Enver Hoxha’s Imperialism and the Revolution—An “Error” from Beginning to End

The article “Beat Back the Dogmatist-Revisionist Attack on Mao Tsetung Thought” which appeared in The Communist (theoretical journal of the Central Committee of the RCP, No.5, May 1979) is a thorough refutation of the main aspects of Enver Hoxha’s repugnant attack on Mao Tsetung’s contributions to the international and Chinese communist movement. Hoxha’s reactionary trash first reared its ugly head in full form in his book, Imperialism and Revolution (Tiranë, 1979). But even some who agree that Hoxha’s characterization of Mao Tsetung is in the main incorrect, see little wrong with the rest of the book: his analysis of the world situation and his strategy for revolution everywhere in the world. Some who fashion themselves as Marxist-Leninists even feel that there is a great contribution to the world revolution bound up in this work, perhaps seeing Hoxha’s view of Mao as a revisionist as some kind of minor aberration.

The above-cited article from The Communist pointed out how Hoxha’s thesis on Mao Tsetung Thought is itself thoroughly revisionist and dovetails and almost copies the Soviet revisionists’ position in many respects. To Hoxha, people’s war in a semi-colonial, semi-feudal country like China is supposedly an endless war game that keeps the working class from the real revolutionary war in the cities, arguing in effect that the proletariat should not only be the leading force, but the main force in a semi-feudal, semi-colonial country such as China. If the peasantry is the main (not leading) force, this is “revisionism.”

According to Hoxha, the source of class struggle under socialism is essentially external (an imperialist plot), the Cultural Revolution was a reactionary mess, and there is no qualitative difference between socialism and communism. On the philosophical front, Hoxha distorts Mao as much as he thinks he can get away with and exposes his own total lack of grasp of dialectical materialism. (All this and more is gone into fairly thoroughly in the above-cited article and the reader is strongly encouraged to study that article, since there will be no attempt here to repeat the previous analysis made.)

It is hard to imagine how one could view these types of errors as anything less than a fundamental departure from and attack upon Marxism-Leninism. Perhaps sincere disgust at the reactionary “three worlds” strategy of the Chinese revisionists and its adoption by social chauvinists around the world and sincere desire for revolutionary Marxism to triumph over revisionism in Albania might be the source of blindness towards Hoxha’s revisionism. But it is blindness nonetheless and can only lead people toward the pit of revisionism themselves.

Hoxha’s method might be contributing to this blindness. Through the skillful use of eclectics, quotes from Lenin and Stalin to prove his “orthodoxy” to Marxism-Leninism and in words fiercely upholding some of the key questions that have separated Marxism from revisionism over the years (such as upholding the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat and vehemently opposing the line of peaceful transition to socialism), he tries to pass off his subjective view of the world, his metaphysics and idealism as some kind of “refreshing” return to Leninism. But for all his “upholding” of Lenin and Stalin, Hoxha has much more in common with other “classical” and even modern figures. Kautskyism, Trotskyism and the current political line of the modern Soviet revisionists are what really come to mind on careful study of Hoxha’s book in its entirety.

There are about as many errors in Hoxha’s book as there are pages (over 400 pages in the English translation), but thoroughly analysing or just pointing out the character of all these errors would take a volume many times its length and would have questionable usefulness to the international communist movement. The following will briefly characterize some of the main features of Hoxha’s analysis of the world situation, going into only three or four of Hoxha’s revisionist theses not already covered in the Communist article and making an initial analysis of the source and implications of Hoxha’s caricature of Marxism.

Hoxha’s tactic reminds one of a peacock. General phrases about the “purity” of Marxism-Leninism are displayed with great pomposity and fanfare. He hopes the display will mask the reality of his revisionism.
I. The World According to Enver Hoxha

The book contains lengthy analyses of what Hoxha believes to be going on in the world today, both in chapters dedicated to that purpose in Part I of the volume and also as part of his lengthy polemic against the Chinese revisionist "three worlds" strategy and their "strategy to become a superpower" (both in Part II of the book). His analysis is an eclectic maze—he mentions almost everything but the kitchen sink—but stripping away empty phrases one finds a distinct, if not thoroughly original, erroneous understanding of what is happening in the world today.

Hoxha acknowledges the existence of two superpowers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, as the main defenders of world capitalism and also says at times that they are "contending over the division of the world." But most often, when the two superpowers are mentioned, Hoxha's next breath mentions China, Japan, and various powers of Western Europe as potential contenders for hegemony against the U.S., not that different at this time from the USSR's relationship to the U.S. And while he does speak of contention between the two superpowers (and more often between all the imperialists equally) over the division of the world, he almost always follows this with an emphasis on their collusion. At times in the book, he says that contention and collusion between imperialist powers are equal tendencies but more often he emphasizes collusion as principal (more on this later). Hoxha does not think that inter-imperialist world war is on the horizon. He does say "The imperialist superpowers, of which we spoke above [and above included a whole section on China], will remain imperialist and war mongering, and if not today, tomorrow they will plunge the world into a great nuclear war." But Hoxha definitely means "not today" and by tomorrow, he means in the long-range figurative sense. He states:

"Of course, while the United States of America and NATO are striving to preserve this status quo with the Soviet Union, at the same time, they have contradictions with it, but these contradictions have not yet reached such a level as to justify the Chinese refrain that war in Europe is imminent."

The point here, of course, is not whether war is literally about to break out. This was not the line promoted by the Chinese Communist Party under the leadership of Mao (nor is this even the line put forward by the Chinese revisionists today). The question is whether the crisis of imperialism has reached the critical stage where it is propelling the two superpowers rapidly toward a war to redivide the world. The quote above epitomizes Hoxha's emphasis and his eclectics; throughout his book he gives some lip service to the inevitability of war between the two superpowers, but he emphasizes that "striving for a status quo" and downplays the way in which their actual moves toward world war, which are intensifying daily, affect and dominate most of their political moves today. (Contrary to Hoxha's dream world, the SALT negotiations represent the opposite of what he's saying they do. They have nothing to do with preserving the status quo, but, in fact, are a cover under which the superpowers are frantically stepping up their preparations for war—not only militarily, but by deceiving the masses and pointing the finger of blame at each other.) Hoxha does not promote the understanding that imperialist war represents the extreme concentration of the contradictions of the imperialist system. In his view, if there's anything close to an impending threat of world war, it's because of "China's strategy" of inciting war between the Soviets and the U.S.

Hoxha does not see that the deepening of the crisis of imperialism is currently leading to the formation of war blocs headed by the two superpowers. Hoxha sees one bloc, one monolithic imperialism, albeit with some contradictions, headed by U.S. imperialism. And as incredible as it may seem coming from a supposed anti-revisionist Marxist-Leninist, the Soviet Union is not only treated as a part of this same bloc, but is viewed as practically a neocolony of the United States! After pointing out that the Comecon countries are in debt to the West to the tune of 50 billion dollars, Hoxha states "The exporting of capital from one capitalist country to another capitalist or revisionist country, no matter whether the state which gives or receives it is big or small, is always one of the forms of exploitation of the peoples by capital. This exploitation brings about the economic and political dependence of the recipient country." Along the same lines he states: "The big countries may repay the credits they receive, but the imperialist investments which are made in these big states, such as the revisionist Soviet Union, China, or anywhere else, cannot fail to leave grave neo-colonialist consequences," and: "Even the Soviet Union has been reduced to this state of curtailed sovereignty [by the Western imperialists]...." (We will see later that Hoxha's simple-minded and wrong thesis that, even in imperialist countries, foreign investments equals "curtailed sovereignty" also dovetails with his efforts to have the working class pick up the blood-soaked national banners in Western Europe.)

Even Hoxha's analysis as to why the United States and such a tremendously large amount of defense industry echoes the views of revisionists and petty-bourgeois radicals. He reduces it to vulgar economies:

"Naturally, the most important sectors, which present more interest for investments in the field of development and the technical revolution, have priority, because they offer greater possibilities for profits. War industry tops the list, as it is here that the rate of profit is highest."

Leaving aside for now his "technical revolution" thesis, his "facts" are off on the question of war industry. The U.S. government makes cost-plus contracts with these companies because the imperialists' political necessity makes it mandatory to guarantee a full flourishing of this production, despite what economic fluctuations due to the crisis are going on overall in the economy! (And, of course, since this guaranteed profit must come from actual surplus value created elsewhere, these contracts just exacerbate the economic crisis.)

When it comes to the prospect of revolution breaking out around the world, Hoxha again has his own "uniqueness." After taking great pains to quote at length from Lenin as to what the criteria are for a revolutionary situation and throwing in his own comment that only "hot heads" would think revolution could be made at any time, he states and develops the idea that "the revolutionary situation has already enveloped or is in the process of enveloping the majority of capitalist and revisionist countries, and hence, that this situation has placed the revolution on the order of the day." True, he focuses on Spain and Italy, where the crisis, while not having reached a revolutionary situation, is more mature, but he
maintains that Italy has been in a revolutionary crisis since 1945. He also emphatically states, "The revisionist parties in France, Japan, the United States of America, Britain, Portugal and all the other capitalist countries are playing a similar role in defending the bourgeois order, enabling it to overcome the crises and revolutionary situations ..." 13

This whole analysis makes a mockery of Lenin's orientation toward a revolutionary situation. (And may we remind Hoxha that Lenin was talking about the critical situation the bourgeoisie of Europe faced during World War I.) Lenin wrote:

"... it [a revolutionary situation] will demand arduous preparatory activities and heavy sacrifices. This is a new form of organization and struggle that also has to be learnt, and knowledge is not acquired without errors and setbacks. This form of the class struggle stands in the same relation to participation in elections as an assault against a fortress stands in relation to manoeuvring, marches, or lying in the trenches. It is not so often that history places this form of struggle on the order of the day, but then its significance is felt for decades to come. Days on which such method of struggle can and must be employed are equal to scores of years of other historical epochs." 14

While Europe or much of Europe is supposedly in a "revolutionary" situation, Hoxha's view flips over to the opposite when it comes to the colonies and neo-colonies of imperialism. With each section of the globe his book traverses, he emphasizes how difficult the road to revolution is in these countries (making a little bit of an exception when it comes to Latin America, on which we will have more to say later).

Even when it comes to Hoxha's more basic analysis of the crisis of imperialism and his "defense" of Lenin's great work, Imperialism, the Highest State of Capitalism, Hoxha's formulations and emphasis are a mockery of Marxist political economy and particularly of Lenin's application of it in analyzing imperialism. While it is not within the scope of this article to carry on a full analysis of Hoxha's political economy, a few things should be noted.

Hoxha is careful to mention all the different chapter headings of Lenin's great work, and he even gives us some good quotes from it. For example, he quotes Lenin at length criticizing Kautsky for reducing imperialism to "a policy 'preferred' by finance capital." But Hoxha himself is in these same waters. Readers should look at pages 340-341 and elsewhere in Hoxha's book to see how, particularly in reference to "Chinese social-imperialism," he separates imperialism from the development of capitalism into its highest monopoly stage—a stage which China obviously has not reached. In fact, in a still relatively backward country such as China, the restoration of capitalism means capitulation to imperialism and neo-colonial dependency on one imperialist bloc or another. 15

Hoxha also shows how he does not analyze imperialism as a system with inner laws which assert themselves whatever the plans and intentions of the bourgeoisie by the fact that he places no emphasis on the anarchy of capitalism either in words or in the content of his section on imperialism. In fact capitalism's anarchy is mentioned only once. 16

He even appears to think that imperialism, rather than being an obstacle to the development of the productive forces, actually contributes to their advancement in the underdeveloped countries: "the United States of America and the other countries export capital precisely to those countries in which economic development requires investments and technology." 17 He's careful to make it clear that this contribution to "economic development" is out of greed and not good will, since they rake in superprofits. But even here he is off—even quite off. Profits for the imperialists have been going up, up (they have no falling rate of profit, we suppose, since Hoxha only mentions how good the profit scene is for them) and it is simply greed that has them investing and fighting over spheres of influence, not necessity, the blind laws of capital at work that makes it mandatory to export excess capital the imperialists cannot reinvest in their country and get the necessary return on their investments; or, as Lenin put it,

"The capitalists divide the world, not out of any particular malice, but because the degree of concentration which has been reached forces them to adopt this method in order to obtain profits." 18

Yes, Hoxha speaks constantly of the deep economic crisis of imperialism. But this he simply describes as the "periodic crisis of overproduction" becoming more frequent. For example, he treats inflation, which is one of the sharpest manifestations of the developing crisis and which shows the depths of the contradictions the imperialists have found themselves in, as simply a plot of the imperialists to increase the relative exploitation of the working class. 19 The reader is urged to study Lenin's Imperialism and compare Lenin's emphasis on the dominance of finance capital, the parasitism of imperialism, Lenin's emphasis on the export of capital and particularly Lenin's emphasis on the imperialists' need to divide and redive the world and see how Hoxha's emphasis is entirely different, even if he makes sure he uses some of the same phrases.

