Marx’s Ethnographical Notebooks, c. 1881
Part III: Excerpts from Henry Sumner Maine,
Lectures on the Early History of Institutions, 1875

Source: The Ethnographical Notebooks of Karl Marx, transcribed and edited, with an introduction by Lawrence Krader, published by Van Gorcum & Co., 1972, pp. 287-336;
Transcribed: by Andy Blunden and Chris Clayton.
For .bmp images of scan, see directory listing

[160] Sir Henry Sumner Maine: “Lectures on the Early History of Institutions. London 1875.”

In d. Uebersetzten d. Brehon Laws – an assemblage of law tracts, wichtigsten:

Senchus Mor (Great Book of the Ancient Law), and the Book of Aicill. Nach Mr. Whitley Stokes das erstere compiled in od. kurz vor 11 Jhdt; d. Buch v. Aicill ein Jhdt fruher. (12)

Edmund Spenser: “’View of the State of Ireland.”

Sir John Davies.

Laws of Wales.

Brehons a class of professional Irish Lawyers, whose occupation became hereditary.

[De] B[ello] G[allico] Caesar. VI, 13, 14:

The learned writer of one of the modern prefaces prefixed to the Third Volume of the Ancient Law contends that the administration of the Brehon system consisted in references to arbitration (p. 38) (See “Ancient Laws of Ireland”) Will ein vornehmer Mann seine Schuld (a claim upon him) nicht discharge, Senchus Mor tells you to “fast upon him” (1.c. Ancient Laws etc. vol. I, p. 113) Dies identisch mit was d. Hindu call “sitting dharna’’ (39, 40).

Alle Pfaffenautorität in Irld ging naturlich, nach d. conversion d. Irish Celts über an d. “tribes of the saints’’ (the missionary monastic societies founded on all parts of the island u. d. multitude of bishops dependent on them. D. religious Theil der old Laws daher superseded, ausser so far as the legal rules exactly coincided with the rules of the new Christian code, the “law of the letter.” (38) The one object of the Brehons was to force disputants to refer their quarrels to a Brehon, or to some person in authority advised by a Brehon, and thus a vast deal of the law tends to run into the Law of Distress, which declares the various methods by which a man can be compelled through seizure of his property to consent to an arbitration. (38, 39) The Brehon appears to have invented (dch hypothetische Conjecturen, i.e. purely hypothetical cases) the facts which he used as the framework for his legal doctrine. His invention necessarily limited by his experience, and hence the cases suggested in the law tracts ... throw light on the society amid which they were composed. (43, 44) The “law of nature” meint d. ancient law (custom) explained by the Brehons, u. dies bindend as far as it coincided with the “law of the letter” (i.e. dem Christlichen Kram). (50) The Brehon did claim that St. Patrick and the other great Irish Saints had sanctioned the law which he declared, and that some of them even revised it. (51)

Dch d. Churchmen, die mit notions of roman law [rather ditto of canonical law] more or less imbued, kam auch d. röm Einfluss (- so far as it goes -) on Brehon law. (55) Daraus im Interesse d. Kirche Testament derived (“Will”); ebenso conception of “Contract” (the “sacredness of promisesetc. sehr wichtig fur Pfaffen) Eine Unterabtheilg (published) des Senchus Mor, nämlich Corus Bescna chiefly concerned mit “Contract” u. zeigt sich darin that the material interests of the Church furnished one principal motive for (its) compilation. (56)

Nach d. Brehon law giebts 2 Sorten of “contract”: “a valid contract, and an invalid contract.”.. Anciently, the power of contract is limited on all sides ... by the rights of family, distant kinsmen, co-villagers, tribe, Chief, and, if you contract (spater mit Christenthum) adversely to the Church, by the rights of the Church. The Corus Bescna is in great part a treatise on these ancient limitations. (57, 58)

The “Book of Aicill” provides for the legitimation not only of the bastard, but of the adulterine bastard, and measures the compensation to be paid to the putative father. The tract on “Social Connections” appears to assume that the temporary cohabitation of the sexes is part of the accustomed order of society, and on this assumption it minutely regulates the mutual rights of the parties, showing an especial care for the rights of the woman, even to the extent of reserving to her the value of her domestic services during her residence in the common dwelling. (59) Dieser tract on “Social Connections” notices a “first” wife. (61) Dies halt Maine für Kitcheneinfluss, kommt aber überall in higher state of savagery vor, z.B. bei [161] Red Indians. The common view seems to have been that (d. christliche) chastity ... the professional virtue of a special class, (monk, bishop, etc) (61) (Die flgden “Extracts” zeigen, einerseits dass Herr Maine sich noch nicht aneignen konnte was Morgan noch nicht gedruckt hatte, andrerseits, dass er Sachen die sich u. a. schon bei Niebuhr finden, darzustellen sucht as “pointed out” by the identical Henry Sumner Maine! -: “From the moment when a tribal community settles down finally (dies “finally"! absurd, da der tribe, wie wir sehr oft finden, having once settled down, migrates de nouveau u. settles again, either voluntarily, or forced to do so somewhere else) upon a definite space of land, the Land begins to be the base of society in place of the kinship. The change is extremely gradual etc.—(72) [Dies zeigt nur, wie wenig er d. point of transition kennt.] Er fuhrt fort: “The constitution of the Family through actual blood-relationship is of course an observable fact, but, for all groups of men larger than the Family, the Land on which they live tends to become the bond of Union between them, at the expense of kinship, ever more and more vaguely conceived.” (72, 73) [Dies zeigt, wie wenig die Gens a fact observed by the identical Maine is!] “Some years ago I pointed out (“Ancient Law,” p. 103 sq.) the evidence furnished by the history of International Law that the notion of territorial sovereignty, which is the basis of the international system, and which is inseparably connected with dominion over a definite area of land, very slowly substituted itself for the notion of tribal sovereignty.” (73) Nach Herrn Maine, first: Hindoo joint Family, 2nd, Household Community of the Southern Slavonians, 3 d) the true Village Community as found first in Russia and next in India. [Dies “first” u. “next” bezieht sich nur auf d. relative periods worin these things dem great Maine bekannt geworden.] (78)

Ohne d. collapse der “smaller social groups” and the decay of the authority which, whether popularly or autocratically governed, they possessed over the men composing them, wie sagt d. wurdige Maine, (we) “should never have had several great Conceptions which lie at the base of our stock of thought” (86) u. zwar sind these great conception(s): “the conception of land as an exchangeable commodity, differing only from others in the limitation of the supply” (86, 87), “the theory of Sovereignty’’, or (in other words) of a portion in each community possessing unlimited coercive force over the rest,”the theory of Law as exclusively the command of a sovereign One or Number,” “the ever increasing activity of legislation” u. – [asinus!] – der test of the value of legislation ... viz: “the greatest happiness of the greatest number.” (87)

The form of private ownership in land which grew out of the appropriation of portions of the tribal domain to individual households of tribesmen is plainly recognized by the Brehon lawyers; yet the rights of private owners are limited by the controlling rights of a brotherhood of kinsmen, and the control is in some respects even more stringent than that exercised over separate property by an Indian village community. (89, 90) Dasselbe Wort: “Fine” or Family (?) is applied to all the subdivisions of the Irish society, von d. Tribe in its largest extension u. all intermediate bodies down to the Family (in the present sense), and even for portions of the Family.” (Sullivan, Brehon Lan,. Introduction’’.) (go) Sept = sub-tribe, or joint Family in d. Brehon tracts. (91) The chief for the time being was, as the Anglo-lrish judges called him in the famous “Case of Gavelkind,” the caput cognationis. (91) Not only was the Tribe or Sept named after its eponymous ancestor, but the territory which it occupied also derived from him the name which was in commonest use – so wie “O’Brien’s Country” or “Macleod’s Country.” (l.c.) Von portions des land occupied by fragments of the tribe some are under minor chiefs or “flaiths” (93) All the unappropriated tribe-lands are in a more especial way the property of the tribe as a whole, and no portion can theoretically the subjected to more than a temporary occupation. (93) Among the holders of tribe-land are groups of men calling themselves tribesmen, bilden in reality associations formed by contract, chiefly for the | purpose of pasturing cattle. (l.c.) [162] Auf dem “waste” – common tribeland not occupied – Stucke bestandig brought under tillage or permanent pasture by settlements of tribesmen, and upon it cultivators of servile status are permitted to squat, particularly towards the border. It is the part des territory woruber d. authority des Chief tends steadily to increase, u. here he settles his “fuidhir” or stranger-tenants, a very important class – the outlaws and “broken” men from other tribes who come to him for protection ... are only connected with their new tribe by their dependence on its chief, and through the responsibility which he incurs for them. (92)

Particular families manage to elude the theoretically periodical re-division of the common patrimony of the group; others obtain allotments with its consent as the reward of service or the a<p>panage of office; and there is a constant transfer of lands to the Church, and an intimate intermixture of tribal rights with ecclesiastical rights ... Brehon law shows that by the time it was put into shape, causes etc. tending to result in Several Property ... had largely taken effect. (95) The severance of land from the common territory appears most complete in the case of Chiefs, many of whom have large private estates held under ordinary tenure in addition to the demesne specially attached to their signory. (l.c.)

Dieser asinus bildet sich ein dass “modern research ... conveys a stronger impression than ever of a wide separation between the Aryan race and races of other stocks (!) but it suggests that many, perhaps most, of the differences in kind alleged to exist between Aryan sub-races are really differences merely in degree of development. (96)

Anfang d. XVII Jhdts erklärten d. Anglo-Irish Judges the English Common Law to be in force throughout Ireland, u. so seit dem lausigen James I all land to descend to the eldest son of the last owner, unless its devolution was otherwise determined by settlement or will. Der Sir John Davis, in seinem report of the case u. d. arguments before the Court, recites that hitherto all land in Ireland had descended under the rule of Tanistry oder those of Gavelkind. Was dieser Davis2 sich einbildet as system of inheritance, called Gavelkind, he (Davis)2 describes so: “When a landowning member of an Irish Sept died, its chief made a re-distribution of all the lands of the Sept. He did not divide the estate of the dead man among his children, but used it to increase the allotments of the various households of which the Sept was made up. Aber was diesen English judges nur als “systems of succession” erscheint, war “ancient mode of enjoyment during life”. (99) So in the Hindoo Joint Undivided Family the stirpes or stocks, dem European law nur bekannt as branches of inheritors, are actual divisions of the family, and live together in distinct parts of the common dwelling. (Calcutta Review, July 1874, p. 208) (100)

Rundale holdings in part of Ireland; jetzt meist common form: “arable land held in severalty” (dies beschreffit d. Sache falsch!), while pasture u. bog are in common. Aber noch vor 50 Jahren, cases were frequent wo d. arable land divided in farms which shifted among the tenant-families periodically, and sometimes annually. (101) Nach Maine “the Irish holdings “in rundale” are not forms of property, but modes of appropriation”, aber d. Bursche selbst bemerkt: “archaic kinds of tenancy are constantly evidence of ancient forms of proprietorship.... Superior ownership arises through purchase from small allodial proprietors (?), through colonization of village waste-lands become in time the lord’s waste, or (in an earlier stage) through the sinking whole communities of peasants into villeinage, and through a consequent transformation of the legal theory of their rights. Aber selbst wenn a Chief or Lord has come to be recognized as legal owner of the whole tribal domain, or of great portions of it, the accustomed methods of occupation and cultivation” are not altered. (102)

D. chief Brehon law tract setting forth the mutual rights of the collective tribe and of individual tribesmen or households of tribesmen in respect of tribal property, is called the Corus Besena, printed in the third volume of the official edition. (103) Das was die ganze Sache verdunkelt ist the “strong and palpable bias of the compiler towards the interest of the Church; indeed, part of the tract is avowedly devoted to the law of Church property and of the organisation of religious houses. When this writer affirms that, under certain circumstances, a tribesman may grant or contract away tribal land, his ecclesiastical leaning constantly suggests a doubt as to his legal doctrine. (104)

In the Germanic countries, their (d. christl. Pfaffen) ecclesiastical societies were among the earliest and largest grantees of public or “folk” land. (Stubbs: “Constitutional History”, v. I, p. 104). The Will, the Contract, and the Separate Ownership, were in fact indispensible to the Church as the donee of pious gifts. (1.c.) All the Brehon writers have a bias towards private or several, as distinguished from collective, property. (105)

Weiter über the “Tribe” or “Sept” see “Ancient Laws of Ireland”, II, 283, 289; III, 49-51; II, 283; III, 52, 53, 55. III, 47, 49. III, 17; III, 5. Der collective brotherhood of tribesmen, wie der Agnatic Kindred in Rom, some ultimate right of succession appears to be reserved. (111, 112)

The “Judgments of Co-Tenancy” is a Brehon law tract, noch unpublished (1875), wovon sich aber Herr Maine, der nur d. Uebersetzg kennt, nicht d. Text, so pfiffig war sich vor d. Publication figdes mittheilen zu lassen: D. tract fragt: “Whence does Co-Tenancy arise”? Answers: “From several heirs and from their increasing on the land”; dann bemerkt der tract: the land is, in the first year, to be tilled by kinsmen just as each pleases; in the second year they are to exchange lots; in the 3d year the boundaries are to be fixed u. the whole process of severance is to be consummated in the 10th year.” (112) Maine bemerkt richtig, dass d. Zeitbestinimgen ideales arrangement des Brehon lawgiver, aber d. Inhalt: “First a Joint Family (dies statt gens, weil d. Herr Maine d. Joint Family wie sie in Indien existirt fälschlich als ursprüngliche Form betrachtet), composed of “several heirs increasing on the land”, is found to have made a settlement. In the earliest stage the various households reclaim the land without set rule. (!) Next comes the system of exchanging lots. Finally, the portions of land are enjoyed in severalty.” (113)

Herr Whitley Stokes hat dem Maine 2 passages occurring in non-legal Irish literature mitgetheilt. The “liber Hymnorum” (soll v. 11t Jhdt sein) contains folio 5 A: “Numerous were the human beings in Ireland at that time (i.e. the time of the sons of Aed Slane A. D. 658-694) and such was their number that they used not to get but thrice 9 ridges for each man in Ireland to wit, 9 of bog, and 9 of smooth (arable), and 9 of wood.” (114) Another Irish Msept, believed of the 12. century, the “Lebor na Huidre” says that “there was not ditch, nor fence, nor stonewall round land, till came the period of the sons of Aed Slane, but (only) smooth fields. Because of the abundance of the households in their period, therefore it is that they introduced boundaries in Ireland”. (114) Beide schreiben a change from a system of collective to a system of restricted enjoyment zu dem “growth of population ”. The periodical allotment to each household of a definite portion of bogland, wood land, u. arable land gleicht sehr dem apportionment of pasture and wood and arable land still going on under the communal rules of the Swiss Allmenden (l.c.)

Herr Maine als blockheaded Englishman geht nicht von gens aus, sondern von Patriarch, der später Chief wird etc. Albernheiten. (116-18). Dies passt namtlich für d. älteste Form der gens! – Dieser Patriarch – z.B. bei d. Morganschen Iroquois (wo d. gens in female descent!) | Der Blödsinn Maine ’s gipfelt in d. Satz: “Thus all the branches of human society may or may not have been developed from joint families [wo er grade die jetzige Hindooform der letzteren im Aug hat, dies sehr sekundären Character hat, u. deshalb auch – ausserhalb d. village communities thront, namentlich in d. Städten!] which arose out of an original patriarchal cell; but, wherever the joint Family is an Institution of the Aryan race (!), we (who?) see it springing from such a cell, and when it dissolves, we see it dissolving into a number of such cells.” (118)

Property of land has had a twofold (?) origin ... partly from the disentanglement of the individual rights of the kindred or tribesmen from the collective rights of the Family or Tribe ... partly from the growth and transmutation of the Sovereignty of the Tribal Chief. [Also nicht 2 fold origin; sondern nur 2 ramifications of the same source; the tribal property u. tribal collective body, which includes the tribal chief.] .... Beide in most of Western Europe passed through the crucible of feudalism.... The first (the sovereignty of the Chief) re-appeared in some well-marked characteristics of military or knightly tenures ... the other in the principal rules of non-noble holdings, and amongst them of Socage, the distinctive tenure of the free farmer. (120) In sehr oberflächlicher Weise: “The Status of the Chief ... left one bequest in the rule of Primogeniture, which, however, has long lost its most ancient form; ... in the right to receive certain dues and to enforce certain monopolies; and drittens in a specially absolute form of property ... once exclusively enjoyed by the chief (?), and after him by the Lord, in a portion of the tribal territory which formed his own dominion. Andrerseits: Out of tribal ownership in various forms of decay have sprung several systems of succession after death, among them the equal division of the land between the children u. has left another set of traces ... in a number of minute customary rules which govern tillage and occasionally regulate the distribution of the produce. (120, 121) Nach Arthur Young (Travels: 1787, 88, 89, p. 407) more than ⅓ of France small properties, that is, little farms belonging to those who cultivate them” (says A. Young.) Nach Tocqueville (“Ancien Régime”) the proportion was growing, dch d. extravagance der nobles which Court life fostered u. compelled them to sell their domains to peasants in small parcels“. (121, 122) The law of equal or nearly equal division after death was the general law of Frace; primogeniture was allzumeist confined to lands held by knightly tenure. “In Südfrankreich the custom of equal division verstärkt dch d. identical rule of Roman jurisprudence u. dort d. privileges des eldest son nur gesichert dch Anwendgd. Ausnahmsregeln des Roman law giving the benefit to milites (soldiers on service) when making their wills or regulating their successions, and by laying down that every chevalier, u. every noble of higher degree, was a miles im Sinn der röm. jurisdiction. (122) D. röm. Gesetz – 12 Tafeln – lässt absolute Freiheit der Verfgg d. testator; gleiche Theilung nur bei intestate (sui heredes), später erst d. Recht d. Kinder etc. Daggen (d. Willkühr d. testator) secured etc. Tocqueville (I, 18) “Ancien Régime” has explained that the right to receive feudal dues and to enforce petty monopolies made up almost the entire means of living für d. majority der French nobility. A certain number of nobles had, besides their feudal rights, their terres (domain, belonging to them in absolute property, and sometimes of enormous extent; d. rest lived mainly, not on rent, but on their feudal dues, and eked out a meagre subsistence by serving the king in arms (123, 124)

