ON THE HISTORICAL MERIT OF MAO TSETUNG AND SOCIALISM IN CHINA

THE PLA'S TREACHEROUS REVERSAL: An Analysis of the PLA Letter

By the Chicago Committee for a Communist Party
And Former Members of the Committee for a Proletarian Party

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Cover Photograph: Oil Workers at Takang denounce the Lin Piao anti-Party clique which attempted to negate the successes of the Cultural Revolution.
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INTRODUCTION

Less than three years ago, the leadership of the Communist Party of China, after the death of Mao Tsetung, took a clearly revisionist course, seeking an unprincipled alliance with U.S. imperialism internationally and reversing many of the gains won by the Chinese proletariat and peasantry domestically. Within this context, the last year has witnessed an open split between the CPC and the Party of Labor of Albania, followed by the PLA's denunciation of Mao Tsetung as well as the entire history of the CPC and socialist China.

The stand taken by this publication is that it is absolutely necessary to uphold the great contributions to Marxism-Leninism and the world proletariat associated with the name of Mao Tsetung, even while drawing lessons from the tragic defeat suffered after his death.

The documents published here are papers concerning the substance and method of the PLA attack on Mao. They were written by various individuals in the course of struggling with the Marxist-Leninist Organizing Committee (MLOC), or its successor, the Communist Party USA/ML. At that time, these comrades did not know one another. After breaking from the MLOC/CPUSA(ML), they discovered substantial unity through the exchange of these papers.

The authors of these papers have long experience in the struggle to reconstitute a vanguard party in the U.S. through work in the trade unions, military, and women's movement. We include former leaders and members of both the Committee for a Proletarian Party (CPP) and the MLOC/CPUSA(ML). One person was one of the main authors of the Revolutionary Union's Red Papers #7, which in our view is still the best document on the restoration of capitalism in the USSR to be produced by any U.S. group. Another was on the Political Bureau of the MLOC. While in the MLOC, these two comrades co-authored Revolution Will Surely Triumph and other MLOC documents, particularly around the struggle against the Theory of the Three Worlds. It was these positions, in fact, which attracted the CPP to the MLOC.

The CPP was a local circle in San Diego, California. The CPP wrote the anti-Three Worlds position, Strategy and Tactics for the Proletariat in the Era of Imperialism, engaged in local trade union and other mass work, and actively participated in the struggle to reconstitute the vanguard party of the U.S. proletariat. Largely on the basis of unity in opposition to the Theory of the Three Worlds, the CPP unanimously dissolved itself in December 1978 to join in the party-formation called by the MLOC. Then, in a characteristically underhanded way, the chair of the MLOC rapidly attacked and isolated the CPP leadership that had in fact led the move toward unity with the MLOC. Because of their expressed reservations to the unfolding lines of the PLA and the MLOC on Mao Tsetung, they were refused membership. Other CPP comrades were encouraged to join and assured that the question of Mao was an "open question" (as is alleged to this day). By the spring of 1979, nearly all of the former CPP cadre who either joined or supported the CPUSA/ML had broken from it for various reasons, particularly bureaucratic centralism, opportunist and ineffective practice, and the organization's incorrect view of Mao and the Chinese revolution.

Although both papers were written in the context of struggle with the MLOC/CPUSA(ML), we are publishing them mainly for their value in the struggle around the wider issues mentioned earlier.

"The PLA's Treacherous Reversal", on the PLA Letter, is based on an internal MLOC document written in the fall of 1978 by two members of that organization's
International Commission, analyzing the Letter of the CC of the Party of Labor and the Government of Albania to the CC of the Communist Party and the Government of China concerning the Chinese revisionists' withdrawal of aid to Albania. These comrades recognized the implications of the PLA Letter, calling attention to a fundamental reversal in the PLA line, even before the full-blown attack was launched in Hoxha's Imperialism and the Revolution. This paper never reached the MLOC membership; one of its authors was quickly expelled and the other resigned.

At the time the CPUSA/ML was declared, the party's line was that Mao was not a "classic teacher"; but the question as to whether Mao was a revisionist or whether socialism even existed in China was still "open." It was in this context that the two CPP leaders were refused membership when they voiced their disagreement with the MLOC's clear tendency toward viewing Mao as a revisionist. The final goal of the CPUSA/ML leadership concerning the "open question" on Mao was clear: to consolidate its membership around the PLA position.

"The Historical Merit of Mao Tsetung and Socialism in China" was the result of the further study and thinking by one of the two CPP comrades. It was first distributed in February 1979 and has been rewritten as a result of collective criticism and struggle around the February draft.

During the coming period, every communist must examine the questions of Mao's contributions, socialist China, and the legacy of the CPC. Marxist-Leninists must take a clear stand against the PLA attack on the Chinese revolution. Furthermore, we must analyze the defeat in China, the degeneration of numerous parties and organizations in this country, and the current direction of the Party of Labor of Albania in order to define the road ahead. We don't believe that this requires retreating to years of study. In fact, Marxism-Leninism provides us with the necessary tools. We hold that there is a sufficient basis for unity, which must be given the proper organizational form, to collectively take up this task. Far from the single and only task, it is one of several that are involved in the reconstitution of a vanguard party based on Marxist-Leninist theory and practice.

We see this publication as part of an extensive campaign in the defense of Marxism-Leninism and the exposure of revisionism, whatever its source. While far from a full defense and exposure, much less a guide to the road ahead, these articles demonstrate that Marxist-Leninists are taking up this struggle. This effort can only be successful if there is a frank and thorough weeding-out of errors. In this spirit we welcome the criticisms of this publication.

Note: Throughout these papers, we use the old form of transcribing Chinese names into English. This does not represent a political statement. Rather, this course was chosen due to the difficulty of finding the correct form of the many historical names which are used.
ON THE HISTORICAL MERIT OF MAO TSETUNG
AND SOCIALISM IN CHINA

The historic victories which the Chinese people have attained in their glorious revolution and the construction of socialism, the creation of the new People's China and the high prestige it enjoys in the world, are directly linked with the name, teachings, and guidance of the great revolutionary, Comrade Mao Tsetung. The work of this outstanding Marxist-Leninist represents a contribution to the enrichment of the revolutionary theory and practice of the proletariat. The Albanian communists and people will always honor the memory of Comrade Mao Tsetung, who was a great friend of our Party and people.

(Report to the 7th Congress of the Party of Labor of Albania, 1976)

The position of the Party of Labor of Albania in late 1976 which is reproduced above represents the ideological and political starting point of this paper. This quote represents the world-historic importance of socialist construction in China, as well as the way in which this must be linked with the CPC and Comrade Mao Tsetung. Since the mid-1960's, modern revisionism has concentrated its ideological and political fire on socialist construction in China, the CPC and most of all on Mao Tsetung. Mao had become the arch-enemy of Khrushchevite revisionism. In the face of revisionist attacks, Marxist-Leninists have resolutely stood with their Chinese comrades, as did the PLA at its 7th Party Congress. Thus, the stand taken towards the leadership of Mao Tsetung has been a line of demarcation between Marxism-Leninism and modern revisionism.

The question of Mao Tsetung and the Chinese revolution is of cardinal importance to the world proletariat. Overall, it goes to the heart of an understanding of Marxist science and philosophy, dialectical and historical materialism, and their continuous and concrete application. It involves a basic understanding of the nature of a Bolshevik party, its relation to the masses, and the functioning of democratic centralism. It involves a basic understanding of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the construction of socialism. It involves a proper grasp of Marxist-Leninist strategy and tactics, the united front, the mass line, and the method for defeating opportunists and revisionists.

Mao Tsetung's historical contributions are many, but one which stands out is his leadership of the CPC and the working masses of China in their victorious struggle against imperialism, feudal backwardness, and capitalist exploitation. The Chinese revolution was a tremendous blow to the imperialist system, second only to the Great October Revolution in Russia in its significance. The victories in China were due primarily to the overall correct leadership of the CPC in applying the principles of scientific socialism, particularly the writings of Lenin and Stalin, to the conditions of China. The strategy and tactics of the CPC, especially in regard to the use of the united front and the waging of people's war, still provide the international proletariat with its richest experiences in regard to revolution in colonial and semi-colonial countries.

The CPC's long experience of people's war armed the party and Mao with a deep understanding of the relationship between the party and the masses. They had learned
to rely on the initiative and criticism of the masses, especially in aiding the party to rectify its errors and weaknesses. Based upon its experience in the liberated zones prior to 1949 and in the period of New Democracy, the CPC under Mao Tsetung was also able to make fundamental contributions to the theory and practice of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Mao's writings on dialectics armed the CPC with the understanding of the crucial significance of the superstructure and of ideological issues (e.g., in education). These factors assumed particular importance in the face of capitalist restoration in the USSR and provided the basis for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. It is to Mao Tsetung that the proletariat owes a deeper understanding of the nature and intensity of class struggle under socialism.

The contributions of the CPC in regard to the dictatorship of the proletariat are intimately connected with its struggle against modern revisionism. Within the CPC, Mao Tsetung was personally responsible for organizing the analysis of and polemics with the modern revisionists. Within the international communist movement, Mao Tsetung and Enver Hoxha took up the historic task of leading the struggle against the Khrushchev clique. In a period of great ideological confusion, the principle stands of the CPC and the PLA greatly reduced the damage done by modern revisionism. As is well known, it was the CPC which was most responsible for widely spreading the issues and content of this struggle among the international proletariat. From his leadership of the struggle against modern revisionism, Mao also grasped that as socialism progresses, capitalist roaders within the party represent the greatest danger of capitalist restoration. He used this understanding to struggle against the influence of modern revisionism within the CPC, especially during the GPCR.

Such contributions are the basis for upholding Mao Tsetung as a great Marxist-Leninist. Such an assessment in no way implies that Mao made no errors. However, the PLA and its supporters now completely negate his contributions and the historic importance of socialism in China. To follow such a course is to indirectly yet staunchly support the present revisionist leadership of the CPC as well as to echo Soviet revisionism. In this period, the historical merit of Mao Tsetung must be reaffirmed against the attack launched by the very same PLA which less than three years ago endorsed the quotation which introduces this paper. While numerous Albanian publications over the past year have intimated that the PLA has completely reversed its verdict on Mao Tsetung, this reversal was fully confirmed by the publication of Enver Hoxha's *Imperialism and the Revolution.*

While this book is fundamentally flawed in its general analysis of the nature of both imperialism and revolution, the fifth chapter, entitled "Mao Tsetung Thought—An Anti-Marxist Theory", represents the most bold and blatant attempt to attack and discredit the recent history of the world proletarian movement. This chapter represents, in particular, a concerted three-pronged assault on the revolutionary experience of the Chinese proletariat and peasantry: 1) Mao Tsetung was a revisionist; 2) socialism never existed in China; and 3) the CPC was never a Marxist-Leninist party.

This reversal of position by the PLA is a strange about-face on fundamental questions of principle for any Marxist-Leninist organization to make. What is immediately and unavoidably called into question is the PLA's own stability of principles and its understanding of revisionism and socialism.

This sudden about-face by the PLA has serious and grave political consequences for the world proletarian movement. Recent experience has demonstrated itself to be a powerful teacher for those comrades who combine their striving to be Marxist-Leninist
with an uncritical following of some international leadership, no matter where its headquarters are to be found. Although the PLA has played a significant role in the struggle against modern revisionism in the past, it has betrayed this struggle by its recent attacks on Mao Tsetung, the CPC under his leadership and socialism in China.

If the PLA has long believed that Mao Tsetung was a revisionist and that socialism never existed in China, it should have engaged in a public polemic on these questions quite some time ago and certainly not waited until after Mao Tsetung was dead and thousands of his closest supporters in the Communist Party of China have been purged or liquidated, unable to come to his defense. By their own standards, the PLA has been consistently conciliating to revisionism for quite a long time.

This paper has a different objective, however, than evaluating the vacillations of the Party of Labor of Albania. Instead, the paper's main purpose is to present a brief and basic restatement of the reasons for which Mao Tsetung has long been characterized as a great Marxist-Leninist. This defense of Mao will be elaborated in the course of initiating a preliminary evaluation of the Communist Party USA/Marxist-Leninist (formerly the Marxist-Leninist Organizing Committee), which, along with the Central Organization of U.S. Marxist-Leninists (COUNML), has been one of the main organizations in this country to tail after the PLA's reversal of verdict.

As the Chinese revisionists have their CP(ML) and the Soviet social-imperialists their CPUSA, so the PLA has its blind followers and apologists, of which the CPUSA/ML is one. While many of the concrete examples of the implications of the PLA's present revisionist course raised in this paper stem from the theory and practice of the CPUSA/ML, it needs to be emphasized that the source of the reversal of verdict on Mao Tsetung is the PLA. Judged on its own merits, the CPUSA/ML is not really significant enough to warrant much concern. Its significance lies in its relationship to the PLA and to the efforts of Marxist-Leninists in the U.S. to reconstitute the Communist Party.

By mid-1978, as an integral part of their campaign to win the "Albanian franchise," the chairman of the MLOC and his supporters within the top leadership of that organization were bending every effort to lay the ideological foundations for their revisionist positions on China. The fact that a year later they still want to publicly deny that these propositions are their position represents a hollow and meaningless formality. If anything, it mainly reveals their own inability to consolidate the rank-and-file cadre around such an unprincipled attack.

Moreover, it has already become obvious that any comrades within their organization, tiny as it is, who have dared to raise serious questions about their ideological direction have been expelled and more will undoubtedly follow. Such expulsions, of course, are necessary since the method the organization is following has very little in common with Marxism-Leninism: following the lead of the PLA, most of the top leadership of the CPUSA/ML was quick to adopt the conclusions that Mao was a revisionist, socialism never existed in China, and the CPC was never Marxist-Leninist. All that was left to them was to consolidate their cadre around this view and concoct a justification for it which would "sell" in a public-relations sense. Scientific, historic analysis has simply not been on the agenda; those cadre capable of it have been purged for coming up with the wrong "product".

This Madison-Avenue approach was not difficult for even contacts of the CPUSA/ML to recognize, as many of them have dropped away from the organization. The basic weakness of the top leadership of the MLOC, and now the CPUSA/ML, has been a long-
standing tendency to often rely more on bourgeois idealism than on the science of Marxism-Leninism. This fatal weakness has necessitated extensive deception by the leadership of the CPUSA/ML concerning its ideological intentions.

This deception has already taken several forms. The first, which we have already mentioned, is to quickly expel any cadre developed enough to expose the bankruptcy of the CPUSA/ML leadership. A concerted campaign is mounted to label such cadre as hopeless petty-bourgeois intellectuals, degenerate individualists, splitters, and wreckers and thus prevent other cadre from hearing their views.

A second form of deception that has already been tried by the leadership of the CPUSA/ML is to belittle the importance of the whole question of Mao Tsetung and opportunistically reduce it merely to an evaluation of one individual. They have tried to tell their contacts, for example, that it is disruptive to raise objections about the evaluation of a mere individual; and they have contended that such an evaluation has really very little to do with their organization's strategy and tactics, its day-to-day conduct in the class struggle of the proletariat.

A third form of deception has involved pointing out how the CPUSA/ML program makes no criticism of Mao Tsetung. If comrades are unclear about the Chinese revolution and the leadership of Mao (which means, in effect, that they are unconsolidated ideologically), they are still encouraged to join the party if they agree with the program. This kind of come-on from the top leadership is especially interesting in view of its efforts to insert just such a condemnation of Mao Tsetung in the draft of the program for the party congress. Wisely, the basic cadre rejected such a condemnation.

The evaluation of Mao Tsetung, of course, has a direct and significant bearing on each comrade's class stand, world view and method. It is a question inseparably connected with the fundamental ideological basis of the party, and not merely its program or political line. It cannot fail to have widespread ramifications on the practice of the party, its leadership of the class struggle of the proletariat, although a resolution of this question cannot be found by attempting to draw lessons from the immediate spontaneous movement of the U.S. working class. The evaluation of Mao and the laying of the ideological basis of the party can only be the result of relying on the summed-up experience of the world proletarian movement, principally embodied in the practice of the October Revolution and construction of socialism in the USSR and the Chinese Revolution and the construction of socialism in the People's Republic of China.

The top leadership of the CPUSA/ML have understood very well the implications of their developing position on Mao Tsetung and the Chinese revolution. But because of this understanding, they also know that for over a year they have not been able to really defend this position because it has been prematurely and primitive developed, has not flowed from any thorough investigation or study, and has not been reached by using the scientific method of Marxism-Leninism--in essence, because it is incorrect. Given this sorry state, the CPUSA/ML leadership has had to resort to a campaign of common bourgeois intimidation and bluff.

Now, a year after they first started reversing the verdict on Mao Tsetung, they have been forced out into the open and have begun to mount a feeble effort to defend Hoxha's book in their newspaper, UNITE!. Already splits have taken place at the level of the political bureau. Their sham party-building effort lies completely exposed as the great majority of the members and contacts of the Committee for a Proletarian Party, the only collective in the whole country to seek unity with the MLOC, have now
split with the organization. Cadre continue to leave the organization.

In order to minimize their losses, the leadership of the CPUSA/ML have had to launch a public counter-attack and try to justify the course they have been following internally for well over a year. The first step was an attack on some of the leading members of the Committee for a Proletarian Party who took an early stand in defense of Mao Tsetung and were refused membership in the party. (see "An Attack on Our Party and Marxism-Leninism," UNITE!, July 15, 1979, p. 9). This article has been followed up by a series attempting to rebut the Revolutionary Communist Party's criticisms of Hoxha's book, "Beat Back the Dogmato-Revisionist Attack on Mao Tsetung Thought" (The Communist, May, 1979), a valuable contribution to this struggle.

What is already evident about this series is that the CPUSA/ML leadership is still opportunistically evading making a head-on public criticism of Mao Tsetung. UNITE! has slyly chosen to use the RCP as a foil for its arguments, focusing its attack on the longstanding errors and weaknesses of the RCP, rather than on the real substance of the RCP's exposure of Hoxha's opportunism. In this way, in polemicizing with the RCP, they have picked a target against which the overwhelming majority of their membership is already consolidated. In addition, in aiming their attention on the RCP article, the CPUSA/ML leadership can selectively defend points in Imperialism and the Revolution without discussing the book as a whole.

We will delay replying to the content of the UNITE! articles until a later date, when we will take up an evaluation of the CPUSA/ML as a whole. To those familiar with the organization's bourgeois idealism, the articles contain the usual diet of evasions, distortions, falsifications, and concoctions.

The CPUSA/ML leadership's evasiveness on this whole topic stems from their recognition that within their own organization there is still great respect for Mao because of his enormous contributions to Marxist-Leninist theory and practice. This respect had in fact been fostered by the MLOC in an earlier incarnation (from its founding through at least the fall of 1977). To have attacked Mao directly a year ago without masquerading their intent would have only demoralized their membership and disintegrated their organization. Therefore, they began their assault through roundabout methods. Before any real evaluation of Mao Tsetung was taken up throughout the organization, the Central Committee passed a resolution that Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin alone were classic teachers of Marxism-Leninism. This technique—as well as its value in preparing cadre and supporters to eventually accept the assessment espoused in Imperialism and the Revolution—was developed by the Communist Party of Germany/Marxist-Leninist (KPD/ML).

Mao Tsetung himself would not disagree with designating these four great teachers as representing the ideological fountainhead of Marxism-Leninism. The differences would center on what seeing these four great Marxists as classic teachers implies. For Mao, as for any genuine Marxist-Leninist, it does not imply unquestioning acceptance or blind faith. For the CPUSA/ML leadership, to even question these four great Marxists is to preach heresy. As the chairman of the organization has stated in public forums, to even question Stalin and the Communist International is to be counter-revolutionary.

After the criticism of Stalin, the victims of blind faith had their eyes opened a bit. In order that our comrades recognize that the "old ancestor" also had his faults, we should apply analysis to him, and not have blind faith in him. We should accept everything good (quote continued on next page)
in Soviet experience, and reject what is bad. Now we are a bit more skillful in this, and understand the Soviet Union a bit better, and understand ourselves.

(Mao Tsetung, Talks at the Chengtu Conference, 1958, Chairman Mao Talks to the People, p.101)

This is the critical and scientific method of Marxism-Leninism which the CPUSA/ML leadership rejects and has already moved to disarm within their own organization. And this is a question of principle upon which there can be no compromise: either idealism or materialism, either metaphysics or dialectics, either revisionism or scientific socialism.

The CPUSA/ML leadership saw 1979, the 100th anniversary of the birth of Stalin, as the year in which they proposed to "set the record straight" on Stalin. By this statement, they meant that they proposed to reject any and all criticisms of Stalin, especially those voiced by Mao Tsetung and the Chinese Communist Party, and re-establish him as an unquestionable and unimpeachable revolutionary authority. In this project, they have been doomed to failure since they were proposing, despite all protests to the contrary, to return to the traditions of blind faith. Neither in their all-out attack on Mao Tsetung nor in their blind acceptance of Stalin have the CPUSA/ML leadership been following a Marxist-Leninist method. The results so far in the party's publications speak for themselves. As the polemics over the historical merit of Mao Tsetung deepen, we are convinced that the sham will be separated from the genuine and that the ongoing effort to reconstitute the vanguard party of the proletariat will thus be moved forward.

Mao Tsetung and the Application of Marxism-Leninism to China

Marxism-Leninism is a science, it is not a pure and immutable body of truth to be found incarnate in a limited set of individuals. A certain set of individuals, such as Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao Tsetung represent by their efforts the highest development of that science. But the science of Marxism-Leninism is not exclusively identifiable with the efforts of any limited set of individuals. On the contrary, it is an independent discipline which serves as a guide in the struggle to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is in this light that this same science can be used to evaluate the efforts of even its most consistent practitioners.

Even the greatest of Marxists make errors in so far as they depart from a consistent and thorough application of the science of the working class. Mao Tsetung made errors as he himself always readily admitted. Stalin also made a number of errors, as did Lenin, Marx, and Engels. In fact, as Lenin pointed out in the well-known passage from Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder, what distinguishes the Marxist revolutionary party is not the absence of errors, but the attitude of rectification taken towards them.

For many Marxist-Leninists, the present struggle represents a choice between Mao Tsetung and Enver Hoxha. This is incorrect. Much less is it a struggle between Mao and Stalin, a choice which is especially favored by the CPUSA/ML. Such a view of what is at stake is far too restricting and personalizes these questions to too great an extent. What is crucial is the historical experience of the world proletariat. Throughout its historical struggle against capital, the proletariat and its leaders have summed up setbacks and advances and have learned lessons which are systematized in the science of Marxism-Leninism. Theoretical and political views and practices are judged in the light of this experience. It is the great merit of Mao Tsetung to have raised the science of Marxism-Leninism to a higher level by summing up the advances made by the proletariat during his lifetime, especially after the death of Stalin.
The CPUSA/ML's slanders against the theoretical and practical contributions to Marxism-Leninism by Mao Tsetung can be categorized into six major areas:

1) Mao conciliated to the bourgeoisie under socialism and deviated from Marxism-Leninism on the nature of the dictatorship of the proletariat;
2) Mao conciliated to revisionism internationally;
3) Mao is theoretically if not directly responsible for the Theory of the Three Worlds;
4) Mao made fundamental deviations from Marxism-Leninism on the norms and principles of the party;
5) Mao's primary stand towards Stalin was one of slander and revision; and
6) Mao's philosophical and theoretical views are eclectic and un-Marxist.

In the course of this section, we will address all of these charges with the exception of point 6, which requires an extensive philosophical presentation of points which have been raised in a very confused fashion by the PLA and its fraternal parties. We plan to address the question of Mao Tsetung's contributions to Marxist philosophy in a future publication.

We have organized our presentation chiefly in terms of the positive contributions of Mao and the CPC, comparing these where appropriate to the practice of the CPSU, the PLA, and the CPUSA/ML. This will take us through the historical application of united front tactics, the question of class struggle under socialism, the struggle against revisionism and the development of a tactical line for the international arena, and the internal practices of the Chinese Communist Party.

In slandering Mao Tsetung, the CPUSA/ML claims to be upholding Stalin and asserts that to defend Mao is to be anti-Stalin. Yet their "defense" of Stalin represents in fact a Trotskyist revision of many of Stalin's contributions to Marxism-Leninism, particularly in regard to the national question in the era of imperialism. In the almost 30 years in which Stalin led the CPSU, he made a number of errors. Mao's criticism of these errors, especially in regard to the nature of class struggle under socialism, represents an essential component of the science of Marxism-Leninism. Marxist-Leninists must oppose the efforts of opportunists like the CPUSA/ML to use the errors of Stalin to obliterate the contributions of Mao Tsetung. Thus, in discussing Mao's contributions, we will also contrast these with the errors made by Comrade Stalin where this is necessary.

A. Proletarian Leadership of the Two-Stage Revolution in Colonial and Neo-Colonial Countries

On numerous occasions, and with increasing frequency towards the end of his life, Lenin very directly linked the fate of world socialism with the nascent struggles against imperialism in the Orient. For instance, in his last major article, "Better Fewer, But Better," he wrote:

Thus, at the present time we are confronted with the question--shall we be able to hold on with our small and very small peasant production, and in our present state of ruin, until the West-European capitalist countries consummate their development towards socialism? But they are not consummating it as we formerly expected...On the other hand, precisely as a result of the first imperialist war, the East has been definitely drawn into the revolutionary movement, has been definitely drawn into the general maelstrom of the world revolutionary movement...

(quote continued on next page)
In the last analysis, the outcome of the struggle will be determined by the fact that Russia, India, China, etc., account for the overwhelming majority of the population of the globe. And during the past few years it is this majority that has been drawn into the struggle for emancipation with extraordinary rapidity, so that in this respect there cannot be the slightest doubt what the final outcome of the world struggle will be.


Lenin is describing here the mass ferment which led to the founding of the Communist Party of China, among others. He describes a situation in which a whole continent was rising up in struggle against imperialism. Lenin fought for joining the principles of scientific socialism to these movements, so that national liberation would be assured and Soviet Russia would be bolstered by strong allies against the common enemy.

This was the task undertaken by the CPC, eventually under the successful leadership of Mao Tsetung. Following the principles of Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and the Comintern, the CPC saw the need to wage a two-stage revolution, to accomplish the tasks of the bourgeois democratic revolution against feudalism and foreign domination and then to continue this revolution through to the socialist stage.

The principal tactic used by the CPC in the struggle for the strategic goal of New Democracy was the united front of the four anti-imperialist classes: the proletariat (the leading force), the peasantry (the main force), the petty-bourgeoisie, and the national bourgeoisie (the vacillating forces). This united front had to wage an ideological, political, and military struggle against imperialism, feudalism, and the compromising forces of bureaucratic capitalism (the comprador bourgeoisie).

The CPUSA/ML concentrates its criticisms of Mao's handling of the united front in the post-1949 period. Nonetheless, the character, strength, and potential of the Chinese united front under socialism is inseparable from its history in the period of the war for national liberation. Even a shallow familiarity with Mao Tsetung's role in combining intense commitment to the strategic goal with tactical flexibility in the face of rapidly shifting conditions shows that his leadership is comparable to that provided by Lenin to the Bolshevik Party between February and October 1917. This entire period is largely left out of the CPUSA/ML's analysis.

Two criticisms are, however, raised by the PLA and the CPUSA/ML of the united front in this period. The first is that Mao and the CPC generally failed to follow the instructions of the Comintern, and the second is that the guerrilla warfare practiced by the CPC (encirclement of the cities by the countryside) was an anti-proletarian policy.

These criticisms are linked in a way which does not support the conclusions of the CPUSA/ML. The importance placed on the peasant question in China represents one of the great contributions of Stalin to the cause of the proletariat. In the struggle against Trotskyist liquidation of the peasant question, Stalin developed the basic principles of the strategy and tactics later followed by the CPC. When Mao was its chairman, the CPC did at times fail to follow directives of the Comintern when these did not fit the concrete characteristics of the Chinese revolution. The CPC's disobeying or ignoring Comintern directives should not be promoted as a model for Marxist-Leninist behavior, but what is crucial is whether the united front tactics the CPC chose to follow on its own were fundamentally correct, whereas the Comintern's tactics would have led to failure and defeat.
In fact, the dogmatic adherence to (or misapplication of) Comintern directives in the period before Mao's election to the highest position in the CPC had led to effective liquidation of the party in the cities. It was only on this basis that leadership of the already raging peasant struggle became a chief aim of the CPC. However, rather than representing the surrender of the leading role of the proletariat, this enhanced it. Given the fact that China was an overwhelmingly peasant country, it was only by leading the agrarian revolution that the Chinese proletariat could fully realize its vanguard role. And in the last analysis, in any country the proletarian and vanguard character of a communist party are determined by the ideology it puts into practice, not by the class origin of its members. This very point applies not only to the Chinese revolution but to the Albanian as well, as is stressed by Enver Hoxha in Imperialism and the Revolution (p. 423, World View edition).

In its first decade, the CPC did make errors in regard to its policy concerning the national bourgeoisie, but these errors were in fact shared by the Comintern and Stalin. In the name of an opportunist orthodoxy, the CPUSA/ML seeks to uphold such errors to attack the generally correct policies of Mao Tsetung.

In practice Stalin advocated policies which led to conciliation to the national bourgeoisie in China, represented by Chiang Kai-shek as leader of the Kuomintang. In contrast, Mao was consistent in his policies towards the national bourgeoisie, never rejecting an alliance with them if it served the cause of the Chinese revolution but also refusing to barter away the independence of the proletariat and its communist party.

Believing that Chiang Kai-shek was a loyal follower of Sun Yat-sen, Stalin helped to promote Chiang as the leader of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China in the 1920's. The alliance between the CPC and the Kuomintang was not decided upon by the two parties between themselves but by representatives of the Kuomintang directly with the Comintern. The conditions for the alliance were that the communists would have to join the Kuomintang as individuals and must submit to Kuomintang discipline. The political independence of the Chinese Communist Party was not promoted because Stalin actually seemed to believe that Chiang was a revolutionary nationalist. Stalin later justified this tactic by stating that it was based on a misrepresentation of the Kuomintang as a party of parties (which still does not explain why the communists had to join the party of parties as individuals).

No clearer indication of the extent of these illusions is the little-publicized fact that in 1926, upon Stalin's insistence, the Executive Committee of the Communist International admitted the Kuomintang as a sympathizing party and elected Chiang Kai-shek himself to be an honorary member of the Presidium, the highest body of the Comintern.

Following Stalin's leadership and that of the Comintern, are the Shanghai proletariat and the Chinese communists who led it to carry the bulk of the blame in 1927 when they seized China's largest industrial city and welcomed in Chiang Kai-shek and his army to take over the city? Did they have any idea that an honorary member of the Presidium of the Comintern would turn on them so quickly and savagely murder thousands of workers and communists in the streets?
B. The United Front in the New Democratic Stage

The United Front existed not only during the struggle for New Democracy but continued as a political form given to social and class relations in China in the period immediately following the victory over feudalism, imperialism, and bureaucratic capitalism. This is the period in which the CPUSA/ML concentrates its charges of conciliation to the national bourgeoisie.

Before we can conclude that if Mao conciliated to the national bourgeoisie, it was a revision of Marxism-Leninism, we should do some concrete investigation to find out who exactly the national bourgeoisie was.

In 1949 China's industry was poor and undeveloped. The comprador capitalists, who were the big landlords who invested their wealth in western industrial urban enterprises, owned 80% of China's industry, commerce, foreign trade, banking, railways, airlines, and road transport. The comprador capitalists were immediately expropriated after liberation.

Besides the comprador capitalists, there was also a small national capitalist class, which because of its relative poverty did not export any of its wealth, was victimized by the wealthier comprador capitalists, and tended to be patriotic and not a lackey of foreign imperialists. In 1949 the number of enterprises run by national capitalists was 123,165. 70% of these enterprises employed fewer than ten workers each. 79% were artisan and handicraft shops which were not mechanized. 95% of the national capitalists had investments of less than 5000 US dollars. (Han Suyin, Wind in the Tower, pp. 40-41).

Concretely, then, the national capitalists did not pose a large and powerful threat to the People's Republic of China. Their continued existence as a class in the period of New Democracy does demonstrate the continuation of a material base hostile in the long run to socialism, however.

Under the guidance of Mao Tsetung, the Chinese Communist Party moved rapidly to liquidate them as a class. Within a couple of years of taking power, the CPC was mobilizing the masses in two large campaigns to break up the national capitalists: the San Fan (three-anti) and the Wu Fan (five-anti) campaigns.* The three-anti campaign was directed against Party members who were collaborating with the capitalists and being corrupted, while the five-anti campaign (against bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts, and stealing of economic information) was mounted directly against the national capitalists themselves. The five-anti movement culminated in 1956 with the self-liquidation of the national capitalists who opted for being taken over by the state sector. They were displaced as owners and paid dividends on their assets and interest on their money until the Cultural Revolution in 1966. While this payment to "coupon clippers" was denounced during the Cultural Revolution, it can in no way be construed as "proof" that socialism did not exist in China, however much groups like the KPD/ML may attempt this. Rather, this policy, in the spirit of the united front of the New Democracy period, represented a buying-off of forces willing to forsake the route of attempting to sabotage the will of the vast majority. Under the leadership of Lenin, the CPSU followed a similar policy in the early years of the Soviet Republic.

