UNITE THE MANY, DEFEAT THE FEW
China's revolutionary line in foreign affairs
By Jack A. Smith

Peking youths pledge support to Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1967 mass rally. Hsinhua News Agency

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What are China's foreign policy objectives? Why is China trying to develop a united front against both the U.S. and the USSR? What role has Moscow played in Peking's foreign line? And what about the Nixon visit, the Pakistan crisis and the Ceylon question. The author, managing editor of the independent radical newweekly, the Guardian, answers these and many other questions on the basis of a six-week journey in 1972 to the People's Republic of China. This pamphlet presents a detailed picture of China's international position from a Marxist-Leninist perspective and argues against certain of China's critics of the right and "left."

China versus the superpowers

The People’s Republic of China has become an important voice in international affairs during recent years.

But it’s not just another voice or even another important voice.

Because People’s China is the world’s most populous country, because it is part of the underdeveloped third world and because it is a revolutionary country, Peking’s entry into the world political arena is an event of historic magnitude.

So far during the early 1970s China has achieved these successes, among others:

1. It has gained membership in the United Nations, defeating 20 years of U.S. obstructionism. This event also marked the beginning of the end for the reactionary Kuomintang regime on Taiwan, a major threat to China’s security.

2. It has begun the process of normalizing state relations with the U.S., symbolizing the bankruptcy of Washington’s post-war policy of isolating, “containing” and attempting to destroy the socialist government of China. This developing detente has temporarily eased another direct threat to China and portends further changes in power relations in Asia.

3. It has re-established state relations with Japan. This, too, has temporarily eased another direct threat to China and Asia and has succeeded in beginning to drive a wedge between Japan and the U.S., allied since the end of World War 2 under Washington’s domination.

4. It has established state relations with scores of countries around the world and particularly friendly relations with third world nations while also developing closer ties with certain socialist governments heretofore regarded with mutual hostility.

These are major achievements for a country only recently in diplomatic isolation, but they represent only the beginning, not the culmination, of China’s external policy; a means to a larger objective, not an end.

China’s larger objective is to transform the contemporary balance of international power without itself succumbing to big-power chauvinism in the process. But this, too, is only a means toward accomplishing what has been the principal international strategy of the People’s Republic since its inception in 1949: the worldwide defeat of imperialism.

In China’s view, the world is dominated by two superpowers—the U.S. and USSR—which collude and contend with each other in dividing up the world into spheres of influence which each would control and exploit. China defines both as imperialistic (with the USSR representing “social imperialism,” after Lenin’s criticism of those who are “socialists in words, imperialist in deeds”) and guilty of big-power chauvinism.

A major aim of Chinese foreign policy is to reduce the power of the U.S. and USSR and increase the power of the rest of the world’s countries. The method used to achieve this is to encourage small and medium-sized countries to take an independent position in international and national affairs, independent of Washington and Moscow.

The thinking behind this thesis was summed up in China’s first major address in the UN, delivered Nov. 15, 1971, by delegation chairman Chiao Kuan-hua: “We have consistently maintained that all countries, big or small, should be equal and that the five principles of peaceful coexistence should be taken as the principles guiding the relations between countries. The people of each country have the right to choose the social system of their own country according to their own will and to protect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own country. No country has the right to subject another country to its aggression, subversion, control, interference or bullying. We are opposed to the imperialist and colonialist theory that big nations are superior to the small nations and small nations are subordinate to the big nations.

“We are opposed to the power politics and hegemony of big nations bullying small ones or
strong nations bullying weak ones. We hold that the affairs of a given country must be handled by its own people, that the affairs of the world must be handled by all the countries of the world and that the affairs of the United Nations must be handled jointly by all its member states and the superpowers should not be allowed to manipulate and monopolize them. The superpowers want to be superior to others and lord it over others. At no time, neither today nor ever in the future, will China be a superpower subjecting others to its aggression, subversion, control, interference or bullying.”

To reduce the role of the U.S. and USSR, People’s China urges the formation of a broad united front of countries taking independent positions—largely of the third world but including any country not under complete domination of the U.S. and USSR—to struggle against the “two superpowers.”

Increasingly, it is projected, more countries would align with this third force—the united bloc of independent countries taking orders from neither big power, “small” and “medium-sized” individually but powerful in unity. If China were to substitute itself for this third force—seeking superpower status for itself or hegemony over the bloc of independent countries—it would destroy its own thesis, since the major basis of attracting countries out of the superpower orbit would be the promise of independence. Hence, China’s repeated emphasis on never becoming a superpower.

If such a united front against the superpowers were formed it would have several possible results.

Regarding the U.S. and USSR, it would increase the contradictions between the two big powers as each sought to retain dominion over “its” dependencies. It would complicate plans to divide the world into two spheres of influence. It would cause break-aways within each of the two existing power blocs, weakening the influence of U.S. imperialism on the one hand and the influence of Soviet revisionism on the other.

Regarding the small and medium-sized countries, the development of more independent positions would pave the way for building an effective barrier against imperialism and lead toward important struggles against neo-colonialism and comprador bourgeois control.

Removal of a country from foreign domination, including countries ruled internally by reactionary forces, would strengthen the progressive and revolutionary forces in each country in time. That is, the struggle for national liberation (from colonial and neo-colonial, feudal and semi-feudal, comprador and big bourgeoisie control) would be enhanced in a country free or mostly free of foreign control and thus of direct manipulation and support of the ruling group in power.

And struggles for independence and then liberation often lead to revolution. This, I think, is what the Chinese mean by their slogan “Countries want independence, nations want liberation and people want revolution.”

The two other major current world views are
those of the USSR and the U.S. The Soviet Union does indeed see the world as composed of two blocs which must peacefully coexist with each other but also compete where necessary. The U.S., under the Nixon administration, is modifying its views to accommodate five potential world powers—the big two plus Europe, Japan and China in regional roles.

The purpose of both the strategies, according to the Chinese, is to preserve the status quo, increase the hegemonic interests of the big two powers and prevent the development of liberation wars—except in certain countries under direct colonial rule—which could bring the U.S. and USSR into conflict.

In the case of the USSR there is the added incentive of maintaining hegemony over the socialist camp, which it largely dominates and freezing China out of the world political situation and out of its camp except insofar as China would adopt a position subordinate to the USSR.

The U.S. has had very little to say about China’s foreign policy objectives, largely because it does not feel immediately threatened by them and because it desires to use China in its contention-collusion duet with the USSR.

The Soviet Union, however, has been most outspoken. An article in Pravda, organ of the Soviet Communist party, Sept. 5, 1972, stated the following: “Facts show that the most important trend of the whole Maoist policy is, as before, the struggle against the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community, which are regarded in Peking as the main obstacle to implementing its hegemonic, great-power chauvinistic aspirations.”

Perhaps even more importantly, from Moscow’s point of view, the Pravda article continued: “Not giving up hope of forming an anti-Soviet, pro-Peking bloc of some parties and groups, the Maoists would like, as a transitional stage, that most of the Communist and Workers parties would, at least, assume a neutral position with regard to Maoism.”

The Soviet party was no doubt thinking not only about Rumania, which has developed warm relations with China especially since the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact members, but also about Poland and Hungary and other socialist countries which have shown some signs of friendliness toward China of late, not to mention several parties not in power generally aligned with Moscow.

Some of the most bitter criticisms of the Chinese foreign line have come from the international Trotskyist movement as well, but it would be a mistake to conclude that only Trotskyists or revisionists oppose China’s new moves. Throughout the world, many independent Marxist-Leinists, including some who were quite friendly to China, have been thrown into confusion or into opposition to certain aspects of China’s international line.

Perhaps the greatest objection is to China’s state relations with reactionary regimes, assuming this to mean the Peking government no longer supports revolution. The Nixon visit, Pakistan, Ceylon, the superpower question and several other issues have engendered controversy within the revolutionary left.

\[ \text{Mao at revolutionary base in Yenan, 1937.} \]

\[ \text{'Let us thank the great Lenin'} \]

Why does People’s China insist on a united front against the superpowers—that is, against both the U.S. and USSR?

The answer, quite simply, is that the Peking governmentviews both big powers—despite differences in social system—as equally dangerous to China and to world revolution.

Indeed, “Soviet...social imperialism...is even more deceitful than old-line imperialist countries and therefore more dangerous,” according to the Oct. 6, 1972 Peking Review.

It has not always been this way, of course, even though the history of differences between the Soviet Communist party (CPSU) and the Chinese Communist party (CPC) extend back to the 1920s.

For two decades after China was liberated in 1949, the official position of the CPC and government was the formation of a united front against U.S. imperialism. By the 1970s, China’s international line had developed to calling for a united front of “small and medium-sized countries” against “the two imperialisms,” one of which was now the USSR.

In December 1963, during the height of Sino-Soviet polemics, the CPC argued that “we have but one objective in view, that is, with the socialist camp and the international proletarian
as the nucleus, to unite all the forces that can be united in order to form a broad united front against U.S. imperialism and its lackeys."

Today, the CPC argues that "we must unite with the other socialist countries and the working class throughout the world, with all oppressed people and oppressed nations and with all peace-loving countries and people who are against power politics to firmly oppose the policy of aggression and war of imperialism and social imperialism.... Our doing so conforms to the fundamental interests of the people of China and the world. And only by doing so can international tension be truly eased and world peace safeguarded."

In late 1963, the CPC listed four main contradictions in the world: "The contradiction between the socialist and the imperialist camps, the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the capitalist countries, the contradiction between the oppressed nations and imperialism and the contradictions among the imperialist countries and among the monopoly capitalist groups in the imperialist countries."

In April 1969, China changed its listing of four major contradictions to read as follows: "The contradiction between the oppressed nations on the one hand and imperialism and social-imperialism on the other; the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the capitalist revisionist countries; the contradiction between imperialist and social-imperialist countries and among the imperialist countries; and the contradiction between socialist countries on the one hand and imperialism and social-imperialism on the other."

This formulation remains unchanged today.

During this six year period, the Chinese (1) put forth the thesis that social-imperialism was the equal to U.S. imperialism, (2) changed the order of priorities in listing contradictions—giving primary weight to the struggle of oppressed nations—and (3) eliminated reference to the socialist and imperialist "camps."

China's reasons for strongly opposing the USSR hinge largely on the CPC's analysis that the CPSU has "restored capitalism," acts in an imperialist manner toward the nations under its influence and has abandoned Lenin's concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat, among many other criticisms.

The CPC regards its four contradictions as "irreconcilable"—that is, "their existence and development are bound to give rise to revolution." But despite a belief that "revolution is the main trend in the world today," the Chinese do not discount the possibility that one or both superpowers may launch a major war to "resolve" these contradictions.

In an important speech in the UN General Assembly Oct. 3, 1972, China's Deputy Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua declared that "the people of all countries must not be deluded by certain temporary and superficial phenomena of detente at the present time and develop a false sense of security. While striving for world peace and the progress of mankind, we must maintain sufficient vigilance and make necessary preparations against the danger of new wars of aggression any imperialism may launch."

"In today's world," I was told by a leading cadre at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Peking during a six-week visit in 1972, "only the superpowers are capable of launching aggressive wars, directly or indirectly." And it was made clear that, to China, the USSR was just as capable of starting armed aggression as U.S. imperialism—directly, as against Czechoslovakia in 1968, or indirectly, as in Pakistan in 1971.

I was left with no doubt that China itself did not rule out the possibility of an attack from the USSR. During a tour of Peking's enormous underground air raid shelter system, I asked from which direction China anticipated an attack. "We are prepared to resist aggression from any direction," was the reply. "From the north as well?" "Most certainly from the north."

To grasp China's new foreign policy it is necessary to understand the history of Sino-Soviet (or more properly CPC-CPSU) relations over a long period of time. The Chinese date the Sino-Soviet split from 1956, when the CPSU, under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev, took a sharp turn to the right in domestic and international affairs. Historic differences between the two parties going back decades helped shape the CPC's ability to independently evaluate the growth of revisionism in the USSR and take action against it. It is important to keep in mind, however, that a qualitative difference exists between CPC-CPSU disagreements during the Stalin era and those that developed under Khrushchev.

The CPC was born at its first national congress in Shanghai, July 1, 1921. "Let us thank the great Lenin," the CPC declared in its 50th anniversary history. "The 1917 Russian October Socialist Revolution led by him brought the Chinese people Marxism-Leninism." But on some occasions during China's revolutionary struggle,
the CPSU, led by Joseph Stalin after Lenin's death, exercised a negative influence, particularly through the offices of the Communist International (Comintern). Apart from this there were influential sections of the CPC which on their own dogmatically interpreted experiences of the CPSU and sought to impose these "lessons" in China, despite important differences in objective conditions.

The Comintern, although helpful in some ways, committed a number of blunders in relation to the Chinese revolution, especially between 1927 and 1935. Part of the fault was to very difficult communications, part was due to the inability of Comintern representatives in China to correctly appreciate the requirements of the Chinese revolution, part was due to the fact that Stalin viewed the Comintern as an extension of Soviet policy. These blunders, which cost untold numbers of lives and almost destroyed the Chinese revolution, demonstrated the impossibility of conducting a revolution by remote control, the need for independence by various national parties and the fact that conditions for revolution vary from country to country. Because of these lessons the CPC developed a strongly independent stance, stressing self reliance to the utmost.

The Chinese minimize their differences with Stalin, concentrating their criticism on those within the CPC who sought to blindly follow the Soviet Union's model and directives. The CPC today considers Stalin a great Marxist-Leninist whose contributions to socialism in the USSR far outweigh his negative aspects. Yet, in a 1963 polemic entitled, "On the Question of Stalin" (which largely supported the late Soviet leader against attacks from the modern revisionists), the CPC said the following:

"...While defending Stalin, we do not defend his mistakes. Long ago the Chinese Communist party had first-hand experience of some of his mistakes. Of the erroneous "left" and right opportunist lines which emerged in the Chinese Communist party at one time or another, some arose under the influence of certain mistakes of Stalin's, in so far as their international sources are concerned."

In general, Mao Tsetung led the struggles against these mistakes, suffering dismissal from the CPC's Politburo in 1927 (he was an alternate member) because he struggled against subordinating the party to the hegemony of the Kuomintang in a united front, the line being propagated by the Comintern. Mao did not oppose a united front with the national bourgeoisie, but maintained a leading role should be played by the CPC with the worker-peasant alliance as its basis.

Many of the most important splits in the CPC during the years of revolutionary struggle were between those who supported the Comintern's often zig-zag instructions and those—led by Mao at every juncture—who insisted on the application of Marxist-Leninist principles to the conditions which existed in China.
One of the first intra-party struggles, which led to Mao’s temporary downgrading, was against CPC general secretary Chen Tu-hsiu, who was following Comintern instructions in developing a united front with the Kuomintang.

According to a recent Chinese publication, Chen at the time “maintained that since the Chinese revolution at that stage was a bourgeoisie-democratic revolution in character, it could lead only to the founding of a bourgeois republic and be led by the bourgeoisie. He claimed that the Chinese proletariat was not ‘an independent revolutionary force’ and could not be the leading class and he slandered the peasants as being ‘loose,’ ‘conservative’ and ‘unlikely to join the revolution.’

“He flatly rejected comrade Mao Tsetung’s correct views and gave up leadership over the peasants, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie and particularly leadership over the armed forces. He advocated ‘all alliance and no struggle’ in the united front.”