Hoxha even does some creative "developing" of the character of imperialism since Lenin's time, as for instance where he more than once mentions the "technical revolution." 20 While Hoxha does not go into this concept much in this book, the Albanian Party of Labor has done more thorough work elsewhere on this creative development 21 (and by Hoxha's references to this concept, he seems to be upholding it). In short, this "technical revolution" thesis pins much of the buoying up of the economy of the imperialists after World War 2, particularly in the U.S., Europe and Japan, on their investing in new and highly technological industry which stimulated the renewal of what he calls "fundamental capital." This line, in fact, dovetails with the imperialists' own explanations for their success, and completely obliterates the oppression and superexploitation of the colonial and neo-colonial countries—the most important factor enabling the imperialist countries to stave off the full effects of the crisis.

This "technological revolution" thesis is thoroughly revisionist. If one took the Albanian party's thesis as correct, conceivably the imperialists could indefinitely find new technological fields to continue this "revolution" and so reinvest their excess capital. This theory also goes against the fundamental premise that imperialism is a fetter on the productive forces (although certain technological advancements are made) in a much more fundamental sense than Hoxha puts it—reducing the question simply to meeting the needs of the people—in the chapter we've been speaking to.

II. Hoxha's "Two Worlds" Thesis

What's pivotal to Hoxha's analysis is what can fairly be described as his "Two Worlds Theory"—"The world is divided in two, the world of capitalism and the new world of socialism..." 22 Or as he says:

"After the triumph of the October Revolution Lenin and Stalin said that in our time there are two worlds: the socialist world and the capitalist world, although at the time socialism had

(Continued on page 31)
Hoxha

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triumphed in only one country." 23
(Hoxha’s emphasis)

This formulation by Hoxha sounds ex-
tremely revolutionary on the surface, especially compared to the Chinese revi-
sionists’ classless “three worlds” strategy, but at bottom Hoxha’s line is far from revolutionary. Hoxha tends to reduce the world to the contradiction between socialism and imperialism, and this metaphysics is what sets the stage for a totally idealist view of the world filled with revisionist and even classical Trotskyite formulations.

Hoxha must sincerely feel that Kaut-
sky was entirely wrong, for he continually tells us so throughout the book. But upon careful examination, he must really think Kautsky was wrong only in that he was premature in his promotion of “ultra-imperialism” or “super imperialism.” What Kautsky wrote in 1915 and quoted in brief by Lenin in Imperialism might be of interest to the reader:

“Kautsky: ‘. . . Cannot the present imperialist policy be supplanted by a new, ultraimperialist policy, which will introduce the joint exploitation of the world by internationally united finance capital in place of the mutual rivalries of national finance capitals? Such a new phase of capitalism is at any rate conceivable. Can it be achieved? Sufficient premises are still lacking to enable us to answer this question.’” 24

Note, Kautsky did not deny that imperialist will be exploiting the world; but, among other things, Kautsky promoted the view that perhaps this could be done rationally and without wars between the imperialists.

According to Hoxha, the victory of the Bolshevik revolution changed the character of imperialism so that today we have an imperialism whose fear of the worldwide struggle for socialism has overshadowed its internal contradic-
tions! Let’s quote from Hoxha at length, and see what he says:

“U.S. imperialism and the other capitalist states have fought and are fighting to maintain their hegemony in the world, to defend the capitalist and neo-colonialist system, to emerge from the great crisis which has them in its grip, with the fewest possible losses. They have striven and are striving to prevent the peoples and the proletariat from fulfilling their revolutionary aspirations for liberation. U.S. imperialism, which dominates its partners politically, economically and militarily, has the main role in the struggle to achieve these aims.

“The enemies of the revolution and the peoples want to create the impression that, because of the changes that have occurred in the world and the losses that socialism has suffered, circumstances entirely different from those of the past have been created. Therefore, although they have fierce contradictions with one another, U.S. imperialism and the world capitalist bourgeoisie, Soviet social-imperialism and Chinese social-imperialism, modern revisionism and social democracy are seeking a modus vivendi, a hybrid ‘new society,’ in order to keep the bourgeois-capitalist system on its feet, to avert revolutions and to continue their oppression and exploitation of the peoples in new forms and by new methods.” 25

As evidence of this “modus vivendi” Hoxha claims that Jimmy Carter’s ma-
jor foreign policy statement delivered at Notre Dame on May 22, 1977 is really talking about this attempt at a “new order” where the U.S. and the Soviets can co-ordinate a way out of the crisis they both face, which according to Hox-
ha mainly consists of mutual suppression of revolution. He states:

“In his speech, the U.S. President said, today ‘we have been freed from that constant fear of communism, which at one time led us to embrace every dic-
tator who was obsessed by the same fear.’

“Of course, when Carter, this faithful representative of the bloodiest imperialism of our time, speaks of being ‘fried from the fear of communism’, he means communism à la Yugoslav, à la Khrushchev, à la Chinese, whose masks only are communist, but the capitalist bourgeoisie has not been and will never be freed from the fear of genuine communism. On the contrary, imperialism and social-imperialism have always been terrified of genuine communism and they will be even more terrified of it. It is this fear and dread that are driving the imperialists and revisionists into each others’ arms, to co-ordinate their plans and seek the most appropriate forms in order to prolong the existence of their rule of oppression and exploitation.” 26

This is Hoxha’s bottom line—collu-
sion is principal between the super-
powers and all imperialists in general because of the threat of revolution. He does mention in passing contradictions among the imperialists, and the U.S.

need to halt the drive of Soviet hegemonism, but half the time he talks about the struggle for hegemony he means the struggle for hegemony be-
tween the two worlds, imperialism vs. socialism, while the absolutely necessary struggle between imperialists over division and redivision of the world, which is propelling the world rapidly toward World War 3, is flushed down the tubes by Hoxha.

According to Hoxha the Soviet Union as well as the Chinese are really only tools of the U.S. to save it from revolution. Continuing from where we left off the last quote from Hoxha:

“In these moments of deep economic, political and military crisis, the imperialists of the United States of America are trying to consolidate the victories of imperialism, attained through the betrayal of modern revision-
ism in the Soviet Union, the former countries of people’s democracy and in China, and to use them as a barrier against the revolution and the revolu-
tionary liberation struggles of the proletariat and the peoples.” 27

And a little further on he says, referring to Carter’s speech already cited:

“U.S. imperialism considers the Khrushchevite Soviet system as a victory of world capitalism and from this it deduces that the threat of a conflict with the Soviet Union has become less intense, though it does not deny the contradictions and rivalry for hegemony with it.” 28

If this were 1960, Mr. Hoxha would have a point. “Khrushchevite revi-
sionism” did overwhelmingly play the role of lessening the contradictions be-
tween the USSR and the USA in these early days of capitalist restoration, when the bourgeoisie that had just taken state power was consolidating its capitalist rule and was in no way capable (nor yet fully facing imperialism’s edict to “expand or die”) of taking on the U.S. The Soviet revisionists did everything they could politically to bow to the U.S., including telling people not to rise up against the U.S. imperialists in order to hold off a confrontation with the U.S. But things have changed in the world. Despite Hoxha’s protestations to the contrary, the U.S. has been weakened over the years— the liberation struggles against it have taken their toll, the deepening crisis of imperialism has been drying up its reserves and the Soviet bourgeoisie has lost its fears of being “Khrushchevite” in the sense that it too must expand its empire, must fight to re-divide the world and increase its own reserves.

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Hoxha, as we pointed out earlier, acknowledges the arms race, vulgarizing it with his “political economy”; but he also gives us a political reason for this race:

“China’s incitement of their contradictions with the Sovieties is to the liking of the capitalist states of Europe and the United States of America, because it enables them to tell the Soviets indirectly, ‘Your main enemy is China, whereas we, together with you, want to establish détente, peaceful coexistence, irrespective of what China says.’ On the other hand, while making believe that they want peace, these states are arming themselves to strengthen their hegemony and military unity against their main enemy—the revolution. This is the aim of all the meetings, such as those of Helsinki and Belgrade, which drag on and on endlessly, like the Vienna Congress after the defeat of Napoleon, which is known as the congress of balls and soirées.”29

In Hoxha’s section combatting the Chinese revisionists’ “three worlds” strategy, he gives a more elaborate theoretical presentation of how the contradiction between the imperialist powers doesn’t mean all that much:

“Marxist-Leninist class analysis and the facts show that the existence of contradictions and rifts among the imperialist powers and groupings in no way overrides or displaces to a position of secondary importance the contradictions between labour and capital in the capitalist and imperialist countries, or the contradictions between the oppressed peoples and their oppressors. Precisely these, the contradictions between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, between the oppressed peoples and imperialism, between socialism and capitalism are the most profound, they are permanent, irreconcilable contradictions.”30

Marxist-Leninists in the general recent period have recognized four major contradictions in the world: between socialist and imperialist countries; between the bourgeoisie and proletariat in the capitalist countries; between the oppressed nations and imperialism; and the contradiction among the imperialist powers. Of these, Hoxha seems to think that only the first three are antagonistic, and that the last one can never be the principal contradiction. In the present stage of human history and the development of society, the basic contradiction, the one that defines this stage and through whose resolution society will make the leap to a new stage, is that between the bourgeoisie and proletariat.

Now Hoxha doesn’t understand this contradiction in the first place, and we’ll get into that shortly, but at the moment the point is that he doesn’t understand the other contradictions and their relation to the basic one. The main thing here to grasp is the role of the principal contradiction, which is the one that, at a certain point in the development of a process defined by the basic contradiction, is the contradiction which plays the principal role in determining and influencing the development of the basic contradiction. Thus, during a certain period of time, any one of the above four contradictions may be the principal contradiction, and it is important to know which one it is. For example, going into World War 1 the principal contradiction was the contradiction among the imperialists; this was the sharpest overall in the world, influencing the development of all the other contradictions, including the basic one, and in fact led to the situations which made it possible for the proletariat to seize state power in the Soviet Union.

Hoxha does his own re-write of World War 2 to bolster his two worlds thesis. He reduces World War 2 to a united imperialist plot against the Soviet Union.