*Through attacking such "typically Chinese stereotyped formulas" without even mentioning the class content of these campaigns, Enver Hoxha exposes his own gross national chauvinism (see Imperialism and the Revolution, World View, p. 389).
The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference was a form of united front which was meant to include representatives of vacillating allies like the national bourgeoisie. The Political Consultative Conference included eight small democratic parties as well as several patriotic organizations, such as the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang and the Chinese Democratic League, a number of people's organizations, and public personages, like Soong Ching-ling, the widow of Sun Yat-sen. It was important to the dictatorship of the proletariat that the vacillating classes that these organizations represented be wedded as much as possible to supporting the People's Republic. In 1949, it was the Political Consultative Conference which performed the formal function of setting up a coalition government, whose conception was developed by Mao in his essay, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship".

It was recognized by Mao and the Communist Party of China that the use of united front tactics did not end with the establishment of the People's Republic, but would have to be used for a long period of time during the transition to socialism and even under socialism itself. It is not opportunism to use such tactics under socialism since socialism itself is a transition period in which, contrary to the idealist estimates of parties like the PLA, there is never 100% support from the people for socialist policies and for the communist party. For a long period of time, the party must be able to unite with those forces which do not totally agree with it and listen to their criticisms at the same time that it carries out struggle with them to remold themselves and fully support socialism. For the CPUSA/ML, the mere existence of these parties is further proof that socialism did not exist in China. The policy of the Bolshevik Party, however, actually supports Mao's line on handling such non-proletarian parties. The Left Socialist Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks were permitted to exist and even publish their views until they attempted to sabotage the proletarian dictatorship. These parties in Russia had an important mass base and, in the case of the Mensheviks, even claimed to represent the proletariat. Lenin's attitude towards them shows that under the dictatorship of the proletariat, the stand taken by the communist party to petty-bourgeois parties is less a matter of principle than a question whether their followers support socialist construction or not. The existence of vacillating forces under socialism is a material fact which cannot be eliminated by decree. How such forces are dealt with is a matter of tactics. What is at issue is not a specific united front tactic, but the crucial role of a correct united front in determining which class holds real political power.

Real political power was exercised by the proletariat in alliance with the poor peasantry and was expressed through the vehicle of the state, at the head of which was the Communist Party of China, which was the political, ideological, and organizational leadership for the People's Republic. The democratic parties, on the other hand, were never associations designed to mobilize and represent the masses. All of them confined their activities to a relatively small elite base, to be found among the national capitalists, enlightened gentry, the intelligentsia, and urban petty-bourgeoisie. Although these parties played a prominent role at the national level in the Consultative Conference, they were isolated from popular political life at lower governmental levels.

The CPC followed a dual policy in regard to many of these parties, which it considered to represent the wavering allies of the People's Republic. While the CPC united with these parties, it also struggled against them to transform their bourgeois nature. By 1956 the democratic parties had the principal task of assisting in their own extinction by ideologically remolding their membership to actively support socialism. By the time of the Cultural Revolution, these parties had
ceased to recruit and ceased to function for all practical purposes. (J.R. Townsend, Political Participation in Communist China, pp. 146-148).

Another charge of conciliation leveled at Mao Tsetung by bourgeois idealists like the CPUSA/ML relates to his supposedly liberal policy of "Let a Hundred Flowers Blossom, Let a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend." This policy, which had been enunciated by Mao for some time, was put into practice for the most part in 1956, partially as a means to neutralize any counter-revolutionary tendencies among the intelligentsia. At the time, the Hungarian Revolt of the intelligentsia in 1956 provided a negative example of what happens when contradictions among the people are not handled correctly. Earlier cases of worker unrest in Poland (1952) and the German Democratic Republic (1953) provided further evidence that serious problems had arisen in the People's Democracies of Eastern Europe. The "Hundred Flowers" movement reflected Mao's understanding that in China it was not the size and wealth of the national bourgeoisie but their bourgeois ideas, shared with the urban petty-bourgeoisie, rich peasants, and intelligentsia, that posed the real threat to socialism.

Mao advocated the "Hundred Flowers" policy because of his general belief that "it is not only futile but very harmful to use crude methods in dealing with ideological questions among the people, with questions about man's mental world." (Mao, Selected Works, Vol. V, p. 411). But this policy was not devoid of class content. There were specific criteria laid down to guide the movement and set limits to its activities:

1) Words and deeds should help to unite, not divide, the people of all nationalities,
2) They should be beneficial, and not harmful, to socialist transformation and socialist construction,
3) They should help to consolidate, and not undermine or weaken, the people's democratic dictatorship,
4) They should help to consolidate, and not undermine or weaken, democratic centralism,
5) They should help to strengthen, and not shake off or weaken, the leadership of the Communist Party, and
6) They should be beneficial, and not harmful, to international socialist unity and the unity of the peace-loving people of the world.

(Mao, Selected Works, Vol. V, p. 412)

Reactionary elements among the bourgeoisie, petty-bourgeoisie, and intelligentsia, especially in the universities, thought they could take advantage of the "Hundred Flowers" policy and began to openly attack the Communist Party and the socialist state. They were clearly violating the criteria laid out to guide the movement. An anti-rightist campaign was mounted in late 1956 and 1957 to weed out these reactionary elements. According to statistics provided by Lo Ju-ch'ing, then minister of public security, 1,770,000 people were the subject of investigation. Out of these investigations, 65,000 counter-revolutionaries and 35,000 "bad elements" were exposed and dealt with. Out of this total, 5000 were Party members, 3000 were members of the Communist Youth League, and 220 belonged to state organizations.

A concrete investigation of the development of socialism in China does not reveal in fact that Mao Tsetung was a bleeding-heart liberal who allowed reactionaries to run amuck. The charge that he conciliated to the national bourgeoisie does not correspond at all to reality. This charge issues from a fundamental failure to understand Mao's radical methods for dealing with counter-revolutionaries and revisionists. As he stated in 1962:
During the whole socialist stage there still exist classes and class struggle, and this class struggle is a protracted, complex, sometimes even violent affair. Our instruments of dictatorship should not be weakened; on the contrary they should be strengthened.

(Talk at an Enlarged Central Work Conference, 1962)

And in the same passage of this speech, Mao goes on to explain that in detecting and defeating counter-revolutionaries, it is not enough to rely on "secret, professional" work by comrades in the security system. What is absolutely necessary is that the masses be mobilized, that cadre apply the mass line in purging counter-revolutionaries; otherwise the proletarian dictatorship cannot be consolidated.

Mao's struggle against the national bourgeoisie as well as against the rich peasants in the countryside does not represent his greatest contribution to the practice of carrying out class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat. His greatest contribution, which he was able to make based on summing up the historical degeneration of the USSR, was to be able to recognize that a new bourgeoisie, much more powerful and dangerous than the national bourgeoisie, could arise as a privileged stratum of party functionaries and government bureaucrats within the socialist system itself and could usurp power from the working class if the masses were not mobilized to strike them down.

It is this contribution to Marxist theory and practice, further discussed below, which Mao's "left"-opportunists like the CPUSA(ML) choose to ignore because to recognize this contribution is to also imply that Stalin made serious mistakes, failed to be vigilant, and conciliated to the new rising bourgeoisie. This is why the CPUSA(ML) prefers to create a diversion by throwing up dust about Mao's supposed conciliation to the old national bourgeoisie. Mao Tsetung's consistent reliance on the mass line is a radical method for dealing with bureaucracy, bourgeois right, and bourgeois forces; and it is a method which even Marxists like Enver Hoxha consciously distort when they make subjective and irresponsible charges that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was really nothing more than a "palace putsch." This kind of arrogance, elitism, and contempt for the Chinese people is consistent with the necessarily reactionary policies of Marxists who habitually deviate towards bourgeois idealism.

C. Class Struggle Under Socialism

It is particularly noteworthy that in its expulsion of Mao Tsetung from the ranks of Marxist-Leninists, the CPUSA(ML) fails completely to address what has long been considered his principal contribution to Marxism-Leninism, his development of the theory and practice of class struggle under socialism in response to the degeneration of the USSR. Both the PLA and the CPC, facing up to the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union, sought to analyze the sources of this defeat and to provide measures for rectification. It was the Chinese who carried this analysis the furthest.

By this we mean that it was the CPC, under the leadership of Mao Tsetung, which sought to ground its analysis in the production relations of socialism. On this basis, the CPC was able to correctly analyze the political practices of the superstructure. The chief components of the Chinese analysis were the following:
a. recognition of the continuance of class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat throughout the existence of socialism due to the con-
continued operation of the law of value and the form of wage-labor;
b. recognition of the principle of bourgeois right as one of the most persistent ideological sources of capitalist relations;
c. recognition that the class struggle under socialism does not abate with economic development;
d. recognition that the socio-economic contradictions inherited from capitalism (manual vs. mental labor, peasantry vs. proletariat, town vs. country, etc.) must be consistently attacked lest they provide a basis for class differentiation; and
e. recognition that the above factors will engender bourgeois tendencies within the Marxist-Leninist party itself, regardless of the class origins of its members or their connections to the old bourgeoisie.

Taken as a whole, these points and their development by the CPC do not represent a fully articulated theory of class struggle under socialism, nor do they present a concrete analysis of the degeneration of socialism in the Soviet Union. They do, however, represent a significant advance in the Marxist understanding of the laws of motion of socialism. This is seen most clearly through comparing the perspective represented above with that prevalent in the Soviet Union from the mid-1930's, particularly the views of Stalin.

Even though not consciously or deliberately, Stalin allowed a new bourgeois stratum to develop and begin to consolidate its hold on the political and economic apparatus of the Soviet Union. Stalin's theoretical errors which led to a lack of vigilance certainly had serious consequences on the development of socialism in the USSR, but those errors are to a certain extent understandable since Stalin had no historical precedent upon which to draw.

Most importantly, the CPSU made a fatal error in misunderstanding the character of the bourgeoisie as a class engendered by material forces within socialist society. Instead, the CPSU tended greatly to view the danger of capitalist restoration as a question of coup d'etat on the part of the old bourgeoisie or the external imperialist camp. This is reflected in the 1936 Constitution and is seen very clearly in Stalin's report to the 18th Congress of the CPSU (1939); for instance:

The feature that distinguishes Soviet society today from any capitalist society is that it no longer contains any antagonistic, hostile classes; that the exploiting classes have been eliminated, while the workers, peasants, and intellectuals, who make up Soviet society, live and work in friendly collaboration. (J.V. Stalin, Selected Writings, Calcutta, 1976, p. 33)

The un-Marxist treatment of the social stratum of the intellectuals as a socio-economic class like the proletariat and peasantry (a formulation which runs throughout this speech) indicates that Stalin himself was aware that there were in fact class forces present in Soviet society whose interests could not be equated with those of the working masses. Nonetheless, the failure to correctly identify these forces as the seeds of a new bourgeoisie served to disarm the Soviet proletariat and its party, already riddled with revisionists in high positions. Can it honestly be said that "intellectual" was the correct class identification of Khrushchev and his ilk?

The system of material incentives and sharp wage-differentials, a form of bourgeois right, were rarely subject to serious analysis or criticism by the CPSU in the last 25 years of Stalin's tenure as General Secretary. This represented a static application of the socialist principle of distribution (to each according to work) and a failure to recognize the necessary increasing restriction of bourgeois right.
Consistent with this practice, the CPSU displayed a persistent reliance on a "forces-of-production" line, often a complement to the position that class struggle ends under socialism and heavily criticized during the Cultural Revolution as the principal cover for revisionism within the party. The proletariat in power must struggle on the political, ideological, and economic fronts; the consolidation and strengthening of socialism requires such a policy, summed up in the Chinese slogan "Grasp revolution, promote production". Economic growth cannot be sustained without the destruction of the capitalist social relations which are in the final analysis barriers to the development of the productive forces. Capitalist social relations are not wiped out without a protracted process of class struggle, of which economic development is a major part.

In the dialectic between "Grasp revolution, promote production", Stalin was not altogether clear that class struggle against a newly emerging bourgeois stratum was the key link in consolidating the economic base of socialism. Stalin often deviated in the direction of a mechanical materialist conception of the nature of socialism itself, believing that a rapid industrialization in the cities and collectivization in the countryside would consolidate socialism as a system and eliminate the material base for capitalist restoration. This represents a failure to apply dialectics and recognize that socialism is nothing more—and nothing less—than a transition period between capitalism and communism in which sharp and protracted class struggle takes place between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and that the outcome of that class battle is by no means assured, certainly not in 20 or 30 years.

This mechanical materialist conception of socialism itself led on the one hand to deviations in the direction of a theory of productive forces and on the other hand to an idealist conception of how to conduct class struggle. Bourgeois elements were viewed primarily as resulting from external causes, namely the imperialist encirclement, and not from internal causes of remaining bourgeois right in the mode of production. No matter how vigilant and merciless Stalin was in striking down agents of imperialism, this alone could not eliminate the cause for capitalist restoration. Learning from the mistakes of the CPSU, it was Mao Tsetung who further developed Marxist-Leninist theory on the dictatorship of the proletariat and was able to perceive the inherent material basis within socialism itself for the continuous generation of capitalist elements.

Stalin's lack of clarity on the relationship between class struggle and production can be seen in one of his last works, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR. The CPUSA(ML) hails this work as proof that Stalin in his later years did come to realize the central role of class struggle under socialism. Though this work does sharply criticize Yareshenko's crude formulation of the productive forces argument, it does not deal a strong and decisive rebuke to revisionism, as the CPUSA(ML) claims. Let's examine how Stalin characterizes the basic law of socialism in order to more clearly see what we are contending:

The essential features and requirements of the basic law of socialism might be formulated roughly in this way: the securing of the maximum satisfaction of the constantly rising material and cultural requirements of the whole of society through the continuous expansion and perfection of socialist production on the basis of higher techniques.

(FLP edition, pages 40-41)

This formulation does not put class struggle at the center of socialist society and recognize it as the motive force of all progress. On the contrary, the implication of this formulation is that the development of technique and the productive
forces plays the leading role in socialist society. This is why we argue that Stalin makes an incomplete and unsatisfactory ideological break with the theory of the productive forces in this work.

This argument could be developed more fully, but let's shift our attention to the role of the masses, especially the working class, under socialism in the USSR. This relates to points d) and e), raised at the beginning of this section as contributions of the CPC to our understanding of socialism.

As even a reading of the above quote would indicate, the political education and mobilization of the masses was not as widely and thoroughly promoted in the USSR under Stalin's leadership as it was in China. This failure also flows from his basic misconception of the nature of socialism, since if socialism can be consolidated and class struggle based on internal causes can be eliminated, there is less need to politically mobilize the masses, since enemy agents who infiltrate the USSR can be dealt with adequately by an extensive security apparatus. Mobilization of the masses did take place in the USSR but this mobilization often took the form of socialist emulation movements, like the Stakhanovites, with the primary goal being greater and more efficient production.

Stalin thought highly of business executives, who were allowed to practice one-man management in industry; and he promoted them as real leaders of the socialist economy. This attitude contrasts with a constant tendency on Stalin's part to belittle the political and economic role of the working class. This tendency can be seen in Economic Problems, for instance, when Stalin talks approvingly of business executives learning how to take into account the law of value, specifically, the cost-accounting measures characteristic of the capitalist mode:

> It is a good practical school which accelerates the development of our executive personnel and their growth into genuine leaders of socialist production at the present stage of development.

(FLP edition, page 19)

Under socialism, many of the forms of capitalist relations of production remain (wages, money, etc.), and a surplus product which takes the commodity (value) form is produced. With this material base, as Mao Tsetung indicated, only extreme vigilance (in a political rather than security sense) in the superstructure guarantees the maintenance of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The underestimation of the potential of "business executives" as agents for capitalist restoration followed from another theoretical error closely related to that concerning the absence of class struggle. In Economic Problems Stalin argues that the economic basis for the antagonism between mental workers and manual workers had disappeared:

> Naturally, with the abolition of capitalism and the exploiting system, the antagonism of interests between physical and mental labour was also bound to disappear. And it really has disappeared in our present socialist system. Today, the physical workers and the managerial personnel are not enemies, but comrades and friends, members of a single collective body of producers who are vitally interested in the progress and improvement of production. Not a trace remains of the former enmity between them.

(FLP edition, pages 26-27)

Of course, this evaluation does not represent a completely accurate view of reality since more than a trace of enmity had to remain because the mental workers, especially the business executives, made the daily decisions in the factories, and not the workers. Furthermore, it indicates that the "intellectuals" cited in Stalin's
speech to the 18th Congress were viewed by Stalin as presenting "not a trace" of a threat to the dictatorship of the proletariat.

It was Mao Tsetung's contribution to Marxist-Leninist theory to recognize that it was precisely in this privileged stratum of business executives and state and party bureaucrats that a new bourgeoisie began inevitably to grow. Within the Chinese Communist Party Mao's proletarian line on building socialism constantly met with opposition from various leaders, such as Kao Kang, Jao Shou-shih, Peng Teh-huai, and even Liu Shao-chi, all of whom to one degree or another derived their inspiration from the Soviet model. Many of the essentials of the Soviet model had been developed by Stalin before the Khruschev revisionist clique took power after his death and began to restore capitalism.

Manchuria is a prime example of the application of the Soviet model since whole industrial plants along with advisers were shipped in from the Soviet Union, and these advisers were able to make proposals which were accepted without question by the Chinese. Manchuria was the power base of Party Secretary Kao Kang, who besides being a vice-chairman of the party was the chairman of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association and a personal friend of Stalin. Under Kao Kang, the industry in Manchuria was run by one-man management, with the workers having no share in the decision-making in each plant. Workers were subjected to a system of piecework, bonuses, and other material incentives. Kao Kang was purged from the party and jailed in 1953 when he attempted a coup d'etat to take over control of the Chinese Communist Party and the state.

Mao Tsetung waged a long and sharp struggle with those in the CPC who identified socialism with the development of the productive forces. Due to a number of factors (one of which was increased opposition to his domestic line after the Great Leap Forward) in the early 1960's Mao assumed leadership within the CPC for the analysis of and polemics with modern revisionism. He thus shouldered the major responsibility for the classic articles of 1962-63, and through this work he deepened his understanding of the roots of Soviet revisionism and the restoration of capitalism in the USSR. The practical result of this understanding was the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. This process describes the way in which Mao Tsetung took up for solution the problem of the revisionist degeneration of the USSR. Mao's criticisms and rectification of many of Stalin's errors is not proof that Mao was "better" or "smarter" than Stalin. The errors and accomplishments of the CPSU during Stalin's lifetime are grounded in the objective conditions and theoretical level of that period; the same is true for the errors and advances made by the CPC while Mao Tsetung was its chairman.

It is our assessment that Mao's study of the theory and practice of modern revisionism and the degeneration of the USSR made him very aware of the extent to which the CPC shared many of these same problems. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was the means devised by Mao and his supporters to counter the dangers represented by this fact.

According to Mao, the basic strategic goal of the Cultural Revolution was "to solve the problem of world outlook and eradicate revisionism." ("Talk by Chairman Mao with an Albanian Military Delegation," People's China, ed. by David Milton, Nancy Milton, and Franz Schurmann, 1974, p. 283) The solution of these problems is primarily ideological, as both Lenin in "Better Fewer, but Better" and Mao recognized in their assessments of the importance of culture. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is one of the central experiences of the international proletariat in its struggle for socialism and an important component of Mao's views on
continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. In its scope and significance, it can best be compared with the Paris Commune and the Soviets of the Russian proletariat in 1905.

The great contribution of this revolutionary form is that the masses are aroused by Marxist-Leninists to take up the most complex issues of cultural, social, and economic life and the questions of the party itself—all of which are subject to revisionist attack. Far from being a single instance, as Mao correctly noted, there will need to be many such cultural revolutions in the future.

During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the PLA correctly hailed it as an important advance in the proletariat's struggle to strengthen its dictatorship and guard against capitalist restoration. The ideas popularized by the Cultural Revolution had a significant impact on the policies of the PLA itself, as can be seen from reading the documents of the PLA's 6th Congress. Today, the Cultural Revolution has become a special target of the PLA.

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China was the first revolution of its kind. Undoubtedly, as Mao himself recognized, mistakes were made. Particularly, the influence of bourgeois and revisionist forces in this movement sometimes led to excesses and a lack of consistent focus. As a result, the Cultural Revolution did not sufficiently strengthen the CPC and eliminate the revisionist headquarters from the party's ranks. The lessons of both the victories and the weaknesses of the GPCR must be learned within the context of upholding this experience as a whole. The present stand of the PLA does not contribute to this and instead represents an opportunist dismissal of the entire Cultural Revolution.

It is our preliminary assessment that during this period Mao Tsetung deviated towards anarcho-syndicalism in tending to belittle the leading role of the Marxist-Leninist party and put too much reliance on the spontaneous mass movements. The most blatant deviations during the Cultural Revolution were those of Lin Piao, who openly pushed the anarchist line that the mass movements were "naturally reasonable" in his attempt to undermine the leading role of the Party and underhandedly strengthen the role of the People's Army which he led.

D. The Struggle Against Modern Revisionism

One of the grossest slanders of Mao Tsetung offered by the PLA and the CPUSA(ML) involves an outright falsification of the historical record of the struggle against Khruschevite revisionism. This falsification seeks to create the impression that the PLA was always and in every case a completely consistent antagonist of Khruschev and his clique, while the CPC was on the other hand a consistent conciliator, tardy in its opposition and taking part in the opposition to modern revisionism for essentially nationalistic reasons.

The other paper in this publication addresses the question of the historical record in great detail. In considering this charge, comrades should recall just which party was seen by Khrushchev as his major antagonist, which among the international parties most strongly denounced the Soviet blackmail and splitting activity in regard to the PLA, and which party was most active in spreading the sources and conclusions of this struggle among the international proletariat.

The CPUSA(ML) would like to make the argument that Mao Tsetung showed his true opportunist colors in the battle against modern revisionism, first represented by Titoism and then later by Khruschevism. But the best that the CPUSA(ML) can do at the moment is to clumsily paraphrase the charges made by other parties, such as the KPD(ML) or the Party of Labor of Albania.
The first charge is that Mao and the Chinese Communist Party conciliated with Titoism. In its commentary "Is Yugoslavia a Socialist Country?" published in 1963, the CPC states that "in 1954, when Khruschev proposed to improve relations with Yugoslavia, we were agreed to treat Yugoslavia as a fraternal socialist country in order to win it back to the socialist road and to observe the Tito clique further." This stance by the CPC is supposedly a gross form of opportunism. But it is not opportunism to show a willingness to seek unity with comrades who have deviated from Marxism-Leninism in order to more closely observe them, determine their true colors, and win them over if possible. Upon further observation of Tito, the CPC determined that his true nature was revisionist and opened up polemics against him. Open, public polemics of this nature represent a state of war, and it is irresponsible to engage in such polemics until the verdict on a comrade or fraternal party is undeniable.

The CPUSA(ML) also blindly parrots the criticisms by the Party of Labor of Albania, which argues that Mao and the Chinese Communist Party also conciliated with Khruschev revisionism. The brilliant polemics conducted by the CPC against Khruschev revisionism are a matter of public record, of course. But what the PLA wants to charge is that at critical junctures, the CPC attempted to reconcile itself with Khruschev or his followers Brezhnev and Kosygin.

In 1962, despite deep ideological and political differences the CPC had with the CPSU, it still maintained its tactical line that the Soviet Union should be united with as much as possible against the world's main enemy, US imperialism. (This was upheld by the PLA as late as 1964, by the way.) And in the course of this united front struggle, such as in the defense of Vietnam, the CPC would be in the best position to expose the conciliation of the Khruschevites with the imperialist system. Again, in 1964, when Khruschev was overthrown and replaced by Brezhnev and Kosygin, the CPC sent a special delegation to Moscow headed by Chou En-lai to sound out the policies of the new leadership. When this delegation saw that there was indeed no change from Khruschev, it returned immediately to China and open polemics were renewed.

Neither in 1962 nor in 1964 did the Chinese Communist Party practice a conciliationist stand towards revisionism. At that time the USSR was still counted in the socialist camp and U.S. imperialism was the main enemy of the world's people. Given these two facts, the policy followed by the CPC during that period was a Marxist-Leninist one.

E. International Tactics Against Imperialism and Social-Imperialism: The Theory of the Three Worlds

The accusation that Mao Tsetung nurtured for a long time the three-worlds theory and has to bear primary theoretical responsibility for its development is another charge made against Mao by the CPUSA(ML). In this respect, the CPUSA(ML) leadership seems to be feverishly trying to outdo the present revisionist leadership in China in digging up obscure quotes from Mao and ripping them out of their particular historical context, all in the name of attempting to "prove" that Mao developed the three-worlds theory. The evidence in Mao's writings which would support his responsibility for the three worlds theory is strikingly meager and clearly outweighed, for the honest reader, by Marxist-Leninist formulations.

There is at any rate no proof that Mao Tsetung developed the three-worlds theory as a strategic conception which was meant to replace the Leninist strategy based on the fundamental contradictions between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie
and the four major contradictions of the imperialist epoch conditioned by that fundamental contradiction. Even circumstantial evidence all points to the conclusion that the three-worlds theory was developed and enshrined as the CPC's strategic line only after his death and the mass purge of his supporters. It is plausible that Mao did propose that the present world situation could best be analyzed for tactical purposes by dividing it into three parts or spheres. But such an analysis for tactical purposes is "worlds apart" from the claim of the present revisionists that the three-worlds theory represents a "great strategic concept". This latter claim is blatantly revisionist.

To stick just with circumstantial evidence, it is interesting that even though the present revisionist leadership in China tries to claim that Mao Tsetung elaborated the three-worlds theory as a result of an extensive and profound study of the present world situation, they can find no more than a couple of vague remarks made by Mao to unspecified sources. Moreover, the revisionists in power openly claim in their article "Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds Is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism" that Mao's supporters--Chiang Ching, Chang Chun-chiao, Wang Hung-wen, and Yao Wen-yuan--all opposed the three-worlds theory. Teng Hsiao-p'ing's infamous speech to the United Nations in 1974, which represents the first public full-blown elaboration of this theory, does not dare to attribute this theory to Mao Tsetung. In addition, upon Mao's death, neither the Central Committee nor Hua Kuo-feng's memorial speech makes any mention of the three-worlds theory as one of Mao's contributions to Marxism-Leninism.

At the same time, it would be incorrect not to note that the Theory of the Three Worlds was being applied by some Chinese leaders while Mao was still alive and Chairman of the CPC. Furthermore, the policies which flow from this theory have their beginnings years before Mao's death. The origins of the Theory of the Three Worlds are extremely complex. The concept itself is connected to an opportunist revision of Mao's correct usage of "intermediate zones." In 1946, in his talk with Anna Louise Strong, Mao Tsetung expressed the view that a number of countries made up an intermediate zone between the socialist camp and the US imperialist camp. In 1968, when the USSR invaded Czechoslovakia, the CPC began referring to the Soviet Union as social-imperialist. The division of the imperialist powers into two strata (the superpowers and the lesser imperialist powers) was first suggested by the Chinese in the early 1970's. In 1972 their formulation of this analysis included the socialist camp, so that the world was effectively divided into four: the socialist camp, the two superpowers, the lesser imperialists (part of the intermediate zone), and the backward countries (the bulk of the intermediate zone). After this date, the socialist camp was increasingly and incorrectly dropped from this analysis.

The division of the world into three parts in order to help clarify the alignment of class forces and countries and elaborate the correct united front tactics for the present historical period draws on a method of concrete analysis of concrete conditions that every Marxist-Leninist must learn to master. Granting that Mao Tsetung did concretely analyze the world into three parts, if this analysis were used to better exploit inter-imperialist contradictions and contradictions between greater and lesser enemies, it is a method no different from that used by Stalin in the period leading up to World War II when he had to seek alliances with one imperialist camp or another in order to prevent a common onslaught against the world's only socialist state, the USSR.

In the period leading up to World War II, Stalin had to resort to a great deal of tactical maneuvering to buy time for the Soviet state and undermine any concerted attack by Western European imperialist powers against the Soviet Union. Such tactical
maneuvering is not in itself opportunism. Depending on the concrete circumstances, the failure to apply such maneuvering leads to an opportunism which can be just as dangerous even though it parades in a very "left" form. It was this kind of "left" posturing by Trotsky, Bukharin, and other members of the Bolshevik Party in 1918 which led to their opposition to Lenin's policy of concluding an early peace with Germany. This "left" opportunism cost the young Soviet state dearly in the loss of territory when finally the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty had to be concluded.

The PLA's present criticisms of Mao's foreign policies have the same "left" opportunist character. As for the claim that Mao initiated the "Opening to the West" which brought President Nixon to Peking in 1972 and began the rapprochement with US imperialism, there is nothing anti-Marxist or narrowly nationalist in Mao's actions. Threatened on two sides by both the USA and the USSR, the People's Republic of China would be foolhardy not to devise tactics to play one imperialist power off against the other. Again, there is not qualitative distinction between the methods used by Mao and the Chinese Communist Party and those used by Stalin to effect a tactical alliance with France, Great Britain, and the USA against the fascist Axis powers (not to mention the Non-Aggression Pact with Nazi Germany).

But the CPUSA(ML) only chooses to expose their own bankruptcy by indulging in Trotskyist deceit and moralizing about how there can be no "genuine differences between Hua toasting the Shah while the workers and peasants of Iran are murdered in the streets, and Mao toasting Nixon while the assassins of U.S. imperialism pulverize Hanoi and Haiphong." ("Chinese Leaders Dance to the Beat of U.S. Imperialism," Unite!, January 15, 1979) The essential differences, of course, are that Mao Tsetung, like Stalin, was a great Marxist-Leninist who recognized the necessity of playing imperialist powers off against one another in order to enhance the conditions for world revolution, while Hua Kuo-feng is a revisionist who is united with the counter-revolutionary Teng Hsiao-p'ing in cementing an alliance with US imperialism in order to accelerate the restoration of capitalism in China and build it up into a superpower which can surpass both the US and the USSR in successful plunder and oppression of its own working class as well as those of colonial and semi-colonial countries. In reality, the likely outcome of Teng's policies of modernization will be to make China a neo-colony of the US or the USSR by the year 2000, if not before.

The CPUSA(ML) knows very well that this is the difference between these two historical examples, so they have to resort to one of their basest lies about Mao Tsetung and the People's Republic of China. In similar fashion to the Progressive Labor Party, which launched a Trotskyist attack against the Vietnamese liberation fighters for selling out the revolution by daring to negotiate with US imperialism, the CPUSA(ML) now brazenly claims that "it is increasingly clear that China sought to maintain US troops in Indochina, and to maintain a divided Vietnam." (ibid.)

Mao Tsetung was not selling out world revolution by initiating the "Opening to the West" nor was he selling out the Vietnamese revolution. Mao's diplomatic initiatives which culminated in the Nixon visit reflected his long-standing mastery of tactical maneuvering and flexibility in the service of revolutionary principles. Such tactical flexibility is impossible without relying on dialectical and historical materialism.

Again, however, one cannot ignore the serious errors to be found in the international policy of the CPC during the final years of Mao's life. In our view, these represented symptoms of intense struggle within the party, struggles which
indicate the incompleteness and failures of the Cultural Revolution and whose existence is proven by Hua Kuo Feng's rapid elimination of his rivals after Mao's death. Thus it seems likely that, while the CPC's reception of Nixon was not itself incorrect, this "opening to the West" was clearly used by forces which even at that time sought to cement an alliance with US imperialism. This is the basis of Chinese policies which failed to firmly support the Marxist-Leninists in various countries, e.g. in Chile after the coup. While not contraverting the arguments presented above, such policies demand serious criticisms of the CPC during this period, when Mao was still its chairman.

As has been pointed out throughout this paper, the kind of tactical maneuvers connected with the united front or with correctly handling the complexities of international politics is absolutely necessary. The PLA has played a leading role in combatting the revisionist Theory of the Three Worlds by showing how it deviates from Marxist-Leninist principles and departs from the correct strategy for world revolution in the epoch of imperialism. But to date, the PLA had not been able to elaborate a clear, coherent, and consistent tactical line to advance world proletarian revolution in this historical period. This is one of the chief reasons that so many communist organizations who have separated themselves off from the obvious social-chauvinism and class collaboration of the three-worlds theory have not been won to support the PLA because they can see its dogmatic, idealist approach and can recognize that it is offering no tactical alternative that is developed out of a concrete analysis of the present world situation.

