



Bobby Wants YOU

KENNEDYISM

the liberal offensive

against the

anti-war movement

Introductory note:

The following is the text of a forum held in San Francisco Sept. 22, 1967 under the auspices of the Progressive Labor Party.

Entitled: Kennedyism—The Liberal Offensive—Against the anti-war movement—the forum dealt with the “three stooges of imperialism in government and the three stooges out of government.”

The forum was presented by Allen Solganick and John Roemer. We invite your comments.

Allen Solganick

Ever since the United States began its aggression against Vietnam, a movement has been growing among the American people to oppose that aggression. This movement has grown to massive proportions, with hundreds of thousands of people demonstrating and organizing against this war. And, as the movement grows, so do the ranks of radicals and revolutionaries who see the need for a complete change in the political and economic system—who see the need to replace capitalism with socialism. Instead of a political and economic system run by big businessmen for their own profit, these radicals want a system run by the majority of the people—by the working class and its allies. Instead of the dictatorship of big business, they want the dictatorship of the working class. They know that only by the installation of a working class government can the war in Vietnam and other wars like it be finally ended. For they realize that the U.S. is in Vietnam because the big businessmen who run the government are interested in expanding their profits by exploiting people in other parts of the world; that is, they are imperialists. And as long as business dominates the government, the U.S. will be an imperialist country. This imperialism can take the form of so called “aid” or outright war, or many other forms, but the effect is always the

same—the exploitation of other countries for the profit of a few big businessmen.

The consciousness that the U.S. is an imperialist country which must be fundamentally changed is spreading throughout the movement. This poses a threat to the rulers of this country. Therefore, representatives of the rulers' point of view have entered the anti-war movement in an attempt to change the real opposition of the American people to imperialism into a loyal opposition, in other words into a sham opposition. The basis for opposition to Johnson by these liberals is not that the U.S. should cease its aggression against Vietnam, but rather that U.S. imperialism conquer Vietnam through negotiations rather than bombing. The basis for opposition to Johnson by these liberals is not that the U.S. should cease its aggression against Vietnam, but rather that U.S. imperialism conquer Vietnam through negotiations rather than bombing.

However, a victory for imperialism either way is not in the interests of the American people. The cost for imperialism in terms of money and lives lost is borne by the working class. But the only benefits go to the millionaires through exploiting the countries which are conquered. Imperialism, whether it be the Peace Corps or the war against Vietnam, must be fought by workers and students because it only fattens the profits of the bosses.

Three imperialist stooges

The three most important non-elected representatives of the liberal point of view are Arthur Schlesinger, John Kenneth Galbraith, and Martin Luther King, all of whom have been faithfully serving imperialism for years. Galbraith was ambassador to India; Schlesinger was special advisor to John Kennedy; and King has been special advisor to Black people—his advice during the Watts rebellion: "Use the full force of police power to quell the situation in Los Angeles." (1) All three also have a special relationship to Bobby Kennedy. Schlesinger is closely tied to the Kennedy family, and it was Bobby who asked Schlesinger to become John Kennedy's special advisor. It was Bobby who intervened to get King out of jail in 1964 and more recently money has been raised for King's organization by Bobby Kennedy men. Galbraith served under John Kennedy, and James Reston has pointed out that since Bobby has such limited maneuverability in Congress, Galbraith has emerged as Bobby's spokesman to the anti-war movement. In fact Reston says that Galbraith is "the most articulate spokesman of the scat-

1. Los Angeles Times, August 14, 1966.

tered Vietnam peace forces in America." (2)

What is it that these three Kennedy stooges want with the anti-war movement? These forces hope to swing the anti-war movement behind Bobby for a victory in 1972. To do that they have to stem its militancy and stop its growing anti-imperialist consciousness.

This is what the three stooges are saying:

Arthur Schlesinger

Schlesinger feels that it is perfectly legitimate for the government to lie to the people. He made this statement on Meet the Press and in his book, One Thousand Days, about the criminal invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. For Schlesinger, the main thing is to defeat communism, that is, working class movements against imperialism at home and abroad. If it takes lies, invasions, wars or negotiations then that is perfectly all right. At home he was one of the founders of Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) which is devoted to anti-communism. For foreign policy he was one of the founders of Negotiation Now.

