301, 345, 348, 357

Pisarev, Dimitry Ivanovich (1840-1868)—Russian literary critic, materialist philosopher and revolutionary democrat—371, 513, 529, 536

Planck, Max Karl Ernst Ludwig (1858-1947)—German theoretical physicist, founder of quantum theory, inconsistent materialist—57

Plato (c. 427-347 B. C.)—ancient Greek philosopher, objective idealist, ideologist of slave-owning aristocracy—47, 90, 107, 146, 218, 221, 222, 260, 273, 274, 276-281, 283, 301, 302, 321, 322, 346, 350, 351, 360, 365, 370, 419, 438, 452, 490

Plehanov, Georgy Valentinovich (1856-1918)—materialist philosopher, outstanding propagator of Marxism, prominent figure in world socialist movement, after 1903 became Menshevik and opportunist, in his philosophical works sometimes deviated from dialectical materialism—160, 179, 275, 308, 357, 360, 403, 479, 480, 482, 501, 528, 544

Perty, Ralph Barton (1876-1957)—American idealist philosopher, professor at Harvard University, neo-realist—398

Peyrotin, Henri Joseph Anastase (1845-1904)—French astronomer, known for his observation of “canals” on Mars and rings about Saturn—333

Perry, Ralph Barton (1876-1957)—American idealist philosopher, professor at Harvard University, neo-realist—398

Pekzoldt, Joseph (1862-1929)—German philosopher, subjective idealist, disciple of Mach and Avenarius, opponent of scientific socialism—496

Plange, Johann (d. 1874)—German sociologist, economist and idealist philosopher, professor at Leipzig and Münster (Westphalia)—238, 388, 390, 391, 397

Pleschcheyev, Alexei Nikolayevich (1825-1893)—Russian poet, in his poems expressed ideas of
revolutionary democrats of the 1840s-1860s—536

Pliny the Elder (Gaius Plinius Secundus) (23-79 A. D.)—Roman writer and scientist—525

Plutarch (c. 46-126 A. D.)—ancient Greek writer, historian and idealist philosopher—341, 342

Poincaré, Jules Henri (1854-1912)—French mathematician and physicist, member of French Académie des Sciences, in philosophy sided with Machians, conventionalist—413, 414, 424, 426, 445, 465, 474

Prantl, Karl (1820-1888)—professor of philosophy at Munich University, idealist, author of works on the history of philosophy and logic—372

Priestley, Joseph (1733-1804)—English chemist and materialist philosopher—43, 517, 518

Protagoras of Abdera (c. 481-411 B. C.)—ancient Greek sophist philosopher; protagonist of democracy in slave-owning society—269, 270, 274, 352

Proudhon, Pierre Joseph (1809-1865)—French publicist, vulgar economist and sociologist, ideologist of the petty bourgeoisie, one of the founders of anarchism—24, 25, 28-30

Ptolemy, Claudius (2nd century A. D.)—ancient Greek mathematician, astronomer and geographer; founder of the doctrine of the earth as the fixed centre of the universe—334, 459

Pyrrho of Elis (c. 365-275 B. C.)—ancient Greek philosopher, founder of scepticism in ancient world—296

Pythagoras (c. 580-500 B. C.)—ancient Greek mathematician and philosopher, objective idealist, ideologist of slave-owning aristocracy—115, 247-249, 332, 370

Raab, Friedrich (b. 1890)—German economist and philosopher, from 1926 professor of political economy at Frankfurt—392

Rankine, William John Macquorn (1820-1872)—Scottish engineer and physicist, a founder of thermodynamics—422

Rau, Albrecht (1843-1920)—German philosopher and naturalist; follower of Feuerbach—394

Renan, Joseph Ernest (1823-1892)—French philologist, idealist philosopher, author of works on history of religion—471

Renouvier, Charles Barnard (1815-1903)—French idealist philosopher and eclectic, headed the so-called school of "neo-criticism," conventionalist—324, 399, 500

Rey, François Abel (1873-1940)—French philosopher, positivist, in questions natural science an inconsistent and spontaneous materialist—325, 407, 428, 430, 443, 452, 459, 465, 474