In Folge d. französischen Revolution: the landlaw of the people superseded the land law of the nobles; in Engld der | umgekehrte Process: primogeniture, once applying only to knightly holdings, came to apply to the great bulk of English tenures, ausser d. Gavelkind of Kent u. einige andre Lokale. (123, 124) Dieser Change was rapidly proceeding zwischen Zeit of Glanville [whscheinlich 33d year of Henry’s reign, hence 1186; Henry II (1154-1189)] u. Bracton [wahrsclich nicht later als 52nd year of Henry III, i.e. 1270; Henry III (1216-1272)]. Glanville schreibt as if the general rule of law caused lands held by free cultivators in socage19 to be divided equally between all the male children at the death of the last owner; Bracton, as if the rule of primogeniture applied universally to military tenures and generally to socage tenures. (125) Optimist Maine findet dass andrerseits “the transmutation of customary and copyhold into freehold property ... proceeding for about 40 years under the Conduct of the Copyhold and Enclosure Commissioners” u. dies betrachtet dieser comfortable Bursch as the English equivalent of the French Revolution. Risum teneatis! (see d. fellow p. 125) Dieser lächerliche Bursche macht d. röm. Form d. absolute landed property zur “English.form of ownership”, u. fährt dann fort:

“... to the principle of several and absolute property in land [das überall in occidental Europe mehr existirt als in Engd] I hold this country to be committed ... there can be no material advance in civilisation unless landed property is held by groups at least as small as Families; ... we are indebted to the “peculiarly” absolute English form of ownership for such an achievement as the cultivation of the soil of North America (126, wo grade alles specifisch English in landed Property vernichtet! O Du Philister)

The Norman nobles who first settled in Ireland are well known to have become in time Chieftains of Irish tribes ... it is suggested that they were the first to forget their duties to their tenants and to think of nothing but their privileges. (128)

Even according to the (Irish) texts apparently oldest, much of the tribal territory appears to have been permanently alienated to sub-tribes, families, or dependent chiefs ... d. glosses u. commentaries show that, before they were written, this process had gone very far indeed. (129) The power of the Chief grows first through the process anderswo called “Commendation,” wdch the free tribesman becomes “his man”, and remains in a state of dependence having various degrees ... ferner dch his increasing authority over the waste lands of the tribal territory u. from the servile or semi-servile colonies he plants there; endlich from the material strength he acquires through the numbers of his immediate retainers u. associates, most of whom stand to him in more or less servile relations. (130)

The Manor with its Tenemental lands held by the free tenants of the Lord and with its Domain which was in immediate dependence on him, was the “type of all feudal sovereignties in their complete form”, whether the ruler acknowledged a superior above him or at most admitted one in the Pope, Emperor, or God himself. (130-31)

D. abominable Freeman (“Norman Conquest” I, 88) erklärt sich d. Verwdlg d. tribe chiefs in feudal lords etc leicht, indem er voraussetzt was er entwickeln soll, nämlich dass d. privlged class always formed a distinct class or section of the community, sagt, l.c. “the difference between eorl u. ceorl is a primary fact from which we start.” (131)

D. chief source of nobility seems to have been the respect of the co-villagers or assemblages of kinsmen for the line of descent in which the purest blood of each little society was believed to be preserved. (132) “Every chief”, says the text, “rules over his land, whether it be great or whether it be small.” (132) | Aber the Brehon law shows the way in which a common freeman may become a chief u. zugleich ist diese position to which he attains “the presidency of a group of dependents” – (später wden diese Burschen erst Glieder einer besondern Klasse). (133) Wo aristocracy a section of the community from the first besondre Umstände, die notabene selbst schon derivative sind, nämlich, wo an entire tribal group conquers or imposes its supremacy upon other tribal groups also remaining entire, oder wo an original body of tribesmen, villagers, or citizens, gradually gathers round itself a miscellaneous assemblage of protected dependents. In Scottish Highlands some entire septs or clans stated to have been enslaved to others; u. ebenso frühest in Ireland met a distinction between free u. rent paying tribes. (133)

Im Brehon law a Chief vor allem a rich man (133), nämlich reich – nicht in Land, sondern in flocks u. herds, sheep, vor allem Ochsen. D. Opposition zwischen birth u. wealth, besonders wealth other than landed property, ganz modern. See Homer’s u. Niebelungen Helden; in späterer griech. Literatur pride of birth identified mit pride in 7 wealthy ancestors in succession, επτα παπποι πλουσιοι, in Rom rasch d. Geldaristokratie assimilirt mit Blutaristokratie. (134)

Im tract (Brehon Laws): “Cain-Aigillne” (p. 279) heissts that “the head of every tribe should be the man of the tribe who is the most experienced, the most noble, the most wealthy, the most learned, the most truly popular, the most powerful to oppose, the most steadfast to sue for profits and to be sued for losses.” Also personal wealth. [Aber Herr Maine, dies only in Status of Upper Barbarism, far from being archaic] the principal condition of the Chief’s maintaining his position and authority. (134, 135)

Brehon law zeigt dass dch d. acquisition of such wealth the road was always open to chieftainship. Portion of the Danish nobility originally peasants u. in early English laws some traces of a process wdch a Ceorl might become a Thane. (135)

Brehon law speaks of the Bo-Aire (the cow-nobleman). Ist simply a peasant, grown rich in cattle, probably through obtaining the use of large portions of tribe-land. (135) D. true nobles – the Aires getheilt [von d. Pfaffenjuristen, d. Brehons notabene; dies wie alle alten Pfaffenbücher (Menu f.i.) voller fictions in Interesse d. Chiefs, höheren Stände etc, schliesslich all das wieder in Interesse der Kirche. Ausserdem sind sie wie Juristen aller Sorten bei d. Hand mit fictive classifications.)] Jeder Grad unterschieden von dem anderen dch the amount of wealth possessed by the Chief belonging to it, by the weight attached to his evidence, by the power of binding his tribe by contracts (literally of “knotting”), by the dues he receives in kind from his vassals, by his Honor-Price, or special damages incurred by injuring him. At the bottom of the scale is the Aire-desa; u. d. Brehon Law provides dass wenn der Bo-Aire has acquired 2× the wealth of an Aire-desa, and has held it for a certain number of generations, he becomes an Aire-Desa himself. “He is an inferior chief – says the Senchus Mor – whose father was not a chief”. (136) Enormous importance of wealth u. specially wealth in cattle reflected in the Brehon tracts. (137) Wahrscheinlich the first aristocracy springing from kingly favour consisted of the Comitatus, or Companions of the King (138) Major Domus bei d. Franken ward König; das blood | des Steward (and Great Seneschal) of Scotland runs in the veins of the Kings of England. Noch in England the great officers of the Royal Council u. Household haben Vorrang vor allen Pairs, od. mindest of all Peers of their own degree. Alle diese hohen Würden [dies hat Maurer u. z. Th. schon Hüllmann lang gewusst vor Maine], wenn nicht marking an office originally clerical, point to an occupation ... at first ... menial.” (139) D. Household sprang von very humble beginnings. (139) D. stubbige Stubbs (“Constitutional History”) states that “the gesiths of an (English) king were his guard and private council)”, wobei er bemerkt, dass “the free household servants of a ceorl are also in a certain sense his gesiths”. D. Companions des king in the Irish legal literature nicht noble, u. associated mit d. king’s body-guard which is essentially servile

Wsclich dass in a particular stage of society, der personal service to the Chief or King was überall rendered in expectation of a reward in the shape of a gift of land. D. Companions d. Teutonic Kings shared largely in the Benefices, grants of Roman provincial land fully peopled u. stocked; in ancient Engld selbe class largest grantees (nach Pfaffen s’il vous plait) of public land; u. dies part of the secret of the mysterious change wdch a new nobility of Thanes, deriving dignity u. authority from the King, absorbed the older nobility of the Eorls. (141) Aber in countries lying beyond the northern u. western limits of the Roman Empire, or just within them land was plentiful. Es war noch im Mittelalter d. “cheapest commodity”. D. practical difficulty was not to obtain land, but the instruments for making it productive. (141, 42) D. Chief (Irish) war vor allem reich in flocks u. herds; he was military leader; great part of his wealth was spoil of war u. in his civil capacity he multiplied his kine through his growing power of appropriating the waste for pasture, and dch a system of dispersing his herds among the tribesmen. D. Companion, der followed him to the foray etc auch enriched by his bounty; if already noble, he became greater; if not noble, the way of nobility lay through wealth. (147) (Vergl. Dugmore: “Compendium of Kaffir Laws and Customs.”)

Whenever legal expression has to be given to the relations of the Comitatus to the Teutonic kings, the portions of the Roman law selected are uniformly those which declare the semi-servile relation of the Client or Freedman to his Patron. Nach d. texts d. Brehon Law a Chief of high degree is always expected to surround himself with unfree dependents u. d. retinue eines King of Erin was to consist not only of free tribesmen but of a bodyguard of men bound to him by servile obligations ... Auch ... wenn d. Comitatus or Companions of the Chief were freemen, nicht nothwdig od. gewöhnlich his near kindred. (145)

In d. Brehon Laws spielen grosse Rolle horned cattle, i. e. bulls, cows, heifers, and calves; auch horses, sheep, swine, dogs, bees (the latter = the producers of the greatest of primitive luxuries). Vor allem aber kine (cows). Capitale – kine reckoned by the head, cattle has given birth to one of the most famous terms of law and one of the most famous terms of political economy, Chattels and Capital. Pecunia. (147) The Primitive Roman law places oxen in highest class of property, mit land u. slaves as items of the Res mancipi. Kine, which the most ancient Sanscrit literature shows to | have been eaten as food, became at some unknown period sacred and their flesh forbidden; two of the chief “Things which required a Mancipation at Rome”, oxen and landed property, had their counterpart in the sacred bull of Siwa and the sacred land of India. (148) Horned cattle showed their greatest value when groups of men settled on spaces of land and betook themselves to the cultivation of food-grain. (1.c.) Erst für ihr flesh u. milk valued, schon in very early times a distinct special importance belonged to them as instrument or medium of exchange; bei Homer sind sie a measure of value; traditional story dass d. earliest coined money known at Rome stamped with the figure of an ox; “pecus” u. “pecunia”. (149) In Brehon laws figuriren horned cattle als means of exchange; fines, dues, rents u. returns are calculated in live-stock, not exclusively in kine, but nearly so. Beständig referred to two standards of value, “sed”, u. “cumhal”; cumhal soll originaliter have meant a female slave, aber “sed” plainly used for an amount or quantity of live stock. Aber, später, cattle hauptsächlich valued for their use in tillage, their labour and their manure. Erst nach u. nach as beasts of plough ersetzt dch Pferde in Western Europe (auch hier nicht überall); in still large portions of the world horse noch ausschliesslich employed, wie wohl ursprünglich überall, for war, pleasure, or the chase. (150) Oxen waren so fst einziger Representative of what now called Capital. (1.c.) The same causes which altered the position of the ox and turned him into an animal partially adscriptus glebae, undoubtedly produced also a great extension of slavery ... Enormous importation of slaves into the central territories of the Roman Commonwealth, and the wholesale degradation of the free cultivating communities of Western Europe into assemblages of villeins. (150, 151)

D. Schwierigkeit – in ancient Ireland – not to obtain land, but the means of cultivating it. D. great owners of cattle were the various Chiefs, whose primitive superiority to the other tribesmen in this respect was probably owing to their natural functions as military leaders of the tribe. Andrerseits scheint aus d. Brehon laws zu folgen that the Chiefs pressed by the difficulty of finding sufficient pasture for their herds. Hatten ihrer growing power over the waste land dr particular group worüber sie präsidirten, aber die most fruitful portions of the tribal territory whsclich those which the free tribesmen occupied. Hence d. system of giving and receiving stock, to which 2 sub-tracts des Senchus Mor are devoted, the Cain-Saerrath u. d. Cain-Aigillne, the Law of Saer-Slock tenure u. the Law of Daer-Stock Tenure. (152)

In Feudalgesellscft everybody has become the subordinate of somebody else higher than himself and yet exalted above him by no great distance. (153) Nach Stubbs (Conslit. History. I, 252) Feudalism has “grown up from 2 great sources, the Benefice and the practice of Commendation”. (154) Commendation, in particular, went on all over Western Europe. (155) D. Chief (Irish) – sei er einer d. many tribal rulers whom the Irish records call kings, or one of those heads of joint families whom the Anglo-Irish lawyers at a later period called the Capita Cognationum, – is not owner of the tribal lands. His own land he may have, consisting of private estate or of official domain, or of both, and over the general tribal land he has a general administrative authority, ever growing greater over that portion of it which is unappropriated waste. He is meanwhile the military <leader> of his tribesmen, and probably in that capacity ... has acquired great wealth in cattle. It has somehow become of great importance to him to place out portions of his herds among the tribesmen, and they on their part occasionally find themselves through stress of circumstance in pressing need of cattle for employment in tillage. Thus the Chiefs appear | in the Brehon law as perpetually “giving stock” and the tribesmen as receiving it. (157)

By taking stock the free Irish tribesman becomes the Ceile or Kyle, the vassal or man of his Chief, owing him not only rent but service and homage. The exact effects of “commendation” are thus produced. (158) Je mehr stock der tribesman accepts from his Chief, desto tiefer der status zu dem er herabsinkt. Hence die 2 classes of Saer und Daer tenants (entspreche<n>d dem status der free und higher base tenants of an English manor). D. Saer Stock tenant erhält nur limited amount of stock from the Chief, bleibt freeman, retains his tribal rights in their integrity; the normal period of his tenancy was 7 years, and at the end of it he became entitled to the cattle which had been in his possession. In d. Zwischenzeit hatte er the advantage of employing them in tillage, and the Chief erhielt the growth and increase [i.e. the young and the manure] and milk. Zugleich it is expressly laid down dass d. Chief überdem entitled to receive homage and manual labour; manual labour is explained to mean the service of the vassal in reaping the Chief’s harvest and in assisting to build his castle or fort; u. it is stated that, in lieu of manual labour, the vassal might be required to follow his Chief to the wars. (158, 159)

Daer-stock tenancy gebildet, wenn entweder any large addition to the stock deposited with the Saer-Stock tenant, od. an unusual quantity accepted in the first instance by the tribesman. D. Daer Stock tenant had parted with some portion of his freedom u. his duties invariably referred to as very onerous. D. Stock, den er vom Chief erhielt, bestand aus 2 portions, wovon die eine entsprechend dem Rang des Empfängers, d. andre der rent in kind to which t<h>e tenant became liable. D. technical standard seines Rangs, war des tenant “honor-price”, d. h. the fine or damage payable for injuring him, variable mit the dignity of the person injured. Mit Bezug auf die rent heisst’s im Brehon Law: “The proportionate stock of a calf of the value of a sack with its accompaniments, and refections for three persons in the summer, and work for three days, is three “sam-haise” heifers or their value” (Cain-Aigillne, p. 25), in andern Worten: Deponirt der Chief beim tenant 3 heifers so wird er entitled to the calf, the refections, and the labour.” Ferner: “The proportionate stock of a “dartadh” heifer with its accompaniment, is 12 “seds” – explained to mean 12 “sam-haisc” heifers, or 6 cows, etc etc. Diese rent in kind, od. food rent, hatte in dieser ihrer ältesten Form, nichts zu thun mit der value of the tenant’s land, but solely to the value of the Chiefs stock deposited with the tenant; sic entwickelte sich erst später in a rent payable in respect of the tenant’s land. Die lästigste imposition des Daer-Stock tenant sind dies “refections”; dies war nämlich d. Recht des Chief, der den stock gegeben hatte, to come with a company of a certain number, and feast at the Daer-stock tenant’s house, at particular periods, for a fixed number of days. D. Irish chief war wahrscheinlich, sagt Herr Maine, little better housed and almost as poorly furnished out, wie seine tenants, and could not have managed to consume at home the provisions to which his gifts of stock entitled him. The Brehon law defines and limits the practice narrowly on all sides, but its inconvenience u. abuse manifest; from it doubtless descended those “oppressions” which revolted such English observers of Ireland as Spenser and Davies19 (!), the “coin and livery”, and “cosherings” of the Irish Chiefs which they [these self~ righteous English canaille!] denounce with such indignant emphasis (!). Der würdige Maine, vergessend die Rundreisen d. englischen Könige u. ihrer Höflinge (see Anderson u. Macpherson) (vgl. auch Maurer) hat d. Frechheit zu vermuthen: “Perhaps there was no Irish usage which seemed to Englishmen (!) so amply to justify ... the entire judicial or | legislative abolition of Irish customs” (!) (159-161) Nach d. Brehon lawyers the relation out of which Daer-stock tenancy and its peculiar obligations arose, were not perpetual. After food-rent and service had been rendered for 7 years [Zeit die Jacob zu dienen hatte?l, if the Chief died, the tenant became entitled to the stock; wenn andrerseits der tenant starb, waren seine heirs theilweis, obgleich nicht ganz, relieved from their obligation. Wahrscheinlich d. Daer-stock tenancy, beginning in the necessities of the tenant, was often from the same cause rendered practically permanent. (162)