Schlesinger states clearly that he wants a victory for U.S. imperialism in Vietnam. He

2. James Reston, "Galbraith on the War in Vietnam," New York Times, July 2, 1967, p. 10E.

wrote in the New York Times that "no serious American—including Dr. King—has proposed unilateral withdrawal; and this, after all, would be the only action which could hand the game to our enemies." (3) In other words, the Vietnamese people who are fighting for national independence from imperialism are our "enemies." And, we do not want them to gain their independence so we do not propose withdrawal.

If Schlesinger wants a U.S. victory in Vietnam, why does he oppose Johnson? According to Schlesinger, Johnson does not realize that the way to conquer the Vietnamese is through negotiations rather than simply using force. He favors the political method over the military method. The best description of the political method was given recently by Roger Hilsman, another Kennedy advisor, who claims that the Kennedy administration was divided into two camps. (4) On one hand was LBJ, McNamara, and Rusk who favored military solutions to all problems, whether it be in Vietnam or Detroit. On the other hand was Averill Harriman, Hilsman, and Schlesinger who favored the political approach which consisted of using neutralists within a country and the international community led by the Soviet Union to keep the communists and anti-imperialists at bay.

3. Arthur Schlesinger, "Dissent and the Vietnam War," New York Times, May 6, 1967.
4. Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation, Doubleday, 1967.

Troops were not ruled out in the political approach, but they would play a secondary role. Of course, the aims of both the political and military approaches were a victory for U.S. imperialism.

Split over strategy

Thus, the split in the ruling class is not over goals, but rather, over the best strategy to gain their ends. Schlesinger wants to stop the bombing not because he feels that the U.S. has no business fighting against Vietnamese independence, but because he feels that victory cannot be achieved through bombing. He wants to use the political approach by following this program as outlined in his book The Bitter Heritage: (5)

- 1) Stop the bombing and further escalation;
- 2) Keep enough troops in Vietnam to assure a stalemate, but do not withdraw completely;
- 3) Create incentives for the Viet Cong to defect (buy them off);
- 4) Try to make Vietnam a neutral country with a coalition government, relying mainly on the Soviet Union, France, and England to create this neutral government;
- 5) Let the Viet Cong have some representation in this new government. But first the U.S.

5. Arthur Schlesinger, The Bitter Heritage, Vietnam and American Democracy, Fawcett Crest Books, 1967.

will have to create a "peasant" government in Saigon. After the Viet Cong enter the coalition, the U.S. can work on splitting the Viet Cong by splitting the "nationalists" from the communists. The U.S. ends up with a government which can be controlled.

It is no wonder then that he was a founder of Negotiation Now. We can see that for him negotiations and a coalition government are the key to an imperialist victory. He would like see the anti-war movement adopt his ruling class program rather than the anti-imperialist program centered around the demand for immediate withdrawal of the U.S. from Vietnam.

John Kenneth Galbraith

The chief liberal strategist for the anti-war movement is Galbraith who Reston calls the leader of the peace movement and who is now head of ADA. With leadership like this, the movement does not need enemies. For example, Galbraith was one of 18 economists who recently called on Congress to support Johnson's tax increase to halt inflation and pay for the war. Instead of calling for an end to the war, he asked the American people to be more heavily taxed to pay for the aggression. There should be no illusion that Galbraith does not want a U.S. imperialist victory in Vietnam.

However, like Schlesinger, Galbraith's strategy for victory is different than Johnson's.

According to both of these stooges the communist world is not a unified menace. One can work with "reasonable communists" like the Russians. Nor is the Viet Cong a unified menace for it too contains "reasonable" communists (we would call these "reasonable" elements either sellouts or revisionists). So a key element in Galbraith's strategy is to rely on revisionists to defeat militant communists and anti-imperialists. His program is very similar to Schlesinger's as outlined in a speech given to a national conference of Negotiation Now: (6)

1) Stop the bombing and further escalation because "given the weight of our attack on a poor and primitive land, the supply of targets has been exhausted...We lose nothing." (7)

2) Pursue a policy of "active defense" until the "enemy" agrees to negotiate;

3) Provide "the maximum of security, tranquility and well-being in the limited but populous areas that we control" and wait for negotiations. We must negotiate with the Viet Cong because we must realize that there are forms of "national communism" that we can live with (revisionists);

4) Disengage ourselves from the generals we are committed to in Saigon (This is similar to Schlesinger's call for a "pro-peasant" government to be set up in Saigon).

