As we pointed out in the Hammer and Sickle, Vol. 1, No. 3, the defeat of fascism represented a monumental victory for the world proletarian movement. However, the price of victory was incalculable. Nearly one Soviet citizen in three was killed or wounded defending the USSR and socialism. Moreover, those who died were many of the world’s most heroic and class-conscious fighters, as well as the very core of Soviet socialism. In fact, the fascist invasion exacted a toll far greater than would have been possible in even the bloodiest civil war.[19]
Prior to Stalin’s death, a sharp two-line struggle was developing within the Party and the state between the capitalist-readers and the proletarian leadership of Stalin. Although the debate was chiefly concerned with questions of economic development, it was in essence a struggle for state power. This is the real significance of Stalin’s essay, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, especially his replies to the revisionists Yaroshenko, Sanina and Venzher, which struck a blow against their capitalist designs. In the midst of this struggle, Stalin suddenly and mysteriously died. (In his memoirs, Khrushchev admits that he and a doctor friend watched gleefully as Stalin suffocated.) This provided the opportunity for the capitalist-roaders, who had planned this coup months in advance, to regroup their forces, stage a coup d’etat and usurp the leading positions of the Party and the state from the proletariat. With many of the proletariat’s finest leaders killed in the anti-fascist war, the counter-revolutionary onslaught was far more devastating than heretofore would have been possible.
The revisionists moved quickly to consolidate their power. On March 7, two days after Stalin’s death, Pravda announced the formation of the new regime. The first move of the capitalist-roaders was to push through a dramatic reorganization of both the Party and state. Claiming that the greatest unity was necessary to prevent disorder and panic, they merged the two leading bodies within the Party and within the state. It is significant that in the Party, a majority of the Central Committee members added during the 19th Party Congress under Stalin’s leadership were relieved of their positions. The fourteen major state ministries were reduced to four, and placed under the leadership of leading Party members, most of whom proved to be revisionists.[20] Later, on April 11, these ministries were given powers they hadn’t possessed under Stalin: they were now free to change the staffs of their enterprises, redistribute equipment, materials and resources, approve certain investment plans, etc.[21]
The key appointments in the new regime fell to Malenkov, with Khrushchev lurking in the background. Malenkov was appointed Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers (Premier) and First Secretary of the Party Presidium. Within two weeks, however, Khrushchev was able to capture the post of First Secretary, thus beginning his ascendancy to the status of Number One Revisionist.[22] Khrushchev had obviously been groomed for this – when Stalin died, he was removed from his duties as First Secretary of the Moscow Committee of the CPSU to allow him to concentrate on work in the Central Committee. Another significant appointment was that of Marshal Zhukov to the post of Deputy Minister of Defense, under Bulganin. Zhukov, of World War II fame, had been demoted in 1946 for advocating the lessening of Party work in the military.[23] All of these figures were to play key roles in the smashing of the proletarian state apparatus.
With the seizure of the ministries by the capitalist-roaders, the State Bank (Gosbank), the most powerful weapon in a centralized economy, fell into their hands. This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that the 1951 Budget reflected the revisionist line throughout.[24] Lenin emphasised the importance of the State Bank as follows:
Without big banks socialism would be impossible. The big banks are the ’state apparatus’ which we need to bring about socialism... A single State Bank, the biggest of the big, with branch–in every rural district, in every factory, will constitute as much as nine-tenths of the socialist apparatus. This will be countrywide book-keeping, country-wide accounting of the production and distribution of goods, this will be, so to speak, something in the nature of the skeleton of socialist society.[25]
Moreover, it goes without saying that these dogs also took control of the means of communication, which they used to publish bourgeois novels as well as preach pacifism and collaboration with USNA imperialism.
Thus, our investigation clearly indicates that with the usurpation of power by the revisionists in March, 1953, a qualitative change took place in the USSR; the dictatorship of the proletariat was torn from the hands of the working class, and as a result, the proletariat was formally expropriated from their ownership and control over the means of production. By the same taken, relations of production ceased to be socialist relations based on the ownership of the means of production by the proletariat. From that point onward, the aim of production ceased to be “the securing of the maximum satisfaction of the constantly rising material and cultural requirements of the whole of society...”[26] From that point onward, the aim of production was for profit. This is what we mean by the restoration of capitalism.
As our Albanian comrades have so correctly pointed out:
...Those who have the state machine in their hands also possess the principal means of production and they use the state machine as a powerful weapon to increase their capitalist wealth and profit. The classics of Marxism-Leninism have pointed out that the character of ownership depends on the nature of the economic-social order and of the state.