F. The Norms and Principles of Party Life

One of the most serious accusations made by the MLOC/CPUSA(ML), following the lead of the PLA, is that Mao Tsetung committed fundamental deviations from Marxism-Leninism on the norms and principles of the party. These deviations included promoting social-democratic policies on party building and inner-party life by glorifying twoline struggle within the party, the tolerance and encouragement of factions, and refusing to purge confirmed opportunists.

The maintenance by a Marxist-Leninist party of a correct internal life (in essence, the correct practice of democratic centralism) is absolutely inseparable from the party's role as the vanguard of the proletariat. The significance of this point goes far beyond the fact that the life of the party reflects the level of its work with and leadership of the masses. Rather, only the correct functioning of democratic centralism can provide a constant check on the policies of the party, can provide the elected leadership of the party with the fullest possible sense of the mood and concerns of the masses as well as ensure that the policies of the party are understood and enthusiastically carried out by its entire membership.

The principles of democratic centralism are not themselves complex. Their interpretations and applications, however, are inevitably the subject of sharp class struggle within the ranks of the proletarian party. The undermining of democratic centralism is one of the principal means used by revisionists to attack Marxism-Leninism. A Marxist-Leninist party must be vigilant in strengthening democratic centralist practices and exposing their distortion. Before discussing democratic centralism as practiced in the CPSU, the CPC, and the PLA, it will be useful to criticize two such distortions.

The first is the formulation which opposes factionalism to democratic centralism. While factions are indeed violations of democratic centralism, the dialectic which is
involved here is between democracy and centralism, not between factions and democratic centralism. Factions are the organizational result of the failure to correctly handle the contradiction between democracy and centralism. Bureaucratic centralism is just as certain to lead to factions as is liberalism and ultrademocracy.

A second prevalent distortion of the principles of democratic centralism is the failure to distinguish between unity of will and action and unity of views. The former is a necessary aspect of any communist party. The latter, while a goal, need not be a requirement for the correct functioning of a party. In fact, the tendency to dogmatically demand unity of views has historically proven to be a major justification of bureaucratic centralism.

With these points in mind, let us turn to the discussions on party unity at the 10th Congress of the CPSU (1921), which provide the clearest statements of Lenin's position on the correct handling of the dialectic between democracy and centralism, unity of will and political struggle.

The History of the CPSU(B) describes one of the central issues at this Congress which is of special interest to us: "Realizing how extremely dangerous the existence of factional groups was to the Bolshevik Party and the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Tenth Congress paid special attention to Party unity." (p. 236).

The Tenth Congress took place during an extremely grave period of Soviet power. The Civil War had just come to an end, but its devastating effects on the masses of the working people were widespread. Industry and agriculture were in shambles, and the country was plagued by famine. Counter-revolutionaries were mounting an offensive against Soviet power, and succeeded in inciting the Kronstadt mutiny.

In view of this dangerous situation, Lenin submitted a Draft Resolution on Party Unity which formally banned factions—the election of central committee members by separate platforms, supported by blocs within the Party—and authorized the extreme measure giving the central committee the power, between Congresses, of expelling its own members. As Lenin stated, "our Party has never allowed the Central Committee to have such a right in relation to its members. This is an extreme measure that is being adopted specially, in view of the dangerous situation." (LCW, Vol. 32, p. 258). Lenin expressed the hope that this measure would never have to be used, and that it should only be used in the exceptional situation in which disagreements merged on a split in the party.

In banning factions, Lenin was referring at the time specifically to the "Workers Opposition," led by Shlyapnikov, Medvedyev, and Kollontai, and the "Democratic-Centralists," led by Sazonov, Drobnis, V. Smirnov, and Ossinsky. These factions were in fact seriously undermining the unity of the Bolshevik Party. Kollontai, for instance, had stated:

Even in the event of defeat at the Congress, it (the Workers Opposition) must remain within the Party and firmly defend its point of view, step by step, saving the Party and straightening out its line.

Such views and practices, which placed the interests of a faction above those of the party, cannot be tolerated in any Marxist-Leninist party.

The Workers Opposition, which was the more influential of the two, deviated from Marxism-Leninism in the direction of anarcho-syndicalism when they proposed
that the management of the national economy should be in the hands of an "All-Russian Congress of Producers." Lenin characterized this proposal as a "gross political mistake and a direct political danger to the very existence of the dictatorship." (pp. 247-8). Lenin labeled their mistake a "syndicalist and anarchist deviation," but he was quick to define exactly what he meant by a deviation:

A deviation is not yet a full-blown trend. A deviation is something that can be rectified. People have somewhat strayed or are beginning to stray from the path, but can still be put right. That, in my opinion, is what the Russian word Oklon means. It emphasizes that there is nothing final in it as yet, and that the matter can be easily rectified; it shows a desire to sound a warning and to raise the question on principle in all its scope. (p. 252)

This precise definition, by the way, contrasts sharply with the use commonly made of it by the CPUSA/ML. The CPUSA/ML devised the phrase "fundamental deviation" for a while as a polite and hypocritical substitute for calling Mao Tsetung an outright revisionist. The problem is that "fundamental deviation" is essentially a contradiction in terms.

At the same time that Lenin was submitting his resolution in order to restrict political struggle and channel it along centralist lines by banning factions, he was also recommending that the members of the Workers Opposition be given every opportunity to develop their theoretical views. He proposed that there be special publications and symposiums where ample space could be provided for a "more comprehensive exchange of opinion between Party members on all questions indicated." (p. 252). He exhorted Comrade Shlyapnikov to continue his scientific research:

We shall be very happy to see Comrade Shlyapnikov supplement his recent book on his experiences in the underground revolutionary struggle with a second volume in his spare time over the next few months and analyzing the concept of "producer." (p. 256)

Lenin helped to promote the "widest and freest discussion" of the views of the Workers Opposition and the Democratic-Centralists before the Congress, with the platform of the Workers Opposition being published by the central organ of the Party in 250,000 copies. (p. 256) In addition, at the Congress he urged that the leading bodies of the party examine every "practical proposal" from the Workers Opposition focused on purging the Party of non-proletarian and unreliable elements, combatting bureaucratic practices, and developing democracy and workers' initiative. (p. 259).

Moreover, Lenin publicly announced his support for the nomination of members of the Workers Opposition and Democratic-Centralists to the central committee. At the Congress, Lenin moved that all members of the opposition factions should remain at their party and state posts and that Comrade Shlyapnikov's resignation from the Presidium and all other resignations be rejected. To a certain extent, Lenin thereby tacitly recognized the validity of some of the Workers Opposition's criticisms of bureaucratic tendencies in the recent practice of the Party and the state.

Lastly, when Comrade Ryazanov motioned an amendment to Lenin's draft resolution on party unity which stated that "while condemning all factional activity, the Congress vigorously opposes any election to the Congress by platform," Lenin argued against this amendment on the grounds that elections by platforms were permissible under conditions in which there was disagreement on fundamental issues, and gave the example of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty. Lenin ended his rebuttal in the following way:
The lesson we have learned at this Congress will not be forgotten. But if the circumstances should give rise to fundamental disagreements, can we prohibit them from being brought before the judgment of the whole Party? No, we cannot! This is an excessive desire, which is impracticable, and I move that we reject it. (p. 261)

Summing this up, the following points can be made about Lenin's views on the questions of inner-party struggle, party unity, and factions:

1) A faction must be seen not as a group of individuals holding views different from those of the party majority but rather as an organized bloc, a party-within-the-party whose members thus operate under a contradictory, dual system of discipline.

2) Struggle between opposing views on significant questions must be full and open, with the entire party membership required to study the documents and arguments of each side. Only in this way, through the dialectical struggle between differing views, can the party hope to consistently remain on the correct course.

3) The correct method on the part of leadership for eliminating the potential for factional activity is to in fact permit and encourage the type of political struggle described in point 2.

4) Under no circumstances can the struggle of views be permitted to lead to disunity of action. In terms of carrying out policy, the minority must submit to the will of the majority, lower bodies must submit to higher, and the individual is subordinate to the collective body.

Both the letter and spirit of these principles were violated in the subsequent history of the CPSU. Stalin must bear a major share of the responsibility for this, as well as for the extent to which these violations strengthened the capitalist roaders in the CPSU.

For both the PLA and the CPUSA/ML, the present position that Stalin is beyond criticism represents a defense of their own violations of democratic centralism. The PLA deviates from Marxism-Leninism, justifying practices of bureaucratic centralism, in its belief that a Bolshevik Party must be "pure and monolithic," extending this from the sphere of practice to all other realms. This is probably one of the clearest expressions of the PLA's characteristic idealism. Basically, this represents an idealist distortion of the nature of the party since it treats the party as though it can have some independent existence from its material environment. The concept of a pure and monolithic entity of any kind relies on a metaphysical view of reality, not on materialist dialectics.

Any party must act in and be conditioned by its historical environment, which is in constant flux and characterized by contradictions. These contradictions, and most importantly class contradictions in society itself, are bound to find their reflection in differing ideas, plans, and policies advocated by cadre within a Marxist-Leninist party. Even cadre who generally uphold a correct line are bound to make mistakes and deviate from Marxism since, as individuals, they can only partially comprehend material reality.

The attempt to create a completely "pure and monolithic" party is bound to fail since the development of contradictions within the party as a reflection of different class interests is a law independent of anybody's will. The attempt to consoli-
date a "pure and monolithic" party can either lead to acting as though differences do not exist, in which case the unity of the party is only formal and has no real substance, or lead to mass purging and suppression of differing ideas within the party. Bureaucratic centralism is the inevitable result. And it is in this kind of environment that bourgeois careerists and double-dealers like Khrushchev thrive since they have absolutely no qualms about hiding their views until they have the opportunity to seize power in the party.

Unity of will or centralism is absolutely essential. There can be no question that, as the History of the CPSU(B) states, "the party can lead the practical struggle of the working class and direct it towards one aim only if all its members are organized in one common detachment, welded together by unity of will, unity of action and unity of discipline." (p. 42, National Book Agency, Calcutta). But unity of will is not synonymous with "pure and monolithic" identity of views. There must be basic ideological agreement among party members on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and agreement on the party program, but this is not equivalent to the absolute identity of views necessary for a "pure and monolithic" party.

This is how the Party of Labor of Albania describes "identity of views":

In order to be able to cope with the heavy and difficult tasks lying before us, we absolutely must achieve identity of opinions and views in both political work and in the organization itself (identity of views should exist in all Leninist-Stalinist type parties, hence our Party also must be based on these foundations, because identity of views is indispensable, it is the prime condition for the Party to achieve its aims).

(History of the PLA, pp. 116-117)

This is the PLA's own creative interpretation of the Leninist principles of the party. For Mao Tsetung, however, unity is not absolute and eternal but achieved through struggle. While unity is primary, struggle is always necessary to further refine and strengthen that unity. This is the sense of the famous principle of unity-struggle-unity. To attempt to treat this achieved unity, which is always the result of the struggle of opposites, as though it has some absolute existence is to undermine the functioning of democratic centralism. Contradictions are always absolute in a party in the sense that they are always present as the backdrop or environment in which unity is achieved. Political unity within a party undergoes change and transformation, inevitably dividing into its inherent opposites, and being reformed and re-consolidated on a new basis.

Grasping dialectics, Mao Tsetung understood this relationship between unity and contradictions within the party. This led him to understand in an all-around dialectical way the proper functioning of democratic centralism. The essential purpose of democratic centralism is probably best captured by the wording in the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party, submitted by Mao Tsetung and adopted by the Party's Tenth Congress in 1973:

It is essential to create a political situation in which there are both centralism and democracy, both discipline and freedom, both unity of will and personal ease of mind and liveliness.

The democratic aspect of the contradiction between democracy and centralism is not exhausted in the exchange of views and elections. It also entails the responsibility of the party leadership to accept criticism and admit mistakes,
both to the party members and to the masses. On this question as well there is a fundamental difference in the present views of the PLA and those of the CPC under the chairmanship of Mao Tsetung.

Mao Tsetung was always ready to admit his errors and to admit the errors of the Communist Party of China. This represents the scientific honesty and forthrightness of a great Marxist-Leninist. It was Mao's view that the communist party itself could never be an unerring elite; it must always struggle with itself and mobilize the masses to also struggle with it to correct its shortcomings, deviations, and errors. Although the PLA has borrowed to some extent from the conception of the party followed by Mao, it has actually missed its essence. This deviation can be seen in the way the PLA views itself and other Bolshevik parties:

The Bolshevik Party, in Lenin's time, did not make mistakes. At the time when Stalin was at the head of the Central Committee some distortions were made by bureaucrats, but the fundamental principles of the general line of the Party remained intact. They were trampled underfoot after his death, when the Party leadership and the state power were usurped by the Khrushchevite revisionists.

With us, the situation developed in a different way. Our Party has always been prudent and just in its line. Nevertheless individual persons make mistakes, but these are not the mistakes of the Party, of its line.

("Socialism is Built by the Masses, the Party Makes Them Conscious," The PLA on the Building and Life of the Party, pp. 299-300)

This kind of idealist conception of itself and other parties goes hand in hand with the PLA's evaluation of Marxist-Leninists like Mao Tsetung who openly admit that they have made mistakes. For the PLA, a party either makes no mistakes or it is revisionist. Thus, following this type of logic, Enver Hoxha is able to make a blanket and irresponsible statement that Mao Tsetung Thought "has nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism.

True to its idealist formulation of "identity of views" and "freedom from error," the Party of Labor of Albania tends to magnify the deviations of the Chinese Communist Party from Leninist norms and principles. This distortion is found in their widely-publicized view that the CPC encouraged two-line struggle and factions within its ranks. The CPC and Mao Tsetung believed that factions can be nipped in the bud and the losses to the party minimized, but the emergence of erroneous or opportunist lines is inevitable as a reflection of class struggle. This does not mean that Mao Tsetung glorified two-line struggle and allowed factions to promote revisionist lines. The fierce ideological and political struggle between two lines can take place within a party, but the promotion or condoning of two lines within a party violates the principles of democratic centralism. As the Basic Understanding of the Communist Party of China explains:

The leaders of the opportunist lines within the Party, practicing revisionism on the political front, invariably work for splits on the organizational front. Revisionism is the political and ideological source of splittism. Revisionist elements are always splitters—this is an objective law which has been fully demonstrated by all the struggles between the two lines that have taken place within the Party.

(Norman Bethune Institute, p. 62)
If there arise two lines in the party, one line generally represents the proletariat and the other line the bourgeoisie, since the struggles within the party reflect the fundamental contradiction in both capitalist and socialist society. This is a most crucial point: the Chinese understanding of the nature and inevitability of two-line struggle within a party is inseparable from their insights concerning the continued existence of classes and class struggle under socialism. What Mao and the Chinese comrades are trying to point out is that the struggle against opportunist lines within the party must always be seen in class terms. A communist party must always be guided by one, Marxist-Leninist line; there can be no compromise or unprincipled peace among comrades on this question because it is a life-or-death question of class struggle.

After leading the Chinese proletariat and peasantry in seizing power in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party experienced four major two-line struggles before Mao's death. These included the struggle against Kao Kang and Jo Shu-shih in 1954 (factionalism was in fact one of the main charges justifying the purge of Kao Kang); the struggle against Peng Teh-huai in 1959; the struggle begun during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution against the Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-p'ing; and the struggle against Lin Piao and Chen Po-ta in 1970. During roughly this same time period, the Party of Labor of Albania also experienced major two-line struggles, although the Party claims that a separate line was never allowed to crystallize. The Yugoslav revisionists attempted to use the Trotskyist group of Koci Xoxe against the PLA; the Soviet revisionists tried to use Party leaders Liri Belishova and Koco Tashko to split the Party. There have also been recent groups led by Fadil Pacrami and Todi Lubonja; by Beguir Belluku, Petrit Dume and Hito Cako; and by Abdyl Kellezi, Koco Theodhosi and Kico Ngjela who were all supposedly crushed before they were able to disrupt the Party.

On the basis of major struggles within the party, it is difficult to distinguish the historical experience of the PLA from that of the CPC. The differences, however, revolve more around the attitude presently taken towards such struggles. The PLA adamantly denies that any real factions or revisionist lines were able to take shape within their party. This contradicts their own History of the Party of Labor of Albania, where they admit that between 1944-1947 Koci Xoxe was able to usurp a large amount of power in the PLA, and that during this period Trotskyist errors were made internally, errors were made towards Yugoslavia externally and that their "organizational line was generally incorrect." Thus, it is with some measure of bravado that the PLA describes how opportunists have failed to gain influence within the party: "...they have always found themselves faced with its monolithic unity which has suppressed them, and with its steel-like links with the people, which have terrified them." ("Class Struggle Within the Party...", Albania Today, 1 (38), 1978). Mao Tsetung does not underestimate these two valuable weapons of internal unity and unity of the party with the people either: "One is the internal unity of the Party and the other the unity of the Party with the people. These are two most valuable weapons for overcoming hardships, and all Party comrades must cherish them." (quoted in Peking Review, No. 27, July 7, 1972, p. 7). But Mao understands the law of dialectics too well and is too ruthlessly honest to overestimate the extent to which these two unities were achieved by the Communist Party of China. Such unities are built on a foundation of vigorous and extensive democracy both within the Party and in the application of the Party's mass line.

It should be clearer by now that Mao Tsetung follows more squarely in the tradition of Lenin than the Party of Labor of Albania does. The principal reason is that Mao understood much more profoundly the dialectical unity of democracy and
centralism, freedom and discipline. This is not to say that Mao Tsetung did not make errors in his conception of a Marxist-Leninist party, but these deviations often represent overcompensation for the types of violations practiced by the CPSU.

Since Mao's nomination of Wang Ming and Li Li-san to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in 1956 is one of CPUSA/ML's principal examples of Mao's violations of party norms, we will consider this case in some depth. The CPUSA/ML focuses on this fact to try to discredit Mao for allowing representatives of the petty bourgeoisie in the party. But why is this practice subject to criticism while the Comintern's handling of Chiang Kai-shek is not? What about the CPSU's handling of Zinoviev and Kamenev in 1918? Wang Ming and Li Li-san were certainly not as dangerous as Chiang; both had been chairman of the Chinese Communist Party. Mao Tsetung never promoted any illusions about Wang Ming or Li Li-san; he openly explained that the vacillating policies of these two comrades objectively represented the interests of the petty bourgeoisie in China.

Nonetheless, their inclusion in the Central Committee of the CPC as representatives of a class other than the proletariat does represent an important deviation. To fully assess the importance of this, we reproduce the following passage from the speech in question:

China is a country with a huge petty bourgeoisie. A considerable part of the petty bourgeoisie vacillates. It is plain to all that the well-to-do middle peasantry, for instance, invariably vacillate and do not stand firm in any revolution, going wild when elated and burying their heads when pessimistic...They are different from the poor peasants. The poor peasants account for 50 per cent of the rural population in northern China and 70 per cent in the south. In terms of class composition, our Party consists chiefly of workers and poor peasants, namely, the proletariat and the semi-proletariat. The semi-proletariat is also petty bourgeois, but they are much more steadfast than the middle peasants. Our party had admitted a number of intellectuals into its ranks, and of our more than ten million members, intellectuals of the higher, middle, and lower levels total approximately one million. It would not be proper to say that they represent imperialism or that they represent the landlord class, the bureaucrat-capitalist class or the national bourgeoisie; it would be more appropriate to classify them as petty bourgeois.

(Mao Tsetung, Selected Works, Vol. 5, p. 320)

A bit further in the same speech, Mao went on:

The point is that in our society, the petty bourgeoisie is vast in number, that in our Party there are many vacillating elements of petty bourgeois origin and that among the intellectuals there are many such elements; they all want to see what will happen to these test cases (Wang Ming and Li Li-san). When they see these two standards still there, they will feel comfortable, they will sleep well and be pleased. If you haul down the two standards, they may panic. Therefore, it is not a question of whether Wang Ming and Li Li-san will mend their ways, that does not matter very much. What matters is that the millions of party members of petty-bourgeois origin who are prone to vacillate, and the intellectuals in particular, are watching the kind of attitude we take towards Wang Ming and Li Li-san.

(continued on next page)
This is like our treatment of the rich peasants in the agrarian reform; when we left the rich peasants untouched, the middle peasants were at ease. If we adopt the same attitude towards these two men at the Eighth Congress as we did at the Seventh, our Party will have something to gain, to derive benefit from, that is, the task of remoulding the masses of the petty bourgeoisie throughout the country will be easier. (p. 322)

Our evaluation of these passages is the following:

1) It is important to point out that Mao expressly differentiates the question of representatives of the petty bourgeoisie from that of representatives of the national bourgeoisie.

2) It is clear that by "petty bourgeoisie" here Mao means in general the peasantry.

3) In our view, Mao is here referring to the way in which the vacillations of cadre of petty bourgeois origin are to be dealt with. His stand towards Wang Ming and Li Li-san is put squarely in the context of facilitating the ideological remolding of such cadre.

4) Particularly in a country like China, with a proportionately small proletariat, it is absolutely necessary for the party to include members of non-proletarian origin. It is further absolutely necessary for any party to admit intellectuals due to the skills and cultural and scientific level they have been able to obtain. The Bolshevik Party itself had many members from these strata, particularly after 1917. Their ideology, rather than class origin, is key; and this question is not solved by the relatively simple fact of admission to the party.

Nonetheless, it is our view that these passages do represent a deviation (not a full-blown trend) from correct party principles. The examples of Wang Ming and Li Li-san show Mao Tsetung's tendency, over-reacting to violations within the CPSU, to too strictly separate ideological struggle from organizational measures. At the top level of the party this meant that opportunists like Liu Shao-chi were given too much power in the name of keeping the party chairman separated from the implementation of party line. The justification for this kind of role for the party chairman was to prevent a re-occurrence of the arbitrariness of Stalin which had a debilitating effect on the Bolshevik Party in the USSR.

Throughout the party, although ideological criticism and struggle were severe, organizational measures tended to be lenient in the name of "curing the sickness to save the patient." This organizational leniency relied on an over-estimation of the power of criticism/self-criticism and the corrigeability of opportunists.

We will close this section by citing two further deviations from party norms on the part of Mao Tsetung. First of all, it seems absolutely clear that--at least in the period after the Cultural Revolution--factions existed within the CPC. The extent to which Mao bears some responsibility for this is as yet unclear. Certainly, the charge of organizational leniency plays a role here. It is our sense that the influence of revisionist capitalist roaders within the CPC was strong throughout the period in which China was a socialist country. This should not be a surprising fact, since the CPC shared this characteristic with the overwhelming majority of the parties of the Third International and yet, unlike its "fraternal parties," was still able to hold to a Marxist-Leninist course. Mao's study of modern revisionism led him to lead the Cultural Revolution against this form of opportunism in the CPC. However, the Party emerged from the Cultural Revolution still split into two camps; and the result greatly increased the possibility of the eventual victory of revisionism in the CPC which has now occurred. As we have stressed already, a full analysis of the
victories and weaknesses of the Cultural Revolution and the history of the CPC is necessary before we can assess whether that party correctly struggled against the factions which developed.

Finally, we believe that Mao Tsetung deviated from Marxism-Leninism in his reliance on the cult of the individual. This cult of Mao reached its heights during the Cultural Revolution and was seemingly exploited by Mao in order to increase his personal authority at the expense of the capitalist-roaders like Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-p'ing. This personal authority was utilized as a substitute for the authority of the Communist Party, which was in shambles.

Mao made use of the cult built up around him because it helped to defeat the revisionists within the Party, but this does not justify the severe ideological shortcomings of such an approach, nor does it deal with the question of how the situation had become desperate enough to require such a cult. Nonetheless, there are a number of indications that Mao did not personally approve of the cult, and certainly not the way that opportunists like Lin Piao promoted it for their own purposes. In a letter written confidentially to his wife, Chiang Ching, in 1966 Mao expresses his own views on the Mao cult and the way Lin Piao used it:

I would never have thought that the few books I have written could have such magic powers. Now he has sung the praises of my works, the whole country will follow his example. This reminds me of the old woman who was selling melons and who exaggerated the quality of her wares. My friend and his colleagues have presented me with a fait accompli. It looks as if there is no other course left open to me than to give my approval.

(J. van Ginneken, The Rise and Fall of Lin Piao, p. 63)

To point the finger at the gross violations of Marxism-Leninism by Lin Piao is not meant to absolve Mao Tsetung of some of the errors. If Mao went along with Lin Piao, it is because to some extent he shared some of the same deviations, although to a lesser extent. But to point out errors or mistakes of Mao, it is not necessary to depart from the camp of Marxism-Leninism and succumb to Trotskyism, as the CPUSA/ML is doing. It was always a tradition of Mao Tsetung to sum up both the positive and negative aspects of other great Marxist-Leninists and communist parties, and no doubt the same tradition with respect to Mao himself will be followed by those in this country and world-wide who still consider Mao Tsetung to be a great Marxist-Leninist.

**Proletarian Honesty vs. Bourgeois Idealism**

This paper has provided a basic statement of the contributions to the cause of the international proletariat for which Mao Tsetung has justly been considered a great Marxist-Leninist. The basis of such a judgment, particularly around the questions of revolutionary struggle in semi-colonial countries and the class forces in socialist society, is in our view uncontestable. This is why upholding the fundamental views and practices of Mao Tsetung in the face of the present revisionist course of the CPC is a very prominent line of demarcation in the difficult situation face by the world proletariat today.

Nonetheless, as we have stressed throughout this paper, the dialectical and historical method must be applied to assessing the work of Mao Tsetung as well as that of any other Marxist-Leninist or communist party. It will not do to claim, as the RCP does, that Mao's work is exempt from any incorrect practices or intern-
al contradictions. Neither will it do to claim that Mao Tsetung Thought "has nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism," while the practice of Stalin and the Comintern is beyond reproach. This is the stance of the PLA and its lap-dogs like the CPUSA/ML and the COUSML.

The international proletariat has won outstanding victories over the last century, particularly in the Great October Revolutions of 1917 and 1949. Future successes of the proletarian movement, here in the US as well as internationally, depends very greatly on the abilities of Marxist-Leninists to correctly and soberly assess the historical legacy of that movement. The lessons it provides must be learned, within the context of upholding the value and validity of our history.

In order to realize this goal, comrades must first of all study this history. Secondly, we must reject any tendency to surrender to discouragement, confusion, or the belief that the restoration of capitalism in the USSR, the victory of revisionism in the CPC, and the present revisionist lines of the PLA force us to question the entire science of Marxism-Leninism. On the contrary. These defeats, while tragic, signify that the method and principles of this science are neither sufficiently widespread nor deeply grasped. The great work of Marx and Lenin in particular provide us with enough tools to turn these defeats to our eventual advantage.

Finally, we must firmly reject the ostrich-like idealism which, like defeatism, is another petty bourgeois refuge from the demands placed on Marxist-Leninists by the present situation. Idealism is a common thread in the recent work of the PLA and the CPUSA/ML, as seen in the thoroughly undialectical blanket condemnation of the past 50 years of revolutionary experience in China as well as in their deification of Stalin and the Comintern.

From our experience with the CPUSA/ML, we can say that the charge of idealism in no way implies that the leadership of that organization is confused or starry-eyed. On the contrary. It is absolutely conscious of the road it is taking and the reasons it does so. It is also very conscious of the way in which it plans to gradually build up to organizational embrace with the present PLA line on Mao and the Chinese revolution. The idealism of the basic cadre, however, is an essential complement to the opportunism of the leadership; and this is a situation objectively fostered and encouraged by the leadership through their indifference to training cadre in the science of dialectical and historical materialism. This form of idealism among the basic cadre has always nourished ultra-"left" sects; the CPUSA/ML is "oh so radical" it even has the "courage" to trash the entire history of revolutionary China.

Underlying the entire question of the defense of Mao and the Chinese revolution is the question of what philosophy and method each comrade is going to adopt—either idealism or materialism, either metaphysics or dialectics. What viewpoints and methods each comrade adopts will determine what class interests he or she is serving. Our ability to learn the lessons of history and thus lead the US proletariat in the struggle to establish its dictatorship depends greatly on comrades' grasping the ideological implications of the present struggle around Mao Tsetung. Because its contradictions and constant motion does not fit their ideal standards, idealists lash out at reality, sabotage the revolutionary movement from within, and use their super-revolutionary disguise to serve the reactionary interests of the bourgeoisie.

We must be perfectly frank about the grave consequences of the positions on Mao Tsetung and the Chinese Revolution which the PLA and other parties are in the process of developing. To label Mao Tsetung a revisionist and claim that socialism long admired in the People's Republic of China was a fraud is to turn reality on its head and directly and inevitably serve the interests of the imperialist bourgeoisie.
Such reactionary positions are bound to lead in practice to the following consequences:

1) Turn contradictions among Marxist-Leninists world-wide into antagonistic contradictions and split the international communist and workers movement.

2) Absolve the real revisionists currently in power in China and allow them to strengthen themselves by fraudulently claiming they are the true inheritors of Mao Tsetung.

3) Discredit the very idea of socialism and spread bourgeois cynicism, disorientation and demoralization among the proletariat and oppressed peoples of the world.

Under the present conditions in the world communist movement, to defend Mao Tsetung represents a fundamental defense of Marxism-Leninism. To attack Mao and the Chinese revolution, as both the CPUSA/ML and the PLA are doing, is to strengthen the hand of revisionism and serve the interests of imperialist reaction.
THE PLA'S TREACHEROUS REVERSAL:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE PLA'S LETTER (JULY 29, 1978)

Introduction

On July 7, 1978, after 24 years of internationalist economic and military aid from the People's Republic of China to the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, this aid was withdrawn by the revisionists presently in control of the Communist Party of China. After the triumph of revisionism in China following Mao's death in September, 1976, this hostile act came as no surprise. What was surprising was the response of the PLA in its July 29th Letter of the CC of the Party of Labor and the Government of Albania to the CC of the Communist Party and the Government of China (full text appears in appendix A). This Letter was a veiled but virulent attack on the entire history of socialism in China and the great leadership given by Mao Tsetung to the Chinese people and to the world's proletariat. The charges and slanders implied in the July Letter have now been made explicit in Imperialism and the Revolution.

The following response to the Letter is a slightly edited version of a document written for the struggle within the MLOC against the adoption of the views of the PLA. It was produced within the International Commission of the MLOC and was submitted to that organization's Central Committee. It never got out of that body. Even there, the substance of its criticisms was never addressed, on the grounds that this document attacked the PLA.

While the Letter itself has been superceded by the more explicit slanders and concoctions of the PLA in Imperialism and the Revolution, in our view it is still valuable to publish the exposure of the Letter at this time. Its more timely circulation, of course, would have been still more valuable; and the comrades responsible for this delay are self-critical about it. But this delay does not alter the fact that the Letter represents a nadir for the PLA in an anti-Marxist style of polemics, dominated by innuendo and ambiguity. This style is often used to delude Marxist-Leninists, to weaken their resistance, and to test their resolve. The response to this Letter has the merit of showing how to expose and analyze such attacks. Such an exposure, based upon understanding of previous instances and some considerable investigation, often requires a very careful reading. To help comrades grasp this method, as well as to encourage comrades to compare the Letter and Imperialism and the Revolution, we are also republishing the Letter itself (see appendix A).

Secondly, the Letter is significant in that, although it does not name names, it is in many ways less cautious in its claims and slanders than Imperialism and the Revolution. For example, through falsifying in detail the historical record, the Letter attempts to buttress the Albanian claim that they were the only consistent opponents of Khrushchev. It is vital to expose these claims before they slip into history unchallenged.

We uphold the merit of the PLA in the historical struggle with Khrushchev. Nonetheless, the substance of its recent polemics must be absolutely condemned. The way it has unfolded these polemics is unprincipled.
In November, 1976, the 7th Congress of the PLA, while opposing the Theory of the Three Worlds, still upheld Mao as an outstanding Marxist-Leninist and praised the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution as a victory. In his address to this Congress, Enver Hoxha stated:

No slander or concoction of the bourgeois revisionist propaganda can cast any shadow over the Marxist-Leninist character and vitality of the Albanian-Chinese friendship.

By July 1978, however, the PLA Letter began to cast just such a shadow. This was followed by further articles, which began to openly attack "Mao Tsetung Thought" while remaining strangely silent about Mao himself. Meanwhile, in April 1978, a party fraternal to the PLA, the Communist Party of Germany/Marxist-Leninist (KPD/ML), published an article which cast Mao from the ranks of classic teachers of Marxism-Leninism. The charges raised by the German party are essentially the same as those raised in Imperialism and the Revolution. Finally, with the publication of that book, the full weight of the PLA was thrown behind the charges that Mao was a revisionist and that socialism never existed in China, slanders which had until then only been implied.

As we now know, Imperialism and the Revolution, released in December 1978, was first published in April 1978 for distribution within the PLA. Clearly the July Letter and the earlier attacks by the KPD(ML) were designed to gradually unfold the revisionist conclusions on Mao and the CPC, conclusions which had been fully developed for quite some time.