The Heriot of English Copyhold tenure, the “best beast” taken by the Lord on the death of a base tenant, has been explained as an acknowledgment of the Lord’s ownership of the cattle with which he anciently stocked the lands of his villeins, just as the Heriot of the military tenant is believed to have had its origin in a deposit of arms. Adam Smith recognized the great antiquity of the Metayer tenancy, wovon er noch in seiner Zeit found in Scotland one variety, the “steelbone”. (162) In einer der prefaces der official translation der Brehon laws Vergleichg gemacht zwischen Metayer tenancy u. the Saer u. Daer-stock tenancy of ancient Irish law. Die differences aber: In Metayage giebt landlord land u. stock, der tenant nur Arbeit u. skill; in Saer u. Daer stock tenancy the land belonged to the tenant. Ferner: d. ancient Irish relation produced nicht allein a contractual liability, sondern a status; the tenant had his social u. tribal position distinctly altered by accepting stock. [Wie leicht in ancient times mere contractual liability umschlägt, oder kaum zu ändern ist von status, Beweis z.B. Russld wo persönlicher Dienst direct in Sklaverei umschlägt u. selbst freiwillige Feldarbeit etc nur mit Mühe von selbem Umschlag zu schützen. Sieh darüber d. Weitere in d. russ. Ouellen.] [163] In Ireland the acceptance of stock not always voluntary; a tribesman in one stage of Irish custom at all events was bound to receive stock from his own “King” ... Dies the Chief of his tribe in its largest extension. In eingen cases the Tribe wzu der intending tenant gehörte had in some cases a veto on his adoption of the new position. Um d. Tribe opportunity to geben to interpose whenever it had legal power to do so, the acceptance of stock had to be open and public, and the consequences of effecting it surreptitiously are elaborately set forth by the law. Hence one of the rules: “no man should leave a rent on his land which he did not find there.” (163, 164)

Gehörten der Chief der den stock gab u. der Ceile der ihn accepted zum selben Tribe, so relation geschaffen verschieden von d. tribal connection u. much more to the advantage of the chief. Aber dieser Chief war nicht immer der Chief of the tribe<s>man’s own Sept or Tribe. Brehon law sucht Schwierigkeiten in d. Weg zu legen wo attempt dies vassalage Verhältniss zu etabliren zwischen a tribesman and a strange Chief. Aber abundant admission that dies vorkam. jeder nobleman assumed to be as a rule rich in stock, u. having the Zweck to disperse his herds by the practice of giving stock. Der enriched peasant, der Bo-aire, had Ceiles who accepted stock from him. Hence the new groups formed in this way were manchmal ganz distinct von den old groups composed of the Chief and his Clan. Auch die new relation nicht confined auf Aires, or noblemen, u. Ceiles (i.e. free but non noble tribesmen). The Bo-aire certainly and apparently the higher Chiefs also, accepted stock on occasion from chieftains more exalted than themselves, and in the end to “give stock” came to mean the same thing wie anderswo “Commendation”.... By fiction the Brehon Law represents the King of Ireland as “accepting stock” from the Emperor. Es sagt: “When the King of Erin is without opposition (wovon the explanation runs: when he holds the ports of Dublin, | Waterford and Limerick, which were usually in the hands of the Danes – “he receives stock from the King of the Romans”. (Senchus Mor.33 II, 225). The commentary goes on to say, that sometimes “it is by the successor of Patrick [dies statt “Pope”] that the stock is given to the King of Erin”. [164-166]

This natural growth of feudalism was not, as some eminent recent writers have supposed, entirely distinct from the process by which the authority of the Chief or Lord over the Tribe or Village was extended, but rather formed part of it. While the unappropriated waste lands were falling into his domain, the villagers or tribesmen were coming through natural (?) agencies under his personal power. [167]

The law-tracts (Brehon) give a picture of an aristocracy of wealth in its most primitive form; cf. über d. Gallic Celts Caesar B. G.3 I. 4, u. VI. 13. In ancient world finden wir sehr early plebejan classes deeply indebted to aristocratic orders. (167) Athenian commonalty the bondslaves through debts of the Eupatrids; so the Roman Commons in money bondage to the Patricians. (167, 168) In very ancient times land was a drug, while capital was extremely perishable, added to with the greatest difficulty, and lodged in very few hands ... The ownership of the instruments of tillage other than the land itself was thus, in early agricultural communities, a power of the first order ... it may be believed (!) that a stock of the primitive capital larger than usual was very generally obtained by plunder ... mostly daher in the hands of noble classes whose occupation was war and who at all events had a monopoly of the profits of office. The advance of capital at usurious interest, and the helpless degradation of the borrowers, natural results of such economical conditions. [168, 169] D. Brehon writers der Cain-Saerrath u. Cain-Aigillne, dch their precise u. detailed statements, plainly intend to introduce certainty and equity into a naturally oppressive system. [169]

Eric-fines”, or pecuniary composition for violent crime. [170] By this customary law, the sept or family to which the perpetrator of a crime belonged etc had to pay in cattle (später Geld) dies fine. [171]

Feodum, Feud, Fief, von Vieh, cattle. Ebenso Pecunia u. Pecus. Wie d. Roman lawyers tell that pecunia became the most comprehensive term for all a man’s property, so “feodum” – originally meaning “cattle”. [171, 172]

Nach Dr. Sullivan feodum Celtic Sprachursprung; he connects it with fuidhir. Nämlich d. territory jedes Irish tribe seems to have had settled on it, neben den Saer und Daer Ceiles, certain classes of persons deren status nearer to slavery than to that of the Saer u. Daer tribesmen. Diese classes genannt Sencleithes, Botbachs und Fuidhirs; diese 2 letzten classes wieder subdivided in Saer u. Daer Bothachs und Saer u. Daer Fuidhirs. Ersichtlich aus d. tracts u. namentlich dem noch unpublicirten “Corus Fine”, dass d. servile dependents, gleich den freemen des territory, had a family or Tribal organisation; and indeed all fragments of a society like that of ancient Ireland take more or less the shape of the prevailing model. D. position d. classes, obscurely indicated in Domesday u. other English records as Cotarii und Bordarii whclich sehr ähnlich denen der Sencleithes u. Bothachs; in beiden Fällen had these servile orders whhsclich an origin distinct from that of the dominant race, and belonged to the older or aboriginal inhabitants of the country. Ein Theil der families or subtribes formed out of them were certainly in a condition of special servitude to the Chief or dependence on him; these either engaged in cultivating his immediate domain-land and herding his cattle, or were planted by him in separate settlements on the waste land of the tribe; rente or service which they paid scheint von Willkühr des Chief abhängig gewesen zu sein. [172, 173] | D. wichtigste Theil dieser Klassen der settled by the Chief on the unappropriated tribal lands. Diese Fuidhirs u. ausserdem strangers or fugitives from other territories, in fact men who had broken the original tribal bond which gave them a place in the community. Aus Brehon law sichtbar, dass these Klasse zahlreich; spricht à diverses reprises von the desertion of their lands by families or portions of families. Unter gewissen Umständen wden the rupture of the tribal bond u. d. Flucht deren who break it als “eventualities” von d. Gesetz behandelt. D. Verantwortlichkeit von tribes, subtribes, u. families for crimes ihrer Glieder u. even to some extent of civil obligation derselben – might be prevented by compelling or inducing d member of the group to withdraw from its circle; and the Book of Aicill gives the legal procedure which is to be observed in the expulsion, the tribe paying certain fines to the Chief and the Church and proclaiming the fugitive ... Result probably to fill the country with “broken men” u. diese could find a home and protection by becoming Fuidhir tenants; alles tending to disturb the Ireland der Brehon Laws tended to multiply this particular class. [173, 174]

D. Fuidhir tenant exclusive<ly a> dependent of the Chief u. nur dch letzteren connected mit d. Tribe; Chief wde auch responsible für sie; sie kultivirten sein Land; sie daher the first “tenants at will” known to Ireland. The “three reins”, says the Senchus Mor are the rackrent from a person of a strange tribe [dies person undoubtedly the Fuidhir], a fair rent from one of the Tribe, and the stipulated rent which is paid equally by the tribe and the strange tribe”. In einer der glosses, was “rackrent” übersetzt ist, verglichen “to the milk of a cow which is compelled to give milk every month to the end of the year”. [174, 175] Andrerseits hatte Chief grosses Interesse to encourage these Fuidhir tenants. Heisst in one of the tracts: “We brings in Fuidhirs to increase his wealth”. D. interests really injured were those of the tribe ... which suffered as a body by the curtailment of the waste land availableforpasture. Vgl. Hunter’s “Orissa” wo shown wie d. “hereditary peasantry” of Orissa beschädigt dch d. broken “migratory husbandmen” etc. (Sieh Orissa, I, 57, 58) [175-177] Cf. Edmund Spenser (writing not later than 1596) u.** —Für d. comfortable Maine d. Irish Tenant question “was settled only the other day”. (178) Mit seinem gewöhnlichen Optimismus d. Sache settled dch d. Act of 1870 (!)

—**Sir John Davis2, writing before 1613.

—The general bias der writers der Brehon Tracts rather towards the exaggeration of the privileges of the Chiefs than towards overstatement of the immunities of tribesmen. [180]

The power of the Irish Chiefs u. their severity to their tenants in the 16th century being admitted, have been accounted for by the Norman nobles – the Fitzgeralds, Burkes, Barrys – becoming gradually clothed with Irish chieftainship had first abused it u. thus set an evil example to all the Chiefs in Ireland. [181] Better Theory of Dr. Sullivan (in his Introduction, p. cxxvi) wonach dies régime determined “by the steady multiplication of Fuidhir tenants”. (182) Und causes at work, powerfully u. for long periods of time, to increase the numbers of this class: Danish piracies, intestine feuds, Anglo-Norman attempts at conquest, the existence of the Pale, u. the policy directed from the Pale of playing off against one another the Cliefs beyond its borders. Dch dies civil war etc tribes far u. wide broken up, dies implies a multitude of broken men. (18 3) Dann wie in Orissa die immigrated cultivators at the disposal of the Zeminders make greatly rise for d. ancient tenantry the standard of rent u. d. exactions d. landlords – selber Einfluss d. Fuidhir tenants in Ireland; altered seriously for the worse the | portion of the tenants by Saer Stock u. by Daer Stock Tenure. [183, 184] Spenser: “View of the State of Ireland”.

In d. übrigens sonst kritisch nicht erwähnenswerthen: “History of Ireland, Ancient and Modern” (Dublin 1867) von Martin Haverty, wd bemerkt: “tanaisteacht (or tanistry), a law of succession, bezog sich auf “transmission of titles, offices, and authority.” Says Professor Curry: “There was no invariable rule of succession ... but according to the general tenor of our ancient accounts the eldest son succeeded the father to the exclusion of all collateral claimants, unless it happened that he was disqualified etc. The eldest son, being thus recognised and the presumptive heir and successor to the dignity, was denominated tanaiste, that is, minor or second, while all the other sons or persons that were eligible in case of his failure, were simply called righdhambna, i.e. king-material, or king-makings. This was the origin of tanaiste, a successor, and Holnais Flacht, successorship. The tanaiste had a separate establishment, as well as distinct privileges and liabilities. He was inferior to the king or chief, but above all the other dignitaries of the State.... Tanistry, in the Anglo-Norman sense, was not an original, essential element of the law of succession, but a condition that might be adopted or abandoned at any time by the parties concerned; and it does not appear that it was at any time universal in Erin, although it prevailed in many parts of it.... Alternate tanaisteacht did not involve any disturbance of property, or of the people, but only affected the position of the person himself, whether king, chief, or professor of any of the liberal arts, as the case might be; ... it was often set aside by force.” [Prof. Curry in: “Introduction, etc to the battle of Magh Leana”, printed for the Celtic Society, Dublin, 1855; quoted in Haverty, Hist. of Irld, p. 49, wo es weiter heisst: “The primitive intention was that the inheritance should descend to the oldest and most worthy man of the same name and blood, but practically this was giving it to the strongest, and family feuds and intestine wars were the inevitable consequence.” (Haverty, p. 49)]

By gavelkind (or, gavail-kinne) [common also to the Britons, Anglo-Saxons, Francs, etc] the property was divided equally between all the sons, whether legitimate or otherwise ... ; but in addition to his own equal share, which the eldest son obtained in common with his brothers, he received the dwelling house and other buildings, which would been received by the father or kenfinè – [Dies Wort “keitfinè” oder “Caen-fine” was (nach Prof. Curry) only applied to the heads of minor families, and never to any kind of chieftains], if the division was made, as it frequently was, in his own life-time. This extra share was given to the eldest brother as head of the family, and in consideration of certain liabilities which he incurred for the security of the family in general. If there were no sons, the property was divided equally among the next male heirs of the deceased, [Nach Curry: in default of any male issue daughters were allowed a life interest in property.] whether uncles, brothers, nephews, or cousins; but the female line was excluded from the inheritance. Sometimes a repartition of the lands of a whole tribe, or family of several branches, became necessary, owing to the extinction of some of the branches; but it does not appear that any such confusion or injustice resulted from the law, as is represented by Sir John Davis and by other English lawyers who have adopted his account of it. (p. 50. He quotes: “Dissertation upon the Laws of the Ancient Irish, written by Dr. O’Brien, author of the Dictionary, but published anonymously by Vallencey in the 3d number of the “Collectanea de Reb. Hib.”)

The Tenure of land in Ireland was essentially a tribe or family right … all the members of a tribe or family in Ireland had an equal right to their proportionate share of the land occupied by the whole. The equality of title and blood thus enjoyed by all must have created a sense of individual self-respect and mutual dependence, that could not have existed under the Germanic and Anglo-Norman system of vassalage. | The tenures of whole tribes were of course frequently disturbed by war; and whenever a tribe was driven or emigrated into a district where it had no hereditary claim, if it obtained land it was on the payment of a relit to the king of the district; these rents being in some instances so heavy as to compel the strangers to seek for a home elsewhere. (l.c. p. 50) (cf. ib. p. 2 8 Nte, ein (angeblich) Beispiel aus d. Zeit der Queen Mab!)

D. Hünde v. Engländern – man kennt d. Humanität dieser Bestien aus d. Zeiten Henry’s VIII, Elizabeth’s u. James I! – machten gross Geschrei über Irish compositio od. “eric”; vergessend dass sich selbiges findet in Laws of Athlestan, Leges Wallicae (Howell Ddla’s) etc. see l.c. p. 51, u. daselbst Nte✝.)

Fosterage prevailed, up to a comparatively recent period; Egl. gvt. machte oft stringent laws daggen, to prevent the intimate friendships which sprung up between the Anglo-Irish families and their “mere” Irish fosterers. By the statute of Kilkenny, 40 Ed. III (a. d. 1367) wden Fosterage and gossipred [gossipred or compaternity, by the canon law, is a spiritual affinity, and the juror that was gossip to either of the parties, might, in former times, have been challenged as not indifferent.” [Davies on Ireland, bei Dr. Johnson Diet. sub voce: gossipred.)] as well as intermarriages, with the native Irish, declared to be treason. Says Giraldus Cainbrensis (Top. Hib. Dist. 3, Ch. 23) “if any love or faith is to be found among them (the Irish), you must look for it among the fosterers and their foster-children”. Staniburst, De reb. bib. p. 49, says, the Irish loved and confided in their foster-brothers more than their brothers by blood: “Singula illis credunt; in eorum spe requiescunt; omnium conciliorum sunt maxime consoci. Collactanei etiam eos fidelissime et amantissime observant”. See also Harris’s Ware v. II, p. 72 (p. 51, 52 l. c.)

Eh wir ftfahren mit dem Maine, zunächst zu bemerken class 4 Juli 1605 der elende Jacob I [der zur Zeit der Elizabeth, before his accession den Katholikenfteund gespielt u., wie Dr. Anderson: “Royal Genealogies, p. 786” sagt, “assisted the Irish privately more than Spain did publicly”] issued a proclamation, formally promulgating für Irland the Act of Uniformity (2 Eliz.) and commanding the “Papist clergy” to depart from the realm. Im selben Jahr the ancient Irish customs of tanistry u. gavelkind were abolished by a judgment of the Court of King’s Bench, and the inheritance of property was subjected to the rules of English law. (D. lumpacii affirmed the illegality of the native Irish tenures of land; declared the English common law to be in force in Ireland, u. von da the eldest son succeeded, as heir-at-law, both to lands which were attached to a Signory and to estates which had been divided according to the peculiar Irish custom of gavelkind. Maine. [185] D. lausige Sir John Davis was King James Attorney-General for Ireland u. für diesen Posten war natürlich entsprechender Lump gewählt -ein ebenso “vorurtheilsfreier” u. uninteressirter Patron wie der Elizabeths Arschkissende Poet Spencer (“State of Ireland”). His remedy for the ills of Ireland, the employment of large masses of troops “to tread down all that standeth before them in foot, and lay on the ground all the stiffnecked people of that land,” u. zwar sollte that war nicht nur im Sommer, sondern auch im Winter gefführt werden, u. fährt dann fort: “the end will be very short” u. describes in proof what he himself had witnessed in the late wars of Munster” etc. See d. weiteren Cannibalismus dieses Poeten bei Haverty, l.c. p. 428 Nte.)