The Kuomintang turned on the unprepared CPC and conducted a bloody purge. Chen was removed from his leading post and ultimately supported Leon Trotsky.

“Shortly after our party had broken with the Kuomintang and corrected Chen Tu-hsiu’s right opportunist line,” according to the 50th anniversary history, “there occurred Chu Chiupai’s ‘left’ putschist line between the end of 1927 and the beginning of 1928, Li Lisan’s ‘left’ opportunist line between June and September 1930 and Wang Ming’s ‘left’ opportunist line between 1931-1934.”

Each of these lines, opposed by Mao’s group, ended in failure—and each was largely put forth under the guidance of Moscow and the Comintern. In January 1935, following the defeat of Wang Ming’s position, Mao and the line he fought for were installed in leadership. Throughout the struggles leading to liberation, Mao conducted several successful campaigns against developing “incorrect lines,” some emerging from Soviet influence.

Throughout the latter part of World War 2, Moscow made many moves to strengthen its relations with the Chiang Kai-shek regime. The USSR agreed with the U.S. and Britain—and against the CPC—that Chiang’s forces alone should accept the Japanese surrender.

In late 1945, the USSR called for a “unified and democratic China under the National government (Kuomintang).” A short while later, Stalin urged the CPC to dissolve the Red Army and “join the Chiang Kai-shek government.”

After the bloody civil war, during which he was backed to the hilt by Washington, Chiang eventually fled to Taiwan and the CPC and Red Army took control of the most populous country in the world—devastated by war, starving, threatened by the U.S. and the Kuomintang.

Soon after assuming power, Mao went to Moscow in late 1949 to negotiate a friendship and economic treaty with the USSR, to whose side China publicly stated it “leaned.” The leader of the greatest revolution since 1917 was given what can only be described as a reserved reception by Stalin. It took more than two months to agree on terms, which themselves were not generous to China by any means.

There are other instances of ideological differences between the CPC and CPSU. In the main, relations between the two parties during this period were cordial. The Chinese have never concealed their huge debt to the party of Lenin, the peoples of the Soviet Union and to Stalin, whose portrait, along with Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mao, is to be seen frequently throughout China and in Peking’s main square.

At the same time, the CPC learned through struggle that it must completely guide its own destiny through the practice of self-reliance within the context of proletarian internationalism. This quality of independence, relatively unique among Marxist-Leninist parties at the time, was to loom very large during the confrontations to come in the next decade.

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Peking’s support of Moscow

The Communist party of China and the Chinese masses brought forth a People’s Republic in October 1949.

It was a monumental 28-year struggle, unique in the history of revolution, involving decades of continuous armed struggle, of guerrilla and positional warfare, of great victories and excruciating defeats, of incredible deprivation, of constantly developing political tactics, of fierce factional strife, of broad united fronts, of isolated encirclement and of the creative application of Marxism-Leninism to conditions only touched on by Marx and Lenin.

This revolution could only have had a dramatic impact on the world revolutionary process. The theories and practices which developed from such a struggle could not expire upon the declaration that the Chinese masses were at long last liberated from eons of oppression.

After liberation, the Chinese Communist party, under the direct leadership of Chairman Mao Tsetung since 1935, believed it could offer the world, especially the nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America, its revolutionary experiences and ideas.

While recognizing the Soviet Union as the first and leading socialist country, the leadership of the CPC did not intend to remain mute in the international revolutionary movement. Six years before liberation, Liu Shao-chi wrote that “our party has witnessed more important changes and accumulated more experiences of
the revolutionary struggle in various complicated forms...than any other Communist party in the world.” Liu of course included the CPSU within this category.

Three years later, Liu told correspondent Anna Louise Strong:

“Mao Tsetung’s great accomplishment has been to change Marxism-Leninism from a European to an Asiatic form. Marx and Lenin were Europeans; they wrote in European languages about European histories and problems, seldom discussing Asia or China. The basic principles of Marxism are undoubtedly adaptable to all countries but to apply their general truth to concrete revolutionary practices in China is a difficult task. Mao Tsetung...uses Marxist-Leninist principles to explain Chinese history and the practical problems of China. He is the first who has succeeded in doing so...On every kind of problem—the nation, the peasants, strategy, the construction of the party, literature and culture, military affairs, finance and economy, methods of work, philosophy—Mao has not only applied Marxism to new conditions but has given it a new development. He has created a Chinese or an Asiatic form of Marxism....”

Edgar Snow, in “The Other Side of the River,” interpreted Liu’s statements as “an unmistakable bid for Chinese leadership at least in Asia.” He continued:

“Following Liu’s 1946 assertion and throughout the 1949-51 post-revolutionary period, Chinese party spokesmen reiterated claims for the originality of ‘Mao’s ideology’ and upheld the Chinese revolution as the ‘model’ for other semicolonial and colonial countries. The Soviet party press took no recognition of any ideological ‘new development’ or ‘Asiatic form of Marxism’... China’s claims ceased only after the outbreak of the Korean war—not to be openly revived again until 1958.”

This renewed assertion of the theoretical implications flowing out of the experiences of the Chinese revolution coincided with a significant shift to the right within the USSR, signalled by the coming to power of Nikita Khrushchev.

It is from this period that the Chinese date revisionism as the dominant trend within the CPSU leadership. The Chinese critique of modern revisionism resulted in the Sino-Soviet split, the direct antecedent to the Peking government’s present foreign policy which views the U.S. and USSR as the two superpowers against whom the world’s peoples must unite.

Despite some differences between the CPC and CPSU, relations with the Soviet Union were basically good in 1949.

China’s first task after liberation was the enormous one of attempting to consolidate its revolutionary victory while keeping an eye on the island province of Taiwan, to which Chiang Kai-shek’s reactionary Kuomintang—with its millions of soldiers—had fled with U.S. assistance and support, vowing to “liberate” China in the immediate future.

Less than a year after the People’s Republic was formed, the tottering South Korean regime of Syngman Rhee ordered his U.S.-financed army to invade the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Swiftly repulsed, Rhee’s army was about to be cast into the East Sea when the U.S., under cover of a United Nations mandate, intervened massively.

Disregarding repeated warnings from Peking, “UN” forces pushed closer to the border and inevitable confrontation with Chinese troops. The Korean People’s Army and Chinese volunteers smashed the U.S. advance and pushed the invaders back to South Korea in the first major defeat for U.S. imperialism.

Rhee’s motivations for invading the DPRK were largely tactical. He was in imminent danger of total political defeat in South Korea and was obsessed with messianic vision of himself as ruler of all Korea.

U.S. motivations were strategic. The Korean war provided Washington with the pretext for giving Chiang Kai-shek complete support for two decades, encouraging his every adventure against China. It was also the pretext for the policy of “containing” China (a policy which led ultimately to the Vietnam war) and for keeping Peking out of the UN.

Had China not intervened, the Korean war could have resulted in the stationing of U.S. troops at the Chinese (and Soviet) border, if not the invasion of China itself.

A decade later, when the CPSU was distorting China’s revolutionary international line to mean Peking desired a war between Moscow and Washington, the CPC had this to say about why it fought in Korea at such great cost to itself when it was hardly prepared for war:

“The Chinese Communist party is firmly opposed to a ‘head-on clash’ between the Soviet Union and the United States and not in words only. In deeds too it has worked hard to avert direct armed conflict between them. Examples of this are the Korean war...and our struggle against the U.S. in the Taiwan Straits. We ourselves preferred to shoulder the heavy sacrifices necessary and stood in the first line of defense of
the socialist camp so that the Soviet Union might stay in the second line.” The Chinese paid an extraordinary price for their involvement in Korea, economically (they repaid the USSR for all its war aid), politically (branded an international aggressor by the UN) and militarily (tens of thousands of Chinese were killed) and in domestic development. And it is without question that one reason they paid this price was to spare the USSR a major war with the U.S. had Soviet troops intervened instead.

Stalin died in March 1953, the same year the Korean war ended. China was busy rebuilding itself, developing into a socialist society and seeking a course for itself in international affairs.

Relations with the USSR were good as the struggle for succession took place in Moscow. Peking even sought to establish friendlier relations with the U.S. at this point, but was cruelly rebuffed. The People’s Republic participated in the 1954 Geneva Conference and played a key role in the Bandung Conference which took place in Indonesia in 1955, attended by 29 Asian and African nations with a population of 1.4 billion people, more than half the world’s population at that time.

It was at this meeting that Chou En-lai put forward China’s five principles of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems, the same principles President Richard Nixon was obliged to sign in the Chinese-U.S. joint communique in 1972: mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence.

Chou also held a press conference, calling for direct China-U.S. talks: “The Chinese people are friendly to the American people,” he said. “The Chinese people do not want to have war with the U.S. The Chinese government is willing to sit down and enter into negotiations with the U.S. government to discuss the question of relaxing tension in the Far East and especially the question of relaxing tension in the Taiwan area.” The talks were to take place 17 years later.

The Bandung Conference represented a significant attempt by the Chinese government to project a positive influence in the third world, especially in Asia and Africa. The Soviet Union was not invited to the conference, indicating China agreed the USSR was not an Asian—and hardly an African—power.

The Soviet Union presumably disagreed. Before the year was over, Khrushchev, now leading the CPSU, embarked on a series of whirlwind tours of several Asian nations. Bandung and Khrushchev’s Asian visits were the first real indications of the beginning conflict between the two largest socialist states. The Soviet party may have re-read Mao’s statement on the Korean war in June 1950: “The affairs of Asia should be run by the peoples of Asia....” Seeking to attain hegemony, the USSR evidently saw China as a threat to its own position in Asia.

Bigger things were brewing, however. Khrushchev chose to make his famous denunciation of Stalin and the cult of personality at the CPSU’s 20th party congress in February 1956. His revelations and charges caused upheavals throughout the socialist camp and in Communist parties around the world.

Virtually lost in the uproar that followed were two of Khrushchev’s other remarks to the party congress on points of Leninist principle. First, the Soviet leader disputed the thesis that war is inevitable during the era of imperialism. Second, he promulgated the idea of the peaceful transition to socialism.

These points were to later become the major initial differences between the CPC and CPSU. The Chinese consider Khrushchev’s departure from Marxism-Leninism on these issues—among others—prime examples of modern revisionism.

The effects of “de-Stalinization” were felt first, however, and resulted in the appearance of greater Sino-Soviet solidarity during the next year.

One of the first results of Khrushchev’s
denunciation of the late Soviet leader was that the Eastern European socialist bloc began to fall apart. The Asian socialist states held together far more firmly, largely because their parties had always maintained a more independent stance in relation to the CPSU. Throughout the world, Communist parties not in power were thrown into chaos. At issue was the dependence of socialist states and Communist parties, their relationship to the “leading” Soviet state and the question of “de-Stalinization.” Left and right manifestations abounded.

The Chinese position was clear: there were, indeed, “different roads to socialism” internally, the CPC having developed its own, for example; all parties, big and small, were equal; a “leading” party could not simply impose its international party decisions on other parties but must act in strict consultation with them. Insofar as there was a socialist bloc, however, the Chinese maintained it must be united on world matters and that the USSR was the leader of that bloc.

At that time, China saw the USSR as a revolutionary socialist country and the strongest of the socialist states, militarily and politically. The Peking government believed—the forces of international reaction being what they were—that it was necessary for the bloc to remain together under Soviet leadership, assuming the CPSU would remain revolutionary, consult with its partners and permit each socialist state to evolve its own road to socialism.

Poland rebelled in the fall of 1956. Polish leader Gomulka left prison and assumed leadership of the government and declared virtual independence from the USSR, including its leadership over the bloc. Moscow’s first reaction, according to Edward Crankshaw’s “The New Cold War,” was to restore the status quo by force. “Warsaw was ringed with Soviet tanks; Soviet warships stood off the port of Gdynia; Khrushchev himself descended on Warsaw and read the riot act. But the Poles stood firm.”

The Chinese argued successfully against Soviet intervention, while upholding the principle of Soviet leadership. Chou En-lai went to Moscow and Warsaw to arrange a compromise, the exact nature of which has not been made known.

A few weeks later the Hungarian uprising took place. Here the Chinese played a different role. Khrushchev, vacillating and under great pressure, indicated he might withdraw Soviet troops from Hungary. In this case, the Chinese argued this was incorrect and that the troops must put down the rebellion. (The Chinese made this fact known four years later.) The revolt was stopped.

The Chinese saw two entirely different situations in Poland and Hungary. The Poles had no intention of leaving the bloc or renouncing socialism and the party was supported by the masses and the army. Soviet military force in this instance would have resulted in a prolonged war which could have destroyed the socialist camp. In Hungary, the rebels would have had the country adopt a “neutral” stance in world affairs as in Yugoslavia, establishing a rightist government that would have resulted in bourgeois restoration.

At this point, Sino-Soviet relations gave the appearance of great solidity, but unity in 1956-57 was only a temporary phenomenon. The split was about to begin.

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**Beginning of the third great debate**

In the Chinese view, there have been three principal debates within the international communist movement in this century.

The first debate was between Lenin and the forces of right opportunism, which “led to the victory of the great October socialist revolution and the founding of revolutionary proletarian parties of a new type throughout the world.” The second debate was between Stalin and Trotsky, Bukharin and others, which “led to the victory in the building of socialism in the Soviet Union, the victory of the anti-fascist world war (and) the victory of the socialist revolution in a number of European and Asian countries.”

The third debate was and is between modern revisionism (present-day right opportunism), led by the USSR, and the forces of Marxism-Leninism, including China.

The CPC believes: the defeat of modern revisionism in the international working class movement is an essential requisite to the defeat of the bourgeoisie and imperialism on a world scale. Should modern revisionism prevail, the Chinese maintain, the worldwide peoples’ struggle for independence, liberation and revolution will be greatly compromised—both by the opportunist position of the Soviet bloc in its relations with imperialism and by the opportunism stemming from this circumstance among the revolutionary forces in various countries.

This is why the CPC has elevated the struggle against revisionism to such high priority. Unless modern revisionism is decisively overcome, the strategic enemy of imperialism led by the U.S. cannot be defeated.

The prelude to the third great debate, which led to the Sino-Soviet split, began in 1957 on a note of relative unity.

An exceptionally important meeting of Communist and Workers parties was called for Moscow in November 1957, coinciding with the 40th anniversary of the October revolution. The purpose of the meeting was to restore unity to the
Khruschev and Mao in Peking as differences began to reach breaking point.
socialist camp and develop a common line in the face of U.S. imperialism.

The November conference was crucial to the Chinese, who had differences with a number of policies announced by Khrushchev in 1956 but which were obscured by the "de-Stalinization" uproar. The meeting was likewise crucial to the CPSU, which intended to impose these policies on the Communist and Workers parties assembled in Moscow.

At issue, basically, was Khrushchev's remark that in today's world of nuclear weapons "there are only two ways: either peaceful coexistence or the most destructive war in history." Peaceful coexistence, he said, was not simply a "tactical move" but the basic principle of the Soviet Union's foreign policy. From this analysis developed the CPSU's emphasis on the "peaceful road to socialism," peaceful competition and cooperation with imperialism, a "warless world" (in the epoch of imperialism) and likewise, its de-emphasis of the importance of national liberation struggles.

The Chinese delegation to the Moscow conference, led by Chairman Mao Tsetung, viewed matters differently. In the months just prior to the meeting, the USSR (and thus the socialist bloc) had achieved two technological firsts: it launched the first intercontinental ballistic missile and the first earth satellite.

