III. A Propos of the Historical Development of Consciousness

1. The Problem of the Psychology of Consciousness

Man’s consciousness is not something immutable. Some of its features in any concrete historical circumstances are progressive, with prospects of development, others are survivals doomed to extinction, which means that consciousness, the psyche, needs to be regarded in its change and development, in its essential dependence on men’s way of life which is determined by actual social relations and by the place a person occupies in them. It is thus necessary to approach the evolution of man’s psyche as a process of qualitative changes, for if the social conditions themselves of men’s being also develop by way of qualitative changes rather than simply through quantitative ones, it is clear that their psyche and consciousness also change qualitatively in the course of socio-historical development.

What do these qualitative changes consist in? Can it be that they consist only in the content that men perceive, feel, and think being altered? That view was stressed in the old psychology, for example by Wundt, who affirmed that the properties of the human psyche were always and everywhere the same, that only the content of men’s experience and knowledge was altered. But that view has long been abandoned; it can be considered established that changes in the qualitative features of man’s psyche are also observed in the course of evolution.

These changes cannot be reduced to changes in individual psychic processes and functions, although most writers maintain that the historical evolution of man’s psyche consists precisely in the reconstructing of separate processes (perception, memory, and especially thought and speech) and finally in their role changing so that now some and then other psychic processes play the main role (Lévy-Bruhl, Thurnwald, Danzel).

It has now been shown that individual psychic processes are actually reorganised during historical development. It is known, for instance, that the memory of the people of certain economically and culturally backward nationalities has very unique features, e.g. a capacity to fix the features of a locality with amazing accuracy (so-called topographic memory). We know that the thinking of these people is also extremely original, and it seems even to have a special logic.

When, however, we confine ourselves to study only of those separate psychic processes, we cannot bring out the real history of the
evolution of the human psyche. People living in different historical epochs and in different social conditions of course also differ in what are their processes of perception, memory, thought, etc. But does the difference between these processes exhaust the difference between their psyche and their consciousness? We assume that it does not, that changes also take place in the course of historical development in the general character of men’s consciousness that are engendered by changes in their mode of life.

We have seen that the general type of psychic reflection changes with the transition to man, and that a new, higher type of psyche – consciousness – arises.

We have seen that the transition to this higher type of psyche comes about as a consequence of the emergence of men’s production relations. The features of men’s psyche are also determined by the features of these relations and depend on them. We know at the same time that production relations alter, that the production relations of primitive society are one thing and those, for example, of capitalist society are quite another matter. It can be taken, therefore, that with a radical change in men’s production relations their consciousness is also altered in a radical way and becomes qualitatively different. The task is to find the concrete psychological features of these different types of consciousness.

To solve this problem, however, calls for a quite different approach to consciousness than that rooted in the traditions of bourgeois psychology.

In passing off the consciousness of men in class society as eternal and universal, capitalist psychology depicts it as something absolute – unqualified and ‘indefinite’. It is a special psychic space (‘scene’, according to Jaspers); it is, consequently, only a condition of psychology, not its subject matter (Natorp). For Wundt consciousness consisted simply in any psychic state whatsoever found in general within ourselves.

Consciousness from that point of view is psychologically a kind of inner ‘luminescence’ or ‘glow’, that is bright or clouded, or even extinguished, as for example in a deep faint (Ladd). It can therefore have only purely formal properties; they are also expressed by its so-called psychological laws (the unity, continuity, and narrowness of consciousness, etc.).

Things are also not altered in principle when consciousness is regarded as the ‘psychic subject’, or as James put it, the ‘boss’ of the psychic function. This mystification of the real subject through its identification with consciousness in no way makes the latter psycho-
logically more meaningful; it proves ultimately that consciousness, too, like the subject, is also ‘metapsychic’, i.e. goes beyond the limits studied by psychology.

From the standpoint of the traditional bourgeois psychological approach to consciousness only what ‘is found’ in consciousness, or 'belongs' to it, is subject to study, i.e. separate psychological phenomena and processes and their mutual relations and connections.

In fact psychological study of consciousness mainly took the line of studying thought. As a result, when speaking of consciousness they began precisely to have thought in mind, the round of notions or ideas, and concepts. That is proper when it is a matter of studying the evolution of human understanding but psychologically the evolution of consciousness does not boil down to the evolution of thought. Consciousness has its own substantial psychological character.

In order to find this psychological character of consciousness we have to discard the metaphysical notions that isolate it from real life. We must, on the contrary, investigate the dependence of man’s consciousness on his mode of life, on his being. And that means that it is necessary to examine how man’s life relationships are built up in any set of socio-historical conditions and what is the special structure of the activity that those relations give rise to. It is necessary, furthermore, to examine how the inner structure of man’s consciousness also changes at the same time as the structure of his activity. The characteristics of the inner structure of consciousness are also its psychological ones.

We have already tried to show that a certain type of psychic reflection corresponds to a certain type of structure of activity. That dependence is also retained subsequently, in the stages of the evolution of human consciousness. The main difficulty in research here is to find the actual ‘generatrices’ of consciousness, its real inner relations that are not only hidden from our self-observation but are now and then contradicted by what the latter discloses.

In order to prepare to analyse the main changes in consciousness that take place during the development of human society, we have to dwell first of all on certain general features proper to its developed structure.

We have already noted that the main change in the form of psychic reflection that occurs during the transition to man is that reality is discovered to him in the objective stability of its properties, in its separateness and independence from his subjective attitude to it, and from his real needs, or, as it is put, is ‘presented’ to him. This ‘presentationism’ properly consists in being aware, in the conversion of un-
conscious psychic reflection into conscious reflection. Let us take an example to clarify what we mean by that.

Suppose a person is walking along the street deep in conversation with his companion. In normal cases all his behaviour would ultimately be in full accordance with what is going on around him; he slows his pace at crossings, avoids on-coming pedestrians, steps off the pavement onto the roadway and back again, and so on. Obviously he is perceiving his environment. Has he, however, a conscious image of the situation in the street? If he is very deep in conversation, he may very well not. In that case we can say that the situation in the street is not ‘presented’ to him at that moment. But now he is clearly conscious that before him is the house where he is going with his companion. A picture of the street opens up before him now, as it were, and is ‘presented’ to him.

This example undoubtedly depicts a psychological phenomenon that is only analogous to the fact that we are examining. All the same it can show in what sense we are employing the term ‘presentation’.

Thus reality is presented to man in consciousness. How is that fact possible psychologically?

Any psychic reflection is the result of a real connection, of a real interaction of a living, highly organised, material subject and the material reality around him. The organs of psychic reflection themselves are at the same time organs of this interaction, organs of vital activity.

Psychic reflection cannot arise without life, without the subject’s activity. It cannot help depending on activity, cannot help being subordinated to the subject’s life relations realised by activity, cannot help being partial, since these relations themselves are partial.

In other words psychic reflection inevitably depends on the subject’s relations with the reflected object, i.e. on its vital meaning for the subject. That remains correct also as regards man, but with the transition to human consciousness something new also develops. An animal, on experiencing a need for food, is stimulated by that influence that is stably associated with food; this influence in fact only acquires the force of a food stimulus for it. With man it is otherwise.

When a primitive beater raises game – and that is the direct objective of his action – he is conscious of this goal, that is to say it is reflected for him in its significance in objective (in this case direct labour) relations.

The meaning or significance is also that which is objectively revealed in an object or phenomenon, i.e. in a system of objective associations, relations, and interactions. The significance is reflected and fixed in language, and acquires stability through that. In this form, in
the form of linguistic meaning, it constitutes the content of social consciousness; by entering into the content of social consciousness it also becomes the ‘real consciousness’ of individuals, objectifying in itself the subjective sense of the thing reflected for them.

Conscious reflection is thus psychologically characterised by the existence of a specific internal relation, namely the relation between the subjective sense and meaning.

This relation is very important and we shall therefore have to dwell on it specially. Since the concept of meaning or significance is more developed in modern psychology, we shall begin by examining it in particular.

Meaning is the generalisation of reality that is crystallised and fixed in its sensuous vehicle, i.e. normally in a word or a word combination. This is the ideal, mental form of the crystallisation of mankind’s social experience and social practice. The range of a given society’s ideas, science, and language exists as a system of corresponding meanings. Meaning thus belongs primarily to the world of objective, historical phenomena. And that must be our starting point.

Meaning, however, also exists as a fact of the individual consciousness. Man perceives the world and thinks about it as a social, historical entity; he is armed and at the same time limited by the ideas and knowledge of his time and his society. The wealth of his consciousness is in no way reducible to the wealth of his personal experience. Man does not know the world like a Robinson Crusoe making independent discoveries on an uninhabited island. He assimilates the experience of preceding generations of people in the course of his life; that happens precisely in the form of his mastering of meanings and to the extent that he assimilates them. Meaning is thus the form in which the individual man assimilates generalised and reflected human experience.

As a fact of individual consciousness meaning does not, however, lose its objective content and does not become a purely ‘psychological’ thing. What I think, understand, and know about a triangle may of course not coincide exactly with the meaning of ‘triangle’ accepted in modern geometry. But that is not a fundamental contrast. Meaning has no existence except in concrete human heads; there is no independent realm of meanings, like Plato’s world of ideas. It is consequently impossible to counterpose this meaning in the consciousness of the individual to ‘geometric’, logical, or objective meaning in general as a special psychological meaning; the distinction here is not between the logical and the psychological, but rather between the
general and the isolated, the individual. Can ‘anybody’s’ concept really exist?

The main psychological problem about meaning is the question of what is its real place and role in man’s psychic life, what they are in his life.

Reality is revealed to man in meaning, but in a special way. Meaning mediates man’s reflection of the world inasmuch as he is aware of it, i.e. inasmuch as his reflection of the world is based on the experience of social practice and includes that.

A sheet of paper is reflected in my consciousness not only as something rectangular, white, and covered with lines and not only as a certain structure and a certain integrated form, but also precisely as a sheet of paper, as paper. The sense impressions I receive from it are refracted in my consciousness in a definite way because I have assimilated the corresponding meanings; otherwise the sheet of paper would just remain something white, rectangular, etc., for me. But when I perceive paper – and this is very important in principle – I perceive this real paper, and not the meaning ‘paper’. As a rule meaning is introspectively missing in my consciousness; in refracting the perceivable or the conceivable, meaning is not itself thereby recognised or thought about. That is a fundamental psychological fact.