In the meantime, the PLA leadership felt quite free to continue taking aid from the Chinese people in the name of socialism and mutual benefit. But with the PLA's private repudiation of the Marxist-Leninist character and vitality of the Albanian-Chinese friendship, the giving and the receiving of this aid could not be considered a mutually beneficial socialist exchange. In spite of its protestations, the PLA obviously considered the friendship of the Chinese people a means of economic profit. This unprincipled appropriation of the resources of the far poorer Chinese people shows how economic interest dovetailed with the PLA's polemical deviousness.

The exposure of the July Letter strikes hard at the anti-Marxist style of cloaked assertions and falsifications. It does not get at the roots and the specific purposes served by these great changes in the PLA positions. These are beginning to unfold as can be seen in the instances cited above and in numerous threads of Imperialism and the Revolution. A chief and pressing task is a full exposure of this work, including especially its sections on imperialism.
Comrades:

The Letter of the CC of PLA and Government of Albania to the CC of the CP and Government of China raises many questions indeed. This letter goes far beyond a just condemnation of China's hostile attack on socialist construction and national defense in Albania. It goes far beyond exposing the immediate political motivation behind the Chinese withdrawal of aid (i.e., the PLA's principled attack on the revisionist Theory of the Three Worlds), a motivation which the Chinese revisionists attempted to conceal with pseudo-technical excuses. The Letter has surprisingly little to say about the line and policies of the revisionist Teng-Hua clique currently at the head of the CPC—but has a lot to say about the anti-Leninist character of the Chinese revolution, the CPC and Mao Tsetung. The Letter, by innuendo, falsification or implication, completely reverses positions formerly maintained by the PLA on:

1. The great victories of the dictatorship of the proletariat and socialist construction in China;
2. The CPC as an authentic communist party;
3. Mao Tsetung as a great Marxist-Leninist, whose theoretical and practical leadership possesses international value;
4. The role played by the CPC and Mao as fighters against modern revisionism;
5. The role played by the CPC and Mao as fighters against imperialism;
6. The assessment of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution as a vital revolutionary movement that preserved socialism and the dictatorship of the proletariat from imminent revisionist-capitalist restoration;
7. The Marxist-Leninist character of the relations between the Chinese, Albanian and other fraternal parties and states;
8. The Chinese people's assistance to the Albanian people, in spite of China's own scant resources.

This reversal of correct verdicts has been made even more explicit by the PLA and by other parties which follow its lead. The Political Bureau has already sent out articles to cadre by the Portuguese Communist Party (Reconstructed) and the Communist Party of Germany (M-L), parties with which they are developing fraternal relations. The Portuguese article attacks the Cultural Revolution as nothing more than a cynical manipulation of the masses. At the same time they pointed out that the groups which formed their party began much of their early activity through "misguided" inspiration from this self-same Cultural Revolution. The German article, entitled "Mao Tsetung is Not a Classic Teacher of Marxism-Leninism", makes charges that not only disqualify Mao from the rank of a "classic" but put him in line for the mantle of Khrushchev as an arch-revisionist. Most of the analysis in this article is identical with the attacks made on Mao years earlier by the Soviet revisionists and their international camp followers (see appendix B, "Khrushchevite Revisionism Analyzes China and Mao"). Finally, in "The Revolution--A Question Taken Up For Solution", a speech made in early October 1978, Ramiz Alia states:

The Chinese version of modern revisionism goes even further in the struggle against Leninism than all its revisionists which preceded it (sic), by opposing to it the so-called "Mao Tsetung thought" and its offspring--the theory of "three worlds," which is complete negation of the revolution.

We are asked to accept that the CPC only fought modern revisionism and U.S. imperialism for its own selfish, nationalistic purposes and was constantly on the lookout for the opportunity to jump into bed with one or the other. We are asked to place Comrade Mao Tsetung on the same shelf with the renegades Tito and Khrushchev, thus calling into question dictatorship of the proletariat and socialist construction in China. Comrades, these are very heavy steps to take solely on the basis of international authority, even on the authority of the tested PLA. It has a much greater weight than, for example, holding up Romania as a socialist country and popularizing its revisionist party on the basis of the international authority of the CPC, which at the time we believed to be a great, tested and correct Party (and which, at the time, was being put forward as such by the PLA). This is one we won't be able to shrug off or chalk up to inexperience.

The position now being put forward by the PLA and the fraternal parties on the eight points outlined above represents a reversal of fundamentally correct verdicts. It contains serious misrepresentations and falsifications of the historical record, particularly on the question of the struggle against Khrushchevite revisionism. It disrupts the international communist movement and creates doubt and dismay among the class-conscious workers. Although the PLA attack on Mao takes a left-dogmatist form, it is similar in effect to Khrushchev's attack on Stalin.

This historical analogy is not put forward lightly. For 30 years after the death of Lenin, Stalin's leadership was synonymous with dictatorship of the proletariat and socialist construction in the USSR and with the battle against Trotskyism, right-opportunist Bukharinism, and emerging modern revisionism. To all these opportunist trends, not to mention the imperialist bourgeoisie, Stalin was public enemy number one. As both the CPC and PLA have repeatedly pointed out, a sweeping attack on him only served these enemies of socialism, who crowed "you see, we were right all along!"

For over a quarter of a century, since the death of Stalin and with the rise of Khrushchevite revisionism and capitalist restoration in the USSR and the European People's Democracies, Mao Tsetung and the People's Republic of China have been symbols of socialism, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and of struggle against modern revisionism and imperialism. This view was most eloquently summed-up by Enver Hoxha in a speech to his Electors, "Our Policy is an Open Policy, the Policy of Proletarian Principles" which was delivered October 3, 1974. This was after Teng Hsiao-p'ing had put forward the Theory of the Three Worlds in April at the United Nations and was three years after China had supposedly "joined the dance of imperialist alliances and rivalries for the redivision of the world, where China, too, would have its own share." (Letter, appendix A, A-13). In that speech, Hoxha said:

The Albanian people and all the people of the world nurture an ardent love and place deep trust in great socialist China, in her glorious Party and in Mao Tsetung, the great and beloved leader not only of the Chinese people and communists, but also the dear and respected leader of all the peoples and communists of the world. This infuriates modern revisionism, which, with the Moscow renegades at its head, and in collusion with U.S. imperialism is waging a fierce and diabolical struggle to oppose the peoples and China...The greatest enemy of U.S. imperialism and of Soviet social-imperialism are the peoples of the world, with great Mao Tsetung's China at the head. The struggle is being waged between freedom and socialism, on the one hand, and slavery and aggressive imperialism of the two superpowers, on the other. All the peoples of the world have pinned their hopes of liberation, independence, and well-being on their efforts and on Mao's China. They are not mistaken, and their conviction is not based on propaganda, but on a great reality,
which shines like the light of the sun on the construction of socialism in China, which is being carried on in a correct way, according to the doctrine of Marx and Lenin and the teachings of Mao Tsetung; it is based on the determined political stand of the People's Republic of China in the international arena, on the concrete moral, political, and economic help it gives the peoples of the world.


Comrades have the responsibility of asking themselves, whom does an attack on the memory of Mao Tsetung serve? It serves the Khrushchevite revisionists in the USSR and around the world. Indeed, since the mid-1960's, Mao Tsetung has replaced Stalin as the number one target of Khrushchevite attack. The revisionists for years have claimed that China was not a socialist country and that Mao was no Marxist-Leninist but an eclectic petty bourgeois nationalistic who sought to ally with imperialism and international reaction, to provoke war, and to expand Chinese rule. Trotskyism has echoed this position.

Such an attack serves imperialism. Yesterday, the imperialists condemned Mao in the same terms they did Stalin, as a tyrant, butcher and madman. Today, they damn him with faint praise as an incurable idealist, who's conceptions of self-reliance and continuing the revolution under socialism were bound to fail because they flew in the face of economic reality and human nature. They are more than happy to see Mao saddled with the authorship of the Theory of Three Worlds, which provides them with great aid and comfort. The fact is that the revisionists in power in the CPC have yet to produce one document written by Mao in which he puts forward this theory. And of course, the imperialists can only rejoice when they see splits arise within the communist and workers movement.

The attack on Mao serves the revisionists in power in the CPC, who are already beginning to mount an ideological and practical attack on all that is most revolutionary in Mao's thinking and policies. To the degree that the international communist movement fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between their counter-revolutionary line and the correct line of Mao Tsetung, we legitimize their revisionist rule and blacken the glorious pages written by the Chinese people in the history of socialist revolution. It amounts to the same thing as trying to pin the main responsibility for capitalist restoration in the USSR on Stalin.

From Praise to Damnation

The attacks on Mao Tsetung represent a sharp break with the past position of the PLA. Was Comrade Mao free from error? No. Does his thought represent a totally new stage in the development of Marxism-Leninism? No. But it does constitute an extremely significant contribution to it. As Enver Hoxha himself wrote on the occasion of Mao's 80th birthday in 1973:

You, dear comrade Mao Tsetung, as a great theoretician and strategist of the revolution, in irreconcilable struggle with various opportunistic trends...especially with the dangerous preachings of the Khrushchevite revisionists who have betrayed the cause of the revolution and communism, loyally and courageously defended the triumphant doctrine of Marxism-
Leninism. As an outstanding follower of the great teachers of the world proletariat, Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, in compliance with the conditions of China and the features of the present epoch, you further developed and creatively enriched Marxist-Leninist science in the field of philosophy, the development of the proletarian party, the strategy and tactics of the revolutionary struggle and the struggle against imperialism, and the problems of the construction of the socialist society. Your precepts on continuing the revolution under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, so as to carry socialist construction to final victory and bar the way to the danger of the restoration of capitalism, whatever form it takes, and wherever it comes from, constitute a valuable contribution, of great international value, to the theory and practice of scientific socialism. Your works are a real revolutionary education for all Marxist-Leninists and working people.

(Albania Today, Supplement Nr. 6, 73)

Having taken such a strong position in the past, one could only expect the PLA to continue to uphold Mao as a great Marxist-Leninist while attacking the revisionists who have usurped power in the Chinese Party and state. This was the course followed by the PLA with regard to the revisionists' attacks on Stalin. If Mao's errors are indeed serious, a complete assessment of his work must be made. To single out the negative features, as the MLOC seems to be preparing to do is totally incorrect. Our approach towards Mao should be all-sided, as was the CPC's assessment of Stalin. It will not do to praise a leader of the international communist movement as a great continuer of the revolutionary tradition of the Marxist-Leninist teachers for a quarter of a century, and then, without a trace of self-criticism, to suddenly damn him as a dangerous revisionist.

In the Letter (p. A-11), the PLA explains that:

Although the ideological differences deepened further, our Party went on with its struggle for the strengthening of the friendship and cooperation with the Communist Party of China, hoping that this would help the Chinese leadership to sound positions in the common struggle against revisionism and imperialism.

At another point in the Letter (p. A-9), it states that:

In their support for China against the enemies of socialism and their defense of its stands and actions which were taken on the right road, the Albanian communists and people fought for the strengthening of the positions of Marxism-Leninism and socialism in China.

But Hoxha's statements, quoted above, go far beyond this. They promote the leadership of Mao and the CPC in the international movement. Since the PLA is a mature and tested party, it must provide a better explanation than this of the discrepancy between its former and present views on the CPC and Mao Tsetung. This is particularly true since the PLA continued to uphold Mao Tsetung, the CPC, and socialist China as late as the first part of 1977, when the PLA had already held its 7th Party Congress and was leading the offensive against the counter-revolutionary Theory of the Three Worlds.
In the absence of such an explanation/self-criticism, one can conclude only one of two things:

Either the position presently being put forward by the PLA always represented its true views on Mao, the CPC and socialist China, even though these views were concealed from the international communist movement and the revolutionary peoples of the world,

Or these views represent a new line and are symptomatic of an intense struggle within the leadership of the PLA, a struggle which will lead to similar reversals on issues not immediately related to the Chinese question.

If the first instance is correct, and the PLA has held such views for a long time, the PLA is open to charges of gravely misleading the communists and peoples of the world. It can be charged with passing off what it secretly held to be an anti-Leninist trend as "the real thing." Albanian Marxist-Leninists could be open to the charge of "selling themselves for 30 pieces of silver," as Khrushchev once accused them of doing.

We believe, instead, that the Letter represents a fundamental break in the path taken by the PLA up to now. The PLA and other fraternal parties are in danger of taking a wrong turn. Faced with the rapid triumph of the revisionists in China following Mao's death, they are in the process of throwing the proverbial baby out with the bath-water. The Albanian comrades, while they were allied with China, never hesitated to follow their own course and put forward their own views, e.g., in regard to the Common Market. After such differences with the CPC had become public and even after Mao's death, the PLA continued to maintain that "the name and work of Comrade Mao Tsetung are immortal" (Albania Today, No. 1, 32, 1977, p.55). One can only assume that this was their position at that time, even though we are not yet able to fully ascertain why this break is occurring now. We know, however, that the position embodied in this letter is open to the same charge raised by the PLA against Khrushchev and Co.'s attack on Stalin: they "are now falsifying history...are now denying what yesterday they admitted with their own mouths." ("An Open Letter to Members of the CPSU," in "Green Book," p. 256).2

The MLOC must attack Chinese revisionism, but if it follows the path of the Letter, it will be taking the wrong road. There is no getting around the fact that wrong lines on the international situation were being implemented while Mao Tsetung was chairman of the CPC, and the correctness of Mao's leadership will inevitably have to be examined. But it is also a fact that with his dying breath Mao attacked Teng Hsiao-p'ing (who is the number one revisionist in China today and the number one proponent of the Theory of the Three Worlds) as a man who "makes no distinction between imperialism and Marxism." We cannot attack revisionism in China today by taking the position that it was never socialist, never had a proletarian dictatorship, and was always under bourgeois and petty bourgeois leadership. This is in fact the position of modern revisionism and Trotskyism.

The PLA Letter's Characterization of the CPC and Mao: Slurs and Innuendo in the Place of Marxist-Leninist Analysis

The centerpiece of the Letter is its point 5. In this section it is all but openly stated that the CPC was never a Marxist-Leninist Party, a vanguard party of
the working class. At best, it was composed of a "Marxist-Leninist nucleus." which nevertheless "slipped into dangerous eclecticism." Thus, from an unspecified date, there were no Marxist-Leninists or Marxist-Leninist lines within it. Indeed, the Letter states:

The entire period of the great Cultural Revolution was a very difficult period for socialism in China, it created a complicated and chaotic situation. This situation was the logical outcome of the factional and unprincipled struggle which took place within the ranks of the Communist Party of China during the time of the struggle for the carrying-out of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and after 1949, around the road which China would follow for the further development of the revolution. (Letter, p. A-11)

This passage indicates that the degeneration of the CPC began not just in 1949, but much earlier. One can only speculate as to what this means concretely. Perhaps the slide began at the Tsunyi Conference (1935), when Mao Tsetung was elected chairman; or perhaps it even goes as far back as the founding of the party itself in 1921! Thus, the CPC consisted of "factions, persons and groups holding various non-Marxist-Leninist views," "pro-Khrushchevites, pro-Americans, opportunists and revolutionaries." We are to assume that out of all these, Mao was at best a "revolutionary," since he was supported by the PLA against out-and-out revisionists, and at worst a "dangerous eclectic."

The description of the CPC as a party "where deep contradictions existed" and in which "a hundred flowers blossomed and a hundred schools contended" (a phrase never used by Mao in the context of inner-Party life) implies that Mao actually fostered the existence of factions inside the Party. Similarly, Mao is implicitly held responsible for the fact that:

...the Cultural Revolution, more often than not, preserved the spirit and actions of an unprincipled struggle, which was not led by a genuine party of the working class which should strive for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

(p. A-11, emphasis added)

Finally, the letter implies that Mao is responsible for the fact that "these clashes amongst factionalist groups ended in the establishment in China of a state power dominated by bourgeois and revisionist elements."

In the Letter, the PLA states that it supported the Cultural Revolution at Mao's personal request, that it supported "the general line of the Cultural Revolution for the liquidation of the capitalist and revisionist elements who had usurped key positions in Party and state power, though it did not agree over many questions of principle and methods." Which ones? The PLA cynically calls upon the present revisionist leadership of the CPC, which is denouncing the GPCR, to make a real Marxist-Leninist assessment of it. From what we can piece together from the Letter, the PLA's interpretation is fourfold:

a) the GPCR was not guided by Marxism-Leninism;
b) the groups and people who carried it out were not Marxist-Leninists but factionalist brawlers;
c) those it was directed against, however, were bourgeois and revisionist elements, and
d) the GPCR, rather than "creating a revolutionary situation and...consolidating the positions of socialism and the dictatorship of the proletariat in China," as Enver Hoxha said at the 7th Party Congress of the PLA, actually drove the final nail into their coffin.
This represents a complete reversal of the PLA's previous verdict on the GPCR. Formerly, they characterized it as "a brilliant example of how to overthrow the various revisionist cliques which have usurped the leadership of the Party and State." (Hoxha, Speech at Mao's 80th Birthday Meeting, *Albania Today* supplement, nr. 6, 1973). Comparing this statement with the Letter, the least one can ask is that the PLA be more explicit on what principles and methods they opposed from the beginning and why they thought it could "find the road of true revolutionary struggle, led by the working class and its vanguard the Communist Party," if it was "inspired and led by Mao Tsetung personally," by a factionalist eclectic? Perhaps they hoped he would be pushed aside by some unnamed authentically proletarian forces?

The Letter makes it clear that the PLA accepts the claim of the present CPC leadership that the Theory of the Three Worlds is Mao's creation. Furthermore, the Letter finds that Mao's discussion of the question of boundaries in Europe expresses "the chauvinistic spirit of a great state and bourgeois nationalism, it was an instigation of war in Europe."

Comrades, these charges are clearly designed to cast a deep spell of doubt over the CPC and Mao. But even if you can swallow such slanders, they must also make you wonder about the PLA--how could it ally with such forces?

**The PLA Letter on Socialism and the DOP in China: More Slurs & Innueudos**

While the Letter speaks of "the cause of socialism in China," of "socialist forces," and of laying "the foundations of socialism in China," nowhere does it say that socialism or the dictatorship of the proletariat ever existed in China.

According to the Letter, China had only a "bourgeois democratic" revolution. Now, comrades, since the Second World Congress of the Communist International, it has been the custom for Marxist-Leninists to refer to the bourgeois revolution in colonial and semi-colonial countries as "national revolutionary" or "national democratic" in so far as it is directed against imperialism and thus represents a component part of the world revolution. To dismiss the Chinese revolution, which the PLA once hailed as the greatest event since the October Revolution, as merely a bourgeois revolution is a slur on the class character and ideology of the CPC. Even more serious, it flies in the face of the teachings of Lenin and Stalin on the national liberation struggle.

The Letter goes on to state that "the great ideas of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the Marxist-Leninist ideology were not properly made the example for, the pillar and compass of, the Communist Party of China" and that this, plus unbridled factionalism, "seriously hampered the laying of the foundations of socialism in China." Thus, at best, China never got beyond New Democracy. Then, "the entire period of the Great Cultural Revolution was a very difficult period for socialism in China." Finally, as a result of the GPCR, the revisionists and capitalist roaders come to power, ending the 30-odd years of "political-ideological and organizational chaos...in the Chinese state." (Letter, p. A-11)

This is the ledger of the Chinese revolution as recently amended by the PLA: no socialist construction, no dictatorship of the proletariat, and a cultural revolution not led by a genuine party of the working class.

What are we to make of this? In the past and at this very moment the Albanian comrades and all Marxist-Leninists have insisted that bourgeois revisionist states
like Yugoslavia not be portrayed as socialist. To do so is to criminally deceive the international working class. The hope that socialism might win out in China is no excuse for describing its mode of production as socialist if it never actually was. But in fact China was a socialist country. To say otherwise is to admit that the bourgeoisie can not only carry out land reform, but collectivize agriculture; that it can develop industry outside the world capitalist system; that it can bring medical care and education to the toiling masses who have been deprived of them from time immemorial; and that it can arm the masses, even call its own authority into question with a political movement such as the GPCR. How can such great changes be accomplished without the leadership of a proletarian party? Since the publication of Theory and Practice of Revolution in July, 1977, the PLA has taken the position that the anti-imperialist revolution cannot succeed without the leadership of a Marxist-Leninist party. To ascribe such great victories of the Chinese working class and peasantry to the bourgeoisie is to go even further than the Theory of the Three Worlds!

The PLA Letter on Norms of Inter-Party Relations

If, as the PLA Letter charges, the CPC never observed the norms of functioning of a Leninist party in its internal life, it should come as no surprise that its relations with other Parties should fail to conform to those norms. The letter repeats the charge of the Revolutionary Communist Party of Chile and other fraternal parties that the CPC never accepted comradely criticism on its line and activities and that it failed to consult with other parties before making major turns in its policies (such as the "tilt" towards the US). It cites a number of instances in which the CPC refused to respond to criticisms made by the PLA and to requests for consultation in regard to differences.

There can be no denying that this constitutes an extremely serious breach of inter-party norms.

However, it is incorrect to claim that "the leadership of the Communist Party of China never wanted Leninist norms and methods to be implemented in relations among parties," and that it "knows no other way apart from dictate and imposition of its views" (emphasis added). This is a slander and the Letter itself contains much material which refutes this view.

The Letter states (p. A-14) that during the struggle against Khrushchevite revisionism:

...the Communist Party of China adhered to the principle, and stressed, that there was no 'mother party' or 'daughter party,' that any party enjoyed the right to hold its own views on all problems, that a party was truly communist and revolutionary when it looked at this problem from the angle of Marxism-Leninism."

It goes on to state that the CPC has violated these norms in trying to impose its alliance with US imperialism on the international communist movement and the national liberation movement. This has certainly been true for the past few years. But the divergences between China and Albania emerged in 1971, and it was seven years later, after Mao's death, that the CPC retaliated against the PLA's private and public expression of its disagreement with the turn in China's policy. On August 6, 1971, the CC of the PLA wrote to the CPC protesting the invitation to Nixon. On August 29 an Albanian delegation met with Chou En-lai. It is unclear whether the Nixon trip was discussed, but China's aid to Albania certainly was. This is what Chou had to say:
We are doing our internationalist duty and it will be betrayal if we do not help you...As the bastion of socialism in Europe, you are fighting against imperialism, revisionism and all reaction. If we do not help you, we would not be internationalist communists, but traitors. Support and assistance between us, between China and Albania, are mutual. You are a radiant beacon in Europe, and you are fighting unflinchingly and intrepidly. This is of great aid to, and support for, us and all the peoples of the world. (Letter, p. A-3)

In the sections of the Letter concerning debates between Albania and China on economic development and military aid, it is evident that the Albanian comrades were able to disregard advice they considered incorrect and still receive economic credits and military aid. The Letter refers to but does not detail Chinese interference in Albanian affairs during this period. However, the Letter does contain many examples of the Chinese acceptance of Albanian plans which they initially considered ill-advised, for example, the construction of hydroelectric power plants.

The Letter makes much of the fact that the CPC failed to send a delegation to the PLA's 6th Congress, held November 1, 1971, to discuss the divergences between the two Parties' international line. It claims that the CPC "concocted some absurd excuses" for its absence. That sounds pretty bad--until one remembers what went on between the visit of the Albanian delegation in late August and the Congress. In September of that year, Lin Piao, who also opposed the Nixon visit, attempted to assassinate Mao Tsetung. When this failed, he fled towards Moscow, carrying with him most of China's military, state, and Party secrets. It was not known what documents had survived his plane's crash in Mongolia, and the possibility of war between China and Mongolia (backed, of course, by the USSR) over the violation of airspace was a real one. The struggle against Lin Piao had gone on within the Party for many months before his flight. Is the PLA suggesting that the CPC should have kept it completely informed of these events? For months afterwards, the main attention of the Chinese leadership had to be focused on assessing the extent of the damage, assuring the loyalty of the Army, and conducting a campaign of explanation within the Party. Not so absurd an excuse after all.

The PLA, in calling upon the present leadership of the CPC to publish its Letter in the Party organ Renmin Ribao, admits that in the past, under Mao's leadership, the Chinese upheld the norm of publishing both sides of a polemical exchange.

A final question of norms involved the question of attacks leveled at fraternal parties from the platform of Party Congresses. The PLA correctly refutes the Chinese charge that its 7th Congress attacked China, the CPC, and Mao. In fact this Congress praises them all highly and is absolutely consistent with the historical stand of the PLA. During the struggle against Khrushchevite revisionism, both parties had defended Leninist norms of inter-party relations against Khrushchev's repeated use of Party Congresses to attack the CPC, PLA, and other forces upholding Marxism-Leninism.

The PLA Letter on the Struggle Against Modern Revisionism

One of the most distressing aspects of the Letter is the PLA's attempt to negate the great ideological contribution of the CPC in the struggle against modern revisionism. The Letter claims that the CPC and Mao were essentially
motivated by nationalistic aims rather than the defense of the revolution and Marxism-Leninism, that they vacillated constantly, and that they were not the first to expose Khrushchevite revisionism. Let us examine these claims, taking the last one as our starting point and investigating in detail the actual history of the split in the international communist movement.

A. Who First Exposed Khrushchevite Revisionism?

Comrades, does such a claim really add so much to the current struggle against Peking-style revisionism? Does it add to the stature of Enver Hoxha to learn that he is running around Albania saying to the working people that:

There are some scaly animals in Europe today who call themselves communists, who say that others recognized even earlier that Khrushchevites had betrayed Marxism-Leninism. The Party of Labor of Albania was the first to see through and expose the Khrushchevite renegades. (Albania Today, No. 3, 40)

We don't believe that it does. However, since the issue is raised, the record should be set straight.

To the PLA belongs the historic merit of being the first Marxist-Leninist party to attack Khrushchev and his clique in the CPSU by name. It was the CPC, however, that first publicly exposed the anti-Marxist line of Khrushchev and contrasted it to the immortal teachings of Lenin. Almost immediately after the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU (1956), the CPC made an assessment of Stalin which upheld him as a great Marxist-Leninist leader and teacher while at the same time attempting to analyze his errors. This was the main focus of two articles published in the Party newspaper, Renmin Ribao, "On the Historic Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" and "More on the Historic Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat." These two articles, it is true, contain a number of bows to "the struggle against the cult of personality" and other Khrushchevite formulae as well as some incorrect statements on the class struggle under socialism.

However, these same flaws can be found in Albanian public documents of the same period. In an article published in April, 1956, for instance, Enver Hoxha criticized the "narrow" view that the class struggle might intensify under socialism. He claimed that experience clearly showed that the class struggle gradually died out under socialism:

The Central Committee of the Party has clearly explained in recent Party district meetings that the narrow conception of the exacerbation of the class struggle during the period of socialist construction, which our country is going through, is incorrect. Each day shows us more clearly that the forces of socialism are getting stronger by the minute, while the economic power and political influence of the overthrown classes are ceaselessly weakened: thus, they are in no position to wage their struggle in a sharper form. This does not mean that there is no class struggle, or that the overthrown classes voluntarily renounce their struggle against socialism. Undoubtedly, the struggle changes form, but this struggle cannot be as bitter as it was during the years following Liberation, when the overthrown classes had a firmer economic base, enjoyed political influence and were tied to foreign reaction and were aided by it.

Finally, although the KPD(ML) and MLOC are now trying to pass these two CPC articles off as an attack on Stalin, there was no confusion when they were first published. They were perceived by communists and bourgeois commentators alike (not to mention Khrushchev!) as an attack on the anti-Marxist-Leninist approach of the 20th Party Congress on the question of Stalin. That is probably why the PLA reprinted them in the pages of its own organ, Zeri i Popullit, and Hoxha quoted from them in his February 13, 1957 speech to the CC of the PLA. This speech, clothed as an attack on Yugoslav revisionism, was the first time the PLA took on Khrushchevite revisionism publicly (see "On the International Situation and the Tasks of the Party" in E. Hoxha, Selected Works, II, p. 681).

While the PLA was gravely concerned with Khrushchev's revision of Marxism-Leninism, his attack on Stalin, and above all his rapprochement with Tito, as late as the Meeting of 81 Communist and Workers Parties in Moscow, November 16, 1960, "it was not yet cognizant of Khrushchev's real intentions, therefore it tried to settle differences through talks and consultations in a comradely spirit." ("Green Book", p. 6).

This is expressed in the introduction to Hoxha's speech at that meeting, a speech which sharply denounced Khrushchev's attack on Stalin, but still described the PLA's early stand thusly:

The condemnation of Comrade Stalin was imposed on the communist and progressive world by Comrade Khrushchev. What could our parties do under these circumstances, when unexpectedly, using the great authority of the Soviet Union, he imposed a matter of this kind on our bloc?

The Party of Labor of Albania found itself in a great dilemma. It was not convinced and will never be convinced on the question of condemning Comrade Stalin in that way and in those forms that Comrade Khrushchev did it. Our Party adopted, in general, the formula of the 20th Congress on this matter but, nevertheless, it did not stick to the limitations set by the Congress nor did it yield to the blackmail and intimidation from outside our country.

("Green Book", p. 94, emphasis added)

The CPC, on the other hand, was pursuing the polemic against modern revisionism more vigorously. The Letter charges that the CPC "wavered in its stand towards Yugoslav revisionism" and only rectified this at the beginning of 1960. This is simply not true. In 1958 the CPC came out with a whole series of attacks on Yugoslav revisionism and analyses of the restoration of capitalism in Yugoslavia, collected in the book "In Refutation of Modern Revisionism." Did the CPC waver? From 1954 to 1957, it followed the lead of the CPSU in treating Yugoslavia as a fraternal country. In the 1963 polemic, "Is Yugoslavia a Socialist Country?" the CPC explains that:

In 1954, when Khrushchev proposed to improve relations with Yugoslavia, we agreed to treat it as a fraternal socialist country for the purpose of winning it back to the path of socialism and watching how the Tito clique would develop.

(continued on next page)
We did not entertain very much hope for the Tito clique even then. In its letter of June 10, 1954, to the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Central Committee of the CPC pointed out that the fact should be taken into account that as the leaders of Yugoslavia had already gone quite far in their dealings with imperialism, they might reject our effort to win it over and refuse to return to the path of socialism: 'but even though this should occur, it would not involve any political loss to the camp of peace, democracy and socialism--on the contrary, it would further expose the hypocrisy of the Yugoslav leaders before the people of Yugoslavia and of the world.'

Unfortunately, our words have proved all too true!...After it refused to sign the 1957 Declaration, the Tito clique put forward its out-and-out revisionist programme in 1958 and set this banner of modern revisionism against the 1957 Declaration which is the common program acknowledged by all Communist and Workers' Parties. The process of restoring capitalism in Yugoslavia has been realized step by step. And internationally, the Tito clique is serving more and more energetically as a counter-revolutionary special detachment of U.S. imperialism.

In these circumstances, the attitude every Marxist-Leninist Party should take towards the Tito clique is no longer the one it should take towards a fraternal Party or a fraternal country, nor should it be that of winning the Tito clique over, but it should be one of thoroughly exposing and firmly combating this gang of renegades.

(Polemic on the General Line, FLP, p. 176)

Let us note in passing that the above arguments of the CPC are rather similar to the reasons given by the PLA for uniting with the allegedly vacillating CPC in the struggle against Khrushchevite revisionism! Noting this, one can wonder why the PLA so sharply condemns Chinese "conciliation" with the Yugoslavs, which lasted for three years, while they see no problem in their own extremely close ties with the CPC, which they now characterize as not really a Marxist-Leninist party, over the last 20 years. Furthermore, the CPC never praised the Yugoslavs, as the PLA did consistently for the CPC.

By 1960, however, the CPC was no longer hitting Khrushchev through Tito. Although the Chinese comrades still used the code words "some people" and "certain comrades," there was no doubt about whom they were attacking. With the 90th anniversary of Lenin's birth, the CPC, backed up by extensive citations from Lenin, came out with a systematic critique of Khrushchev's revisionist views on war and peace, peaceful coexistence, and peaceful coexistence. The Chinese comrades also began to actively oppose the CPSU's attempts to impose its dangerous views on the international working class and international democratic organizations. In its "Open Letter of the CC of the CPSU to All Party Organizations, To All Communists of the Soviet Union" (July 14, 1963), the revisionist CPSU leadership puts it thus:

In April 1960 the Chinese comrades openly revealed their disagreement with the world communist movement by publishing the collection of articles "Long Live Leninism!" This collection, made up, in the main, of distorted, truncated, and incorrectly interpreted passages from well-known works of Lenin, contained propositions directed, in substance, against the fundamentals of the Declaration of the Moscow Meeting of 1957, which was signed on behalf of the CPC by Comrade
Mao Tsetung, against the Leninist policy of peaceful co-existence of states with different social systems, against the possibility of preventing world war in the present era, against recognition of the peaceful as well as non-peaceful road of development of socialist revolution. The CPC leaders tried to impose their views on all the fraternal parties. In June 1960, during the Peking session of the General Council of the World Federation of Trade Unions, the Chinese leaders, without the knowledge of the leadership of fraternal parties, arranged a meeting of representatives of several parties then in Peking and launched open criticism of the position of the CPSU and the other Marxist-Leninist parties and the Declaration adopted by the Moscow Meeting in 1957. Furthermore, the Chinese comrades aired their differences with the CPSU and the other fraternal parties from the open tribune of a non-party organization.