6. This speech is published in Current, August, 1967, pp. 6-10.

7. *ibid.*, p. 10.

So Galbraith also calls for a coalition government of U.S. puppets and sell-out liberation front members. But he also has a lot to say about what the strategy of the anti-war movement should be. He says that critics of the government are wrong in assuming that they have no influence on government policy because they have had a moderating influence. Furthermore, critics can have an effect on U.S. policy only if they will moderate their demands. Instead of calling for an immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops, they should work for lesser steps, such as stopping the bombing and negotiations. He says that "Moderation in these days is not in high repute. But increasingly men are divided between those who want the catharsis of total violence and those who want the comforts of escape. Yet if our national mood opposes moderation, history favors it." (8) In other words, the American people do not want moderation, they want to get out of Vietnam now. But history and Galbraith favor moderation. This is a perfect example of how these liberals are attempting to stem the militancy of the anti-war movement. Galbraith says that we can influence policy, but we know that this is an imperialist government where big business makes policy.

Martin Luther King

King, along with Schlesinger and Galbraith,
8. *ibid.*, p. 6.

was one of the chief founders of Negotiation Now, which claims that both sides, the Vietnamese liberation fighters and the U.S., are equally to blame for the war. In a full page ad placed in newspapers around the country they say that "Negotiation Now rejects the untenable choices of either unleashing our full military strength in an all-out war or 'pulling out' and abandoning responsibility for establishing conditions for a stable peace." (9) We know that for Schlesinger and Galbraith a "stable peace" means a U.S. imperialist victory. Negotiations Now is calling for a cease fire, with 500,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam so that a coalition government can be set up before the troops are withdrawn. We have already seen what kind of coalition government they have in mind.

King comes late to the anti-war movement scarred from the battles he fought to stem the militancy of the Black peoples movement. And, King too has a program for Vietnam, outlined in his speech at Riverside Church in New York on April 4, 1967: (10)

- 1) End the bombing of North and South Vietnam;
- 2) Declare a cease-fire in the hope that such action will create the atmosphere for negotiation;
- 3) Realistically accept the fact that the Viet

9. New York Times, May 7, 1967, p. E5.

10. Published in Ramparts, "Declaration of Independence From the War in Vietnam," May, 1967.

Cong has "substantial" support in South Vietnam and must thereby play a role in any meaningful negotiations and in any future Vietnam government;

4) After negotiations, set a date for the removal of "all foreign troops" from Vietnam.

Again we have the call for a coalition government, with the Viet Cong "playing a role." We know that the Viet Cong are the only true representatives of the Vietnamese people. But King wants them to enter into a coalition with U.S. puppets. This is not surprising, for King is the same kind of anti-communist as Schlesinger and Galbraith. In the same speech he says that "this kind of positive revolution of values (brotherhood) is our best defense against communism."

Why are we in Vietnam? Is it because of imperialism? According to King that is not the answer. He says "We were taking the young Black men who had been crippled by our society and sending them 8,000 miles away to guarantee liberties in Southeast Asia which they had not found in Southwest Georgia and East Harlem. So the U.S. is fighting for the liberty of the Vietnamese according to King. Part of his role in the anti-war movement is to steer people away from the idea that the U.S. is in Vietnam because of imperialism. His other role is to dampen militancy by calling for Negotiation Now. He says that "these are days which demand wise restraint and calm reasonableness."

All three of the liberals tell us to be calm

and reasonable and not advocate the immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam. They push the line of negotiations, which is Bobby Kennedy's line. Kennedy needs the anti-war movement as a base for his presidential bid. They want the opposition in this country to be loyal, to stay within bounds. Dean Rusk, in an unguarded moment on October 13, 1967 said that "the debate in which we are now involved is essentially a debate about detail—this or that military move, this or that diplomatic step..." (11) The liberals want the anti-war movement to debate details rather than take the position of full scale opposition to imperialism. For them it is alright to debate the best strategy for an imperialist victory, and that is why they call on us to be moderate.

But we must stick to our position that the U.S. get out now in the face of this attack by the liberals, because this is the only position which is in the interest of American workers and students, the vast majority of the American people. We must continue to demand that there be no imperialist wars which destroy the standard of living and the lives of workers. Anti-communism is a cover used by the bosses to protect and expand their profits. We must attack these liberals and expose them for the ruling class agents that they are.