"In China," recounted Edgar Snow, "this was news of even more stunning importance (as it turned out) than in Moscow. A 'new stage' had been established in the world power balance."

In his speech to the conference, Mao took note of these achievements and the fact that the socialist bloc far exceeded the imperialist countries in population. "I am of the opinion the international situation has now reached a new turning point. There are two winds in the world: the East wind (meaning the socialist world) and the West wind.... I think the characteristic of the situation today is the East wind prevailing over the West wind.... The socialist forces are overwhelmingly superior to the imperialist forces...."

Mao's thesis was that the socialist bloc must strive for peace but should not stall or reverse its revolutionary course, especially its support of national liberation struggles in the third world, for fear of war.

Since unity was the prevailing idea behind the conference, to which China as well as the USSR subscribed, a compromise was worked out. The Moscow Declaration emerging from the meeting managed to satisfy each side—the Soviet Union because it reemphasized Moscow's leadership of the socialist bloc (which was strongly supported by Peking) and because at least part of the CPSU's new line was adopted; the Chinese because Khrushchev's policies were modified (the wording of the Declaration providing for two interpretations) and the socialist bloc appeared strengthened. In all probability, neither side fully appreciated how far apart each was at the time.

The Declaration supported the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence as "further developed" by Khrushchev, but left room, no doubt after considerable Chinese pressure, for revolutionary struggle.

In general, the Declaration implied that peaceful transition was the preferred means to socialism:

"In present-day conditions in a number of capitalist countries the working class, headed by the vanguard, has the possibility—on the basis of a workers' and people's front or of other possible forms of agreement and political cooperation among the different parties and public organizations—to unite the majority of the people, win state power without civil war and ensure the transfer of the basic means of production to the hands of the people.... The working class can defeat the reactionary, antipopular forces, win a firm majority in parliament, transform the parliament into an instrument serving the working people, develop a broad mass struggle outside the parliament, break the resistance of the reactionary forces and create the necessary conditions for bringing about the socialist revolution peacefully.... In conditions in which the exploiting classes resort to violence against the people, it is necessary to bear in mind another possibility—nonpeaceful transition to socialism...."

In view of Chinese protests against emphasis on peaceful transition, this compromise—wherein violent revolution is considered "another possibility"—undoubtedly reflected a bitter struggle against the CPSU's departure, or "further development," of Lenin's teachings.

Of great importance was the statement on revisionism. "The Communist parties," the Declaration read, "consider the main danger in present-day conditions to be revisionism or, in other words, right-wing opportunism, as a manifestation of bourgeois ideology that paralyzes the revolutionary energy of the working class and demands the preservation or restoration of capitalism."

This section was directly aimed at Yugoslavia
but the Chinese at least were indirectly aiming it at the CPSU's new line.

The following year saw the gradual breakdown of the Moscow unity. In July 1958 U.S. and British troops invaded Lebanon and moved into Jordan in the wake of the revolution in neighboring Iraq. Most of the world viewed the invasion as a prelude to an attack on Iraq.

Khrushchev responded by calling for a summit meeting of the U.S., Britain, France, India and the USSR. The day after the Soviet proposal, the Peking government declared, "Nothing can be saved by yielding to evil and coddling wrong only helps the devil. If the U.S.-British aggressors refuse to withdraw from Lebanon and Jordan and insist on expanding their aggression, then the only course left to the people of the world is to hit the aggressors on the head...."

Khrushchev made a secret visit to Peking, according to Stuart Schram in "Mao Tsetung," and "while there he withdrew his offer of a summit. It seemed obvious that this brusque turnabout was due to pressure from the CPC."

A few weeks later, in response to the U.S. occupation of Taiwan and continuing threats from Chiang Kai-shek to "retake the mainland," People's China began shelling the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu still in the hands of reactionary forces.

The U.S. retaliated by announcing it would defend the islands, stepping stones to Chiang's Taiwan fortress, with nuclear weapons if required. The Soviets made it publicly clear they would not back China in any conflict with Chiang and Washington. Several years later the CPSU called the shelling a "provocation of American and Chiang Kai-shek troops in the region."

That same summer, the CPC put forth the idea of agricultural communes as a means of accelerating development toward communism. Khrushchev denounced the plan, first privately then publicly, including no small degree of mockery during his conversation with the then Sen. Hubert Humphrey who visited the USSR in December 1958.

Early in 1959, according to Jacobs and Baerwald in "Chinese Communism," the Soviet leader "extended his 1956 remarks on the inevitability of war by implying that war—even local wars—can be permanently removed from the 'life of society' even before the complete victory of socialism throughout the world. To this the CPC replied that the 'so called warless world—if it is not a childish fantasy—can only be a world where there is no imperialism.'"

Throughout the year, the USSR was making preparations for the summit meeting between Khrushchev and President Eisenhower, which was to take place in the U.S. in September 1959.

In August, the reactionary Nehru government, now favored by Moscow, instigated the Sino-Indian border clash. On Sept. 9, against strong Chinese urgings, the Soviet government issued a "neutral" statement expressing "regret" over the clash.

The implication was that China had been the aggressor. The Chinese later stated: "Here is the first instance in history in which a socialist country, instead of condemning the armed provocations of the reactionaries of a capitalist country, condemned another fraternal socialist country when it was confronted with such armed provocation."

The Chinese were highly displeased by the Khrushchev-Eisenhower meeting, particularly by the Soviet party chief's theory that a "world without weapons, without armed forces and without wars" could flow from increasing Moscow-Washington consultations and agreements.

Khrushchev traveled to Peking after his meeting with Eisenhower and utilized the occasion of a banquet in his honor to criticize those who wanted to "test by force the stability of the capitalist system," an attack on the leadership of the CPC.

In April, China unleashed a massive assault on modern revisionism, without naming the USSR publicly. At the same time, a leading CPC cadre delivered a major speech wherein he argued that "whether or not to carry out revolution and whether or not to oppose imperialism have become the fundamental differences between the Marxist-Leninists and modern revisionists."

The purpose of the Chinese polemics was to convince the CPSU not to make any sell-out agreements with Eisenhower at the next summit. The summit was called off due to the U.S. spy plane incident.

In June 1960, at the 3rd congress of the Rumanian Communist party, Khrushchev angrily attacked Mao Tsetung by name, accusing him of being "an ultra-leftist, an ultra-dogmatist and indeed a left revisionist." Only Albania publicly defended China at this meeting.
In August, in an attempt to force the Chinese into line, the Soviets abruptly terminated their technical assistance program and withdrew their experts from China. They even took back blueprints for half-completed installations and machine complexes, refusing Chinese offers to pay for the designs so they could finish the projects themselves.

The CPSU's message was clear: line up behind the foreign policy of the Soviet party and cease the attacks on modern revisionism (which until this point had been kept on a party-to-party level) or suffer extreme economic and social consequences. From June to August, the Soviet Union escalated party differences to state differences and replied with a resounding "no" to China's attempt to argue its own external line and struggle against revisionism within the socialist camp.

The Chinese were not intimidated and still continued their arguments within the socialist bloc, preparing for one of the most important conferences in the socialist world, the November 1960 meeting of Communist and Workers parties in Moscow.

This meeting represented the last serious attempt to prevent a schism and the start of the "third debate" in the international communist movement.

The brink of the precipice

A total of 81 parties participated in the two-week conference, with all but five led by their party chiefs. The main purpose of the meeting was to agree on a new statement which would bring the 1957 Moscow Declaration up to date and to restore harmony between the CPC and CPSU.

The CPC favored the meeting because it considered the Soviet Union repeatedly violated the 1957 agreement and sought international reaffirmation of the three-year-old Declaration. The CPSU desired the conference in order to line up as many parties as possible behind the Soviet party's foreign line and against China's criticisms of modern revisionism.

The Moscow Statement resulting from the meeting was a compromise, similar to 1957, weighted toward the CPSU but satisfactory enough to the Chinese to gain their approval in the name of unity. In signing the Statement, the Chinese party made clear it was doing so because it expected another gathering of the parties to take place within the next two years. During this time the Chinese planned to have consultations with the CPSU and argue their position against modern revisionism with other parties. The CPC's hope was that a 1962 meeting would produce a document more in line with its thinking. Ultimately, the Soviet party made sure the 1962 meeting never took place.

A preparatory commission met in Moscow for two months to work on the Statement before the conference. It was apparent here that the cards were stacked against China. The parties of Albania, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Indonesia backed China on most issues, joined by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Australia and Japan on certain issues.

When the conference began, party after party lined up against China, many deliberately distorting the CPC's position on various questions, accusing the CPC of "dogmatism" and "sectarianism."

The CPC's delegate, Teng Hsiao-ping, sought to clarify his party's position. No, he said, China did not desire nuclear war (as some parties alleged), but the international movement must face the fact that war cannot be eliminated during the imperialist epoch and that international proletarian solidarity dictated that Communists must support wars of national liberation and against imperialist aggression. No, he continued, China did not oppose the concept of peaceful coexistence, but peaceful coexistence must be only an aspect of Communist foreign policy, not the main line, a thesis propounded by Khrushchev. No, again, he declared, the CPC is not against the peaceful road to socialism, but the success of such a road was highly doubtful.

One of the big arguments was the charge by the Soviet party and others that the Chinese party was guilty of factionalism (or factionalism) and that there was no room for this in the international movement.

While maintaining that the CPSU was the "leading party" insofar as the Chinese were concerned, Teng said this did not mean such a party was above criticism. Stressing the difference between factionalism within a party and between parties, he insisted China had the...
right to put forth its views within the Communist movement.

"In relations between parties," he said, "there is no reason to demand that the minority should submit to the majority, for between parties there are no superiors and inferiors: each party is independent.... The Soviet party accuses us of fractionalism for disputing certain resolutions passed by its own congresses. In trying to bind others it is the Soviet party which has offended against inter-party discipline. For how can there be equality between fraternal parties if everything the Soviet party decides at its own congresses is binding on the rest? Or must we admit a new concept—'father' parties and 'son' parties?... The purpose behind the condemnation in the draft resolution of the activities of factions and groups is intended to place a bomb under the Chinese party and nothing else at all. We shall not yield!"

All else, after this ringing declaration of party independence, was commentary. The CPSU soon demonstrated it was not disposed to tolerate opposition from the left within the ranks it dominated—but this was not to be made completely clear for a year or so more. The Chinese at the time apparently believed that the Soviets could be convinced to permit a left opposition to exist within the international movement and proceeded on this assumption for several years.

The conference was notable for another important speech, that of Enver Hoxha, leader of
the Albanian Party of Labor. The Albanian party raised a storm because of its criticism of Soviet revisionism at the Rumanian party congress in Bucharest earlier in the year, bringing down upon itself a torrent of abuse from the CPSU. This time it raised a hurricane.

Hoxha raked Khrushchev over some very hot coals and attacked modern revisionism on the questions of peaceful coexistence, peaceful transition, the complete downgrading of Stalin and for splitting the socialist camp. "The three years that have passed since the Moscow conference," he said, "have fully verified that the modern revisionists are nothing but splitters of the communist movement and the socialist camp, avowed enemies of socialism and the working class."

The CPSU reacted to Albania's stand against modern revisionism the same way it did against China's. It scrapped agreements between the two countries, recalled specialists and terminated credits. These actions caused great temporary hardship for the Albanian people.

While the line put forward by China and Albania was a distinct minority on many questions, their influence on the conference was important, perhaps largely for what they were able to prevent. "China's thesis," wrote Edgar Snow, "had found wider support than Khrushchev anticipated. Albania was the only European party which openly espoused the Chinese position in 1960, but elements in other parties, including the Soviet, were in sympathy with it. As a whole, Asian parties attempted to steer a middle course."

In general, the CPC was pleased by the outcome of the conference, believing that modern revisionism would be defeated in a matter of time through open debate within the international movement and that the unity of the socialist bloc, most certainly including the Soviet party, would be restored on a higher revolutionary level. In this the Chinese were mistaken. Khrushchev had no intention of permitting the Chinese to undermine the dominating role of the Soviet party. Within two years he had constructed a bloc, led by the European parties, that virtually tried to read China out of the Communist movement.

At the 22nd party congress of the CPSU in October 1961, Khrushchev issued a violent denunciation of the Albanian Party of Labor (a surrogate for China in the CPSU's polemics), demanded the expulsion of its leadership and implied it should be kicked out of the socialist camp. Chou En-lai, attending the congress, defended the Albanian party. Following this episode, the CPSU kept up incessant attacks against Albania, but the main target was China.

Three months after the October congress, the DRV Workers party urged that "mutual attacks on the radio and press should be stopped by the parties." The Chinese agreed, once again suggesting that differences should be solved by consultations between parties. Both the DRV and DPRK parties actively sought to prevent a split in the early part of 1962. At the same time, both took principled stands against modern revisionism.

Sensing a major division in the socialist bloc at this time, U.S. imperialism, now led by President Kennedy, adopted a two-fold policy. First, it sought detente with the USSR, which was clearly in a compromising mood. Second, it increased the pressure in Asia to "contain China" by involving itself in Vietnam. The Chinese backed the South Vietnamese national liberation struggle from the beginning, coinciding as it did with the CPC's thinking on "local wars." The USSR was not involved in a major way until the U.S. began attacking the socialist DRV in 1965.

Throughout 1962 the CPSU continued to build its anti-China bloc. In the latter part of the year, the Indian government once again precipitated a serious border clash with the People's Republic. This time, Khrushchev promised to send jets to India. Then came the Cuban missile crisis, when the Soviet government was forced by threats from Kennedy to remove the missiles it recently positioned in Cuba. China criticized the USSR on two grounds: first, it was "adventurism" to place the missiles there in the first place; second it was "capitalization" to imperialist threats to remove them once they were there. The year was rounded out with a state visit to Moscow by Yugoslavia's President Tito. (Stalin broke relations with Belgrade in 1948 and Yugoslavia had been the model par excellence of modern revisionism. Just two years before Tito's visit, the CPSU agreed in the 1960 Statement that the Yugoslav party was engaging in "subversive work against the socialist camp." The major charges against the Yugoslav party were its capitalist-type reforms, stressing material incentives and market economics and its "neutral"—often pro-West—stance in international affairs.)

By December 1962 it was apparent there would be no new meeting of the parties as promised in 1960. Instead, the CPSU instructed the European parties to launch direct attacks against China at various party congresses held in late 1962 and early 1963. It was obvious the CPSU was trying to squeeze China out of the bloc.

The French Communist party, loyal to Moscow, put forth the new line. Its central committee decided Dec. 14, 1962, that revisionism was no longer the main danger within the international movement (as maintained in the 1957 and 1960 documents). "Latterly," the CFP intoned, "the danger of dogmatism and sectarianism has become the main danger."

Responding to this new state of affairs, Peking's People's Daily published an editorial (Dec. 15) entitled, "Workers of all countries unite, oppose our common enemy." The "common enemy" was the U.S. Noting the attacks on China at party congresses, the article said: "This adverse current, which is disrupting unity and creating splits, reached a new high at the Italian and Czechoslovak Communist party
congresses. Comrades of certain fraternal parties not only continued their attacks on the Albanian Party of Labor, but also openly attacked the Communist party of China by name and they even censured the Korean Workers party for disagreeing with attacks on the Chinese Communist party."