D. beswusste Zweck d. James was “looting”, was d. Bursche Colonisation nannte. Vertrebg u. Unterjochung d. Irish, u. confiscation ihres Lands u. Habe, alles das unter d. Prätext von Anti-Popery. 1607 O’Neill u. O’Donnell, noch in possession of vast tracts of country, the last great Irish chieftains, crushed. 1608 d. Chiefs im Norden, Sir Cahir O’Doherty etc crushed (ihr Revolt). Nun 6 counties of Ulster – Trone, Derry, Donegal, Fermahagh, Armagh u. Cavan – confiscated to the Crown u. parcelled out among adventurers from England and Scotland. Dazu benutzt Sir Arthur Chichester (Bacon’s plan gefiel nicht dem beastly fool James II), the lord deputy, der zum Dank erhielt the wide lands of Sir Cahir O’Doherty for his share in the wholesale spoliation. (see O’Donovan, “Four Masters”. Die reichen Spiessbürger der London City were the largest participators in the plunder. They obtained 209,800 acres and rebuilt the city (i.e. Derry) since then called Londonderry. Nach d. plan finally | adopted for the “plantation of Ulster” the lots into which the lands were divided were classified into those containing 2000 acres, which were reserved for rich undertakers and the great servitors of the crown; those containing 1500 acres, which were allotted to servitors of the crown in Ireland, with permission to take either English or Irish tenants; and, thirdly, those containing 1000 acres, to be distributed with still less restriction. The exclusion of the ancient inhabitants, and the proscription of the Catholic religion, were the fundamental principles to be acted on as far as possible in this settlement. Cox says that in the instructions, printed for the direction of the settlers, it was especially mentioned “that they should not suffer any laborer, that would not take the oath of supremacy, to dwell upon their land”. (p. 497-500 l. c.)

Irish Parlement berufen angeblich für “Protestant Ascendancy”, aber namentlich auch um Geld für James I zu pressen (whose insatiable rapacity u. stete Geldnoth notorious. (p. 501-503 l.c.)

Da der Raub vermittelst der “plantation” so gut gelungen, suchte James I Sache jetzt auf andre Theile Irlands auszudehnen; appointed commission of inquiry to scrutinize the titles and determine the rights of all the lands in Leinster; commissioners worked so rapidly, that in a little time land to the extent of 385,000 acres placed at James’s disposal [dieser “silly, pedantic fool”, der “British Solomon” lauded by Hume] for distribution. (Weiteres darüber p. 501-505 l.c.) See Leland. Der puritanisch thuende ruffian Arthur Chichester [der für jede neue infamy additional grant of Irish lands erhielt u. d. Title: Baron of Belfast, hatte 1616 sein Werk gethan u. withdrew from the Irish gvnment] laid down as the punishment of jurors who would not find for the king on “sufficient evidence” the Star Chamber; sometimes they were “pillor<i>ed with loss of ears, and bored through the tongue, and sometimes marked on the forehead with a hot iron etc.” (Commons’ Journal. v. I, p. 307.) (l.c. p. 5 0 5. nte✝)

D. flgde Passus in einem d. “famous” (why not “infamous”?) cases in which the Anglo-Irish judges affirmed the illegality of the native Irish tenures of land: “Before the establishment of the (English) common law, all the possessions within the Irish territories ran either in course of Tanistry or in course of Gavelkind. Every Signory or Chiefry with the portion of land which passed <with> it went without partition to the Tanist, who always came in by election or with the strong hand, and not by descent; but all inferior tenanties were partible between males in Gavelkind”. (Sir J. Davis” Reports; “Le Cas de Gavelkind”, Hil. 3, Jac. I, before all the Judges.) (p. 185)

[Dass Tanistry (see d. vorigen Ausz. aus Haverty) eine ältere Form (archaische) der Primogenitur, ist keine Entdeckg d. Herrn Maine, sondern wie d. Auszüge aus Haverty zeigen war von Dr. O’Brien, Prof. Curry etc lang vorher als fact angenommen. Es beruht einfach d<arau>f, dass d. Chief, sei es der gens, sei es d. Tribe, theoretisch gewählt, praktisch vererbbar in d. Familie (u. für tribe, rather die gens) der der defunct Chief angehört; meist ältester Sohn, relativ Onkel (modificirt dch descent linie); ist bereits eignes head verbden mit d. function, so geht dies natürlich mit d. Function.]

Von Gavelkind sagt Sir John Davis: “By the Irish custom of Gavelkind, the inferior tenanties were partible among all the males of the Sept, both Bastards and Legitimate; and, after partition made, if any one of the Sept had died, his portion was not divided among his sonnes, but the Chief of the Sept made a new partition of all the lands belonging to that Sept, and gave everyone his part according to his antiquity.” [186] [D. Irish Sept = Gens.] Skene citirt observation eines engl. Engineer officer in d. Highlands abt 1730: “They (the Highlanders) are divided into tribes or clans under chiefs or chieftains, and each clan is again divided into branches from the stock, who have chieftains over them. They are subdivided into smaller branches of 50 or 60 men, who deduce their original from their | particular chieftain.” (Skene: “Highlanders” I, p. 156) Was Davis describes passirt which in a Hindoo Joint Family in case of death of one of its members. [187] Dort nämlich, all the property being brought into the “common chest or purse”, the lapse of any one life would have the effect, potentially if not actually, of distributing the dead man’s share among all the kindred united in the family group. And if, on a dissolution of the Joint family, the distribution of its effects were not per capita but per stirpes, this would correspond to Davis’s Chief giving to each man ‘according to his antiquity.’ [p. 187, 188] Gavelkind entspringt aus d. gleichen od. period. Theilung d. Lands in rural commune; zuletzt “the descendants (aber vorher dies auch schon bei Lebzeit) of the latest holder take his property, to the exclusion of everybody else u. d. rights of the portion of the community outside the family dwindle to a veto on sales, or to a right of controlling the modes of civilation. ” [189]

Das was in Davis’s Report (sich oben) in Widerspruch scheint mit d. Brehon Laws, u. a. mit Corus Bescna (which deals with rights over tribal lands) ist dass er ausser rule of Tanistry nur die of “Gavelkind” kennt, whd in Brehon Laws andre (nicht tribal oder gentilician) “property” excluding the “Sept. ” Dr. Sullivan in Introduc. (Breh. Laws p. CLXX) says: “According to the Irish custom, property descended at first only to the male heirs of the body, each son receiving an equal share.... Ultimately, however, daughters appear to have become entitled to inherit all, if there were no sons.” (Dies analog dem Gavelkind of Kent.) Corus Bescna implies that under certain circumstances land might be permanently alienated, at all events to the Church. [191] Ist möglich, dass in certain time the Irish Gavelkind (in distinct sense d. Vertheilung unter Sept d. Landes d. defunct), the modern Gavelkind known to Kent, and many forms of succession intermediate between the two, co-existed in Ireland. The Brehon writers als lawyers u. friends of the Church [“Comfortable” Maine adds in his usual Pecksniff unctuosity: “and (it may be) as well wishers to their country”!] sehr biassed für descent of property in individual families. [193] Beständig kam vor in Irland u. schott. Highlands dass a Chief, ausser domain appertaining to his office, had a great estate held under what the English lawyers deemed the inferior tenure. D. Beispiele on record wo 2 grosse Irish chiefs distributed such estates among their kindred. Im 14 Jhdt Connor More O’Brien assigned the bulk of the estate to the various families of the Sept formed by his own relatives (also Gens), behielt sich nur ½ of a 3d = 1/6 vor, u. dies 1/6 divided er unter his 3 sons, reserving only a rent to himself. Am Ende d. 15 Jhdts Donogh O’Brien, son of Brien Duff, son of Connor, King of Thomond, divided all his land unter seine 11 sons, reservirte für sich nur mansion u. the demesne in his vicinity. Diese 2 cases getrennt dch a century. Im ersten Fall d. land had remained in a state of indivision whd several generations; in 2ten had been periodically divided. Der Connor More O’Brien distributed the inheritance of a Sept; Donogh O’Brien that of a family. (Vallancey: “Collectanea de Rebus Hibernicis,” I, 264, 265. Cf. Haverty. Maine exploits former Irish writers without naming them.) Connor More O’Brien scheint (!) to have paid regard to the various stirpes or stocks, worm d. gens sich branched out; entsprechend was Davis sagt dass d. Chief divided a lapsed share between the members of a sept “according to their antiquity”. In d. most archaic form der Joint Family (soll heissen Gens) u. d. institution which grew out of it, the Village Community, these distributions per capita, später distribution per stirpes, wo careful attention is paid to the lines into which the descendants of the ancestor of the joint-family (read: gens) have separated, and separate rights are reserved to them. Finally, the stocks themselves escape from the sort of shell constituted by the Joint Family (gens); each man’s share of the property, now periodically divided, (diesen Uebergang d. period. gleichen Theilung erklärt Maine nicht) is distributed among his direct descendants at his death. At this point, property in its modern form has been established; but the Joint Family has not wholly ceased to influence successions. [Keineswegs ist ddch “property in its modern form” established; see Russian communes f. i.] Fehlen direct descendants, it is even now the rules of the Joint Family which determine the taking of its inheritance. Collateral successions, when distant, follow the more primitive form – per capita; when they are those of the nearer kindred ... per stirpes. [194-96] | D. Theilung bei Lebzeiten, das sich bei beiden Chiefs findet, auch in Hindoo Joint-Family; auch Laertes in Odyssee, the Old Chief, wenn krackschelig, parts with his power u. retains but part of the property he has administered; daggen d. “poorer freeman” wd einer der “senior” pensioners des tribe so often referred to in the tracts (Brehon). [196]

[Es ist modernes Vorurtheil, d. Theilung post mortem, hervorgegangen aus d. testamentarischen Erbseft, als etwas Specifisches zu betrachten. D. Eigenthum an Land z.B., common selbst nach Verwandlg in privates Familieneigthm, nämlich common property d. family, worin jeder seinen ideellen Antheil hat, bleibt so nach Tod, sei es dass d. Familie zusammenbleibt, sei es dass sie faktisch theilt; folgt daher dass d. Theilung, wenn der Chief d. family (od. wie bei Hindoo joint-family der gewählte od. erbliche Repräsentant der family dazu gezwungen wd dch d. co-parceners) will, bei seinen Lebzeiten stattfindet. D. ganz falsche Vorstellung des Maine, der d. Privatfamilie, wenn in Indien auch in d. Form, worin sie dort existirt, – u. zwar in d. Städten mehr als auf d. Land, u. bei d. Grundrentbesitzern mehr als bei d. wirklichen arbeitenden Gliedern einer village community – als d. Basis betrachtet, woraus sich Sept u. Clan entwickeln etc, zeigt sich auch in flgder Phrase: Nachdem er gesagt, dass d. “power of distributing inheritances vested in the Celtic Chiefs” essentially dieselbe Institution sei, die dem “Hindoo father” reserved ist dch die “Mitakshara”, fährt er fort: “It is part of the prerogative (eselhafter Ausdruck für die gens u. Tribe verhältnisse) belonging to the representative of the purest blood in the joint family; but in proportion as the Joint Family, Sept, or Clan becomes more artificial, the power of distribution tends more and more to look like mere administrative authority”. [196, 197] D. Sache ist grad umgekehrt. Für Maine, der sich d. English Private family after all nicht aus d. Kopf schlagen kann, erscheint diese ganz natürliche function des Chief of gens, weiter of Tribe, natürlich grade weil er ihr Chief ist (u. theoretisch immer “gewählter”) als “artificial” u. “mere administrative authority”, whd d. Willkühr d. modernen pater familias grade “artificial” ist, wie d. Privatfamily selbst, vom archaischen Standpunkt.]

In einigen systems of Hindoo law, hat der Vater, der bei Lebzeiten d. Eigenthum vertheilt, d. Recht to retain a double share u. nach einigen Hindoo customs, nimmt der älteste Sohn, wenn d. patrimony theil end mit seinen Brüdern, 2 × grösseren Antheil als d. anderen. Aehnlich “the birthright” of the Hebrew patriarchal history. Dies nicht zu verwechseln mit Recht of the rule of Primogeniture. [Sieh oben Haverty, zum Beweis, dass d. irischen Vorgänger des Herrn Maine dies lange vor iihm constatirt hatten, wo sie diese Ungleichheit bei Gavelkind sehr genau scheiden von Tanistry u. auf Pflichlen d. ätesten Sohns etc reduciren.] Er sucht sich dann the double share plausible zu machen [sic sei “reward or security for impartial distribution” (!)] u. bemerkt das sei oft coupled with the right to take exclusively such things deemed incapable of division, the family house, f.i., and certain utensils. Statt d. ältesten Sohns dies Privileg manchmal dem jüngsten Sohn zufallend. (197) Primogenitur unbekarint Griechen n. Römern u. Semiten (Juden u. a. auch). Aber wir finden als familiar fact dass d. letzten Königs ätester Sohn ihm folgt; d. griech. Philosophen speculiren auch dass in älteren states of society, smaller groups of men, families u. villages, governed by eldest son after eldest son. (198)

Auch beim Einfall d. Teutonic Barbars in West Europa Primogenitur nicht d. gewöhnliche Regel der Nachfolge. D. Allodial Property d. Teutonic freemen – theoretisch d. share he had got bei original Erobrungssettlement d. tribe etc. wenn getheilt, gleichgetheilt zwischen Söhnen od. auch zwischen Söhnen u. Töchtern. Doch erscheint erst mit diesen Barbaren Primogenitur rasch ausgebreitet über Westeuropa. Und nun findet Maine neue Schwierigkeit, die jedoch nur aus seiner Unbekanntsc<ha>ft mit Wesen der gens herstammt, nämlich dass statt ältesten Sohns the eldest male relative of the deceased eintritt (dies bei Vorherrschen d. gens d. Normale, da der eldest male relative – wo female descent also superseded – näher dem Vater des deceased als der son des deceased) oder dass neither the succession of the eldest son nor that of the eldest relative could take effect without election or confirmation by the members of the aggregate group to which they belong. [199] [Dies ist noch normaler als alles andre; da d. Chief immer theoretisch elective bleibt, only selbstverständlich, within the gens resp. within the tribe.] Um sich letzteren Punkt | klar zu machen, pflückt Herr Maine wieder in seiner beliebten Hindoo joint Family, wo nach Tod d. Familienhaupts, wenn d. Familie separates, gleiche Theilung stattfindet; wenn nicht, election, meist ältester Sohn; wenn dieser als improper set aside, nicht sein Sohn, sondern meist d. brother of deceased manager gewählt; so sort of mixture of election and doubtful succession, was auch gefunden wird in the early examples of European primogeniture. [200] So d. Tribe Chief gewählt from the Chieftain’s family “as representing the purest49 blood of the entire brotherhood”. (Blödsinn, wenn von wirklich primitive communities Rede. See f.i. Red Indian Iroquois. Umgekehrt, weil meist d. Wahl traditionell in derselben, od. gewissen gentes ftführt, u. dann wieder in einer bestimmten Familie derselben gens, mag diese später, unter changed circumstances als “representing the purest49 blood” gelten.) u. instances of the choice being systematically made from 2 families in succession. [200] Ist auch eine Fiktion d. Herrn Maine, dass der war chief ursrünglich der Tribe chief ist. Dieser wde umgekehrt nach seinen individual capacities gewählt. Spencer, aus dem Maine flgde Stelle citirt, ist authority good enough for stating the facts he saw, but their origin cannot be elucidated from Spenser’s plausible reasons for the facts observed. Folgendes d. Stelle aus Spenser: “It is a custom among all the Irish that presently after the death of any of their chief lords or captains, they do presently assemble themselves to a place generally appointed and known to them to choose another in his stead, where they do nominate and elect or the most part, not the eldest son, nor any of the children of the lord deceased, but the next to him of blood that is eldest and worthiest, as commonly the next brother if he have any, or the next cousin ... as any is elder in that kindred or sept; and then, next to him, they choose the next of the blood to be Tanaist, who shall succeed him in the said Capraincy, if he live thereunto .... For when their Captain dieth, if the Signory should descend to his child, and he perhaps an infant, another might peradventure step in between or thrust him out by strong Hand, being then unable to defend his right and to withstand the force of a forreiner; and therefore they do appoint the eldest of the kin to have the Signory, for that commonly he is a man of stronger year<s> and better experience to maintain the inheritance and to defend the country... And to this end the Tanaist is always ready known, if it should happen to the Captain suddenly to die, or to be slain in battle, or to be out of the country, to defend and keep it from all such dangers.” (Spenser: “View of the State of Ireland”, bei Maine, [p. 201, 202] [Maine, der gar nicht erwähnt (cp. oben Haverty) was d. Irisch writers gesagt, giebt als seine Entdekkung: “Primogeniture, considered as a rule of succession to property, appears to me a product of tribal leadership in its decay. [202] Glanville (unter Henry II, whslich 1186) writes mit Bezug auf English military tenures: “When anyone dies, leaving a younger son and a grandson, the child of his eldest son, a great doubt exists as to which of the two the law prefers in the succession to the other, whether the son or the grandson. Some think the younger son has more right to the inheritance than the grandson ... but others incline to think that the grandson might51 be preferred to his uncle.” (Glanville, VII. 7) Ebenso disputes among Highland families about the title to the chieftaincy of particular clans. [l.c. 203] Maine versteht d. ganzen case nicht; meint d. Onkel z.B. gewählt, weil mehr wehrhaft; daggen sobald times had become friedlicher unter central authority of a king “the value of strategical capacity in the humbler chiefs would diminish, and in the smaller brotherhoods the respect for purity of blood would have unchecked play”. [203] [Dies reiner Blödsinn. D. Sach’ ist allmälig Ueberwigen (zusammenhängend mit Entwicklg v. Privatgdeigenthum) der Einzelfamilie über d. Gens. Des Vaters Bruder näher dem ihnen beiden gemeinscftlichen Stammhaunt, als irgendeiner der Söhne des Vaters; also der Onkel der Söhne näher als einer von diesen selbst. Nachdem schon mit Bezug auf d. Familie d. Kinder d. Vaters theilen, u. d. gens nur noch wenig od. gar nicht an d. Erbscft betheiligt, kann für öffentliche Funktionen52b, also gens chief, tribe chief, etc noch d. alte gens rule vorwiegend bleiben; nothwendig entsteht aber struggle zwischen beiden.] Dieselbe Streitfrage arose zwischen d. descendants of daughters in d. controversy zwischen Bruce u. Baliol über Krone von Schottland. [204] (Edward I liess für Baliol entscheiden, danach d. descendants of an elder child must be exhausted before those of the younger had a title.) Sobald d. älteste Soht statt d. Onkel folgte to “the humbler chieftaincies” he doubtless also obtained that “portion of land attached to the Signory which went without partition to the Tanaist.” [204] So “the demesne”, as it was afterwards called, assumed more and more the character of mere property descending according to the rule of primogeniture”. [p. 204] | Nach u. nach dann this principle of primogeniture extended from the demesne to all the estates of the holder of the Signory, however acquired, and ultimately determined the law of succession for the privileged classes throughout feudalised Europe. [204, 5] French “Parage” under which the near kinsmen of the eldest son still took an interest in the family property, but held it of him as his Peers. [205]