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11. San Francisco Chronicle, October 14, 1967, p. 1.

Imperialism in Vietnam and the peace movement

John Roemer

What is the strategy of imperialism in Vietnam and in the peace movement? In this paper, I'll examine the role the dissenters in the Senate play in formulating that strategy—in particular, the roles of Kennedy, Morse and Fulbright. Few people in the left doubt that these men represent the ruling class, and not the people. The question, rather, is whether they represent a fundamental split in the ruling class, or simply a divergent view on the correct tactics for imperialism.

This is an important question, for out of it can flow different tactics to fight the ruling class. If the dissenters represent a fundamental split, we could argue our tactic should be to widen that split, thereby giving the working class forces more leverage. If, on the other hand, they represent merely a divergent view on tactics, we must oppose them vehemently, and not confuse the issue by trying to separate them from the more hawkish ruling class forces. In fact, they can be even more dangerous than the Johnsons, in this case, for they mislead the people.

I'll start by reviewing the positions of the three senators on the war.

Sen. Fulbright

Fulbright has been the most outspoken of the three. According to him, "...the two essential reasons for our involvement in Vietnam are: the view of communism as an evil philosophy and the view of ourselves as God's avenging angels, whose sacred duty is to combat evil philosophies." (1) Indeed, Fulbright's explanation of all the forces in the world is a moral one, as opposed to a class one. "Power tends to confuse itself with virtue," he says. America's problem is an "arrogance of power," China's problem is her "ancient pride." (2)

For Fulbright, an alternative policy is needed in Vietnam for such reasons as these: "...the tactical premise underlying the large scale American military involvement has proven to be unsound; the level of violence has become so high as to negate the concept of counter-insurgency; the war is having a destructive 'fallout' effect on American policy both at home and throughout the world; the war is now 'open-ended;' the war is based on a misconceived strategy for the containment of China." (3) In other words, we've miscalculated on our tactics for controlling Southeast Asia—Fulbright makes no mention of our right to be

in Vietnam, or the necessity of our controlling it. Fulbright proposes an eight point plan for Vietnam. It is essentially this: negotiate with the puppet government of the South, and the National Liberation Front (N.L.F.), and the North. After the negotiations have been successful, the U.S. forces should gradually withdraw—he is careful to say he has no definite time limit in mind for this. The negotiations should achieve a neutral South Vietnam, and preferably Southeast Asia—allowing no U.S. bases, and no Chinese bases. If we cannot negotiate such a settlement, the U.S. should consolidate its forces in highly fortified defensible areas in South Vietnam and keep them there indefinitely. This will give China and the North an "inducement" to negotiate. (4)

Is Fulbright anti-imperialist? Does he want control of Vietnam? Last year, he advocated "resolute and restrained containment." Concerning who should control Vietnam he says: "Mistakes are not liquidated without a price being paid. No responsible critic of the war—certainly no member of the Senate—advocates a disorderly withdrawal of American forces and the abandonment of South Vietnam to the Vietcong." (5)

What, then, is Fulbright's strategy? He says: "Vietnamese communism is a potential bulwark—perhaps the only potential bulwark—against Chinese domination of Vietnam. It is for

1. Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power, p. 107.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.*, 180-1

4. *Ibid.*, 188-196

5. *Ibid.*, 182

this reason that I believe that we should try, if it is not yet too late, to come to terms with North Vietnam and the Vietcong." (6) Again: "In South Vietnam as in North Vietnam the communists remain today the only solidly organized political force. That fact is both the measure of our failure and the key to its possible redemption." (7) And most clearly, "If we accept the premise that it is aggression rather than communism which endangers us, then it follows that the existence of a strong communist state which poses a barrier to expansion by an aggressive communist power may be more desirable from the viewpoint of American interests than a weak non-communist state whose very weakness forms a vacuum which invites conquest or subversion." (8) "More than ever," he continues, "we are tending to give our opposition to communism priority over our support of nationalism. The result has been that with certain exceptions we have strongly and for the most part unsuccessfully opposed those genuinely nationalist movements which have been controlled or influenced by communists. The most notable—and rewarding—exception has been Yugoslavia, whose national independence we have supported since 1948 with the result that it has posed a powerful barrier to Soviet aspirations in Southeast