“Infuriated by the loss the October Revolution in Russia inflicted on it, the imperialist and capitalist world coalition reinforced its instruments of political, economic and military struggle against the new state of the proletarians and the spread of Marxist-Leninist ideology throughout the world. The imperialists, the reactionary bourgeoisie, European and world social-democracy, together with the other parties of capital, prepared the war against the Soviet Union. Together with the Hitlerites, the Italians and Japanese fascists, they also prepared the Second World War.”31

Thus in typical Hoxha fashion, 20 years of history is eclectically mushed together as one straight line event, and World War 2 is presented as the continuation of the “strategy” world imperialism launched against the infant proletarian state on the heels of its victory in 1917. Apparently contradictions among the imperialists had nothing whatever to do with it! There are a number of other mentions of how collusion among the imperialists against the USSR was the principal aspect of World War 2. In commenting on Carter’s speech already referred to, Hoxha explains to us,

“The U.S. President also admits that, out of fear of communism, in the past the capitalists and the imperialists embraced and supported the fascist dictators like Mussolini, Hitler, Hirohito, Franco, etc. These fascist dictatorships in the respective countries were the ultimate weapon of the capitalist bourgeoisie and world imperialism against the Soviet Union of the time of Lenin and Stalin and against the world proletarian revolution.”32

Carter, of course, was not confessing to dealings with Mussolini, Hitler, etc. (even to the degree that this went on even during the war, which was obviously not the principal aspect of World War 2!). Instead this demogogy related to Carter’s “human rights” campaign, parading around a few countries where “democratic” forms have replaced fascist dictatorships as the means to maintain U.S. domination, etc.33

Yes, victorious proletarian revolution is a threat to the imperialists. And 1/10 of the globe freed from bourgeois rule (with the victory of socialism in the USSR) and later (adding the victory of China and the East European states), 1/4 of the globe free from that rule was a terribly great threat. Why? Because huge sections of the globe were removed from where the imperialists could “freely” fight over them for domination. More importantly, these countries were political bastions of the world revolution, not only providing material aid and political assistance to revolution around the world, but existing as a living example of how capitalist enslavement was no longer the order of the day in a large part of the world. But the existence of the proletariat in power—even involving over 1/4 of humanity, did not and could not make the workings of capitalism in its highest, most decadent stage more rational.

Stalin had to deal with a similar line in the Soviet Union shortly after WWII, and although his answer is slightly off the mark, he is far more correct than his supposed student, Hoxha.

“Some comrades hold that, owing to the development of new international conditions since the Second World War, wars between capitalist countries have ceased to be inevitable. They consider that the contradictions between the socialist camp and the capitalist camp are more acute than the contradictions among the capitalist countries; that the U.S.A. has brought the other capitalist countries sufficiently under its sway to be able to prevent them going to war among themselves and weakening one another; that the foremost capitalist minds have been sufficiently taught by the two world wars and the severe damage they caused to the whole capitalist world not to venture to involve the capitalist countries in war with one another again—and that, because of all this, wars between capitalist countries are no longer inevitable.

“These comrades are mistaken. They
see the outward phenomena that come and go on the surface, but they do not see those profound forces which, although operating imperceptibly, will nevertheless determine the course of developments.

"It is said that the contradictions between capitalism and socialism are stronger than the contradictions among the capitalist countries. Theoretically, of course, that is true. It is not only true now, today; it was true before the Second World War. And it was more or less realized by the leaders of the capitalist countries. Yet the Second World War began not as a war with the USSR, but as a war between capitalist countries...

"[In the aftermath of World War I] Germany rose to her feet again as a great power within the space of some fifteen or twenty years after her defeat. And it is significant that it was none other than Britain and the United States that helped Germany to recover economically and to enhance her economic war potential. Of course, when the United States and Britain assisted Germany's economic recovery, they did so with a view to setting a recovered Germany against the Soviet Union, to utilizing her against the land of socialism. But Germany directed her forces in the first place against the Anglo-French-American bloc. And when Hitler Germany declared war on the Soviet Union, the Anglo-French-American bloc, far from joining with Hitler Germany, was compelled to enter into a coalition with the USSR against Hitler Germany.

"Consequently, the struggle of the capitalist countries for markets and their desire to crush their competitors proved in practice to be stronger than the contradictions between the capitalist camp and the socialist camp."

One weakness in Stalin's formulation is his juxtaposition that "theoretically" the contradictions between socialism and capitalism were stronger than between capitalist countries, but "in practice" the opposite proved to be true. What Stalin means here, though, is that socialism and capitalism have diametrically opposed interests. This is absolutely true. The formulation is weak, however, in that it is not just "in practice" where the contradictions between the imperialists could prove to be sharper at times, but is rooted in the very character of the capitalist class—a class which is not internationalist like the proletariat, but a class whose interests remain national, despite their gigantic international dealings, and they fight fiercely with their counterparts, members of their same class, of other "great" nations for the spoils of the world for their very survival as imperialists.

Hoxha does leave open the possibility for world war, but he is clearly incorrect in his view of what the character of that war will be. He says:

"Marxism-Leninism teaches us that the contradictions between a socialist country and capitalist and revisionist countries, which reflect contradictions between two classes with diametrically opposed interests, the working class and the bourgeoisie, are permanent, fundamental, irreconcilable. They run like a red thread through the entire historical epoch of the transition from capitalism to socialism on a world scale. On the other hand, the contradictions between the imperialist powers are expressions of contradictions amongst exploiters, amongst classes with common fundamental interests. Therefore, however severe the contradictions and conflicts between the imperialist powers may be, the danger of aggressive actions by world imperialism or various sections of it against the socialist country, remains a permanent real danger at any moment. Riffs between imperialists, inter-imperialist quarrels and conflicts may, at the most, weaken or temporarily postpone the danger of the actions of imperialism against the socialist country, therefore while it is in the interests of this country to utilize these contradictions in the enemy ranks, they cannot eliminate this danger."

And this logically leads Hoxha up to the point of saying that if world war does break out, its principal character will be socialism vs. imperialism.

"Therefore, our Party has stressed and stresses that any underestimation of the contradictions of a socialist state with the imperialist powers and the capitalist-revisionist countries, any underestimation of the danger of aggressive actions by the latter against socialist Albania, any relaxation of vigilance resulting from the idea that the contradictions between imperialist powers themselves are very abrasive, and because of this they cannot undertake such actions against our Homeland, would be fraught with very dangerous consequences."

Of course no one to our knowledge, least of all a Marxist, has ever maintained that inter-imperialist rivalries will somehow stop an invasion of Albania, particularly in the course of world war. What Hoxha has set up to promote is that if war breaks out, if Albania is invaded, the principal source and character of the war would be an imperialist war against the "socialist Homeland."

Thus overall Hoxha presents a super-imperialism that could keep itself from all out inter-imperialist war because of its contradictions with socialism and world revolution, and could stay in that position for some time to come if it wasn't for the warmongering policies of the Chinese revisionists. Maybe Hoxha reasons that imperialism has somehow managed to keep from going to world war for over 30 years now (implicitly describing the USSR as having been an imperialist superpower since 1956), without inter-imperialist war having broken out—so if it breaks out now it must be China's incitement which causes it, with invasion of socialist Albania being the war's principal object.

Are we exaggerating Hoxha's efforts to reduce the international situation to the conflict between Albania and the various imperialist powers (in which he includes China)? Those taken in by Hoxha's line will emphatically point out, that while he might underestimate the contradictions between the imperialists, he does recognize the class struggle going on around the world. His supporters (or conciliators) might argue that Hoxha doesn't just recognize the contradiction between socialism and imperialism, pointing to many quotes showing that he recognizes the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and proletariat (at least in a non-socialist country) and the contradiction between the oppressed masses and imperialism, that he supports revolution around the world, not capitulation to imperialism such as the Chinese revisionists, and for that reason revolutionaries should still uphold his contribution at this time—such is the argument of many.

But Hoxha, while in words recognizing three separate contradictions, in reality, meshes them all into one. In fact, Hoxha does not understand that there is one basic contradiction in the world in this epoch—private appropriation vs. socialized production which takes the political form of the bourgeoisie vs. the proletariat—and that the other three contradictions, oppressed nations vs. imperialism, socialist vs. imperialist countries, and inter-imperialist rivalries,
all flow from this contradiction (though
on a world scale or in a particular coun-
try one of these contradictions could be
the principal contradiction for a time).
No, Hoxha says:

"If Mao Tsetung and the other Chi-
inese leaders have had and still have a
good deal to say about contradictions in
theory," then they ought to speak not on-
ly of exploiting inter-imperialist con-
tradictions and of compromises with the
imperialists, but, in the first place, they
ought to speak of the fundamental con-
tradictions of our epoch, the contradic-
tions between the proletariat and the
bourgeoisie, the contradictions between the
oppressed peoples and countries, on
the one hand, and the two superpowers
and the whole of world imperialism, on
the other, the contradiction between
socialism and capitalism."38

Here Hoxha is clearly saying that
only these last three are "the fundamen-
tal contradictions of our epoch." This is
no minor word problem on his part—it is
an "error" of replacing dialectics with
eclectics, allowing the replacement of
whatever pragmatically serves what in-
terests he wants to promote (or anyone
else who promoted such a line) for a
Marxist-Leninist analysis of what is ob-
jectively going on in the world. In
the name of opposing the "three worlds"
strategy, he demotes the contradiction
among imperialist powers from the sta-
tus of a fundamental contradiction. He
then advances his own "two worlds"
thesis, which puts all the remaining con-
tradictions together, and ends up essen-
tially holding that one of them is always
principal: that between socialism and
capitalism. He opposes the "three
worlds" strategy in the name of revolu-
tion, but his own "two worlds" mishmash
is equally revisionist and does not pro-
mote revolution.

III. Hoxha on the
National Liberation
Struggles

The Communist article cited earlier
illustrated how Hoxha does not see
the basic contradiction under socialism
as the bourgeoisie and the proletariat,
but as socialism vs. imperialism; he
makes the basis for class struggle under
socialism external and in no way grasps
the qualitative difference between
socialism and communism, etc. This
question will not be pursued further in
this article since Hoxha's orientation on
this question is directly tied to his at-
tack on Mao Tsetung and the Cultural
Revolution and was gone into in depth in
The Communist. We'd also like to refer
the reader to the first section of the
same article, which exposes Hoxha's
denial of the bourgeois character of the
democratic, anti-imperialist stage in the
oppressed countries, his underestima-
tion of the anti-feudal character of this
stage, his total opposition to the
military strategy of people's war and his
efforts to pit the leading role of the
proletariat against mobilizing the peasan-
try as the main force in the revolution in
a country like China. All of which
demonstrates that Hoxha has landed in
the camp of the Trotskites, Wang Ming
and the Soviet revisionists when it
comes to his analysis of the Chinese
revolution in particular. The Communist
article correctly points out that this
idolatry is not simply restricted to
Hoxha's view of the Chinese revolution,
but extends to his whole view of the
struggle of the oppressed peoples and
nations.

Hoxha of course does not promote this
muck on a neon sign. He tries to cover
himself, hiding behind the raunchy line
of the Chinese revisionists and the revers-
sal of the revolution in China to make
himself look good. And if one wants to
substitute formal logic for dialectics, and
doesn't like the Chinese revisionists' line, then Hoxha is definitely the
man to look to. But the world
doesn't exist as the logical opposite to
the Chinese line. While their "three
worlds" strategy is thoroughly reac-
tionary, it is just as reactionary to gloss
over the difference between the oppress-
ed and oppressor nations. Contrary to
what Hoxha might think, neither Lenin
nor Stalin reduced the world simply to
"two worlds" of socialism and im-
perialism when it came to the national
question. In Lenin's time he described
"three different types of countries" when
it came to the question of self-
determination, or the national question:

"First type: the advanced countries
of Western Europe (and America), where
the national movement is a thing of the
past. Second type: Eastern Europe,
where it is a thing of the present. Third
type: semi-colonies and colonies, where
it is largely a thing of the future."39

Things have advanced somewhat
since the time of Lenin and what was
once a question of the future (the col-
onies and semi-colonies) has become a
question of the present, although these
countries are generally dominated in the
neo-colonial as opposed to direct colonial
form (and what was a question of the
present in Lenin's time, the national
question in Eastern Europe, no longer
has the same importance).

Lenin said at the time in criticizing
"imperialist economists" who did not
support the right to self-determination,
saying it was the same as raising "de-
fend the fatherland" in the advanced
capitalist countries and arguing on the
basis that real liberation of the oppres-
sed nations from imperialism was not
possible without socialist revolution:

"In the Western countries the na-
tional movement is a thing of the distant
past. In England, France, Germany,
etc., the 'fatherland' is a dead letter, it
has played its historical role, i.e., the
national movement cannot yield here
anything progressive, anything that will
elevate new masses to a new economic
and political life. History's next step
here is not transition from feudalism or
from patriarchal savagery to national
progress, to a cultured and politically
free fatherland, but transition from a
'fatherland' that has outlived its day,
that is capitalistically overripe, to
socialism." (Emphasis added.)40

And Lenin argued further:

"In these advanced countries
(England, France, Germany, etc.) the
national problem was solved long ago: ob-
jectively there are no 'general national
tasks' to be accomplished. Hence, only
in these countries is it possible now to
'blow up' national unity and establish
class unity.