Speaking of nationalizations, K. Marx said: ’...as long as the rich classes remain in power, any nationalization represents not the liquidation of exploitation, but only “the change of its form…”
Proceeding from this thesis of Marx’s we can also define the character of the state ownership in the Soviet Union. The new Soviet bourgeoisie seized state power not as an aim in itself, but as a powerful means to enrich itself and to draw material profits. Through the state it also seized the state property and changed it into capitalist property of a special type.
Formally and in external appearance the state property in the Soviet Union is called socialist property, but in reality it has lost its one-time socialist character. With the working class divorced from running the country’s life, the state property is being used by the new Soviet bourgeoisie as a means of capitalist enrichment and profit, appropriating the surplus value created by the working class.
With the change of the character of ownership, the aim of production and the destination of the results of work also changed. The system of running and planning also changed fundamentally. Depriving the working class of the means of production brought about, as a consequence, its separation from the effective management of the economy and production.[27]
In an all-out attempt to win support for the new regime, as well as to confuse and disorient the masses, Malenkov immediately introduced radical economic “reforms”:
1) A shift in emphasis from heavy industry to the increased production of consumer goods was announced.[28] This was in complete contradiction to Stalin’s socialist policies:
It is necessary, in the first place, to ensure, not a mythical ’rational organization’ of the productive forces, but a continuous expansion of all social production, with a relatively higher rate of expansion of the production of means of production. The relatively higher rate of expansion of production of means of production is necessary not only because it has to provide the equipment both for its own plants and for all the other branches of the national economy, but also because reproduction on an extended scale becomes altogether impossible without it.[29]
2) Prices were cut, from 10% on bread to 50% on vegetables, sauerkraut and grapes;[30]
3) Real wages during 1953 went up by 8% as a result of huge tax cuts and nominal wage increases, ([31], [32])
4) Taxes on private plots were drastically reduced, while prices paid by the state to collective farms jumped; this, of course, meant greater commodity circulation in the economy end higher profits for the peasants. ([33],[34])
As we pointed out in the Hammer and Sickle, Vol. 1, No. 3, the revisionists manipulated the achievements of socialism under Stalin and used them to broaden their base of support. Fittingly, they aimed their sugar-coated bullets at the former exploiters and vacillating elements in particular, i.e., those most willing and able to consolidate the restoration of capitalism.
Finally, when the capitalist-roaders came to power in 1953, they began to export capital (commodities, credits, loans, etc.) in the form of foreign “aid” to the colonies and semi-colonies of the world imperialist system; again, a complete reversal from the practice and policies under Stalin. (See Section IV) The usurpation of power by the revisionists did not go unchallenged. A number of sources indicate that Beria, Minister of Internal Affairs (State Police) had wide mass support and was preparing a counter-attack when he was arrested June 26 by leading members of the Presidium and the military, and later executed. ([35],[36], [37]) As Khrushchev described the arrest:
We would have been quite helpless because there was a sizeable armed guard in the Kremlin. Therefore we decided to enlist the help of the military. First, we entrusted the detention of Beria to Comrade [General K.S.] Moskalenko, the air defense commander, and five generals. This was my idea. Then, on the eve of the session, Malenkov widened our circle to include Marshal Zhukov and some others. That meant eleven marshals and generals in all.[38]
Beria’s arrest and execution was followed by mass arrests and executions, and the dismantling of the state police apparatus. Thus, one of the major bulwarks of the proletarian state apparatus was smashed. The transformation of the military into a tool of the revisionists took place as a result of the capitalist-roaders assuming leading positions, and publicly leading and defending the execution of Beria.[39] Zhukov, already Deputy Minister of Defense, was awarded full membership in the Central Committee by the plenum that had agreed on Beria’s murder. The regime further consolidated its grip over the military by promoting ten generals, marshals and admirals to high positions during the three months after Beria’s arrest.[40] By 1955, the post of political officer at company level had been abolished, thus bringing into reality Zhukov’s cherished dream of subordinating ideology to “practical affairs”.[41]
The wholesale release of political degenerates – Trotskyites and Bukharinites in particular – began to take place immediately after the usurpation of power, and was speeded up after the execution of Beria and the dismantling of the state police. This could not help but bolster the capitalist-roaders in power, as well as encourage the spread of bourgeois ideology.[42]
By the time of the 20th Party Congress in 1956, the capitalist-roaders were in firm command of the Party and state. This is borne out by the vicious attack on Stalin and, through him, the dictatorship of the proletariat. Khrushchev and his ilk declared that the dictatorship of the proletariat was no longer necessary, and replaced it with a “state of the whole people”, i.e., the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Moreover, they transformed the Party into an appendage of the bourgeois state. Cadres were swamped with petty economic tasks, as communism became equated with a good dish of goulash. What else could such a party be called if not “a party of the whole people”, i.e., the bourgeoisie? Khrushchev backed up his words, too. Within ten years he purged over 70% of the Central Committee members of the 10th Party Congress, and replaced local Party leaders with increasing numbers of engineers, teachers and specialists – children of the former exploiting classes and his hand-picked ideological flunkies.