Unter act of the 12th year of Elizabeth (1570) the Lord Deputy was empowered to take surrenders and regrant estates to the Irishry. “The Irish Lords”, says Davis, “made surrenders of entire counties and obtained grants of the whole again to themselves only, and none other, and all in demesne. In passing of which grants, there was no care taken of the inferior septs of people .... So that upon every such surrender or grant, there was but one freeholder made in a whole country, which was the lord himself; all the rest were [made dch Elizabeth’s Act] but tenants at will, or rather tenants in villeinage.” (bei Maine [p. 207])

In Brehon Laws (Book of Aicill, namentlich Third Vol.) Irish family getheilt in Ceilfine, Deirbhfine, Iarfine u. Indfine (wovon d. 3 letzten ubersetzt: the True, the After u. d. End Families). D. Editor d. Third Volume (Brehon Laws, wovon d. Book of Aicill) sagt: “Within the Family, 17 members were organised in 4 divisions, of which the junior class, known as the Geilfine division, consisted of 5 persons; d. Deirbhfine – 2nd in order, Iarfine – 3d in order, and the Indfine – the senior of all – consisted respectively of 4 persons. The whole organisation consisted, and could only consist, of 17 members. [(3 × 4 + 5.)] If any person was born into the Geilfine division, its eldest member was promoted into the Deirbhfine, the eldest member of the Deirbhfine passed into the Iarfine, the eldest member of the Iarfine – moved into the Indfine, and the eldest member of the Indfine passed out of the organisation altogether. It would appear that this transition from a lower to a higher grade took place upon the introduction of new members, not upon the death of the seniors.” (citirt bei Maine, [209])

Nach Maine (Bei diesem Bursch nöthig d. Irländer zu vergleichen): any member of the Joint family, or Sept might be selected as the starting <point>, and become a root from which sprung as many of these groups of 17 men as he had sons. Sobald einer dieser Söhne 4 Kinder hat, ist a full Geilfine sub-group formed of 5 persons; wd ein neues male Kind (Sohn) zugeboren diesem Sohn or to any of his male descendants, so d. älteste Glied der Geilfine sub-group – provided always he were not the person from whom it had sprung – sent into the Deirbhfine. A succession of such births completed the Deirbhfine Division, and went on to form the Iarfine and the In<d>fine, the After and the End Families. D. 5te Person in d. Geilfine division soll sein the parent von dem d. 16 descendants spring; er scheint to be referred to in the tracts as the Geilfine Chief. [210]

The Geilfine group is several times stated by the Brehon lawyers to be at once the highest and the youngest. Whitley Stokes told dem Maine, dass Geilfine = hand-family; nämlich “Gil” sei = hand (also the rendering of O’Curry) and sei in fact = γειρ; u. hand in several Aryan languages = power, namtlich für family or patriarchal power; so, in Greek, υποχειρις u. χερης, for the person under the hand; latin. “herus” (master) von an old word, cognate to χερης; ebenso lat. manus, in manu etc, in Celtic “Gilla” (a servant, bei Walter Scott “Gillie”) [216, 217] Hence der gewaltige Gedanke des Maine, dass hinter dieser Irish distribution der Family d. Patria Potestas u. founded (d. Eintheilung) on the order of emancipation von Paternal authority. The Geilfine, Hand family, consists of father u. 4 natural or adoptive sons immediately under his power; d. other groups of emancipated descendants diminishing in dignity in propertion to their distance from the group which ... constitutes the true or representative | family. [217] Aehnlich in Roman family, wo die enumerated members der family underwent a capitis deminutio. [218]

The Irish division of the Family seems only to have been wichtig mit Bezug auf law of succession after death. Aber dies rule in all societies. When the ancient constitution of the Family has ceased to affect anything else, it affects inheritance. [219] D. authors der Brehon law tracts oft compare the Geilfine Division der family <mit> der human hand. Dr. Suffivan says: “as they represented the roots of the spreading branches of the Family, they were called the cuic merane fine or the ‘five fingers of the Fine’. ” [p. 220] Patria potestas referred to in the Irish tracts as the father’s power of “judgment, proof, and witness over his sons. (l.c.) See Tylor über “Finger-Counting” (in “Primitive Culture”. Weil menschliche Hand 5 Finger zählt, 5 a primitive natural maximum number. Early English Township represented by the Reeve and the 4 men; the Indian punchayet. [221]

Borough English”, unter which law the youngest son and not the eldest succeeds to the burgage-tenements of his father. [222] Blackstone, um dies zu erklären, citirt von Duhalde that the custom of descent to the yougest son prevails among the Tartars; sobld d. älteren sons fähig to lead a pastoral life, verliessen sie den father to migrate “with a certain allotment of cattle”, and go to seek a new habitation. D. younges<t>, who continues longest with his father, is naturally the heir of his house, the rest being already provided for. [222] In d. Leges Wallicae, diese Gewohnheit for all Welsh cultivating villeins: “Cum fratres inter se dividunt hereditatem, junior debet habere tygdyn, i.e., aedificia patris sui, et octo acras de terra, si habuerint. ” (L. Wall. v. II, p. 780), ausserdem certain ustensils; – the other sons are to divide what remains. [223] D. youngest, remaining under patria polestas, preferred to the others. (l.c.) Primogeniture ... comes ... from the Chief (of clan); “Borough English” wie “Geilfine” dagegen von ancient conception of family as linked with patria potestas. (l.c.)

D. Irish word Fine – in the Brehon Laws – used for d. family in present sense, for d. Sept, for Tribe etc. [231]

Irish family liess Adoption zu; the Sept admitted strangers on stated conditions, the Fine Taccair; d. Tribe included refugees from other tribes, die nur im Zusarnmenhang mit ihm dch Chief. (231, 232)

In Dr. Sullivan’s introduction he traces the origin of Guilds to the <grazing partnerships> common among the ancient Irish; the same words used to describe bodies of co-partners, formed by contract, and bodies of co-heirs or co-parceners formed by common descent. [232]

Tribe of Saints” or Verwandtscftsideen applied to monastic houses with its monks and bishops, ebenso to the collective assemblage of religious houses etc. [p. 236, sq.] The abbot of the parent house and all the abbots of the minor houses are the “combarbas” od. co-heirs of the saint. (1.c.) An entire sub-tract in the Senchus Mor devoted to the Law of Fosterage, setting out with the greatest minuteness the rights and duties attaching to all parties when the children of another family were received for nurture and education. [241 sq]. This classed with “Gossipred”, religious Verwcltscft. [p. 242] [The same mother’s milk given to children of different origin.

Dies reminds one d. Mutterrecht und the rules flowing from it; but Maine noch unbekannt hiermit, it seems.] “Literary Fosterage. [p. 242 sq.] D. Brehon lawyers selbst sind betrachtet by the English writers who have noticed them as a caste. Nach evidence d. Irish records jedoch anyone who went through a particular training might become a Brehon. Zur Zeit wo Ireland began to be examined by English observers, the art and knowledge der Brehon had become hereditary in certain families attached to or dependent on the Chiefs of particular tribes. Dieser selbe change has obviously occurred with a vast number of trades and professions in India, jetzt popularly called castes. Mit a native Indian schwer zu verstehen why z.B. a son should not succeed to the learning of a father, and consequently his office and duties. In d. States von Engl. Indien governed by native princes, it is still praktisch allgemeine rule that office is hereditary. Aber dies erklärt nicht the growth of those castes which are definite sections of great populations. Nur eine einzige dieser castes really survives in India, that of the Brahmins u. it is strongly suspected that the whole literary theory of Caste, which is of Brahmin origin, is based on the existence of the Brahmin caste alone. [245] Bei d. Irish gesehn wie all sorts of groups of men considered as connected through blood relationship [247]; so “associations of kinsmen shading off into assemblages of partners and guild-brothers-; foster parentage, spiritual parentage, and preceptorship | (Teacher and pupil) taking their hue from natural paternity – ecclesiastical organisation blending with tribal organisation. [248]

Gröster Theil des Senchus Mor – the largest Brehon law-tract – handelt v. Distress. Es handelt sich hier um Procedur, die bei d. Rechtsanfängen d. wichtigste.

In Anfang d. Book IV des 1816 von Niebuhr disinterred manuscript of Gajus fragmentary u. imperfect account of the old Legis actions.

Actio generally = Handlung, Vollbringung, That. (Cic. N. D. Deos spoliat motu et actione divina. actio vitae, id. Off. I, 5 (= vital action; ferner actiones = public functions or duties, wie actio consularis; dann: negotiation, deliberation wie: “discessu consulum actio de pace sublata est etc; political measures or proceedings, addresses of the magistrates to the People. Nun kommen wir aber zum sense worin legis action: an action, suit, process with a defining genitive: action furti action for theft; auch mit de: “actio de repetundis” action (prosecution for refunding money extorted by magistrates). actionem alicui intendere, actionem instituere (bring an action agst somebody). “Multis actiones (processes, suits) et res (the property in suit) peribant. Liv.)

Daher allgemein: a legal formula or form of process (procedure) “inde illa action: ope consilioque tuo, furturn aio factum esse.” actiones Manilianae, forms relative to purchase and sale.) “Dare alicui actionem”, Permission to bring an action which was the office of the Prätor. “Rem agere ex jure, lege, causa etc “to bring an action, to manage a cause or suit.

Lege, respective legem – agere, to proceed according to law, mode of executing law, to execute a sentence. “Lege egit in hereditatem paternam ex heres filius.” Cic. de Orat. I, 38)

Bentham unterscheidet zwischen Substantive Law, the law declaring rights and duties, and Adjective Law, the rules wonach that law is administered. In älteren Zeiten rights and duties <were> rather the adjective of procedure als umgekehrt. Difficulty in such times not in conceiving what a man was entitled to, but in obtaining it; so that the method, violent or legal, by which an end was obtained, was of more consequence than the nature of the end itself.... D. wichtigste sehr lange Zeit the “remedies”. [252]

D. first dieser alten (Roman) actiones ist die: Legis Actio Sacramenti, the undoubted parent of all the Roman actions u. daher of most of the civil remedies now in use in the world. [sacra mentum in law: the sum which the parties to a suit at first deposited with the tresviri capitals, but for which they subsequently gave security to the praetor, so called because the sum deposited by the losing party was used for religious purposes, esp. for the sacra publica; or rather, perhaps, because the money was deposited in a sacred place. Festus. “ea pecunia, quae in judicium venit in litibus, sacramentum a sacro. Qui petebat et qui infitiabatur, de aliis rebus item utrique quingenos aeris ad pontem deponebant, de aliis rebus item certo alio ligitimo numero assum; qui judicio vicerat, suum sacramentum c sacro auferebat, victi ad aerarium redibat.” Varro.]

Diese Actio sacramenti is a dramatisation of the Origin of Justice; 2 Bewaffnete Männer ringen mit einander, Prätor geht vorbei, interposes to stop the contest; d. disputants state him their case, agree that he shall arbitrate; arrangirt dass der loser, ausser resigning the subject of the quarrel shall pay a sum of money to the umpire (the Prätor )[p. 253] (Dies scheint rather Dramatisation of how law disputes were becoming a source of fees profit to lawyers! u. dies nennt Herr Maine, als a lawyer, “the Origin Justice”!)

In dieser dramatisation the claimant holds a wand in his hand, der nach Gajus a spear repräsentirt, the emblem of the strong man armed, served as the symbol of property held absolutely and agst the world (rather the symbol of Gewalt als origin of Roman u. other property!) in Roman u. several Western societies. Quarrel between plaintiff u. defendant [assertions u. reassertions – formal dialogue dabei] was a mere pretence among the Romans, long remained a reality in other societies u. survived in the Wager of Battle, der als English Institution erst “finally abolished in our father’s day”. [255]

The disputants staked a sum of money – the Sacramentum – on the merits of their quarrel, and the stake went into the public exchequer. The money thus wagered, das erscheint in a large number of archaic legal systems, is the earliest representative of Court Fees.... [D. Legis Actio Sacramenti so conducted, u. dies wieder showing the intimate nature of the Lawyer – dass d. Lex, d. geschriebne Recht, aber auch literally – nicht d. Geist, sondern | der Buchstabe d. Gesetzes, d. Formel d. Wichtigste] So sagt Gajus: if you sued by Legis Actio for injury to your vines, and called them vines, you would fail; you must call them trees, because the Text of the 12 Tables speaks only of Trees. Ebenso enthält d. alte collection of Teutonic legal formulas – the Malberg Gloss – provisions von genau derselben Natur. If you sue for a bull, you will miscarry if you describe him as a bull; you must give him his ancient juridical designation of “leader of the herd”. You must call the fore-finger the “arrow” finger, the goat the “browser upon leeks”. [255, 256]

Flgt bei Gajus the Condictio [in Digests: demand for restitution]; er sagt sie sei gegründet, soll aber nur regulated wden sein dch 2 Roman Statutes of the 6th Century B.C., the Lex Silia u. the Lex Calpurnia; becam Namen von a notice die der Kläger dem Beklagten gab in 30 Tagen vor Prätor zu erscheinen, damit ein judex oder referee might be nominated. [condicere, to speak with, agree upon, decide, appoint, ansagen. “condicere tempus et locum coëundi”. “condicere rem”, demand restitution, “pecuniam alicui” Ulp. I. Nach d. condictio the parties entered into “sponsio” u. restipulatio”. Sponsio, a solemn promise or engagement, guarantee, security. “sponsio appellatur omnis stipulatio promissioque.” Dig. 50, 16, 7 .61 “non foedere pax Caudina sed per sponsionem (by giving surety) facta est.” (Liv.) Speciell in civil Suits, ein Agreement between 2 parties in a suit, dass der der den Process verliert should pay a certain sum to him who gains it. “Sponsionem facere”. (Cic.) Endlich: a sum of money deposited according to agreement, a stake (Einsatz beim Spiel, bei Wette, that which is laid down, as the amount of a wager etc.)

Restipulatio. A counter-engagement or <counter->obligation (Cic.) restipulor to stipulate or engage in return.]

Nachdem diese condictio gegeben, the parties entered into a “sponsio” and “restipulatio”, i.e. laid a formal wager (distinct from the so called Sacramentum) on the justice of their respective contentions. D. sum so staked always = ⅓ of the amount in dispute, went in the end to the successful litigant, and not, like Sacramentum, to the State. [Hat ausserdem d. innern ironischen Sinne, dass die Parteien d. Processes dasselbe unsichre Hazardspiel treiben wie beim Wetten, ddch dies ein d. röm. jurisprudenz unbewusster Witz!]

Gajus proceeds von der Condictio zur Manus Injectio u. Pignoris Capio, actiones legis die nichts mit modernem Begriff von actio gemein haben. Manus injectio ausdrücklich stated to have been originally the Roman mode of execution against the person of a judgment debtor; war the instrument der Cruelties prakticirt dch röm. Aristokratie on their defaulting plebejan debtors, gab so impetus to series of popular movements affecting the whole history of Roman commonwealth. D. Pignoris Capio war zuerst ein völlig extrajudicial proceeding. D. Person die es anwandte seized (beschlagnamte) in certain cases the goods of a fellow citizen, agst whom he had a claim, but against whom he had not instituted a suit. Dies zuerst beschränkt – these power of seizure – auf soldiers against public officers bound to supply them with pay, horse, or forage; ditto auf seller of a beast for sacrifice against a defaulting purchaser; später extended to demands for overdue arrears of public revenue. Etwas Achnliches in Plato’s Legees, auch als remedy for breach of public duties connected with military service or religious observance. (Dies dem Maine verrathen von Post.). Gajus sagt dass d. Pignoris Capio could be resorted to in the absence of the Prätor and generally of the person under liability, and also that it might be carried out even when the Courts were not sitting. [256-59]

The Legis actio sacramenti assumes that the quarrel is at once referred to a present arbitrator; the Condictio, dass d. Referenz to the decision of an arbitrator nach 30 days; aber meantime the parties have entered into a separate wager on the merits of their dispute. Noch zu Cicero’s Zeit, als condictio eine der most important Roman actions geworden, an independent penalty attached to the suitor in dieser Klage. [260]

Glaubt dass die Pignoris Capio, obgleich dies schon veraltet zur Zeit d. 12 Tables, taking forcible possession der moveable property des adversary And detain it till he submits. [260]

So in English Law Power of Distraint or Distress – (womit connected als Remedy d. socalled Replevint) – z.B. heut zu Tag landlord’s right to seize the goods of his tenants for unpaid rent, and the right of the lawful possessor of land to take and impound stray beasts which are damaging his crops or soil. [261, 262] Im letztren Fall cattle kept bis satisfaction made for the injury. (l.c.)