"The undeveloped countries are a
different matter... In those areas, as a
rule, there still exist oppressed and
capitalistically undeveloped nations. Ob-
jectively, these nations still have general
national tasks to accomplish, namely,
democratic tasks, the tasks of over-
throwing foreign oppression."41

Thus the first step in the oppressed
nations is, in the main, the transition
from semi-feudalism or other forms of
enforced backwardness to "national pro-
gress" and they have the "democratic
tasks of overthrowing foreign oppres-
sion."

But to Hoxha, everything collapses in
to a giant muddle, and despite his lip
service to the question of two stages, he
makes little distinction between the first
stage of the revolution in the oppressed
countries and the socialist revolution in
the advanced capitalist countries! Con-
stantly throughout the book he adds the
task of eliminating exploitation as part of
this first stage of the revolution,
along with overthrowing foreign pres-
tence in those countries. He says things
such as:

"In our time, in the conditions of im-
perialism, the main internal enemy of
the revolution, not only in the developed
capitalist countries, but also in the op-
pressed and dependent countries, is the
local big bourgeoisie which stands at the head of the capitalist order and fights with all its means, with violence and oppression, demagoguery and deceit, to preserve its domination and privileges, to smother and extinguish any movement of the working people which jeopardizes its state power and class interests in the slightest degree."

And:

"The Chinese leadership takes no account of the fact that in the ‘third world’ there are oppressed and oppressors, the proletariat and the enslaved, poverty-stricken and destitute peasantry, on the one hand, and the capitalists and landowners, who exploit and fleece the people, on the other. To fail to point out this class situation in the so-called third world, to fail to point out the antagonisms which exist, means to revise Marxism-Leninism and defend capitalism. In the countries of the so-called third world, in general, the capitalist bourgeoisie is in power. This bourgeoisie exploits the country, exploits and oppresses the poor people in its own class interests, to make the largest possible profits for itself and to keep the people in perpetual slavery and misery."

And elsewhere he says:

"Both in the countries of the ‘third world’ and in those of the ‘second world,’ it is the bourgeoisie capitalist class, the same social forces, which are ruling the proletariat and the peoples and which must be smashed. Here, too, the main motive force is the proletariat."  

While Hoxha is right about the Chinese revisionists’ refusal to carry out any class analysis, which is un-Marxist, Hoxha’s thesis that the “bourgeoisie” is in power is only half right and misses what the character of national subjugation is, and his premise that the exact same social forces are in power in the advanced capitalist and oppressed nations is absurd.

The colonies and neo-colonies of imperialism must go through a two-stage revolution, not simply because there are foreign imperialists present in their countries (and Hoxha does not fail to point out numerous times that there is plenty of foreign investment, particularly from the U.S., in Europe and in the USSR—a point which will be gone into later), but because imperialist oppression of these nations has meant national subjugation (whether openly or in a neo-colonial form) and has thwarted the completion of the bourgeois-democratic revolution.

This domination has meant in most of these countries the propping up of feudal or semi-feudal relations to a greater or lesser degree, and denies, overall, the native bourgeoisie its own national market, its own nation-state to exploit. Imperialism makes an alliance with the landlords, who represent the old feudal society, and this arrangement crushes the peasantry even more than previously, as well as holding back the development of the national bourgeoisie. Of course the imperialists also viciously exploit the working class and squeeze the urban petty bourgeoisie and they do create a class of local bourgeoisie accomplices (or compradors) in such countries. For all these reasons it is imperialism that is the main target of the revolution in the oppressed countries and the role of other class forces is determined primarily by their relation to imperialism. Hoxha not only misses this material basis for the two stages of the revolution, he clearly disagrees with it. The article in The Communist pointed out clearly how Hoxha misses the centrality of the peasant question which is still the case in many if not most of these countries and his disagreement with Mao’s (and Lenin’s and Stalin’s) analysis of the two-stage revolution in the oppressed countries and the bourgeois-democratic character of the first stage.  

In passing, Hoxha once mentions that the “middle peasantry and that section of the bourgeoisie which is not linked with foreign capital and which aspires to an independent development of the country, can also be allies of the proletariat.”

But mainly he is saying the opposite when he criticizes Mao’s call in China for the alliance of workers, peasants, urban petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie, and in his constant theme that ending exploitation is part of the first stage of these revolutions. Hoxha’s line can have a certain appeal because it is true that the bourgeoisie, at the head of a liberation struggle or in power, whether initially patriotic or not, will tend sooner or later to capitulate to imperialism. It seems as if he has at least half a point because he mainly poses his line when talking about the Chinese revisionists’ current “organizing” efforts among the heads of state of the “Third World” countries. But some kind of an “anti-imperialist/socialist” single stage is still a recipe for defeat in many if not most of these countries and would have the same ramifications as the continued implementation of Wang Ming’s line would have had in China.

We can get a little more of the flavor of Hoxha’s line if we see what he means in practice in his book. He does go into the question of Indonesia a little, when he says:

“In order to quell the revolutions and the liberation struggle in the countries of Asia and open the way to the realization of their hegemonic and expansionist plans, the Soviet and Chinese revisionists, in feverish competition with each other, have been and are engaged in a very filthy job of splitting and destroying the ranks of the communist parties and the revolutionary and freedom loving forces of these countries. This activity was one of the main causes of the catastrophe suffered by the Communist Party of Indonesia, and of the splitting and destruction of the Communist Party of India, etc. They advocate the alliance and unity of the proletariat and the broad popular masses with the local reactionary bourgeoisie, while each of them is trying to win the friendship of this ruling bourgeoisie, for its own ends.”

The catastrophe suffered by the Indonesian Communist Party Hoxha is referring to took place in 1965, when a U.S. imperialist-inspired coup overthrew Sukarno and replaced his regime with that of the reactionary General Suharto. In the wake of the coup, it is estimated that as many as a million communists and other revolutionaries and progressives were slaughtered in Indonesia. But what was going on at the time was not competition between the Soviet and Chinese revisionists; on the contrary, to the degree Chinese revisionists were involved (Liu Shao-chi and Co.—and these revisionists were not principal within the Chinese Party), their advice was exactly the same as that of their Soviet mentors, since these revisionists’ line dovetailed with that of the Soviets at the time. This “advice” was to liquidate their party into a mass people’s party, liquidate armed struggle, and work toward the parliamentary road to socialism in Indonesia, merging themselves with the national bourgeoisie (represented by Sukarno). The actual “splitting” that went on by the Chinese was a question of Marxism vs. opportunism.

The revolutionary line of the Chinese Communist Party, promoted through their series of polemics against the Soviet revisionists, was assisting various parties and genuine communists around the world in breaking with the grip of the revisionist line of the USSR! (Hoxha’s crying about “splitting” just exposes how his idealism about the two-line struggle in the communist parties in power applies to his views on the struggle in parties out of power and is just as reactionary, since it is a recipe for capitulation to opportunism in the name of not “splitting.”) He also exposes himself as being against the peaceful transition to socialism thesis in words only, since in practice, according to Hox-
ha's logic, a "genuine" party would not split over such a question!) To give a brief description of what the developments were, there had been a mass, anti-imperialist, democratic struggle waged in Indonesia in the wake of World War 2. The national bourgeoisie (Sukarno, etc.) had been in the leadership of this struggle, and while the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) had a strong base of support among the people due to the role it had played in the struggle against Dutch imperialism and the Japanese occupation, it did not lead this stage of the revolution to victory because of errors in line. As the PKI put it:

"This theoretical shortcomings and inability to make a concrete analysis of the concrete situation of the world and of Indonesia had resulted in that the PKI was unable to make use of this highly favorable opportunity given by the August Revolution of 1945 to overcome its shortcomings. The PKI did not consistently lead the armed struggle against Dutch imperialism, did not develop guerrilla warfare that was integrated with the democratic movement of the peasants, thus winning their full support, as the only way to defeat the war of aggression launched by the Dutch imperialists. On the contrary, the PKI even approved of and itself followed the policy of reactionary compromises of Sjahir's Right-wing socialists. The PKI did not establish the alliance of the working class and the peasantry by leading the anti-feudal struggle in the countryside, and did not establish, on the basis of such a worker-peasant alliance, a united front with all other democratic forces. The PKI did not consolidate its strength, on the contrary, it even relegated to the background its own role. These are the reasons why the August Revolution of 1945 did not proceed as it should, did not achieve the decisive victory, and finally failed in reaching its objective."

Upon victory against the Dutch, the reactionary feudal and comprador state machinery was not smashed. A coalition government which included anti-feudal, anti-imperialist elements (and at times, on and off, even the PKI) was established, but in fact it was dominated by feudal and comprador interests, with the national bourgeoisie of course playing a vacillating role in this government. The PKI mistakenly took these concessions (the fact that popular forces were taking part in government) to mean that there was a "pro-people" aspect to this government that they should build on, that the agrarian revolutionary war was not necessary, that the vanguard character of the Party could be liquidated and that it was quite possible to carry on the peaceful transition to socialism through parliamentary means. As the PKI later summarized, "The August Revolution of 1945 should have established a completely new state, a state jointly ruled by the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal classes under the leadership of the working class. This is what is to be called a people's democratic state."51

While there could be much more said about the experience in Indonesia and the above is just a sketchy outline of what happened and some of the political questions involved, it is clear that the PKI's errors did not lie in recognizing Sukarno as a patriotic bourgeois and potentially a part of the united front, but rather in merging themselves with the national bourgeoisie (tailoring behind Sukarno), liquidating the question of armed struggle, confusing the change of regime with the smashing of the state machinery of the reactionaries, etc. It is only in the simpliminded reactionary line of Trotskyites and E. Hoxha that the error lay in the PKI not recognizing that Sukarno (patriotic national bourgeoisie) and Suharto (comprador U.S. imperialism) were "identical," because both were bourgeois, and that therefore Sukarno should have been the "target of the revolution." As the PKI summed up after the coup:

"By correcting the mistakes made by the Party in the united front with the national bourgeoisie it does not mean that now the Party need not unite with this class. On the basis of the worker-peasant alliance under the leadership of the working class, our Party must work to win the national bourgeois class over to the side of the revolution."52

But even leaving aside Hoxha's rewriting of history on the question of Indonesia, he exposes himself for his lack of support for the national liberation struggles going on today in other ways too. Hoxha is conspicuously silent about the revolution that was beginning in Iran when his book was first written, and which was at a high peak of struggle in December 1978 when the volume was re-edited. (The editor says, "Some events that have taken place during the period since the first publication have also been included." But the Iranian revolution was not one of these!) Of course the proletariat did not have "hegemony" in this stage of the struggle, not only in Hoxha's dreamland Trotskyite sense, but even in the real meaning of the word (although proletarian forces were gaining and continue to gain strength toward that goal). Hoxha does not only fail to mention the revolution going on at the time of the writing, there is one section of the book that seems to be a backhanded slap, since it's the only reference to any type of "struggle" going on in Iran:

"The prolonged struggle which went on between the American oil companies and the Mexican Government and which ended in 1938 with the collapse of the Mexican Government's policy of opposition, is well known. There was a similar outcome to the struggle between the British oil monopoly and the Iranian Government, which resulted in the toppling of Mossadegh. Such ruinous conflicts are going on all the time and they end with the triumph of the big American Trusts."53

Is it possible that we are stretching a point by insinuating that Hoxha just sees the mass upsurge that was going on in Iran at the time of the writing of his book as a "ruinous conflict" (in the same way that the Cultural Revolution was a "countrywide putsch")? We don't think so, because Hoxha definitely does not support the revolution in Iran. In fact, he goes out of his way not to mention or analyze what was going on in Iran. Three or four times he has the opportunity to at least acknowledge the existence of this struggle, when he criticizes the Chinese revisionists' dealings with the Shah or his government. He fails to mention that these revisionist dogs from China actually carried on their frenzied dealings with the Shah while he was in the midst of trying to crush the massive revolutionary upsurge against his fascist regime and the U.S. imperialists behind it. (Keep in mind that Hoxha, throughout the rest of the book, spares no space in taking shots at the Chinese whenever he has the opportunity.)