The editorial urged socialist unity under the 1957 and 1960 agreements, arguing that different opinions are often unavoidable and not necessarily bad. "In order that unity may be securely guaranteed," the article continued, "the important thing is that we must start from the position of defending and strengthening internationalist unity and standing together against the enemy."

Defending itself against charges of splitism, dogmatism, sectarianism, adventurism and war mongering, the CPC said: "For a communist the minimum requirement is that he should make a clear distinction between the enemy and ourselves, that he should be ruthless towards the enemy and kind to his own comrades. But there are people who just turn this upside-down. For imperialism it is all accommodation and 'mutual concessions,' for fraternal parties and fraternal countries it is only implacable hostility...."

At the January 1963 congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, China was again attacked. When the Chinese delegate criticized Yugoslav revisionism, the delegates booed, stamped and whistled. The chairman denounced the Chinese speech and "rejected" criticism of the Tito government. The Soviet newspaper Izvestia then attacked China for its criticism of Yugoslavia, calling it "utterly impermissible."

In a major editorial Jan. 27, People's Daily replied: "Better a single good deed contributing to unity than a thousand empty words about unity. It is time to rein in on the brink of the precipice!"

But it was too late. The CPSU had evidently decided the only way to deal with its left opposition within the international movement was to eliminate it from the bloc. The year of no return in Sino-Soviet relations was 1963. Although several efforts were made to seek some resolution of differences between the two socialist giants during the year, the course of developments was such that a complete rupture in relations became virtually inevitable.

From the Chinese point of view in 1963, the split had two major causes:

1. The growth of modern revisionism in both theory and practice in the USSR. Between the 1956 20th party congress and 1961 22nd congress, the Chinese party insisted, "the leaders of the CPSU developed a rounded system of revisionism. They put forward a revisionist line which contravenes the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, a line which consists of 'peaceful coexistence' (as 'further developed' by Khrushchev), 'peaceful competition,' 'peaceful transition,' 'a state of the whole people' and a 'party of the entire people,' " all concepts the CPC maintained were deviations from Leninism. The CPC does not view this as simply fine points of ideological interpretation. They have a material base in the development of a bureaucratic elite in the Soviet Union, the degeneration of democratic centralism and the process of criticism-self-criticism within the CPSU and the adoption of an international strategy by the leaders of the USSR based upon active collaboration with U.S. imperialism on the basis of the shared hegemony of the world's two most powerful states.

2. The refusal of the CPSU to respond in a Leninist fashion to CPC criticism of modern revisionism within the international working class movement. First, China was made to suffer grave economic consequences when the USSR withdrew its technicians and aid in 1960 to punish Peking on a state level. Second, instead of conducting a political struggle on the question of two lines, the CPSU conducted a splitting struggle intended to isolate and excommunicate the Chinese and Albanian parties from the socialist bloc. Of the parties in power in 1963, only those of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, democratic People's Republic of Korea, and, to a much lesser extent, Rumania, tended to side with China on many of the major issues dividing the CPSU and CPC. The rest, as well as the great majority of parties not yet in power, supported the Soviet party, largely because of opportunism within their own ranks and because they were dependent to one extent or another on the CPSU. About 65 out of 86 parties supported the CPSU.

Responding to the increasing denunciations of the CPC at East European party congresses and open polemics against Peking in the newspapers of the USSR and aligned countries, the CPC suggested in March 1963 that each side publicly
print the polemics of the other side and ‘‘let the people in our own countries and the whole world figure who is right and who is wrong.’’ The CPSU never took the idea seriously, but the CPC did and printed many criticisms of itself in its newspapers.

And 1963 was a big year for polemics. In reply to a lengthy ‘‘open letter’’ criticizing the CPC, the Chinese party published six or seven major critiques of the CPSU, modern revisionism, differences on peaceful coexistence, disarmament, peaceful transition, neocolonialism—most of which serve today as the ideological basis of the Chinese struggle against the USSR.

On Aug. 1, 1963, the U.S., USSR and Britain signed the nuclear test ban treaty, outlawing atmospheric testing, largely because Washington and Moscow no longer had any need for above-ground testing. The Peking analysis was that the treaty represented a ‘‘U.S.-USSR alliance against China, pure and simple.’’ China was anxious to break the big-power nuclear monopoly and still required above-ground tests to perfect its weaponry. The disruption of economic relations on a state level by the USSR, together with the increasingly hostile polemics, had made it clear to the Chinese that they could no longer rely on the Soviet nuclear deterrent to protect themselves from U.S. imperialism. It therefore became a matter of critical self-defense for China to develop its own nuclear capability. As subsequent events have shown, this was also necessary because of the military threat posed by the USSR.

Soon after the treaty was initialled, Khrushchev traveled to Yugoslavia for consultations with Tito, seeking closer ties with ‘‘fraternal, socialist Yugoslavia.’’ This was followed by a Soviet statement that China could no longer be considered a full member of the socialist bloc.

As these developments were taking place, the Kennedy administration was gradually increasing U.S. troop strength in Vietnam, evoking a demand from Chou En-lai in October 1963 that the ‘‘U.S. must withdraw from South Vietnam.’’ In March 1964, Peking said the main lesson of the NLF struggle was that the ‘‘people of any country...subjected to U.S. aggression can win victory if only they are not overawed by its apparent strength...and know how to struggle.”

This was a direct challenge to the CPSU’s desire to limit and eliminate such ‘‘local wars’’ in the name of ‘‘world peace.’’

A few days later, Khrushchev was in Hungary where he declared April 1: ‘‘There are people...who call themselves Marxist-Leninists and at the same time say there is no need to strive for a better life. According to them, only one thing is important—revolution. What kind of Marxism is this?’’ He added: ‘‘Prosperity is the only thing worthwhile while struggling for.’’ In his speeches at the time, Khrushchev made a practice of calling CPC leaders ‘‘crazy’’ and ‘‘idiots.’’

In mid-1964, Soviet troops conducted massive war games in the USSR’s far eastern section, the objective being to thwart a mock Chinese invasion. The purpose was to intimidate China. The Chinese did not consider such ‘‘games’’ entertaining. A short while later, the Italian CP leader Palmiro Togliatti wrote an important document which has come to be known as ‘‘Togliatti’s will’’ (because he dropped dead of a stroke upon completing it), wherein the leader of the largest CP not in power advocated each party should ‘‘act in an autonomous manner’’ in national affairs. While holding no truck with the Chinese, Togliatti—who coined the term ‘‘polycentrism’’ in 1956—also criticized the manipulative manner in which the CPSU was lining up anti-Chinese support.

A month later, Khrushchev was ousted from power by a group headed by Leonid Brezhnev and Alexi Kosygin. Although the causes of Khrushchev’s fall have never been fully elaborated, his monomaniacal campaign against China was important among them. The new leaders realized Khrushchev’s buffoonish antics were beginning to harm the CPSU’s anti-Chinese crusade.

The day after Khrushchev was deposed, the CPC sent its ‘‘warm greetings’’ to the new CPSU leadership. The same day, China detonated its first nuclear bomb and issued the following statement: ‘‘The development of nuclear weapons by China is for defense and for protecting the Chinese people from the danger of the U.S. launching a nuclear war.... The Chinese government hereby solemnly declares that China will never...be the first to use nuclear weapons.... On the question of nuclear weapons, China will commit neither the error of ad-

Czechoslovakia 1968—limited sovereignty.
venturism nor the error of capitulationism. The Chinese people can be trusted." The statement proposed "a summit conference of all the countries of the world be convened to discuss the question of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons."

The polemics between the USSR and China quieted down for a few weeks after Khrushchev's departure. Despite certain differences in style, it soon became apparent to the CPC (largely on the basis of a policy speech by Brezhnev Nov. 17, 1964) that the CPSU's line hadn't changed. "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev" was the Chinese response—and the open polemics continued, until this day.

The next major phase in China's foreign policy began in mid-1966 with the launching of the cultural revolution. By this time the CPC was convinced the leadership of the CPSU was restoring capitalism in the USSR and that elements within China had the same intention. Under the guidance of Chairman Mao Tsetung, the leading section of the CPC launched a nationwide campaign to galvanize the masses in a struggle against party and state cadre "taking the capitalist road," that is, instituting economic and social practices in China similar to those which reversed the course in the USSR. Such practices included measures which could have led to abandoning the proletarian dictatorship, material incentives to increase production, introduction of a market economy in certain areas and the development of a bureaucratic elite which stood above the working class, much the way the bourgeoisie does in capitalist countries.

The cultural revolution, which lasted until the beginning of 1969, was a highly positive achievement internally but contained some negative aspects in external policy. China entered a period of extreme diplomatic isolation and tended at times to adopt a dogmatic and sectarian foreign line. Beginning at the end of 1966, every Chinese ambassador but one (the representative in Cairo) was recalled to Peking. New ambassadors were not sent to their posts until 1969. For a while during this period, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was obviously under the influence of the ultra-"left." Foreign Minister Chen Yi was denounced by Red Guards in 1967 and even the position of Chou En-lai appeared to be threatened by ultra-"left" criticism. It was at this time that Red Guards created a number of incidents at foreign embassies. On Aug. 19, 1967, Red Guards and some ultra-"left" officials actually occupied the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and held it for five days before being ousted. The period of "Red Guard Diplomacy" lasted in lesser degree for a few more months before it was completely defeated.

One aspect of this period was the temporary estrangement of China and the DPRK, one of China's original supporters in the struggle against modern revisionism. When the Red Guards began to criticize the DPRK and its Worker's party for not being "revolutionary" enough, Pyongyang began to issue veiled criticisms of Chinese dogmatism.

Perhaps it would have been impossible to prevent this ultra-"left" phase in foreign relations, considering the enormous social forces that were unleashed during the cultural revolution and the need for a thorough housecleaning in all China's state institutions. By 1968, China largely corrected its ultra-"left" errors in foreign affairs, although it took a year or so to repair the damage and develop a forceful external line.

Commenting on this phase, an official of the Ministry of Foreign affairs told me in Peking last year that "the line of Chairman Mao and the party had been to unite the broadest possible united front to isolate the common enemies. Ultra-"left" elements, which had temporary influence, maintained it was revolutionary to sever diplomatic relations with foreign countries. A handful of bad elements took advantage of a confusing situation in those years. For instance, in retaliation for the unwarranted arrests of some Chinese in Hong Kong, the ultra-"left" here burned down the British charge
d'affaires office. This just isolated China. It did not benefit revolution. It helped the enemy.

"In dealing with foreign countries, for a temporary period of time, these elements tried to impose their will on these countries," the Ministry official continued. "This is big nation chauvinism. Also in dealing with fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties and organizations in other countries, they viewed only one as the sole revolutionary Marxist-Leninist group and the others as non-revolutionary. This was wrong and was corrected."

Throughout the cultural revolution China was basically concerned with internal matters. It returned to the world political scene dramatically in response to the invasion of Czechoslovakia on Aug. 10, 1968, by the USSR and some Warsaw Pact countries. While strongly disagreeing with the "liberal" revisionist Dubcek regime, Peking argued that the invasion was without justification. Speaking at Rumania's national day reception in Peking Aug. 23, Chou En-lai said the invasion "marks the total bankruptcy of Soviet modern revisionism. The Chinese government and people strongly condemn the Soviet revisionist leading clique and its followers for their crime of aggression—the armed occupation of Czechoslovakia—and firmly support the Czechoslovakian people in their heroic struggle of resistance."

It was the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the ensuing Brezhnev doctrine of "limited sovereignty," which was intended to rationalize the attack on Prague, that gave rise to the expression "social imperialism."

Regarding "limited sovereignty," the Chinese declared: "The CPSU leadership raved that the interests of the socialist community under their control represent the 'highest sovereignty' and that this must be given first place, while the sovereignty of any one state is limited. They abrogate to themselves the right to determine the destiny of the members of the community, including the destiny of their sovereignty. They allege that such an act as 'rendering military aid to a fraternal country to do away with the threat to the socialist system' is in the common interests of the camp of socialism and is upholding the sovereignty of another country. This is out-and-out gangster logic put out by the new czars to justify their aggression."

The Chinese were not ignorant of the fact that "limited sovereignty" could also be invoked to "limit" the sovereignty of China, Albania and other socialist countries through armed assault, should this suit the Soviet leaders.

Throughout the 1960s there were a series of escalating incidents along China's northern border involving armed forces of the Soviet Union. In most cases, until March 2, 1969, there were relatively minor skirmishes. On that day, according to the Chinese, the Soviet Union "sent armed soldiers to flagrantly intrude into Chenpao Island...and killed and wounded frontier guards of the Chinese PLA (People's Liberation Army)." The fighting continued for a while and then both sides went into negotiations.

The Chinese position on the border territory is summed up in the following 1969 statement: "There exists a boundary question between China and the Soviet Union not only because Czarist Russia annexed more than 1.5 million square kilometers of Chinese territory by the unequal treaties imposed on China but also because it crossed in many places the boundary line stipulated by the unequal treaties and further occupied vast expanses of Chinese territory."

In support of their thesis, the Chinese point to statements by the Lenin government in the early years of the Bolshevik revolution, including an official proclamation of the Soviet government on Sept. 27, 1920, which "declares null and void all the treaties concluded with China by the former governments of Russia, renounces all seizures of Chinese territory and all Russian concessions in China and restores to China, without any compensation and forever all that had been predatorily seized from her by the czar's government and the Russian bourgeoisie." The USSR has never returned an inch of this territory—and in fact claims even more. Chenpao Island, for instance, is on the Chinese side of the center-channel dividing line of the Ususli River according to the unequal "Sino-Russian Treaty of Peking" of 1890 forced upon China by the czar.

The Chinese government has never demanded the return of the territory annexed by the czar. It officially maintains that "the Sino-Soviet boundary question should be settled peacefully and that, even if it cannot be settled for the time being, the status quo of the border should be maintained and there should definitely be no resort to the use of force."

By early 1969, as a result of the continuing development of modern revisionism in the USSR, increasing collusion between Moscow and Washington, the border crisis, threat of aggression from the USSR and other factors, combined with the conclusion of the cultural revolution, the Chinese government began to inaugurate a dramatically new foreign posture which ultimately led to the restoration of its rights in the UN, the Nixon visit and greatly expanded influence in international affairs.

Before discussing China's policies from 1969 to today, it is necessary to examine some of the major theoretical differences between the CPC and CPSU, since these have a profound influence on present Chinese policies.
Criticism of modern revisionism

The Chinese Communist party does not consider itself the cause of the present split in the international communist movement.

On the contrary, the Chinese insist they did everything possible to prevent this historic political schism.

The division taken place in the international movement, according to the CPC, is the result of fundamental departures from Marxism-Leninism as manifest in the practice of the Communist party of the Soviet Union.

In other words, it was not the Chinese who split off from the socialist camp but a large section of the socialist camp, led or coerced by the CPSU, which split off from Marxism-Leninism and the principles of proletarian internationalism.

The struggle against modern revisionism or right opportunism was the tool employed by the CPC to forge unity in the socialist camp, not the wedge that resulted in division. Had this tool proven successful and had the sharp move to the right taken by the CPSU in 1956 been deflected, the socialist camp would have been united as never before on a high level of revolutionary unity.

