(Chapters I - IV)

Tan Malaka (1948)

This cut down version of GERPOLEK is translated from the French, which is translated from the Dutch which, in turn, is translated from Bahasa. It should be used with caution therefore but will be useful as a crib when a translation straight from Bahasa to English is done. Nevertheless Tan Malakka had a great reputation as an educator of the workers and peasants using simple grammatical constructions to explain complex matters and this seems to come through. Note by translator and transcriber, Ted Crawford July 2007.

Source: Tan Malakka, “Le partisan et sa lutte militaire, politique et économique”, Quatrième Internationale, Vol. 9 Mai-juillet 1951, pp.10-17,

The Partisan and his Struggle Military, Political and Economic


The editorial board of FOURTH INTERNATIONAL is happy to be able to present to its readers, for the first time in French, an authentic text of the great Indonesian revolutionary TAN MALAKKA. It is the first extract of the booklet “The Partisan and his Military, Political and Economic Struggle” (GERPOLEK) written by Tan Malakka May 1948 when he was in prison by the request of the Dutch mission in Indonesia, slavishly carried out by the conciliatory government of the Indonesian Republic. This booklet reached us in the Malayan language; the translation was made initially in Dutch, then in French. Thus we cannot swear that it is accurate in every particular.

The booklet of Tan Malakka was written for fighters in the partisan formations fighting since 1947 against the forces of the Dutch army in the Indonesian archipelago. It explains in detail the views of the author on the partisan war. For Tan Malakka, the conduct of the military operations, the policy orientation to follow, the diplomatic discussions to engage in, the economic measures to carry out, constitute a coherent whole tending towards a single objective: the conquest of total independence for Indonesia and the social emancipation of the Indonesian masses. Written for a national liberation movement of a colony and being presented in the form of the expression of nationalism arising from an oppressed people, the booklet of Tan Malakka pushed the ultimate consequences of this revolutionary nationalism by giving it an absolutely clear proletarian class orientation. This orientation is in perfect agreement with the theory of permanent revolution, without mentioning it or using an identical vocabulary. Working class people must have a real interest in carrying out the war against the imperialism, and this interest will only be won if at least 60% of the owners of the means of production are expropriated. This idea is a leitmotiv in the whole text. In certain places, Tan Malakka expressed it with even greater clarity: “The plans worked out by a dozen “brain trusts” in the spirit of a collaboration with the large foreign capital will lead to the exploitation and the oppression of the workers and Indonesian peasants… The proletarians must put into execution an economic plan of great scale until the revolution ends in the victory of the proletariat.” For this consistent nationalist, the interests of the proletarian class are by no means diluted with a phraseology of “new democracy”, but clearly remain as the first consideration whatever the concrete stage of the colonial revolution which he is studying and whatever the concrete tasks necessary at this stage.

The brilliant and simple at the same time - one feels in Tan Malakka a teacher of the backward masses of enormous capacity to whom he manages to explain the most complicated problems of the military strategy – the booklet of Tan Malakka is limited to the problems of the anti-colonialist struggle in Indonesia. The international problems are only touched on, and only directly concerning the questions of the Indonesian revolution. That is why Tan Malakka does not deal with the question of Stalinism and just limits himself to some general observations. But when he deals with concrete positions, he each time differentiates himself in a very clearly from Stalinist positions. For Indonesia, the revolutionary program that he proposes opposes the opportunist tactic of class collaboration and conciliation with imperialism continued by the Stalinists until their criminal putschist adventure in 1949 at Madioen. When he deals with the question of the UN., he fights every illusion by which the UN could guarantee Indonesian independence, while explaining correctly that the Indonesian revolutionary movement must exploit to its advantage the contradictions between the various groups of powers and members of the UN. When he speaks about the danger of war, he says that this danger will remain as long as capital remains. When he speaks about Germany defeated in the Second World War, he speaks of a people oppressed by the victors. Isolated from the world in his prison, cut-off from the most basic sources of information, Tan Malakka oriented himself with remarkable class instinct even in international questions and one can only admire the clarity of this instinct.