Ribot, Théodule Armand (1839-1916)—French philosopher and psychologist, founder and editor of the magazine Revue Philosophique—399

Ricardo, David (1772-1823)—English economist, leading representative of classical bourgeois political economy—25

Richter, Raoul Hermann (1871-1912)—German philosopher, neo-Kantian—58

Rickert, Heinrich (1863-1936)—German philosopher and sociologist, subjective idealist and agnostic, one of the main representatives of the Baden school of neo-Kantianism—399

Riecke, Eduard (1845-1915)—German physicist—57
Riehl, Alois (1844-1924)—German philosopher, neo-Kantian—239, 399
Ritter, Heinrich (1791-1869)—German theist philosopher, historian of philosophy—345
Robespierre, Maximilien François Marie Isidore (1758-1794)—leader of the French Revolution, Jacobin, head of the revolutionary government (1793-1794)—40
Robinet, Jean-Baptiste René (1735-1820)—French philosopher, materialist, deist—44
Römer, Ole Christensen (1644-1710)—Danish astronomer; was the first to determine the velocity of light, invented a number of astronomical instruments—333
Roscher, Wilhelm (1817-1894)—German economist, representative of the so-called historical school of political economy—525
Rössler, Constantin (1820-1896)—German publicist, professor of government at Jena, neo-Hegelian—238
Rotta, Paolo (b. 1873)—Italian philosopher, close to neo-scholasticism, Hegelian, professor at Milan Catholic University—241
Royce, Josiah (1855-1916)—American philosopher, objective idealist, representative of American neo-Hegelians—399, 445
Ruttmann, Wilhelm Julius (b. 1884)—German psychologist, author of Die Hauptergebnisse der modernen Psychologie...—396

S
Saint-Just, Louis Antoine Léon de (1767-1794)—leader in the French Revolution, Jacobin—40
Salignac, Fénélon—French scientist, author of Questions de physique générale et d’astronomie—57
Sand, George (1804-1876)—French authress—510
Schaden, Emil August (1814-1852)—professor of philosophy at Erlangen University, mystic; critic of philosophy of Hegel and Feuerbach—82
Schaller, Julius (1807-1868)—professor of philosophy at Halle University, Hegelian; criticised Feuerbach’s materialist philosophy—82
Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph (1775-1854)—outstanding German idealist philosopher, representative of German classical philosophy; developed ideas of Kant and Fichte; elaborated objective idealistic “Identitätphilosophie” (“philosophy of identity”); became an official ideologist of the Prussian monarchy toward the end of his career, propagated the religious and mystical “Philosophie der Offenbarung” (philosophy of revelation)—236, 301, 387, 492-493
Schiller, Ferdinand Canning Scott (1864-1937)—English philosopher, prominent representative of pragmatism—398, 399, 445
Schinz, Max (b. 1864)—Privatdocent, professor of philosophy at Zurich University—58
Schlieermacher, Friedrich Daniel Ernst (1768-1834)—German theologian and idealist philosopher, romanticist—345
Schmidt, Ferdinand Jakob (1860-1939)—German philosopher and pedagogue, professor at Berlin University, fideist, in regard to the theory of knowledge was close to the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism and to the immanents—238
Schmitt Eugen Heinrich (1851-1916)—author of Das Geheimnis der Hegelschen Dialektik, beleuchtet vom konkretssinnlichen Standpunkte, which he submitted in a contest arranged by the Hegelian Berlin Society of Philosophers; the work was recognised as outstanding but was not awarded a prize because of its “materialism and sensualism”; subsequently he turned to mysticism and gnosticism—239, 399
Schopenhauer, Arthur (1788-1860)—German idealist philosopher, ideologist of Prussian Junkers; his voluntarist and misanthropic philosophy provided a source of German fascist ideology—496
Schulze, (Anesidem) Gottlieb Ernst (1701-1833)—German idealist philosopher, agnostic, Humean; sought to restore and modernise the argumentation of ancient scepticism—296
Schulze, Johannes (1786-1869)—German educationalist, Hegelian; edited The Phenomenology of Mind for the posthumous edition of Hegel’s works—296
Schuppe, Wilhelm (1836-1913)—German philosopher, subjective idealist, headed the so-called school of immanence—399
Schwegler, Albert (1819-1857)—German theologian, philosopher, philologist and historian—359, 365, 369, 371-372
Segond, Joseph-Louis-Paul (1872-1954)—French idealist philosopher and psychologist, author of several works on aesthetics—399
Seneca, Lucius Annaeus (c. 4 B. C.-65 A. D.)—Roman philosopher, stoic, political figure, writer, Nero’s tutor—78
Seth, Andrew (1856-1931)—English philosopher, professor at Edinburgh, author of works on philosophy—238, 239, 240
Sertus Empiricus (2nd century A. D.)—ancient Greek physician and sceptic philosopher, author of historical and philosophical works: Pyrronische Hypolyposen and Adversus Mathemeticos—250, 252, 255, 261, 265, 272, 297, 298, 299
Shakespeare, William (1564-1616)—great English dramatist—31
Shechedrin (Saltykov-Shchedrin), Mikhail Yevgrafovich (1826-1889)—Russian satirist, revolutionary democrat—503
Shulyatikov, V. M. (1872-1912)—Russian literary critic, Bolshevik; criticised idealism from the viewpoint of vulgar sociology, thus distorting Marxism—484, 486, 492, 494, 499, 500
Sierakowski, Zygmunt (1827-1863)—Polish revolutionary democrat, one of the leaders in the rising of 1863 in Poland; executed by the tsarist government on June 15, 1863—508
Sismondi, Jean Charles Lenard Simonde de (1773-1842)—Swiss economist, petty-bourgeois critic of capitalism—25
Smith, Adam (1723-1790)—English economist, leading representative of classical bourgeois political economy—25
Socrates (c. 469-399 B. C.)—idealistic philosopher of ancient Greece, ideologist of slave-holding aristocracy—146, 223, 272, 273, 274, 451, 522
Spaventa, Bertrando (1817-1883) Italian idealist philosopher, leading representative of neo-Hegelianism in Italy, professor at Naples University—58, 239
Spencer, Herbert (1820-1903)—English bourgeois philosopher and sociologist, one of the founders of positivism—45, 428
Speransky, Mikhail Mikhailovich (1772-1839)—Russian statesman; early in the rule of Alexander I drafted state reforms designed to introduce elements of constitutional government, while retaining feudalism and autocracy in Russia; the draft was rejected and he was exiled—552, 553