While it did not succeed in its initial objective of preventing a split, the Chinese struggle against modern revisionism also did not fail. Had China not engaged in the struggle, it is logical to speculate that the moves to the right by the CPSU and a number of other parties would have been greatly accelerated. Only China, because of its size, the prestige of its revolution and its accomplishments of socialist construction, was able to apply the brakes on this development internationally. The brakes did not "hold," but at least slowed the process.

At the same time, the spirit, theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism have been kept intact in China, Albania and in certain socialist countries which have adopted strong anti-revisionist positions on some questions in the split while maintaining neutrality on others and within large sections of the international revolutionary movement.

The current phase in China’s foreign policy is inextricably connected to the struggle against modern revisionism as well as imperialism. In order to defeat imperialism on a worldwide scale, the Chinese say, it is necessary to expunge revisionism from the international revolutionary movement and to rebuild the socialist camp—which the CPC no longer believes to exist today—behind the banner of Marxism-Leninism. In this connection, the CPC often quotes Lenin: “The fight against imperialism is a sham and humbug unless it is inseparably bound up with the fight against opportunism.”

This chapter will examine more fully some of the contents of the CPC’s critique of modern revisionism.

The genesis of the Sino-Soviet dispute began over the question of peaceful coexistence. In his 1956 speech to the 20th party congress, Khrushchev disputed the Leninist thesis that war is inevitable during the era of imperialism, arguing that “indeed, there are only two ways: either peaceful coexistence or the most devastating war in history. There is no alternative.” The Soviet leader also stated that countries with “differing social systems cannot just exist side by side.... There must be progress to better relations, to stronger confidence among them, to cooperation.” In 1960, Khrushchev declared “the inevitable struggle between the two systems must be made to take the form exclusively of a struggle of ideas.” During this four-year period, the CPSU put forward notions that the USSR and U.S. could create a “warless world” where even “local wars” could be eliminated; that imperialism would be defeated through peaceful competition and that peaceful coexistence was the “general line” (not just an element of a general line) of the USSR and the socialist camp.

The CPC has never been against the concept of peaceful coexistence as developed by Lenin. What it opposed were the CPSU's departures from Leninism.

Charging that “the leaders of the CPSU have one-sidedly reduced the general line of the foreign policy of the socialist countries to peaceful coexistence,” the CPC declared in a 1963 polemic: “We hold that the general line of foreign policy for socialist countries must embody the principle of their foreign policy and comprise the fundamental content of this policy. What is this fundamental principle? It is proletarian internationalism... The following should therefore be the content of the general line of foreign policy for socialist countries: to develop relations of friendship, mutual assistance and cooperation among the countries of the socialist camp in accordance with the principle of proletarian internationalism; to strive for peaceful coexistence on the basis of the five principles with countries having different social systems and oppose the imperialist policies of aggression and war; and to support and assist the revolutionary struggles of all the oppressed peoples and nations. These three aspects are inter-related and not a single one can be omitted.”

Noting that “Lenin consistently held that it was impossible for the oppressed classes and nations to coexist peacefully with the oppressor classes and nations, the CPC continued: “As for oppressed peoples and nations, their task is to strive for their own liberation and overthrow the rule of imperialism and its lackeys. They should not practice peaceful coexistence with the imperialists and their lackeys, nor is it possible for
them to do so. It is therefore wrong to apply peaceful coexistence to the relations between oppressed and oppressor classes and between oppress and oppressor nations, or to stretch the socialist countries' policy of peaceful coexistence so as to make it the policy of the Communist parties and the revolutionary people in the capitalist world, or to subordinate the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed peoples and nations to it.

Khrushchev's 1956 speech marked another departure from Leninism in the heavy emphasis he gave to the possibility of peaceful transition to socialism. "Radical changes have taken place" since the Bolshevik revolution, Khrushchev said, which have opened "the possibility of employing the parliamentary form for the transition to socialism." In policy, pronouncements and deeds over the next several years, the CPSU made it evident that peaceful transition was the probable road to socialism.

The Chinese argue that the CPSU's stress on peaceful transition was founded on the premise that violent upheaval could jeopardize the developing detente between the USSR and the U.S.

In an article commemorating the Paris Commune, the Chinese party paper, People's Daily, stated in 1971: "Violent revolution is the universal principle of proletarian revolution. A Marxist-Leninist party must adhere to this universal principle and apply it to the concrete practice of its own country. Historical experience shows that the seizure of political power by the proletariat and the oppressed people of a country and the seizure of victory in their revolution are accomplished invariably by the power of the gun; they are accomplished under the leadership of a proletarian party, by acting in accordance with that country's specific conditions, by gradually building up the people's armed forces and fighting people's war on the basis of arousing the broad masses to action and by waging repeated struggles against the imperialists and reactionaries. This is true of the Russian revolution, the Chinese revolution and the revolutions of Albania, Vietnam, Korea and other countries and there is no exception."

Another outgrowth of the Khrushchev years was the CPSU's contention that the USSR had developed beyond the point where the dictatorship of the proletariat was necessary, substituting for it an obscurantist formulation called "the state of the whole people." In parallel, the party of the proletariat became known as the "party of the whole people." The thinking behind these new concepts was that, in general, contradictory classes had been eliminated in the Soviet Union, therefore the proletariat alone should no longer dictate policy. When the CPC challenged this notion, the CPSU replied: "Over whom do the Chinese propose we exercise dictatorship?"

In a speech in 1962, Chairman Mao Tsetung stated: "Socialist society covers a considerably long historical period. In the historical period of socialism, there are still classes, class contradictions and class struggle, there is the struggle between the socialist road and the capitalist road and there is the danger of capitalist restoration."

A year later, in an open letter to the CPSU, the CPC put it this way: "The fundamental thesis of Marx and Lenin is that the dictatorship of the proletariat will inevitably continue for the entire historical period of the transition from capitalism to communism, that is, for the entire period up to the abolition of all class differences and the entry into a classless society, the higher stage of communist society. What will happen if it is announced, halfway through, that the dictatorship of the proletariat is no longer necessary?...This would lead to extremely grave consequences and make any transition to communism out of the question. In the view of Marxist-Leninists, there is no such thing as a non-class or supra-class state. So long as the state remains a state, it must bear a class character; so long as the state exists, it cannot be a state of the 'whole people.' As soon as society becomes classless, there will no longer be a state. Certain persons (Khrushchev) may say that their society is already one without classes. We answer: No, there are classes and class struggles in all socialist countries without exception."

"The rise to power of revisionism," Chairman Mao said in 1964, "means the rise to power of the bourgeoisie." A few months later Chou En-lai warned that there was a danger of capitalist restoration in the USSR.

On the basis of new economic reforms and changes in management techniques introduced in the USSR in the mid-1960s, coupled with revisions in the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the CPC began to argue that capitalism, in effect, was being restored in the
first socialist state. In a series of articles published in 1967, the CPC criticized the economic reforms as "putting profit above anything else."

"The essence of the 'new system' being pushed ahead so vigorously by the Soviet revisionist leading group under the cloak of 'economic reform' is to practice in an all-round way capitalist management in all fields of the national economy, completely disrupt the socialist relations of production and thoroughly break up the socialist economic base. The enforcement of the 'new system' has resulted in abolishing the former system of unified economic planning by the state and setting profit above all. It authorized the enterprises to decide independently on their production and management plans and gives them free rein to seek high profits as in capitalist enterprises. It provides the leaders of the enterprises with more and bigger privileges and endows them with the power to deal freely with matters concerning production, finance and personnel in the enterprises.... The (new) regulations empower the managers to fix or change the wages, grades and bonuses for the workers and staff at will, to recruit or dismiss workers and mete out punishment to them and to determine themselves the structure and personnel of the enterprises. Thus, the enterprises of socialist ownership have been turned into capitalist undertakings owned by a bourgeois privileged stratum and broad sections of working people in industry and agriculture have been turned into wage slaves who have to sell their labor power."

In another article, the CPC charged that "a big share of the profit gained by enterprises is directly pocketed by a small handful of persons of the privileged stratum, such as directors and engineers or used indirectly for their benefit."

The Chinese party also maintained that a "rural privileged stratum" has developed in the Soviet countryside which "has gone to all lengths to foster the growth of private economy and encourage the free marketing of agricultural products. As a consequence, capitalist forces have become rampant in the Soviet countryside."

Some of the best writings in the U.S. on the subject of Soviet economic revisionism have appeared over the years in the independent socialist magazine "Monthly Review." Co-editor Paul Sweezy (along with European Marxist economist Charles Bettleheim) contends that a new ruling class has emerged in the USSR—a "state bourgeoisie." Sweezy continued: "It rules not through private ownership of the means of production, as in capitalist society, but through occupying the decision-making position in the party, the state and the economy; and it is a class and not simply a stratum because its sons and daughters have a much better chance of occupying the same positions of power than do the children of the rest of the population.... For reasons which I believe were related to the rise of the new state bourgeoisie and the depoliticization of the masses, the system of central administrative planning entered a period of crisis during the 1950s and 1960s. In seeking a way out, the countries of Eastern Europe, led by Yugoslavia, turned increasingly to the methods of capitalism."

In another article, Sweezy maintains that private "ownership" in the USSR should be "interpreted de facto rather than de jure." The Soviet state bourgeoisie, he continued, "controls the means of production and thereby decides how the fruits of production are to be utilized. Regardless of legal forms, this is the real content of class ownership."

Bettleheim, who has done considerable original thinking on the question of the long transition process between capitalism and communism, posits that the determining factor in this regard "concerns the domination or non-domination by the producers over the conditions and results of their activity" and that "socialist relations of production can exist only to the degree that there is control by the producers over the conditions and products of their work.... What is decisive—from the point of view of socialism—is not the mode of 'regulation' (state direction) of the economy, but rather the nature of the class in power." This class, he writes, is the state bourgeoisie, which "possesses," if not privately "owns," the means of production and disposal of products. This has resulted in the separation of the masses from control over the means of production and—through decentralization schemes—the separation of one enterprise from another.

These are just some of the more important differences between the CPC and CPSU. Coupled with Soviet practice since 1956—attitudes of great power chauvinism toward socialist and third world countries and collusion with the U.S. in dividing the world into two power spheres controlled from Moscow and Washington—these differences form the bedrock upon which China's foreign policy is presently based. This policy views "Soviet social imperialism" and U.S. imperialism as the twin main dangers to the world's peoples.

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Building a new united front

People's China was in a distinctly disadvantageous international position in 1969—diplomatically, politically and militarily.

Diplomatically, China was still denied its right place in the United Nations and other international bodies. The Chiang Kai-shek clique on Taiwan was still recognized by the majority of countries. Then, too, there was a period of self-
isolation during the cultural revolution. Aside from its impact among advanced revolutionary forces, Peking's voice was barely audible in international affairs.

Politically, the People's Republic had been branded a renegade by the Soviet Union within the socialist camp and was generally shunned by the majority of Communist and Workers parties in power. Albania was a faithful ally but the huge Indonesian Communist party (which had been exceptionally close to China) had been smashed by the military rulers in Djakarta, the Japanese party was fractured, the Communist party of the Philippines had just been reconstituted along Marxist-Leninist lines and relations with the DPRK were just beginning to resume their traditional closeness. China was on very warm terms with the DRV, National Liberation Front of South Vietnam and revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia and in some Mideast and African countries, but in political affairs, China's influence was hardly commensurate with its potential.

Militarily, the Peking government was in a difficult situation. Surrounded to the west and south by over 120 hostile U.S. military bases; a brutal war of aggression involving over a half-million U.S. soldiers (originally brought to Vietnam to "contain" China) was raging in Indochina; an angry India to the Southwest, now fully supported by the USSR, was anxious for revenge after having been bested by China in a series of border confrontations; the prospect of a resurgence of Japanese militarism to the northeast and—above all—the immediate military threat posed by the Soviet Union to the north. After a series of ugly border clashes instigated by the Moscow government, the USSR was in the process of building up its forces in Mongolia and Siberia to over a million troops. Not only could the Chinese not expect Soviet protection against the U.S. nuclear threat, Peking had to contend with the possibility of a Soviet nuclear threat as well, particularly a pre-emptive strike by the USSR against China's inchoate nuclear installations. China's leaders fully expected in 1969 that the Soviet Union would launch one major form of aggression or another. In military terms, China faced two major antagonists at the same time, several minor antagonists and was almost completely surrounded.

It was obvious to the leaders of the Peking government at the time that China must quickly extricate itself from this combination of circumstances.

The possibility of realignment with the USSR was considered out of the question by the CPC. China chose another alternative—to wage a struggle of a different type against U.S. imperialism and modern revisionism (which, projected on an international scale in the hegemonic practice of Moscow's foreign policy, was defined as "social imperialism"). China decided to oppose both existing power blocs, identify itself as part of the third world and "to unite all who can be united to oppose U.S. imperialism and Soviet social imperialism."

One aspect of this line was to break U.S.-Soviet hegemony over the world by supporting the independence of small and medium-sized nations in the "first and second intermediate zones."

The concept of intermediate zone was first put forth by Chairman Mao Tsetung in 1946 to signify countries belonging to neither the Soviet nor U.S. bloc. During the 1960s, consistent with the Chinese theory that the focus of world revolution had temporarily shifted to Asia, Africa and Latin America, the Chinese developed a "two-zone" perspective, the first intermediate zone being the third world, the second being Western Europe, Oceania and Canada (assuming these countries were not in the complete control of the U.S.). Most recently, the Chinese seem to think that even some countries heretofore regarded as belonging solidly in either the U.S. or Soviet bloc may now be gravitating to one or another zone between the blocs.

By reducing the grip of the superpowers in these intermediate zones and indeed within the respective blocs themselves, the Chinese believe imperialism and revisionism will become weakened as country after country becomes more independent of outside control. Freed to a certain extent from external domination, the internal forces of national liberation and revolution (and anti-revisionism in socialist countries) will become strengthened.

Implicit in this new strategy, which began to take form at the ninth congress of the CPC in April 1969, is vastly increased Chinese diplomatic activity, some reduction in the considerable military threat posed against China by the U.S. and USSR and the adoption of an international united front political policy broad enough to attract and encompass a wide variety of governments and movements in the struggle against the superpowers.

The success of this new strategy diplomatically is immediately apparent. China now is an important member of the UN and is recognized by the majority of countries (which have agreed to Peking's insistence upon the five principles of coexistence) and among them Taiwan.

Militarily, the USSR still maintains about 50 divisions near the Chinese border but its efforts to create a politically unified strategic encirclement of China, with the U.S. providing half the circle, have been less than successful because of the easing of tensions between Peking and Washington. The Soviet government gained ground in South Asia by sponsoring India's secession from Pakistan and the establishment of the client state of Bangladesh, but this has been offset by China's new relationship with Tokyo.

Although the Soviet Union is attempting to establish itself as an Indian Ocean power to increase its influence in both South and Southeast Asia, a number of countries—including Ceylon, which is in a key position in the area—have been taking stands against both the U.S. and Soviet fleets. Moscow's continuing recognition of the Phnom Penh puppet clique and
its refusal to give decisive political backing to the Cambodian liberation movement (because it has close ties to China) seems to be backfiring in its face, as is its campaign to discredit the Communist party and New People's Army of the Philippines. At the same time, the Soviet Union's efforts to organize an Asian collective security organization—another anti-Chinese maneuver—appears to have gotten nowhere.

Because of Peking's new diplomacy, the threat of aggression against China and the containment policies of both the U.S. and USSR have been neutralized to a certain extent. Because of the proximity of its troops and the fact that Moscow appears to be intensifying its containment and encirclement policies while Washington is preoccupied with its impending defeat in Indochina, the Chinese may well view USSR as the principal threat to its security at this moment.