Since Tan Malakka’s booklet was written, the situation has again greatly changed in Indonesia [1]. When the Dutch imperialist armies for the second time launched a military attack against the territory of the Republic, the Indonesian masses responded by a mass levy of partisans which, soon, was likely to throw the imperialists into the sea. Driven back by the threat of inevitable defeat, the government of the Netherlands transferred sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia and began to evacuate its troops. In exchange, the Indonesian bourgeoisie recognised the right of the imperialists to all their old property, and joined the Netherlands in a “Dutch Union” under the crown of the House of Orange-Nassau. The power of the revolutionary upsurge has since then transformed United States of Indonesia into a single centralised Republic and today directly threatens capitalist property. The PARTAI MURBA inspired by the ideas of Tan Malakka fights in the vanguard of the Indonesian revolution.

The lack of space prevents us from publishing the booklet as a whole. We will publish in this number all the first part which deals with the political problems of the Indonesian revolution. After this part follows a chapter dealing with general problems of military strategy which is not of particular interest to the Western reader. In the next number of our review, we will reproduce large extracts from the third and fourth part of the booklet, dealing with specific military problems of the partisan war and the economic questions of the Indonesian revolution.





We are on the edge of the abyss. In the economic, financial and military areas possibilities for us are limited in the extreme. Here is the result of two years of negotiations. The unity of the people in the struggle against capitalism and imperialism has been broken.

Most Indonesian territory is isolated, subject to the authority of the enemy, dominated again by the Netherlands. Several puppet States have been created and set one against the other. The economy and finances of the territories still administered by the Republic are in the greatest disorder. The policy of “rebuilding and rationalisation” of the army threatens to transform it into a colonial army, i.e. an army made from the money of the masses but separated from them and intended to maintain them in a state of subjection.

Such is the road followed since the revolution! When this broke out, 79 million Indonesians were united in the fight against capitalism and imperialism. All the sources of the authority were in the hands of the masses. The entire population took the initiative in creating an army and defence services which extended all along the coasts and included all the cities and all the villages. Firmly united it organised its defence and was ready for every sacrifice.

Is it possible to find the spirit of August 17, 1945? The history alone will be able to answer this question. But if history determines the course of the events, we cannot remain impassive in front of the dangers which threaten the country and are likely to lead it to its loss. I estimate that one of measures which can most contribute to save the country, is the creation on land and sea, everywhere, of guerrillas. It is to express my opinions on this subject that, I wrote this booklet. Admittedly it is regrettable that the author is not an expert of the art of warfare; however he had certain contacts with soldiers, abroad as well as in Indonesia, and he always felt attracted by the science of the war. The knowledge of which he made use in this work was born from conversations with soldiers and reading, a venture of a few years ago, of books and reviews devoted to the problems of the army. This knowledge is the result of a study which took me more than 3 years. The wish of the author, when he was young and was in Europe, to become an officer encountered many objections and important obstacles; but he had as a result, during the last world war, concentrated his attention on books and reviews devoted to military problems. The training thus acquired, was not lost later on, although the long years spent abroad has modified certain conceptions.

Between the four walls of stone and behind the iron bars, the author does not have any works which enable him to check the exactitude of his opinions. Under these conditions, it is possible that certain military rules which he formulates do not seem very satisfactory. I hope and I am convinced that the experts and the combatants will supplement him and eliminate the useless errors and developments that it includes. I hope and I am convinced that they will forgive me my errors and my useless comments. But the author, in his forced isolation, does not wish to rule on all military problems, essential aspects of the revolution; but only to draw the attention to their importance.

I wish my comrades in combat, who know military questions better than me, to take the initiative in writing a work on the art of the war. Similar work is necessary if one wants to popularise the art of warfare among the masses and the youth.

The technical subjects and the problem of the instruction were not tackled.

In this case I reckon that the Japanese instruction for 2 to 3 years and more especially the instruction in the technique and conduct of war developed during 2 to 3 years of engagements on the Indonesian battle fields are enough and are well-known to tens of thousands of soldiers.

I only want to draw attention to some military precepts which appear important to me. These are the principles which, beside other political and economic subjects, must be learnt by the partisans, be they officers or soldiers. The technique of the Spanish partisans which disorganized the armies of Napoleon; that of the Boers combatants who held in check the strong modern army of the English; that of the Russian partisans who during the Second World War which has just finished completely discountenanced the motorized German forces. This tactic is one of the most important weapons of the fight of oppressed and badly equipped people against an enemy with a modern armament.

I hope that this booklet, written hastily in the most difficult circumstances, will be able to be useful to young people, and to the heroic combatants of the proletariat of Great Indonesia.