Such steps by the CPC leadership aroused anxiety in the fraternal parties. In view of this, an attempt was made at the Bucharest Meeting of Communist Parties in 1960 to discuss the differences that had arisen with the leaders of the CPC. Representatives of 50 Communist and Workers' parties subjected the views and actions of the Chinese leaders to comradely criticism and urged them to return to the path of unity and co-operation with the international communist movement, in conformity with the principles of the Moscow Declaration. Unfortunately, the CPC leadership disregarded this comradely assistance and continued to pursue its erroneous course and deepen its differences with the fraternal parties.

(Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement, FLP, pp. 533-34.)

At the Bucharest Congress, Khrushchev arrived with a lengthy document attacking the Leninist views of the CPC. He attempted to force the other fraternal parties present to adopt it, although a meeting of the 80 communist and workers' parties was to be held in Moscow later that year to air and resolve divergences between the Parties in accordance with Leninist norms. Within a month of the Bucharest Meeting, the Soviet Union brutally suspended economic aid to China, after having already unilaterally torn up an agreement to provide advanced military technology to China in 1959. The USSR did not impose similar sanctions against Albania until 1961.

The Albanian comrades defended the CPC at Bucharest not by attacking the revisionist theses which Khrushchev was trying to cram down the collective throats of the fraternal parties, but rather on the basis of his violating Leninist norms of inter-party relations. The stand of the PLA is summed up by Hoxha in an August 9, 1960 "Letter of the CC of the PLA to All Party Basic Organizations on the Proceedings of the June 1960 Bucharest Meetings and the Disagreements that had Emerged There Between the CPSU and the CPC":

First, the differences in question are differences between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of China; second, the Bucharest Meeting was premature and was conducted in violation of Leninist organizational rules; third,
our Party will voice its opinion on these differences in the coming
meeting which should be prepared according to the rules and existing
practice of the communist and workers parties."
(Hoxha, Selected Works, Vol. 2, p. 789)

This letter does not comment on the substance of the disagreements between the two
parties, nor does it mention that the USSR had withdrawn its economic and military
aid from China that July. In fact, according to other documents from this period
collected in "Albania Challenges Khrushchev Revisionism", the substance of Sino-
Soviet disagreements had not even been unfolded within the entire CC of the PLA
until after Bucharest.

Comrades, it was the CPC, not the PLA, which Khrushchev attacked at Bucharest.
And it was China who was the first victim of Khrushchev's anti-Marxist policy of ex-
tending the antagonisms which developed between two parties over questions of prin-
ciple into the realm of state-to-state relations. These are historic facts and there is a reason behind them which should not be forgotten.

All the Albanian documents, including this Letter to the CPC, date the antagon-
ism between the Albanian and Soviet Parties to the Bucharest Meeting, when the PLA
attacked Khrushchev's violation of Leninist norms or inter-party relations. An
article called "Nikita Khrushchev has made Efforts Not to Settle But to Aggravate
the Differences with Our Party and State," published in Zeri i Popullit, March 25,
1962, clearly states:

The starting point in the attitude of the Nikita Khrushchev group
towards the Party of Labor of Albania and the People's Republic
of Albania that led to the aggravation of Soviet-Albanian relations
was the meeting held in Bucharest in June, 1960. Prior to the
Bucharest Conference, between our two parties and countries there
existed cordial fraternal relations which may rightly be character-
ized as exemplary in relationships of proletarian internationalism.
Up to that time the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union and the Government of the Soviet Union had assumed a friendly
and internationalist attitude towards our country and extended to
Albania great assistance in all the fields of socialist construction,
for which help the Party of Labor and the entire Albanian people
have been and will eternally be grateful to the glorious Communist
Party of the Soviet Union and to the brotherly Soviet people.
(The Facts About Soviet-Albanian Relations,
Tirana, 1964, p. 82, emphasis added.)

The article continues:

And it should be emphasized that our fraternal ties had at no time
been weakened despite the fact that between our Party and the Soviet
Leadership, headed by Nikita Khrushchev, differences on certain im-
portant issues had existed for a long time. It is a known fact, for
example, that our Party does not agree with the criticism against
Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, nor with the manner in which it was
made, nor with the aims which Nikita Khrushchev and his group pur-
sued at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
and later; the Party of Labor of Albania was not in agreement with
the attitude of appeasement and of opportunism that was being as-
sumed by Nikita Khrushchev and by his group towards the revisionist
Tito clique, our Party did not reconcile itself to the course he
introduced and to the opportunistic aims which he pursued in regard
to the questions of war and peace; it did not reconcile itself to his revisionist conception in connection with the peaceful and non-peaceful transition to socialism and in regard to other issues. On the other hand, it is known that Nikita Khrushchev, more than once and on different occasions, has directly or indirectly expressed himself against the line of our Party on account of its attitude of principle towards the Yugoslav revisionists and on other issues... All these facts are borne out by documentary evidence. Notwithstanding this, the Party of Labor has constantly striven for the settlement of these comradely discussions and criticisms, by repudiating at the same time Nikita Khrushchev's proposals in regard to the question of the Yugoslav revisionists and the rehabilitation of the Albanian traitors in the service of the Tito clique. It is a fact that despite the existence of the aforementioned differences, up to the middle of the year 1960, the relations of the Party of Labor with the Soviet leadership and, especially, state relationships between our two countries, had not been rendered acute, but on the contrary they were proceeding in the normal course of friendly, fraternal and internationalist cooperation. (pp. 83-84, emphasis added)

Please note that as late as 1962, after the break in diplomatic relations, the withdrawal of Soviet aid, and all the vile attacks of Khrushchevite revisionism on Albania and her Party of Labor, Zeri i Popullit states that the Soviet leadership was capable of fraternal and internationalist behavior.

The stand of the PLA at Bucharest was indeed a correct Marxist-Leninist position. And the CPC took an identical stand at the 22nd Party Congress of the CPSU, when Khrushchev attacked Albania. However, the PLA Letter claims that Chou En-lai "did not defend our Party, but demanded that polemics should cease instead." It also brands the position taken by the CPC at that Congress a "colorless stand." What are the facts, comrades?

After the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU, the 22nd Congress is the most important date in the consolidation of Khrushchevite revisionism in the USSR. This Congress renewed and expanded the attack on Stalin, it expelled the Bolshevik opposition within the CPSU (the so-called Anti-Party Group, led by Molotov), and it adopted a new, revisionist program for the CPSU (which contained the notorious theses on the "State of the Whole People" and "Party of the Whole People" and put profit in command of the Soviet economy). At this Congress, Khrushchev claimed that the Albanian leadership's defense of Stalin was based solely on a desire to maintain their own "cult of personality" and power. With this attack, Khrushchev hoped to split China from Albania. He was speculating that there were divisions within the CPC leadership on how far to take the struggle against modern revisionism, and on how to deal with the grave economic difficulties China was going through--difficulties caused by the withdrawal of Soviet aid and technical assistance the year before and compounded by natural disasters. His gamble failed. The CPC was in fact the only party to condemn Khrushchev's attack.

Here, comrades, is the relevant portion of Chou En-lai's "colorless" speech in defense of the PLA. We urge you to compare it carefully with the "Declaration of the CC of the PLA Against the Attack and Slanders of N. Khrushchev at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU" issued one day later (Appendix C). Their substance and
even phrasing are virtually identical. Chou said:

Our socialist camp, composed of 12 fraternal countries, from the People's Democratic Republic of Korea to the German Democratic Republic, from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to the People's Republic of Albania, represents a unique entity. Fraternal mutual aid and cooperation between our socialist countries and our communist Parties exist on the basis of independence and complete equality of rights. We must unite closely with each other, guard our cohesion like the apple of our eye and in no case allow any attacks or acts which harm this cohesion.

We hold that if unfortunately disputes and divergences arise between fraternal parties and countries, they should be resolved with patience in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and in accordance with the principles of equal rights and of unanimity arrived at through consultations. Open, unilateral condemnations, issued against any fraternal party do not lead to cohesion any more than they provide the solution to the problem. It is impossible to consider the act of openly exposing to the enemy disputes which have occurred between fraternal parties and fraternal countries as a serious Marxist-Leninist attitude. Such an attitude can only dismay our friends and give joy to our enemies. The Communist Party of China sincerely hopes that those fraternal parties which have disaccords and differences outstanding will recover their unity on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and mutual respect for each other's independence and equality. This, I believe, is the position we must take as communists.

At this very minute the imperialist circles, with the US at their head, are carrying out aggressive and expansionist activities against communism undercover. US imperialism and the Yugoslav revisionist gang are trying in every way to disrupt and sap the cohesiveness of progressive forces the world over. Under these conditions the cohesiveness and unity of the whole socialist camp and the entire international communist movement acquires an even greater importance. Unity is a force which can triumph over anything. Faced by the cohesion of the forces of socialism of the whole world, with that of the oppressed nations and peoples, and with that of the peace-loving peoples and states throughout the world, the wild schemes of the imperialists and their acolytes will undoubtedly suffer a total failure.

(Hsinhua release, October 19, 1961, from Kessel, p. 406-7, our translation)

Hoxha made the first public attack against Khrushchev by name in the November 7, 1961 speech, "Twenty years of Revolutionary Life and Struggle," commemorating the 20th anniversary of the founding of the PLA and the Great October Revolution. Here we find that the Albanian comrades characterized the silence of other fraternal parties as "a correct Marxist-Leninist stand" under the circumstances ("Green Book," p. 165).

Since some comrades may find that simply upholding the norms of inter-party relations when a fraternal party and the very essence of Marxism-Leninism are under attack does amount to a rather "colorless" stand, we should examine the actions of Chou En-lai and of the CPC after Chou's speech. In doing so, we can expose as an out-and-out falsification the charge in the Letter (p. A-8) that the CPC was "seeking a reconciliation with the Soviets and the ceasing of polemics with them."
After Chou's speech, Khrushchev repeated his attacks on the PLA, calling for the overthrow of the leadership of Hoxha and Shehu. He said if the Chinese comrades were really so upset about the lack of unity and poor relations between the PLA and the fraternal parties, they were in the best position to contribute to the solution of the problem—in other words, shut up and tell your Albanian buddies to do the same. At this point, Chou En-lai and the Chinese delegation left the Congress and returned to Peking, but only after first laying a wreath on Stalin's bier at the Mausoleum (the body was removed to the Kremlin wall a few days later).

In fact, 24 hours after Khrushchev had made his first speech attacking Albania, Remmin Ribao prominently featured a speech, made by the Chinese delegate to the 5th Congress of the Albanian Women's Union several days before, which stated, "the friendship between the Chinese and Albanian peoples, based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, is unbreakable and no force can destroy it." Far from seeking to extinguish polemics, the Chinese reprinted all the major Albanian attacks on Khrushchev, although their own polemical materials did not as yet name names. But let us listen to how Enver Hoxha appraised the Chinese action at the time. Speaking to the cadres of the Gjirokastra district on November 15, 1961, he said:

At the 22nd Congress the representative of the CP of China rose and described Khrushchev's attacks on our Party as anti-Marxist. This was a very heavy blow for Khrushchev and his followers. With his speech, the representative of the CP of China gave Khrushchev to understand that his actions were anti-Marxist and served only the enemies of socialism. The statement of the CC of the PLA and the articles of "Zeri i Popullit" about the attacks of the Soviet revisionists at their 22nd Congress, have been published in the Chinese press, indeed on the front page. Since the beginning of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, up to two pages of the newspaper "Zheminzhibao" (sic) have been full of materials about Albania and her successes. When the 20th anniversary of our Party was celebrated, the Chinese press announced that "comrade Enver Hoxha has delivered a very important speech" and a few days later, they published it in their own language. Apart from this, they sent us a message of congratulations on the 20th anniversary of the founding of our Party, with full appreciations of the correct course of our Party. In this way, the CP of China told Khrushchev that it does not agree at all with the stand he maintains towards the PLA.

("The Dictatorship of the Proletariat in Albania is Alive, Vigilant and Active," Albania Today, nr. 4 (29), 1976, p.50)

Comrades, be honest. These words and actions of the Chinese are not "colorless." They are not the words and actions of a Party "seeking a reconciliation with the Soviets and the ceasing of polemics with them." Confronted with the facts, you cannot agree with the PLA's present assessment of them.

Certainiy, it is a fact that certain elements in the CPC were in favor of reconciliation with Khrushchev, among them Teng Hsiao-p'ing's late friend T'ao Chu, the Kwangtung First Secretary who was disgraced during the GPCR and is currently being praised to the skies. But these forces did not succeed in stopping the struggle against revisionism. Who opposed them and their efforts? Mao Tsetung. It is important to be absolutely clear about this since Mao, in the division of labor undertaken by the CPC prior to the CPGR, was principally
responsible for the conduct of the struggle with Soviet revisionism and for foreign policy.

Who, then, started the polemics and struggle against Khrushchevite revisionism? A comprehensive analysis of the history of this struggle leads to the following conclusions:

1. Both the PLA and CPC had grave misgivings about the revisionist theses of the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU as early as 1956.

2. The PLA kept its criticism largely confined to bi-lateral exchanges with the CPSU, or masked it as criticisms of Yugoslav revisionism, and at the earliest stages of the dispute did not even unfold the differences with the CPSU within the whole CC of the PLA.

3. The CPC publicly expressed its disagreement with the 20th Party Congress in 1956.

4. Both the CPC and the PLA went along with certain Khrushchevite formulations publicly. At the Moscow Meetings of 1957 and 1960, however, they fought with some success against the wholesale adoption of the revisionist theses of 20th Congress by the entire international communist movement.

5. By 1960, the CPC had extended the fight against the Khrushchevite line to international proletarian organizations like the World Federation of Trade Unions.

6. While Albania had openly refused to go along with Khrushchev's attempt to rehabilitate Tito, the CPC did go along from 1954 to 1957, resuming polemics against Tito in 1958 (not in 1960, as the Letter states), when the League of Yugoslav Communists came out with its revisionist program.

7. By the Albanian's own account, despite their struggle with the CPSU on questions of principle, Soviet-Albanian state-to-state and even Party-to-Party relations were good until the PLA defended China against Khrushchev's violation of norms at Bucharest.

8. The USSR had already stopped its military and economic aid to China in 1959 and 1960 respectively, and was trying to "excommunicate" the CPC in 1960.

9. Soviet attacks on Albania began after Bucharest, with the main hostile events taking place in 1961, including the public attack on the PLA by Khrushchev at the 22nd Party Congress, the rupture of diplomatic relations which followed, and the formal cessation of aid (which actually began in the Fall of 1960--see Hoxha speech to the Moscow Meeting, "Green Book").

10. After Khrushchev's attack at the 22nd Congress, the Albanians opened up public polemics, attacking Khrushchev by name.
11. The CPC defended the PLA in Moscow on exactly the same basis as the PLA defended it against Khrushchev at Bucharest. Rather than trying to stop polemics, it reprinted all major Albanian attacks on Khrushchev, even though Chinese materials still did not refer to him by name.

We can see that the presentation of this early history in the Letter is not an accurate one.

B. The Charge of Chinese Vacillation

What are we to make of the claims that "Whereas our Party initiated and carried on the fight against Khrushchevite revisionism with consistency and resolve, the Chinese leadership wavered and failed to adopt clear-cut anti-Khrushchevite stands"? (Letter, p.A-8). In support of this assertion, the Letter cites:

1. the CPC's stand when the PLA was attacked by Khrushchev;
2. the CPC's alleged inclusion of Soviet revisionism in the United Front against imperialism through 1968;
3. the PLA's assessment that the CPC did not join this struggle until the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (August, 1963);
4. the CPC's stand when Khrushchev was deposed; and
5. the allegedly nationalistic character of the CPC's struggle against Soviet revisionism.

Since we have already analyzed the CPC's stand towards Khrushchev's attack on the PLA, we can begin this section with the charge that the CPC's formulation of the anti-imperialist front in the 1962-68 period was an opportunistic "line of reconciliation with the Soviet revisionists" because it included the USSR and other countries of the socialist camp under revisionist leadership. The PLA, on the other hand, claims that in 1962 it upheld the line that "the anti-imperialist front not include the Soviet revisionists, but at the same time, it should spearhead its struggle both against imperialism in general, and US imperialism in particular, as well as against Soviet revisionism." (p.A8). It also charged that China's leadership still entertained illusions about Khrushchev's ability to return to the path of Marxism-Leninism, citing statements made by Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-p'ing to the delegation of the CC of the PLA.

Comrades should examine this part of the Letter very carefully. On page 8 of Appendix A, it is stated that it was the viewpoint of the Chinese that the "anti-imperialist front should necessarily include the Soviet Union as well, which at that time was led by Nikita Khrushchev's revisionist clique" (emphasis added). The USSR was at that time still upheld by Albania, as well as by China, as a socialist country and thus part of the socialist camp. But in the paragraphs which follow the slide is made. It is no longer a question of including the Soviet Union in the front, but of including the Soviet revisionists, which is not the same thing.

At that time, Khrushchevite revisionism attempted to wreck the unity of the socialist camp and the international communist and workers' movement and colluded with US imperialism to extinguish the fires of revolution and national liberation around the world. It was just beginning the actual implementation of the restoration of capitalism in the USSR and its export of capital. Thus, the struggle against Soviet revisionism was still primarily a struggle against an ideology of capitulation, rather than a struggle against a new imperialism. It was a struggle to restore
the unity of the socialist camp and the communist movement on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, so that in fact the socialist countries and international proletariat could serve as the nucleus of a "broad united front."

In a letter to all district Party committees entitled "Anti-Marxist and Anti-Albanian Activity of the Modern Revisionists Must Be Patiently Exposed and Combatted on the Basis of Principles" (November 1, 1961), Enver Hoxha wrote:

While unmasking the anti-Marxist activity of N. Khrushchev and those who follow him, we must always bear in mind the general line of our Party, we must not permit, in the heat of the moment, any violation of the stand of the Party on the main issues of its policy...

We must always aim the main blow against imperialism, and especially US imperialism. Imperialism has been, is, and will remain the main enemy. This must be true not only to you and the mass of the Party, but also to the entire people... Naturally, you understand that firmly unmasking imperialism helps sharpen the vigilance of the masses, and at the same time helps expose revisionism and Khrushchev himself because, just as imperialism cannot be fought without fighting revisionism, revisionism cannot be fought without fighting imperialism first of all...

The work of the internationalist education of the Party and the masses should go on as before and be reinforced. Thus we must speak about the unity of socialist countries, the unity of the international communist and workers' movement, friendship with the peoples of the other socialist countries, about the struggle of the communist and workers' parties of the entire world. We must not forget that enemies of socialism, the imperialists, the Yugoslav revisionists and the renegade Khrushchev with those who follow him would like to divert us from the position of internationalism.

(Hoxha, Speeches, 1961-1962, pp. 213-16)

We can see that it was not only the Chinese leadership which held that "US imperialism... was the main enemy." The PLA still held this position in 1964, when it signed the Sino-Albanian Joint Statement, which gives the following formulation of the anti-imperialist front:

The two parties hold that a new world war can be prevented, a nuclear war can be averted and world peace can be safeguarded so long as all peace-loving forces of the world, namely, the socialist camp, the national liberation movement, the revolutionary movement of the peoples and all peace-loving countries unite, and form the broadest possible united front to wage unremitting struggle against the aggressive and war policies of imperialism headed by the United States.

(Peking Review 3, Jan. 17, 1964, p. 15, emphasis added)

What was at issue during this period was not whether the socialist countries (including the USSR) belonged in the united front against imperialism. At issue was how and on what basis to fight for the unity of the socialist camp, plus the question of whether the leadership of the CPSU could be brought back to correct positions. At the same time a number of fraternal parties, in particular the Vietnamese Party, were attempting to resolve the divergences in the international movement. A meeting of the
CPSU, CPC, and PLA was proposed; and in January 1962, the Vietnam Workers Party proposed that "mutual attacks on the radio and in the press should be stopped by the Parties." Both the CPC and PLA agreed to do so (see Polemic on the General Line, pp. 348-49, and Hoxha, Speeches, 1961-1962, p. 355-6). However, the Khrushchevites violated this media truce, continued to use the Congresses of Eastern European parties as platforms to attack the PLA and the CPC, and proposed unacceptable conditions for negotiations with the PLA.

In his letter to all Party basic organizations of May 9, 1962, entitled "The Line of Our Party is a Correct Revolutionary Line, in Conformity with the Teachings of Marxism-Leninism," Enver Hoxha points out that during this period Khrushchev was not only attacking the genuine Marxist-Leninists but was also engaging in a lot of demagogic talk about unity in the socialist camp and the international movement. He states that the only way to determine whether Khrushchev's desire for unity is real and whether he can "reform" is for him to openly repudiate his attacks on Albania, China, and their Parties and to eliminate all preconditions for a meeting. Judging from quotations from a letter sent to the CC of the CPC in the text, the CPC may have questioned this correct stand of the PLA and may have been more optimistic about the possibility of resolving the differences. However, in addition to stating that "the struggle for unity and the struggle against the splitters of unity, the modern revisionists, cannot be separated." Hoxha says:

When the problem of unity is seriously worrying the Parties and communists the world over...it is all the more necessary for the parties which stand resolutely on sound Marxist-Leninist positions to take the banner of unity of the international communist movement into their own hands, to take the initiative in this direction, and thus expose the tactical manoeuvres of N. Khrushchev. It should be borne in mind that N. Khrushchev is not fully exposed in the communist movement as a splitter of the socialist camp and the communist movement and as an anti-Marxist.

(Speeches 1961-1962, p. 365)

The PLA accuses the CPC of harboring illusions about the CPSU under Khrushchev and of conciliating to it. However, it is not too difficult to find equally conciliatory statements being made by the PLA right up to Khrushchev's ouster in 1964.

After Khrushchev's scandalous attack on the PLA at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, Hoxha's November 7, 1961 speech winds up with an appeal to the new Central Committee of the CPSU, elected at that Congress, "to judge with Leninist equity, with objectivity and calmness...on the situation created in the relations between our two Parties and two countries." He further states that "Our party has always been ready, for the sake of the unity of the communist movement and the socialist camp, to settle the existing disagreements". Not only does Hoxha indicate that he believes at least some of the current leadership of the CPSU was capable of "Leninist equity", but goes on to say:

Differences had existed between our Party of Labor and the Soviet leadership even prior to June 1960 on some questions of ideological and political nature: however they have not exerted any negative influence on the relations between our two socialist states, between our two Marxist-Leninist parties.

(continued on next page)
The Party of Labor of Albania has always declared, and declares now, too, that the experience of the CPSU, the experience of its congresses, including here also the 20th and the 22nd Congresses, have been, are and will always be a great help on our road for the up-building of the socialist and communist society. However, as regards some special theses of principle of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union our Party has not been and is not of the same opinion with the Soviet leadership, just as it is not also at present as regards some special questions of the 22nd Congress or of the new programme of the CPSU approved by the 22nd Congress. Is not our Party entitled to this? Is this not consistent with the teachings of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism? Can this be considered as an anti-Soviet attitude, as they are trying to accuse us?

("Green Book," p. 128)

As late as October 1964, the CC of the PLA in its open letter to the members of the CPSU states:

We want to see the Soviet Union, yesterday, today, tomorrow, and always, a powerful bastion of the cause of socialism and communism, of the Revolution and freedom of peoples, of peace in the world...

Once again we express our full confidence and unshaken belief that our comrades, the communists of the glorious party of Lenin and Stalin, who have been an example of great inspiration for all of communists and peoples of the world, today too, with a lofty revolutionary consciousness, will know how to carry out the very responsible duties with which history charges them.

In defense of Marxism-Leninism, in defense of socialism and communism, in defense of the Soviet Union, and under the great banner of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, the Soviet communists will unite their efforts, their powerful struggle with those of all of the communists and proletarians of all countries, for the complete exposure and defeat of modern revisionism and imperialism.

("Green Book," pp. 278-279)

You may object that this was a tactic to expose the revisionists. Indeed. But if you accept this tactic from the PLA, you must accept it from the CPC. We don't doubt that the revisionists Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-p'ing had genuine illusions about Khrushchev or were willing to sell out to him—in 1965 they and their friends like Lo Jui-ch'ing (former Chief of Staff of the People's Liberation Army) pushed for "united action to aid Vietnam." But once again, as long as one held that the USSR was still a socialist country—one in danger, but still socialist—such tactics are obligatory. Besides, comrades, not everyone in the CPC had illusions about Khrushchev. In September 1962, at the 10th Plenum of the 8th CC of the CPC, Mao delivered an analysis of how revisionism in power was leading the USSR to "change color" and calling Khrushchev the representative of a new bourgeoisie. At this plenum he also began the attack on Chinese revisionism represented by Liu and Teng.

A further charge of vacillation is found on page A-9 of the Letter, where it is charged that Albania had fought Khrushchevite revisionism alone from 1961 on and that the CPC had not engaged in polemics or struggle with modern revisionism until the
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of August 1963. Comrades, this is false and ignores a whole series of actions in which the CPC opposed Khrushchevite revisionism before August 1963:

1. In the late summer of 1962, the Chinese government shut down Soviet consulates after a series of provocations by their personnel similar to those in Albania in 1961.

2. It condemned Khrushchev for supporting India's attack on China in 1962—a war which only the revisionists and Indian reactionaries presented as provoked by China, but which we can now expect to see cited by the PLA as an early example of Chinese expansionism.

3. In November 1962, it strongly condemned Khrushchev's capitulation to US imperialism during the Cuban missile crisis, calling it a new Munich (then a correct use of the analogy!).

4. In December 1962, the CPC published "Workers of All Countries, Unite, Oppose Our Common Enemy," which contains a militant defense of the PLA. This article was the first of the polemics which did not let up until March of 1963, when they were suspended in order to create a favorable atmosphere for talks between the CPC and CPSU.

5. The CPC published "A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement" on June 14, 1963. This proposal, as comrades are well aware, is a classic refutation of the revisionist positions of Khrushchev. The proposal put forward as the general line of the international communist movement:

Workers of all countries unite; workers of the world, unite with the oppressed peoples and oppressed nations; oppose imperialism and reaction in all countries; strive for world peace, national liberation, people's democracy and socialism; consolidate and expand the socialist camp; bring the proletarian world revolution step by step to complete victory; and establish a new world without imperialism, without capitalism and without exploitation of man by man... (Polemic, FLP, p. 5)

This proposal was viciously attacked a month later, while the CPC delegation was in Moscow, in the "Open Letter of the CC of the CPSU to All Party Organizations, to All Communists of the Soviet Union."

Once again, comrades must admit that the Chinese were leading the struggle against Khrushchevism and that they were not prepared to sacrifice all principles for "reconciliation and agreement with the Soviet revisionists," as is claimed by the PLA Letter (p. A-9). And they must ask themselves what purpose is being served by concealing and distorting these historical facts.

Yet another charge of vacillation comes over the question of the CPC's behavior after Nikita Khrushchev fell from power. This event took place on October 13, 1964. As we have seen above, the PLA had addressed an open letter to the member-
ship of the CPSU (p.50-1) calling upon them to repudiate Khrushchevism and restore the great traditions of their Party. (October 6, 1964).

Did the PLA suspect that a change of leadership was afoot? This is speculation, but it's certain that such a letter assumed that there were still honest communists within the CPSU in 1964 (see the Letter, p. A-9, where the PLA protests Mao's raising the border question). In its letter of October 6, the PLA makes clear that it will unite with the CPSU on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism ("Green Book", p. 249) provided the Soviets criticize their hostile acts against Albania. ("Green Book", p. 239). Obviously Brezhnev and Kosygin failed to meet the Albanian conditions for unity.

In Chou's statement of October 29, 1964, as quoted on page A-10 of the Letter, he also calls for unifying on the basis of Marxism-Leninism. In a polemic called "The Leaders of the CPSU are the Greatest Splitters of Our Time," published eight months before Khrushchev fell, the CPC had also laid out what it considered to be the conditions for unity:

The revisionism and great-power chauvinism of the leaders of the CPSU are an unprecedented menace to the unity of the socialist camp and the international communist movement. By taking a revisionist and great-power chauvinist position, the leaders of the CPSU are standing for a split. So long as they maintain such a position, they are in fact working for sham unity and a real split no matter how volubly they may talk of "unity" and abuse others as "splitters" and "sectarians."

The Chinese Communist Party, other Marxist-Leninist Parties, and all Marxist-Leninists persevere in Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. This position is the only correct one for defending and strengthening the genuine unity of the socialist camp and the international communist movement.

Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism constitute the basis of that unity. Only on this basis can the unity of fraternal Parties and countries be built. Such unity will be out of the question if one departs from this basis. To fight for Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism is to work for the unity of the international communist movement. Persevering in principle and upholding unity are inextricably bound together.

If the leaders of the CPSU genuinely want unity and are not just pretending, they should loyally abide by the fundamental theories of Marxism-Leninism and by the Marxist-Leninist teachings concerning classes and class struggle, the state and revolution, and especially proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is absolutely impermissible for them to substitute class collaboration or class capitulation for class struggle, and social reformism or social pacifism for proletarian revolution, or abolish the dictatorship of the proletariat no matter under what pretext.

If the leaders of the CPSU genuinely want unity and are not just pretending, they should abide by the revolutionary principles of the 1957 Declaration and the 1960 Statement. It is absolutely impermissible for them to substitute their own Party programme for the common programme which was unanimously agreed upon by the
fraternal Parties. If the leaders of the CPSU genuinely want unity and are not just pretending, they should draw a sharp line of demarcation between enemies and comrades and should unite with all socialist countries, all fraternal Marxist-Leninist Parties, the proletariat of the whole world, all oppressed people and nations and all peace-loving countries and people in order to oppose US imperialism, the arch-enemy of the people of the world, and its lackeys. It is absolutely impermissible for them to treat enemies as friends and friends as enemies, and to ally themselves with the US imperialists, the reactionaries of various countries and the renegade Tito clique against fraternal countries and Parties and all revolutionary people, in the vain pursuit of world domination through US-Soviet collaboration.

(Polemic on the General Line, pp. 354-355)

This is not exactly a program for ideological reconciliation with revisionism! Comrades should remember, too, that truces are called by forces who are at war with each other.

After Khrushchev was deposed, the CPC sent a delegation to Moscow and encouraged the PLA to do the same. The Albanian comrades were quite correct to criticize the Chinese Party for suggesting this without the restoration of Soviet-Albanian relations, and without any self-criticism by the CPSU. What was at issue was not simply Albania's national pride but the gross violation of Leninist norms. And they were right about the new leadership of the CPSU.

However, it is doubtful that the CPC was fooled by Brezhnev or that it seriously believed in the possibility of a rapprochement on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. We believe the purpose of the proposed visit was to expose the leadership of the CPSU to the Parties which were really vacillating in the struggle against modern revisionism: Vietnam, Korea, Cuba, and Romania. Thus, while the CPC was wrong with respect to Albania, the trip was not completely wrong-headed.

For a grand total of six weeks, the CPC suspended polemics. If they had wanted to sell out to Moscow, they had the chance to do so. They did not. In the polemic "Why Khrushchev Fell," published November 21, 1964, the CPC also attacks "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev". They do not hail Brezhnev's palace coup as a victory for Marxism-Leninism, but rather cite the fact that Khrushchev--the arch-representative of modern revisionism--was so discredited that he had to be removed. Dear comrades, read the Letter (p. A-10) and you'll see that the PLA itself claimed that "N. Khrushchev's exit from the political scene is an important victory of Marxism-Leninism."

The final assertion made by the PLA's Letter in regard to alleged conciliation with Khrushchevite revisionism is that the CPC took on the struggle strictly for national reasons. The border question is the chief example they give of this. The Albanian comrades claimed that raising the issue of the Sino-Soviet border undercut the so-called purity of the ideological struggle against Khrushchevite revisionism and would turn the Soviet masses and even true Soviet communists against the CPC. This is a strange assertion.

The Tsars had seized large tracts of Chinese territories and carved out concessions in China during the 18th and 19th centuries through a series of unequal
treaties. Isn't it a principle of Leninism to oppose annexations and imperialist exploitation? Why should this be incomprehensible to "true Soviet communists" today, when it was not after the October Revolution:

On September 27, 1920, the Soviet Government led by Lenin proclaimed that it 'declares null and void all the treaties concluded with China by the former Governments of Russia, renounces all seizure of Chinese territory and all Russian concessions in China and restores to China, without compensation and forever, all that had been predatorily seized from her by the Tsar's Government and the Russian bourgeoisie'. This great testament of Lenin's failed to come true because China was then ruled by a reactionary government.