What we have said does not mean that the revisionists in power could immediately and openly put profit in command of the economy. Although it is clear in retrospect that the essential smashing of the Party and the proletarian state took place in 1953, it does not follow that the economic base was automatically “swallowed up” by the superstructure. The existence of a working class that had been steeled in years of struggle under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party, that had built socialism under the dictatorship of the proletariat, acted as a powerful brake on the designs of the ruling revisionist clique. This is precisely why some of their first measures were aimed at confusing and disorienting the masses of Soviet people, while materially encouraging the development of a base of support among the peasantry and skilled workers in particular. With the aim of production turned into its opposite, the capitalist-roaders were faced with the task of finding methods that would best facilitate the appropriation of surplus value and the accumulation of capital, while maintaining the outward appearance of building socialism. It is this process that characterizes the period from 1956-61 in particular, a transitional period during which the rule of the revisionist clique, based among a privileged stratum, was transformed into the rule of a bourgeois class of a new type, and when the means of production they controlled were transformed into capital and, consequently, the working class into wage-laborers.
From 1956-64, Khrushchev was the undisputed leader of the capitalist-roaders. By 1953, through a series of maneuvers, he was in control of both positions of Party First Secretary and Premier. Working closely with other leading revisionists such as Bulganin, Mikoyan, Zhukov, Brezhnev, etc., he set about to further consolidate the bourgeois Party and state apparatus, to nurture and develop a bourgeois class in the cities and the country-side, and devise a form of economic management and control which would both allow for the transformation of the means of production into capital and at the same time hide this transformation behind the outward trappings of socialist organisational forms and phrases.
In terms of the state apparatus, major organizational changes took place with great frequency under Khrushchev. The central planning apparatus had been reorganized in 1953 and 1955; it underwent further major changes in 1960 and 1962.[43] As for the ministries, a major decentralization plan was put into effect in 1957. The plan abolished the old ministries, established new regional councils, and increased their authority in raking economic decisions independent of the higher state bodies.[44] By 1963, after several intermediate reorganizations, the system of regional councils was subordinated to a new and powerful Supreme Council of the National Economy, with power to direct all industry and construction in the USSR.[45] All of these changes resulted in extreme dislocation and anarchy; most importantly, they represented the dismantling and destruction of the unified central planning apparatus that had been carefully developed under the dictatorship of the proletariat to carry out the building of socialism. The planning apparatus created in its stead bore certain outward traces of the old, but its purpose was clearly to serve the interests of the ruling bourgeoisie by facilitating the full development of production for profit. How else can we explain the concurrent division of the Party into two sections – an industrial and an agricultural branch?[46] As Khrushchev himself declared: “We say bluntly that the main thing in the work of the Party is production.”[47]
In 1956, in order to strengthen the growth of an urban and rural bourgeoisie, Khrushchev removed criminal penalties for the punishment of collective farmers who failed to work the required minimum days on the collective farm, and criminal penalties were removed as punishment for industrial executives and others who sold industrial equipment and materials illegally.[48] In the former case, such action not only allowed collective farmers to spend more time in production on the private plots, thereby strengthening the growth of private, small-scale economy; it also created the conditions for massive theft and embezzlement by collective farm managers. In the latter case, this change facilitated greater theft and embezzlement from state resources, and the funneling of funds into illegal, private enterprises. As Khrushchev reported in a speech to the Central Committee in November, 1962, known thievery from state enterprises during the first half of 1962 amounted to 56,000,000 rubles![49] The disastrous effect of these measures in terms of nurturing a “new” bourgeoisie is recorded in the Soviet press itself:
The chief of the workshops affiliated to a Moscow psycho-neurological dispensary and his gang set up an ’underground enterprise’ and by bribery ’obtained fifty-eight knitting machines and a large amount of raw material. They entered into business relations with fifty-two factories, handicraft co-operatives and collective farms and made three million rubles in a few years. They bribed functionaries of the Department for Combating Theft of Socialist Property and Speculation, controllers, inspectors, instructors and others.[50]