A few months ago the Albanian party finally acknowledged the Iranian revolution—after the new government came to power and around the same time that the Soviets, who were also conspicuously silent during the mass upsurge, recognized the installation of the Khomeini-Bazargan government. (An interesting side note of remarkable bourgeois advice is the PLA's fixation on "correctly wielding the weapon of oil" as key to continuing the revolution.4) The struggle in Iran just didn't fit into Hoxha's idealized view of what a national liberation struggle should look like at any point in its development, because all exploiting classes weren't the target, the proletariat did not have hegemony from the beginning, etc.

What Stalin said in Foundations of Leninism still holds today: "The revolutionary character of a national movement under conditions of imperialist oppression does not necessarily presup-
He opposes the "three worlds" strategy in the name of revolution, but his own "two worlds" mishmash is equally revisionist.

pose the existence of proletarian elements in the movement..."55 Not because the class-conscious forces desire that the working class not be in leadership of these struggles, and not simply because they weaken the imperialists (which they do!), but because the class-conscious proletariat is acting on the material world, must understand what represents progress and what represents reaction, support and unite with what is genuinely progressive (and definitely not uncritically or in a tailist fashion), in order to gain "hegemony" in the real sense of the word and lead all the class forces at the particular stage that will advance the revolution forward, toward the socialist revolution and the eventual triumph of communism.

While Hoxha thought it better not to explicitly attack the struggle in Iran, some of his loyal followers in the U.S. (such as the Marxist-Leninist Organizing Committee, now known as—believe it or not—the CPUSA-ML) went all the way with this line, like every Trotskyite and his mother who called for the equal targeting of the Bakhtiar stand-in-for-the-Shah regime and Khomeini. This idiocy only aided the forces of reaction, objectively siding with U.S. imperialism. Had such a line been implemented in Iran at the time, it would have actually weakened the proletariat's ability to gain hegemony in the revolution and strengthened Khomeini's position.

Hoxha's "very revolutionary" two worlds thesis, complete with its "three fundamental contradictions," overall misses the particularity of the contradictions between the oppressed nations and imperialism, promoting the erroneous view that revolutionary struggles in both types of countries are basically the same, except maybe in the one case they have to deal quantitatively more with foreign domination than in an advanced capitalist country. While occasionally mentioning "two stages," he merges the content of both stages into one—the socialist revolution—and in turn imposes the criteria for a socialist revolution on these oppressed nations. Thus he rates the potential and problems in making revolution in large part according to the size of the working class—the social force he demands must be the main force—regardless of the class composition and social relations in the countries themselves. Consequently his line smacks of the idealism of the Trotskyites on this question (as well as of plain old national chauvinism).

Hoxha does speak about the areas of imperialism, Latin America and Africa as being "cauldrons" of struggle, and he mentions some ongoing struggles in Asia and says that Latin America is in a revolutionary situation (perhaps because it has a larger working class than many other parts of the underdeveloped world?). But overall, as we pointed out earlier, his emphasis is on how truly difficult it is to have a revolution in these countries (repeated numerous times in each continent his book traverses in the underdeveloped world). And while Hoxha uses Stalin's formulation of the "weak link" of capitalism as to where revolution will most likely take place, this is used in specific reference only to the advanced capitalist countries, not in connection with the oppressed nations and peoples at all. And it's no wonder. If these countries must take Hoxha's route to revolution, it will probably be a cold day in hell before they get there.

Hoxha's "two worlds" thesis, and his particular feature of muddling the bourgeois-democratic and socialist revolutions in the oppressed nations into a single proletarian-national stage, may sound very revolutionary but in fact it is just the opposite. How this line, in the form of classical Trotskyism, can lead to attacking the revolutionary struggles in the oppressed nations is relatively well understood. But the same line can also lead to a more openly right-wing opportunism.

As pointed out in the Communist article, such a line abandons the need of the proletariat to fight for the leadership of the democratic revolution, denying its bourgeois character. And a bourgeois revolution will undoubtedly involve bourgeois forces who will contend for the leadership of the revolution. As can be seen from countless examples around the world, these bourgeois revolutionaries often adopt a Marxist garb and many even join the communist party while remaining bourgeois in politics and ideology. By recognizing the two stages of the revolution and recognizing the conflicting class forces and class ideologies that would be brought forth in the first, or democratic, stage, genuine Marxist-Leninists can (as Mao did) identify and struggle against exactly those bourgeois and petty-bourgeois tendencies which would prevent the revolution from winning complete victory over imperialism and from being transformed into a socialist revolution. Hoxha's line of proletarian nationalism is not only theoretically repugnant, it leaves the door wide open to various types of "socialists" in the underdeveloped countries who in fact abdicate the task of carrying through the struggle against foreign domination and often end up a tool of the Soviet social-imperialists. Mengistu, the "socialist" butcher of the Ethiopian and Eritrean peoples is a fine example.

IV. The Advanced Capitalist Countries and Imperialist War

For all of Hoxha's talk about a revolutionary situation enveloping Europe, his recipe for revolution there is not more correct than his other theses. Hoxha's orientation toward the working class is fairly simple. He emphatically states that "The most important organizations of the masses are the trade unions."56 Then he explains that most of the trade unions are counterrevolutionary organizations that must be "smashed." How should they be smashed? "By getting into them in order to fight and erode them from within..."57 He even gives us the political orientation genuine revolutionaries must have in order to accomplish this. He tells us, "In every case the aim must be to achieve a steel unity of the proletariat in the fight not only against the employers..."—but also in the all-round struggle against the bourgeoisie? Not quite, according to Hoxha: "but [continuing from where we left off] also against their agents, the trade union bosses."58 All this with the final aim of "the setting up of genuine proletarian trade unions."59

Thoroughly refuting this economist and classical syndicalist malarkey is not within the scope of this article. Already the RCP, USA has carried on extensive polemics (and will most likely continue to do more in the future) around this type of deviation which is so prevalent among revisionists of every stripe and which is also such a strong spontaneous drag on the ranks of the proletariat and genuine revolutionaries. Nevertheless, it deserves some brief comments here. Obviously the struggle in the trade unions is an arena of class struggle, and at times it can be a very important arena, but promoting a strategy of setting up "genuine proletarian trade unions" is just as ridiculous a theory of stages as the Economists' (of Lenin's time) promotion of building trade unions among the workers as a stage, despite Hoxha's warning to Marxist-Leninists not to stoop to trade-unionist, reformist, and
Hoxha just about explicitly says that accomplishing this is a prerequisite to making revolution! And as we pointed out, Hoxha's political orientation to the trade unions is just as economist as the original revisionists of that name.

And Hoxha may have more in common with the old-time Economists than just their over-fascination with the trade unions as organizations and their focusing of the workers' attention on the fight against the employers (and, oh yes, the union officials too). Hoxha's riff on "propaganda and actions" is not that dissimilar to the old-time Economists' thesis on propaganda as an explanation of the workings of the capitalist system, and agitation as "calls to action," a thesis which Lenin criticizes in What Is To Be Done? Hoxha even steps upon the same quote by Marx, "Every step taken by a genuine movement is worth more than a dozen programs," which the Economists raised against Lenin. Whether Hoxha means exactly what the Economists did is not completely clear, since he counterposes his theses on "action" only to the activity of terrorists and he never explains what he means when he says that the class struggle proceeds "from a simpler to a higher form" (from economic to political, maybe?). But even if one gave him the benefit of the doubt and put the best possible interpretation on these points, his orientation of "proletarian trade unionism" has little to do with forging a class-conscious movement preparing for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie.

But Hoxha has some other problems equally as serious, if not more so, when it comes to the question of revolution in these countries. These center around his orientation toward imperialist war and, closely linked to this, his efforts to resurrect national tasks in imperialist countries (a point addressed more fully later).

It is important to note that when Hoxha is talking about the developments toward a revolutionary situation in the advanced capitalist countries (or the revolutionary situation that already exists in Hoxha's mind) and the program for making revolution in those countries, he does not emphasize that the proletariat should be preparing to turn the imperialist war moves into their opposite, i.e., through preparation for civil war, nor is there any mention of the orientation of revolutionary defeatism in response to such a war. (There is one quote by Lenin in this section which puts forward the thesis that in the face of reactionary imperialist war, the duty of the proletariat is to prepare for world proletarian revolution, which Hoxha raises in response to the followers of the Chinese revisionists in Europe who call for reliance on U.S. imperialism. Hoxha never repeats or goes into Lenin's words in the body of this section, leaving opposition to imperialist wars in the abstract, not in the concrete context of the growing danger of world war. His overall political line in this section is erroneous, as discussed below.)

Obviously, Hoxha's overall lack of emphasis on the tasks of communists in relation to an inter-imperialist war is linked with his view that such a world war is far off and has no real significance with regard to the tasks of communists at the present time. Hoxha's reduction of a revolutionary crisis to the level of the political and economic crisis which exists today is also linked to his downplaying of the threat of world war (and may also help explain and be linked to his economism).

This in itself is no insignificant error, but even more damning is that when he does put forward an orientation around world war, it is far from revolutionary. On the contrary, Hoxha's position is reformist and goes along with his Kautskyism on the nature of imperialism. And for all his criticizing the social chauvinism promoted by the Chinese, Hoxha has a more refined, if not particularly original, "defend the homeland" line himself—although it is not so apparent, masked as it is in his polemic with the Chinese revisionists. There are two sections of the book in which Hoxha goes into this question of the orientation of the proletariat in the advanced capitalist countries toward inter-imperialist war (aside from the quote from Lenin mentioned above). First, in the part mentioned earlier where Hoxha says nuclear war is inevitable between the superpowers, if not today then tomorrow. There he says:

"When the superpowers fail to achieve their predatory interests through economic, ideological and diplomatic means, when the contradictions become exacerbated to the most acute level, when the agreements and 'reforms' prove unable to resolve these contradictions, then the war between them begins. Therefore, the peoples, whose blood will be shed in this war, must strive with might and main not to be caught unawares, to sabotage the predatory inter-imperialist war so that it does not assume world-wide proportions, and if they are unable to achieve this, to turn it into a liberation war and win."

The other major reference is in his section "China's Plans to Become a Superpower." We'll quote at length from this section to give readers the full flavor of Hoxha's line:

"Many a time the Party of Labour of Albania has raised its voice to expose the deafening pacifist propaganda which the superpowers spread in order to lull the peoples and the freedom-loving countries to sleep and blunt their vigilance, in order to bemuse them with illusions and catch them unawares. More than once it has drawn attention to the fact that American imperialism and Russian social-imperialism are leading the world towards a new world war and that the danger of the outbreak of such a war is real and by no means imaginary. This danger cannot fail to be a matter of constant concern for the peoples, the broad working masses, the peace-loving forces and countries, the Marxist-Leninists and the progressive people everywhere in the world, who, in the face of this danger cannot stand by passively and do nothing. But what should be done to stay the hand of the imperialist warmongers?"

"This cannot be achieved through a course of capitulation and submission to imperialist warmongers, or of toning down the struggle against them. The facts have proved that the unprincipled compromises and concessions of the Krushchevite revisionists did not make American imperialism any tamer, better behaved, or more peaceful, but the contrary they made it more arrogant and voracious. But the Marxist-Leninists are not for pitting one imperialist state or grouping against the other, nor do they call for imperialist wars, for it is the peoples who suffer in them. The great Lenin pointed out our policy is not aimed at inciting war, but preventing the imperialists from uniting against the socialist country."