6. *Ibid.*, 114

7. *Ibid.*, 118

8. *Ibid.*, 81

Europe—a more powerful barrier; it should be noted, than many non-communist governments have been able to erect." (9) Fulbright's message is clear: we have become paranoid in our fear of communism, and don't realize that national communist movements are the perfect breeding grounds for imperialism. Our policy in Vietnam should be to strengthen, in addition, the national non-communist forces in the N.L.F. and build a government there which will be anti-Chinese but reasonably representative. The N.L.F. can do this. Tito did this in Yugoslavia, and now the U.S. can control 49% of Yugoslavian companies, if it so desires!

Bobby Kennedy

What about Kennedy? Everyone realizes he is an opportunist, from his days as McCarthy's counsel, to his Teamster busting antics, to his johnny-come-lately anti-war stand. As recently as a year ago, RFK said that the growth of gross national product (GNP) makes it possible to fight both the war abroad and poverty at home. (10) He never voted against war appropriations (neither did Fulbright) since this "would interfere with the prerogatives of the President." (11) Kennedy jumped on the

9. *Ibid.*, 78

10. *I.F. Stone's Weekly*, Aug. 15, 1966.

11. *IFS*, Feb., 1967

“Stop the Bombing” bandwagon—he only entered the arena after the main fight had taken place in the Senate. He didn’t vote for the “Stop the Bombing” resolution in February (neither did Fulbright). In fact, as recently as January he stood squarely behind Johnson.” (12) Kennedy’s claim to fame comes with his March speech, which contains his plan for Vietnam. “Nearly all Americans,” he says, “share with us the determination and intention to remain in Vietnam until we have fulfilled our commitments.” (13) His request for a halt to the bombing is, he says, offered as a test for the sincerity of Kosygin, who claims negotiations will begin with such a halt. His three point program is this: to test the sincerity of the North by halting the bombing and declaring that we are willing to negotiate within the week; to have an international patrol to assure that during negotiations, neither side substantially increases the scale of war in the South; to have an international presence gradually replace Americans, and then to have elections in which both communists and non-communists can run. “If the failure of negotiations coupled with the actions of our adversary make it necessary for us to re-examine our position,” he says, “we would act with far clearer international understanding of our motives and necessities.” (14) That is, is we can’t force an

12. New York Times, Jan. 29, 1967.

13. NYT, March 3, 1967

14. Ibid.

agreeable settlement at the conference table, we’ll resume the war. The policy of “Stop the Bombing” and “Negotiations” as put forth by Kennedy is a mask for continuing the war, for continuing U.S. domination of Vietnam—not a way of ending it.

What’s Kennedy’s strategy? He says “Let’s continuously ask the help of Pope Paul, Wilson, U. Thant, and Kosygin...” (15) He contends we are not making enough of the Sino-Soviet split, and observes “North Koreans have strongly declared their independence if not hostility towards Peking.” (16) He attacks the Ky regime as not being representative, says the communist action in the South is “basically a native growth” (17) and wants more social reform. His strategy is the same as Fulbright’s, plus a little more: as well as recognizing the strength of “national communism” in opposing revolution and befriending imperialism, he also has appreciation, more than Fulbright, of the role the Soviet Union can play in bringing the Vietnamese to terms. That is, selling out the revolution by forcing a negotiated settlement. A “negotiated settlement,” of course, means either getting U.S. control of Vietnam or continuing the war.

Sen. Morse

Morse is the least polite critic of what he

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid., Feb. 9, 1967

17. Ibid.

calls "McNamara's war." (18) He is opposed to our policy because: "The U.S. will exhaust itself by reaching out beyond its natural limits and trying to maintain dominion where it has no real interests but only imaginary ones." (19) His plan, first enunciated in 1964, was: "... to get out now, except for participating in the maintenance of a peacekeeping U.N. force and trying to bring the killing to an end." (20) This September, he offered a proposal: for Johnson to request a meeting of the U.N. Security Council to act to end the war and pledge U.S. support for U.N. decisions in advance, or to go to the General Assembly if necessary. He asked that overall U.S. support be given for an effort to convene an international conference to reach a lasting peace settlement for Southeast Asia, coupled with an immediate cessation of hostilities. (21) Morse's position is different from Fulbright's and Kennedy's: he is a "sphere of influence" man, as the quote above about "reaching out beyond our natural limits" attests to. Again, this position comes forward when he says: "Our manpower and our resources can be bled away in foreign fields just as surely as were those of Great Britain. They will be, too, unless we come to recognize some