Spicker, Gideon (1840-1912)—German idealist philosopher, author of several works on the history of philosophy—393


Stahl, Georg Ernst (1660-1734)—German chemist and physician, formulated the theory of phlogiston, vitalist in his works on physiology and medicine—438

Stakheevich, S. G. (1843-1918)—participated in the revolutionary movement in Russia in the sixties; in 1863 was arrested, sentenced to penal servitude and exiled to Siberia for life; author of reminiscences about N. G. Chernyshevsky, with whom he spent several years in Siberia—506

Stein, Ludwig (1859-1930)—German sociologist and philosopher, member of the Academies of Sciences in Berlin and Geneva, editor of the magazine Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, author of works on the history of philosophy—58

Stirling, James Hutchison (1820-1909)—English philosopher, founder of English neo-Hegelianism; physician by education—239

Stirner, Max (1806-1856)—German idealist philosopher, Young Hegelian, one of the ideologists of anarchism; his basic work is Der Einzige und sein Eigentum—452

Stobaeus, Joannes (c. 5th century A. D.)—Greek writer, compiler of writings by Greek authors—345

Strache, Hugo (1865-925)—Austrian chemist and engineer, author of Die Einheit der Materie, des Weltäthers und der Naturkräfte—58

Strauss, David Friedrich (1808-1874)—German theologian and idealist philosopher, Young Hegelian, author of the book Life of Jesus, a historical criticism of the gospels—44, 45

Sue, Eugène (1804-1857)—French writer, author of cheap sentimental novels on social themes—31, 46, 47, 49

Suter, Heinrich (1848-1922)—Swiss professor of mathematics—396

Szeliga—pseudonym of Franz Zychlinsky (1816-1900)—Prussian officer, Young Hegelian, participated in the publication of B. Bauer’s works—30, 31

T

Taggart—see MacTaggart

Taine, Hippolyte Adolphe (1828-1893)—French literary and art critic, historian and positivist philosopher—420