And further:
The chairman of a collective farm in the Alma-Ata Region specialized in commercial speculation. He bought fruit juice in the Ukraine or Uzbekistan and sugar and alcohol from Djambul, processed them and then sold the wine at very high prices in many localities. In this farm a winery was created with a capacity of over a million litres a year, its speculative commercial network spread throughout the Kazakhstan SSR, and commercial speculation became one of the farm’s main Sources of income.[51]
In the country-side, one of the sharpest reversals engineered by the revisionists came in 1958, when the Machine and Tractor Stations were sold to the collective farms. This was the clearest demonstration to date of the complete control the capitalist-roaders exercised over the means of production. Not only did this move put weans of production into the hands of collective farms and thereby stimulate the growth of a kulak class, it also put 2 billion rubles into the state treasury, at the disposal of the bourgeoisie.[52] Furthermore, it represented another complete departure from the principles of socialist construction as laid down by Stalin in 1952:
The state, of course, does sell minor implements to the collective farms, as, indeed, it has to in compliance with the Rules of the Agricultural Artel and the Constitution. But can we lump in one category minor implements and such basic agricultural means of production as the machines of the machine and tractor stations, or, let us say, the land, which, after all, is also one of the basic means of production in agriculture? Obviously not. They cannot be lumped in one category because minor implements do not in any degree decide the fate of collective-farm production, whereas such means of production as the machines of the machine and tractor stations and the land entirely decide the fate of agriculture in our present-day conditions.
Assuming for a moment that we accepted. Comrades Sanina’s and Venzher’s proposal and began to sell the basic implements of production, the machine and tractor stations, to the collective farms as their property. What would be the outcome?
The outcome would be, first, that the collective farms would become owners of the basic instruments of production; that is, their status would be an exceptional one, such as Is not shared by any other enterprise in our country, for, as we know, even the nationalized enterprises do not own their instruments of production. How, by what considerations of progress and advancement, could this exceptional status of the collective farms be justified? Can it be said that such a status would facilitate the elevation of collective-farm property to the level of public property, that it would expedite the transition of our society from socialism to communism? Would it not be truer to say that such a status could only dig a deeper gulf between collective-farm property and public property, and would not bring us any nearer to communism, but, on the contrary, remove us farther from it?
The outcome would be, secondly, an extension of the sphere of operation of commodity circulation, because a gigantic quantity of instruments of agricultural production would come within its orbit...
Criticizing Duhring’s ’economic commune’, which functions in the conditions of commodity circulation, Engels, in his Anti-Duhring, convincingly shows that the existence of commodity circulation was inevitably bound to lead Duhring’s so-called ’economic communes’ to the regeneration of capitalism.[53]
Khrushchev’s “justification” for introducing a measure that he himself had sharply opposed was a weak declaration that conditions had changed.
Just after the 20th Party Congress, Khrushchev called for a number of conferences by leading economists to discuss the law of value, price formation, and other questions. By 1961, he was able to state openly: “We must elevate the importance of profit and profitability...”[54] He then went on to establish commissions to deal with these questions state-wide. Thus the ground was prepared for “the Liberman debates”. In 1962, Pravda invited open debate on the complete reorganization of the economy by publishing Liberman’s proposals, which called for making profitability the single measure of economic performance. Liberman further stressed the need for a change in the relationship between central planning and the producing enterprises, calling for “economic incentives over commands”.[55] Revisionists who had advocated similar “reforms” as early as the 1920’s came out of the woodwork and joined in the debate.[56] This led to a series of experiments set up to try out some of the ”reform” proposals, with, the first wave beginning in light industry on July 1, 1964, at two clothing firms – Bolshevichka and Mayak. Both were allowed to draw up production plans based on orders, profit was made the principal criterion in nudging performance, and bonuses were directly tied to profits.