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18. Congressional Record, April 24, 1964.
 19. Speech given at University of California, Berkeley, May 21, 1967.
 20. Congressional Record, April 24, 1964.
 21. San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 12, 1967.

limits of the territory we feel we must control." (22) Those limits, for Morse, include Latin America. He makes no bones about being a guardian of imperialism's interests—he just doesn't see that Southeast Asia is that important. He supports our fascist allies in Brazil, but thinks our troops in Western Europe are unnecessary.

We can summarize the strategies of Fulbright, Kennedy, and Morse as a reliance on nationalism and sellout-ism, or revisionism, and maintaining our legitimate sphere of influence. Morse seems to be a maverick, no one else is both such an unabashed imperialist and also anti-administration. But what is the basis for Fulbright and Kennedy feeling that nationalism and revisionism can succeed in selling out the Vietnamese? Does North Vietnam show signs of faltering? In January of this year, Pham Van Dong, Premier of North Vietnam said: "We can say this is an unjust war, carried on for no reason... where lies the honor of America... this war is a sacred war." (23) There is no mention of imperialism in his words: from the Vietnamese point of view this is a sacred war, and from the American, a war for no reason. Is this sufficient political understanding to wage a war to the death against imperialism? In January of last year, Pham Van Dong said to Staughton Lynd:

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22. Berkeley speech, May 21, 1967.
 23. NYT, Jan. 8, 1967

"The great truth of our time is that we must be brothers . . . if you have the opportunity to meet President Johnson, will you please ask him: why is he fighting against us? There is no reason for it." (24)

Depending on Vietnamese

The North Vietnamese have given support to Kennedy for his "anti-war" stand. They have added a fifth point to their original four point ultimatum—that negotiations can begin with a permanent and unconditional halt to the bombings. (The implication is that the other four points need not be fulfilled, but this will suffice, for negotiations to begin.) The Russians have said negotiations will begin if there is merely a "definitive cessation" of the bombing—no permanence necessary. This August 30, North Vietnam said "unconditional cessation" is all that is needed for negotiations to begin. (25) Indeed, Kennedy's hopes of using the Soviet Union to mediate negotiations are well-founded: the Russians almost pulled it off in February in London, and in 1965 they offered full anti-aircraft protection to the North in return for carte blanche to run the war in the North themselves—that is, to end it, by selling out the South. Recently, the Russians have once again exposed how they sell out national

24. Viet Report, Jan. 1966

25. San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 15, 1967.

liberation struggles in their handling of the Arab-Israel war.

Johnson has also observed the forces of nationalism and revisionism operating in North Vietnam, but his response has been to escalate the attack in hope of bringing these forces to the fore, instead of letting the Soviet Union do it peacefully, by itself. Hence McNamara's frank confessions that the bombings are of no tactical value in preventing supplies from reaching the South—their purpose is to force negotiations, or a sellout. This is the great split in the ruling class: whether to force a sellout with the stick, or to first try the carrot and then use the stick.

Three against the people

What is the role of Fulbright, Kennedy and Morse in the peace movement? First, it should be observed that their dissent is reserved for the war, they do not pretend to be generally "progressive." Kennedy's record has been mentioned; Morse is Johnson's chief strike breaker, being the architect of the railroad injunction most recently; Fulbright has voted consistently against all civil rights bills in the Senate in 1957, '58, '60, '62, '64 and '65. Fulbright and Kennedy are most restrained in their anti-administration stand on the war: they talk, but don't vote against the war. Morse and Gruening are usually the only ones who oppose more appropriations; recently, Ful-

bright said he will oppose any effort to repeal the Gulf of Tonkin resolution! Our three stooges as well as thirteen other doves in the Senate signed a declaration directed to the North Vietnamese saying that their anti-administration stand should not be misinterpreted! "The signers of this declaration share the conviction that the tragic war in Vietnam should be ended by negotiation of a mutually acceptable settlement. However, in the absence of such a settlement we remain steadfastly opposed to any unilateral withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam." (26) That is, our dissension is internal—the question is merely how we should control you. Two million copies of this declaration were scattered upon North Vietnam, from the air.