(Down With the New Tsars! FLP, p. 22)

Following the establishment of the People's Republic, negotiations with Stalin resulted in certain initial adjustments: Soviet military bases at Port Arthur were to be handed over to China, as was the Chinese-Changchun R.R. in Manchuria, and China's authority in Sinkiang was recognized. However, after Stalin's death negotiations in 1954 and 1960 failed to produce results. Soviet troops began to occupy territory on the Chinese side of the boundaries established by the old, unequal treaties. The initial Chinese position was that if the Soviet Government would reaffirm Lenin's position that the treaties establishing the boundaries were unequal treaties imposed by Tsarist imperialism, China would agree to take the existing borders as the basis for negotiation—provided both sides withdraw to their own side. The Soviets refused to comply with either of these just requests.

Comrades, just whose expansionism and great nation chauvinism was exposed by raising the question in this manner? Wasn't it still another, very concrete, proof that Khrushchev had abandoned the principles and practice of Lenin and Stalin with regard to the Chinese border question and was in fact carrying on like a "new tsar"? This ugly performance by the Soviet Union strengthened the polemics, not weakened them. We certainly don't fault Albania's struggle against Titoite revisionism simply because Albania struggled to prevent herself from being annexed to Yugoslavia and continues to struggle to protect the rights of Albanian minorities in Yugoslavia—we say that exposes Tito, don't we?

The border question in Europe is somewhat more complex. As we know, the Tsarist empire was a veritable "prison house of peoples"; and the cornerstone of the Leninist nationalities-policy was the recognition of their right to self-determination. Following the October Revolution and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the old empire was broken up. Russia lost Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, the Russian part of Poland, and Bessarabia, which had been annexed from Romania in 1812. Prior to the outbreak of WWII, on the basis of agreements made with Nazi Germany in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact, the Soviet Union's sphere of influence in Eastern Europe was re-established. The USSR re-acquired Bessarabia and Bukovina (which had been part of the Austrian-held Romania) from Romania through diplomatic pressure. It brought about changes in governments in the Baltic states, which then applied for membership in the USSR. And finally it occupied Eastern Poland during the Nazi invasion in 1939, on the grounds that the Polish state no longer existed and the Byelorussian and Ukrainian minorities of that region had to be protected. War with Finland in 1940 got the USSR part of the Karelian Penninsula. Romania and Finland as well as Poland were all hostile capitalist states with proto-fascist regimes; there is no question that the people of the territories annexed were better off in the USSR, as were the Baltic peoples. The territorial and political adjustments put the Soviet Union in a better position to defend itself from the Nazi attack which came in 1941. But after the war, these territorial gains were maintained, despite the establishment of People's Democracies in Romania, Poland, and East Germany
and despite the desire of the Baltic nations for national sovereignty. Under these conditions, it was somewhat more difficult for Marxist-Leninists to justify the expansion of the USSR to the borders of the old Russian Empire. But once revisionists took control and started reinstituting the national oppression that was the hallmark of the Tsarist Empire, it was absolutely correct to call the borders into question. Doesn't the Leninist principle of self-determination apply to a new "prison-house of peoples"?

The Albanians were not always so upset by raising this question, nor did they always consider it "an instigation of war in Europe." In his "Conversation with Chou En-lai" in March 1965, Enver Hoxha had this to say about the stand of the revisionist countries on the German question:

This tendency has sharpened the contradictions between the revisionist countries, and this is reflected in their internal and external weaknesses. The German problem is raised by them as the main political-military problem. They pretend to maintain the same, allegedly resolute stand. But this is not and cannot be the reality. It is true that all of them are concerned about this problem, but each of them wants to settle it according to his own views. They are all manoeuvring at the expense of the German Democratic Republic. The meetings of the Warsaw Treaty disregard Ulbricht's appeals and memoranda, and the communiques from the meetings are demagogy and bluff which do not reflect the truth. None of them is genuinely for the proper defence of the German Democratic Republic. They are all afraid of a fight, of war. Gomulka is ready to impose heavy conditions of capitulation to Bonn on the German Democratic Republic so long as the imperialist states officially recognize the Oder-Neisse border. Czechoslovakia, likewise, is moving towards the normalization of its old alliances, provided only that the Bonn revanchists give up their claims to the Sudeten. Hungary has no desire to be embroiled in war over the German problem. Its ambitions lie in other directions, on the territory of its neighbors and the strengthening of the capitalist regime it is restoring at home.

(Albania Today 5(36), 1977, p. 50-1)

In fact, reading between the lines, it appears that much of Albania's displeasure over Mao's raising the border question centers around the fact that he failed to call for the rectification of the border between socialist Albania and revisionist Yugoslavia, which oppresses the Albanians in Kossovo, Montenegro and Macedonia. This is clearly stated in more recent Albanian articles, such as the editorial on Hua's Balkan trip. But if that is the case, Mao should be criticized for inconsistency and failure to support his friends rather than for screwing up the polemics, criticizing Stalin, instigating war and failing to answer the criticism of a fraternal party! Consistent opposition to national oppression is after all a hallmark of Leninism.

The PLA Letter on Collusion With US Imperialism

The crux of Albania's position that China colluded with US imperialism is in section 8 and 9. On page A-14, it states that "the axis of the Chinese policy has changed three times over ten years, from 1962 to 1972" as a result of frenzied inner-Party struggle. The political line is described as vacillating, opportunist
and contradictory in its attitudes towards US imperialism, modern revisionism and international reaction. There is no suggestion that the line may have been altered to reflect changing objective realities, such as the emergence of the USSR as a full-scale imperialist power.

The Letter states "First, the Communist Party of China abided by the strategic formula of a 'united front with the Soviet and other revisionists against US imperialism and its allies'" (Letter, p. A-14). In spite of the quotation marks, the actual Chinese formula in the Proposal Concerning the General Line is "a broad front with the socialist camp and the international proletariat as its nucleus, to oppose the imperialists and reactionaries headed by the United States; it is a line of boldly arousing the masses, expanding the revolutionary forces, winning over the middle forces and isolating the reactionary forces" (Politic, p. 5-6).

As we have already seen, in early 1964 the PLA had joined in calling for the broadest possible united front against US imperialism. Part of this front, for both the PLA and the CPC, was the socialist camp that included the Soviet Union. By 1965, both parties no longer included the Soviet Union in the socialist camp. While the Soviet Union was no longer included in the united front, in the eyes of the CPC it did not join the US as an imperialist enemy until its attack on Czechoslovakia in 1968. For the PLA to talk of a CPC formulation of "a united front with the Soviet and other revisionists against US imperialism and its allies" over the period 1962-68 is a distortion of both the formulations and the practice of the CPC from 1962-65 and 1965-68.

The second formula, "A very broad United Front of the proletariat, and the revolutionary peoples of all countries against US imperialism, Soviet revisionism, and reaction of various countries" (p. A-14), is a real one. This formula elevated Soviet revisionism from the rank of an opportunist ideological trend undermining the socialist camp and supporting imperialism, to a full-fledged imperialist power. It did not reflect inner-party instability, as the PLA would have us believe. Rather, it reflects a changed reality which led to the USSR attack on Czechoslovakia. It is in this context that the question of China's decision to mend its relations with US imperialism comes to the fore.

Comrades should recall that China's relations with the two imperialist superpowers were ultra-tense during the period of the GPCR. There were serious incidents along the border with the USSR and constant violations of Chinese airspace by US planes attacking Vietnam. Popular American literature and films were filled with the image of the "sensible" Soviets and American imperialists and Popes, etc. getting together to keep the insane Chinese from blowing up the world--remember "The Chairman" and "Shoes of the Fisherman"? H.R. Haldeman revealed what had been long suspected, that the Soviet social-imperialists had proposed a preventive nuclear strike against China's military installations and major industrial centers, but that Nixon would not go along. To maintain that a policy of militant opposition to all imperialism and all reaction requires no dealings with it might satisfy petty bourgeois desires for purity. But under the concrete conditions facing China at the time, it would have involved political and economic choices that would have severely damaged the dictatorship of the proletariat there. Lin Piao was pushing for a militarization of the economy in order to face up to the combined threats of US, Soviet, and Japanese imperialism. To carry out such a program would have put even more power and influence in the hands of the army and would have meant a precipitous drop in the well-being of the masses. Most seriously, it would have introduced grave distortions in the relatively harmonious relationship between the towns and countryside, shaking the worker-peasant alliance. Was there a choice? Mao and Chou believed that a "tilt toward the US" could be accomplished without harming the revolution.
The PLA claims that after Nixon's visit in 1972, China proposed a new version of the "broad united front," one which included the US and was directed solely at the USSR. This just isn't true. It represents a telescoping of events. It was only in 1975 that such a front was even whispered about. At the 10th Party Congress, a year after Nixon's visit, the CPC still affirmed that:

Our Party must uphold proletarian internationalism, uphold the Party's consistent policies, strengthen our unity with the proletariat, the oppressed people and nations of the whole world, and with all countries subjected to imperialist aggression, subversion, interference, control or bullying and form the broadest united front against imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism, and in particular against the hegemonism of the two superpowers, the US and the USSR. We must unite with all Marxist-Leninist Parties and organizations the world over, and carry the struggle against modern revisionism through to the end.


At the time, the PLA hailed this Congress and its line as revolutionary and correct.

Is it true, as the Letter claims, that "with Nixon's visit, China joined the dance of imperialist alliances and rivalries for the redivision of the world"? That "at the same time, the inauguration of the alliance with the United States of America also marked the abandoning on the part of the Chinese leadership of the genuine socialist countries, the Marxist-Leninist movement, the revolution and the national liberation struggle"? (Letter, p. A-13). Specifically, did it constitute an abandonment of Vietnam?

Certainly there is no evidence that the long-standing material support on China's part diminished. As for ideological and moral support, even at the time of Nixon's visit it maintained its staunch support for the Vietnamese people, as can be seen by reading Peking Review of that period. Indeed, the Chinese statement in the Shanghai Accords makes the future improvement of relations contingent on the withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam. The Shanghai accord spells out Chinese support for just about every struggle against US imperialism of major importance in the world. And in Asia, at least, these contacts did lead to an upsurge in the fortunes of the revolution for about two years, during which US troops were withdrawn, Indochina liberated, and the first serious steps towards peaceful reunification of Korea were taken.

The total hypocrisy of the PLA in charging China with selling out the Indochinese peoples' struggles can be seen not only in historical fact, but in the pages of Albania Today itself:

At his meeting with the Charge d'Affaires of the Republic of South Vietnam and the Ambassadors of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Cambodia, and the People's Republic of China, on May Day, comrade Enver Hoxha, congratulating them, pointed out that the victory of the Vietnamese people and that of the Cambodian people, are a brilliant triumph and a great example for all the peoples of the world fighting for their freedom and rights. 'The imperialists, social imperialists, and the bourgeoisies' said comrade Enver Hoxha, 'can do nothing against the peoples. The peoples
are invincible when they fight arms in hand. The US imperialists received a heavy blow, they have been discredited; their allies, too, have been discredited. The peoples have already drawn great lessons from the heroic struggle of the peoples of Vietnam and Cambodia. The friendship of the peoples with great China, said comrade Enver Hoxha in conclusion, 'is a very powerful backing and support in their struggle for freedom, independence, and social progress.'

(Albania Today, nr. 3(22) 1975, pp. 29-30)

A related charge that must be taken up here is that the CPC and the People's Republic of China will fully undercut Albanian defense as early as 1968 and again in 1975, and that the Chinese leadership criminally interfered in the internal affairs of Albania. The PLA states that it will make these later facts available at the appropriate time, and they will have to be judged then. But the charges on defense can be evaluated now. The substance of the charges is that Chou proposed that to cope with foreign aggression, the Albanians should apply the tactics of partisan warfare, and secondly that it should conclude a military alliance with Yugoslavia and Romania.

Dependence on the tactics of partisan warfare was the policy of the CPC at the time. It was a policy that had proved effective in the great struggle of the Chinese peoples, the great struggle of the PLA against the might of the Fascists, and the great struggle of the Vietnamese peoples against the technological onslaught of the United States. By 1968, this issue had already been joined in China between Lin Piao and Mao. Lin and other military figures had put forth a military policy that would have bled the workers and the peasants gains almost entirely away to create a conventional modern standing army.

As for the proposal to make a military alliance with Yugoslavia and Romania, this would clearly depend on the kind of alliance proposed. For several years, the position of the PLA has been that if either of these two countries were attacked, it would unequivocally enter the fray. If the PLA prefers to make such decisions to fight on another country's soil unilaterally, that is its affair, but the CPC's suggestion of such an alliance cannot then be dismissed as monstrous or an attempt to kindle the fire of war in Europe. As for dictate, the evidence presented by the PLA thus far at least is that no such dictate occurred. Again, note that as late as the 1977 article "The Name and Work of Comrade Mao Tsetung are Immortal" (Albania Today #32, 1977), the PLA acknowledges the important role of the CPC in the strengthening of Albanian defense.

Chinese policy did go rotten, but when and under whose leadership? It is not until the end of 1975 that you find articles in Peking Review supporting NATO (the question of the EEC comes earlier, but also at a time of sharp contradiction between US imperialism and the EEC countries) and the opportunist line of "the Third World is the motive force of history." It is with Nixon's return visit in 1976--with Chou dead, Mao dying, and Hua Kuo-feng speaking for the CPC--that you get a rash of articles openly supporting NATO, Hinton letting the cat out of the bag about the coming "United Front Against Social-imperialism," and the disastrous policy in Angola.

The contacts initiated through Nixon's visit did develop into a counter-revolutionary alliance, but contacts with imperialists do not necessarily end up that way. Serious Marxist-Leninists must be able to explain why such tactics are correct or incorrect or how opportunists can push a correct tactic into out-and-out revisionism. At present the critique presented by the PLA in their letter of August 6, 1971 (quoted in the Letter, p. A-13) and the comments about "uniting with the devil" (p. A-15) show a dangerous purism if taken as categorical imperatives for Marxist-Leninist parties and socialist states. Yes, Nixon was known as a frenzied anti-communist, an aggressor and assassin
of the peoples. But so were Hitler and Churchill, yet Stalin found it necessary to deal with them to preserve the dictatorship of the proletariat. Marxist-Leninists are not afraid of uniting with the devil, if it will further the proletarian cause. The absolutism and lack of analysis about why it was incorrect for the CPC to take the course it did comes dangerously close to Trotskyism. The history of the USSR under the leadership of Lenin and Stalin provides a wealth of precedent for the actions of the leadership of the CPC in soliciting military understandings with imperialist states.

In 1935, the USSR contracted a formal military alliance with imperialist France. Lenin allowed foreign concessions to develop Soviet oil, coal, and forestry. The Ford Motor Co. constructed a plant in the USSR in the 1930's. All these precedents are being incorrectly invoked by the revisionist CPC today. Marxist-Leninists must criticize this, but must not rule out all the dealings with hostile classes. Upholding such a standard of behavior would disqualify the leaders of the world's first socialist state from being considered communist!

The Stand of the PLA Letter to the Chinese People and the CPC

Finally, a criticism of this Letter cannot ignore one of its most malignant aspects, its stand toward the CPC and the Chinese people. We have already looked at its position that the CPC was, at least for the past several decades, not a Marxist-Leninist Party. But even granted that incorrect view, how are we to explain that nowhere in the Letter does the PLA call for the Marxist-Leninists of China to take up the battle against the revisionists? Nowhere do they call upon the Chinese people to overthrow their oppressors. Instead their emphasis is on the position that their own cause is just: "Socialist Albania Will Triumph!"

It is shocking to compare this view with the stand of both the CPC and the PLA towards the CPSU and the Soviet peoples. For example, as late as 1963, ten full years after Khrushchev rose to the highest position in the CPSU and Soviet state and seven years after the 20th Congress, the PLA was addressing appeals to the Marxist-Leninists in the CPSU. Whatever the grave defects of the view of the PLA Letter toward the CPC, the dictatorship in China, and Mao, the PLA shares responsibility with the present revisionist leaders in Peking for undermining the fraternal friendship of the Albanian and Chinese peoples.

The absence of calls to Chinese Marxist-Leninists and to the Chinese working class, the absence of passion as they abandon the 800 million people of China to their fate, should give us all pause, above and beyond the Albanians' reversal of verdicts, distortions, and falsifications.

Add Up the Reckoning

Comrades, given the rapid degeneration of the CPC after Mao's death, it is a difficult task indeed to face up to the implications of this "Letter of the CC of the PLA and Government of Albania to the CC of the Communist Party and Government of China." Nonetheless, Marxist-Leninists must not shrink from the duty of objectively studying the history of the working class movement and basing their struggles upon this history. This Letter calls into question the entire socialist experience of China, the status of the CPC as a vanguard communist party, and Mao Tsetung's contributions to the science of Marxism-Leninism. However veiled, that is the real message of this Letter. The evidence provided in support of these conclusions is comprised almost completely of slurs, innuendos, and falsifications. These conclusions are so unexpected and so at odds with the historical record--
including the PLA's past stand—that only rank careerists or individuals largely ignorant of this history could follow the PLA along this road. It must be stated that if the PLA continues along this road, it too will lose its Marxist-Leninist character.

The pressure to go along with the PLA's new positions is strong. Nonetheless, we owe it to ourselves and to the working class to critically assess the PLA's charges and to conduct a thorough struggle around them within the MLOC. All comrades have the responsibility of gaining their independent bearings on these questions. As the great poet Bertolt Brecht wrote:

Add up the reckoning
It's you who must pay it,
Put your finger on each item,
Ask: how did this get here?

Before the MLOC follows the PLA's new turn, we must answer these questions. Historical experience clearly shows the fate of organizations which blindly follow another party, however prestigious. Let us struggle over these charges and reach the correct conclusion, so that the MLOC can then say to the PLA, as we now say to cadre of the MLOC: comrades, turn back.

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FOOTNOTES

1. Until mid-1977, the Marxist-Leninist Organizing Committee was upholding Romania as a model socialist country on the authority of the Communist Party of China, but actually going much further than the CPC. At that time the CPC was treating Romania in a fraternal way because of its determined stand in defending its national independence against Soviet pressures in the Warsaw Pact and Comecon.

2. The Party of Labor of Albania in Battle with Modern Revisionism, Tirana, 1972. Throughout this paper it is referred to as the "Green Book" for brevity.
LETTER
OF THE CC OF THE PARTY
OF LABOUR
AND THE GOVERNMENT
OF ALBANIA TO THE CC
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
AND THE GOVERNMENT
OF CHINA

(July 29, 1978)

On July 7, 1978 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China sent an official note to the Embassy of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania in Peking, whereby announcing the decision of the Chinese Government to stop its economic and military aid and its aid payments to Albania and bring back its economic and military experts working in Albania up till that date.

With this perfidious and hostile act towards socialist Albania, you unscrupulously scrapped the agreements officially concluded between the two countries, brutally and arbitrarily violated elementary international rules and norms and extended ideological disagreements to state relations with Albania.

Taking this hostile step against socialist Albania, you seek to hit at, and damage the economy and defence capacity of our country, to sabotage the cause of the revolution and socialism in Albania. At the same time, you gravely undermine the fraternal friendship between the Albanian and Chinese peoples. Wishing ill to a socialist country, such as the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, you give satisfaction to the enemies of socialism and the revolution. The responsibility for this reactionary and anti-Albanian act, as well as its consequences, lies completely with the Chinese side.

The Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania and the Albanian Government denounce the brutal cessation of aid and loans to socialist Albania before all world public opinion as a reac-
tionary act from great power positions, an act which is a repetition, in content and form, of the savage and chauvinistic methods of Tito, Khrushchev and Brezhnev, which China, also, once condemned.

The Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania and the Albanian Government reject the attempts made in the Chinese note to blame Albania, to groundlessly accuse the Albanian leadership of allegedly being ungrateful for China’s aid and of allegedly having tried to sabotage the economic and military cooperation between the two countries. To any normal person it is unbelievable and preposterous that Albania, a small country, which is fighting against the imperialist-revisionist encirclement and blockade and which has set to large-scale and all-round work for the rapid economic and cultural development of its country, which is working tirelessly for the strengthening of the defence capacity of its socialist Homeland, should cause and seek cessation of economic cooperation with China, refuse its civil and military loans and aid.

Inspired by the teachings of Marxism-Leninism and the principles of proletarian internationalism, the Albanian people, their Party and Government have sincerely and consistently fought for the strengthening of friendship, fraternal co-operation and mutual aid between Albania and China. They have always highly appreciated China’s aid to Albania, considering it an internationalist aid of the Chinese people, an aid serving the general cause of the revolution and socialism in the world, an aid coming from a country which was called socialist. Now, as in the past, the Albanian people, their Party and Government stick to their assessments of this aid and its role, among other external factors, in the development of our country.

Socialist Albania has never considered its friendship with the peoples of other countries a means of economic profit. At the same time, it has permitted nobody to consider economic aid and co-operation an investment whereby political and ideological views, which run counter to Marxism-Leninism and socialism, are dictated to, and imposed on, our country. The Peoples Socialist Republic of Albania has never sold out principles, it has never traded on them.

When the Party of Labour of Albania defended the Communist Party of China from the attack of the Khrushchevite revisionists at the Bucharest and Moscow Meetings of the Communist and Workers’ Parties in 1960, it did so in full consciousness in order to defend the principles of Marxism-Leninism and not to be given some factories and some tractors by China in return. When socialist Albania, for many years on end, defended the rights of People’s China at the UNO against the US plot, it was not doing so for material interests, but for the defence of a just and principled cause. When the Party of Labour of Albania and our working class supported the strategic aims of the Cultural Revolution in China, they were not doing so for the sake of compensation, but out of their will to assist the working class, the communists and people of China to save their country from the capitalist elements who had usurped power in China.

In order to justify its cessation of aid to Albania, the Chinese Government, out of necessity, has limited itself to economic and technical «arguments» of simple common practice in interstate relations. You are doing this in order to cover up the true motives which have impelled you to take this hostile action against socialist Albania.

The cessation of aid and loans to Albania cannot be motivated with the 8 «facts» listed in the Chinese note that allegedly «the Vice-minister of Industry and Mining of Albania... refused further consultations... and brazenly terminated the talks»; that the Albanian experts «ignored the technical guidance of the Chinese experts» in the oil refinery; that the Chinese design for a military project proved unsuccessful because of «the belated discovery of seeping karst caves overlooked through poor geological survey by the Albanian side» and that the Albanian side «changed its mind by taking the work upon itself and terminated Chinese aid for this project»; that the Albanian side «created various pretexts and in violation of agreements, refused to sign notes on the starting of operations of projects»; that the Albanian side «suddenly refused to accept the 25 invoices totalling nearly 100 million yuan Renminbi»; «that due to the Albanian side’s disregard for the technical advice of Chinese experts, a scaffold was formed in the blast-furnace», and the Albanian specialists eliminated this defect without waiting for experts to come from China; that «the Albanian Ambassador to China refused to accept the Chinese note of June 7, 1978».

These «arguments» and the «facts» brought forward by the Chinese Government, are not only fabricated and distorted, but even if they were not so, they could never serve as a moral and juridical basis whereupon a state could rely to justify its one-sided and brutal cessation of economic and military aid to another state, with which it has been in close alliance for a long time.

The true motives for the cessation of aid and loans to Albania have not an exclusively technical character, as the note of the Chinese Government makes out, on the contrary they have a deep political and ideological character. In their letter, the Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania and the Albanian Government will throw full light on these political and ideological moti-
ves. But first we will stop to prove that the «arguments» the Chinese side resorts to in its note do not respond at all to reality.

I

The Government of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania will acquaint world opinion with the truth on economic relations between China and Albania and, in particular, on the questions the Chinese note takes up, by publishing the full text of the notes exchanged on these questions between the governments of the two countries. Herein we will clarify some «facts» mentioned in the Chinese note.

Tendentiously listing a series of figures about China's aid to Albania, the Chinese note of July 7 reflects the desire of the Chinese leadership to boast before the world. It is acting in the same way as the Soviet revisionist leadership, and with the boastfulness of the great state, constantly advertises the «aid» it has once granted Albania.

We are compelled to remind the Chinese leaders that their boasting is in flagrant opposition to the official declarations once made by the Chinese Government itself.

The solemn Statement on the 8 principles of the aid of the Chinese Government to other states reads: «The Chinese Government always bases itself on the principles of equality and mutual benefit in giving aid to other countries. It never considers such an aid one-sided aims, but something reciprocal». When visiting 14 countries in 1964 Chou En-lai stressed, «...in case we were to boast of our aid to others this would be great state chauvinism».

The Albanian people, Party and Government have never denied the aid of the People's Republic of China and its role in the economic development of our country. They have acknowledged and appreciated this aid, proceeding from their sincere feelings, thinking that it came from a friendly state and was given in the spirit of the principles of socialism.

Yet, while making an exaggerated and embellished description of the Chinese economic and military aid to Albania, the Chinese note has no word about the fact that Albania, too, has aided China, as the Chinese leaders themselves have declared time and again, previously.

Appreciating the aid Albania has given China, Mao Tse-tung said: «First of all, we must thank you, because you stand in the forefront, because you are in very difficult situations and persistently fight to defend Marxism-Leninism. This is a very valuable thing, this is most valuable» (From minutes of a meeting with an Albanian delegation, June 29, 1962).

On his part, Chou En-lai stated: «The Albanian comrades frequently mention China's support for, and aid to, Albania. I would like to stress here in the first place, that Albania has given us great aid and support.

«... The Chinese people will never forget that at the time when the modern revisionists slandered against and attacked the Communist Party of China frenziedly, assuming a correct stand, regardless of all pressures, difficulties and dangers, the Party of Labour of Albania courageously faced up to this opposite trend, exposed and mercilessly hit at the anti-Chinese plots of modern revisionism» («Zëri i popullit», January 9, 1964, speech at the Tirana rally).

On another occasion Chou En-lai said: «We are doing our internationalist duty and it will be betrayal if we do not help you... As the bastion of socialism in Europe, you are fighting against imperialism, revisionism and all reaction. If we do not help you, we would not be internationalist communists, but traitors. Support and assistance between us, between China and Albania, are mutual. You are a radiant beacon in Europe, and you are fighting unflinchingly and intrepidly. This is of great help and support to us and the peoples of the world» (From minutes of a meeting with an Albanian delegation, Peking, August 29, 1971).

A similar statement was made also by Kang Sheng: «I have often told the comrades and I again stress that the Albanian comrades are giving us a great, colossal help. We must not consider only the nitrate ammonium plant, the thermopower station, the various plants and factories we give you, they are nothing compared to the great support the Albanian comrades are giving us and the world communist movement» (From the speech at the dinner in honour of the Chinese delegation on November 13, 1966, in Tirana).

We are embarrassed when we have to mention the help Albania has given China, because what the Albanian Party and people have done for China and the Chinese people has been done with a communist sense of duty and inspired by fraternal and internationalist feelings. But you forced us to mention it, because following in the footsteps of Khrushchev and Brezhnev, you began to count the yuans and fens you have given Albania!

In its note, the Chinese Government tries to create the impression, in the public opinion, that if Albania has had any success in its economic development, this, allegedly, is due to Chinese aid. For this purpose and in order to impress the internal and international public opinion, the figures mentioned in the Chinese note are purposely inflated and fabricated. It says that the implementation of the agreements concluded between China and Albania calls for an outlay by the Chinese Government of more than ten billion yuan Ren-
minbi». This is an arbitrary figure which does not correspond to the truth.

First of all, it must be said that what the Chinese Government considers aid is in reality credits, obligations deriving from agreements concluded between the two governments in conformity with the desires and interests of the two sides and common international practice in the relations between sovereign states, which involve bilateral obligations. Thus, here we have nothing to do with alms or Christian charity.

On the other hand, from documents in possession of the Albanian side, it follows that from December 1954 up to July 1975, 17 government agreements on granting credits to Albania by People's China, besides agreements on military aid, have been signed between People's China and Albania. Among these 17 agreements, there are some in which the aid in credits is calculated in old rubles, then in new rubles, later in British pounds, finally in internal yuan, or in commercial yuan or US dollars. From the conversion of the various currencies mentioned in these agreements into 'commercial' yuan according to the Chinese official exchange rate fixed by the China Bank in the respective periods, it follows that the total value of Chinese economic aid in credits accorded to Albania from 1954 up to 1975, when the last agreement was signed, does not «exceed 10 billion yuan», as claimed in the Chinese note, but amounts only to 3 billion and 53 million commercial yuan. Until July 1978 Albania has utilized about 75 percent of this sum, reckoning the value of integral projects and general materials at the prices unilaterally set by the Chinese side. But here it must be stressed that the values included in the invoices of the China Bank for complete projects and general materials are not calculated on the basis of prices set «in joint consultation», but at arbitrary prices set by the Chinese side alone, without consulting the Albanian side at all, as stipulated in the agreement. Therefore, the return by the Bank of the Albanian State to the China Bank of the invoices for the projects built in Albania is no «violation of agreements», as the Chinese note makes out.

Prices for integral projects and general materials, on which the invoices sent by China are reckoned, were not set in accordance with the provisions of the official agreements between the Government of the People's Republic of Albania and the Government of the People's Republic of China on June 8, 1965, and the stipulations of the correspondence of December 22, 1971 which clearly says that: «Prices for integral projects and general materials... will be fixed after joint consultation according to the principles of the setting of trade prices between China and Albania».

As far as military aid is concerned, the assessments of the Chinese side are utterly arbitrary, because in agreements of this category prior to 1967, all evaluations are made in Chinese currency, without consulting the Albanian side, whereas in later agreements which comprise most of the Chinese military aid to Albania, there is no definition of concrete values, either in Chinese or any other currency.

Therefore, those billions of yuan mentioned in the Chinese note do not represent the real sum of China's economic and military aid to Albania, but represent a claim laid on the basis of arbitrary, one-sided and tendentious calculations by the Chinese side. We affirm that, in order to further its sinister aims, the Chinese side precipitated matters when it set such figures. Complete calculations will be made according to the agreements, protocols and criteria established by both sides. Reckonings will be made taking account also of the loss and damage the Chinese side has caused our economy by failing to meet contracted obligations on time, leaving an important part of the projects incomplete, etc.

The Chinese side has not been correct in the implementation of official agreements and protocols and jointly established criteria, either. The overwhelming majority of the economic projects built in Albania on Chinese credits have always been carried out with delays, which fluctuate from 1 to 6 years. There are also projects, such as the Ferro-chrome Factory which was due to be built on Chinese credits in Albania on the basis of an agreement concluded in 1965, which for the fault of the Chinese side has not been completed to this day. Likewise, the construction of the Metallurgical Complex began with delay and to this day, also, for the fault of the Chinese side, investment in its construction has been realized only to a measure of 67 percent against the volume of the total value of the Complex, and China has delivered only 74 percent of the equipment.

These flagrant violations of official agreements by the Chinese side have caused great damage to the Albanian economy, and the Chinese Government bears full material and moral responsibility for this. When all this is calculated according to official documentation and concrete facts, then it will be seen who owes whom and how much.

In the Chinese note China's aid to Albania is presented as the decisive factor in our country's development. But it has never been, nor could it ever be, such a factor. The decisive factor, which nobody can deny, has been the resolute, persistent and heroic work and struggle of the Albanian people, under the leadership of the Party of Labour of Albania, for the construction of socialism according to the Leninist principle of self-reliance. The brilliant successes attained by Albania in the construction of socialism and the defence of the country are the deed of the Party of Labour of Albania, of the Albanian state of the dictatorship of the pro-
lettariat, of the Albanian people, and not the result of external aid.

The aid received from China has been only an auxiliary factor. The total value of the Chinese credits utilized by Albania up to the end of 1977 amounted to a very small percentage of our national income. This is the reality, and not its false presentation by the Chinese side which tries to create the impression as if it is China that has kept the Albanian people alive.

The chauvinistic concepts of the great state have clouded the minds of the Chinese leadership and have made it speak in the language of feudal landlords. The Chinese note boasts that China has delivered 1.8 million tons of wheat, etc., to Albania. It almost stops short of saying that Albania "has kept body and soul together thanks to China's bread." This is an offensive stand towards the Albanian people. The truth is that Albania has imported grain from China during the period of 1955-1975. Not only does this figure not correspond to reality, but it should also be said that Albania has received only 436,000 tons of bread grain on credit from China over all this period, whereas it has received the rest in the commercial way, paying for it on a clearing basis. As the Chinese note has rounded into one figure both the bread grain imported by Albania on credit and the bread grain imported by it on a clearing basis, why does the Chinese side fail to mention what it has taken from Albania, what Albania has exported to China on a clearing basis during the period 1954-1977? Albania has delivered to China over 1.7 million tons of oil, over 1.3 million tons of bitumen, about 2.7 million tons of chromium ore and chromium concentrate, etc.