If the ’merit’ of the working out of the general line of modern revisionism belongs to N. Khrushchev, to his successors, the Brezhnev-Kosygin clique, belongs the ’merit’ of the full implementation of this counter-revolutionary line.[57]
Kosygin and Brezhnev moved quickly to consolidate and extend the most “successful” features of the experiments. Outwardly attacking Khrushchev’s constant experimentation with different forms of organization, a Pravda article declared that the time had come to allow enterprises more independence in the use of “economic levers” in the economy – in particular, cost accounting, prices, credit, and profits.[58]
In agriculture, restrictions were relaxed on the private ownership of livestock and higher agricultural prices were encouraged, supporting the drive for greater farm autonomy.[59] Kosygin’s September 1965 speech to the Plenum announced the reinstitution of the ministerial system in managing the economy, but along totally different lines:
Kosygin denied that the proposed reorganization is a simple resuscitation of the old ministerial system. To him the core of the difference is that the ministries will have to cope with an entirely different setup where economic levers are employed to a much wider extent and the prerogatives of enterprises are substantially expanded.[60]
In outlining the tasks of managerial cadres, Kosygin summed up the reforms:
... initiative based an know-how, efficiency, a businesslike approach, a feeling for the new, and the ability to use production resources in each specific circumstance with maximum effectiveness, herein is the essence of the new demands.[61]
Most important, the economic reforms of 1965 ware introduced, confirming the further development of state monopoly capitalism of a new type in the USSR. First, profit was placed clearly and unmistakably in command of production.[62] From now on, it was said, profits and profitability of enterprises would be the main criteria for evaluating their social efficiency. This was in complete contestation to the teachings of Marxism-Leninism. Just thirteen years earlier, Stalin had emphatically declared:
Can we speak in general of the aims of capitalist or socialist production, of the purposes to which capitalist or socialist production are subordinated? I think that we can and should.
Marx says:
’The direct aim of capitalist production is not the production of goods but the production of surplus value, or of profit in its developed form; not the product, but the surplus product. From this standpoint, labour itself is productive only in so far as it creates profit or surplus product for capital. In so far as the worker does not create it, his labour is unproductive. Consequently, the sum-total of applied productive labour is of interest to capital only to the extent that through it – or in relation to it – the sum-total of surplus labour increases. Only to that extent is what is called necessary labour time necessary. To the extent that it does not produce this result, it is superfluous and has to be discontinued.
’It is the constant aim of capitalist production to produce the maximum surplus value or surplus product with the minimum of capital advanced; in so far as this result is not attained by overworking the labourer, it is a tendency of capital to seek to produce a given product with, the least, expenditure – economizing labour-power and costs....
’The labourers themselves figure in this conception as what they actually are in capitalist production – only means of production; not an aim in themselves and not the aim of production.’
These words of Marx are remarkable not only because they define the aim of capitalist production concisely and precisely, but also because they indicate the basic aim, the principal purpose, which should be set for socialist production.
Hence, the aim of capitalist production is profit-making. As to consumption, capitalism needs it only in so far as it ensures the making of profit. Outside of this, consumption means nothing to capitalism – man and his needs disappear from its field of vision.
What is the aim of socialist production? What is that main purpose to which social production should be subordinated under socialism?
The aim of socialist production is not profit, but man and his needs, that is, the satisfaction of his material and cultural requirements. As is stated in Comrade Stalin’s ’Remarks,’ the aim of socialist production is the securing, of the maximum satisfaction of the constantly rising material and cultural requirements of the whole of society.’[63]
In order to stimulate the drive for greater profits, the reforms granted local enterprises greater autonomy in reducing the workforce and responding to market demand. The reforms provided for greater use of material incentives (bonuses, etc) in order to combine personal gain with profit-making. ([64], [65])
Moreover, enterprises were allowed, to dispose of capital goods outside of the plan as a source of revenue, with the consequences being an increase in the circulation of means of production as commodities ([66], [67]) This is something Stalin strongly opposed as reversing the development of socialist construction. As another way to feed the profit drive, investment funds advanced to enterprises now took the form of interest-bearing loans, as opposed to interest-free, non-repayable grants from the state budget as was the case under Stalin.