The role of these dissenters, then, is to build a loyal opposition, which is a sham opposition, and capture the peace movement and assure its loyalty. These men are necessary for the ruling class—Johnson can say about them what Voltaire said about God: if he didn't exist, I'd have to invent him. How is their loyalty transmitted to the peace movement? First of all, it is done ideologically. The lines of "Negotiations Now" and "Stop the Bombing" are given strength because of their support by important senators. Many sincere people, who think "Negotiations Now" would mean getting the U.S. out, are tricked by these

26. NYT, May 18, 1967

slogans. This transmission is effected by such organized groups as the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and the Communist Party (CP)—witness the April 15 mobilization in San Francisco, and the recent Peace Torch Marathon, with its CP backing. Not only does the ruling class depend on such friends in the peace movement; it also has paid agents—for example, McKissick (\$200,000 grant from Ford) and Lowenstein. As an example, I'll digress for a moment on Allard Lowenstein. He is a former president of the National Student Association (NSA), from its CIA days, and graduated to Humphrey's staff when Hubert was a senator. He organized the Mississippi voter registration project at Stanford, and turned up at the '64 convention to get the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP) seated—this was Humphrey's idea. He became the Kennedy spokesman of the National Council of Churches to the Mississippi Coordinating Committee, and later a Kennedy spokesman on the committee Americans for Reexamination of our Far Eastern Policy. More recently, he has been one of the links between Kennedy and King—he writes some of King's speeches, in particular the "radical" one King gave when he came out against the war. Lowenstein's special province has been student work: he is young, informal, wears sneakers and talks radical. Recently he toured campuses pushing a Negotiations petition. The idea, as he presented it, was this: there are

some important people, senators for instance, who would like to start a real anti-war push in the government, but they have to have a public mandate behind them to do it. So if 100,000 students at select universities sign this petition (of course, lots of us feel more radical about the war, but we shouldn't let those constant dissenters on the extreme left divide us), then these people in government have the green light. Lowenstein is now a vice-chairman of the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA); his latest project has been a group called Concerned Democrats whose ostensible purpose is to defeat Johnson in the Democratic primaries next year. They plan to build a national student "dump LBJ" movement.

State power the key issue

This last example highlights another effect the Senatorial dissenters have on the peace movement: they foster the illusion that it is possible to defeat imperialism through electoral victories. In Chicago recently, the Dubois clubs, arm of the CP, pushed for a third ticket next November featuring King and Spock. Whether or not King runs, his ultimate role will be to hand over the peace movement to Kennedy.

How, then, do we fight this ruling class offensive in the peace movement? One way is to fight the "Negotiations" and "Stop the Bomb-

ing" lines. But it is not because the lines are not militant enough, or because they will have no effect, that we must fight them: it is because they are the lines of the ruling class, and the Vietnamese will be defeated if these policies succeed. We should clarify not only the content of these lines, but also their connections to the ruling class. If Kennedy takes power under the banner of Negotiations, or if Johnson negotiates, many will feel that a basic victory has been won. Secondly, we must fight the illusion that anything can be won at the ballot box. According to the stated plans of the various doves, our troops will remain in Vietnam for a long time—even with successful negotiations. To fight the illusion of electoral gains, we must expose the role of the agents and friends (King, the CP, etc.) of the "doves," in the movement.

What is the fundamental issue in this fight against a sellout in the peace movement? There has been a tendency for us to consider it as being between the ideologies of "Negotiate" and "U.S. Get Out." This, I think, is not it: the fundamental issue is who has state power. The point is this: the reason we are against the line "Negotiations" and for "U.S. Get Out" is that at this time the former is the ruling class line, and the latter is the working class line. But the ruling class can compromise on a line: the only thing it can't compromise on is its state power. Thus, we must build an opposition which cannot be appeased by any shuffling of politicians, by any changing of line, even by

any pretense the ruling class might effect that the peace movement has won it over. Unless we build consciousness of who has state power, that no political bosses will help the people, all these gambits will be tried by the ruling class, and some will be successful. Increasing people's clarity on state power must be the way we oppose fake electoral gains and fight for a revolutionary line in the peace movement.

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