SUN-UP OF THE S.J. UNIT
IN THE TWO-LINE STRUGGLE

In order to be concrete, the summary and evaluation of the unit's work must be seen in light of the tasks and programs of the organization and the communist movement. In order to be dialectical, we must compare the unit not to some ideal, but to its own development. Accordingly, we begin with a brief summary of the period just prior to when the line struggle broke out in the organization.

PERIOD OF THE STUDY

In the period of the study, we operated under an incorrect plan for carrying out ideological struggle. But given the objective condition of the plan, the overall development of the unit was positive.

Many cadre in the unit who came into the organization with a weak grasp of NL in general and of the organization's line in particular took up the study militantly and advanced considerably. Generally correct methods of leadership were developed, especially in regards to collective leadership, based on political line and struggle. The strengths overall were a serious attitude to the study of NL by leadership and cadre. There was considerable one-to-one struggle between cadre and leadership with the effect of drawing out cadre and developing cadre on one hand and on the other the better grasp of particulars by leadership.

The weaknesses of the period became more apparent by the end of the study. A general demoralization had begun to set in among cadre with the feeling that the study was abstract, did not bring us closer to the party, did not give us adequate guidance for work in the class, and that the organization was not progressing.

Other problems in the period of the study was the absence relatively of a political relationship between the UL's and the DE and the DC. The UL's would bring points for political struggle to the DE, but they would either be ignored or stifled.

Work teams organized along industrial lines had been organized in the unit to give specific guidance to comrades around common work in the class. In trying to apply the organization's line on factory nuclei and so forth, these teams underlined the problems with the organization's line and though armed with good intentions, never got anywhere.

THE INITIAL STAGE OF THE STRUGGLE

Even before the National Secretariat unfolded the line struggle that was going on at the national level, the S.J. UL's had precipitated a parallel struggle on the DC. Their ability to do so reflected the state of the unit at the time. In the course of the study, but in particular in the course of trying to apply the line of the organization to revolutionary work in the class, cadre had time and again pointed out the inadequacy and infat incorrectness in the organization's line. Because cadre had taken up the study for the most part in a militant and Bolshevik manner and tried to apply it
to their work in the class, the conditions were established giving the UL's a grasp of the situation to bring about questions to the DC.

The initial response of the unit to the struggle was positive and in fact among some of the cadre who had been most lagging in the period of the study the response was very positive. Generally comrades saw that struggle was a good thing, and grasped that cadre would have to decide what will come out of it.

What followed was an intensive period of studying and criticizing the papers from the NS, some reading of ML classes, considerable group struggle, and a great deal of one-to-one struggle between cadre and UL's in which comrades developed positions supporting what would become the "majority position." It is of course no accident that cadre independently came to support the majority position as the position put forward by the UL's in the DC was based originally on the cadre in the first place.

Due to the failure of comrades on the DC from up north to grasp the importance of line struggle and get out position papers as agreed upon, the period in which UL's in S.J. reserved their own opinions was drawn out too long; long after cadre had independently come to initial positions on the struggle. The struggle in the unit for about a week took on an artificial and forced character. The error here in the implementation of the plan falls primarily on the DC members up north, but secondarily on the UL's in S.J. for mechanically sticking to the plan.

During this period the UL's also wrote their position paper and a few comments on that are in order. The paper itself correctly identified at an early stage of the struggle what was at the heart of the contention—the struggle between "political line is key" vs. "organization is key." In identifying the heart of the struggle a key was provided for deepening and further understanding the struggle.

On certain major points the paper was deliberately vague. It stated that the line was inadequate, without clearly stating that an incorrect line had arisen. Further it identified the errors on D.W. and J.P. as "right opportunist in essence," without commenting on whether in form they constituted a right or "left" deviation. However, it should be pointed out that the paper was simply vague, not incorrect. Also it was better to have gotten the paper out in time, than for us to have delayed the paper until we personally got enough clarity on these questions to come up with a definite position.

Secondarily though the failure to clearly state that the line was incorrect did reflect a political error in our thinking. While we considered the question, we thought that to say that the line was incorrect would be factional. This was an incorrect assessment of the struggle, and erroneous understanding of what constitutes
factionalism, and a political tendency to place organizational matters over political. In other words, not clearly grasping the majority position.