Two revolutionary periods.
From its birth, on August 17, 1945, until today May 17, 1948, the Republic underwent many changes. During these two years, three quarters of existence, it only retreated from the economic, political, military and diplomatic as well as moral point of view.

We can divide the history of the Republic into two periods, one period of victorious fighting and a period of diplomatic defeats.

The first period, that of the victorious fighting, began on August 17, 1945 and finished on March 17, 1946. Its beginning was marked by the proclamation of independence, its end by the arrest of the leaders of the Popular Front at Madioen. The period of the diplomatic failures lasted from March 17, 1946 until today. It began with the arrests at Madioen and still continues, always marked by diplomatic negotiations.

What is the basis of this division into two periods from a political point of view?
The arrest of the leaders of the Popular Front showed the desire of the Republic’s government to transform the struggle of the proletarian masses into a purely diplomatic action; to replace the diplomacy of the “bamba run-tjing” (lance with point of sharpened bamboo) by a diplomacy based on negotiations, to replace the watchword “to negotiate on the basis of complete recognition” by that of “peace by the sacrifice of sovereignty, independence, the economic resources and the population”, or the sacrifice of all that had been conquered by the people during the first period. In short, the struggle until the departure of the last enemy was replaced by a tactic of concessions in order to make peace with the enemy.

What is the basis of this division in two periods from the economic point of view?
Measures which aimed at returning all the possessions of the enemy to the Indonesian people which had the right to them were replaced by a policy aimed at restoring all the foreigner’s possessions, including those of the enemy’s subjects; the construction of an independent economy intended to ensure the prosperity of all the Indonesian people (in so far as it respects the interests of all other people) was given up and there was move to collaboration with the Dutch capitalists and imperialists who, for 350 years, had oppressed and exploited the Indonesian people.

What is the basis of this division into two periods from the military point of view?
Inspired by partisan tactics and mobile warfare, the continual attacks, with the intention of driving out or exterminating the enemy, were replaced by the tactics of “cease fire” and by the evacuation of pockets in the middle of enemy occupied the territories. In short, the military tactics which made it possible to weaken and finally to overcome the enemy were replaced by a policy which gave the enemy the opportunity to be reinforced while we weakened.

What is the basis of this division in two periods from the diplomatic point of view?
It arose from the declaration of the former prime minister Amir Sjarifuddin before the Military High Court which dealt with the affair of June 3, 1946, that is the arrest of the leaders of the Popular Front at Madioen, as arising from the policy of diplomatic negotiations. According to the declaration of Amir Sjarifuddin, the arrest of the leaders of the Popular Front by the republican government took place on the written request to the Indonesian delegation by the Dutch.

This delegation was a republican contact mission which kept at this time links with English and Dutch representatives. The written request with the object of the arrest did not emanate from the government of the Republic. Thus it was inspired by foreigners, the English or the Dutch. It is thus about a “concession” by the Republic to the pressure of the English or the Dutch. The government thus carried out the arrest of its citizens, actually, at the request of the enemy. It was extremely regrettable for the interested parties; it was still more for the Indonesian State whose sovereignty was not respected.

What were the consequences of this new policy which replaced struggle with negotiation?
Over all Indonesia, in every society, in every party, in every military authority, the spirit of initiative, of decision, of unanimity, of the offensive, yielded place to acceptance, passivity, weakness, division and reciprocal mistrust.


If we draw up from the point of view political, economic, military and social, the profit and loss account the two periods, we arrive roughly at the following image


A. Territory.


All the territory of some 1,800,000 square kilometres of land and approximately 12 million square kilometres of seas was under the authority of the Republic.


In accordance with the recognition de facto of Lingadjatti, the territory of Java and Sumatra ruled by the Republic included only 550,000 square kilometres or 30% of the Indonesian territory. With territorial waters of Java and Sumatra we obtained only 600,000 square kilometres or 1/20 of all the Indonesian land and seas. But the agreement of Renville further decreased this territory. Six or seven isolated territories in Java and some in Sumatra included only 2% of the Indonesian land and sea.

B. Population.


The whole population of 70 million inhabitants was ruled by the sovereign authority of the Republic.


By the acceptance of the de facto recognition for Java and Sumatra, the Republic would count 50 million inhabitants, that is to say a little more than 70% of the population. But by signing the agreement of Renville with the creation of 4 or more new States… there remained only 23 million inhabitants, which is 33% of the total population, ruled by the Republic.