Psychologically, meaning is thus the general reflection of reality developed by humanity and fixed in the form of a concept or knowledge, or even in the form of an ability or skill as a generalised ‘mode of action’, norm of behaviour, etc., that has become accessible to my consciousness (more or less fully and many-sidedly).

Meaning is the reflection of reality irrespective of man’s individual, personal relation to it. Man finds an already prepared, historically formed system of meanings and assimilates it just as he masters a tool, the material prototype of meaning. The psychological fact proper, the fact of my life, is this, (a) that I do or do not assimilate a given meaning, do or do not master it, and (b) what it becomes for me and for my personality in so far as I assimilate it; and that depends on what subjective, personal sense it has for me.

The concept of sense has been developed in bourgeois psychology in very different directions. Müller called it an embryonic image;

1 It is another matter that meaning can be comprehended, but that is a secondary phenomenon that arises only when the object of consciousness is not the thing signified but the meaning itself, as happens, for example, in study of a language.
Binet was much shrewder in calling it an embryonic action. Van der Veldt tried to demonstrate the formation of meaning experimentally as the result of a previously undifferentiated signal's acquiring for the subject the meaning of an action conditionally associated with it. Most contemporary writers, however, have taken another line, considering the concept of sense only in connection with language. Poland defined sense as the aggregate of all the psychic phenomena evoked in consciousness by a word, Titchener as complex, contextual meaning, and Bartlett more exactly as the meaning created by the 'wholeness' of a situation, and many others as the concretisation of meaning, as the product of denoting.

For all this difference in understanding sense, there is also something in common in these writers, and that is that they treat phenomena belonging to the sphere of consciousness itself identically as the initial phenomena for analysis, and therefore remain identically locked within this sphere. But consciousness cannot be understood from itself.

Another approach in principle is that of genetic, historical research. This is an approach from the angle of analysing phenomena belonging not to consciousness but to life itself, i.e. from the aspect of phenomena that characterise the real interaction of a real subject with the world around him, in all the objectiveness and independence of its properties, connections, and relations. And sense therefore appears to a historical investigation of consciousness primarily as a relation that is created in life, in the subject's activity.

Arising in the course of the development of activity, in practice linking animal organisms with their environment, this specific relation is originally biological, and animals' psychic reflection of the external medium is inseparable from this relation. Subsequently, for the first time only in man, this relation is differentiated for the subject as his relation and comprehended. This conscious sense is created concretely psychologically by an objective relation reflected in man's head of what stimulates him to act to what his action is directed as its direct result. In other words conscious sense expresses the relation of motive to goal. It is necessary simply to stress specially that we use 'motive' not to signify the experiencing of a need but as signifying the objective thing in which this need is concretised in the conditions and to which the activity is directed.

Suppose a student reads the literature recommended to him. That is a conscious, purposive process. Its conscious aim is to assimilate the content of this literature. But what personal sense does this aim, and so the corresponding activity, have for the student? That depends
on what the motive is that stimulates the activity realised by his action. If it consists in preparing him for his future profession, the reading will have one sense for him, but if it is simply, for example, to pass an examination, then the sense of the reading will understandably be quite another one, and he will read the literature with other eyes, and assimilate it in a different way.

The question of personal sense can thus be answered by bringing out the corresponding motive.

Sense is always the sense of something. There are no ‘pure’ senses. Subjectively sense therefore belongs, as it were, to the comprehended content itself, and seems to be part of its objective content. That circumstance has also created very great misunderstanding in psychology and psychologising linguistics, which is expressed either in complete indistinguishableness of these concepts, or in sense being considered a concretised meaning, depending on the context or situation. In fact, although sense (‘personal sense’) and meaning introspectively seem merged in consciousness, the two concepts need to be differentiated from one another. They are linked internally with one another but only by a relation that is the reverse of the above-mentioned one; or rather, sense is expressed in meanings (like motive in aims), but not meaning in senses.

In some cases the disparity between sense and meaning in consciousness comes out especially clearly. One may know some historical event or another very well and excellently understand the significance of some historical date, but that date may at the same time have a different sense for one: one sense, for example, for a youth who has not yet left school, another for the same youth when he is defending his country, and giving his life for it, on the battlefield. Has his knowledge of this event, of this historical date, been altered or increased? No, it has perhaps even become less distinct, something perhaps even forgotten; for some reason, however, it is now recalled and brought to mind, and then it proves to be illuminated in his consciousness, as it were, by some already quite different light, and brought out, as it were, in a fuller content. It has become different, but not as meaning, and not from the angle of knowledge of it, but from the aspect of its sense for the individual; it has acquired a new, deeper sense for him. Such changes had already been noted by Ushinsky.

In introducing a differentiation between personal sense and meaning proper into the psychological description of consciousness we must stress that this differentiation does not relate to the whole content but only to that to which the subject’s activity is directed, for
personal sense expresses precisely his *attitude* to comprehended objective phenomena.

We have dwelt in detail on the question of meaning and sense because their relation is that of the main ‘generatrices’ of the inner structure of human consciousness; it does not follow from that, however, that while being the main ones they are the only ones. Even while simplifying and schematising the very complex relations that are inherent in developed consciousness, we may yet, for all that, digress from one of its ‘generatrices’, namely from its sense content.

It is sense content (sensations, feelings, images of perception, representations) that forms the basis and condition of any consciousness. It is its material tissue, as it were, that which forms the richness and fullness of conscious reflection of the world. At the same time this content is what is direct in consciousness, what is directly created by the conversion of the energy of external stimulation into a fact of consciousness. But, while being the basis and condition of any consciousness, it is its ‘generatrix’ precisely because it does not, in itself, express everything specific in it.

Suppose a person suddenly loses his sight. The world would then be dimmed in his consciousness, but would his consciousness of the world be altered? No, his consciousness of the world would, of course, be retained. It is another matter when a person’s higher brain processes are disturbed. It is then precisely his consciousness itself that is drastically altered, although all his possibilities of direct sense perception of the world remain intact. That is well known.

Just as obvious is the statement that a change and development of the directly sensuous content of consciousness only happen in the course of the evolution of human forms of activity. The evolution of phonematic hearing in man comes about by men’s employment of audible speech, while man’s eye begins to see differently than the crude, non-human eye only inasmuch as the object becomes a social object for him.

The last question, finally, on which we shall have to dwell briefly is that of the general method of psychological research into the evolution of consciousness.

The evolution of consciousness, we know, does not have its own independent history, and is ultimately governed by the evolution of being. This general proposition of Marxism retains its force, it goes without saying, in respect of the development of individual consciousness and the consciousness of individual people.

What is the concrete link between the psychological features of man’s individual consciousness and his social being? How, in other
words, do we pass in research from analysis of the social conditions of the life of society to that of man’s individual consciousness? And is it possible in general to make such a transition?

The answer to that stems from the basic psychological fact that the structure of man’s consciousness is linked in a regular way with the structure of his activity.

Man’s activity then can only have a structure that is created by given social conditions and the relations between people engendered by them. It is necessary, however, to stress here that, in speaking of the individual person’s consciousness, we must bear in mind precisely those concrete conditions and relations in which this man is placed by the force of circumstances and that this connection is never at all direct.

Our general method thus consists in finding the structure of men’s activity that is engendered by given concrete, historical conditions, and starting from that structure to bring out the essential psychological features of the structure of their consciousness.

2. Primitive Consciousness

In bourgeois psychological literature a very broad, not quite definite meaning is illegitimately attached to the concept of primitive consciousness (more often termed thought). Any consciousness is called primitive that differs from the consciousness of men belonging to so-called civilised society (Lévy-Bruhl and others). A false counterposing of two types of psyche is thus created at bottom, namely between a ‘lower’ and a ‘higher’ psyche, a counterposing based on reactionary, colonialist ‘doctrines’ about the alleged psychic inferiority of whole peoples.

When we speak of primitive consciousness we have something else in mind, namely man’s consciousness in the initial stages of society’s development when, already possessing primitive tools, they waged a joint struggle against nature, when they had common labour, common ownership of the means of production, and common ownership of its product, when, consequently, there was, as yet, no social division of labour and private property relations, and no exploitation of man by man. In short we have in mind the consciousness of men in the early stages of the evolution of the primitive communal system.

What is it that characterises the structure of man’s consciousness psychologically at those early historical stages?

Its characteristics stem from the main features inherent in man’s activity in those conditions. The first of these features is that the new
structure of activity, social by nature, did not originally embrace all its forms.

The range of the conscious was limited simply to the individual’s relations that were directly relations of the process of material production. As Marx and Engels said:

The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men.\(^2\)

The sphere of sex relations, for example, is therefore not represented at all in primitive linguistic meanings; clear evidence of that is the fact that all sex terms were originally asexual. For that same reason the names of domestic animals appeared before those of wild ones; the same also applies to plants.

In other words the sphere of linguistic meanings already coexisted at the dawn of man’s evolution with a much wider sphere of instinctive, biological senses, in the same way as men’s still numerous instinctive relations with nature coexisted along with their socially mediated relations with it. That is the first point.

Another feature characterising consciousness at that very early time in its evolution is that it was not yet fully such even within the narrow limits of the conscious.

The evolution of consciousness thus did not take place at all as if a previously dark inner field of perception were suddenly evenly illuminated by ‘the light of consciousness’, at first dimly, hardly flickering, and then getting stronger, which made it possible to distinguish the content composing it more and more correctly and exactly. The conscious was originally tightly limited.

Finally, we find a feature of primitive consciousness that defines its general structure, its general formation as it were, which lasted for the whole existence of the primitive commune.

Originally men were not at all conscious of their relations with the group. Only the beginning of a consciousness that man lived in general in society had developed. As Marx and Engels put it:

This beginning is as animal as social life at this stage. It is mere herd-consciousness, and at this point man is distinguished from sheep only by the fact that with him con-

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sciousness takes the place of instinct or that his instinct is a conscious one.3

At later stages, when men’s consciousness, as we shall see, made important steps in its evolution, linguistic meanings, formed in men’s joint labour activity, already reflected their relations with one another as well as with nature. But because the relations of the individual participants in collective work with the conditions and means of production remained in general the same, the world was reflected in the same way both in the system of linguistic meanings that formed the group’s consciousness and in the consciousness of the separate individuals – in the form of these same meanings.

This is connected psychologically with this, that the sense of the phenomenon that the separate individual is aware of and its sense for the group as a whole, fixed in linguistic meanings, coincide. This undifferentiated character of senses and meanings in consciousness is possible because the range of the conscious still remains limited for a long time by those of men’s relations that are directly the relations of the whole group, and on the other hand because the linguistic meanings themselves are not sufficiently differentiated.