'... if we were really driving workers and peasants to war' he [Lenin] said, 'that would be a crime. All our politics and propaganda, however, are directed towards putting an end to war and in no way towards driving nations to war. Experience has shown very clearly that the socialist revolution is the only way out of eternal warfare.'

"Hence, the only correct course is to raise the working class, the broad strata of the working people and the peoples in revolutionary actions to stay the hands of the imperialist warmongers in their own countries. Marxist-Leninists have always been and are the most determin-
The imperialists and social-imperialists have aggressive war in their bloodstream. Their ambitions to enslave the world lead them to war. But although it is the imperialists who unleash imperialist world war, it is the proletariat, the peoples, the revolutionaries and all progressives who pay the price in blood. That is why the Marxist-Leninists, the proletariat and the peoples of the world are against imperialist world war and fight relentlessly to foil the plans of the imperialists so that they do not drive the world to a new slaughter.

"Hence imperialist war must not be advocated as the Chinese revisionists are doing, but must be combated. The duty of Marxist-Leninists is to raise the proletariat and the peoples of the world in struggle against oppression to wrest their power and privileges from them and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. China is not doing this, the Communist Party of China is not working for this. With its revisionist theory, this party is weakening and delaying the revolution, splitting the vanguard forces of the proletariat, the Marxist-Leninist parties which will organize and lead this revolution."66

While Hoxha may appear to be on the mark by bringing up that the duty of the proletariat is to wrest power from the bourgeoisie, there are some serious errors in his orientation which in reality cut against the proletariat successfully doing so. One is the whole backdrop for this section—that world war is impending only to the degree that the Chinese are inciting it. Second, Hoxha overestimates the degree to which the masses can stave off world war short of revolution. Third, his program of what to do in the face of world war, including in the imperialist countries, is to wage a "war of liberation." In addition, Hoxha wrongly handles the question of defense of a socialist country.

World War—China's "Policy"

Hoxha falls into extremely voluntarist views on the question of world war. Just the fact that his most major treatment of the question of world war is in his section "China's Plans to Become a Superpower" is telling in itself. Hoxha's line is that China is inciting the two superpowers to war so it can become an imperialist superpower. Revealing how far he has departed from a materialist explanation of the source of imperialist war, Hoxha writes:

"The great ambition of the Chinese leaders to transform their country into a superpower as soon as possible and to establish its hegemony everywhere, especially in the so-called third world, has impelled them to make incitement of inter-imperialist war the basis of their strategy and foreign policy. They greatly desire a frontal clash between the United States of America and the Soviet Union in Europe, during which China, from a comfortable distance away, would warm its hands at the atomic holocaust that would destroy its two main rivals and leave it the all-powerful sole ruler of the world."67

And, it might be noted, this formulation of Hoxha's is not even original—for it is essentially the same line that the Soviet revisionists have used for years to cover their imperialist track.

Hoxha does have half a point when he notes the desire of the Chinese revisionists that a major war not be focused against China itself. But fundamentally he is wrong. World war is not developing because of China's "incitement" and the role of the Chinese revisionists is not decisive in determining the nature of a third world war or how it would be fought.

Hoxha's underestimation of the depth of inter-imperialist rivalries is further shown by his arguments with the Chinese about Europe as the focus of a war between the two superpowers. Hoxha does not believe that world war is a question for survival of one imperialist bloc against the other (or as Stalin put it, their necessity to crush one another), and for this reason does not see that Europe, while not being the only center of warfare, will undoubtedly be a key arena because of the development of the productive forces in that continent which are so vital to each bloc for dominating the rest of the world. On the contrary, China's revisionist line and current capitulation to the U.S.-led imperialist bloc are in large measure a response (a bourgeois response, of course) to the growing threat of world war—toward which the deepening crisis of imperialism is propelling the two superpowers ever more rapidly today.

While Hoxha says a few times, mainly through quotes, that war will not be wiped out without wiping out imperialism, he promotes this mainly only in the general sense. (It should be noted that the Soviet revisionists upheld this Marxist principle in the abstract also.) But in the concrete of today's world situation, the superpowers moving closer and closer to world war—not because of China's incitement but because of the very workings of capital—the proletariat must be preparing for these developments, exposing and struggling against these war moves as part and parcel of its preparations to make revolution. And the developments toward world war themselves are bound up with the developments toward emergence of revolutionary situations.

Hoxha poses the contradiction as being between "inciting war" and being opposed to it—in other words as war versus peace. But the contradiction actually is between imperialist war and revolution, or as Mao Tsetung so aptly put it: Either revolution will prevent world war, or world war will give rise to revolution. Hoxha's orientation fosters illusions about reforming away world war. (If it's impending because of a policy, then it might be possible, though not easy, to defeat this policy, at least for the time being.) While particular wars may be stopped through the people's struggle, this cannot stop the imperialists' moves toward world war.

World war is not a "policy" that the imperialists can do away with, no matter how great the pressure from the people. The proletariat, of course, is not for world war. Moves toward world war must be exposed, opposed and militantly fought through revolutionary struggle, but the class-conscious proletariat cannot stoop to spreading illusions that world war can possibly be stopped by fighting against the imperialists' war moves—or even by smashing China's policies. Nothing short of revolution in the superpowers (or possibly revolution in a significant number of countries in either's camp) can stop the particular collision course these imperialists have already embarked upon. Hoxha emphasizes the opposite in his book, in the name of combatting the Chinese attempt to scare people into submission, but Hoxha's emphasis is nothing less than disarming in the face of the developing world situation.

Defending the Homeland, Hoxha-Style

Hoxha at least does not promote the absurdity that permanent peace is possible under imperialism. But here is where he gets into deeper, if not as obviously Kautskyite, waters. Hoxha talks about turning the imperialist war into a liberation war or a revolutionary liberation war, making no distinction between capitalist and semi-colonial countries; and the two phrases quoted by Hoxha, aside from his one quote from Lenin, are the only mention of turning the war into revolution in the whole book. This maybe could be chalked up to inaccurate wording on Hoxha's part. But even if that were the case, in the context of world war developing and the efforts of revisionists to paint such an inter-imperialist war as a "war of aggression"
vs. a "war of national salvation" in the advanced capitalist countries, it is more than a minor problem of choosing words, particularly when it is seen in light of Hoxha's overall analysis and emphasis. Hoxha criticizes the Chinese for promoting a "defense of the fatherland" position:

"When the Germany of Wilhelm II attacked France and Britain, the heads of the Second International advocated 'defense of the bourgeois homeland'. Both the German and the French socialists fell into this position. How Lenin condemned this and what he said against imperialist wars is common knowledge. Now when they preach unity of the European peoples with imperialism in the name of defense of national independence, the Chinese revisionists, too, are acting in the same way as the partisans of the Second International. Contrary to the theses of Lenin, they are inciting the future nuclear war which the two superpowers are trying to launch, and issuing 'patriotic' calls to the peoples and the proletariat of Western Europe to put aside their 'petty' differences with the bourgeoisie (over oppression, hunger, murders, unemployment), to refrain from threatening its state power and unite with NATO, 'United Europe', the Common Market of the big bourgeoisie and the European concerns, and fight only against the Soviet Union, and become disciplined soldiers for the bourgeoisie. Even the Second International could not have done better."176

This sounds good, even very good. But Hoxha, who conveniently avoids going into Lenin's condemnation of this social chauvinism, does not really understand the political basis of the "defense of the fatherland" line, and he ignores what Lenin said to do instead (turn imperialist war into a civil war). As we pointed out earlier, Hoxha sees the national domination of the oppressed nations as being only quantitatively greater as compared to the advanced capitalist countries. (The neo-colonies are "more dependent" on foreign capital and the "democratic and anti-imperialist tasks" of the revolution have a "special importance.") This leads him to a classical two-into-one on the national and class character of the revolution in the non-superpower advanced capitalist countries.

But not only does Hoxha fail to understand the material basis for the national liberation struggles of the oppressed nations—he does not thoroughly grasp the fact that the national question is a thing of the past for the imperialist countries, or as Lenin said, "the national movement cannot yield here anything progressive." It is Hoxha's confusion on this point that has him put "patriotic" in quotes in describing the Chinese line (above). Hoxha does this consistently throughout his book, attributing a national aspect to the struggle in the advanced capitalist countries (except the U.S.). Thus he talks about the positive "patriotic" forces in Europe and even tends to make U.S. imperialist penetration into Europe and even the USSR a question of national subjugation. Since war is an extension of politics, it's no surprise that the kind of war he proposes for the advanced countries (liberation war) reflects his "national" program. This confusion is reflected in the section that we referred to earlier where Hoxha quotes Lenin about building for proletarian revolution in response to reaction imperialist wars. Criticizing the followers of the Chinese revisionists in Europe today, Hoxha says:

"The main slogan of these parties, which is also the basic slogan of the Chinese policy, is that, in the present situation, the sole and fundamental task of the proletariat is to defend national independence, which is allegedly threatened only by Soviet social-imperialism. They are repeating, almost word by word, the slogans of the chiefs of the Second International who aban- doned the cause of the revolution and replaced it with the thesis of defense of the capitalist homeland. Lenin exposed this false and anti-Marxist slogan, which does not serve the defense of true independence but serves the instigation of inter-imperialist wars. He clearly defined what the stand of the true revolutionary should be towards the conflicts between imperialist groupings. He wrote:

'If the war is a reactionary imperialist war, that is, if it is being waged by two world coalitions of the imperialist, violent, predatory, reactionary bourgeoisie then every bourgeoisie (even of the smallest country) becomes a participant in the plunder, and my duty as a representative of the revolutionary proletariat is to prepare for the world proletarian revolution as the only escape from the horrors of a world slaughter . . .

That is what internationalism means, and that is the duty of the internationalist, the revolutionary worker, the genuine socialist.'176

Hoxha says a little later:

"At the same time these hangers-on of the Chinese have become ardent defenders of the bourgeois capitalist state institutions, especially of NATO, the European Common Market, etc., which they consider as the main factors for the 'defense of independence.' Like the Chinese leaders, they whitewash and prettify these pillars of capitalist domination and expansion. They are assisting precisely those organisms which, in reality, have seriously violated the independence and sovereignty of their countries."177

Sorry, Hoxha—"defense of the fatherland," while being a cover for the predatory nature of the war, would also be the slogan for the safeguarding of these countries' "true independence"—the only problem is that there is nothing progressive about safeguarding these nations or defending these "fatherlands" at all! These nations themselves (with a possible exception or two) have reached the stage where they are based on their own imperialist plunder and exploitation (regardless of the fact that they might be exploited and even dominated by other stronger imperialists, and during a war they will be plundered, etc.) While U.S. imperialism's role of propping up these imperialist countries should be exposed and fought in these countries, given that these countries are already developed capitalist nations—nations overripe for socialist revolution—the question of independence and sovereignty has nothing to do with the impending world war or their revolution, regardless of the fact that U.S. troops may be stationed in them or even in the event of military aggression against these countries in the course of the war—just as Lenin emphasized in World War I.

In analyzing Hoxha's line it is particularly important to take a hard look at his "quotes"—often what he omits is more revealing than what he includes. Not only is this true with regards to his hatchet job on Mao Tsetung Thought,72 he also falsifies Lenin! In his excerpt from Lenin cited above, Hoxha omitted two sentences:

"I must argue, not from the point of view of 'my' country (for that is the argument of a wretched, stupid, petty-bourgeois nationalist who does not realize that he is only a plaything in the hands of the imperialist bourgeoisie), but from the point of view of my share in the preparation, in the propaganda, and in the acceleration of the world proletarian revolution."173

Quite an omission, and one that was hardly accidental, as it speaks exactly to Hoxha's own deviations. It's wrong, according to Hoxha, for the working class to have the orientation of defending "their country" only against possible Soviet aggression. This is not in the interests of "true independence": no,
feudal and dynastic wars were then opposed by revolutionary-democratic wars, by wars for national liberation. This was the content of the historical tasks of that epoch.