A. Production.


All plantations (rubber, coffee, tea, sisal, etc), all factories (sugar refineries, metallurgy, textiles, paper mills), all the mining companies (oil, coal, tin, bauxite, gold, money, etc), owned by the enemy or their allies, were under the authority of the Republic


The agreements of Lingadjatti and Renville recognized the right of foreign ownership, whether by nationals of a friendly nation or of an enemy State which had invaded the territory of the Republic.

B. Communications.


All the means of transport, terrestrial or maritime, were the property of the Republic and were subjected to its authority (cars, trucks, trains for the transport of the people and the goods of the countryside and the cities towards the ports). All the ships in service or construction, intended to transport the people and the goods of an island to another and from Indonesia to abroad, were in the hands of the people. Thus the Republic held the principal commercial tools. Through the property of most of the companies, minies, plantations, banks and means of transport, the Indonesian people could quickly have remedied their economic backwardness and have ensured a satisfying standard of living for everyone.


In accordance with the agreements of Lingadjatti and Renville, the Dutch have the right to retake their possessions. Thus they will quickly be able to dominate transport, both by sea and land again. When they again take the possession of the plantations, the factories and mines, they will again dominate domestic and external trade as at the time of the Dutch Indies. Already during negotiations, the Dutch secured the possession of almost all the plantations, factories and mines, as well as important ports. Through that they dominate almost all imports and exports. By blockading the Republic, its economic development was hindered



All mountainous areas and all the airfields being of military interest as well as many arms belonging to the people and to the youth of the Republic. Equipped with spears of bamboo with sharpened point, the people and youth had had all sorts of weapons, from hand grenades to the shells, from pistols to artillery, from warships to planes, everything was seized from the Japanese and the English. In the whole Indonesian archipelago there were not a single port, not a single city, not a single village accessible to the enemy.

All the roads were blocked by a thousand and one obstacles which made impossible any attack by the enemy on the people and the youth.


In consequence of the diplomatic negotiations, all the important ports, such as Soerebaya, Batavia, Palembang and Medan fell into the hands of the Dutch. Currently the Republic only has a few usable airstrips. By the evacuation of the pockets on the west and east of Java and of some pockets in Sumatra, the Dutch took possession of territories that months of engagements, using tanks, of guns and planes, would not have been able to gain them. By ceaselessly sending reinforcements and proposals for a truce when they were driven back towards the coast, by bringing the Republic to a policy of “rationalization”, the Dutch made sure of a much stronger position than during the first truce in October 1946.



The unity of the parties, organizations and combat groups, broken at the beginning of the revolution, was restored by the Popular Front, created on 4 & 5 Jan 1946 at Paerwokerto. 171 organizations representing almost all parties, formed bodies and military units were linked in the Popular Front to fight the enemy on the basis of common minimum program.


Hardly were the negotiations started and the Popular Front replaced by “National Unirty” that deep differences opened about the agreement of Lingadjatti. All the organizations, all the parties, all the combat groups were divided into advocates and adversaries of this agreement. Today we hear talk of “Sejaf Kanan” (“right wing” transl.), about “Sejaf Kienan” (“left wing” transl.) and about the tendency “more to the left than the left”. All the parties are divided. The P.K.I. (Indonesian Communist Party) was divided into three groups. The “old P.K.I.,” the red P.K.I and the P.C.I. The P.B.I and Partai Sosialis were divided into two groups. How many workers “fronts” and workers organisations did not exist until they agreed to unite! These divisions made it possible for the Dutch 5th column to be introduced into the organizations, the combat units, the parties and even the army, the administration and the government.


Sovereignty belongs, according to the Lingadjatti agreement, to the Dutch crown; a dozen puppet States were created; almost all the plantations, the factories, mines as well as the means of transport and the banks will be restored the foreigners; almost all the mining riches are in territories occupied by the Netherlanders; the Dutch army occupies part of Indonesian territory; the blockade of the Republic continues; the 5th column settles into the parties, the organizations, the army and the administration. Following the agreement of Renville, the government of the Republic will keep only 10% of the apparent authority which it still holds.



The word “gerpolek” is a combination of the first syllables of the words “Gerilja”, “Politik” and “Economi” (guerrilla, policy and economy).

Utility of the gerpolek.
The gerpolek is the weapon of the partisan in his fight for the maintenance of the proclamation of August 17, 1945 and complete independence.