The coincidence of senses and meanings is the main feature of primitive consciousness. Although the breakdown of this coincidence is prepared already within the primitive communal system, it takes place only together with the breakdown of the system itself.

The condition that prepared the differentiation of senses and meanings was, from the angle of the evolution of consciousness itself, the extension of the range of the conscious to which the development of labour necessarily led, i.e. of its tools and forms, and the work relations of those involved in production.

The first important change in the direction of an extension of the realm of the conscious was caused by the complicating of work operations and of the tools themselves. Production more and more called for a whole system of coordinated actions from each participant in the work, and consequently for a whole system of conscious aims, which at the same time were parts of a single process and of a single, complex action. Psychologically this merging of separate, partial actions into a single action was a conversion of partial actions into operations. The content that had previously occupied the structural place of conscious aims or objectives of these partial actions thus occupied the place in the structure of the complex action of the conditions for its fulfilment. And that means, that now both the operations

and the conditions of an action could also enter the realm of the conscious. Only they did so in an essentially different way than the actions proper and their goals.

This metamorphosis of actions, i.e. their conversion into operations and so the consequent birth of operations of a new type (we shall call them conscious operations), has been well studied experimentally, but in modern conditions, it goes without saying. It is therefore easily described.

When, for example, a learner hits the target in shooting practice, he performs a definite action. What characterises it? First of all, of course, what the activity is that it forms part of, i.e. what its motive is, and consequently what sense it has for him. But it is also characterised by something else, namely by the means and operations by which it is performed. The aiming of the shot calls for many operations, each one corresponding to certain conditions of the action: it is necessary to put the body in a certain position, to align the sights of the rifle and correctly establish the line of sight, to press the butt to the shoulder, to hold the breath, and to press the trigger smoothly.

For the trained marksman none of these processes is an independent action, and their objectives are not singled out in his consciousness. He does not say to himself: ‘Now I must cradle the butt; now I must hold my breath’, and so on. There is only one aim, to hit the target; and that means that he has command of the motor operations necessary for shooting.

It is different with the person who is only beginning to learn to shoot. First he must make it his objective to hold the rifle correctly, and his action consists in that; then he makes the aiming his conscious action, and so on. Thus, in tracing the process of learning to shoot, or incidentally of the learning of any complex action, we see that the elements composing it are first formed as separate acts and only then converted into operations.

These operations, however, differ from those that arise through the simple adaptation of an action to the conditions of its performance. As experimental research has demonstrated, these operations are above all distinguished objectively by their flexibility and controlled nature. They also differ by quite another relation to consciousness.

An action, and its objective composing part of another action, are no longer ‘presented’ directly in consciousness. That does not mean, however, that they cease to be conscious. They simply occupy a different place in consciousness; they are only consciously controlled, as it were, i.e. can be conscious in certain conditions. Thus the operation
of aligning the foresight like its position itself in relation to the backsight, may not be presented in the consciousness of an experienced shot, but it is sufficient for there to be some departure from its normal performance for the operation itself, like its material conditions, to come distinctly then into his consciousness.

These transformations of unconscious content in conscious and vice versa, that occur in connection with a change of the place occupied by the content in the structure of the activity, can now also be understood neurophysiologically.

Modern research has shown that any activity is physiologically a dynamic functional system controlled by complex, varied signals coming both from the environment and the organism itself. These signals arriving at various interconnected nerve centres, including proprioceptors, are synthesised. Involvement of nerve centres is also characteristic of the structure of activity as regards its neurological aspect. Activity may proceed at various stages of the nervous system, involving its various ‘levels’. These levels, however, are not equal. One of them is the leading one, while the others play the role of background (‘background levels’ in Bernstein’s terminology). It is notable, here, that (as Bernstein specially stresses), the sensory signals of the highest, leading level are always conscious. This conscious content also controls activity, whose structure may be different. Its leading level itself is determined by what Bernstein called the task, i.e. by exactly that which has to be called objective in our terminology (we mean something else by task, namely the goal or objective set in certain conditions).

Although the relations described above are established for fully developed consciousness, they permit us also to understand the historical origin of the possibility of being aware not only of the content occupying the structural place of a goal in activity but also the modes of activity and the conditions in which they take place.

The need for awareness of operations already arose in the transition to the fashioning of differentiated tools, and especially of composite ones. The earliest tools, as archaeological finds have shown, could still have been the result of simple ‘adaptation’ of natural objects to the conditions of labour activity (for example, the ‘natural retouching’ of universal stone implements in the course of using them).

4 See: N. A. Bernstein. O postroenii dvizheniya (A Propos the Structuring of Movements), Moscow, 1947.
It is another matter with the production of specialised tools. Their fashioning necessarily calls for differentiation and awareness of operations, for the production of such tools has as its aim precisely the operation that is objectivised in it.

Labour operations that were originally formed in the course of simple adaptation to existing external conditions thus acquire another genesis in connection with their complication: when the goal of the action is part of another action as a condition of its performance, the first action is transformed into a mode of realising the second, into a conscious operation. That also greatly extends the sphere of the conscious. The whole significance of that for the subsequent evolution of human activity will be readily understood.

From the aspect of the structure of man’s consciousness the formation of conscious operations means a new step in its development, a step that consists in the rise of a ‘consciously controlled’ content in addition to the content presented in consciousness and the transition of the one to the other.

In order to avoid misunderstanding here, we must note simply that the relation of consciousness described above is also preserved, as we have seen, in its developed forms, but is not grasped immediately by introspection. When a person is reading, for example, it seems to him that both the ideas expressed in the book and the outward graphic form of their expression, i.e. the text itself, are recognised identically – both the one and the other. In fact, however, that is not wholly so; in fact only the ideas and their expression are presented in consciousness, and the outward aspect of the text may only seem to be conscious, as it usually is when there are omissions, crude typographical errors, etc. But if the reader asks himself whether he is also conscious of the outward aspect of the text and so shifts the aim from the content of the text to that very aspect of it, he is, of course, clearly aware of it. That kind of unnoticed conversion of operations into action – in our example the conversion of perception of the text as an operation of reading into perception of it as an independent, purposive inner activity – also creates an illusion of the ‘field’ of consciousness being structureless.

Extension of the realm of consciousness through the inclusion of the material conditions, means and modes of an action in it does not exhaust the process.

There is yet another essential change in activity that leads to awareness of the sphere of men’s other relations coming about as well as awareness of the sphere of direct production.
The emergence of a relatively stable technical division of labour made this change necessary; the division was expressed in individual people’s acquiring of fixed production functions, i.e. in their being constantly engaged in performing a certain round of actions. The natural consequence of that (once again already described in the old psychology) was that a kind of shift of motive took place in the objective of these actions. The action was also now transformed, but no longer into an operation, as we saw above, but into activity that now has an independent motive. Because of that motives also come into the realm of the conscious.

Such shifts of motives are constantly observed at the highest stages of development as well. These are the ordinary cases when a person undertakes to perform some actions under the influence of a certain motive, and then performs them for their own sake because the motive seems to have been displaced to their objective. And that means that the actions are transformed into activity. Motives of activity that have such an origin are conscious motives. They do not become conscious, however, of themselves, automatically. It requires a certain, special activity, some special act. This is an act of reflecting the relation of the motive of a given, concrete activity to the motive of a wider activity, that realises a broader, more general life relation that includes the given, concrete activity.

While arising originally as an actually occurring shift of motives to conscious aims, the process of becoming aware of motives then becomes a sort of general mechanism of consciousness. The motives that correspond to primary biological relations can therefore also become conscious and can enter the realm of the conscious.

That fact has a dual significance.

(1) It makes it psychologically understandable how reflection of the sphere of other human relations can become conscious at a certain stage of socio-historical evolution, as well as reflection of the sphere of directly material production.

At the dawn of the evolution of society, for example, men’s sexual relations, not yet limited by anything, lay in the sphere of purely instinctive relations, but the gradual contraction of the range of possible relations of marital community between the sexes that began indicates that these relations were then coming into the sphere of conscious relations. The fact that some of them became taboo already suggests the possibility that relations of kinship had become conscious.
(2) The fact of a shift of motives to the goals of actions makes it psychologically understandable how new needs could arise and the very type of their development become altered.

A need of some sort is a prerequisite of any activity. In itself a need cannot, however, determine the concrete direction of activity. A need gets its definiteness only in the object of the activity; it has as it were to find itself in it. In so far as a need finds its definiteness in an object (becomes ‘objectified’ in it), the object becomes the motive of the activity, and that which stimulates it.

In animals’ activity the range of possible motives is strictly limited to actual natural objects corresponding to their biological needs, and any step in the development of the needs themselves is caused by a change in their physical organisation.

It is another matter in the conditions of men’s social production of objects serving as means of satisfying their needs. As Marx and Engels said, production furnishes not only the material for a need but also the need for material.

What, however, does it mean psychologically? In itself the fact of the satisfaction of a need by means of new objects – means of consumption – can lead only to this, that the objects acquire a corresponding biological sense and perception of them will subsequently stimulate activity directed to getting them. We are concerned with the production of objects that serve as means to satisfy a need. And for that it is necessary for consumption – whatever the form it takes – to lead to reflection of the means of consumption as what must be produced. Psychologically that means that the objects – the means of satisfying needs – must be recognised as motives, i.e. must enter consciousness as an inner image, as a need, as stimulation, and as objective.

The link between consciousness of motives and the development of needs is not exhausted, of course, by the fact of consciousness of motives corresponding to natural needs. The decisive psychological fact consists in the shift of motives precisely to those objectives of action that do not directly meet natural, biological needs. Such, for example, are the cognitive motives that subsequently arise. Knowledge, as the conscious aim of an action, can also be stimulated by a motive that meets a natural need for something. The conversion of this objective into a motive is also the birth of a new need, in our example a thirst for knowledge.

The creation of new, higher motives and the formation of new, specific, human needs corresponding to them are a very complicated process, which also takes place in the form of a shift of motives to objectives and their recognition.

Thus, already in the conditions of primitive society, the evolution of material production and of the mutual relations between people built up during it created a need for full extension of the realm of the conscious. As more and more aspects and relations of human affairs begin to be determined socially, i.e. become social in their nature, consciousness more and more acquires the character of the universal form of man’s psychic reflection of reality. That does not, of course, mean that all reality now forms part of the realm of the conscious; it only means that everything can enter this sphere.