These plans were quickly converted into action: in 1970, enterprises operating under the new reforms accounted for 92% of the industrial, output in the Soviet economy.[68] And the decisions of the 24th Congress of the CPSU called for all enterprises in every sphere of “material production” to change over to the “new system” by 1974.[69]
As a consequence of these “reforms”, and the twenty-one years of capitalist development since 1953, when the revisionists took power, it is a fact that today mass unemployment is a feature of the Soviet economy. Peking Review estimates the figure at 3 million![70] The Albanian comrades put the number at 10% of the work-force![71]
To sum up, from 1953, when the revisionists came to power, down to the present, we have witnessed a multitude of shifts, zig-zags in economic policy, forms and methods under which production has taken place in the Soviet Union. We should not be confused as to the meaning of these developments. It does us no good to attempt to analyze any one of these factors independently of the main thing – which class holds state power? The sum total of all of the shifts, zig-zags, etc. clearly represents the motion towards greater consolidation of state monopoly capitalism of a new type in the USSR. As Kosygin knowingly reflected:
The essence of the system of economy lies in the fact as to in whose hands lie state power, the means and tools of production, to the interests of which class is production developed and profits distributed.[72]
[19] See Hammer and Sickle, Vol. 1, No. 3 for quotes on this subject from People’s Tribune, p. 5.
[20] Pravda, March 7, 1953.
[21] Alex Nove, An Economic History of the USSR, Penguin Press, London, 1969, p. 323.
[22] Kenneth R. Whiting, The Soviet Union Today, Praeger Publishers, New York, p. 83.
[23] Otto Preston Chancy, Jr., Zhukov, University of Oklahoma Press, 1971, p. 350.
[24] Alex Nove, “Soviet Budgets After” Stalin”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, November, 1954; p. 416.
[25] Lenin, CW. Vol, 26, p, 106; emphasis in the original.
[26] Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, Peking ed., pp. 41-2.
[27] v. Toci and K. Kabetani, “Soviet Working Class Deprived of the Means of Production”, in Two Articles Reprinted by the Communist League on the Struggle of the Soviet Working Class Against Capitalist Restoration.
[28] Chaney, Jr., op. cit. P 356.
[29] Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, p. 68.
[30] Harry Schwartz, The Soviet Economy Since Stalin, 0. B. Lippincott Co., New York, 1965, p. 57.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Alex Nove, An Economic History of the USSR, p. 324.
[33] Alex Nove, “Soviet Budgets Since Stalin” p. 417.
[34] Alex Nove, An Economic History of the USSR, p. 323.
[35] Chaney, Jr., op. cit., p. 354.
[36] Nove, An Economic History of the USSR, p. 326.
[37] Whiting, op. cit., p. 84 and 164.
[38] Quoted in Chaney, Jr., op. cit., p. 354.
[39] Ibid., o. 356.
[40] Ibid., p. 355.
[41] Ibid., p. 356.
[42] Nove, An Economic History of the USSR, p. 326.
[43] David W. Conklin, An Evaluation of the Soviet Profit Reforms, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1970, p. 149.
[44] Schwartz, op. cit., p. 89.
[45] Ibid,, p. 156.
[46] Ibid., p. 151-2.
[47] Khrushchev, “Speech at the Election. Meeting of Kalin Constituency in Moscow”, February 27, 1963.
[48] Schwartz, op. cit., p. 79.
[49] Ibid., p. 155.
[50] Izvestia, Oct. 20, 1963 and Izvestia Sunday Supplement, No. 12, 1964; quoted in On Khrushchev’s Phoney Communism, p. 17-18.
[51] Pravda, Jan. 14, 1962; quoted in ”On Khrushchev’s Phoney Communism, p. 20.
[52] Schwartz, op. cit., p. 117-118.
[53] Stalin., Economic problems of Socialism in the USSR, p. 92, 95-6; emphasis added.
[54] George R, Feiwel, The Soviet Quest for Economic Efficiency, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1967, p.151.
[55] Ibid., p. 209.
[56] Ibid..
[57] Zeri i Popullit, “The Demagogy of the Soviet Revisionists Cannot Conceal Their Traitorous Countenance”, The Party of Labor of Albania in Battle with Modem Revisionism, p. 489.
[58] Schwartz, op. cit., p. 187.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Feiwel, op. cit., p. 252-3.
[61] Quoted in Feiwel, p. 253.
[62] Economist, Feb. 26, 1966, p. 786.
[63] Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, p. 78-80.
[64] Time, July 1, 1966, p. 75.
[65] Economist, Feb. 26, 1966, p. 785.
[66] Feiwel, op. cit., p. 307.
[67] Ibid., p. 313.
[68] Soviet Economic Reform: Progress and Problems, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, p. 202.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Peking Review, #31, 1974, p. 21.
[71] V. Toci and K. Kapetani, op. cit., p. 3.
[72] Kosygin, as quoted in Zeri i popullit, Nov. 18, 1965, p. 18.