China's projected international united front against the superpowers is based upon what might be termed the "5, 4, 3, 2, 1 combination."

—The "5" is the five principles of coexistence (mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence).

—The "4" is the four major contradictions in the world (the principal of which is between the oppressed nations and imperialism and social imperialism).

—The "3" is the three aspects of socialist foreign policy (proletarian internationalism, peaceful coexistence and support for revolutionary struggles).

—The "2" is the two superpowers.

—The "1" is the particular essay by Chairman Mao among several others on the question of united fronts which serves as one of the foun-
dations for the front China is trying to construct today.

Since the other elements in this combination have already been noted, I shall here discuss the brief essay "On Policy," written in December 1940 on the question of the united front between the CPC, Kuomintang and other elements against Japanese imperialism. China's present call for a united front is the international application of the national tactics put forward by the CPC over three decades ago against Japan.

The objective of the united front struggle against Japan, Chairman Mao wrote, "is to make use of contradictions, win over the many, oppose the few and crush our enemies one by one and to wage struggles on just grounds, to our advantage and with restraint." This policy eventually led to the defeat of Japanese aggression in China, which was the principal national contradiction at the time. Once defeated, the struggle against the Kuomintang became the principal contradiction, as it had been before the Japanese invasion. Only a broad united front could have defeated Japan and the construction of such a front required (to quote from another of Chairman Mao's articles) that while "we should be firm in principle, we should also have the flexibility permissible and necessary for carrying out our principles."

Those who must be brought into the front, Mao wrote, "include all people favoring resistance; that is, all anti-Japanese workers, peasants, soldiers, students and intellectuals and businessmen." Regarding the various class forces within China needed to build the front, Chairman Mao wrote that "our basic policy is to develop the progressive forces, win over the middle forces and isolate the anti-communist die-hard forces."

The progressive forces were the proletariat, peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie.
These were the most important forces which always must be expanded within the front to insure continued leadership by the working class. The middle forces were the middle bourgeoisie (or national bourgeoisie as opposed to the comprador bourgeoisie), “enlightened gentry” and certain regional power groups. It was crucial to win these middle forces over and their interests were respected for the duration of the front. The die-hards were the big landlord class and comprador or big bourgeoisie, but even they exhibited a dual character. Regarding them, Mao said, “ours is a dual policy of uniting with them insofar as they are still in favor of resisting Japan and of isolating them insofar as they are determined to oppose the Communist party.”

Within the anti-Japanese front, the CPC tactic was “neither all alliance and no struggle nor all struggle and no alliance but combines alliance and struggle,” Mao wrote. If there was all struggle there could be no front. If there was all alliance there could be no victory. The CPC’s role within the front was “one of independence and initiative” as well as unity.

Another aspect of “On Policy” is that all enemies are not the same and that policy is determined by making distinctions between adversaries. Determining which at a given moment is primary, which is secondary and which can be used against the other. Likewise, to the degree enemies switch their policies, revolutionary forces must adjust their policies to take advantage of these shifts.

Regarding distinctions and contradictions in the enemy camp, the CPC argues (in a commentary on “On Policy” in the Aug. 27, 1971, Peking Review): “The nature of imperialism and all reactionaries will never change. Inevitably, their subjective wish at all times is to oppress and exploit the revolutionary people of the whole world and to oppose the revolutionary cause of the people of all countries. But this is only one side of the coin. There is another side, that is, there are objectively many difficulties for them to realize their counter-revolutionary wishes. Proceeding from their reactionary nature and counter-revolutionary needs, they inevitably and ceaselessly switch their counter-revolutionary tactics and resort to counter-revolutionary dual tactics. On our part, we must seize and make use of all enemy contradictions and difficulties, wage a tit-for-tat struggle against them, strive to gain as much as possible for the people’s fundamental interests and seize victory in the struggle against them. To smash the enemy’s counter-revolutionary dual policy, we must adopt a revolutionary dual policy. While persisting in armed struggle as the main form of struggle, we must also engage in various forms of struggle with the enemy on many fronts. The different forms of flexible tactics in struggle are required by the proletariat in the fight against the enemy.”

How does this relate to contemporary Chinese policy? The USSR and U.S. are resorting to dual tactics. The USSR, the Chinese say, is giving lip-service to revolution but is following a counter-revolutionary line in practice. The U.S. is following a counter-revolutionary line but because of contradictions ranging from its developing defeat by revolutionary forces in Indochina to the capitalist economic crisis, it too, has adopted a dual line of seeming peace and friendship. China, therefore, has adopted dual tactics in relation to both adversaries, the purpose being to take advantage of contradictions between the two and within each one. In pursuit of the principle of world revolution, the Chinese are utilizing flexible tactics.

Regarding the broad united front against the superpowers, this would be composed of all countries, oppressed nations and peoples “favoring resistance.” While the progressive forces—the working class of all countries and the masses in oppressed nations—are key, it is crucial that the front win over the middle forces—the petty-bourgeois and bourgeois governments of the small and medium-sized countries in the first and second intermediate zones. Their interests in opposing superpower hegemony are to be respected. But while attempting to form an alliance with these countries, China also struggles with them.

The CPC has repeatedly emphasized that just because a government has joined in struggle against the superpowers to one extent or another, the revolutionary forces in these countries must not give up their struggle. National and class struggles must continue, even though particular governments may establish friendly relations with China. In fact, constantly developing the progressive forces within each country is a most necessary ingredient in building the front.

By winning over the many to oppose the few and making use of contradictions, China hopes to defeat the superpowers.

Relations with the United States

In a fundamental sense, China’s “new” foreign policy is not new.

Many of the principles of this policy have been in existence since soon after China was liberated in 1949. Some go back to ideas developed during the long revolutionary struggle.

The five principles of coexistence were concretely formulated in 1954. The concept that revolution cannot be exported and that revolutionary forces must primarily depend upon themselves and not outside assistance is a traditional CPC notion. And it was 18 years ago, after all, that the Peking government proposed
that the U.S. and China conduct negotiations to relax tensions in the Far East.

What is new is the tactical use to which these policies are being put to achieve the unchanging objective of world revolution under the changed conditions that exist today. These conditions include the developing decline of U.S. imperialism (although the Chinese have no illusions but that it is still an enormously powerful and dangerous system) and the rise of modern revisionism in the international proletarian movement.

Chairman Mao has said “revolution is the main trend in the world today,” but the Chinese are not mechanical determinists. Imperialism will not fall of its own weight, they say, nor will it expire of mortification because the Soviet Union may one day produce as many washing machines as the U.S.

My interpretation of China’s views of changed world conditions is as follows: Indeed, imperialism is in rapid decline and will inevitably fall, but revolutionary struggle is required to fulfill this process. Modern revisionism, with its emphasis on peaceful competition, peaceful roads to socialism and increasing reliance on capitalist methods, subverts the revolutionary forces in the fight to hasten the downfall of imperialism. Thus, class collaboration and opportunism on the part of modern revisionism threaten to prolong artificially the existence of imperialism, causing misery to hundreds of millions of people whose liberation will be delayed.

China believes the USSR is far more interested in “protecting” its own interests within the camp it dominates than in contributing to world revolution, which could bring it into a collision with U.S. imperialism. The two superpowers, it is argued, are in the process of establishing a bipolar world wherein each respects the interests of the other insofar as their own power blocs are concerned. Each would contend or collude with the other in the third world for political, economic and military benefit but not to the extent of upsetting the strategic international balance of power by striving for major gains at the expense of the other.
The Chinese see most revisionist parties not in power as pawns in this global balancing act. Dedicated, as most of them are, to the idea of peaceful transition to socialism and to the CP-SU's political leadership, they are doomed not to lead revolutions. Revolutionary in form, they are reformist in essence. This is their role in a bipolar world. When a Soviet-aligned CP does move decisively as in the abortive coup (not revolution) in the Sudan, according to the Chinese, it is done to bolster Moscow's influence in a part of the world where the USSR feels it must increase its strength in dealing with the U.S.

In recent years, the majority of Soviet arms aid (for which it has extracted a handsome price) has gone to Egypt and India, not the Vietnamese liberation forces. This is not to say the USSR has not given tremendous aid to Vietnam. To its credit, it has—but this is a situation where the U.S. has overstepped the bounds by direct military intervention against a popular revolution on the verge of taking power and the threat of destroying socialism in the DRV. Vietnam was also a place where the U.S. broke an international agreement to which the USSR was a party.

The Chinese also insist the USSR had no real choice in Vietnam. Had it refused to support the DRV and revolutionary forces in South Vietnam it would have been thoroughly discredited within the socialist world and may have lost its leadership of the bloc. The Chinese believe their principled criticisms of modern revisionism helped to establish a barometer against which Soviet actions in Vietnam had to be judged.

In response to the developing balance of power between the U.S. and USSR, China adopted a new tactical application of certain existing policies. To build a united front against superpower hegemony, the Peking government placed more stress on its policy of peaceful coexistence, for instance. To take advantage of the contradictions between the U.S. and USSR it was willing to normalize state relations with the Washington government when the Nixon administration indicated it wished to do so. As a matter of principle and to retain its credibility with small and medium-sized nations, China scrupulously adheres to a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations.

The struggle against the superpowers is one of the means to revolution, not an end. The purpose is to break the hold of imperialism and modern revisionism and release revolutionary forces around the world. Tactics should not be mistaken for strategy.

While the CPC's new tactical policy has scored several solid gains in the last one or two years, certain aspects of China's foreign policy since 1969 have engendered confusion or criticism from some sections of the international left-wing movement.

These criticisms have been concentrated upon the relaxation of tensions with the U.S. and President Nixon's journey to China in 1972 and China's policy in regard to the Indo-Pakistan war in 1971. China's position on Ceylon has also been criticized.

The nature of the criticism depends on the political line of the tendency expressing its disagreements. The revisionist and Trotskyist parties were the most critical of all, although other left elements were disturbed as well. Some of these latter identified with the ultra-"left" in the Chinese cultural revolution; some did not fully comprehend China's policy; some understood but differed either with the CPC's analysis of the world situation or the conclusions it drew from this analysis.

Regarding Chinese-U.S. relations, the revisionist parties tended to scratch because the CPSU itched. The Soviet party was displeased by Nixon's visit to China because it would obviously contribute toward ending China's isolation in world affairs and signified that, for reasons of its own, the U.S. was not prepared to overtly collude with the USSR on the question of containing China. Also and perhaps particularly upsetting, the U.S. chose to associate with a major socialist country without seeking agreement from the CPSU which, after all, is "elder brother" (according to Chinese renegade Wang Ming, now resident in the Soviet Union) to this portion of the world.

Deprived of any theoretical basis for opposing Nixon's China trip, many revisionist parties (such as the CPUSA) simply spread rumors that China was "-selling out" the Indochinese liberation struggle. These rumors began to evaporate swiftly as the time approached for Nixon to arrive in Moscow and disappeared completely when the U.S. President and Soviet party leader Brezhnev signed agreements that far transcended the rather simple and formal joint communique of Peking.

The Chinese regard the joint communique as the principal victory to emerge so far from their new foreign line. U.S. imperialism, Peking holds, was forced to concede that its two-decade policy of overt aggression, boycott and containment had failed. The fact that Washington initiated the move toward normalization of state relations and Nixon "came to us" is imbued with considerable significance, not only in China but in Asia generally.

China made no concessions during the talks and subsequent contacts between the two countries. The joint communique was a model of what China believes to be the correct handling of relations between states with different social systems. Of great importance, the U.S. side agreed to China's five principles of coexistence. China for its part expressed firm support for the revolutionary struggle in Indochina and for the DPRK's unification proposals.

On the question of Taiwan, which China subordinated to the question of Indochina, Peking reaffirmed that there is but one China (of which Taiwan is a part) and that the People's Republic was the sole legal government of China and demanded that U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from the
province. The U.S., dropping its short-lived flirtation with the idea of “two China’s,” agreed that it “did not challenge” the position that Taiwan was part of China and affirmed that the withdrawal of the U.S. from Taiwan was Washington’s “ultimate objective,” pledging to “progressively reduce its forces and military installations.”

In the communique, the Chinese side also stated: “Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and people want revolution—this has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big and small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind.”

There has not been a single scrap of evidence to even suggest that China made a “deal” with the U.S. at the expense of the Indochina liberation struggle. Yet, largely fed by the Trotskyist school of falsification, the rumors persist in certain quarters. At the same time, some ultra-“left” elements continue to denounce China for welcoming Nixon (even if there were no “deals”), seemingly guided by the theory that the best way to defeat imperialism is to “snub” it.

Still others seem to believe that China “hurt” the Indochina struggle simply by talking to the U.S. while the war in Vietnam continued, as though the DRV and PRG had not been talking and negotiating with the U.S. for the last four years. Another school of thought in the U.S. insists Peking should not have allowed Nixon to be received in China because it contributed to the defeat of Democratic presidential candidate George McGovern. Nixon’s visit probably played a small role in the elections—but regardless of whatever role was involved, it is hardly likely the Chinese people would ever consider basing their foreign line on the vices of U.S. bourgeois politics.

This is not to say Nixon’s motivations for taking steps to normalize state relations with China were altruistic. His reasons were complex and were intended to suit U.S. imperialism’s interests.

First, Washington’s Asian policy was completely out of date and was failing. It was ridiculous to pretend it was any longer possible to “contain” China. Second, Nixon took advantage of the Sino-Soviet split by creating enormous apprehensions in Moscow about Washington’s intentions in Peking. The purpose, which appears to be in the process of being rewarded, was to force the USSR to accelerate its collusion with the U.S. in economic and other areas. Third, Nixon was looking toward his election campaign and there is no doubt his new China line was popular with the American masses (that the people responded favorably to a big reduction in U.S. hostility is a good thing, proving once again that despite decades of anti-communist brainwashing, the American people prefer a policy of peace and friendship). Last, Nixon undoubtedly entertained the idea of possibly making a “deal” with China over Vietnam—and just as undoubtedly, he failed.

Criticism of China’s role in the Indo-Pakistan war perhaps equaled that of the Nixon visit, largely from the same quarters.

To some on the left, China’s support of Pakistan against India was “proof” that the CPC was no longer interested in revolution. To many, the issues were quite simple: West Pakistan was repressing East Pakistan. A national liberation struggle developed. Repression increased. India, no longer able to tolerate terror on its borders, was finally driven to intervene in the name of justice. The USSR, sincerely interested in the fate of the Bengali people, backed India.

The reality is that the CPSU took advantage of the brutal stupidity of the Pakistani ruling class by supporting the reactionary and anti-Chinese Indian government’s expansion on the subcontinent at the expense of Pakistan in order to increase Soviet influence in South Asia, to extend
its encirclement of China and inhibit the development of people's war in southern Asia. Since this could not be acknowledged, most revisionist parties confined themselves to self-righteous denunciations of the Pakistan government and glorification of the "humanitarian" basis for India's aggression, a myth likewise perpetrated by many bourgeois governments but not the top ranks of the U.S. government because Washington was contending with Moscow for influence in South Asia.

The Nixon administration, recognizing that the USSR held temporary sway in Delhi, decided to gather what influence it could in Islamabad. The U.S. in any event viewed East Pakistan as strategically worthless while West Pakistan, a viable Moslem state, could be potentially useful against the Soviet Union in the Middle East, a section of the world toward which the Islamabad government will logically gravitate in the future when it recovers.