THE STRUGGLE SINCE THE NCC MEETING

Around the time the the Feb. NCC meeting, the situation in the unit began to turn into its opposite. After having initially formulated individual positions on the line struggle, having consolidated them through study and struggle in the unit, and having at least intellectually grasped the role of cadre in line struggle, degeneration set in and petty-bour. individualism became the dominant aspect of the unit.

Some of the cadre who had initially led the struggle in the unit and who had come forward very strongly in making original and profound contributions to the majority position fell back. This was seen particularly in their failure in general to struggle with comrades in other units. As long as the struggle over line in the organization coincided with their own personal need for political clarity they came forward. But when it came to applying this clarity by writing position papers or taking the struggle up beyond the unit, seeing it in a broader context, they fell back. In general there was a tendency to militantly take up the struggle to formulate a personal position on the struggle, but once a certain degree of clarity had been achieved, not to act on it. That is, to narrowly and individualistically see the role of cadre as limited to taking a stand. And for the less theoretically developed cadre, even their understandings of their own stands degenerated and became confused in failing to move the struggle on.

While in general the unit grasped the meaning and significance of line struggle for the proletariat, one comrade in particular never did and still sees the existence of two lines on an issue as confusion, rather than the first step in resolving a contradiction.

With other cadre it was a clear question of vacillating on class stand. They clearly saw what needed to be done on an intellectual level, but putting their personal needs above those of the proletariat, let the struggle slide.

In all then cadre having been moving backward and demoralization has set into the unit. The ultimate test of Bolshevik leadership is the development of cadre. If cadre are negative, leadership cannot be positive.

Primarily for leadership abnegated its role and was unable to move things on. Instead of combating the demoralization that had set up on the unit, it largely contributed to and utterly failed to combat it. Individually the two UL's contributed to demoralization by their tendencies to be cynical and subjective. But primarily it was in their failure to provide clear leadership recently. And in fact have been the principle contradiction in the unit to moving the work forward.
From not making a lead in the political struggle, the UL's began to take a wait-and-see attitude. We allowed ourselves to get cynical about the overall state of the organization and its ability to pull out of the struggle. And we allowed our struggles with holders of the minority point of view to get to us personally and to get us down. Even though we were now on the DE, our attitude was to an extent one of going along, rather than being in the vanguard. At the heart of this is a subjective desire not to take on the responsibilities of leadership and the political tendency to abnegate the role of leadership. This comes out in varying from subjectivism to liberalism in our relations with comrades.

The problems were far more pronounced at the unit level than on the DC or DE. In the unit in the absence of leadership, things did not have a center. The summations of the role of individual cadre went out to lunch. Not only were the discussions circular, rambling, etc. but primarily they became divorced from the line struggle and degenerated into seeking self-knowledge form a non-materialist point-of-view.

Cadre who sought out leadership, outstripped the ability of leadership to give them guidance, while other cadre who were already falling behind further degenerated. Problems of leadership of the past which had been a secondary aspect have in this period become the primary aspect of leadership. They symptoms of this are the cutting up at meetings and the bursts of subjectivism by leadership. The source is leadership's abnegating of its political role.

Individualism in various forms is the main problem overall in the unit. Leadership is most guilty of individualism in this period. Without leadership, individual cadre cannot by themselves pull the unit up by its bootstraps. Leadership must take the lead to develop cadre initiative, and weld the unit from a loose grouping of separate individuals to a collective whole. This must be done in the context of resolving the line struggle and integrated with our other work.

THE FUTURE

In summing up the unit, problems have been identified, particularly petty-bourgeois individualism. The source and conditions leading to these problems have also been exposed. Leadership has been identified as the weak link that must be strengthened for the unit to move forward. The conditions that resulted in this degeneration of leadership were the change from being a minority and going against the tide to being at the helm in riding the tide. Having grasped the conditions and analyzed them, we are now in a period of transition. Subjectively we have identified the problems, their sources, and conditions and have struggled to correct them.

San Jose
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