By mentioning its military aid in its note and making this note public, the Chinese Government has deliberately disclosed the military secret of the defence of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania. By so doing, the Chinese Government has gravely impaired the defence of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania and helped its external enemies, in particular the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and US imperialism and the forces of the Warsaw Treaty and Soviet socialimperialism. This is an act of perfidy, and the Chinese Government bears responsibility for it.

A special place in the note of the Chinese Government is occupied by attempts to accuse the Albanian working people of allegedly failing to respect, and being unwilling to collaborate with, the Chinese experts who had come to Albania. These are inventions through and through, and we will not take the trouble to refute them. We are convinced that, in his conscience, no Chinese expert who has lived and worked among our people will approve of these accusations. During all this time, the Albanian workers, specialists and managers have collaborated with the Chinese experts in a fraternal and friendly spirit, assessed their work correctly, respected their knowledge and experience.

Furthering definite ends, the Chinese note says that within 24 years 6,000 Chinese experts have been sent to Albania. This global figure is dishonored in order to back up the claim that the credit for constructions, industry, agriculture and everything that has been made in Albania allegedly goes to these 6,000 specialists. But the construction of new Albania is the deed of the Albanian people themselves. Scores of thousands of Albanian specialists, engineers and technicians have worked everyday and continuously in the construction of various projects, without mentioning here the hundreds of thousands of technicians of medium training and the skilled workers. Without their work and knowledge no project could have been built.

As well as this, the Chinese note does not say that the experts sent by China have been paid handsomely by the Albanian people. This is not mentioned, but the note does not fail to remind us that China has allegedly spent 100 million yuan to experiment upon Albanian iron! And this at a time when the Chinese experts, on orders from above, upon leaving Albania, left no blueprints to the Albanian specialists; they either burnt or took along with them all blueprints in their possession of the projects which were being built in Albania with Chinese aid.

It is natural that problems should arise between two partners, between two states about concrete economic questions for the solution of which discussions are necessary, even indispensable. The Chinese leadership, however, felt no need to conduct normal discussions, because it wanted to impose its opinions on Albania. Not only today, but for a long period of time before, the Chinese side, in various forms and manners, has brought pressure to bear on Albania over economic questions. During the talks about the signing of agreements of China's granting economic aid in credits to Albania, and then on observance of these agreements, many debates have taken place, in which the Albanian side has successfully opposed the views of the Chinese leadership which sought to impose a one-sided economic development on Albania, to inhibit its rapid and steady development.

In the lengthy debates, the pressure of the Chinese leadership reached such a degree that it threatened to have work on the designing of the hydro-power plants of Vau i Dejës and Fierza suspended, so that we should not build at all these very important industrial projects. The Chinese leadership thought that, as in their opinion Albania had no technical cadres to design such large-scale and complicated hydro-power plants with its own forces, it would consequently give up work on construction of these projects. But in the end, seeing that the Albanian side was undertaking to
design these two hydro-power plants itself, it was compelled to accord the credit. And actually these hydro-power plants were designed and built by the Albanian specialists, whereas the Chinese experts played the role of consultants instead of designers.

Many facts and documents indicate that, at given moments, whenever the Chinese policy made great turns, to which the Albanian Party and Government did not agree, the Chinese Government resorted to pressure and various coercive economic measures. These stands are a flat denial of the clamorous and repeated statements by the Chinese Government according to which «in granting aid to other countries, the Chinese Government strictly respects the sovereignty of the recipient country and never makes it conditional on, or asks, any privilege in return».

The Chinese note says: «... The Albanian side out of its own needs in domestic and foreign policies..., has wantonly maligned China’s aid to Albania...». This lays bare the spirit of intrigue of the Chinese leadership and its desire to see Albania politically, ideologically and economically enslaved by Soviet social-imperialism or American imperialism and the reactionary bourgeoisie. The Chinese leadership speaks so because it thinks that Albania is isolated, that it could breathe and live only through China, and that now it has remained on the streets and will fall into the trap laid by the imperialists or the social-imperialists. This is what Khrushchev and Mikoyan thought when they once said that Albania would sell itself out «for thirty pieces of silver», that «without Soviet aid it would die of starvation, within fifteen days».

But life showed that Albania did not sell itself out, nor did it die of starvation. It forged ahead with great success in the construction of socialism. And this was done not with Chinese aid, but with the heroic work and glorious struggle of the Albanian people.

In the future, too, under the leadership of the Party of Labour of Albania, the Albanian people, relying on their own forces, will always advance triumphantly on the road of socialism, and with their own example they will demonstrate to their friends and the peoples the unenconquerable strength and vitality of Marxism-Leninism, the vigour of socialism, the vigour of the people.

In our struggle for the construction of socialism and the defence of the Homeland, in our efforts to face up to and overcome with success the difficulties raised to our country by the hostile act of the Chinese Government, we have and will continue to have more internationalist aid from the genuine revolutionaries, the freedom-loving and progressive peoples all over the world. Albania has never been isolated, it can never be isolated.

The plans for Albania’s development, as laid out by the Party, will be carried out with success in all directions, through the selfless work and resolve of our people, relying on their own forces, also on the projects which China left incomplete, as well as on more new projects which will be added to them.

II

The unilateral breach of the agreements on economic and military co-operation with Albania by the Chinese Government, the arbitrary violation on its part of the contracts officially concluded between the two countries, the suspension of work on many projects important to our socialist economy, the ordering back of its experts, and so on, reflect a definite political and ideological line of the Chinese leadership. They are the outcome of the departure of the Chinese leadership from Marxism-Leninism and the principles of proletarian internationalism, of its rapprochement to, and collaboration with, American imperialism, the international bourgeoisie and reaction, of its renunciation of aid to, and support for, the revolutionary and liberation forces in the international arena, of China’s intentions to become an imperialist superpower.

This course of the Chinese leadership, which went through a zigzag process, has come up against the constant opposition of the Party of Labour of Albania which cherishes the cause of socialism, the revolution and the liberation of the peoples above everything else. This accounts for the emergence of serious ideological and political contradictions which have been gradually growing between the Party of Labour of Albania and the Communist Party of China. Precisely because our Party and the Albanian people did not accept and did not submit to the Chinese line and views of a great power, the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese Government went to such lengths as to cut all aid to socialist Albania, and extended ideological disagreements to interstate relations.

All along, the Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania has tried to settle these differences on a Marxist-Leninist road, through mutual consultations and comradely explanations, never making them public.

On this question, our Party has proceeded from the principle that differences and misunderstandings may arise among various parties and states, even when they have relations of close friendship. No matter which side is to blame, the clearing of differences and misunderstandings calls for negotiations. The more so, this principle should be implemented between two socialist countries and communist parties. Such norms, as mutual consultations and comradely explanations, are absolutely necessary, because these Marxist-Leninist norms
defend pure friendship, and not hypocritical and
evil-intentioned friendship, they defend the purity
of our scientific theory, Marxism-Leninism,
strongen the revolution and the struggle of the
peoples.

Among the Marxist-Leninist norms which re-
gulate relations among communist parties there
exists also one on the correct and reciprocal, prin-
cipled and constructive criticism of mistakes which
are observed in the line and the activity of this
or that party. Such a comradely criticism cannot
be called polemics, as the Chinese leadership inter-
prets this norm. Polemics, as the word itself indi-
cates, means a state of ideological and political
struggle, it is a state in which non-antagonistic con-
tradictions are transformed into antagonistic con-
tradictions.

In its relations with the Communist Party of
China, the Party of Labour of Albania has rigo-
rously abided by these Marxist-Leninist principles
and norms which are implemented among genuine
communist parties. Whenever it has seen that
the Communist Party of China adopted stands and
took actions in opposition to Marxism-Leninism
and proletarian internationalism, in opposition to
the interests of socialism and the revolution, it
has pointed out the mistakes to, and criticized it,
in a comradely manner. This is borne out by
written documents of our Party and State, which
are in your possession. And what has the attitude
of the Chinese leadership been? While it welcomed
and highly praised the Party of Labour of Albania
and the Albanian Government for their support to,
and defence of, People’s China, the Chinese side has
never welcome the correct and principled remarks
of our Party. The leadership of the communist Par-
ty of China has never wanted the Leninist norms
and methods to be implemented in relations among
parties. Reasoning and acting according to the con-
cepts and logic of a great power, of a great party
and a great state, which considers itself an infa-
lible genius, it has demonstrated that it knows
no other way apart from dictate and imposition
of its views on the others, especially on the smaller
parties and states.

Despite the existing divergencies, the Party of
Labour and the Government of Albania have pu-
licly supported China and the cause of social-
isim in China, especially, at the most difficult, in-
ternal and external political junctures it has gone
through, at the moments when China was isolated
and made the target of attacks from all quarters,
even by its present friends. Our Party and Govern-
ment have done this with an open heart, convinced
that by so doing they were defending the fate of
the revolution in China, which was under serious
threat, defending the lofty interests of proletarian
internationalism, the friendship between Albania
and China. In their support to China against the
enemies of socialism, and their defence of its
stands and actions which were taken on the right
road, the Albanian communists and people fought
for the strengthening of the positions of Marxist-
Leninism and socialism in China.

In order to better understand the political and
ideological causes which led the Chinese leadership
to its arrogant act of ceasing aid to Albania, in
order to understand its chauvinistic attitudes of a
great power in its relations with the Party of La-
bour of Albania, as well as to demonstrate the sin-
cere, fraternal and correct stand adopted by the
Albanian Party, Government and people towards
China and the Chinese people it is necessary to re-
view the development of Albanian-Chinese re-
lations.

1. Contacts between our two parties and coun-
tries were established after the triumph of the re-
volution in China, after the founding of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China. They became closer and
stronger especially after 1960, when the open
struggle against Khrushchevite revisionism began.
The struggle against imperialism and modern re-
visionism brought our parties together, but with
China’s departure from this struggle our roads
parted.

The struggle of the Party of Labour of Alba-
nia against modern revisionism had begun even
prior to the condemnation of Titoism by the In-
formbureau. It continued more fiercely after Stalin’s death, when the Khrushchevite variant of
revisionism began to show up. Our Party extended
and intensified this struggle more and more, rising
in opposition against the anti-Marxist attitudes and
actions of Khrushchev and his gang, both in their
foreign policy and in their relations with the
communist parties, with our Party in particular.

The Khrushchevite deviation represented the
revision of the Marxist-Leninist theory in all fields
and on all questions. The Khrushchevite strategy
was aimed at undermining the dictatorship of the
proletariat and restoring capitalism in the Soviet
Union, transforming this country into an imperialist
superpower, for the division and domination of the
world together with American imperialism. In
order to realize this strategy, Khrushchev attacked
Stalin and bolshevism, he advocated extinction
of class struggle both within the Soviet Union and
outside it. On the pretext that the ratio of forces
in the world today had changed, that US imperial-
ism and the international reactionary bourgeoisie
had become reasonable, he justified his abandon-
ment of the key thesis of Marxism-Leninism on
the violent revolution and spread illusions about
the so-called peaceful road. In their relations with
the communist and workers’ parties, the Khrushche-
vites acted according to their concept of the «mo-
other party» and «conductor’s baton». They wanted
the other parties to submit to their dictate and
adopt their views, to transform them into tools of
their foreign policy. On this road, Khrushchev,
Brezhnev and others reconciled themselves to the Yugoslav revisionists and made common cause with them in the struggle against Marxism-Leninism and the revolution.

To this traitorous and counter-revolutionary line of Khrushchevism the Party of Labour of Albania responded with its determined and unyielding fight. In particular, it opposed and denounced the ideological rehabilitation of Titoism by Khrushchev, who with this act of his was clearly showing that he had completely sunk in the quagmire of opportunism and betrayal. Documents prove that, despite its waverings in its stand towards Yugoslav revisionism, at the beginning of 1960, the Communist Party of China, also, influenced by nobody, condemned the rehabilitation of Tito and his group by Khrushchev.

In June 1960, as is known, the Bucharest Meeting was held. There, the counter-revolutionary line of Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites was still better confirmed. They not only attacked Marxism-Leninism in all directions, but also attacked the Communist Party of China directly. At that meeting, the Party of Labour of Albania openly went to the aid of the Communist Party of China and defended it to the end, thus drawing upon itself the fire of the anger and the weight of the pressures of all the Khrushchevite revisionists. Our Party made this principled defence in pure communist conscience, thinking and convinced that by so doing it was defending Marxism-Leninism and People's China.

The Bucharest Meeting and, later, the Conference of the 81 Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow marked the final split between the Marxist-Leninists and Khrushchevite revisionists, and the beginning of the open polemics between them. Whereas our Party initiated and carried on the fight against Khrushchevite revisionism with consistency and resolve, the Chinese leadership wavered and failed to adopt clear-cut anti-Khrushchevite stands. In the initial stage of the fierce polemics between the Party of Labour of Albania and the Khrushchevite revisionists, China was in agreement with Albania, but this only on the surface, because, in reality, as was proved later, it was seeking a reconciliation with the Soviets and the ceasing of polemics with them. This was evident also in Chou En-lai's speech at the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, where in fact, he did not defend our Party, but demanded that polemics should cease instead. The Chinese leadership called this colourless stand assistance to Albania, but the demand to cease polemics was neither to the interest of socialist Albania, nor to the interest of China itself. It benefited Khrushchev and his fight against socialism and Marxism-Leninism.

2. The wavering stand of the Communist Party of China in the struggle against revisionism became clearly manifest in June 1962. At that time the Party of Labour of Albania sent a delegation to Peking to conduct talks with the leadership of the Communist Party of China on important questions which had to do with the tactics and strategy of the common struggle of our two parties in the international arena. On this occasion, the delegation of our Party came up against the very wrong views of the Chinese leadership.

Liu Shao-chi, who next to Mao Tsetung was the principal leader of the Communist Party of China at that time, and who led the talks for the Chinese side, as well as Teng Hsiao-ping, who was then the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, stubbornly insisted on the viewpoint of the Chinese leadership according to which the anti-imperialist front should necessarily include the Soviet Union as well, which at that time was led by Nikita Khrushchev's revisionist clique.

The delegation of our Party upheld the line of the Party of Labour of Albania, which was based on Lenin's teachings according to which no successful struggle could be waged against imperialism without simultaneously combating revisionism. Our delegation insisted on the view of the Party of Labour of Albania that not only should the anti-imperialist front not include the Soviet revisionists, but, at the same time, it should spearhead its struggle both against imperialism in general, and US imperialism in particular, as well as against Soviet revisionism.

The Chinese leadership argued its line of reconciliation with the Soviet revisionists with the need to unite «with everybody» against US imperialism, which, in its words, was the main enemy. Apart from other things, this opportunist thesis also expressed the illusions entertained by the Chinese leadership about the Soviet revisionist leaders. During the Peking talks, Teng Hsiao-ping declared to the delegation of the Central Committee of our Party: «It is impossible for Khrushchev to change and become like Tito... As a socialist country, the Soviet Union will never change» (From minutes of talks, June 11, 1962).

The Party of Labour of Albania accepted neither these viewpoints nor the Chinese thesis on a common anti-imperialist front, in which the Khrushchevite revisionists, also, should be included, whereas the Chinese leadership held on to its opportunist positions.

The development of later events, the stepping up of the struggle of the Marxist-Leninist forces against Khrushchevite revisionism, the deepening of Khrushchev's disruptive activity and especially the signing of the Anglo-American-Soviet Treaty of August 1963 on the banning of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, which reflected the uniting of the efforts of the two superpowers for the establishment of their domination over the world, forced the Chinese leadership to start open po-
lemics with Khrushchev. In this manner, when the reconciliation and agreement with the Soviet revisionists, so ardently sought by the Chinese leadership, did not materialize, only then the Communist Party of China effectively entered the road of anti-Khrushchevism and agreed to the determined, consistent and principled struggle of the Party of Labour of Albania. This could not fail to rejoice the Party of Labour of Albania and the Albanian people who, single-handed, were for almost three years then facing up to the open frenzied attacks of Khrushchev and entire modern revisionism. The bonds and co-operation between our two parties in the struggle against imperialism and revisionism were strengthened even more.

Our Party made all the efforts for this struggle to be broadened and deepened, because it served the mobilization of the anti-imperialist and anti-revisionist forces for the defence of the cause of socialism and the liberation of the peoples. But the Chinese leadership, as we will see below, did not prove to be consistent and principled in this struggle.

3. In Summer 1964 Chinese propaganda took up the Sino-Soviet border problem. Referring to a talk of Mao Tsetung with a group of Japanese socialist parliamentarians, it claimed that China had been dispossessed by the Russian Czars of vast territories of hundreds of thousands of square kilometres, that in Europe, too, the Soviet Union had territorial problems which had emerged as a result of the Second World War.

The Party of Labour of Albania did not approve of Mao Tsetung’s raising the problem of rectification of borders. According to the view of our Party, the Chinese leadership was making two gross mistakes. In the first place, the raising of the border problem at that moment did not assist the ideological struggle against Khrushchevism. On the contrary, it provided the Soviet leadership with a powerful weapon against China and the Marxist-Leninists in order to neutralize the effect of the ideological struggle they were waging to expose the Khrushchevite betrayal and to present our struggle as a border dispute or territorial claim. On the other hand, by calling into question the rectification of the borders of the Soviet Union with some European countries following the Second World War, J. V. Stalin was unjustly attacked, and the accusation levelled by international reaction against him for creating «spheres of influence» was backed up. The Chinese leadership agreed with Tito, who, when it came to redress the injustices Yugoslavia had suffered in the past at the hands of the victorious powers, upheld this thesis and raised his voice to the skies, while he kept completely silent about the injustices done to another people, if they were in Yugoslavia’s favour.

The Chinese thesis on the rectification of borders was not as simple as that. It expressed the chauvinistic spirit of the great state and bourgeois nationalism, it was an instigation of war in Europe.

In keeping with Leninist norms, in the spirit of complete correctness and in a comradely manner, the Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania informed the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Chairman Mao Tsetung personally of its opinions on these questions in a letter addressed to them on September 10, 1964.

The letter reads in part:
«We think that raising territorial problems with the Soviet Union now would gravely harm our struggle. If we were to do this, we would be giving the enemy a powerful weapon to fight us, and this would paralyse our march forward.

«Under the pressure of Khrushchev’s revisionist propaganda, under the influence of Khrushchev’s slanders and calumnies, and for many other reasons, the masses of the Soviet people will not understand why People’s China is now putting forth territorial claims to the Soviet Union, they will not accept this, and Soviet propaganda is working to make them revolt against you. But we think that even true Soviet communists will not understand it, nor will they accept it. This would be a colossal loss for our struggle.

«...we think that we must not open old wounds, if any, we must not start a controversy and polemics over whether or not the Soviet Union has appropriated other countries’ land; but our only concentrated struggle should be spearheaded against the great ulcer, against the great betrayal represented by imperialism and modern revisionism, the traitor groups of Khrushchev, Tito and all their henchmen».

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China did not reply to the principled and correct letter of our Party. The Chinese leadership never gave our Party any explanation on this question of so great importance. Mao Tsetung limited himself to a verbal statement to the effect that «we will not reply to your letter because we do not want to stir up polemics». In our view, which is in keeping with Leninist norms, the exchange of opinions, comradely criticism and each other’s enlightenment are normal things between two communist parties. They can by no means be considered polemics.

Despite this incorrect stand of the Chinese leadership, our Party did not make this disagreement public. It continued its revolutionary struggle against imperialism and revisionism together with China.

4. In October 1964 N. Khrushchev was overthrown. This event again revealed the wavering stand of the Chinese leaders towards the Soviet revisionists. The hopes for a reconciliation with, and rapprochement to, them were revived,
On October 29, 1964, on behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, in the presence of the ambassadors of Vietnam, Korea, Rumania and Cuba, Chou En-lai requested the Albanian ambassador to Peking to transmit to the Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania the Chinese proposal that our parties send delegations to Moscow to back up the new leadership of the Soviet Union with Brezhnev at the head, and to unite with it «in the struggle against the common enemy, imperialism». He added that he had suggested to the Soviet side that an invitation be extended to Albania, also, to attend the November 7 celebrations.

Expounding the view of the Chinese leadership at that meeting, Chou En-lai said: «Changes have taken place in the Soviet Union. Their influence and importance is not circumscribed within the Soviet Union, alone, but extends to the socialist parties and countries and the entire international communist movement, even to our common enemies and their agents. In a word, this is a good thing, a change has been made.

«For these reasons we sent a message of greetings to the new leadership of the Party and Government of the Soviet Union, informing them that we support and welcome this change.

«... Now, in Peking, from October 16 we have adopted a truce in our press.

«... This we do in order to unite on the basis of Marxism-Leninism against our common enemy, although many major problems may not be solved for the time being».

Although Chou En-lai knew that there were no diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Albania, which were brutally broken off on the initiative of the Krushchevites, he insisted that Albania should send a delegation to Moscow, and told our ambassador, «We think that the Albanian comrades must study our proposal, because this is a good opportunity to stretch a hand to, and unite with, them in the struggle against the enemy».

The Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania could not accept this proposal, which sought the cessation of the struggle against revisionism and ideological reconciliation with it. If this line of reconciliation with the Soviet revisionists were accepted, it would have spelt disaster to the Marxist-Leninist movement, it would have been a destructive blow at it. Therefore, our Party categorically refused the request of the Chinese leadership and turned it down flatly.

In its letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on November 5, 1964, the Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania explained patiently and with Marxist-Leninist correctness that the assessment made by the Chinese leadership of the changes that took place in the Soviet Union was wrong and their proposal to go to Moscow was unacceptable.

This letter reads in part:

«This event, though important and susceptible of serious consequences, has not yet led, at least until now, to the complete defeat of revisionism, has not yet marked the final victory of Marxism-Leninism over revisionism, but has only put off the decay of revisionism, has pushed revisionism closer to its grave, while Khrushchev’s successors are trying to prevent revisionism from falling into this grave, by implementing the policy of Khrushchevism without Khrushchev.

«... Although N. Khrushchev’s exit from the political scene is an important victory of Marxism-Leninism, the Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania holds that it must not be overrated, that the vigilance of the Marxist-Leninists must not be relaxed nor should their principled struggle to smash Khrushchevite modern revisionism cease.

«... We are of the opinion that the open and principled polemics for the ceaseless exposure of modern revisionism must be kept up today and carried through to the end until revisionism is buried as an ideology... Our retreat from these positions won with struggle, would be a loss for us and a gain for the revisionists.

«... In these conditions, when the Soviet Government has unilaterally broken off diplomatic relations and committed dreadful anti-Marxist acts against us, we are of the opinion that it is neither permissible for us as Marxists nor is it worthy of us as a sovereign state, to ignore these things only because of the fact that the person of N. Khrushchev has been deposed.

«For these reasons we have to express our opposition to the proposal of Comrade Chou En-lai to the effect that an Albanian delegation be invited by the Soviet Party and Government to attend the November 7 celebrations».

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China adopted a disparaging stand towards this confidential letter of our Party. The Chinese leadership never replied to this letter and did not take into consideration its reasonable and comradely remarks.

On November 7, 1964, Chou En-lai went to Moscow at the head of a delegation of the Chinese Party and Government, to hail Brezhnev’s advent to power. But, as facts were to prove, he had no success in his mission to bring about a reconciliation and agreement with the new Soviet leadership and no sooner had he returned to China than the Chinese leadership was compelled to resume polemics with the Soviet Union.

Thus, our Party’s stand and its assessment of the events with regard to Khrushchev’s down-
fall proved correct, Marxist-Leninist. Whereas the position of the Chinese leadership was conciliatory, opportunist and utterly wrong both in its assessment of, and stand to, the new revisionist leadership of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, although the Chinese leadership did not behave correctly and made no self-criticism, although the ideological differences deepened further, our Party went on with its struggle for the strengthening of the friendship and co-operation with the Communist Party of China, hoping that this would help the Chinese leadership to sound positions in the common struggle against revisionism and imperialism.

5. Regardless of the contradictions which had arisen between us, taking account of the difficult situations China was going through, and sincerely wishing to assist the Communist Party of China to overcome them, the Party of Labour of Albania continued to support China resolutely, especially in those political and ideological questions over which we held common views.

Our Party supported the Cultural Revolution at the personal request of Mao Tsetung, who declared to our Party that China was facing a colossal danger, and that no one knew who would win in China, the socialist forces or the revisionists (From minutes of the talk with the delegation of the Albanian Party and Government, May 1966). The Party of Labour of Albania assisted China at a very critical moment, when it was going through great upheavals and was being savagely attacked by the united imperialist-revisionist front. It supported the general line of the Cultural Revolution for the liquidation of the capitalist and revisionist elements who had usurped key positions in the Party and state power, though it did not agree over many questions of principle and methods which guided this revolution and were used in it. By supporting the Cultural Revolution, our Party nurtured the hope that it would find the road of true revolutionary struggle, led by the working class and its vanguard, the Communist Party. The entire period of the great Cultural Revolution was a very difficult period for socialism in China, it created a complicated and chaotic situation. This situation was the logical outcome of the factional and unprincipled struggle which took place within the ranks of the Communist Party of China during the time of the struggle for the carrying out of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and after 1949, around the road which China would follow for the further development of the revolution.

The great ideas of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the Marxist-Leninist ideology were not properly made the example for, the pillar and the compass of, the Communist Party of China in the concrete conditions of its country. This accounts for the fact that the Marxist-Leninist nucleus of the Party slipped into dangerous eclecticism, which gave rise to a chaos of unbridled struggle for power between factions, persons and groups holding various non-Marxist-Leninist views, something which seriously hampered the laying of the foundations of socialism in China. This political-ideological and organizational chaos in the Communist Party of China and the Chinese state enabled capitalist and revisionist elements to seize key positions in the Party, in the state power and in the army. In these conditions, the Cultural Revolution, inspired and led by Mao Tsetung personally, broke out.

The Party of Labour of Albania supported the general strategy of the Cultural Revolution. But we want to stress that our Party supported the strategy of this revolution and not all its tactics, it defended with determination the cause of socialism in China, defended the fraternal Chinese people, the Communist Party of China and the revolution, it did not defend at all the factionalist struggle of the anti-Marxist groups, whoever clashed and wrangled with each other, resorting even to arms, overtly or covertly, in order to retake state power.

The Cultural Revolution, more often than not, preserved the spirit and actions of an unprincipled struggle, which was not led by a genuine party of the working class which should strive for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Thus, these clashes among factionalist groups ended in the establishment in China of a state power dominated by bourgeois and revisionist elements.

The present Chinese leadership wanted and wants the Party of Labour of Albania to denounce the Cultural Revolution according to the will and the reasons of the Chinese leadership. The Party of Labour of Albania will never accept such a dictate. Together with all the world revolutionaries it is expecting the Communist Party of China to make the true analysis of this Cultural Revolution, to have the courage to state the truth on the ideas which guided this revolution, the groups and people who carried out and led it, on those against whom this revolution was directed, and to assume clear-cut stands on these questions. To this day, the leadership of the Communist Party of China has not done such a thing, because it is afraid of facts, events and their true Marxist-Leninist interpretation.

6. The Party of Labour of Albania has made all-round, powerful and open efforts to defend China in the international arena, though on many issues it held opposite views on principle. Such is the protracted and persevering diplomatic struggle of socialist Albania for the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations, denied it by US imperialism and its allies.

China pursued a close-door policy in its relations with other countries of the world. The
leadership of our Party had expressed, on special occasions and in a comradely way, its desire to the Chinese leaders that People's China should be more active in its foreign policy, extend its political, economic, cultural and other contacts and relations with various countries, particularly with its neighbouring countries. According to our view, this would be to the advantage of China itself and the cause of socialism and the revolution in the world. But your leadership found this wish of Albania's unreasonable and preferred its own isolation, excusing itself with various pretexts before all the states which expressed their wish to establish relations with it.

7. In 1968, a Party and Government delegation of Albania went to China, headed by the former Member of the Political Bureau and former Vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of People's Defence, Beqir Balluku. This delegation was also charged with the task of presenting to the Chinese leadership our requests for aid to strengthen the defence potential of Albania.

On that occasion, Chou En-lai openly put forth to Beqir Balluku the view of your leadership, according to which, Albania, as a small country, had no need of heavy armament and that it was not at all in a position to defend itself alone from foreign aggression, particularly from Soviet socialimperialism and US imperialism, no matter how much military aid it would receive from China. Therefore, according to Chou En-lai, the only road for Albania to cope with foreign aggression was that of applying the tactics of partisan warfare in the country and concluding a military alliance with Yugoslavia and with Rumania.

When our delegation came home, Beqir Balluku informed the Political Bureau of Chou En-lai's proposal. The Political Bureau of the Central Committee of our Party unanimously condemned and rejected Chou En-lai's anti-Albanian and counter-revolutionary proposal. Beqir Balluku, who formally adhered to the decision of the Political Bureau, added that he had allegedly opposed Chou En-lai's proposal. But later facts proved that Beqir Balluku had, in reality, been in full agreement with the proposal of the Chinese leadership and worked in secret to carry out this hostile strategic plan against the People's Socialist Republic of Albania.

Cho En-lai repeated this same thesis to the Albanian Government delegation which had gone to Peking in July 1975, to conclude an agreement on China's economic aid to Albania for the 6th Five-year Plan 1976-1980. This thesis was turned down again by our delegation in a clear-cut and categorical manner.

The leadership of our Party considered Chou En-lai's proposal about the military alliance he was seeking to impose on us an attempt of a reactionary character on the part of the Chinese leadership to drive socialist Albania into the trap of warmongering plots through military alliances, with the final aim of turning the Balkan area into a powder keg, as the Soviet socialimperialists and the US imperialists are seeking to do.

We do not know if Yugoslavia and Rumania were informed of these plans of the Chinese leadership. But even at present we are witnessing that the Chinese leadership is displaying unusual zeal to interfere in the affairs of the Balkans, to mix up the cards and to kindle the fire of war in this very sensitive area of Europe. But we are confident that the Balkan peoples will never accept to be set at loggerheads with each other, they will never accept to become tools either of US imperialism, Russian socialimperialism, or Chinese hegemonism.

These acts of the Chinese leadership and the opposition of our Party to these reactionary acts had, later, very serious consequences in the relations between our two countries. Our Party has never meddled with the internal affairs of China. But the Chinese leadership, at certain moments, has criminally interfered in the internal affairs of Albania. We will make these facts public at an appropriate time. If these condemnable acts undertaken by the Chinese leadership in collusion with the Albanian traitors were realized, the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, its independence and sovereignty would have been liquidated.

8. While our Party was working to strengthen fraternal co-operation with China, while it wanted to correctly wage and intensify the struggle against imperialism, modern revisionism and reaction on a joint front also with all the Marxist-Leninist parties and forces, China saw everything only from its own angle, it wanted to dominate others, so that the latter would follow its strategy and tactics.

The events that were taking place revealed ever more clearly that the political and ideological struggle of the Communist Party of China against the Khrushchevites did not proceed from a sound basis, in reality, its aim was not to defend Marxism-Leninism, the revolution and the liberation of peoples. It was waged simply for pragmatic ends and selfish interests. This became evident in the radical change of the Chinese strategy, to which Nixon's visit to Peking officially set the seal.

In the summer of 1971, Albania, considered the closest ally of China, learned from foreign news agencies the report spread all over the world that Kissinger had paid a secret visit to Peking. Negotiations, which marked a radical change in the Chinese policy, had been held with Kissinger. As in other cases, this time, too, though the question was about a major political turn, a change in the strategic line, the Communist Party and the Government of the People's Republic of China did not deem it necessary to hold preliminary talks.
with the Party of Labour and the Government of Albania, too, to see what their opinion was. The Chinese leadership put others before an accomplished fact, thinking they had to obey it without a word.

It was clear to our Party that Nixon’s visit to Peking was not an escalation of the talks that were going on till then in Warsaw between the Chinese and US ambassadors, that it was not made to promote ‘people’s diplomacy’ and to pave the road to contacts with the American people, as the Chinese leaders claimed. Nixon’s visit to Peking was laying the foundations of a new policy on the part of China.

With Nixon’s visit, China joined the dance of imperialist alliances and rivalries for the redivision of the world, where China, too, would have its own share. This visit paved the road to its rapprochement and collaboration with US imperialism and its allies. At the same time, the inauguration of the alliance with the United States of America also marked the abandoning on the part of the Chinese leadership of the genuine socialist countries, the Marxist-Leninist movement, the revolution and the national-liberation struggle of the peoples.

This alliance and meeting in Peking, between the Chinese leadership and the American President Nixon, were taking place at a time when the US was waging its predatory imperialist war in heroic Vietnam, when it was using all its most up-to-date means of war, except for the A-bomb, to kill the fraternal heroic Vietnamese people and to reduce Vietnam to ashes. This monstrous alliance and the Sino-US contacts were condemnable acts of disastrous consequences for the peoples.

Therefore, in view of this dangerous turn in the foreign policy of China, on August 6, 1971, the Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania sent a long letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, stressing in no uncertain terms that it was against this turn of China, which ran counter to the interests of People’s China itself, the revolution and socialism.