**China's role in Pakistan**

Why did China support the West Pakistan government in its suppression of the autonomy movement in East Pakistan in 1971? The answer is simple: it didn't—although this absurd notion has gained widespread currency throughout the world, largely due to bourgeois, revisionist and Trotskyist propaganda.

The Peking government recognized the existence of a national question in East Pakistan and that it was aggravated by the repressive policies of the West Pakistan government, but repeatedly argued that the people in the eastern region were "perfectly capable of taking care of their own affairs" without outside interference. In effect, this statement meant that the 75 million people of East Pakistan were "perfectly capable of taking care" of some 70,000 West Pakistani troops without India's subversive "assistance."

The five principles of coexistence governing Sino-Pakistan relations forbade China from making any statements that could be construed as interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan, a decade-long ally in the struggle against Indian expansionism.

 Didn't China support the Pakistan government? Yes, but against Indian subversion, not against the East Pakistani masses. From the very beginning the People's Republic correctly anticipated that it was just a matter of time before India, backed by the USSR, would invade East Pakistan in order to split its arch enemy and gain complete domination of the subcontinent. Peking regarded Delhi's protestations of humanitarian concern toward Pakistani refugees as thoroughly hypocritical in view of the Indian government's indifference to the plight of its wretched millions.

Throughout the development of events in East Pakistan, from March to December 1971, China's principal role was to support Pakistan against Indian intervention, especially after the signing of the India-Soviet friendship treaty in August, which the Chinese interpreted as Moscow's endorsement for Delhi's impending armed aggression. At the same time, while supporting Pakistan against continual Indian subversion, Peking exercised its diplomatic influence in Islamabad against the brutal suppression in East Pakistan by the Pakistani army.

China's position was summarized for me by an official of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. "It was just for the people of East Pakistan to wage revolution, as it is just for people everywhere to rebel against oppression," he said, "but it was wrong for foreign troops to invade to create a bourgeois government, which was India's intention all along.

"Until the Indian invasion, the situation in Pakistan was an internal affair. We opposed Yahya Khan's suppression policy and told him so. Premier Chou En-lai urged Pakistan to pay attention to Indian-Soviet plans for aggression and to make a distinction between this and the problems in East Pakistan.

"Regarding East Pakistan, we urged the Pakistani government to distinguish between the secessionists, who sought to place East Pakistan under Indian domination, and the legitimate demands of the people. We criticized the Pakistan government privately, which we thought proper at the time, considering the world situation and India's obvious preparations for aggression. If we had denounced Yahya Khan publicly, this would only have given support to Indian and Soviet plans to intervene and deprive the people of East Pakistan of being united."

It is my impression the Peking government believed the interests of the Pakistani masses, of the world revolutionary struggle and China's own security could best be served through a united Pakistan. In any event, China would have been reluctant to support a bourgeois-led secessionist movement.

In general, the Chinese viewed the principal contradiction in Pakistan—a peasant country governed semi-feudal, semi-colonial relations—as between the workers and peasants on the one side and the feudal class and comprador bourgeoisie on the other, not between East and West. The correct course for revolutionary forces in such a circumstance is to organize a protracted people's war leading toward a national democratic revolution which would develop into a socialist revolution. Such a struggle, according to Chinese theories, can only be guided by a Marxist-Leninist party of the proletariat based on a worker-peasant alliance leading a united front with certain progressive and democratic forces.
The secession movement led by the bourgeois Awami League could only have been capable of bringing down a bloody suppression upon a largely unprepared people; transferring the masses from the domination of one ruling class to another ruling class (in Dacca and Delhi) and setting back the genuine revolutionary forces that were making advances in the East Pakistani countryside until India “liberated” the country.

Had the East Pakistan uprising against Islamabad’s oppression been permitted to continue, the outcome would have been quite different. The Pakistani army was at the end of an impossible supply line and could not have hoped to cope with organized guerrilla war. Leadership of the most important revolutionary forces within East Pakistan had been assumed by a number of Maoist organizations, dedicated in one degree or another to the concepts of people’s war, including the Communist party of East Pakistan (M-L).

The Awami League leadership was safely hidden in India during this struggle (with the exception of its leader, Mujibur Rahman, under arrest in Pakistan) and was in danger of losing political command while the Indian-supplied and controlled guerrilla forces under Awami League direction had become peripheral to the battles being waged in East Pakistan. India’s intervention reversed this situation, installed the Awami League in power in the new state of Bangladesh and resulted in the disarming of the masses and isolation of fighting groups in opposition to the League, which was in thrall to Delhi and in debt to Moscow.

The Pakistan situation was enormously complex. There is no question but that the Yahya Khan regime was a military dictatorship serving the needs of the comprador bourgeoisie and feudal class against the interests of the overwhelming majority of workers and peasants in Pakistan and especially in East Pakistan, which was in a semi-colonial relationship to the West. The rate of exploitation was greater in East Pakistan, though as far as the masses were concerned the difference in this area was one of degree, not kind. It is true that a national question existed for the Bengalis, in the Indian state of West Bengal as well as in Pakistan’s eastern region. In generally free elections in December 1970, the great majority of East Pakistan supported the Awami League’s six-point proposal for regional autonomy (not secession).

The Awami League, far from representing the interests of the East Pakistan masses, was always the vehicle of the regional bourgeoisie. It was and still is pro-Indian, pro-U.S., anti-communist and anti-China. The League has never had an interest in the revolutionary transformation of the country. The kind of “socialism” it puts forth is a sham socialism, just as, according to the CPEP (M-L) early in the struggle, “Mujib (Mujibur Rahman) and his men have raised the demand for sham national liberation—a maneuver to strengthen the imperialist and feudal fetters and to fulfill the aspirations of East Bengal’s comprador bourgeoisie.”

Why was the Awami League so successful in the elections? Mohammed Ayoob, a professor at
Nehru University, New Delhi, a supporter of Bangladesh, gives three reasons: (1) "The sense of accumulated resentment harbored by the Bengali middle class which had also percolated down to other strata of East Bengal society." (2) The withdrawal of the left forces from the electoral arena just before elections.

The CPEP(M-L) had long refused to participate in the elections, announcing a few months earlier the beginning of a people's war in sections of the countryside. The three or four other Maoist groups had just emerged from a series of political splits which left them disorganized. The National Awami party, which could have been expected to reduce the Awami League's vote, dropped out of the election a few days before it was held. This mass (and pro-Chinese group) was reeling from the recent splits. The revisionist CP and its broader front group (also known as the National Awami party) hardly played a role in the elections.

(3) The terrible cyclone which struck East Pakistan weeks before the election and the callous ineptitude of West Pakistani authorities also was a contributing factor to the Awami League victories.

The Awami League gathered 72.6 percent of the vote for East Pakistan's seats in the National Assembly in an election where about 58 percent of registered voters cast ballots.

Just before the elections, Yahya Kahn referred to Mujib as the next Prime Minister of Pakistan. He was perfectly prepared to accept the fact that the Awami League would win a big victory in the eastern zone, perhaps gaining as much as 115-120 seats in the National Assembly, and to work out some kind of compromise on the autonomy issue. But in winning 162 seats—which gave the league an absolute majority in the combined East and West assembly—the Awami League was in a position to demand total agreement to its six-point program for regional autonomy.

At the same time, another unexpected event took place. Z.A. Bhutto's Pakistan People's party also won a very strong victory, gaining 60 percent of the seats from West Pakistan. Bhutto had no intention of being completely frozen out of power after such a mandate from the western zone and he opposed two of the League's six autonomy points, insisting they would lead not to provincial autonomy but to separation. (The points involved transfer of the power of taxation and control of foreign exchange from the national government to the East Pakistan wing.)

The Awami League rejected the possibility of a compromise on the two points and refused to share power on the national level with the party supported by the majority of West Pakistan voters.

Talks between Bhutto, Mujib and Yahya continued through January and February, nearly up to the projected opening of the National Assembly in Dacca, East Pakistan, March 3. At that point, Bhutto withdrew from the talks, announcing that if the assembly were held as planned he would call a general strike in West Pakistan "from Khyber to Karachi." He said he wanted more time to negotiate. Remembering the strikes and disorders that brought down the regime of Gen. Ayub Khan in 1969, Yahya postponed convening the Assembly, thereby instigating mass rioting in East Pakistan. Within days, dual power existed in East Pakistan, with Mujib in effective control. Some 3000 non-Bengalis were slaughtered by the mobs. During this period, the Pakistani army remained in its cantonments.

Yahya desperately sought to arrange another meeting with Mujib but was turned down. To pacify the Bengalis, Yahya said he would convene the Assembly in Dacca March 25. Yahya, Mujib and Bhutto were in continuous discussion for about 10 days. Unable to reach agreement, Yahya and Bhutto returned to West Pakistan March 24. The army began its slaughter the next day.

As the talks neared their end it was apparent to some that the army would act if an agreement was not reached. Leaders and cadre of revolutionary communist organizations got the hint in mid-March and went deeper underground or to the north to prepare for war. (This is why much of the left leadership remained intact in the early days of the suppression.) The Awami League appeared oblivious to what was going to happen and kept urging the people of East Pakistan to rebellion even though the people were completely unprepared to defend themselves in the face of the inevitable army assault.

Retaliation was swift and brutal. The West Pakistani army killed tens of thousands in the first few days. The apparent intent was to destroy the Awami League infrastructure, stir up communal hatreds and terrorize the people. The Pakistani army acted in an utterly depraved manner. Hundreds of thousands were slain and millions (mostly Hindus) sought refuge in India.

By mid-April, according to pro-Bangladesh British correspondent David Loshak in "Pakistan Crisis," "Hardline Maoists had taken command, easily wresting leadership from ineffectual Awami Leaguers.... To them, this was a Vietnam situation.... The Awami League and many Bengali moderates bitterly opposed a Maoist usurpation of their autonomist movement." Marxist-Leninist forces, although badly split, were in the process of giving direction to the armed resistance. If this situation continued much longer, what began as a semi-autonomy movement, evolving into secession, could become a full-blown revolutionary people's war, which the Awami League and Delhi feared as much as Islamabad.

India, which had long supported the Awami League in an effort to weaken a unified Pakistan, became alarmed. The puppet "progressive" government it hoped to install in Dacca was being swept aside by a revolutionary movement with the possibility of igniting the tinder box of its own West Bengal state.

By early summer, Yahya Khan began to make overtures toward the Awami League and India, indicating he wanted to find some way out of the political dilemma he had created for himself.
India turned a deaf ear and instead sought a friendship treaty with the USSR, which was only too willing to comply. This treaty, in effect, guaranteed India’s plans for invasion, which took the form of increasing border incursions until late November, when the assault began.

For India, the invasion accomplished two purposes: (1) It split Pakistan with finality, eliminating the major threat to India’s subcontinental hegemony. (2) It set back the revolutionary movement in East Pakistan. For the Soviet Union, the invasion humbled China’s ally, gave Moscow a big foothold in South Asia and prevented the development of a revolutionary momentum it could not control.

China strongly argued against the Indian-Soviet invasion in the UN and successfully supported votes demanding withdrawal of aggressor troops and return of prisoners. Over a year later, India and Bangladesh have refused to return some 90,000 Pakistani prisoners, including civilians. Bhutto, who took over from the disgraced Yahya Khan, prevented political chaos in Bangladesh by promptly returning Mujib to Dacca, but Mujib (in early 1973) still refuses to release the Pakistani prisoners until Bhutto recognizes Bangladesh. This is not a simple request. Bhutto, an extraordinarily adroit politician, has had difficulty convincing the West Pakistani people to accept this, particularly because of the prisoner issue.

China, backed by Pakistan, has voted against UN membership for Bangladesh. Its reasons are that India and Bangladesh must return the prisoners and Indian troops must be withdrawn, as demanded by the great majority of UN members. When this finally happens, it is entirely likely China will remove its objections to UN membership for Bangladesh and may well enter into diplomatic relations with the Dacca government.

Far from supporting counter-revolution in Pakistan, China took a position consistent with the development of revolution in that country: to keep India out. At the same time, China’s constant support of national integrity and noninterference in the affairs of sovereign states no doubt gained some additional adherents to the united front it desires to create against the superpowers.

### The question of Ceylon

China’s enemies on the “left” charge that the Peking government subordinates and subverts national struggles in order to develop favorable relations with bourgeois governments.

In addition to China’s new relations with the U.S. and its role in the Pakistan situation, these critics point to Ceylon as an example of Peking’s “renunciation” of world revolution. Both the revisionist and Trotskyist parties agree on this conclusion, although they approach the subject from the right and the “left.”

China’s position on the question of relations between socialist and capitalist countries and the effect these relations have on revolutionary struggles around the world has remained constant since 1946, when Chairman Mao Tsetung commented on the compromises worked out between the USSR and its World War 2 capitalist allies.

Compromise on certain issues may well be necessary, he wrote, but this “does not require...”

the people in the countries of the capitalist world to follow suit and make compromises at home. The people in those countries will continue to wage different struggles in accordance with their different conditions."

In a 1963 polemic against the CPSU, the CPC argued that while "it is absolutely impermissible and impossible for countries practicing peaceful coexistence to touch even a hair of each other's social system...the class struggle, the struggle for national liberation and the transition from capitalism to socialism in various countries is quite another thing."

At the same time, China distinguishes between what are termed nationalist countries, which have newly attained political independence, and imperialist countries. In another 1963 statement, the CPC declared that "although fundamentally different from the socialist countries in their social and political systems, the nationalist countries stand in profound contradiction to imperialism. They have common interests with the socialist countries—opposition to imperialism, the safeguarding of national independence and the defense of world peace."

This distinction between nationalist countries and imperialist countries is one of the foundations of China's attempt to create a united front against the superpowers. Does this mean the Peking government opposes revolutionary struggles in nationalist countries, whether governed by a reactionary or progressive regime, for fear of alienating the government in question?

The answer, according to numerous Chinese officials I asked, is no. "In our objective of uniting the world's peoples against U.S. imperialism and Soviet social imperialism, national struggles must not be subordinated," I was told. "China has friendly and diplomatic relations with a number of countries. This should not have any effect on the revolutionary forces in those countries. This was one of the principal aspects of our struggle with the Soviet Union. We oppose the subordination of genuine people's struggles to the foreign policy requirements of a socialist country, including our own." Another government official commented: "China is not against people's struggles in reactionary countries or in countries where a progressive government is in power. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution. We support this.

"We have always believed, however, that revolution cannot be exported. The people of each country must rely on their own correct line in winning. Only by creating their own revolution, depending primarily on themselves, can a people truly gain freedom.

"Look at the countries of Eastern Europe which depended primarily on the Soviet Union to make revolution. They have very limited independence. Albania achieved victory by relying on its own efforts—and it is staunch and independent today. A revolution cannot succeed if the revolutionary forces do not rely on their own efforts and do not mobilize the great masses of people but place hope on aid from abroad.

"Everyone—and every government—knows. China supports all genuine revolutionary struggles led by the party of the proletariat and supported by the masses of people. But in our relations with governments we adhere strictly to the five principles of coexistence and we do not interfere in the internal affairs of these countries. China cannot bypass the stage of state relations.