We have not the space to trace out the concrete dependencies that link together the successive stages of the broadening of the sphere of the conscious with the historical stages of the evolution of primitive society. That calls for extensive special research. We can only note that the facts which characterise the level of development of production, of men’s mutual relations and their language, are undoubtedly evidence that the process of broadening the sphere of the conscious was already completed at the level of the primitive communal system.

The stages in the extension of the realm of the conscious described above only express the evolution of consciousness from its functional aspect, from the aspect of the development of the process of comprehension. These stages, in forming layers on each other, as it were, also form the functional structure of consciousness, which is characterised by the process of comprehending the content, which occupies a different place in the structure of activity, taking place in a psychologically different concrete form.

Thus the content that occupies the structural place of objective in an action, is always presented, i.e. is always actually realised. The content that forms part of the structure of activity as the action’s conditions and as the operations meeting these conditions is realised differently, as we have seen. Finally the motives of the activity are realised differently still. Consciousness thus by no means appears to us, even from this functional and descriptive aspect of it, as an un-qualified, uniform ‘psychic space’ limited only by its ‘volume’ and the brightness of its ‘glow’, but does so as characterised by definite relationships and a historically moulded structure. The forming of this functional structure of consciousness also constitutes the main con-
tent of the evolution of man’s consciousness, which takes place within the limits of its general, primitive type.

This general type of consciousness is characterised, as we have already said, by a coincidence of meanings and senses. This coincidence is originally the psychological expression of the sameness of men’s relation to the instruments and products of labour, i.e. to the first objects that enter the realm of the conscious.

The development of the means and relations of production, however, and the extension of the sphere of cognised phenomena taking place on that basis had inevitably to lead to a divergence between how these phenomena are reflected in the heads of individual people and how they are generalised in linguistic meanings, only in the form of which they can be comprehended. In the epoch of primitive society this divergence is expressed in a person’s sense of the phenomena of reality being comprehended within a limited round of meanings. The latter, on the other hand, acquire a capacity to migrate from one group of the phenomena of reality, which they reflect, to the phenomena of another group.

The many facts that constitute the factual aspect of Lévy-Bruhl’s well-known conception are evidence of this divergence, which survives vestigially in certain conditions for a long time still after the breakup of the primitive commune. But this same divergence at the same time provides the key to a correct understanding of the phenomena that he describes as ‘prelogical’.

Lévy-Bruhl points out, for example, that the men of the Huichol tribe identify deer and feathers, wheat and deer, etc. among themselves. This seems also to characterise their thinking, i.e. the way these things are represented in it.

This generic, i.e. generalised, image, he writes, ‘implies something quite different from the quite similar image that comes to the mind of a European in the same circumstances’. But that, of course, is impossible. It is impossible for their thinking to be really such. Their thought is not characterised just by a ‘logic of implication’ that merges wheat and deer in a single, generalised image, but primarily by the fact that they rationally sow fields of wheat and with full consciousness of the object of their actions hunt deer. In practice they act quite differently in regard to the one and the other: quite different images of these objects have also obviously been created among them, and they are by no means merged with one another in their thinking when

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they cultivate plants or pursue game, as has been pointed out many times by Lévy-Bruhl’s critics.

It is another matter what is the form in which the sense of what is presented enters their consciousness, i.e. what are the linguistic means that still objectify in themselves the reflection in consciousness of the given objects from the aspect of the group’s relation to them. For from the aspect of these relations deer and wheat really have something in common, which is that they are identically objects on which the tribe’s existence depends.

Wheat, the Huichol say, was once a deer. In a special ceremony they place a deer on wheat, treating it as if it were a sheaf of the latter. In the view of Lumholtz and Lévy-Bruhl this happens because wheat is a deer in the notions of the Indians.

If we start from the point that the structure of primitive consciousness and of the consciousness of modern man is the same, then such an assumption is understandable, although it also leads to a flagrant contradiction with the facts of the practical life of the men of this tribe. If, on the contrary, we start from the point that primitive consciousness has a quite different internal structure than ours, which is that it is characterised still by an indifference of senses and meanings, then the phenomena described take on a quite different aspect.

The resemblance of the meanings ‘deer’ and ‘wheat’ is obviously, from this point of view, only the form of comprehending the carrying over of their sense, i.e. the transfer of the group’s practical relations from deer to wheat. This transfer, which reflects the transition from a predominance of hunting and herding to a predominance of plant growing (which leads to an important change of mutual relations within society – which is now already tribal), is also consolidated ideologically in the ceremony described.

We find the same in other cases as well. The even more puzzling implication of the meanings ‘deer’ and ‘feather’, for example, expressed only awareness of the fact that an arrow has to be so fashioned as to be able to hit a deer. The fact of the binding of deer hairs to the feathering of an arrow that directs its flight is evidence of that.

Among the peoples of Bantu tribes barren wives are recognised as a calamity. Lévy-Bruhl explains that by their thinking identifying barren women and crop-failure. We must, however, reject the pre-conceived idea that consciousness is determined by thinking and knowledge. Then, behind this ‘implication of representations’ or this ‘ignorance’, something quite different is revealed, and that is the peculiar form of expression of the identity of the social sense (meaning)
of the one and other in consciousness: smallness of a family leads to a lack of grain in the household, the same as a crop-failure.

The many facts of the ‘mystic implication’ of the properties of objects and men’s actions or relations are particularly noteworthy. In the conditions of the commencing development of a social division of labour and private property, objects actually acquire ‘ultrasensory’ properties for man that depend not on the things themselves and not on their natural character, but on the men’s relations moulded in production. It is these relations that also determine how an object really appears for man. If awareness of this, however, acquires special forms quite different from ours, that once again does not depend on a ‘mysticalness’ of thinking but is determined by the fact that in the epoch when men’s social relations are already objectively differentiated, their consciousness continues to preserve its earlier structure and earlier type of awareness through direct embodiment of the sense cognised in socially developed meanings.

The general picture presented by the forms of consciousness described is specially complicated by the difficulty of separating psychological, proper linguistic, and purely ideological formations from one another. To analyse this picture we need above all, of course, to make a careful study of the connections of the phenomena that characterise consciousness with the concrete, socio-economic conditions that give rise to them. But in modern, so-called ethnopsychology, this has not been adequately done, so that the concept of primitive consciousness remains extremely vague in it, as we have already noted.

We have not set ourselves the task of tracing the course of the historical evolution of consciousness in this essay. We therefore limit ourselves, as regards the early forms of consciousness, to the general description given above of its most primitive structure.

The primitive structure of consciousness with progressive development was already breaking down in tribal society, but its new internal structure only found full expression in the later stages of class society. We shall now try to describe its main features in precisely those stages.

3. Men’s Consciousness in Class Society

We saw above the simplest inner structure of man’s consciousness, which reflects his relation to nature and to other men under the primitive communal system. It is characterised by the sense of the phenomena of reality still coinciding directly for man with the meanings socially developed and fixed in language, in whose form these phenomena are comprehended. Common property put men into
identical relations with the means and products of production, and they were reflected identically in the consciousness both of the individual and of the group. The product of common labour had a common sense, for example, of ‘good’ or the ‘commonweal’, both objectively, socially, in the life of the community, and subjectively for any of its members. Socially developed linguistic meanings, crystallising the objective social sense of phenomena, could therefore serve as the direct form of the individual consciousness of these phenomena as well.

The breakdown of this – we might call it the primitive, integrated – formation of consciousness had already been prepared within primitive society. As we have already remarked it was prepared (if we bear in mind the changes taking place in a reflected way in consciousness) by a broadening of the range of conscious phenomena and the disparity arising, as a consequence, between the wealth of the conscious and the relative poverty of the language, which sometimes led to an inadequate psychological differentiation of meanings.

Only the emergence and development of a social division of labour, however, and of private property relations, could lead to the old structure of consciousness giving way to a new structure corresponding to the new socio-economic conditions of men’s life.

This new structure of consciousness had a quite different relation of the main ‘generatrices’ of consciousness, i.e. senses and meanings. This, as we shall see, is a relation of estrangement between them, which we may conventionally call disintegrated.

The main change typical of man’s consciousness with the development of class society is change of the relation of the plane of senses and the plane of the meanings in which they become conscious.

Another very important change relates to the ‘functions’ of consciousness, and at the same time to its phenomenal aspect, i.e. the subjective phenomena that constitute its content. From the aspect of the functional development of consciousness this change consists in the forming of inner psychological processes proper. Let us first consider this particular change.

The evolution of language and speech creates the premise for it, so we shall have to return once again to their sources.

The development of men’s oral intercourse leads to the rise of vocal actions, i.e. actions that have a special objective, namely vocal transmission or communication of a certain content.

This content is rigorously defined. The development of speech does not, of course, begin with conversations about something or other. Its function is determined by its being embedded in men’s col-
lective activity. It consequently realises some content of that activity. What, precisely, is the content of the activity that can be realised in vocal acts? Obviously, only that which relates to the planning, organisation, and control specific to the activity, i.e. which does not constitute its direct, practical realisation. This is the 'phase of preparation' of practical labour activity, which also constitutes its theoretical aspect. The latter is thus distinguished from the direct, practical labour process although it also still remains merged with vocal intercourse.

A new step is the separation of the theoretical, cognitive function of speech from that of intercourse proper, a separation that also begins in the next historical stage. Its historical precondition is isolation of the function of organising production and exchange, and in that connection, too, of the affective function. This circumstance imparts an independent motivation to speech, i.e. converts it into a relatively independent activity.

The development of the division of labour and a certain isolation of mental activity led to vocal acts now no longer realising just intercourse but to their being directed to theoretical ends as well, which made their outward form optional and even unnecessary; subsequently, therefore, they acquired the character of purely internal processes.

These internal processes (inner speech actions, and the inner activity (linguistic in form, and inner operations subsequently formed by the general law of the shift of motives) now operate as purely cognitive processes, viz., as processes of speech thinking or, perhaps, as processes of active remembering, etc.; in short, they form a special group of internal mental processes that are vocal only in the sense that their texture is formed by linguistic meanings capable of being separated from the direct effect of the thing meant.

What the subjective form of these meanings is, i.e. how they are sensually represented in the individual consciousness – whether in the sound image of a word or in an inner visual image – is fundamentally a matter of indifference. Even their inner form is not wholly necessary; thinking can also be based on an external graphic representation of words or on mathematical or chemical formulae; it can take place as the thinking out loud or as thinking 'with a pen in hand'. From this aspect of the development of the forms of human life what is really essential to these thought processes is that they do not directly transform the material world, that their product, whatever external, material form it acquires, is a theoretical product.