The letter reads in part:

«...We regard your decision to welcome Nixon in Peking as incorrect and undesirable, we do not approve of, nor do we support, it. We also hold the view that Nixon’s announced visit to China will be inconceivable to, and will not be approved by, the peoples, the revolutionaries and the communists of various countries.

«...Welcoming Nixon to China, who is known as a frenzied anti-communist, an aggressor and assassin of the peoples, as a representative of blackest US reaction, has many drawbacks and will have negative consequences for the revolutionary movement and our cause.

-Nixon’s going to China and his talks there cannot fail to arouse harmful illusions among the rank-and-file, the peoples and the revolutionaries, about US imperialism, its strategy and policy.

«...Talks with Nixon provide the revisionists with weapons to negate the entire great struggle and polemics of the Communist Party of China to expose the Soviet renegades as allies and collaborators of US imperialism, and to put on a par China’s stand towards US imperialism and the treacherous line of collusion pursued by the Soviet revisionists towards it. This enables the Khrushchevite revisionists to flaunt their banner of false anti-imperialism even more ostentatiously and to step up their demagogical and deceitful propaganda in order to bring the anti-imperialist forces round to themselves.

«...The visit of the US President to China will give rise to doubts and misunderstandings among the rank-and-file who may suspect that China is changing its stand towards US imperialism and involving itself in the game of the superpowers.

«...Our strategy calls for close alliance with the peoples fighting all over the world, with all the revolutionaries, on a joint front against imperialism and socialimperialism, and never for an alliance with Soviet socialimperialism allegedly against US imperialism, never for an alliance with US imperialism allegedly against Soviet socialimperialism».

In conclusion, the letter points out: «the line and attitudes of the Party of Labour of Albania will always remain principled, consistent, unchanging. We will combat US imperialism and Soviet revisionism uncompromisingly and consistently». The letter expressed the hope that the remarks of the Party of Labour of Albania made to a sister party «would be taken up in a comradely spirit and understood correctly».

The Chinese leadership adopted its usual stand also towards this letter. It did not deign to give any answer. By so doing, it betrayed not only big state megalomania but also its fear to face the correct and principled Marxist-Leninist arguments of our Party. It is a fact that two months after our letter, the 6th Congress of the Party of Labour of Albania was held. That was a good occasion to exchange views with the Chinese delegation invited to the Congress and to clarify each other’s positions. But in this case, too, the Chinese leadership, consistent on its road of refusing consultations and the settling of disagreements through talks, adopted a stand in contravention of all practice and internationalist relations between sister parties. It concocted some absurd excuses for its failure to send a delegation to the Congress of our Party. Practically, the Communist Party of China has ever since reduced contacts with our Party, turning relations between the two parties into a purely formal relationship.

The change of China’s strategy has come about as a result of an internal struggle within its Com-
munist Party where deep contradictions existed, "a hundred flowers blossomed and a hundred schools contended", where there were pro-Khrushchevites, pro-Americans, opportunists and revolutionaries in the leadership. This accounts for the successive changes in the political line of the Communist Party of China, its vacillating, opportunist, and contradictory attitudes towards US imperialism, modern revisionism and international reaction. The axis of the Chinese policy has changed three times over ten years, from 1962 to 1972. First, the Communist Party of China abided by the strategic formula of a "united front with the Soviet and other revisionists against US imperialism and its allies". Later on, the Communist Party of China came forward with the slogan of a "very broad united front of the proletariat and the revolutionary peoples of all countries against US imperialism, Soviet revisionism and reaction of various countries". After Nixon’s visit to China, the Chinese strategy again speaks of a "broad united front", but this time it includes "all those who can be united", incorporating it even the United States of America against Soviet social-imperialism.

9. After its rapprochement with US imperialism and overtures to the United States of America and its allies, the leadership of the Communist Party of China proclaimed the anti-Marxist and counter-revolutionary theory of the "three worlds", which it presented as a strategy of the revolution, and made efforts to impose it on the Marxist-Leninist communist movement and all the peoples of the world as the general line of their struggle.

When they were fighting together against modern revisionism, and Khrushchevite revisionism, in particular, the Party of Labour of Albania as well as the Communist Party of China adhered to the principle, and stressed, that there was no "mother party" or "daughter party", that any party enjoyed the right to hold its own views on all problems, that a party was truly communist and revolutionary when it looked at this problem from the angle of Marxism-Leninism. The Communist Party of China has violated these principles and norms in all directions. It is seeking to impose China’s counter-revolutionary turn of unity with US imperialism and world reaction on all Marxist-Leninists, to have the entire revolutionary and liberation movement accept its anti-Leninist concepts and analyses of imperialism, the present-day world situation, alliances, and so on, as an absolute and incontrovertible truth.

Practice shows that in most cases, the Communist Party and Government of China have not viewed international issues from the angle of Marxism-Leninism, the interests of the revolution and the liberation struggles of the peoples. Chinese policy is a pragmatic policy, and it cannot be otherwise, in as much as its strategy and tactics are such. Therefore, the world has witnessed and will witness about-faces in the Chinese strategy and politics in the future, too. These turns are passed off as Marxist-Leninist, but in reality they are anti-Marxist, they are turns catering to the interests of the big China state in its search of alliances with US imperialism, Soviet social-imperialism and world capital to create and build China into an imperialist superpower.

At present, the Chinese plan to become a superpower has found its concentrated expression in the infamous theory of "three worlds". The theory of "three worlds" seeks to replace Marxism-Leninism with an eclectic amalgamation of opportunist, revisionist and anarchic-syndicalist ideas and theses, it seeks to dampen the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat and its class struggle, advocating an alliance with the bourgeoisie and imperialism. Alleging that time is not ripe for revolution, the theory of "three worlds" seeks to preserve the status-quo, the present situation of capitalist, colonialist and neo-colonialist oppression and exploitation.

Under the hoax of defence of national independence from Soviet socialimperialism which it regards as the only danger and threat today, China requires the peoples to give up their struggle for national, economic, and social liberation, to submit to US imperialism and the other capitalist powers of the West, the former colonialists. It presses for the strengthening of the Common Market and the European Union, organisms set up to keep the proletariat of Europe in capitalist bondage and to oppress and exploit the peoples of other countries. By fanning up the armaments race of the superpowers and relying on such instruments of war of US imperialism as NATO and other military blocs, the theory of "three worlds" instigates imperialist world war.

The theory of "three worlds" is a smokescreen to hide China's ambition for hegemony over what it calls the "third world". It is no accident that it has included itself in the "third world" and presents itself as its leader in the international arena. It is no accident either that the Chinese leadership is flirting with the "non-aligned" and seeking to take them under its wing.

The Chinese leadership is not the first to display its "affection" and "care" for the so-called "third world". The imperialists, the social-imperialists and the other neo-colonialists have worked out various theories on the "third world" long before it, in order to dominate and subjugate the countries and peoples of this "world". Therefore, it is a futile effort on the part of the Chinese leadership to claim that it is the first, as early as 1974, to have produced this theory on the basis of an allegedly objective analysis of the international situations made by Mao Tsetung.
It is common knowledge that the theory of «three worlds» has been concocted by world reaction. The Party of Labour of Albania and the Albanian Government exposed and combated the theoretical and practical speculations in regard to the «third world» in the international arena as far back as 1960, and even before, as bourgeois-capitalist, neo-colonialist and racist manoeuvres and conspiracies to suppress the peoples who were fighting for freedom and independence.

The «contribution» of the Chinese leaders to the theory of «three worlds» consists only in its «substantiation» of the need for reconciliation of the «third world» with imperialism; they have discovered nothing; they concocted the alliance of the «third world» with US imperialism and the other imperialists to solicit their aid and to make China an imperialist superpower.

Therefore, it is not the Party of Labour of Albania which attacks the Chinese inventor or champions of this theory; it is precisely the latter who were the first to attack the Party of Labour of Albania and the struggle it has waged against this theory of world reaction, the struggle it has conducted in support of the freedom and independence of the peoples of Africa, Asia, Latin America, etc.

The implementation of the theory of «three worlds» led the Chinese leadership to unite even with the «devil», to unite with the US imperialists and the monopolists of Europe, with fascists and racists, kings and feudal lords, most rabid militarists and warmongers. Pinochet and Franco, former nazi generals of the German Wehrmacht and the Japanese imperial army, dyed-in-the-wool criminals like Mobutu and bloodthirsty kings, American bosses and presidents of multinational companies, became its allies.

This anti-Marxist line led China’s leadership to unite with Tito, Carillo and other revisionists. At one time, it was against Tito, whereas now it has united with him. This testifies to its lack of Marxist-Leninist principles, to inconsistencies in its line. But our Party wants to tell the Chinese leadership: your uniting with Tito now and the suspicious alliances you are trying to piece together in the Balkans, pose a great danger to the peoples of this peninsula, to the Yugoslav, Albanian, Greek, Turkish and other peoples. Albania is well aware of the plans and ambitions of the Chinese leadership towards the Balkans. Therefore, the peoples of the world must be vigilant towards the Chinese intrigues in this region.

10. The Party of Labour of Albania has made every effort to solve the differences arisen between the two Parties and which were becoming pronounced with the passage of time, on the Marxist-Leninist road.

Proceeding from this desire, seeing that the Chinese leadership systematically failed to answer its letters and refused to send official delegations to Albania, seeing that ideological differences with the Chinese leadership were assuming broad proportions, the Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania did not stay aloof, but made other efforts to engage in comradely talks with it.

Thus, in January 1974, the Central Committee of our Party proposed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China that a top level delegation of our Party and Government go to China for talks and that this visit be made, possibly, within the first six months of the year 1974. Though formally agreeing to the proposal of our Party, in point of fact, the Chinese leadership did not agree to our delegation going to Peking. In the beginning, the Chinese leadership told us that the delegation should arrive in the second six months of the year 1974, later it postponed its visit to the first six months of the year 1975. And, finally, it kept silent about this issue, thus barring the way to talks, at a time when kings and princes, reactionaries and fascists were welcomed with great pomp in Peking. It was clear that the Chinese leadership was persistently treading its anti-Marxist road, that in relations with our Party and country, it was guided by the concepts of great power chauvinism, that it was trying to have its line and dictate accepted unconditionally and indisputably.

In these conditions, when the Chinese leadership refused any contacts, when it avoided any discussion and consultation, when it was working arrogantly and overbearing to impose the theory of the «three worlds» on the Marxist-Leninist movement, what had the Party of Labour of Albania to do? To connive at the anti-Marxist line of the Communist Party of China and deny itself? To give up the struggle against imperialism and modern revisionism and join the enemies of the revolution, socialism, the freedom and independence of the peoples? To break away from the Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries and unite with the opportunists and the reactionary bourgeoisie? To fail to support the national liberation struggle of the peoples against the superpowers and their agents in the ranks of these peoples?

The Party of Labour of Albania stood loyal to Marxism-Leninism and the correct and revolutionary line it has always followed resolutely, unyieldingly and consistently. It also presented this Marxist-Leninist line at its 7th Congress, where it put forward its views and stand with regard to the main international problems today, the revolution and the liberation struggle of the peoples. Just as at all its other congresses, at the 7th Congress, too, our Party expressed its views also on problems which have to do with the Marxist-Leninist movement in the spirit of proletarian
internationalism. The line of the 7th Congress, which was unanimously approved by the entire Party, lies at the foundation of all the home and foreign policy of our country.

This Marxist-Leninist line of our Party, the independent policy of socialist Albania, the principle and resolute stand of the Albanian people, which have always run counter to the anti-Marxist big power line and policy of the Chinese leadership, are the main and real cause of the anti-Albanian attitudes and acts of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese Government, which led to the arbitrary cessation of civil and military aid to Albania.

This was evident especially after the 7th Congress of the Party of Labour of Albania, when the Chinese leadership, breaking every norm of relations between sister parties, hurried to attack the 7th Congress of our Party, under the pretence that it had allegedly attacked China, the Communist Party of China and Mao Tsetung.

The accusation of the Chinese leadership is groundless. For this suffice it to read the documents of the 7th Congress, which are all made public. It is not difficult for anyone to see that it contains no attacks either against China, or against the Communist Party of China or Mao Tsetung. The Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania has asked the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China through a letter dated December 24, 1976, to indicate when and where our Party has attacked the Communist Party of China and Mao Tsetung. To this day the Chinese leadership, as usually, has given no reply.

But the question does not consist in «attacks» which do not exist. The anger and arrogance of the Chinese leadership towards the 7th Congress draw their source from the fact that our Party did not adopt the Chinese anti-Marxist theses and views, its counter-revolutionary theory of the «three worlds». The Party of Labour of Albania, as a genuine Marxist-Leninist Party, agrees to discuss problems, but it has never accepted orders and directives from anyone on what it must put forward and how it must put forward its view at its own congresses. Therefore, it has never allowed any Party, whether big or small, including the Communist Party of China, to interfere in its internal affairs and dictate what it should do and how it should act.

11. Continuous changes have taken place in the leadership of the Communist Party of China as to its line, strategy and composition. The Party of Labour of Albania never defended this or that group of individuals that was removed from the leadership of the Communist Party of China. We have had and still have our opinion on everything and on every person or group of the leadership acting in China. This is natural.

The present Chinese leadership wanted the Party of Labour of Albania to support its acts with regard to the changes made at the head of the Communist Party of China. As we did not do so, it comes to the conclusion that we are partisans of Lin Piao and «the gang of four». It is wrong in both aspects, and this is one of the unavowed major political, ideological reasons which have urged the Chinese leadership to cease aid to Albania. The present Chinese leadership has wanted our Party to support its illegal and non-Marxist-Leninist activity to seize state power in China. Our Party has not fulfilled and will never fulfil this desire of the Chinese leadership. The Party of Labour of Albania never tramples on the Marxist-Leninist principles, and has never been, nor will it ever be anybody's tool.

In the ideological and political differences and contradictions with the Party of Labour of Albania, in the failure of the attempts of the Chinese leadership to impose its views and line on the Party of Labour of Albania lies the real reason of the Chinese decision to cease aid to Albania. Having failed to subdue socialist Albania, the Chinese leadership is now seeking to avenge itself and harm the construction of socialism in Albania. In so doing, it is revealing its anti-Marxist and counter-revolutionary countenance even more clearly.

* * *

The cessation of credits and aid to socialist Albania on the part of the Chinese leadership is not only an episode, however grave, in the relations between China and Albania. This act assumes great international importance, it proves that China has come out against Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, that it has adopted and is applying a big power chauvinistic policy and dictate, that it is implementing hegemonic practices and it is perpetrating arbitrary and brutal acts of a superpower.

For its selfish aims, to make China a central world power, the Chinese leadership is publicizing itself as a «defender of small and middle-sized countries», that it is fighting against «the unfair division of the world economy», that it is against «economic discrimination against the developing countries by the imperialist powers», that it stands for the «development of their national economy», for «the strengthening of their independance and sovereignty», that it is fighting «against the bullying of the small by the big», etc. But when the Chinese leadership behaves like an enemy towards Albania, when it ceases aid and credits because the Party of Labour of Albania does not submit to its conductor's baton, all the falsity of the Chinese line is seen through, the not in the least good-intentioned aims and lies that the Chinese leadership wants to peddle to the peoples of the
—third world— in order to suppress and enslave them, to impose its will and that of the old and new colonialists on them, are also clearly understood.

By cutting short aid to socialist Albania, at a time when China receives substantial aid and credits from US imperialism and world capitalism and accords aid and credits to their agents like Mobutu and his ilk, the Chinese leadership openly shows world public opinion that it does not agree ideologically with a truly socialist country, but it agrees and is in alliance with the enemies of socialism and the reactionaries, that it is against the socialist order, against the countries and peoples who demand liberation precisely from imperialism and socialimperialism, from oppression and dictate by big state chauvinism.

We want to say to the Chinese leaders: You extended the ideological differences and disagreements also to the field of state relations with our country. With this you dealt a heavy blow at the Albanian-Chinese friendship for which the Albanian people and the Chinese people have fought so hard. You made public the disagreements and differences and began open polemics. We accept this challenge and are not afraid of polemics. But you are fully responsible for all your hostile, anti-Marxist and anti-Albanian acts before the Chinese people and the Albanian people before all world public opinion.

In order to provide the Albanian people and the Chinese people and all world public opinion with the possibility of becoming acquainted with, and pass judgement on, the views of your Party and Government and the Albanian Party and Government with regard to the cessation of credits and aid on the part of China to Albania, we will publish this letter as well as the note of the Chinese Government in our newspaper «Zëri i popullit». We hope that you will publish our letter in your newspaper «Renmin Ribao». This is a norm which China has supported in the past.

The Party of Labour of Albania, the Albanian Government and people will fight to preserve the Albanian-Chinese friendship, which is a friendship between peoples. For their part, they will make every possible effort to maintain normal state relations between Albania and China. They are sure that the Chinese people will make a correct assessment of the Albanian stand and will know how to judge the anti-Albanian acts of the Chinese leadership.

The Chinese leadership ceased economic and military aid to Albania in the belief that Albania would have either to capitulate and submit to it or to stretch its hand out to others and be discredited. But the Chinese leadership has not reckoned with the Party of Labour of Albania and the Albanian people, their determination, the strength of their unity.

The People’s Socialist Republic of Albania and the Albanian people, under the consistent leadership of the Party of Labour of Albania, with Comrade Enver Hoxha at the head, will thoroughly and honourably fulfill their historic mission for the construction of socialism by relying on their own forces, further proving to the proletariat and all the peoples of the world the inexhaustible and indomitable vitality of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, which enables even a small country, encircled by imperialism and revisionism, as Albania is, to build socialism successfully, to defend and carry it always ahead.

Albania will never submit to anybody, it will stand to the end loyal to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. It will march non-stop on the road of socialism and communism illuminated by the immortal teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. The Albanian people, with the Party of Labour at the head, will resolutely and consistently support the revolutionary and liberation struggles of the peoples, their efforts for freedom, independence and social progress. They will fight uncompromisingly through to the very end against US imperialism, Soviet social-imperialism, modern revisionism and world reaction. Albania has never bowed its back or its head, either in the past or today, nor will it ever do so in the future.

The Chinese leadership will fail both in its sermons and in its intrigues. The reactionary act it committed against Albania is revolting to the conscience of every honest man and woman in the world. Though encircled, socialist Albania is not isolated because it enjoys the respect and love of the world proletariat, the freedom-loving peoples and the honest men and women throughout the world. This respect and love will grow even more in the future. Our cause is just! Socialist Albania will triumph!

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE PARTY OF LABOUR
OF ALBANIA

THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
OF THE PEOPLE’S SOCIALIST REPUBLIC
OF ALBANIA

Khrushchevite Revisionism

Analyzes China & Mao

The following are excerpts from revisionist sources that address the question of China and Mao. In comparing them to the recent attacks by the PLA Letter and Enver Hoxha's Imperialism and the Revolution, there is a remarkable similarity.

Is China a Socialist Country?

"Much of what in 'present day China' surprises, startles and puzzles us, and what in recent years has been seriously worrying us is linked with the traditional prototype of 'old China,' which, allegedly, has been eradicated completely. Unfortunately, we grew accustomed much too quickly to regarding China as a socialist country and took it for granted that development there was proceeding without conflict and was following a classical pattern."


"But the year 1956, which should have marked a turn in China's domestic development...showed that Mao Tsetung and his supporters were opposed to the Party's line of building socialism...At the critical moment in the period of transition from the democratic to the socialist revolution, they veered away from scientific socialism and found themselves in a dead end of history. Moreover, they dragged the Chinese people into that dead end...In contravention of the decisions of the 8th CPC Congress and ignoring its warning that the adventurerist ambition of building socialism 'in one morning' was pernicious, the Maoists began enforcing their 'big leap' and 'peoples' communes' policy. This policy nullified all the earlier achievements and plunged China into chaos."

"'Mao Tsetung Thought' vs Marxism," Einheit No. 4/5, 1968, (GDR), in Maoism Through the Eyes of Communists, p. 40.

"Military deformity of the economy makes China's entire economic and social development lopsided...The Peking leaders have distorted the essence of socialist industrialisation. By relying on small-scale enterprises they only preserve the country's economic backwardness. The social consequences of this policy are also most negative: the growth of an organized working class is being retarded."


Is There a Dictatorship of the Proletariat in China?

"The defeat of the Chinese revolution in the 1920's strengthened Mao Tsetung and his supporters in their contention that the proletariat was incapable of leading the revolution. They adhered to this view during the people's democratic revolution, too, when non-recognition of the leading role of the working class was particularly disastrous. During the years of successful socialist construction in China, the Maoists tried to slow down the growth of the working class. They went to all ends to keep it from coming to the fore...True, time and again Mao Tsetung and official propaganda nodded approval of the working class. However, against the
background of the Mao group's home policy, all these nods were nothing but cheap demagoguery aimed at giving this policy a Marxist colouring."

"Mao Tsetung Thought Vs. Marxism" in Maoism Through the Eyes of Communists, p. 44.

"As distinct from Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung regards the cultural revolution not as the culminating point of the socialist revolution in ideology but as an uprising against Party organs and the socialist state apparatus...Students only create a clamorous aureole around a much more serious process which in reality is leading to a change of power in the state. The militarization of social organizations in China undermines the Party's leading role and raises doubts about the people's nature of Chinese socialism."

Mika, "Reasons Behind the Chinese Attitude," in Maoism Through the Eyes of Communists, p. 63

"The Maoists staged the 12th Plenary Meeting to provide further justification for the 'cultural revolution', dissociate themselves from the line laid down by the Eighth Congress of the CPC and thereby end the PRC's socialist development, and ideologically prepare the country for the establishment of a new system of political rule. The machinery of a military-bureaucratic dictatorship is being rapidly built up in China today. The demolition of the political superstructure of the people's democratic system is nearing completion. The Communist Party as the leading force of society, the elective organs of state power, the trade unions, the Young Communist League and all other public organizations have been disbanded or paralyzed under the slogan 'break the old machinery of state.'"

"The Situation in China and in the CPC at the Present Stage," Kommunist, No. 4, 1969 (USSR), in Maoism Through the Eyes of Communists, p. 66.

"The 'cultural revolution' is a sweeping attempt to give Chinese society a military orientation. At the same time it eradicates the principle features of socialist democracy and suspends the functions and role of the proletarian dictatorship."


The Party and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution

"All the indications are that the adversaries of Mao Tsetung's line have clashed with him and his group for the most diverse reasons and that not all the divergences are over a principled line. According to available information, Mao and his group are fighting for personal power and this struggle is directed against individuals among the Party and Government leadership and also against persons who have stated dissenting views on various issues but have given no cause for believing that they desire a change of general policy."


"The leadership of the CPC and the Chinese Army was seized by the Mao Tsetung group in January 1935 as a result of a factional struggle. By that time Mao Tsetung had fallen into error on a series of fundamental issues...The Chinese revolution triumphed
chiefly because of the assistance received by it from the Soviet Army."


"In order to substantiate the factional struggle, which has developed into a civil war for the seizure of absolute power in the Party and the state and justify their foreign policy aimed at hotting up international tension and provoking war between the USSR and the USA, and also to divert the anger of the masses over the tremendous internal difficulties, Mao Tsetung and his group took a series of steps to give Maoism the shape of an ideology."

Kozharov, p. 25.

"The fact that subjectivism and factionalism have been decisive elements in organizing the persecution of cadres devoted to socialism and proletarian internationalism or simply persons objectionable to the Mao faction has given rise to conditions for internecine strife between rival Maoist organizations and groups. This, along with the growing resistance of the working people to the 'cultural revolution,' has led to chaos which is accompanied by economic dislocation and a considerable lag in public education, science and culture, and nullifies past achievements in the building of socialism and in uniting the Chinese people morally and politically."

Kozharov, p. 27-28.

"The situation that has been shaped in China by the 'cultural revolution' derives directly from the undermining of the Party's leading role, the abandonment of the CPC's ideological and organizational foundations and the discrediting of its programme guidelines. The Mao group has broken with the Marxist-Leninist propositions on the proletarian Party's leading role in society, its nature, the standards of inner-Party life and the nature of its links with the working people."

"Situation in China and in the CPC at the Present Stage," in Maoism Through the Eyes of Communists, p. 81.

"'Political conditions' imply a change of the Party's political make-up and its social composition. Although the CPC was heavily cluttered up with petty-bourgeois, nationalistic elements even before the 'cultural revolution', while the working-class nucleus was relatively small and weakened by Mao Tsetung's policies and the constant purges, there nevertheless were in the Party many Communists who had been trained on Marxist-Leninist ideals and who could see the difference between these ideals and the views of Mao."

"Situation in China," p. 87.

"In order to achieve their design of establishing absolute domination over the Party and the state, Mao Tsetung and his group, who have clashed with the majority in the CC and, consequently, with the entire Party, had to come into sharp conflict with and flout the Marxist-Leninist teaching on the Party. While pursuing their aim of liquidating the CPC and establishing their domination over it, the Maoists have evolved various 'theories' and 'slogans' in order to camouflage the anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist substance of these actions and give them the appearance of being 'revolutionary.' However, as we shall see, despite
their new formulations and features all of them are fundamentally nothing more than 'theories' and 'slogans' of the petty-bourgeois and anarchist liquidationism which Lenin had exposed."


Mao as a Marxist-Leninist

"What on the theoretical level is the substance of the evolution of Maoism? Until recent years the followers of Mao have sought to represent Maoism as 'Chinese Marxism', having in mind that Mao applied Marxist-Leninist theory to the specific conditions obtaining in China. Indeed, Mao's earliest works contain some Marxist propositions, but these are worded very primitively and vaguely. However, basic concepts like 'dialectical contradiction,' 'proletarian revolution,' and 'dictatorship of the proletariat' are not interpreted by Mao in the universally accepted scientific sense. He injects his own anti-scientific meaning into them. Thus, Marxist phraseology conceals an anti-scientific, profoundly erroneous content. For instance, Mao frequently reduced a dialectical contradiction to a purely formal, external element such as the contradiction between the concepts of good and evil; he includes poor peasants into the concept 'working class'; he reduces the dictatorship of the proletariat to a military-bureaucratic dictatorship of a ruling clique headed by himself and so on.

"The anti-Marxist, anti-scientific aspects of Maoism began to predominate after 1956, when Mao turned radically away from the sound decisions of the Eighth Congress of the CPC. Regardless of the partial use of Marxist terminology, all the 'new' features introduced into Maoism in recent years and advertised as the 'highest stage of the development of Leninism' are profoundly erroneous and constitute an eclectic mixture of Trotskyism, anarchism, Great-Power chauvinism and political adventurism with the addition of the most rabid anti-Sovietism."


"Marxist theory has been 'expanded' to include three more 'components' deriving from the Mao Tsetung's theories on the people's war, the upbuilding of the Party, and the 'development of the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat.' At first sight the formulations in Mao's writings do not seem to be a variance with Marxism. But a closer scrutiny shows that in most cases they are only a simplified retelling which frequently distorts the sense of known propositions...The resultant system lacks harmony. But this whole eclectic mixture of vulgarized Marxist theses, opportunist ideas and Confucian rules plays the role of a screen for Mao's political line."


"The current Chinese leadership is compelled to reckon with the tremendous prestige enjoyed by Marxism-Leninism. Mao realizes, of course, that he will not be able to win the masses and keep them under his control with his name and his 'ideas' alone. For a certain period he disguised himself as a Marxist, and now he is even trying to pass himself as a successor to Marx and Lenin.

"There was a time when many of the notions that constitute Mao's 'thought' were regarded as mistakes and delusions owning to Mao's lack of experience and theoretical background...Mao often came under criticism in the CPC and in the Comintern.

"The developments in China have revealed the real essence of Maoism, a reactionary Utopian petty-bourgeois conception, which on the theoretical plane, is an eclectic
hotch-potch of widely different views, including elements of Confucianism, anarchism, Trotskyism and petty-bourgeois nationalism.

"Mao took the most conservative aspects of Confucianism—the preaching of submissiveness, the glorification of authoritarianism, the cult of the supreme ruler.

"From petty-bourgeois views Mao borrowed the ideas about the special revolutionary character of the peasants, underrating the vanguard role of the working class. Reactionary Utopian ideas, born of historical backwardness, are elevated by Mao to the rank of a new theoretical discovery.

"Mao took from the bourgeois nationalist doctrines Great Power and chauvinist views, transforming them into a Messianic theory about China's exclusiveness.

"To the Trotskyites Mao owes his ideas about the precedence of political aims over the objective laws of social development, about the 'tightening of the screws' and the militarization of society; the theory that socialism cannot triumph anywhere before the victory of the world revolution; the theory of the export of revolution, according to which a world war is the only way of carrying out a revolution on the world scale; and finally, rabid anti-Sovietism and the methods of conducting subversive activities in the ranks of the international communist and working class movement.

"Maoism is an anti-Leninist political trend based on 'Sinoised' social-chauvinism, the 'Sinoised Marxism' which was declared at the Ninth CPC Congress 'an entirely new stage of Marxism-Leninism'...is an open attempt to replace Marxism-Leninism by Mao's 'ideas' and political directives, which, in their class nature, are alien to the theory and practice of scientific communism."

Declaration of the Central Committee
of the PLA Against the Attack and Slanders of
N. Khrushchev at the XXII Congress of the CPSU

At the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, N. Khrushchev publicly attacked the Party of Labor of Albania. The slanders and anti-Marxist attacks of N. Khrushchev serve only the enemies of communism and of the People's Republic of Albania, the various imperialists and the Yugoslav revisionists. By making public before the enemies the disagreements which had existed for a long time between the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Party of Labor of Albania, N. Khrushchev brutally violated the 1960 Moscow Declaration which points out that the disagreements which arise between sister parties must be resolved with patience, in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and on the basis of the principles of equality and consultations. By attacking publicly the PLA, N. Khrushchev effectively launched the open attack against the unity of the international communist and workers' movement, against the unity of the socialist camp. For this anti-Marxist act, for all the consequences arising from it, N. Khrushchev bears full responsibility.

The PLA, led by the interests of the unity of the world communist movement and the socialist camp, with a great patience, since our disagreements with the Soviet leadership arose, has striven to resolve them on the correct Marxist-Leninist course, on the course defined by the Moscow Declaration. N. Khrushchev chose the anti-Marxist course of their exacerbation, the course of attacks and slanders, pressures and threats, the course of public denunciation of our disagreements.

The PLA welcomed with sympathy the declaration of the head of the delegation of the Communist Party of China at the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, comrade Chou En-lai, which points out that the unilateral criticisms and making public, before the enemy, of the disagreements between sister parties cannot be considered as a serious and Marxist-Leninist attitude. However, from the tribune of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, even after this principled warning of the representative of the CPC, the most savage attacks and slanders continue against the PLA and the People's Republic of Albania, by some members of the Soviet leadership as well as by some leaders of the communist and workers' parties of other countries, thus assuming, they, too, a heavy historical responsibility, as disrupters of the unity of the international communist and workers' movement.

In these conditions, in the face of the organised anti-Marxist attack of N. Khrushchev and those who follow him, in the face of slanders and inventions, which aim at discrediting our Party, in the face of the serious danger to the further fate of the unity of the international communist and workers' movement and the socialist camp, the PLA cannot keep silent. With facts and documents, it will make known to the entire communist and workers' movement, as well as to the entire international public opinion, how the truth stands about the relations between the PLA and the leadership of the CPSU, on which side is the right, and will expose the anti-Marxist and anti-Albanian actions of N. Khrushchev and his group.

The unity of the socialist camp and the international communist and workers' movement is being seriously endangered by the anti-Marxist actions of N. Khrushchev and his followers. In this situation, to defend the supreme interests of the people
and the homeland, their socialist victories, to defend the purity of Marxism-Leninism and the unity of the ranks of the communist movement and the socialist camp, the PLA, with a pure conscience, has assumed and will assume the responsibility for every action of its own, as well before the international communist and workers' movement, as also before the Albanian people.

The struggle which is being imposed on our Party and people will be a protracted and difficult one. But difficulties have never frightened our Party and people. Our Party and people have been tempered in struggle against the many and continual slanders, attacks and conspiracies of various imperialists and the Yugoslav revisionists. They will not bend and will not fall to their knees either before the slanderous attacks, blackmails and pressures of N. Khrushchev or of those who follow him. Party and people, in steel unity, as always will blaze ahead determined and will win on their correct course, on the course of the triumph of Marxism-Leninism and the cause of socialism and communism. We shall win because we are not alone. With us, with the great cause of Marxism-Leninism, are the communists and the peoples of the Soviet Union, with whom we are bound with an unbreakable love and friendship which we shall preserve intact in our hearts as always, in every storm and stress; with us are the communists and peoples of China, all the communists and peoples of other socialist countries. The victorious banner of the Party, the unconquerable banner of Marxism-Leninism, with flutter always proudly in new socialist Albania.

The Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania
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