"At the present time, the objective situation in the biggest advanced states of Europe is different. Progress, if we leave out for the moment the possibility of temporary steps backward, can be made only in the direction of socialist society, only in the direction of the socialist revolution. From the standpoint of progress, from the standpoint of the progressive class, the imperialist bourgeois war, the war of highly developed capitalism, i.e., primarily civil war for power between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie; for unless such a war is waged, serious progress is impossible..."75

Hoxha does not pose any earlier bourgeois revolution in promoting his two-into-one view of the tasks of revolutionaries in the advanced capitalist and oppressed nations. On the contrary, he poses the World War 2 model, just as the Chinese revisionists do, to promote his national program. Hoxha's emphasis on the attack on "the socialist country" as being at the heart of the imperialist war question, his continual metaphysical insistence that nothing much has really changed in the world with the defeat of the proletariat in the Soviet Union, coupled with no more than a few references to the line around World War 1 (revolutionary defeatism, etc.), indicate that he's opting for the "World War 2" model of defense of the socialist motherland in combination with revolutionary wars of national salvation - like the successful Albanian Liberation War (in which, he reminds us, they tactically united with the British and U.S. imperialists without capitulating to them and specifically points out the possibility of a similar situation arising again.76

This implicit and de facto promotion of the World War 2 model is very dangerous in today's situation. Leaving aside Albania and its social character, this analysis glosses over the fundamental character of the war that is developing today. Despite Hoxha's preachings on making proletarian revolution everywhere, if war comes, it will be the "bad guys" against the "good guys," it will be a war to defend the socialist motherland and be a war of liberation. In the name of defending socialism and "really defending" national interests, Hoxha is preparing the proletariat to fight a war against U.S. aggression - in the PLA's opinion, their "main enemy." And although Hoxha sees this threat to the "socialist motherland" coming from the U.S., his "proletarian nationalism" or "true independence" line if adopted by communists in advanced capitalist countries could lead them to fight a liberation war against any actual invader of "their" country, even the USSR. (Then we would see how long Hoxha's "socialist camp" would last!)

And Hoxha is not in the same camp as Rosa Luxemburg. The root of her problem was bowing somewhat to petty-bourgeois nationalism, but in the context of an overall line which called on the German proletariat to have the orientation in World War 1 of revolutionary defeatism. Hoxha has exactly the line Lenin attributed to the petty-bourgeois nationalists. It could only be from the point of view of nationalism that Yugo-slav revisionism (Yugoslavia is Albania's neighbor) in a book entitled Imperialism and Revolution (not Socialist Albania's Problems) is attacked and criticized with such zeal and at such length - much more so than Soviet social-imperialism. (And just in terms of ideological penetration into the working class of Europe and in the national liberation movements around the world, Soviet-style revisionism is, by far, the much greater danger.)

Hoxha's particular version of combining nationalism with Marxism takes the form of metaphysically merging everything into the contradiction between socialism and imperialism. It also appears in his idealist contention that nothing has changed in the world in terms of the socialist camp with the resurrection of bourgeois rule in the USSR (and today, China).

The struggle between a socialist country or even several countries and imperialism is not the same as the worldwide struggle of the historical march toward communism. It is not equivalent to that march - it is only a part of it, subordinate to the whole. Defense of a proletarian state is not an absolute - the proletariat's ultimate goal is not protecting the sovereignty of nations which have reached the socialist stage. The proletariat's goal is worldwide com-
munism and its outlook is internationalism, seeing all the struggles in light of that goal, including the struggle to defend a socialist country against imperialist aggression, as important as it is, as subordinate to that worldwide goal. Equating the struggle between the socialist country and imperialism with that goal, or viewing the worldwide struggle principally from the point of view of defending the socialist country (which the promotion of this "two worlds" theses does) is slipping into nationalism in the name of internationalism.

It's absurd to talk of a socialist camp—"even if it is one small country"—and try to use the argument that the proletariat and oppressed masses' aspiration and struggle for socialism is part of this camp, as Hoxha does. A socialist camp is just that—the actual existence of the proletariat holding state power in a significant section of the world—a significant material force posing a certain freedom and necessity for the proletariat worldwide and for the imperialists. Thus under the conditions of the imperialist invasion of the USSR in World War 2, it was correct, stemming from the interests of the worldwide proletariat, to adjust the class struggle temporarily, and for the proletariat in those countries to temporarily place their own struggle for socialism in a secondary capacity (though not liquidate it) in order to facilitate the defeat of the imperialist bloc trying to annihilate the proletarian state. (However, this "adjusting" generally resulted in the dragging of the red flag for the "national flag"). Had the imperialists succeeded in overthrowing proletarian rule in the Soviet Union through the World War 2 Nazi invasion, it would have been a devastating blow to the worldwide march toward communism. This was not only because of the tremendous moral force the USSR was as an example to workers everywhere, but also because of the material force the USSR was as a powerful bastion of revolution and a vital reserve for the struggle worldwide.

However, the implications of Hoxha that an invasion of Albania would determine the character of a general world war and (again by implication) require revolutionaries everywhere to base their strategy and tactics on the defense of Albania, is a dangerous one. Hoxha does not explicitly call on the proletariat to subordinate its struggle for power to defense of Albania in the event of war—he just sets people up for this line by merging everything into the contradiction between socialism and imperialism, with the Albanian nation of course at the head of the "good guys" in this simple world of two opposing armies.

Slipping into nationalism in the name of internationalism by equating defense of the socialist country with the worldwide revolutionary struggle is something particularly new. This happened to a great degree in World War 2. The Axis countries had to be fought, and the other imperialist bloc had to be tactically united with, because Germany had invaded the bastion of socialism. But defeating the fascists was *equated* with the advance toward socialism in these capitalist countries themselves, and the fascist threat to the Soviet Union was presented as the reactionary enemy of the British, French and U.S. nations, an enemy that had to be defeated in those countries as a stage preceding making revolution.

Hoxha, while taking a quick pot shot at Browder, still overall embraces this orientation. Instead of learning from the historical experience of the proletariat, he enshrines these errors and takes them to new depths with Albania raised as the center of this monolithic struggle for hegemony between socialism and capitalism. He's not much different from the Chinese on this count—he just shrouds his nationalism more thoroughly with the mantle of orthodoxy.

For those upset by our crass disrespect for the socialist motherland in the face of imperialist aggression against it (in the context of World War 2), they would do well to consider the situation toward the end of World War 1, immediately after the success of the Bolshevik revolution. At that time, the war was still going strong and Germany in particular was encroaching on the proletarian state. The Bolsheviks correctly took a stand of defending the socialist state, and the class-conscious proletariat stood and fought politically against the imperialist aggression. But there was no call by Lenin for adjustment of the class struggle in the belligerent countries, no calling on everybody to fight the enemy of the socialist country as their main enemy.

Why? Revolutionary situations were developing rapidly in Europe and adopting such a line would have cut short the real possibility of immediate victory for the proletariat elsewhere. (Lenin had hoped that the Russian Revolution would be just the first victory in a chain of such victories, and these hopes were based on a correct assessment of the objective conditions.) In fact, revolution was attempted in a number of countries, but was not successful. To have demanded that revolutionaries in France, for example, unite with their bourgeoisie because Soviet Russia was confronting the German army would have completely obscured the fact that the *main character* of the war was still a fight among imperialists for the division of the world. Also, the relationship of the imperialists against Soviet Russia was very fluid, and its immediate danger was not just from the German bloc. These of course were different conditions than existed during the World War 2 invasion of the USSR. But that is exactly the point. Today we have very *different* conditions than at the onset of World War 2, and promoting this model, with defense of Albania as central to a world war situation (since even an invasion of Albania, despite Hoxha's protestations to the opposite, will in no way be a determining feature in such a war), is petty nationalism, not internationalism, justified through the rankest idealism.

V. Hoxha and the USSR

In case there is any doubt that Hoxha is promoting a "U.S. imperialist main danger" line, let's examine a little more what he says about the character of a war between the superpowers. As was already pointed out, despite his references to superpower contention, he promotes the notion that the Soviet Union is dependent on, dominated by, has its sovereignty threatened by, etc., the U.S. There is a definite method to his madness. Masterfully while quoting from Lenin's polemics against Kautsky's view of World War 1, Hoxha turns around and shows how his own far-off world war will be predatory all right. Predatory against socialist Albania as we already pointed out, but also predatory against the USSR, rather than predatory on the part of all the imperialists!

It is useful to quote at length from Hoxha, including his citation from Lenin, to show how he opportunistically uses a quote from the classics and turns around and promotes the opposite in his interpretation. Hoxha says:

"In his polemic with Kautsky, Lenin said:

... in the realities of the capitalist system, and not in the banal philistine fantasies of English persons or of the German "Marxist" Kautsky, "inter-imperialist" or "ultra-imperialist" alliances, no matter what form they may assume, whether of one imperialist coalition against another, or general alliances embracing all the imperialist powers, are inevitably nothing more than a "truce" in between periods of wars."

"These teachings of Lenin's are very relevant in the present conditions when the Chinese revisionists are talking
Hoxha must figure no one really bothered to read or try and understand the quote from Lenin. Lenin in his polemic with Kautsky is emphasizing the opposite of Hoxha’s interpretation. Lenin says nothing about all the imperialists jointly plundering anything. He is arguing that truces among imperialists (whether between blocs or embracing all the imperialists) are nothing but a truce between them in between wars between them, i.e., a war against each other over who can plunder the world. Instead Hoxha promotes his Kautskysm of a new type and describes a grand coalition of all the fascist, feudal, capitalist and imperialist states (specifically leaving out the USSR, one of the two most powerful imperialist powers!) and regimes for the joint crushing of the revolution and socialism (read: Albania) and for the joint plunder of the colonies and dependent and semi-dependent countries (perhaps including the Soviet Union!).

Half the time the Albanians call the Soviets imperialists, and the other half they attribute to them the character of a dependent country. And consistently Hoxha says they are but a tool, an “agency” of U.S. imperialism—which cuts against the understanding that the Soviets are “equal contenders” for hegemony, despite Hoxha’s few references to that effect. Hoxha’s “two worlds” thesis is definitely a bourgeois logical opposite of the Chinese “three worlds,” though he covers himself with more revolutionary phrases and more of a mantle of “orthodoxy.” If the Chinese’s narrow nationalist interests have them tailing and promoting U.S. imperialism—for now—through their “three worlds” strategy, Hoxha’s “two worlds” thesis is definitely tailing after the Soviets—and for the same reason.

Hoxha’s entire treatment of the Soviet Union’s war preparations is extremely interesting. Take for example his statement that “it is most likely that the policy of the United States of America and the wrong strategy of China itself, may impel the Soviet Union to increase its military strength even further, and as the imperialist power it is, to attack China first.” Or “The problem is that

the increase of U.S. military potential relatively weakens Soviet fighting strength and forces the Soviet Union to follow the United States of America step by step in order to balance its military potential and aggressive powers.”

When the nasty adjectives are eliminated, what’s left is the USSR’s very own justification of their war preparations—that they are “forced” to carry them out by the U.S. and China in order to “balance” the world power equation!

This tendency for the Albanian position to dovetail with the line of the Soviet social imperialists comes out in many particular positions taken as well as the common features of their overall international line. For example, most readers will no doubt be familiar with Hoxha’s full support for Vietnam’s Soviet-backed invasion of Cambodia. But Hoxha’s support for the Soviet position in the Middle East may come as more of a surprise.

It is interesting that someone who constantly hits China for simply looking at countries when it comes to the “third world,” himself totally slips into this orientation of “countries” when it comes to his main section on the Arab world, and lands implicitly in the camp of supporting the Soviet mini-state position when it comes to the Palestinian question.

Hoxha says:

“The fight against Israel—the most bloodthirsty tool of U.S. imperialism—which has become a great stumbling block to the advance of the Arab peoples, is a common problem for all these peoples. In practice, however, not all the Arab states are of one mind about the struggle they should wage jointly against Israel and about the character this struggle against their common enemy should have. Frequently, some of them see this struggle from a narrow nationalist angle. We cannot agree with such a stand. We stick to our stand that Israel must withdraw to its own lair and renounce its chauvinist, provocative, offensive and aggressive attitudes and actions against the Arab states. We demand that Israel give up the territories of the Arabs, that the Palestinians gain all their national rights, but we can never accept that the Israeli people should be wiped out.”