Aelter als Roman Conquest in Engnd the practice of Distress, – of taking names, word erhalten im law-term withernam. [262, 63] Zur Zeit v. Henry III confined to certain specific claims u. wrongs. Damals: Person seizes the goods (almost always cattle) | der Person von der er sich benachtheiligt glaubt; treibt d. beasts to a pound (von angels<ächsisch> pyndan), an enclosed piece of land reserved for the purpose, and generally open to the sky ... eine d. ältesten Institutionen Englands; the Village-Pound far older than the King’s Bench, and probably than the Kingdom. While the cattle were on their way to the pound the owner had a limited right of rescue which the law recognised, but which he ran great risk in exercising. Once lodged within the enclosure, the impounded beasts, when the pound was uncovered, had to be fed by the owner and not by the distrainor; this rule only altered in the present reign. [263] Wenn d. Eigner d. cattle altogether denied the distrainor’s right to distrain, or refuse to release the cattle, on security being tendered to him, dann d. cattle owner might apply to the King’s Chancery for a writ commanding the Sheriff to “make replevin”, or he might verbally complain himself to the Sheriff, who would then proceed at once to “replevy”. [264]

Replévin (to), Spenser, to “replévy”, replegio Law Latin, of re u. plevir or plegir, fr. to give a pledge; bdtet nach Johnson: to take back or set at liberty, upon security, anything seized; er citirt aus Hudibras:

“That you’re a beast and turrn’d to grass,
Is no strange news, nor ever was;
At least to me, who once, you know,
Did from the pound replevin you.”

In d. action of Replevin, wenn d. Sache vor Gerichtshof kam, der owner des distrained cattle war der Kläger u. der Distrainor was the defendant. [265]Taking in withernam” of Old English Law means, wenn d. distrainor dem Sheriff d. distrained cattle nicht seizen wollte od. es in distance out of his jurisdiction removed, so erhob dieser wegen Brechen of King’s Peace, “hue u. cry” wider ihn u. seized von des distrainor’s cattle double the value of the beasts which were not forthcoming; letztres “taking in withernam”. (l.c.) Dies seizure, rescue u. counterseizure ursprünglich disorderly proceeding which the law steps in to regulate. (l.c.) In d. Form of impounding, wo d. person distrained must feed the cattle (als Zeichen of deren continued ownership), Verbot für distrainor to work them. – Distress becomes a semi-orderly contrivance for extorting satisfaction. [266] Blackstone hat bemerkt, that the modified exemption of certain classes of goods from distraint – z.B. plough-oxen u. instruments of trade, ursprünglich nicht intended als kindness to owner, sondern weil ohne d. instruments of tillage or handicraft, the debtor could never pay his debt. (l.c ) D letzte – u. auch historisch letzt entwickelte incident des proceeding ist: the King steps in, dch his deputy, den Sheriff; selbst wenn dieser obtains his view, he can do nothing unless the cattle owner is prepared with security that he will try the question between himself u. den distrainor in a Court of Justice; dann erst steps in the judicial Power of the Commonwealth; its jurisdiction acquired through the act of the Sheriff in restoring the cattle upon pledge given. D. distrainor has lost his material security, the cattle; the owner of the cattle has become personally bound; so both placed under a compulsion which drives them in the end to a judicial arbitration. [267] [D. ganze Proceeding implies dass d. Power of State – i.e. Court of Justice – noch nicht so firmly settled, class people de prime abord submit to its judicial authority.]

Fast alle Leges Barbarorum refer to Pignoratio od. distraint of goods. D. Lex Visigothorum verbietet es ausdrücklich; d. Lex Lombardorum, permits it after simple demand of payment. D. Salic Law – nach d. neusten deutschen Autoritäten – redigirt zwischen Tacitus Zeit u. d. Zeit d, Invasion des Roman Empire dch d. Franken, enthält sehr genaue Bestimmungen die zuerst fully interpreted by Sohm. In diesem System Distress not yet a judicial remedy; ist noch an extrajudicial mode of redress, but it has been incorporated with a regular and highly complex procedure. Eine succession of notices to be given in solemn form dch d. complainant der Person über die sich der would be dist<r>ainor beklagt u. whose property he proposes to seize. Er kann nicht saisiren bevor er jene person vor d. Volksgericht geladen u. bevor d. Popular Officer dieses Gerichts, der Thunginus, pronuncirt hat eine Formel licensing distraint. Dann erst kann er distress auf seinen Gegner machen. Entsprechend eine Ordon<n>anz von Canut that no man is to take names unless he has demanded 3 times in the Hundred; erhält er d. 3t mal keine justice, so geht er zum Shire-gemot; d. Shire appoints him a 4th time, u. when that fails, he may take the distress. [269, 270]

D. fragment of the system which has survived in the English Common Law (and it is to this that it probably owes its survival) was from the first pre-eminently a remedy by which the lord compelled his tenants to render him their services. Was archaischer im engl. Gesetz als in den leges barbarorum: notice of the intention to distrain was never in England essential to the legality of distress, obgleich d. Statute-law renders it it necessary to make a sale of the distrained property legal; ebenso im ältesten state d. Common Law, obgleich distraint sometimes followed a proceeding in the lord’s Court, yet it did not necessarily presuppose or require it. [270-71] D. Frankish procedure was completely at the disposal of the complainant. | it is a procedure regulating extrajudicial redress. Beobachtet der complainant the proper forms, so ist the part of the Court in licensing seizure purely passive .... When the defendant submitted or was unsuccessful in attacking the proceedings of the other side, he paid not only the original debt but various additional penalties entailed by neglect to comply with previous notices to discharge it. Dies founded on the assumption that plaintiffs are always in the right u. defendants always in the wrong, whd the modern principle compels the complainant to establish at all events a prima facie case. Früher the man most likely to be in the right the man who faced the manifold risks attending the effort to obtain redress, to complain to the Popular Assembly, to cry for justice to the king sitting in the gate.... In einem Fall, wo King Kläger, d. Presumption dass Kläger in the right lang aufrecht erhalten in engl. Recht u. hence the obstinate dislike of (Engl.) lawyers to allowing prisoners to be defended by Counsel. [271-73]

Galus sagt v. d. Legis Actiones im allgemeinen dass “sie in discredit fielen, weil wegen der excessive subtlety der ancient lawyers things came to such a pass that he who committed the smallest error failed altogether.”

Ebenso Blackstone remarks on English Law of Distress: “The many particulars which attend the taking of a distress used formerly to make it a hazardous kind of proceeding; for, if any one irregularity was committed, it vitiated the whole. ” [273]

[Diese excessive technicality of ancient law zeigt Jurisprudenz as feather of the same bird, als d. religiösen Formalitäten z.B. bei Augur’s etc, od. d. Hokus Pokus des medicine man der savages!]

Nach Sohm the power of seizing a man’s property extrajudicially in satisfaction of your demand mit grossen risks verbunden; ging der complainant who sought to distress nicht dch alle acts u. words required by the law with the most rigorous accuracy so, besides failing in his object, incurred a variety of penalties, which could be just as harshly exacted as his own original demand. [273, 74] Ha<u>ptsache bei d. Barbaren to compel the appearance of the defendant and his submission to jurisdiction, was damals noch keineswegs selbstverständlich. [275] In d. Fränkischen Gesetz, wenn in gewissen cases auch selbe von Anfang an bis judgment judicially tried, so noch nicht the judgment by its own force operative. Hat der defendant ausdrücklick erklärt to obey it, the Court or royal deputy, on being properly summoned, will execute it; but if no such promise has been made, the plaintiff has no remedy except an application to the King in person. [275]

Später sobald d. Franks settled in Roman Empire, the royal deputy will execute the judgment ohne promise des defendant to submit. In England dieser change u. d. Macht der Courts greatly due to the development of royal justice at the expense of popular justice. Doch savoured Engl. judicial proceedings noch long of the old practices. Hence on the smallest provocation the King constantly took the lands of the defendant into his hands or seized his goods, simply to compel or perfect his submission to the royal jurisdiction. [See bei Walter Scott, dass ein Mann wegen Schulden eingesperrt wird wegen d. Fiction seiner contempt of the King.]

D. survival of distress in Engld den Herrn landlords zu lieb. The modern – dem Ursprünglichen ganz wiedersprechde – theory of distress: ist that a landlord is allowed to distrain because x by the nature of the case he is always compelled to give his tenant credit, and that he can distrain without notice because every man is supposed to know when his rent is due. [277] Ursprünglich distress treated as willful breach of the peace; ausser wo it was connived at so far as it served to compel the submission of defendants to the jurisdiction of courts. [278]

Ueber Hälfte d. Senchus Mor taken up with Lair of Distress. Senchus Mor pretends to be the Code of Irish Law prepared unter the influence of St. Patrick upon the introduction of Christianity in Ireland. [279] Er gleicht sehr d. Teutonic Laws u. English Common Law. Putting in a pound kommt noch darin von d. Speciality drin: “If the defendant or debtor were a person of chieftain grade, it was necessary not only to give notice, but also to fast upon him. The fasting upon him consisted in going to his residence and waiting there a certain time without | food. If the plaintiff did not within a certain time receive satisfaction for his claim, or a pledge therefore, he forthwith, accompanied by a law-agent, witnesses, and others, seized his distress” etc. [p. 280-81]. Cf. Senchus Mor. 1st vol. remarks of the Editor.) Erlaubte d. Schuldner nicht his cattle to go to pound u. gab er sufficient pledge (e.g. his son, or some article of value, to the creditor, that he would within a certain time try the right to the distress by law, the creditor was bound to receive such pledge. If he did not go to law, as he so undertook, the pledge became forfeited for the original debt.” [p. 282]. [Noch heut zu Tag bei distress in Oudh d. creditor landlord takes ausser cattle (dies vor allem etc) auc<h> Personen als Sklaven. See The Garden of India von Irwin.] [Im Wesentlichen d. Irische law hier mehr identisch mit d. Leges Barbarorum als mit d. Englischen.] “The distress of the Senchus Mor is not, like the Distress of the English Common Law, a remedy confined in the main to demands of the lord on his tenants; as in the Salic u. andren Leges Barbarorum it extends to breaches of contract u., so far as the Brehon law is already known, it would appear to be the universal method of prosecuting claims of all kinds.” [p. 283] The Irish stay of proceedings (Dithim) entspricht einigen provisions in d. leges barbarorum. In einigen derselben when a person’s property is about to be seized he makes a mimic resistance; im Salic law he protests against the injustice of the attempt; im Ripuarian law he goes through the formality of standing at his door with a drawn sword. Thereupon the seizure is interrupted u. opportunity given for enquiring into the regularity of the proceedings etc. [284] Mit d. English law hat d. Irische speciell gemein – was ganz absent from the Teutonic procedures – the “impounding”, the “taking in withernam” u. namtlich dass nicht required “assistance od. permission from any Court of Justice. [284] Dies nur im Lombardic law (unter den leges barbarorum) (l.c.) Ferner – u. dies in England erst dch Statute Law eingeführt – im Brehon Law the seizure of cattle nicht nur als a method of satisfaction, sondern it provides for their forfeiture in discharge of the demand for which they are taken. [285]

Sohm sucht zu beweisen dass d. Fräkischen Volksgerichte nicht ihre eignen Dekrete exequirten; versprach der defendant to submit to an award, the local deputy of the King might be required to enforce it, aber, when no such promise, the plaintiff was forced to petition the King in person u. in d. älteren Zeiten, vor full development der kgl. Gewalt, Courts of justice existed less for the purpose of doing right generally than for the purpose of supplying an alternative to the violent redress of wrong.... The Norse literature (see Mr. Dasent) shows that perpetual fighting and perpetual litigation may go on side by side, and that a highly technical procedure may be scrupulously followed at a time when homicide is an everyday occurrence.... Contention in Court takes the place of contention in arms, but only gradually takes its place.... In our day, when a wild province is annexed to the British Indian Empire, there is ... a rush of suitors to the Courts which are immediately established.... The men who can no longer fight go to law instead ... Hasty appeals to a judge succeed hurried quarrels, and hereditary law-suits take the place of ancestral blood-feuds. [288, 289]

Im Allgem. probable that, in proportion as Courts grow stronger, they first take under their control the barbarous (aber d. Sache bleibt ja, auf das legale übersetzt) practice of making reprisals on a wrongdoer by seizing his property, and ultimately they absorb it into their own procedure. [290] D. Irish Law of Distress offenbar in Zeit wo action of Courts of justice feeble and intermittent. [291] Statt dieser – d. law agent (Brehon lawyer) d. grosse Rolle spielend. (l.c.)

The Irish used the remedy of distress, because they knew no other remedy, u. d. Hunde von Engländern made it a capital felony (mit Todesstrafe) in an Irishman to follow the only law with which he | was acquainted. (294 Cp. Spenser. “View of the State of Ireland.”) Nay, those very subtleties of Old English Law which, as Blackstone says, made the taking of distress ‘a hazardous sort of proceeding’ to the civil distrainor, might bring an Irishman to the gallows, if in conscientiously attempting to carry out the foreign law he fell into the smallest mistake. (l.c. Also gehangen, wenn er seinem native law nach handelte, ditto gehangen wenn er sich dem aufgezwungnen englischen zu adoptiren suchte!)

Mit Bezug auf d. “fasting upon” the debtor heisst es in Senchus Mor: “Notice precedes every distress in the case of the inferior grades except it be by persons of distinction or upon persons of distinction. Fasting precedes distress in their case. He who does not give a pledge to fasting is an evader of all; he who disregards all things shall not be paid by God or Man.”

Dies, wie Whitley Stokes zuerst pointed out, diffused over the whole East, entspricht dem Hindoo “sitting dharna”. (Cf. Strange: Hindoo Law.) [297] Heute noch sehr striking examples davon in Persien, wo a man intending to enforce payment of a demand by fasting begins by solving some barley at his debtor’s door and sitting down in the middle. (l.c.)

D. Wort dharna soll exact equivalent sein von Roman “capio”, and meaning “detention” or “arrest”. Soll VIII, 49 bei Manu vorkommen. (l.e.) Im Vyavahara-Mayukha, Brihaspiti is cited as enumerating, among the lawful modes of compulsion by which the debtor can be made to pay, “confining his wife, his son, or his cattle, or watching constantly at his door.” [298]

See Lord Teigmouth’s description (in Forbes “Oriental Memoirs” II, 25) d. form dieses “watching constantly at the door” in British India vor Ende d. 18. Jhdts.)

In einem Law of Alfred heissts:

“Let the man who knows his foe to be homesitting fight not before he have demanded justice of him. If he have power to beset his foe and besiege him in his house, let him keep there for 7 days but not attack him if he will remain indoors. If then, after seven days, he be willing to surrender and give up his weapons, let him be kept safe for thirty days, and let notice be given to his kinsmen and friends. But if the plaintiff have no power of his own, let him ride to the Ealdorman, and, if the Ealdorman will not aid him, let him ride to the King before he fights.” Schliesslich kommt dann a provision that if the man who is homesitting be realy shut up in his house with the complainant’s wife, daughter, or sister, he may be attacked and killed without ceremony.” (Dies letztere auch in 324. Code Pénal des Herrn Napoleon .... ) The Anglo-Saxon rule is to be enforced by the civil power, the Ealdorman or the King; the Hindoo Brahminical rule by the fear of punishment in another world. [303, 4]Sitting dharna” placed under the ban of the Brit, law, still common in the Native Indian States, u. dort hptsächlich an expedient resorted to by soldiers to obtain arrears of pay, wie “pignoris capio” beim Gajus surviving in 2 cases, wovon einer the default of a military paymaster. [304, 5]

In Lecture XI “The Early History of the Settled Property of Married Women” hat comfortable Maine noch keine Bekanntscft mit Mutterrecht (Bachofen etc.) gemacht, hatte auch Morgan’s Buch noch nich<t> für “elegante” Vermöblg seinerseits.