Man, for whom these inner processes are the main content of his activity, can therefore only exist on condition that he receives some
of the products of social material production in exchange for the product of his activity. The ideal products of his own activity have to be converted into objects that are not ideas for him. For man himself his theoretical activity thus becomes a means of realising his practical life. It does not follow from that, of course, that his theoretical activity now coincides with the material process of his life; even subjectively, even psychologically, it differs from real practice. It is not that, however, that is important for us now, but something else, viz., that with the separation of mental labour from physical, men’s activity in the form of ideas becomes capable of implementing his life.

So a form of activity arises that the old idealist psychology considered the sole ‘psychological’ one, the sole subject-matter of psychological study. For that reason it is of special interest to analyse it.

As we have already said, the social division of labour led to mental and material activity falling to the lot of different people. At the same time there was a separation of this form of activity from material, practical activity, which was engendered by separation of the personal relations and connections of the individuals whose exclusive occupation it was.

This separation of men’s mental activity also found reflection in their heads, so that they began to see in it not a historically arising form of the manifestation of the single process of man’s real life, but a manifestation of a special, mental principle that formed a special world, the world of consciousness opposed to the world of matter, the world of extension.

That false, idealist conception of the opposition of mind and matter has played a truly fatal role in psychology, and still does. The erroneous counterposing of mind and matter was expressed in thought and any inner mental activity not being distinguished from the very beginning as what they are in fact. They did not figure in psychology as a historically engendered form of the realisation of real human life (which constitutes their main content for some people only in certain historical circumstances), but as an allegedly special activity, as a special process opposed in principle to the processes of outward practical activity and completely independent of it.

The inner activity of ideas is, of course, a profoundly unique, qualitatively special activity, but for all that it is genuine activity and not the reflection of a special principle. Mental labour is therefore also precisely labour, even though a special form of it.

This labour is governed by the general conditions of any production, so that it is necessary to pay attention even to the labour time required for it.
Otherwise (Marx and Engels wrote) I risk at least that the object that is my idea will never become an object in reality, and can therefore acquire only the value of an imaginary object, i.e. an imaginary value.

Only as a result of the social division of labour into mental and physical are the conditions created making it possible for the processes of inner activity to be presentable to man as something quite different from those of external activity, as something that constitutes their primordial, eternal opposition.

Analysis of the process of man’s historical development thus shows that his life can be manifested, from the aspect of its content most vital for him, in the form of a theoretical activity of ideas and, in certain circumstances, even mainly as such. It produces ideal, mental products, but for man these are transformed into objects that satisfy his practical needs, i.e. into food, clothing, and shelter. The social relations in which this metamorphosis is accomplished separate his ideal activity from the material, practical activity that falls to the lot of other people. When man’s ideal activity thereby loses its proper sense for him, by acquiring a gross sense of earnings, he strives all the harder to get a firm footing in another, but also mental, activity, which, moreover, begins all the more to seem to him to belong to a special world that can even be represented as the only real one. The more mental and physical labour, and mental activity and material activity, are divided from one another, the less is man able to see in the former the outcome, a copy, of the second, and to see the common nature of their structure and their psychological laws.

That puts its stamp on scientific psychology, too, whose development has long followed the line of research into exclusively inner psychic activity as independent of external activity. Inner psychological processes were therefore treated in a one-sided way, only as determining outward activity; the dependence of the formation of the inner activity itself on external activity, however, was concealed. Even when the moulding of mental processes in a child was being investigated their sources were at best considered to be his sense perceptions; the development of mental acts, however, was represented as an independent process on which the development even of external actions themselves, from some sort of obvious material depended. It was overlooked that inner, theoretical processes were originally differentiated within external, outward activity, and only later transformed into a special kind of activity.

The question of whether thought and man’s other forms of inner, inward, ‘ideal’ processes should be considered a form of his activity, or something else, is a most important one, incidentally, for psychology, as regards both its method and a concrete, scientific approach to the psyche.

Psychological analysis demonstrates that inner, ideal activity has the same structure as practical activity. In thinking, too, we should consequently distinguish between activity, acts, and operations proper, and the functions of the brain realising them.

It is precisely because of the commonness of the structure of inner theoretical activity and outward practical activity that their separate structural elements can and do pass into one another, so that inner activity is constantly embracing separate external acts and operations, while developed external, practical activity incorporates inner, thought actions and operations.

When I occupy myself with scientific work, my activity is, of course, a thinking, theoretical one, but during it several objectives become singled out for me that call for external practical activity. Let us assume that I have, for example, to set up a laboratory experiment (and I mean to set it up, and not just think it up or design it), and that I get about laying wire, driving screws, sawing, soldering, etc.; in mounting the equipment I perform actions that, though practical, nevertheless form part of the content of my theoretical activity and that are senseless without it.

Let us assume, further, that the way of including some instrument or other that forms part of the set-up requires me to pay attention to the level of the general resistance of the electric circuit, and that I mentally calculate this while fixing the leads to its terminals; in that case conversely, a mental operation forms part of my practical action.

The common nature of external, practical activity and the inner activity of ideas is not limited simply to the community of their structure. It is also psychologically essential that they both equally, though differently, link man with the world around him, which is consequently reflected in his head, that both the one and the other form of activity is mediated by a mental reflection of reality, and that they are equally intelligent, meaningful processes. The wholeness of man’s life is also expressed in their community.

Only the ‘disintegration’ of man’s life that occurred at a certain historical stage led to the opposing of inner, thought activity to practical activity and created a rupture between them. This relation (rupture) is consequently neither universal nor eternal. In man, whose life
is not limited simply to mental labour but is many-sided, embracing varied forms of activity, including physical activity, his thinking also has a many-sided character. It is therefore not fixed simply in the form of abstract thought, and the transition from thought to practical activity is made as a wholly natural act. 'From the outset it [thought – Tr.] is always a factor in the total life of the individual, one which disappears and is reproduced as required.'

It is most important for psychology to bring out the community of structure of mental and practical activity, and the community of their inner connection with the reflection of reality. That enables us, in particular, to understand how, with all-round development of man’s personality, a harmonious uniting of these historically differentiated forms of activity is psychologically possible.

The first change in consciousness, which was brought about by the development of a social division of labour, thus consists in the separation of mental, theoretical activity.

Consciousness, moreover, is altered, as regards its functional structure, in that man becomes aware as well of the inner links of his activity, which thereby get the chance to develop to the full. They acquire a relative independence, become purposive, controlled, and consciously motivated, i.e. develop into a special kind of activity. Subjectively, man’s psyche now figures as thought, as mental activity in general, as an aggregate, reservoir, or subject of inner psychic processes. Classical psychology also depicted it thus.

Another and, moreover, very important change in consciousness is, as we have already said, the change in its inner structure. That comes out especially clearly in the conditions of developed class society. Its foundation is the separation of the bulk of the producers from the means of production that occurs in those conditions, which transforms men’s relations more and more into ones purely of things that are separated (‘alienated’) from man himself. As a result his own activity also ceases to be for him what it in fact is.

This ‘alienation’ comes about through the development of forms of property and relations of exchange. Man’s labour was not originally separated from its material conditions. Man was united with these conditions, which were objectively the sine qua non of his life, by a natural relationship. But the development of the productive forces inevitably dissolved this relationship, which was also expressed in the development of forms of property. So a dissolution of the worker’s original relation to the land, the instruments of labour, and labour

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itself, came about. The bulk of the producers, finally, were converted into hired labourers, whose only property was their capacity to work. The objective conditions of production were now opposed to them as another’s property. They could therefore live and satisfy their vital wants only provided they sold their labour power, i.e. alienated their labour. But labour was the most intrinsic content of their life; they consequently had to alienate the very content of their life.

The same process that led to separation of the producers led on the other hand to a separation as well of the conditions themselves, which appeared as the property of capitalists in the form of capital. The capitalist now also personifies these conditions, which, as far as the worker is concerned, are opposed to him, the worker. But the capitalist’s capital also has its own existence separate from the capitalist, which takes possession of his own life and subordinates it to itself.

These objective conditions, engendered by the development of private property, also determine the features of man’s consciousness in the conditions of class society.

The traditional psychologist, of course, refuses to consider them, seeing in them only a relation of things. He demands that psychology should, come what may, remain within the context of the 'psychological', which he understands purely as subjective. He even reduces psychological study of man’s industrial activity to investigation of its 'psychological components', i.e. of those psychic features for which engineering presents a demand. He is unable to see that industrial activity itself is inseparable from people’s social relations, which are engendered by it and determine their consciousness.

But let us return to our analysis of these relations.

A consequence of the ‘alienation’ of human life that has occurred is the emergent disparity between the objective result of man’s activity on the one hand, and its motive on the other. In other words, the objective content of the activity is becoming discrepant with its subjective content, with what it is for man himself. That also imparts special psychological features to his consciousness.

The activity of the primitive beater is subjectively evoked by his share in the common bag, which corresponds to his needs; the quarry is, at the same time, the objective result of his activity in connection with the group’s activity. The hired worker in capitalist production is

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also subjectively striving to meet his need for food, clothing, shelter, etc., as a result of his activity, but its objective product is something else altogether. It may be the gold ore that he mines, or the palace that he builds.

What he produces for himself is not the silk that he weaves, not the gold that he draws from the mine, not the palace that he builds. What he produces for himself is wages, and silk, gold, palace resolve themselves for him into a definite quantity of the means of subsistence, perhaps into a cotton jacket, some copper coins, and a lodging in a cellar.  

His labour activity itself is transformed for him into something different than what it is. Its sense for him does not now coincide with its objective meaning.

Does the worker in capitalist production know, for example, what weaving or spinning is? Does he possess the appropriate knowledge and meanings? Of course he does, at least in so far as what is needed to weave, spin, or drill intelligently, in short to perform the labour acts that constitute the content of his work. But weaving does not have the subjective sense of weaving for him, or spinning of spinning.

The twelve hours’ labour, on the other hand, has no meaning for him as weaving, spinning, drilling, etc., but as earnings, which bring him to the table of the public house, into bed.

So weaving has the objective meaning of weaving for him and spinning of spinning, but that is not the special feature of his consciousness. His consciousness is characterised by what the relation of these meanings is to the personal sense his labour actions have for him. We already know that sense depends on motive; consequently the sense of weaving or spinning for the worker is determined by what induces him to weave or spin. His conditions of life, however, are such that he does not spin to satisfy a social need for yarn, does not weave to meet a social need for cloth, but for wages; that also imparts sense to weaving for him, and to the yarn and cloth produced by him.