Full Palestinian national rights are, of course, really in contradiction with the Zionist state of Israel having a “lair” to withdraw to, and if one supports the liberation of Palestine, one does not lecture about driving “Israelis” (as he doesn’t say Jews, he must mean the state of Israel) into the sea. This little riff by Hoxha is a new emphasis for him.

Could it be that Hoxha himself is praying for a maintenance of equilibrium between the superpowers in the Middle East, that the struggle for restoration of the full national rights of the Palestinians is too revolutionary for Mr. “super-Marxist” because the Soviets need some sort of base, a mini-state, etc. as soon as possible? (Such is the material basis for the promotion of the mini-state by the Soviets.)

Who else has the same line as Hoxha on Mao Tsetung Thought and the Cultural Revolution, who else has the line that China is instigating world war instead of the blind forces of imperialism propelling both the Soviets and the U.S. in that direction? Who else says that the Soviets are arming, as Hoxha does, because the U.S. is making them arm, and who else sees the contradiction between socialism and imperialism as what really defines the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat in the world today?

In an article written in October 1975 in the Soviet theoretical journal International Affairs, entitled “China’s Ideological Subversion,” the Soviets take on the Chinese differentiation of the “three worlds” (sorry, Enver, you were not the first). They say:

“While the 9th Congress of the CPC in 1969 pronounced that in the contemporary epoch, imperialism was moving toward a complete collapse, and socialism to worldwide victory, the report to the 10th Congress characterized this epoch by referring to the ‘instructions of the helmsman’ according to which ‘we still [Soviets’ italics] live in the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolution.’

“The repetition of Lenin’s definition of the epoch with the ad-libbed word ‘still’ in absolutely new conditions, a definition made prior to the Great October Socialist Revolution, is definitely intended to obliterate the world historic significance of the victory of the Socialist Revolution in the USSR. By falsifying the Leninist formula and then using it to describe the contemporary epoch Maoist theoreticians endeavor to justify their rejection of the world socialist system.

“Furthermore, the Chinese leadership juggled with the definition of the epoch to justify their line of instigating a dangerous aggravation of the world situation. Since they say there have been no fundamental changes in the alignment of forces, and socialism as a vehicle of a peaceful policy does not exist, then the aggravation of tensions with another world war as the most probable outcome is ‘naturally’ the dominating feature of the contemporary epoch . . .”
The Soviet article goes on to explain how differentiating the world into three is a plot for China to become a superpower, and that Peking is inciting war between the Soviets and the U.S. for its own hegemonistic ends, etc.

The Soviet socialism vs. imperialism thesis differs a little from Hoxha's, since it emphasizes the Great Socialist Soviet Union as a force for world peace, whereas Hoxha doesn't have this same emphasis; but their main political conclusions are just about identical: what's shaped the world since the victory of the Bolshevik revolution is the contradiction between socialism and imperialism, world war is really not on the horizon, but to the degree that it is it flows out of the hegemonistic aims of Peking.

The similarity between Hoxha's line and the Soviets' has two main sources. First, revisionism is revisionism. The Soviets use "Marxism" to cover their bourgeois rule and national interests, and Hoxha does a similar two-into-one which has both lines parroting similar distortions of Marxism. (And for the same reason, Hoxha's line dovetails with the Chinese revisionists', as well as the Soviets', on some fundamental questions, such as the class struggle under socialism, both having to reject Mao Tsetung's contributions on this score, and so forth.) But many particular political lines dovetail with the Soviets' because Hoxha sees his main enemy as the U.S., especially because they back up Yugoslavia, the most immediate threat to Albania, and because he sees less of a danger coming from the Soviets at this time. His line definitely leaves a big opening for a rapprochement with the Soviets.

His main political differences with the Soviets seem to fall out on such questions as the peaceful transition to socialism, and Hoxha's contention that the Soviet Union is not a socialist country. But on the question of "peaceful transition," the Soviets more and more are rejecting this form of revisionism in many parts of the world such as Africa as things sharpen up between them and the U.S. While Hoxha acknowledges that the Soviets have been changing their tune somewhat in connection with the liberation struggles, he emphasizes the opposite aspect of the Soviet line overall, maintaining that the Soviets are clinging to the peaceful transition line. But when it comes to the advanced capitalist countries, the Soviet revisionists will most likely reject this "peaceful" road as the situation sharpens between them and the U.S.—at least in countries where they feel the revisionist parties might have a real chance of coming to power by other, non-peaceful, means. And as we pointed out with the example of Indonesia, Hoxha's opportunism has him ignoring the necessary line struggle against this "peaceful transition" revisionism in order to be able to attack what he considers more serious problems—such as Mao Tsetung Thought!

And even the difference over whether the Soviet Union is socialist or not will probably not serve as much of an obstacle to uniting with it. The Soviets have certainly shown they can tolerate a few insults as long as people line up with them when the chips are down! As we pointed out, Hoxha is already portraying a scenario in which U.S. imperialism, Number 1 bad guy, will be assaulting Number 1 good guy, Albania, and going after the U.S.'s semi-dependent agent, the Soviet Union. But even beyond that, Hoxha's fixation on Khrushchevism (is Hoxha aware that Khrushchev was dumped by the Soviet bourgeoisie?) as the essence of Soviet revisionism, and his emphasis throughout his whole book that Western imperialist investment in a socialist country is the basis for capitalism there, even leaves the door open for socialism to be restored in the Soviet Union (short of proletarian revolution) if it dumps this western "subjugation" and if the Khrushchevite form of revisionism is more thoroughly rejected.

It is certainly not too difficult to imagine a situation in which the Soviets posthumously rehabilitate Stalin's name as a "national war hero" (of course, they could never uphold his revolutionary essence—but then neither does Hoxha!) and criticize Khrushchev and his policy of capitulation to the West, his open renunciation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, etc. In fact there is much evidence that this is exactly what the Soviets are planning to do. And especially if this were coupled with a more aggressive and hostile stand toward Yugoslavia, it is very difficult to see what the remaining obstacles to a Soviet-Albanian rapprochement would be!

Hoxha even has two sections of his book that makes one think this "restoration of socialism" in the USSR is not that unlikely in his opinion. One is a section in which Hoxha goes into a long explanation as to the character of loans and aid between socialist countries and the obligations of "economically developed socialist states." Though none exist today, he poses the question as if it had immediate implications. The other is where Hoxha states that those who made errors in the past can reject them and return to the Marxist-Leninist road. Though these sections don't conclusively prove that Hoxha will move in that direction—and Hoxha has shown that he can combine the interests and outlook of "socialist" Albania with those of the imperialist Soviet Union without too much difficulty—politically it would not be that difficult for Hoxha to re-define the character of the rulers of the USSR if it becomes necessary for "the salvation of Albania."

In form, Hoxha's revisionism does not at this time involve the same blatant and wholesale capitulation to Soviet imperialism as the Chinese revisionist bootlicking to the U.S. No—he's opted, because of having a different freedom and necessity, for a more "orthodox" approach. In part this has to do with how the Albanian rulers can best get over with the Albanian masses and the PLA's loyal followers around the world. For years Albania had been a part of the international struggle against Soviet revisionism—and today they pose as standard bearers in the fight against revisionism (though mainly of the Chinese and Yugoslav variety), which allows them to ride on this tradition. It would be difficult, to say the least, to justify Albania's being the blatant gendarme for the Soviets like Cuba is. (Though it has not been so hard to take to the defense of the Vietnamese revisionists when it came to their invasion of Cambodia!) And once more, it's not that likely that the Soviets are interested enough in Albania to negotiate Cuba-like terms for its national subjugation.

Overall, Albania does not have the same "capital" the Chinese do to sell themselves to the imperialists, or for that matter, to be part in any major way of the evaluation the imperialists make of the world situation. (This is also why the Albanians—very subjectively of course—can promote the "moral" socialism of never dealing with the major imperialist countries. They lie about history and try to misrepresent Lenin's
line, to contort it to mean never dealing with them as some Leninist absolute, when it is nothing more than ascribing an absolute principle to the position in the world in which Albania finds itself.)

But whether a line reflects capitulation to imperialism cannot be measured only by how much direct whoring a revisionist is doing for a great power. Indirectly Hoxha does promote the political view and needs of the Soviet imperialists to a great degree. In fact the content of Hoxha’s whole presentation of the world situation is almost identical to that of the Soviets—except that in Hoxha’s case it is presented through the prism of narrow Albanian nationalism, while the Soviets present the same line openly from a great nation, imperialist standpoint. Hoxha promotes a thoroughgoing revisionist line, trying to drag many who have stood against revisionism throughout the years with him. But the proletariat is capable of distinguishing nationalism from internationalism, and metaphysics and idealism from dialectical and thoroughgoing materialism, no matter what type of drape of “leftist” rhetoric is used to cover these distinctions.

Hoxha’s tactic in writing *Imperialism and the Revolution* reminds one of a peacock. General phrases about the class struggle, revolution, proletarian dictatorship, and the “purity” of Marxism-Leninism are displayed with great pomposity and fanfare. He hopes the dazzling display of presumed “orthodoxy” will mask the reality of some of his more noxious theses, especially his attack on Mao Tsetung. But on examining the substance beneath the fluff and show, the reader finds a mishmash of eclecticism, idealism, metaphysics and, one must add, plain old-fashioned doubletalk. Hoxha’s recipes, if followed, would produce a strange-tasting goulash.

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**Footnotes**

2. Ibid., p. 279 for Lenin’s supposed thesis on the “two tendencies of capital.”
3. P. 47.
5. See pp. 365-66 for example.
6. See pp. 21-22, 24-25 for example.
8. P. 348; emphasis added.
9. P. 351.
10. P. 122; emphasis added.
13. P. 163.
15. For more on this point see “Normalization: China Joins U.S. War Bloc” in the January 1979 *Revolution*. For a more detailed analysis of how the Chinese revisionists are restoring capitalism, see “The Destruction of China’s Socialist Economy” in *Revolution*, May 1979.
17. Ibid., p. 91.
20. Ibid., see pp. 93, 122.
22. Hoxha, pp. 139-40.
23. Ibid., p. 257.
27. P. 24-25.
29. P. 365.
30. P. 300.
31. P. 12.
32. P. 25.
35. Hoxha, pp. 301-302
36. P. 303.
38. P. 299.
40. Ibid., p. 265.
41. Ibid., p. 271.
42. Ibid., p. 276.
43. Ibid., p. 261.
44. P. 263; emphasis added.
46. Ibid., Section 1, especially pp. 6 and 10.
47. Hoxha, p. 222.
49. Ibid., p. 193.
51. Ibid., p. 15; PKI’s emphasis.
52. Ibid., p. 42.
53. Hoxha, p. 102.
57. Ibid., p. 231.
59. P. 232.
60. P. 232.
63. Hoxha, pp. 239-240.
64. Ibid., p. 248.
65. P. 50.
67. P. 363.
68. Pp. 377-78.
69. P. 287.
70. Pp. 247-48; emphasis added.
71. P. 249; emphasis added.
72. *The Communist*, No. 5 presents detailed evidence of Hoxha’s dishonest and opportunist method of quoting. See, for example pp. 22, 32, 64.
75. Ibid., pp. 315-16; Lenin’s emphasis.
76. Hoxha, p. 226.
77. Ibid., pp. 258-59.
78. P. 306.
79. See the three articles in *The Communist* (in Vol. 1, No. 1; Vol. 2, No. 1; and Vol. 2, No. 2) dealing with the origins, nature and outcome of World War 2 and the role of communists in relation to it.
80. Hoxha, p. 136; emphasis added in last paragraph.
81. Ibid., see pp. 24, 25.
82. P. 366; emphasis added.
83. P. 289; emphasis added.
84. P. 177-78.
85. See *The Communist*, No. 5, especially pp. 80-88.
86. Hoxha, p. 95.