A man of continuous servile occupation in a Roman household wde dch Usucapio (was später Prescriptio) a slave of the paterfamilias. [315] Später d. ordinary Roman marriage a voluntary conjugal society, terminable at the pleasure of either side by divorce. [317] Nach dem Ancient Irish Law women had some power of dealing with their own property without the consent of their husbands, and this was one of the institutions expressly declared by the [English blockbeaded] Judges to be illegal at the beginning of thee 17th century.[324] Die Brahminical Indian Lawyers haben ganz | ausgearbeitet (u. dies beginnt fast with Manu) the doctrine of “Spiritual Benefit”, as they call it. Inasmuch as the condition of the dead could be ameliorated by proper expiatory rites, the property descending or devolving on a man came to be regarded by them partly as a fund for paying the expenses of the ceremonial by which the soul of the person from whom the inheritance came could be redeemed from suffering or degradation, and partly as a reward for the proper performance of the sacrifices. [332, 333] Ebenso Catholic Church: the first and best destination of a dead man’s goods to purchase masses for his soul, u. out of these views grew the whole testamentary and intestate jurisdiction of the Ecclesiastical Courts. [332]

Im Mitakshara heissts: “The wealth of a regenerate man is designed for religious uses, and a woman’s succession to such property is unfit because she is not competent to the performance of religious rites. ” [332, 33]

D. Gunst der indischen Gesetzgebung für d. Frauen, die sich bis jetzt in dem Stridhan (settled property of a married woman), incapable of alienation by her husband, u. ebenso darin verspricht, dass d. Habe der Frau auf d. Töchter od. die female members ihrer family übergeht (cf. Strange: “Hindoo Law”) etc – alles dies von Herrn Maine nicht richtig gedeutet, weil ilim alle Einsicht in gens u. daher auch ursprüngliche Vererbung in female, – nicht male, line of descent – abgeht. Der Esel sagt selbst mit welchen gefärbten Brillen er sieht: “Among the Aryan [the devil take this “Aryan” cant!] sub-races, the Hindoos may be as confidently asserted as the Romans to have had their society organized as a collection of patriarchally governed families. [Aus Niebuhr konnte er schon wissen, dass d. röm. family noch eingehüllt in der gens, selbst nachdem sie in ihrer specif. Form mit d. patria potestas ausgebildet.] If, then, (a nice “If” only resting upon Maine’s own “confident assertion”) then, (dies “then” Pecksnifflan), at any early period, [Maine transports his “patriarchal” Roman family into the very beginning of things] the married woman had among the Hindoos her property altogether enfranchised from her husband”s control [“enfranchised”, that is to say, from Maine’s “confident assertion”], it is not easy to give a reason why the obligations of the family despotism [a principal pet-doctrine of blockheaded John Bull to read in original “despotism”] were relaxed in this one particular. [323]

Maine citirt folgende Stelle aus d. treatise Mitakshara u. zwar Stelle schon citirt von Sir Thomas Strange “Hindu Law” (see Daselbst t. I, p. 26-32) in Strange’s Buch (obgleich schon 1830 publicirt citirbar als 2nd edit. seines Werks: “Elements of Hindu Law”, enthält viel vollständigere Quellenangaben u. Auseinandersetzg über diesen Punkt. Man ersieht ferner aus dem was Strange aus d. Quellen angiebt, das schon im Mitakshara, nicht zu sprechen von späteren Hindu juristischen Commentaren, ihr Verfasser den Ursprung der Stridhana nicht mehr versteht u. sich selbe ganz so falsch rationalistisch plausibel zu machen sucht, wie etwa d. röm. Juristen aus Cicero’s Zeit ihnen unverständliche altrömische (für sie “archaische”) Rechtsgebräuche od. Formeln. Eine solche rationalistische Erklärung ist es z.B., wenn in Mitakshara d. “fee” der Braut “what is given her in her bridal procession, upon the final ceremony, when the marriage already contracted and solemnized, is about to be consummated, the bride having hitherto remained with her mother” (Strange, t. I, p. 29); Strange bemerkt of this domi-ductio, this bringing of the bride home, which, with the Hindoo, is a consequence only of the antecedent contract, that, among the Romans, it was an ingredient wanting to its completion; till when, the bride was a “sponsa” only; becoming “uxor” statim atque ducta est, quarrivis nondum in cubiculum mariti venerit”; und fährt Strange fort: “The fee of a Hindu wife has moreover this anomaly attending it, | that, upon her death, it descends in a course of inheritance peculiar to herself.” Diese “anomaly” ist nur fragmentarisches, auf bestimmten Theil d. Vermögens reducirte, survival d. alten normalen rule, die gegründet auf descent der gens in der female line, der primitiven. So verhält es sich allzuerst mit den “Anomalien” in Recht etc. (In d. Sprache d. Ausnahmen auch allzuerst Ueberbleibsel d. älteren, ursphinglicheren) D. alte Norm erscheint in veränderten relativ modernen Zustand als “Anomalie”, als unverständliche Ausnahme. Sämtliche indische Rechtsquellen u. Commentare verfasst, nachdem d. descent in female line schon seit lange übergegangen in descent in male line. (Aus Strange ferner ersichtbar, dass in verschiednen Theilen Indiens d. Anomalie mehr od. minder “vollständiges” Ueberbleibsel.)

Die von Maine citirte Stelle aus Mitakshara lautet:

“That which is given (to the wife) by the father, the mother, the husband, or a brother, at the time of the wedding, before the nuptial fire.” Aber d. compiler of the Mitakshara adds a proposition not found elsewhere: “also property which she may have acquired by inheritance, purchase, partition, seizure, or finding, is denominated by Manu and the others “woman”s property.” (Mit. XI. 2) [p. 322]

Hierüber heftige controversies unter d. Brahminical commentators.

U. a. erklärt sich d. pfiffige Maine d. Sache wie folgt:

Unter d. Aryan Communities findet man “the earliest traces of the separate property of women in the widely diffused ancient institution known as Bride-Price. Part of this price, which was paid by the bridegroom either at the wedding or the day after it, went to the bride’s father as compensation (!) for the Patriarchal or Family authority which was transferred to the husband, but another part went to the bride herself and was generally enjoyed by her separately find kept apart from her husband’s property. It further appears that under a certain number of Aryan customs the proprietary rights of other kinds which women slowly acquired were assimilated to their rights in their portion of the Bride-Price, probably (!) as being the only existing type of women’s property.” (324) Richtig dagegen was Maine sagt: “There are in fact clear indications of a sustained general effort on the part of the Brahminical writers on mixed law and religion, to limit the privileges of women which they seem to have found recognized by older authorities.” [325]. In Rom selbst die Stellung d. patria potestas vis-à-vis der Frau exaggerated in opposition to the old contrary tradition.)

D. Sauerei der Brahminen gipfelt in d. “Suttee” or widow burning. Dass diese practice “malus usus”, nicht “law” sagt schon Strange, da sich bei Manu u. other high authorities nichts davon finde; dieser “as the condition on which the widow may aspire to Heaven” have simply required that she should, on the decease of her husband, live a life of seclusion, privation, and decency.” (Post, p. 245) Im Shaster auch noch d. suttee (Strange l.c. p. 241) nur recommended. Aber sich oben, wic d. Brahminen selbst d. Sache erklären (“property designed for religious uses”) u. d. Interesse der Burschen, denen sie d. Nachlassenseft zuwälzen (die dafür have to pay the expenses of the ceremonial). Strange spricht ausdrücklich of “designing Brahmins” u. “interested relatives” [l.c. p. 239]

Nämlich: “the wife surviving her husband, succeeds as heir to him, in default of male issue. (Strange, t. I, p. 236) Ausserdem “her claim to be maintained by his (the defunct husband’s) representatives. (l.c. p. 246) Mit Ausnahme der “Stridhana”, die sie in her own right besitzt, geht das was sie von ihrerem husband ererbt, (sofern dieser kein male issue hatte) über to her husband’s heirs, not the immediate ones merely, but the whole living at the time.” (p. 247) Hier d. Sache klar: d. suttee einfacher religiöser Mord, um d. Erbscft theils für religiöse Feierlichkeiten (für d. Verstorbnen) in Hände d. Brahmanen (geistlichen) zu bringen, theils der dch d. brahmin. Gesetzgbg an Beerbung d. Witwe interessirten gens, nearer family des husband. Hence d. violence u. infamies, meist von Seiten der “connexions” to bring the widow to Flammentod. (239, 240 Strange, t. I)

Herr Maine selbst fügt dem, was man schon bei Strange findet nichts zu. Und selbst | wenn er generalisirt, dass: “The Hindoo laws, religious and civil, have for centuries been undergoing transmutation, development, and, in some [! Maine always mild when speaking of clergy and lawyers! and higher class people generally!] points, depravation at the hands of successive Brahminical expositors.” [326] So weiss dies Strange auch, setzt aber hinzu, dass d. Kirchenpfaffen es anderswo nicht besser machten!

Das ganze Primitive fasst d. englische Philister Maine auf as “the despotism of groups over the members composing them[p. 327]! Damals hatte Bentham – nämlich in d. Urzeiten – noch nicht die nach Maine merkwürdig die Neuzeit repräsentirende Formel u. Treibwerk d. “modernen” Gesetzgebg erfunden: “The greatest happiness of the greatest number”. O Du Pecksniff!

Wir haben gesehn, dass wenn der Mann ohne issue stirbt, the widow comes in for her life (diese Herabsetzung auf tenure for life auch erst später, wie genaue Musterung des von Strange angeführten Quellen zeigt) before the collateral relatives (of her husband, not her own, was Maine zu sagen vergisst; ihre eignen Verwandten hatten beim suttee bloss d. Interesse, dass sie sich “religiös” bewährte). “At the present moment, marriages among the upper classes of Hindoo being very commonly infertile, a very considerable portion of the wealthiest Indian province (Bengal) is in the hands of widows as tenants for life. But it was exactly in Bengal proper that the English, on entering India, found the Suttee “not merely an occasional, but a constant and almost universal practice with the wealthier classes.” [Strange, dessen Buch 45 jahr älter als das des Maine, u. der Chief Justice of Madras gewesen war, u. 1,798 entered upon the administration of justice, at the Presidency of Madras (l.c. Preface VIII) wie er selbst uns in Vorrede seines Buchs erzählt, sagt daggen mit Bezug natürlich auf d. Präsidentschft v. Madras: “It (the custom of Suttee) is confined pretty much to the lower classes,” – a proof that it has no deeper root in the religion, than it has in the law of the country. T. I, p. 240] “and, as a rule, it was only the childless widow, and never the widow with minor children, who burnt herself on her husband’s funeral pyre. There is no question that there was the closest connection between the law and the religious custom, and the widow was made to sacrifice herself in order that her tenancy for life might be got out of the way. The anxiety of her family [Umgekehrt: of her husband’s family, die erbte; nur die weiblichen Glieder ihrer family waren interessirt in her Stridhana; im übrigen konnte ihre family nur dch religiösen Fanatismus u. Einfluss der Brahminen interessirt sein] that the rite should be performed, which seemed so striking to the first English observers of the practice, was, in fact, explained by the coarsest motives; but the Brahmins [ausser d. ecclesiastical Brahmins could, namentlich in d. higher classes, d. Verwandtscft d. Mannes musste es gross<t>entheils aus weltlichen Brahminen bestehen!] who exhorted her to the sacrifice were undoubtedly (! naiver Maine!) influenced by a purely professional dislike to her enjoyment of property. The ancient [i.e. dies auch modificirtes survival vorn Archaischen] rule of the civil law, which made her tenant for life, could not be got rid of, but it was combated by the modern institution which made it her duty to devote herself to a frightful death.” (335, 336)

Obgleich Suttee eine Neuerung, v. d. Brahminen eingeführt, hindert dies nicht, dass in d. Brahminenköpfen d. Neuerung selbst wieder auf Reminiscenz auf älterer Barbarei (Begraben d. Mannes mit seinem Eigenthum) beruhte! Namentlich in Pfaffenköpfen revive d. urältesten Greuel aber ihrer Naiven Ursprünglichkeit beraubt. | Wenn Herr Maine sagt: “There can be no serious question that, in its ultimate result, the disruption of the Roman Empire was very unfavourable to the personal and proprietary liberty of women” [337], so dies verdammt cum grano salis zu nehmen. Er sagt: “The place of women under the new system (d. Barbaren) when fully organised (d.h. nach Entwicklg d. Feudalwesens) was worse than it was under Roman law, and would have been very greatly worse but for the efforts of the Church[337] so dies abgeschmackt, considering dass d. Church den divorce (röm.) aufhob od. so viel als möglich erschwerte u. überhaupt d. Ehe, obgleich sacrament, als Sünde behandelte. Mit Bezug auf “proprietary right” hatte d. Güterschleichde Kirche allerdings Interesse den Weibern einiges zu sichern (umgekehrtes Interesse wie die Brahminen!) Herr Maine in Lecture XII theilt d. erstaunten Europa mit, dass England d. Privileg d. s. dort19 g. “Analytical Jurists” besitzt, wovon d. bedeutendsten Jeremy Bentham u. John Austin. [343] Austin’s: “Province of Jurisprudence Determined” has long been one of the higher classbooks in this University. (345) (andre lectures des Kerl more recently given to the world.) Seine Vorgänger Bentham u. Hobbes. Folgendes d. grosse Entdeckung selbigen John Austin’s:

“If (says the immense John Austin) a determinate human superior, not in the habit of obedience to a like superior, receive habitual obedience from the bulk of a given society, that determinate superior is Sovereign in that society, and the society, including the superior, is a society political and independent.” “To that superior the other members of the society are subject; or on that determinate superior the other members of the society are dependent. The position of its other members towards that determinate superior is a state of subjection or a state of dependence. The mutual relation which subsists between that superior and them, may be styled the relation of Sovereign and Subject, or the Relation of Sovereignty and Subjection” (citirt bei Maine [p. 348, 349]) D. “determinate human superior” so der Sovereign is “an individual or a collegiate Sovereign” (diese Phrase für single person or group auch eine Erfindg d. Austin) (349) Herr Maine erklärt d. Aussichten d. Austin weiter dahin: If the community be violently or voluntarily divided into a number of separate fragments, then, as soon as each fragment has settled down (perhaps after an interval of anarchy) into a state of equilibrium, the Sovereign will exist and will be discoverable in each of the now independent portions. [349, 350] Das gemeinsame Charaktermal aller shapes of dr Sove<r>eignty – whether the Sovereign a person or a combination of persons – ist, dass er has* the possession of irresistible force, not necessarily exerted but capable of being exerted. Ist d. Sovereign a single person, so nennt ihn Austin a Monarch; if a small group – Oligarchy; if a group of considerable dimensions, an Aristocracy; if very large and numerous, a Democracy. Austin hates the name of “Limited Monarchy”, in his days more fashionable than now, u. d. Government of Great Britain he classes with Aristocracies. Was alle forms of Sovereignty gemein haben is the power (but not necessarily the will) to put compulsion without limit on suijects or fellow-subjects. (350) Wo kein solcher sovereign erkennbar – Anarchie. [351] The question of determining his (the Sovereign’s) character [in a given society] is always a question of fact ... never a question of law or morals. (l.c.)

D. Sovereign must be a determinate human superior. Besteht er aus mehren Personen, so he must be a number of persons capable of acting in a corporate or collegiate capacity ... since the Sovereign must effect his exertions of power, must issue | his orders, by a definite exercise of his will. The possession of physical power unentbehrliches Merkmal. [351] The bulk of the society must obey the superior who is to be called Sovereign. Not the whole of the Society, for in that case sovereignty would be impossible, but the bulk, the large majority, must obey. [352]

The Sovereign must receive an habitual obedience from the bulk of the community. [353] Ferneres characteristic desselben: is immunity from the control of every other human superior. (l.c.)

[Dies d. Grundtext nach, wie Maine selbst zugiebt, v. Austin, wie so weit damit identisch, von Bentham aus Hobbes (Leviathan: Ch. De Cive, first published in Latin, in the Elementa Philosophiae)]

Aber sagt Maine: Hobbes’ Object war politisch; das des Austin “strictly scientific” (355) [Scientific! doch nur in d. Bdtg, dies dies Wort im Kopf of blockheadish British lawyers haben kann, wo altmodische Classification, Definition etc als scientific gilt. Vgl. übrigens I) Machiavelli u. 2) Liuguet.] Ferner: Hobbes will origin of Staat (Government u. Sovereignty) ergründen; dies Problem existirt für lawyer Austin nicht; für ihn dies fact gewissermassen a priori vorhanden. Dies sagt Maine [p. 356]. D. unglückliche Maine selbst hat keine Ahnung davon, dass da wo Staaten existiren (after the primitive Communities etc) i.e. eine politisch organisirte Gesellschaft, der Staat keineswegs d. Prinz ist; er scheint nur so.