Although the social meaning of the product of his labour is not hidden from him, it is a meaning foreign to the sense this product has

11 Ibid.
for him. So, if he is given the chance to choose work, he finds himself forced to choose primarily between higher or lower pay, more reliable or less reliable earnings, rather than between spinning or weaving.

This point is revealed ever more and more clearly, together with the worker’s mounting feeling of uncertainty about tomorrow and his feeling of dependence on conditions that have nothing in common with the content of his labour. According to contemporary psychological research abroad, English women factory workers’ estimate of the permanence of work takes first place in their appraisal of a job. Other facts indicate the same thing. Workers, for example, reluctantly accept retraining for other jobs organised by industrial companies precisely because it undermines their feeling of security in their old job.

The foreignness of meanings to the sense behind them also comes out of course at the opposite pole of society. For the capitalist, for instance, the whole sense of spinning and weaving consists in the profit he will make from them, i.e. in a thing devoid both of the properties of the output of production in itself and of its objective meaning.

The alienation of people’s personal relations and their conversion into a relation purely of things comes out particularly clearly in the power that money, the universal means of exchange, has acquired over man.

The less you eat, drink, and buy books; the less you go to the theatre, the dance hall, the public house; the less you think, love, theorise, sing, paint, fence, etc., the more you save – the greater becomes your treasure which neither moths nor rust will devour – your capital. The less you are, the less you express your own life, the more you have, i.e. the greater is your alienated life, the greater is the store of your estranged being. ... All the things which you cannot do, your money can do. It can eat and drink, go to the dance hall and the theatre; it can travel, it can appropriate art, learning, the treasures of the past, political power – all this it can appropriate for you – it can buy all this: it is true endowment.12

Everything acquires a dual aspect under the dominance of private ownership of the means of production, viz., both man’s own activity and the world of objects around him.

The picture that an artist puts all his skill into, he has to paint in order to convert it into money, into a thing that has nothing in common with painting. Nevertheless the picture retains its real sense for the rich industrialist who buys it. For him it may, perhaps, acquire the sense of a thing in which he wants to invest some of his money, or of a thing testifying to the prosperity of his firm.

The doctor who buys a practice in some little provincial place may be very seriously trying to reduce his fellow citizens’ suffering from illness, and may see his calling in just that. He must, however, want the number of the sick to increase, because his life and practical opportunity to follow his calling depend on that.

This dualism distorts man’s most elementary feelings. Even love proves capable of acquiring the most ugly forms, not to mention love of money, which can become a veritable passion.

The penetration of these relations into consciousness also finds psychological reflection in a ‘disintegration’ of its general structure characterised by the rise of an estrangement between the senses and meanings in which the world around man and his own life are refracted for him.

Whatever concrete, historical feature of man’s psyche under the dominance of private property relations that we take (whether thought, interests, or feelings), it inevitably bears the impress of this structure of consciousness and can only be properly understood from its peculiarities. To ignore these peculiarities and remove them from the context of psychological research is to deprive psychology of historical concreteness, converting it into a science solely of the psyche of an abstract man, of ‘man in general’.

What we said above about the general structure of man’s consciousness under capitalist production does not yet give anywhere near a full psychological description of it. To make any progress in that respect we must pay attention to at least the following two circumstances.

(1) The first circumstance is created by the nature of the alienation of man’s activity itself. The point is that the ‘alienated’, is not, of course, what has simply ceased to exist for me. Alienated labour, for example, is by no means labour that does not exist for the worker. It exists for him, of course, and, moreover, forms part of his life in two ways: negatively and positively.

It forms part of his life negatively because this labour takes part of his life away from him, because, for him, to work does not mean to
live. ‘Life begins for him where this activity ceases, at table, in the public house, in bed.’  

It is positive in two respects.

(a) It is positive as the means of his activity. They constitute real wealth, the ‘technical’ side, so to speak, of his life; it is the wealth of knowledge, skills, and know-how that he must possess in order to perform his labour activity.

(b) It is positive as a condition of the enriching of his life with a new content quite different to that proper of his alienated activity, but nevertheless engendered precisely by it. The worker in a capitalist mill not only alienates his labour; he enters into relations with other people in that way – with the person exploiting his labour on the one hand, with his fellow-workers on the other hand. And these, of course, are not simply ‘theoretical’ relations, but are embodied for man above all in the class struggle that he has to wage at any stage of the development of class society – as slave, as serf, or as proletarian. This struggle goes on at any social pole – at that of supremacy and at that of enslavement or subjugation.

The development of this struggle at the pole of supremacy is the evolution of ever greater inhumanity in man, and we now know to what terrible limits this inhumanity can develop.

At the opposite pole of the development of this struggle is the evolution of the truly human in man. In capitalist society, therefore, the worker must choose, must either surrender himself to his fate, become a ‘good’ workman, heed ‘faithfully’ the interest of the bourgeoisie, in which case he most certainly becomes a brute, or else he must rebel, fight for his manhood to the last, and this he can only do in the fight against the bourgeoisie.

The practical movement that expresses this indignation leads to real unity of individuals; they recover their human essence, in their mouths human brotherhood becomes a truth, and then ‘the nobility of man shines upon us from their work-hardened bodies’.

The character of workers’ relations with one another creates a sense (Sinn) of collectiveness which also permeates their attitude to work; therefore only among workers is consciousness of labour, even

with alienation of its product, truly moral. Although the worker is forced to sell his labour power, labour is never, for him, converted simply into a commodity.

(2) The second circumstance that needs to be pointed out is the following. While part of the worker’s life is alienated along with practical alienation of his labour, and this finds reflection in his consciousness, the real relations, on the other hand, retain their human sense for him. This sense does not escape him, and is not dressed up in a mystic envelope of religion. His spiritual ideals and his morality are human, his consciousness needs no religious notions, which remain empty for him, devoid of sense.

If he chances to have any religion he has it only in name, not even in theory. Practically he lives for this world, and strives to make himself at home in it.\textsuperscript{16}

Because there are no motives in the worker’s activity by which another person might lose his sense for him and acquire simply the significance of a thing, the worker is much more humane in his everyday life than the capitalist.

“To them (the workers – ANL.) every person is a human being, while the worker is less than a human being to the bourgeois.”\textsuperscript{17}

The worker experiences a feeling of hatred and anger for enslavers but these feelings in no way express a loss of humanity.

This rage, this passion, is rather the proof that the workers feel the inhumanity of their position, that they refuse to be degraded to the level of brutes.\textsuperscript{18}

What the workers are completely free of is the ‘reverence for money’, the ‘religion of capital’. Money has no special sense of its own for them, and although they are forced all the same to work for its sake,

for them money is worth only what it will buy, whereas for the bourgeois it has an especial inherent value, the value of a god. ... Hence the workman is much less prejudiced, has a clearer eye for facts as they are than the

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Ibid.}, p 420 footnote.
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Ibid.}, p 414.
bourgeois, and does not look at everything through the spectacles of personal selfishness.\textsuperscript{19}

So a closer examination of the general picture of man’s life in capitalist society brings out not only its dual character but also its inner contradictoriness.

Man’s life in these conditions is not simply split into its inherent content and into a content alien to it. For man himself his \textit{whole life} remains an integral one. It therefore also takes the form of an inner struggle in which his resistance to this relation that subordinates him to itself is expressed. The mutual foreignness of senses and meanings in consciousness is directly hidden from man, and does not exist for his introspection. It is discovered to him all the same, but only in this form, i.e. as the processes of inner conflict that are usually called contradictions of consciousness and sometimes, more expressively, torments of consciousness. These are processes of becoming aware of the sense of reality, processes of establishing the personal sense in meanings. Let us consider them first in their simplest form.

The discrepancy originally arising between the human group’s relations to the reality around it, on the one hand, which is generalised in a system of linguistic meanings, and the personal relations of individual people, on the other hand, which form the sense of what is reflected for them, already complicates the process of awareness. In certain conditions this process takes on very fanciful forms, as we have seen, of the nature of ‘participations’.

Consciousness may develop in these forms as universals, but only to a certain limit. The complication of production, and in connection with that the extension of positive knowledge of nature, inevitably leads to a development and differentiation of meanings, which consists in meanings now more and more reflecting the objective relations between objects, to which the socially developed technical modes and means of human activity are subordinated. At the same time they are more and more freed from social relations to the cognised phenomena crystallised in them.

These relations are now sometimes reflected in special meanings, and sometimes, too, this content is reflected \textit{by means of} meanings rather than in the meanings themselves. To understand that we must, at the same time, allow for the concomitant change in the forms of language and social consciousness.

\textsuperscript{19} Engels. The Condition ... \textit{Op., cit.}, pp 420-421.
From the aspect of the history of language this is associated with the technicisation of language (Abayev), which consists in words not directly bearing a reflected content, because of the development of language, but of transmitting it indirectly. From the angle of the history of social consciousness this is associated with the fact that ‘the ideology expressed in a language is succeeded by an ideology expressed by means of language’.20

One and the same system of linguistic meanings thus proves capable of expressing a different, and even opposite content. Even the root difference in men’s ideas and thoughts that inevitably arises in class society therefore does not also require different languages and different systems of linguistic meanings to express it. There are, of course, a difference and oppositeness in how the slave and the slave-owner, the peasant and the feudal lord, the worker and the capitalist imagine the world, but it in no way calls for such a difference in their language, in the verbal meanings which they possess, and is by no means reduced to them.

From the psychological aspect, from the aspect of the process of consciousness, this is connected with the fact that this process now takes on an expanded and developed character. For consciousness of the sense of a phenomenon being disclosed is only possible in the form of awareness of the phenomenon; as we have said many times, a sense that is not embodied in meanings is not yet sense that has become conscious for man. This establishing of sense in meanings is now transformed from the process of its simple concretisation in meanings into a very complex one that is, as it were, the resolution of a particular psychological task.

This task sometimes becomes painfully difficult. The ‘torment of the word’, the agony of objectifying sense in meanings, the pangs of becoming aware of the sense when, as Dostoyevsky put it, ‘the idea won’t go into words’, have been described many times in the scientific literature and in fiction. They are by no means the same as the creative torment of thinking; they are the torment precisely of consciousness, of becoming aware. It is therefore in vain to seek their nature in the nature of cognitive activity proper.

Their nature does not lie simply in the process of establishing sense in meanings now taking a very complicated form; for the complication of the process creates, on the contrary, very broad possibilities. Their true nature lies in the contradictoriness of the content of

man’s life itself; it is associated at the same time with the limited nature of social, now class, consciousness.