The partisan.
The partisan is a young Indonesian, the proletarian who remains loyal to the proclamation of August 17 and complete independence and is ready to destroy every force that opposes to this proclamation and this complete independence.

The partisan does not let himself be influenced by the length of the struggle. He will do his duty with courage, perseverance and confidence even if the fight lasts as long as his life. He will cease the fight only when complete independence is achieved. The partisan will not lose courage if, with his own primitive weapons, he has to face an enemy with every modern armament. The fight of the guerrillas which will also be done equally from the economic and political point of view, the application of the “Gerpolek” make him happy and he fights ceaselessly, with an unbeatable courage, which can be broken only by the harsh climate, the enemy or by death. Just as Anoman was persuaded that by his strength and his intelligence he could reach Dasamuka, so the partisan is confident and believes that “Gerpolek” will guarantee him victory over capitalism and imperialism.



We can, according to the objectives of the belligerents, divide wars into two categories. This division is done on the basis of a clear contrast. The two categories have nothing in common. The division is thus absolute.

First category: the war of a dominating nation against another people with an aim of dominating it and of oppressing it.

Second category: the war of the people attacked against the attacker, or the fight for freedom against its dominators.

The wars of the first category are wars of conquest, those of the second of the wars of liberation.

The purpose of the majority of the Asian, African and European wars in feudal times was the conquest of land; these wars which we hear about stories and the fables, were wars of conquest. The wars of conquest in the capitalist epoch time, we call imperialist wars. The aim of an imperialist war is:
a) Seizure of the raw materials, of the industry and the foodstuffs of the conquered country;
b) The conquest of the market of the vanquished country in order to keep it for the industrial products of the victorious country;
c) The investment of the capital of the victorious country in the plantations, mines, industries, the means of transport, commercial exports, the banks and the insurance companies of the vanquished country.

These aims mean the enrichment and srengthening of the capitalists in the victorious country and the increasing misery, poverty and the cultural backwardness of the vanquished country.

But misery and oppression will give birth to a national liberation movement in the vanquished country which will tend to free it from exploitation and foreign domination. This movement of freedom will culminate in a war of liberation. It is these kinds of war which we classify in the second category.

In the feudal as in the capitalist epoch there were many wars of liberation.

The wars of liberation can be divided into two categories: 1st the war of liberation of colonial people against their oppressors to free themselves from their chains. Such a war is often called a war of national liberation.

The best known war of national liberation is that of America against the English imperialists. This war lasted approximately 7 years. But this war did not oppose two different peoples, but Anglo-Saxons with other Anglo-Saxons.

2nd a war of liberation of one class against another of the same people. This war is also called a civil war or a social war.

The civil wars can be bourgeois or proletarian. The traditional example of the bourgeois civil war is that which took place in France from 1789 to 1848. In this civil or social war, the bourgeoisie fought against the feudal class and the clergy. It ended in the victory of the bourgeoisie in 1848. A well-known example of proletarian civil war is the Commune of Paris during which the workers held power in Paris for 72 days.

In 1917 the permanent revolutions, initially bourgeois and then proletarian, took place in Russia. At the beginning the bourgeoisie managed to drive out the feudal class; during the second phase, the proletarians destroyed by violence the feudal groups, the clergy and the bourgeoisie.

One speaks sometimes about ideological wars, but this only hides the pursuit of political and economic advantages…



Analysis, since the proclamation of August 17, 1945, of the war waged against the Japanese, the English, and the Dutch.

The kind, category and character of the war in Indonesia.
The fight carried out by the people Indonesia since the proclamation of August 17, 1945 is not a war of conquest. Indonesians never have, during the fighting, intended to occupy foreign territories nor to oppress and exploit their inhabitants. The people and “Youth” of Indonesia had one desire: to free their country from foreign domination. It is for this aim that the Indonesian Republic was proclaimed and created on August 17, 1945.

From this what has been said it follows that the Indonesian struggle is a war of liberation.

Is the fight for Indonesian freedom only a national revolution intended to free the country from the foreign domination and will it be simply the conquest of political power?

The American national revolution did not have an economic aspect and occurred at a time when modern industry still did not exist, when modern trains did not yet run, and where the economy was still at a regional and workshop stage.

It is undoubtedly because America was in this state that the English could give it up easily. They did not leave behind them factories, plantations, mines, railroads and dockyards. The country which they gave up was inhabited by English and those retook sovereignty and the political authority.