Tarde, Gabriel (1843-1904)—French sociologist, criminalist and psychologist; a founder of a psychological trend in sociology; voluntarist—452

Thales of Miletus (c. 624-547 B. C.)—ancient Greek materialist philosopher; founder of Miletian (Ionic) school—223, 246

Thomson, Joseph John (1856-1940)—British physicist, mem-
ber of the London Royal Society, of which he was President from 1915 to 1920; held mechanistic materialist philosophical views—57, 335

Tiedemann, Dietrich (1748-1803)—German historian of philosophy, professor at Marburg University, author of the six-volume *Geist der Spekulativen Philosophie*, which served Hegel as a source in his course of lectures on the history of philosophy—270

Timaeus (4th century-3rd century B.C.)—ancient Greek historian, author of works on the history of Sicily and Italy, which have come down to us in fragments—302, 347, 349

Trendelenburg, Friedrich Adolf (1802-1872)—German idealist philosopher and logician, professor at Berlin University; critical of Hegel’s philosophy, particularly his dialectics—238

Turgenev, Ivan Sergeyevich (1818-1883)—Russian writer, liberal in his political views—503, 504, 531

U

Uberweg, Friedrich (1826-1871)—German philosopher and psychologist, professor at Königsberg University, author of *Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie*—52, 256, 276

Uhde-Bernays, Hermann Hans (b. 1873)—German philologist, author of works on the history of literature and art—395

Uspensky, Nikolai Vasilyevich (1837-1889)—Russian democratic writer—534

V

Van’t Hoff, Jacobus Hendricus (1852-1911)—Dutch chemist, a founder of modern physical chemistry and stereochemistry—435

Véra, Augusto (1813-1885)—Italian philosopher, forerunner of Italian Hegelians, translated Hegel’s works into Italian and French—240, 324

Verworn, Max (1863-1921)—German physiologist, founder of the magazine *Zeitschrift für allgemeine Physiologie*, eclectic in philosophy, close to Machism—329, 330

Vissarion—see Belinsky, Vissarion Grigoryevich

Volkmann, Paul (1856-c. 1938)—professor of theoretical physics at Königsberg, author of *Erkenntnistheoretische Grundzüge der Naturwissenschaften...*, idealist, eclectic—328, 335, 360

Voltaire, (François Marie Arouet) (1694-1778)—French philosopher and writer of 18th century Enlightenment; deist and historian, opponent of absolutism and Catholicism—42

Volynsky, A. L. (1863-1926)—Russian reactionary critic, decadent, advocated the theory of “art for art’s sake”—520

De Vries, Hugo (1848-1935)—Dutch botanist, anti-Darwinian, founder of reactionary pangenesis and mutation theories—440

W

Waals, Johannes Diderik, van der (1837-1923)—Dutch physicist, professor at Amsterdam University; known for his works on the kinetic theory of gases—435

Wallace, William (1844-1897)—leading representative of British Hegelians; translated Hegel’s *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* into English—239
Willy, Rudolf (1855-1920)—German philosopher, follower of Avenarius, subjective idealist—496

Windelband, Wilhelm (1848-1915)—German philosopher, neo-Kantian, prominent historian of philosophy—239, 369

Wiassak, Rudolf (1865-1930)—Austrian physiologist—498

Wolff, Christian (1679-1754)—German idealist philosopher, metaphysician, popularised and vulgarised Leibnitz’ philosophy, teleologist—96, 208

Wundt, Wilhelm Max (1832-1920)—German psychologist, physiologist and idealist philosopher—321, 494-500

X

Xenophanes of Colophon (c. 580-470 B. C.)—ancient Greek philosopher and poet, founder of the Eleatic school—252

Xenophon (c. 430-355/4 B. C.)—ancient Greek historian, was not in sympathy with Athenian democracy, protagonist of aristocratic Sparta—274

Y

Yurkevich, P. D. (1827-1874)—professor of philosophy, idealist and mystic; entered into polemics with Chernyshevsky on philosophical questions—516, 320, 521

Z

Zart, A.—German physicist, author of the book Bausteine des Weltalls. Atome und Moleküle...—395

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