We have already seen that man does not simply face tasks of becoming aware of the world around him, and of his life and himself in that world. His individual consciousness is only possible in conditions of social consciousness, in assimilating which he reflects reality, as it were, through the prism of socially developed meanings, i.e. knowledge and notions. With developed ‘technicised’ language, moreover, man does not simply master a range of linguistic meanings. He does so by assimilating the system of ideas and views that they express. Otherwise it would be quite impossible psychologically to master them. In other words, mastery of a system of linguistic meanings is, at the same time, as well, mastery of a more general ideological content, i.e. mastery of meanings in the broadest scope of the term.21

As we know, the dominant ideology in class society is the ideology of the dominant class, which reflects and consolidates the existing social relations. But we have already seen that these relations become enslavers of man, subordinating his life to themselves and creating inner contradictions in it. Just as the embodiment of human life in these relations is not its complete, genuine embodiment, so too, the embodiment of senses engendered by man’s life in meanings that reflect these relations that are alien to it is incomplete and untrue. That also creates the incompleteness and inadequacy of consciousness and of becoming conscious.

We must stress that although we are concerned here with the inner inadequacy of consciousness, its incompleteness and inadequacy cannot be eliminated in any way other than through a practical change in the objective conditions that engender this inadequacy; or rather, if those conditions are preserved, they can be eliminated only at the price of isolating consciousness from real life or through active struggle against the conditions themselves.

Man strives to eliminate the disintegrated nature of his consciousness. He does not strive for adequacy and truthfulness in his consciousness, moreover, in any way from an abstract love for truth. It is his striving for true life that is expressed in that; that is why it is so intent, and why it sometimes imparts such a really dramatic charac-

21 We once again draw readers’ attention to our dual use of ‘meaning’: sometimes as the meaning of a word (verbal meaning) and at other times as knowledge, as the content in general of social consciousness assimilated by the individual.
ter to the processes of becoming conscious — to the most cherished processes of man’s ‘inner life’.

This striving is different, however, at the different social poles, takes dissimilar forms, and has a dissimilar outcome.

At the pole of the ruling classes it takes the form of man’s denial of himself and his life, and therefore cannot be in any way permanent or lasting; the main point is that this striving is powerless and can only be realised in an illusory way, only in emotion.

Maxim Gorky demonstrated its negative form and its weakness in the image of the Gordeyevs and his portrait of Bugrov.

Ignat Gordeyev’s whole life was dedicated to the accumulation of capital, and in that his cupidity and cruelty knew no bounds. In periods of passion for business he treated people harshly and mercilessly; ‘he went about snatching up hundreds and thousands of roubles’. These periods were succeeded by others when he broke away from the shifting turns of affairs and another light was suddenly shed on everything for him. ‘Ignat Gordeyev seemed to sense that he was not the master of his affairs but their lowest despicable slave. And another spirit awoke in him — the fierce.’ ‘He seemed to be tearing at the chains he had forged and clamped on to himself, tearing wildly at them without being able to break them.’

Drinking bouts would begin, then days of repentance and prayer. “Dear Lord, Thou seest everything,” Ignat would murmur at last, pressing ...

Gorky recorded the words of a Russian millionaire, merchant Bugrov: ‘Another time, you come to your senses from the bustle of the day, and suddenly — your soul trembles, and you meekly think to yourself: “O Lord, does everyone, or most people, live in such dark clouds as you yourself?”’

‘It was strange to know,’ Gorky remarked, ‘that this man lived by the labour of thousands of people, and at the same time to hear this labour was unnecessary, was senseless in his eyes.’

This impotence of the striving for adequacy of consciousness is only a reflection of the objective inadequacy of man’s real, living relations. Psychologically it is explained in a twofold way, both by distor-

23 Ibid., p 10.
tion of the senses created by the relations of things to which man’s life is subordinated, and by the system of meanings, the ideology, that reflects precisely these ‘untrue’ relations of things. For Gordeyev’s life really remained one of the piling up of capital and took on substance in that. In its embodied form it subdued even his most intimate feelings and desires. He passionately wanted a son, but even that wish – so human! – acquired a distorted, purely possessive sense, “It’s a son I want, can’t you understand that? A son and heir! Who’ll I leave my money to when I die?...” And he would grow peevish and morose.26

At the pole of labour the striving for adequacy of consciousness is, on the contrary, the psychological expression of a real, living striving. It does not oppose itself, does not negate the real content of man’s life, but confirms its fullest development.

Labour, we know, acquires an ever more collective nature with the development of capitalist production; vast masses of workers are united, and close ranks, in the practical struggle against the bourgeoisie. In those conditions, which are workers’ life conditions, nothing any longer remains of the conditions that confirmed these dominant relations in their consciousness. Even the last patriarchal-like threads that disguised their true character have proved broken.

All that leads to both these dominant relations and the elements of new relations hidden in them emerging in their real, true sense for workers.

Initially, however, this sense is not adequately realised. To be realised it has to be embodied, to become socially developed meanings for consciousness that would reflect the real nature of the relations. But the meanings, i.e. notions and ideas that are dominant in these historical conditions are those that express bourgeois ideology. They are, therefore, of course, foreign to this sense. Their rooting in the consciousness of the masses also creates its psychological inadequacy and ‘untruthfulness’.

We have already mentioned the point that any inadequacy of consciousness or awareness is not an unimportant fact, but, on the contrary, hides an inadequacy of life itself, because consciousness is not only an ‘epiphenomenon’, not only a ‘side effect’, but also the sine qua non of life. A striving to overcome this inadequacy is therefore inevitably created.

The striving for adequacy of consciousness, however, takes a special form at the pole of labour in the historical conditions we are

considering, that differs radically from the forms we observe at the pole of capital. It does not give rise to a negation of, and withdrawal from, real life, to a loss and distortion of its sense for man, but to denial and rejection of the inadequate meanings that interpret this life in a distorted way in consciousness. At the same time it creates the psychological soil for assimilating adequate meanings and an adequate ideology, creates what emerges objectively as an attraction to a socialist ideology and to a scientific socialist consciousness.

The reason for this is that the sense of existing objective relations, if it may still be adequately realised in workers’ consciousness, and still has the form of unconscious sense, the form of instinct, is later realised in their practical life – in spontaneous struggle, in workers’ practical uniting and associating together. Being the real sense of existing relations, it is effective. The difficulties and contradictions of consciousness therefore do not take the form of helpless indignation with oneself, or of helpless emotion, but the form of indignation against the ideology that subordinates consciousness to itself and of a striving for true understanding, and knowledge. This indignation of workers against the fetters of capitalist ideology, and this instinct for true understanding, are well known and there is no need to give examples.

From the psychological standpoint we have an essentially new correlation here of the main generatrices of the inner structure of consciousness brought out above, though still within the limits of its previous general structure. It is expressed in the new role of the meanings and ideas assimilated, and in the emphatic force that they are able to acquire by adequately reflecting real relations.

The ideas that express these real relations, i.e. those of scientific socialism, which form a new socialist ideology under capitalism, are, as we know, developed by people who know science, who are eminent scientists, and who, at the same time fully understand the sense of the working-class movement.

The great role of the ideas of scientific socialism is comprehensively disclosed by the Marxist teaching on the inculcation of socialist consciousness in the spontaneous workers’ movement. We would simply like to stress once more a most important psychological moment typical of consciousness at this historical stage of its evolution, which is the new relationship arising between senses and the meanings and ideas now embodying them that we have just noted and that imparts a special role to them in life.

This relationship is such that man's becoming aware of senses, which occurs within the system of these meanings, gives his actions
new psychological features. They seem once more to get the full force and naturalness of instinct, and at the same time to retain the rationality and clarity of aims inherent in developed human activity.

The mounting force of these features is a kind of ‘psychological enigma’ for capitalist ideologists. Its link with the spread of the ideas of scientific socialism, however, is sufficiently clear to them for them to increasingly step up their struggle against these ideas.

This strength is finally converted, in certain historical circumstances, into a force of historical action that destroys the domination of private property relations and emancipates man’s labour. This practical annulment of the relations of private property and practical emancipation of human labour, which brings about the ‘reintegration’ (as Marx put it) of man himself, leads to a reintegration of his consciousness as well. So there is a transition to a new, inner structure of consciousness, to a new ‘formation’ of it, viz. to the consciousness of socialist man.

The main psychological change here once again consists in a change in the main relation of consciousness, i.e. the relation between sense and meanings. Like any change in a meaningful relation, it is impossible without a change in what is related, but it does not affect both parts of the relation concerned in the same way.

Its basis is the practical return of the subjective content of activity, i.e. of the real sense of activity for man, to objective activity, and the wiping out of the discrepancy and contradiction between them, that comes about as a consequence of the elimination of private property in the means of production.

The socialist worker, just like the worker in a capitalist undertaking, is occupied in weaving, spinning, etc. but for him this work has the sense precisely of weaving, spinning, etc. Its motive and its objective product are not now foreign to each other for him, because he is now working not for exploiters but for himself, for his class, for society.

The socialist worker receives wages for his work, so that his work also has the sense of earnings for him, but the pay is only a means for him to realise some of the output of social production for his personal consumption. This change in the sense of labour is engendered by its new motives.

The new motivation of labour is also a new attitude to the task of mastering the technique of labour, the instruments of labour, and production operations. As a relation of consciousness it is one of the sense of labour and of the corresponding range of concrete meanings, knowledge. These concrete meanings – knowledge and know-
how – now lose their foreignness to the sense of labour. Possession of
them ceases to be simply a condition for earnings or, if we have
the capitalist employer in mind, a condition for making profit, i.e. it is
a condition in both cases for getting results that have nothing in
common with the essence of production itself and its product. These
concrete meanings emerge for man in their reality, in their own con-
tent as a condition of high productiveness, of productivity. The thirst
for knowledge now, understandably, becomes much stronger.

This is a necessary condition of the forming of the new man’s
consciousness: for the new sense must be realised psychologically in
meanings; for sense not objectified and concretised in meanings and
knowledge is not yet conscious, is not yet a sense that fully exists for
man. The new sense of labour is also realised in mastering what is
called the culture of labour and that which constitutes its intellectual
aspect.

The realm of meanings now emerges quite differently for man.
Objectively it is expressed in this, that whereas, on the one hand,
there is mastery on the broadest scale of the wealth of experience of
human practice crystallised and reflected in this realm, on the other
hand this wealth now seems to appear to people in the light of new
personal senses. Everything genuine in it is brought out with empha-
sised force in consciousness and develops rapidly, while the illusory
loses sense and fades.