The Dutch, on the other hand, who are owners of the plantations, mines, the factories, the railroads, and the dockyards, will probably not give up sovereignty and the political authority so easily to people with a different language, culture and interests, the Indonesian people. Furthermore Indonesians are generally not owners of companies, factories, banks and important means of transport. In the eyes of the Dutch, the transfer of sovereignty and political authority to the Indonesian people constitute a threat to their properties and their fellow-citizens in the archipelago. They fear that the Republic would put too heavy taxes on their companies or even weaken their rights of ownership. They fear that the Indonesian workers would go on strike, or that Indonesians would seize their property completely. In short, the Dutch will not give up sovereignty and total political authority over the Indonesians without a fight.

In addition, the transfer of sovereignty and the political authority does not constitute in itself a victory of the proletariat. If the transfer of sovereignty meant that all the government posts were occupied by people like Professor Hossein Djajadi-ningrau, colonel Adbul Kadir and the Sultan Hamid, while the economic life remained dominated by the foreigners, the national revolution would not have changed the situation for the masses at the time of the “Dutch Indies”. In short, just national independence, or just political independence is not important for the proletariat, the workers, the peasants and all the non-propertied classes.

In Indonesia, the Dutch cannot abandon their political rights without at the same time endangering their capitalist interests. The Indonesian people cannot ensure their survival by limiting their action to obtaining political rights, without questioning the economic domination of the foreign capitalists. The economic questions and political are closely linked.

The struggle for the freedom of the Indonesian proletariat is a fight for political and economic independence without it being possible to dissociate the political, economic and social objectives. The fight to free Indonesia does not only tend to eliminate political imperialism but also to the suppression of economic exploitation and gaining of the right to the life in the new society. The Indonesian revolution is not a simple national revolution such as some Indonesians want whose only aim is maintaining or improving their own situation, while being ready to yield the sources of all riches to foreigners, whether they are allies or enemies of the nation. The revolution must associate the economic and social measures with those aiming at carrying out complete independence. The revolution cannot be victorious if it does not go beyond the limits of a national revolution.

The fight to free the Indonesian people must get social and economic guarantees.

It is only when, along with all political power, the Indonesian proletariat can control 60% of the economic power that the national revolution will have reached its meaning. It is only then that the existence of the Indonesian proletariat will reach it full significance. It is only then that it will try actively to resist the enemy and that it will sacrifice itself to create a new society for its benefit and that of the following generations.

That will be only when the representatives of the people - elected officials by the Indonesian people in general, direct and secret democratic elections - have political power in their hands and that in addition 60% of the plantations, factories, mining, transport and banks will be in the hands of the people when the national revolution will have attained its full significance and will be able to ensure the future of the proletariat. But if the lackeys of foreign capitalists again control the country - even if these lackeys are Indonesians - and if 100% of the modern businesses fall into the hands of the capitalists as at the time of the “Dutch Indies”, then the national revolution will be the negation of the Proclamation and national independence, and the beginning of the return of the capitalists and the imperialists.

Existing independent Indonesia has since August 17, 1945, seen in the aggression of the Dutch who attacked the Indonesian Republic with an aim of destroying it, the right to confiscate all the goods of the attackers.

The proclamation of the independence of the Indonesian people, made on the 17th August 1945, is not contrary to the international law which recognises the right of every people to determine its fate.

The Indonesian people decided on August 17 to create an independent State and to break all the chains with which the foreigners had bound them.

In addition, always in accordance with the international law - any people attacked by another has a right to defend themselves in arms and to confiscate the goods of the attacker. The attack of the Dutch on the Republic thus provides the Indonesian people with a fine excuse to confiscate, i.e. to seize without compensation, all the goods of the Dutch who anyway are only the product of the land and the work of the Indonesian proletarians for 350 years.

The partisan must thus regard the defence of complete independence and the confiscation of all the enemy goods as a unique opportunity, fallen from the sky and offered to Indonesians so that they can carry out an important task and a sacred work.

Only people without intelligence do not see this opportunity. Only cowards and dishonest persons cannot wish to achieve a task which, if it is heavy, will be however of fundamental importance for present and future society.

[1] See on this subject the article. Van der Kolk: “The Independence of Indonesia” (December issue of 1949-January 1950 of Quatrième Internationale).
(to be followed.)