Herr Maine bemerkt über Austin’s Ausgabe der Hobbes’schen “force” theory:

If all the members of the community had equal physical strength and were unarmed, the power would be a mere result from the superiority of numbers; but, as a matter of fact, various causes, of which much the most important have been the superior physical strength and the superior armanents of portions of the community have conferred on numerical minorities the power of applying irresistible pressure to the individuals who make up the community as a whole. [358]

Die assertion which the great “Analytical Jurists” (Bentham u. Austin) cannot be charged with making, but which some of their disciples go very near to hazarding, that the Sovereign person or group actually wields the stored-up force of society by an uncontrolled exercise of will, is certainly never in accordance with fact. The vast mass of infuences, which we may call for shortness moral, [dies “moral” zeigt wie wenig Maine von der Sache versteht; so weit these influences (economical before everything else) “moral” modus of existence besitzen, ist dies immer ein abgeleiteter, secundärer modus u. nie das prius] perpetually shapes, limits, or forbids the actual direction of the forces of society by its Sovereign. (359) The Austinian view of Sovereignty really is – that it is the result of Abstraction [Maine ignores das viel Tiefere: dass d. scheinbare supreme selbständige Existenz des Staats selbst nur scheinbar u. dass er in allen seinen Formen eine exerescence of society is; wie seine Erscheinung selbst erst auf einer gewissen Stufe der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung vorkömmt, so verschwindet sie wieder, sobld d. Gesellscft eine bisher noch nicht erreichte Stufe erreicht hat. Erst Losreissung der Individualität von d. ursprünglich nicht despotischen Fesseln (wie blockhead Maine es versteht), sondern befriedige den u. gemüthlichen Banden der Gruppe, der primitiven Gemeinwesen, – damit d. einseitige Herausarbeitung der Individualität. Was aber die wahre Natur der letzteren zeigt sich erst wenn wir d. Inhalt – d. Interessen dieser “letzteren” analysiren. Wir finden dann, dass diese Interessen selbst wieder gewissen gesellscftlichen Gruppen gemeinsame u. sie charakterisirende Interessen, Klasseninteressen etc sind, also diese Individualität selbst Klassen- etc Individualität ist u. diese in letzter Instanz haben alle ökonomische Bedingungen zur Basis. Auf diesen als Basen baut sich der Staat auf u. setzt sie voraus.] It is arrived at by throwing aside all the characteristics and attributes of Government and (!) Society except one, and by connecting all forms of political superiority together through their common possession of force. [Das ist nicht der Grundfehler; dieser | ist, dass d. political superiority, whatever its peculiar shape, and whatever the ensemble of its elements, is taken als etwas über d. Gesellschaft stehendes, auf sich selbst beruhendes.] The elements neglected in the process are always important, sometimes of extreme importance, for they consist of all the elements controlling human action exceptforce directly applied or directly apprehended. [Z.B. die bessere Bewaffnung ist schon ein direct auf Fortschritt in d. Productionsmitteln (diese fallen z.B. bei Jagd u. Fischfang direct zusammen mit Zerstörungsmitteln, Kriegsmitteln) berühendes Element.] but the operation of throwing them aside for purposes of classification is ... perfectly legitimate.” (359) We reject in the process of abstraction by which the conception of Sovereignty is reached ... the entire history of each community ... the mode in which the result has been arrived at. [360] Seine flache Kritik, die er unter zum Theil richtig klingender Phraseologie verbirgt, windet sich ab erstens in folgender Phrase: “It is its history (des Gemeinwesens), the entire mass of its historical antecedents, which in each community determines how the Sovereign shall exercise or forbear from exercising his irresistible coercive power,” [p. 360] aber these ganze Geschichte 1öst sich bei Maine in socalled “moral elements” auf, denn er fährt wieder, als either Jurist od. Ideolog unmittelbar fort: “All that constitutes this – the whole enormous aggregate of opinions, sentiments, beliefs, superstitions, and prejudices of all kinds, hereditary and acquired, some produced by institutions and some by the constitution of human nature – is rejected by the Analytical Jurists. And thus it is that, so far as the restrictions contained in their definition of Sovereignty are concerned, the Queen and Parliament of our own country might direct all weakly children to be put <to> death or establish a system of lettres de cachet” (p. 360) (such as the English now have established by their coercion bill in Irld. Dies geschrieben Juni 1881) [Gutes Beispiel d. halbverrückte Iwan IV. Whd wütliend gegen Bojaren u. auch gegen rabble in Moskau, sucht er, u. muss er, sich halten als Vertreter d. Bauerninteressen.]

Daggen werden d. “assertions” des Austin “self evident propositions”, sobld man weiss dass “in his system the determination of Sovereignty ought to precede the determination of Law”, it being once understood that the Austinian conception of Sovereignty has been reached through mentally uniting all forms of Government in a group by conceiving them to be stripped of every attribute except coercive force”, and (hier zeigt sich wieder der Eselsfuss) when it is steadily born<e> in mind that the deductions from an abstract principle are never from the nature of the case completely exemplified in facts.” [362]

Weitere Dogmen des Austin: “Jurisprudence is the science of Positive Law. Positive Laws are Commands, addressed by Sovereigns to their Subjects, imposing a Duty, or condition of obligedness, or obligation, on those Subjects, and threatening a Sanction, or Penalty, in the event of disobedience to Command. A Right is the faculty or power conferred by the Sovereign on certain members of the community to draw down the sanction on a fellow-subject violating a Duty.” [362]

Alle diese kindischen Trivialitäten – Höchste Obrigkeit ist wer d. Macht hat zu zwingen, Positive Gesetze sind Befehle der Obrigkeit an ihre Unterthanen; sie legt dadurch diesen Unterthanen Verpflichtungen auf, u. dies ist Pflicht, u. droht mit Strafe für Ungehorsam gegen d. Befehl; Recht ist die Macht welche d. Obrigkeit gewissen Gliedern der Gesellscft überträgt, pflichtwidrig handelnde Gesellscftsglieder zu strafen – dies Kindische, u. viel mehr kann selbst ein Hobbes aus der blossen obrigkeitlichen Gewaltstheorie nicht herausklauben – dies von John Austin ernsthaft doctrinair gepredigte nennt Maine eine “Procedur” der analytischen Juristen, die closely analog sei mit der in Mathematik u. d. Politischen Oekonomie befolgten u. “strictly scientifick”! | Alles dreht sich hier nur um d. formelle Seite, die natürlich für einen Juristen überall d. Hauptsache. “Sovereigntey, for the purposes of Austin’s system, has no attribute but force, and consequently the view here taken of “law”, “obligation”, u. “right” is a view of them regarded exclusively as products of coercive force. The “sanction” (penalty) thus becomes the primary and most important member of series of notions and gives its colour to all the others”. [363] Niemand, sagt Maine, wd es schwer finden dies zuzugeben (“allowing”) “that laws have the character given to them by Austin, so far as such laws have proceeded from format Legislatures.” (l.c. ) Aber manche Personen protestiren dagegen. Z.B. with regard “to the customary law of all countries which have not included their law in Codes, and specially the English Common Law. (l.c.) The way in which Hobbes and he (Austin, the great Pompejus!) bring such bodies of rules as the Common Law under their system by insisting on a maxim which is of vital importance to it: “Whatever the Sovereign permits, he commands[p. 363] Until customs are enforced by Courts of Justice, they are merely “positive morality”, rules enforced by opinion, but, as soon as Courts of Justice enforced them, they become commands of the Sovereign, conveyed through the Judges who are his delegates or deputies. [364] [Hier Austin ohne es zu wissen (sieh oben Sohm p. 155-59) hat als engl. Jurist d. engl. fact in Knochen, dass d. normänn. Könige in Englel dch ihre normänn. courts of justice erzwungen (Aenderungen in Rechtsverhältnissen), die sie auf legislativem Weg nicht hätten erzwingen können] D. Herr Maine erklört dies weiter: “They command (d. Sovereigns) what they permit, “because, being by the assumption possessed of uncollfrollable force, they could innovate without limit at any moment. The Common Law consists of their commands because they can repeal or alter or re-state it at pleasure.” [364]

Law is (by Austin) regarded as regulated force. [365]

Der comfortable Maine glaubt: “The one doctrine of this school of jurists which is repugnant to laywers would lose its air of paradox if an assumption were made which, in itself theoretically unobjectionable (!), manifestly approximates to practical truth as the course of history proceeds – the assumption that what the Sovereign might (!) alter, but does not alter, he commands. [366] Dies d. Mainesche Ausgabe von Hobbes u. his little man Austin. Dies blosse scholastische Spielerei. D. Frage ist “what he might alter”. Nehmen wir selbst etwas juristisch Formelles. “Laws”, ohne abgeschafft zu werden, fallen in “desuetude”. Da “positive laws” commands des sovereign, so bleibben sie sein command, so lange sie existiren. Da he not alters them – he “might” do so, because the fact of their falling into “desuetude” proves, that the social state has outgrown them; shall we now say, that he commands them, because he does not abrogate them, though he “might” do so, as Maine’s panacea runs; or shall we say, that he commands them to fall into “desuetude”, because he does not enforce them? In that case he commands that his positive commands shall not be obeyed, i.e. executed, which shows that his “command” is a very imaginary, fictive sort of command. Austin’s “own ethical creed ... was Utilitarianism in its earlier shape.” [368]. Benthamism ganz würdig des Maines)

The 2nd, 3d, and 4th Lectures (of Austin) are occupied with an attempt to identify the law of God and the law of Nature (so far as these last words can be allowed to have any meaning) with the rules required by the theory of utility .... The identification ... is quite gratuitous and valueless for any purpose (369) The jurist, properly so called, has nothing to do with any ideal standard of law or morals.” ([p. 370]. Very true this! as little as theology has!)

Lecture XIII. Sovereignty and Empire. (Dies letzte Lecture des Maine’schen Buchs)

The word “law” has come down in close association with two notions, the notion of “order” and the notion of “force”. [371] | The principal writings of Austin are not much more than 40 years old. [373]

From the point of view of the jurist, law is only associated with order through the necessary condition of every true law that it must prescribe a class of acts or omissions, or a number of acts or admissions determined generally; the law which prescribes a single act not being a true law, but being distinguished as an “occasional” or “particular” command. Law, thus defined and limited, is the subject-matter of Jurisprudence as conceived by the Analytical Jurists. [375]

Austin in his treatise examines “a number of existing governments or (as he would say) forms of political superiority and inferiority, for the purpose of determining the exact seat of sovereignty in each of them. [375, 376]

Austin recognizes the existence of communities, or aggregates of men, in which no dissection could disclose a person or group answering to his definition of a Sovereign. D’abord, er, wie Hobbes (whose little man he is) fully allows that there is a state of anarchy. Wherever such a state is found, the question of Sovereignty is being actively fought out, u. er giebt als Beispiel that which was never absent from Hobbes’s mind, the struggle zwischen Charles I u. his Parliament. An acute critic of Hobbes u. Austin, der gewaltige Fitzjames Stephen, insists that there is a condition of dormant anarchy, z.B. United States (d. Beispiel v. Maine before the War of Secession. (377) Dies alles most characteristic of “acute” English jurists! Grausser Maine seinerseits declares ... there may be deliberate abstinence from fighting out a question known to be undecided, and I (Maine him. selber!) see no objection to call<ing> the temporary equilibrium thus produced a state of dormant anarchy. [p. 377]

Austin further admits the theoretical possibility of a state of nature; giebt ihm nicht d. Wichtigkeit wie Hobbes u. andre, aber allows his existence, wherever a number of men, or of groups not numerous enough to be political, have not as yet been brought under any common or habitually acting community. [378]

Austin sagt, p. 237, Ist vol., 3d ed.:

“Let us suppose that a single family of savages lives in absolute estrangement from every other community. And let us suppose that the father, the chief of this isolated family, receives habitual obedience from the mother and children. Now, since it is not a limb of another and larger community, the society formed by the parents and children, is clearly an independent society, and, since the rest of its members habitually obey its chief, this independent society would form a society political, in case the number of its members were not extremely minute. But since the number of its members is extremely minute, it would, I believe, be esteemed a society in a state of nature”; that is, a society consisting of persons not in a state of subjection. Without an application of the terms, which would somewhat smack of the ridiculous, we could hardly style the society a society political and independent, the imperative father and chief a monarch or sovereign, or the obedient mother and children subjects.” (Sehr tiefe!)

Dies so far Wasser auf d. Mühle Maine’s, “since, wie er sagt, the form of authority about which it is made, the authority of the Patriarch or Paterfamilias over his family, is, at least according to one (Maine’s u. consorts) modern theory, the element or germ out of which all permanent power of man over man has been gradually developed”. [379]

Aber nun kommt Maine mit “schwerem Geschütz”. D. Punjaub, after passing dch every conceivable phase of anarchy and dormant anarchy, fell, about 25 Jahre vor seiner Annexation, under the tolerably | consolidated dominion of a half military, half religious oligarchy, known as the Sikhs, sie selbst reduced to subjection by a single chieftain belonging to their order, Runjeet Singh. Dieser allgewaltiger Despot. He took, as his revenue, a prodigious share of the produce of the soil. He harried villages which recalcitrated at his exactions, and he executed great numbers of men. He levied great armies; he had all material of power, and exercised it in various ways. But he never made a law. The rules which regulated the life of his subjects were derived from their immemorial usages, and these rules were administered by domestic tribunals, in families or village-communities. (380, 381) Runjeet Singh never did or could (!) have dreamed of changing the civil rules under which his subjects lived. Probably he was as strong a believer in the independent obligatory force of such rules as the elders themselves who applied them. An Eastern or Indian theorist in law, to whom the assertion was made that Runjeet Singh commanded these rules, would etc feel it etc absurd etc. [382]

Dieser state d. Punjab under Runjeet Singh may be taken as the type of all Oriental communities in their native state during their rare intervals of peace and order. They have ever been despotisms etc. D. commands der despots at their head, harsh and cruel as they might be, implicitly obeyed. But then these commands, save in so far as they served to organise administrative machinery for the collection of revenue, have not been true laws; were of the class called by Austin occasional or particular commands. The truth is that the one solvent of local and domestic usage ... has been not the command of the Sovereign but the supposed command of the Deity. In India, the influence of the Brahminical treatises on mixed law and religion in sapping the old customary law of the country has always been great, and in some particulars it has become greater under English rule. [382, 383]

D. Assyrian, Babylonian, Median u. Persian Empires, for occasional wars of conquest, levied vast armies from populations spread over immense areas; verlangten absolute obedience to their occasional commands, punished disobedience with the utmost cruelty; dethroned petty kings, transplanted whole communities etc. Aber mit all dem interfered but little with the every day religious or civil life of the groups to which their subjects belonged. The “royal statute” and “firm decree” preserved to us as a sample of “law of the Medes and Persians which altereth not”, ist kein law in modernem Sinn, sondern a “particular command”, a sudden, spasmodic, and temporary interference with ancient multifarious usage left in general undisturbed. Selbst d. Athenian empire, so weit es nicht Attica betraf, sondern d. subject cities u. islands, was clearly a tax-taking Empire wie die Asiatischen, nicht a legislating Empire. [384, 385]

A new order of legislation introduced into the world dch d. empire of the Romans. [386]

Nach d. Burschen Maine d. origin of the political communities called States is that they were formed by the coalescence of groups, the original group having been in no case smaller than the patriarchal family. (Again!) Aber dies coalescence was soon arrested. [386]

In a later stage, political communities ... often of very great territorial extent, are constructed by one community conquering another or one chieftain, at the head of a siugle community or tribe, subjugating great masses of population. But ... the separate local life of the small societies included in these great States was not extinguished or even much enfeebled. [386, 387] | The “complete trituration in modern societies of the groups which once lived with an independent life has proceeded concurrently with much greater activiy in legislation.” [387]

If the powers of the Village Council (später Athenian Ekklesia etc.) must be described by modern names, that which lies most in the background is legislative power; that which i<s> most distinctly conceived is judicial powers. The laws obeyed are regarded as having always existed, and usages really new are confounded with the really old. (388, 389) The village communities of the Aryan (! again this nonsense!) race do not therefore exercise true legislative power so long as they remain under primitive influences. Nor again is legislative power exercised in any intelligible sense of the word by the Sovereigns of those great States, now confined to the East, which preserve the primitive local groups most nearly intact. Legislation, as we conceive it, and the break up of local life appear to have universally gone on together. [389] The Roman Empire was the source of the influences which have led, immediately or ultimately, to the formation of highly-centralised, actively legislating, States. It was the first great dominion which did not merely tax, but legislated also. The process was spread over many centuries .... Its commencement and completion, I should place ... roughly at the issue of the first Edictum Provinciale, and at the Extension of the Roinall citizenship to all subjects of the Empire. But, in the result, a vast and miscellaneous mass of customary law was broken up and replaced by new institutions .... it (the Roman Empire) devoured, brake in pieces, and stamped the residue with its feet. [390, 391] Dann wirkte d. Roman Empire u. sein law auf d. neuen dch d. Barbaren gegründeten Reiche etc. [391]

Customary law ... is not obeyed, as enacted law is obeyed. When it obtains over small areas and in small natural groups, the penal sanctions on which it depends are partly opinion, partly superstition, but to a far greater extent an instinct almost as blind and unconscious as that which produces some of the movements of our bodies. The actual constraint which is required to secure conformity with usage is inconceivably small. When, however, the rules which have to be obeyed once emanate from an authority external to the small natural group and forming no part of it, they wear a character wholly unlike that of a customary rule. They lose the assistance of superstition (par exemple Christian Religion. Roman Church?), probably that of opinion, certainly that of spontaneous impulse. The force at the back of law comes therefore to be purely coercive force to a degree quite unknown in societies of the more primitive type. Moreover, in many communities, this force has to act at a very great distance from the bulk of the persons exposed to it, and thus the Sovereign who wields it has to deal with great classes of acts and with great classes of persons, rather than with isolated acts and with individuals. Daher d. indifferency, inexorableness, u. generality ihrer “laws”. [392, 393]

Their generality (of the Laws) and their dependence on the coercive force of a Sovereign are the result of the great territorial area of modern States, of the comminution of the sub-groups which compose them, and above all of the Roman Commonwealth etc. [394]

We have heard of a village Hampden, but a village Hobbes is inconceivable. Flüchtet v. England wegen civil disturbance; a<u>f continent sah d. Bur<s>che governments rapidly centralising (i.e. was Maine zu tief zu sagen: Richelieu, Mazarin etc), local privileges u. jurisdictions in | extreme decay, the old historical bodies, such as the French Parliaments, tending for the time to become furnaces of anarchy, the only hope discoverable in kingly power. These were among the palpable fruits of the wars which ended in the Peace of Westphalia. The old multiform local activity of feudal or quasi-feudal society was everywhere enfeebled or destroyed. (Dagegen hingegen Locke Holland vor Augen, ebso wie Petty). Was dahingegen d. graussen Bentham betrifft, was hatte er hinter sich: (Französ. Revol. u. Napoleon). A Sovereign who was a democrat commenced, and a Sovereign who was a despot completed, the Codification of the laws of France. There had never before in the modern world been so striking an exemplification of the proposition that, what the Sovereign permits, he commands, because he could at any time substitute an express command for his tacit permission, nor so impressive a lesson in the far-reaching and on the whole most beneficial results (!) which might be expected from the increased activity of Sovereigns in legislation proper. [396]