The new inner structure of consciousness arising, i.e. its new
‘formation’, above all also has this new relation of senses and mean-
ings. The new relation is by no means a return to their original simple
coincidence, to their simple fusion. It retains a developed form of
complex transitions from the one to the other. There is only a change
of sorts on the plane of senses that abolishes the phenomenon of the
disintegrated character of consciousness. Man’s consciousness now
becomes integrated in structure.

Does this characteristic of the structure of consciousness consti-
tute its truly psychological one? That point arises because the charac-
teristics of consciousness include a relation with social consciousness
and its ideological content that in itself is not, of course, the subject-
matter of psychology. A tool, for example, is, however, not in itself a
‘psychological’ object, but the inner structure of intelligent tool activ-
ity, like the process of handling a tool, has an undoubted psychological
content. In implementing man’s activity a tool so reconstructs it
that its more elementary constituent processes are thereby altered.

The separate acts are altered – both the outward, practical ones
and the inner, theoretical ones; the change of actions, too, gives rise
to a development of their modes and operations, and consequently of the meanings as well in which they are crystallised for consciousness. Finally, as modern experimental research has shown, the most elementary functions, too, are altered, depending on the operations that they realise; suffice it to mention, for example, that the thresholds of sensations can sometimes be altered several times over depending on what place a given form of sensitivity occupies in an activity and how the corresponding sensory operation enters into it.

It is this strictly objective dependence of partial processes on the general structure of man’s activity and consciousness determined by the concrete, historical conditions of their lives that also makes the change in human qualities and forces taking place before our eyes psychologically understandable, qualities and forces that are creating a new psychological image of man himself. Is it possible, for example, not to see the inner link between the fact that men’s real community has been disclosed to them without further distortion by the material form of their relations with one another, and the fact that previously dominant feelings have begun more and more to give way to new, genuinely human feelings?

For the difference between senses and motives is always also a difference between will and feelings. The brave deed whose motive is to enslave another man, to seize another’s possessions, or to get promotion, and the courageous action whose motive is to help the common cause have quite different psychological qualities of course. But there is also a psychological difference between great exploits when they are done under a contradiction in the whole of life (and therefore seemingly only in one sphere of the personality), and feats in which man’s personality is expressed in all its natural integrity and fullness; for only on that condition can the exploit’s moral force and inner beauty be perfect.

By ignoring the dependence of the separate peculiarities and features of man’s psyche on the general character of his consciousness determined by the conditions of his real life, psychology in fact inevitably comes to deny their historical nature. In trying to reduce man’s psychological image to his separate capabilities and qualities, psychology takes a direction in its research opposite to that of their actual forming. Everything therefore appears upside-down in it; the determined is depicted as the determinant, effect as cause. It sees even the motives of human activity in the subjective experiences engendered by them: in feelings, in the excitement of interest or attraction. Continuing its analysis in that direction, psychology finally finds the source of these experiences in the emotions and inclinations engendered in man, and in the peculiarities of his instincts.
The line that historical analysis opens up shows, on the contrary, that the human psyche’s properties are determined by man’s real relations with the world, which depend on the objective, historical conditions of his life. These relations also create the features of human consciousness’s structure that reflects them and that characterises men’s psyche in its actual social essence.

Without going into the problem of tracing the concrete history of the evolution of man’s psyche, we have limited ourselves simply to a very short sketch of its most common, historical ‘formations’. Even so this sketch has shown that what seems at first glance to be immutable in man is in fact only a transitional stage in his historical evolution. It makes it possible, moreover, to see something else, viz., that really free, really all-round development of human consciousness only begins with its ‘reintegration’, which comes about through a radical reform of society.

A new psychological structure of consciousness does not, of course, arise suddenly and immediately after a change in the conditions of being. It also does not arise of itself, spontaneously, without struggle and without an educating of people, without socialist ideology being inculcated in their consciousness. Active training of new psychological qualities, on the contrary, is a very necessary condition of its becoming.

The metamorphosis taking place in consciousness does not immediately embrace all aspects of man’s life or all his relations with the world. Here, as with the first display of consciousness, it does not happen so that all reality is suddenly being illuminated as it were by a new light; much still appears at first in the old light because meanings, notions, and ideas are by no means altered by themselves, automatically, as soon as they lose their roots in life’s objective conditions. They may retain the force of prejudices for man, sometimes requiring persistent struggle to undermine them in his consciousness.

On the other hand, the ‘reintegration’ of consciousness occurring is by no means, as we have already said, a transition to coincidence, to simple coherence of the systems of personal senses and meanings in man’s consciousness. The inner work, which is that of becoming aware of, objectivising subjective, personal attitudes to reality and to the system of socially developed meanings, is not only preserved but also does not become less complex and tense. There is only a sort of shifting of it to the sphere of more diverse, more profound, and finer living relations, which man must become aware of for himself and, as it were, ‘find himself’ in.
So men’s consciousness evolves psychologically, changing qualitatively, so that its old features die out and new ones take their place. At the dawn of human society man’s consciousness reached the stage of its primitive formation; only the subsequent development of the social division of labour, of exchange and forms of property, led to the evolution of its inner structure; at the same time, however, it made it limited and contradictory; a new time has arrived – a time of new relations giving rise to a new consciousness in man, and it is still difficult for us to imagine the whole vastness of the outlook for its future growth.

* * *

To end this short sketch it remains for us to sum up some of the theoretical conclusions regarding the fundamental approach to the psyche.

The points that we were able to cover did not, of course exhaust even the most important content of the psyche’s evolution. Our sketch cannot, therefore, pretend to be an essay on the history of the psyche’s evolution; the task that it has attempted is that rather of presenting a sketch of the theory of psychic development, or were exactly of investigating the actual principle of an historical approach to the psyche.

What are the general conclusions, that we have come to?

The traditional approach to the psyche starts from a difference in phenomena and processes of a dual kind. The first kind are the inner processes and phenomena that we find within ourselves, viz., sense images, concepts, emotional experiences, and at the same time processes of thinking, imagination, voluntary recall, etc. All these belong to the sphere of the psychic. It is they that constitute in the aggregate Descartes’ famous ‘cogitatio’.

By the word ‘to think’ I mean everything that happens in us in such a way that we perceive it immediately in ourselves; that is why not only to hear, to wish, and to imagine, but also to feel, are the same thing as to think.27

The other kind is the phenomena and processes that, unlike those of the first type, form the external material world. They include the material reality surrounding man, and equally his own body and the physiological phenomena and processes taking place in it. In their

27 René Descartes. Les principes de la philosophie. Première partie (Berlin, Paris, s.a.), pp 43-44.
aggregate all these phenomena and processes constitute the sphere of
the physical, the world of ‘extension’.

Thus two groups of phenomena and processes proved to be op-
posed to one another, and allegedly it is only the first that is subjected
to study in psychology. What then constitutes the specific difference
between this group and physical phenomena and processes? It is their
purely subjective nature, i.e. that they allegedly exist simply as data of
the subject's direct inner experience and have no other existence; for
any other form of existence would already be their existence in the
physical world, in the world of extension, and not of thought.

The approach to the psyche that begins with this distinction quite
inevitably, and with certain reservations, completely closes the book
of man’s practical, sensory activity to psychology, without which psy-
chology (as Marx remarked) cannot become a really meaningful and
real science.28

There is also another approach to the psyche. Its philosophical
basis is the theory of reflection. This approach also relies on a certain
initial difference, that between the material subject of life and the ob-
jective reality of things in which the subject lives, i.e. with which he
constitutes a special form of material interaction. In other words,
from the standpoint of this approach, the subject is not opposed to
the world like Fichte's 'Ego' but is linked in practice from the begin-
ning with it; life and the subject's vital activity really link him with the
object, implementing their interconversions, which are originally ex-
pressed simply as metabolism.

At a certain level of development of the material subject’s life,
specific phenomena necessarily also arise that reflect the properties of
objective reality in their connections and relations, i.e. reflect reality in
its physical materialness. This is the psychic form of reflection.

Psychic reflection, taken in the system of connections and rela-
tions of the matter of the subject himself, is only a special state of this
matter, a function of his brain; taken in the system of the subject’s
links and relations with the world around him, it is an image of this
world.

There is thus a real process in which the reflected engenders a re-
flection, the ideal. This process is also the material process of the sub-
ject’s life expressed in those processes of his activity that link him
with the objective world.

28 See Marx. “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,” MEClW
vol. 3 p 303
It is in consequence of the fact that activity in practice links the subject with the surrounding world, affecting it, and being subordinated to its objective properties, that phenomena arise in him that are an ever more adequate reflection of this world. In so far as the activity is mediated by these special phenomena and is, as it were, pregnant with them, it is animate activity.

At a certain, relatively late stage of evolution activity may be interiorised, i.e. may also acquire the form of an inner activity of ideas, but it remains a process implementing the real life of a real subject and does not become ‘purely’ mental, opposed in principle to external, directly practical activity. The absolutising of the opposition between them characteristic of traditional idealist psychology is only an ideological expression of the actual separation of mental and physical labour that occurred during the evolution of society, a separation that in fact has the same non-absolute, historically transient character, as the economic relations that gave birth to it.

This approach thus rejects the dualist opposing and isolation of inner, theoretical activity from outward, practical activity. It calls on the one hand for a clear differentiation between reflection proper, as an image of reality (in whatever form this reflection arises, whether as sensation, a concept, or some other form), and the processes proper of activity, including inner activity.

To reject this separation and confusion is at the same time to reject the idealist conception of the psyche expressed by them. It enables us to overcome the idea of the psyche as something that has a special existence of its own thanks to which it can allegedly form part of material processes, interact with them, implicate something in itself, etc. It is necessary to stress that specially, and to add a rider, because the very mode of expression of psychological concepts and relations to which we have become accustomed bears the stamp of this conception. We usually say, for instance, that something ‘happens in our consciousness’, etc., but that, of course, is only unavoidable homage to linguistic tradition.

From the standpoint of this approach to the psyche, the real history of its evolution emerges as the history of the development of a ‘split’ in the formerly simple unity of life, the beginnings of which gave rise to the primitive psyche of animals, and which ultimately found full expression in man’s conscious life. This history is, as we have seen, a reflection of the history of the evolution of life itself and is governed by its general laws: at the stages of biological development by the laws of biological evolution, and at the stages of historical development by socio-historical laws.
We think the historical approach to psychology can make it a science that is not cut off from the great vital tasks of building a new life, but will really help resolve the problems of building emancipated man’s life, guiding him to a higher, all-round, harmonious development of all his faculties and qualities.