"Regarding countries with which we have diplomatic relations, we support the government insofar as it is engaging in struggle against the two superpowers, not in its suppression of legitimate local struggles. We believe that by giving firm backing to governments against the domination of one or two superpowers we are helping the forces of national liberation and revolution."

While insisting that revolutionary forces depend primarily upon themselves, China gives abundant material aid to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the liberation movements in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos as well as strong backing to revolutionaries in Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Palestine, southern Africa, Northern Ireland and many other countries.

China is not indiscriminate in its support, generally adopting a neutral attitude toward movements where a Marxist-Leninist party is not in command, in situations where the masses of people are not involved or where rebel forces seek to gain power through a coup or stage insurrections before objective conditions are ripe for success—which brings me to Ceylon and the abortive insurrection of April 1971.

The Chinese government, in my opinion, made an error in Ceylon. The error was not in its analysis of the adventurist practices of the insurrectionary forces which sought to overthrow the Ceylonese government or in its generally warm relations with Prime Minister Sirimavo
The united front government took a number of progressive steps in foreign affairs, establishing relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DRV, South Vietnamese PRG and the German Democratic Republic and generally assumed an anti-imperialist posture. In internal affairs, Bandaranaike faced enormous problems of unemployment and economic decline. Joblessness was particularly severe among the youth who, due to the peculiarities of Ceylon’s colonial and neo-colonial development, were unusually highly educated—an explosive combination.

The JVP supported the united front in the elections and for a period of time after it gained victory. Within a matter of months, however, JVP was increasingly critical of the new government for not immediately implementing some of the far-reaching reforms contained in the coalition platform. At the same time, JVP entered into close communion with the LSSP-R (the Trotskyist group recognized by the Fourth International) and the Young Socialist Front, a youth organization close to the LSSP-R. Throughout this period the JVP continued to build itself as an organization, especially attracting the alienated youth, whose plight was not improved by the new government.

On the basis of a militant demonstration outside the U.S. embassy in Colombo, the Ceylonese capital, in March 1971, during which a policeman was killed, the government declared a state of emergency, charging the JVP (which denied participation in the demonstration) was planning to overthrow the state. Some 300 people were arrested. In response, the JVP decided on armed struggle against the new government. After deciding on the tactic of armed insurrection instead of protracted guerrilla warfare, according to Fred Halliday in New Left Review, JVP cadre attacked dozens of police stations throughout the country. “The overwhelming bulk of the fighting was performed by units of armed youth, often including many members in their teens,” Halliday reported.

It is estimated that tens of thousands of people took part in the uprising, far outnumbering Ceylon’s small army and police forces. The government retaliated swiftly, smashing the insurrection a few weeks later and arresting more than 10,000 youths. A number of countries, including the U.S., USSR, China, Britain, India, Pakistan, Australia and Yugoslavia, all sent aid to the Colombo government. Contrary to other countries, China does not appear to have shipped any arms to Ceylon, instead agreeing to extend an interest-free loan.

In a message to Bandaranaike announcing the loan, Premier Chou is said to have written: “The Chinese people have all along opposed ultra-‘left’ and right opportunism in their protracted revolutionary struggles. We are glad to see that thanks to the efforts of your excellency and the Ceylon government, the chaotic situation created by a handful of persons who style themselves ‘Guevarists’ and into whose ranks foreign spies have sneaked has been brought
under control. We believe that as a result of your excellency's leadership and the cooperation and support of the Ceylonese people these acts of rebellion plotted by reactionaries at home and abroad for the purpose of undermining the interests of the Ceylonese people are bound to fail."

Even Halliday, a supporter of JVP, acknowledged that the organization "did not have the necessary social base for a truly nationwide insurrection." Further, he wrote, "the insurrection was launched in conditions and in a form that limited its chances of success and validated the strict Leninist insistence on the necessary preconditions for a successful socialist insurrection.... At the political level, the JVP seems to have had a loose and un-systematized internal structure. It was not a Leninist party; there were loosely coordinated factions within the leadership, reflecting different groups that had fused in the JVP at the beginning and the relationship between these factions and the base was imprecise; so far as is known, the JVP had never held a national congress and had no elected officials. Moreover, there was an internal tendency towards adventurism as a spontaneous reaction at once against the predominance of parliamentarist reformism in Ceylon...."

It does not seem likely that Chinese revolutionaries would have supported such an uprising under any conditions, containing as it did elements of adventurism and ultra-"leftism" without a mass base, led by a non-Leninist party influenced by Trotskyism. Such tactics are diametrically opposed to the ideas of people's war the CPC has worked out over the last 50 years.

In discussing the Ceylon situation, a Chinese government spokesman told me the following: "Many of Ceylon's problems at the time had been caused by the previous government, which was extremely reactionary and pro-American. But as soon as a more progressive government was voted into existence, an insurrectionary movement—composed largely of petty-bourgeois students and ultra-"leftists"—became very active.

"Who were actually behind the rebels? As far as I know, many of those in the leadership were quite questionable, although not all were bad. The Trotskyites, of course, have long had an influence in Ceylon. Such a movement, it seemed to us, was not capable of leading the masses to revolution and socialism. In fact, it could have resulted in the restoration of a more reactionary ruling group.

"At the same time, we considered the international situation as well as the national situation. Ceylon has for hundreds of years been the victim of colonialism and in more recent times the continual target of neo-colonial incursions by the superpowers.

"The Chinese government took all of this into consideration in adopting its stance toward events in Ceylon."

Ceylon, now officially named Sri Lanka, has continued to take a series of progressive stands in foreign affairs. The Ceylon government, for instance, initiated a draft resolution at the UN calling for the Indian Ocean to be transformed into a "zone of peace." The resolution, adopted 72-0, essentially seeks to prevent the two superpowers from extending their influence in the Indian Ocean. Most third world countries, including China, backed the resolution. The U.S. and USSR were among the 35 who abstained. Ceylon's action in this area, among others, could not have taken place under the previous government.

In general, China regards Ceylon as an important factor in the construction of a united front against imperialism. But this does not mean—despite an indiscretion on the question of the adventurer JVP—that the Peking government in any way seeks to discourage the development of genuine Marxist-Leninist revolutionary forces in any country, capitalist or nationalist, reactionary or progressive. China's practice in this regard demonstrates the opposite, although those tendencies which oppose peaceful coexistence or do not comprehend the logic of developing better relations with the U.S. so as to take advantage of the contradictions between the superpowers, or who distort China's position on Pakistan and Ceylon would have it otherwise.

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**Unite the many, defeat the few**

People's China will play an increasingly large role in international affairs in coming years.

The results of China's new foreign policy since 1969 have been considerable—but this represents the budding of only the first few seeds. Many more have been planted which will take longer to mature. I would like to summarize and comment upon some of these short range and long range goals.

Although China sees big differences between the U.S. and USSR, it also sees big similarities, stemming from the growth of modern revisionism in the world's first socialist state. These similarities are essentialized in the word "superpowers," the one aspect being classic imperialism, the other aspect being imperialism of a new type, "social-imperialism."

The basic characteristic of these superpowers is to divide the world into two main spheres of influence, each under the domination of one or the other. The result of such a situation is the stratification of the status quo in each respective "sphere" and peaceful contention and collusion between the superpowers for advantage in the
contested area between the two blocs. The vast majority of the world's peoples are located in this contested area, poor, hungry and desperate. For them there is but one recourse—revolution.

Social revolution, however, is a grave threat to the modus vivendi that has been worked out between the superpowers. To the U.S., it represents another nail in the coffin of imperialism. To the USSR it represents the possibility of having Washington take steps to redress the power balance which might endanger the stability of the bloc it dominates or to intervene more forcefully to the disadvantage of the USSR in the vast contested area.

Because of this, China argues, the Soviet Union no longer has interest in world revolution. Further, the USSR has discovered certain important virtues in this perhaps initially uncomfortable necessity: it has afforded Moscow the opportunity of becoming a great world power and of developing in certain ways like the "affluent" U.S. itself, albeit at the expense of its ideological foundations.

"Two is company," says the old proverb, "while three's a crowd." China, because of its principled stand against modern revisionism and U.S. imperialism, became a "crowd" to the Soviet Union in the 1960s as well as to Washington, which from the beginning sought to subvert the Chinese revolution.

Since this period the USSR, too, has sought to undermine the Chinese state, first by applying extreme economic pressure, then by isolating the CPC in the socialist bloc, attempting to create subversion in China's border areas, supporting China's enemies and finally by developing into a direct military threat equal to and possibly greater than the U.S. itself. One third of the USSR's army is poised near the Chinese border and an untold number of nuclear weapons are directed at China's homeland.

Why are those Soviet troops and weapons there? Is it because the Soviet Union fears an attack from economically and technologically backward China? This is a preposterous notion. And even if the military imbalance were not so obvious, when has People's China ever militarily threatened the USSR or in fact ever invaded a neighbor? China's preparations in this regard have been defensive.

It was the Soviet Union, not China, which developed the doctrine of limiting the sovereignty of socialist states. It is also the USSR, not China, which is stationing hundreds of thousands of soldiers in foreign lands and several fleets in distant seas.

The million Soviet troops on China's northern border are a constant military threat intended to silence and "contain" the People's Republic but always with the suggestion (amplified quite openly at times by the Soviet press) that they might be used, either to prevent Chinese "aggression" or in answer to a call from "patriotic" Chinese in opposition to the "Maoist clique."

In this way the Soviet Union joined hands with the U.S. in an imperialist effort to "encircle"

revolutionary China, which had no intention of respecting the two spheres of influence much less ignoring the contested areas between them.

For several years during the 1960s China appeared to be casting about for a correct policy in view of the fact that it now faced two major enemies militarily more powerful than itself while the course of world revolution, to which the CPC was dedicated, was encountering a difficult period. Some ultra-"left" mistakes were made and rectified at this time.

The new foreign policy, largely resting on the tactical and strategic theories developed by Chairman Mao during the long years of revolution, was developed in order to align subjective conditions (China's role) with changes in world objective conditions (U.S.-USSR redivision of the world).

Before reviewing some of the goals of this policy it is important to discuss the erroneous impression spread by revisionist parties that China seeks to unite with the U.S. against the USSR. This is not what it is all about.

China would like to split and weaken the superpowers by taking advantage of the contradictions between the two but it views them as twin enemies with whom one goes so far but no further. (On other grounds as well, China must realize that neither superpower desires at this point to eliminate the other and that neither would dare risk a close alliance with China for fear of provoking the other.) Additionally, China's eye is on the first and second intermediate zones between the blocs, where it would defeat its purposes were it to "ally" with the U.S.

In this regard, a 1963 polemic of the CPC against the CPSU is still valid: "How can you (the USSR) 'unite' with the main enemy of world peace to 'safeguard peace'? Can it be that more than a hundred countries and over three billion people have no right to decide their own destiny? Must they submit to the manipulations of the two 'giants,' the 'greatest powers'?... Isn't this arrogant nonsense of yours an expression of great-power chauvinism and power politics pure and simple?"

China has no intention of "uniting" with U.S. imperialism against the Soviet Union or any
other country. On the contrary, China believes the USSR, in effect, united with the U.S. when it began to adopt an openly revisionist line in 1956. One of the major objectives of its new foreign policy is to split and weaken that unity by encouraging a majority of the world's countries to adopt an independent or oppositional stance toward the superpowers while China gives them whatever backing it can, supports revolutionary struggles and seeks to sow confusion between the two big powers.

Peking's short-range goals have succeeded quite well, perhaps more so than its own expectations. It has reentered the diplomatic arena as an important factor, temporarily reduced certain immediate threats to its national security and has contributed to a relaxation of tensions in some parts of Asia, a continent embroiled in conflict due to U.S. imperialism for over a quarter-century.

The future course of Asia, the Chinese insist, must be determined by Asians. Without U.S. subversion and aggression, such a course will inevitably be toward revolution, always assuming the revolutionary forces are not infected by modern revisionism and illusions about achieving revolution peacefully. The same is true for other areas of the world.

U.S. imperialism is still a very important force in Asia, of course, and it is still engaging in a war aggression in Indochina. But the situation in Asia is changing and the U.S., for all its brute imperialism, is a declining power in this section of the globe. Revolutionary struggle against imperialism and neo-colonialism is succeeding in Indochina and is developing satisfactorily in several Southeast Asian countries, including the Philippines.

Contradictions between the U.S. and Japan have increased and the Tokyo government is anxious for good relations with Peking. Taiwan, for decades "Asia's" voice in the UN security council and a symbol of U.S. counter-revolution, has virtually been eclipsed in the last year. In South Korea, the U.S. puppet regime has had to enter into negotiations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in order to prevent its own collapse. In Australia and New Zealand, more progressive governments have come into power in the aftermath of the improvement of China-U.S. relations.

It is too early to tell whether China's longer-range goal—building a united front of small and medium-sized countries against the two superpowers—will be successful. A trend has developed in this direction, judging from the 1972 Georgetown conference of non-aligned countries, the more independent stands being taken by a number of nations throughout the world and progressive tendencies at the United Nations, where each major power is experiencing difficulties in ruling the roost.

To achieve this goal, China is relying on Chairman Mao's line of gathering the majority against a minority. Such a policy means that in addition to strategic, stable allies, China must also try to win over tactical, vacillating allies. These tactical allies must be gained for the united front to become a significant force in world affairs, but alliance with them is never viewed as more than temporary. This is a classic Chinese revolutionary strategy and one of Mao Tsetung's great contributions to the practice of winning revolutions.

Gaining such tactical allies does not mean China opposes the revolution in each particular country but it does mean that China will do its best on a diplomatic and state level to develop friendly relations with the government in question if it is willing to abide by the five principles of peaceful coexistence and recognizes Taiwan as a part of China.

It is difficult to fully understand China's present international line without comprehending the CPC's united front tactics. And it is impossible to understand the line without appreciating the depth of China's criticism of modern revisionism in the USSR. "For us," I was told, "the first question is how to defeat U.S. imperialism and Soviet social imperialism. If there is a major war, only one or the other or both can start it. Generally, we think that what hurts the superpowers helps the people. When the hold of the superpowers is broken or reduced it makes revolution easier and the people will gain victory sooner."

The Chinese believe world revolution will take place "soon." To explain what this means I shall quote from the last paragraph of Mao Tsetung's essay, "A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire," written Jan. 3, 1930. "How then should we interpret the word 'soon' in the statement, 'there will soon be a high tide of revolution'? This is a common question among comradels. Marxists are not fortune-tellers. They should, and indeed can, only indicate the general direction of future developments and changes; they should not and cannot fix the day and hour in a mechanistic way. But when I say that there will soon be a high tide of revolution in China, I am emphatically not speaking of something which in the words of some people 'is possibly coming,' something illusory, unattainable and devoid of significance for action. It is like a ship far out at sea whose mast-head can already be seen from the shore; it is like the morning sun in the east whose shimmering rays are visible from a high mountain top; it is like a child soon to be born moving restlessly in its mother's womb."

Two decades later, the world's largest and one of the most wretched of countries was liberated. China is still guided by this vision and is attempting to apply in international affairs the practical knowledge it acquired in one of humankind's most glorious struggles.

No policy, no thing at all, is without contradiction. What I have tried to argue is not the absolute perfection of China's policy but its essential correctness in analyzing the world situation at the present time, in fighting revisionism as well as U.S. imperialism and in its approach toward helping countries to gain independence, nations to gain liberation and peoples to gain revolution.
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