The Struggle Over China in the RCP

The question of China, of a correct stand on the revisionist coup carried off there in October 1976, on the round attacks on the revolutionary line of Mao Tsetung that are waging around the world. This question came to concentrate a whole wave of articles in the journal "Proletarian Revolution," and which seeks to outlaw revolution. They have dubbed the RCP with the label of "revisionist headquarters within the RCP. But, unlike the revisionist coup in China that was carried off in October 1976, the RCP receives this without being troubled. Without being troubled, the RCP is studying Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao, the writings of which have given us the most pertinent advice on how to remove revisionism from the heart of our party. The RCP is studying the history of this struggle within the RCP, and what we have learned from it.

The RCP is reviewing the history of this struggle within the RCP, Kuo-feng, Teng Hsiao-ping, et al., are pushing a line of revisionism—a struggle spearheaded by Mao and the correct and very important part of proletarian internationalism.

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...
Struggle... Continued from page 2

Since the dramatic and well-documented event to the international proletariat was not Teng Hua-ping's reactionary "three worlds" speech at the United Nations in 1974, when the coup he helped hearten in 1976.

Resolution to Revise... Coup

This coup did, in fact, bring the struggle within our Party to a new term line of battle. The Bergman clique toward the coup in China had a process of revisionism, and its ultimate framework was crafted in January 1978. The downfall possesses continuities to this day, as the crass opportunism of the "Revolutionary Communist Party" (RCP), USA is produced and deepened daily. But there have been certain consistent features which characterized their behavior from the beginning to the end. The motion of the RCP, USA and other factors entered in, but basically this clique was on the defensive because of their own revisionism. It fit them like a glove.

Thus something external to the RCP, USA—the question of China and Tibet—brought to the boiling point the internal contradiction between Marxist and revisionism. It made impossible for Jarvis and Bergman to straddle the fence between Marxism and revisionism. And the factional behavior of this clique—a consistent hallmark which helped earn them the name "Revisionists"—brings home the truth spoken to by Wang Hung-wen in his report to the 10th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party: "If one practices revisionism... one will inevitably go in for splits, intrigues, and conspiracies." So it went with this clique, in the downward slide process of development.

In early October 1976, as soon as the word of the arrest of the Four reached the United States, no one at the Party Center liked what had happened. Everyone said that these four were the revolutionaries, the ones who were being fought at Mao's side against revisionists like Teng Hua-ping. At the same time all agreed, at least in word, that further study of the basic question of line, and ideological and political consolidation was necessary for a full understanding. This even included Lichel Bergman, who had adduced so well at the time Yao Way-sun and Chang Chiu-chao's two major (and now attacked) articles had appeared in early 1977. "That's the RCP line," he said and referring to that the fact these two articles, which made impor- type declaration, and the people's unity against capitalism under socialism, put forward much the same line on this question as did the RUC's publication "Red Papers"? 7: How Capitalism Has been Restored in the Soviet Union. Of course, this was no surprise since both R7 and these articles were based on Mao's analysis of the internal situation; the international situation, all Bergman was thinking of, though, was not the question of line, but of the possibility that such agreement might open up a vast market in China for sales of R7. Right after the arrests, Mickey Jarvis even did his famous "confession letter" (written by a ghost writer, of course) on "Bourgeois Right, Reaction, and Revolution In the U.S."

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The revisionist coup in China, the criminal reversal of the achievements of the Cultural Revolution and the open rejection of Mao Tsetung's line by the capitalist readers now in power have sent shock waves throughout the world.

All people who have looked to China's great pathbreaking advances have been affected by the revisionists. Marxists are being put to the test. This new book contains in full the original internal documents of the sharp struggle within the Revolutionary Communist Party, USA—a struggle to uphold Mao's revolutionary line and the Four who heroically fought for it against the revisionist line of the capitalist readers. An appendix documents the related struggle over the Party's line on making revolution in the U.S.

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Continued on page 6

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Continued on page 6
Struggle...

Continued from page 5

increased it may seem for Marxist-Leninists, just taking this approach of focusing on line was a victory over the "truth to the telegraph office with a con

gratulato" telegram" approach of Klikaev and the "BY" grown-up approach of Jarvis and Bergman of distorting the importance of line.

Of course, had the initial unity of assessment on the events in China been maintained at the Party Center, things would have proceeded differently. It would have been possible quite soon to put to the whole Party that the leading bodies had the strong feeling that these developments were negative and opposed to Mao's line, while calling for further study and investigation as events unfolded. But the quick adoption by Jarvis and Bergman of rank opportunism made this approach impossible.

The early bulletin went on to say, "This same principle (paying attention to line) should guide comrades throughout the Party in taking up these questions. While going deeply into the lines involved, people should strive to keep an open mind, and while people will and should tend to have opinions, these should not become hard and fast and should not lead to the formation of groups in the Party taking one side or the other. Further guidance will be coming in the future from the Party Center." Party units were called on to have collective discussion of basic points of line on the struggle under socialism, but to not collectively discuss and "decide on" what was right and wrong in China—through informal discussion of this by people in the same units was not discouraged. The reason for this was two-fold: first, to arm people with a grasp of the most important line questions to strengthen the Party's ability to judge things as they developed; secondly, it was felt that if and only if people were on the same track—which was not the case—within weeks of the publication of the October 15 day" with advice like, "Hope for the best, have faith in

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Bergman was a self-styled Confucian sage to whom his feet were always firmly planted in the camp of the revisionists and the "gang of four." He cast himself simultaneously in the role of moral guardian of the Chinese people, and just kept reeling off everything that mattered was "genius" (particularly his), not facts. He had been always fond of repeating a story from some Canadian sagas in which the "gang of four" didn't want the trains to run on time. Bergman—The gang didn't believe in paying at attention to production, they said it would "automatically" go on.

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REVOLUTION

September 1978

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Jarvis—The gang didn't believe in paying attention to production, they said it would "automatically" go on.

—Oh, how do you know?

—It says so in the current issue of Peking Review.

—Have you ever seen that—or anything different from Mao's line "grab revolution, produce production" in anything the Four wrote, or in articles under their leadership?

—Now, But articles are just articles. Practice is what counts.

It would be constantly pointed out by Comrade Avakian and others that written articles from both before and after the Four's arrest were precisely the best, most concentrated way, to compare and understand the lines of the two sides. Other sources of facts should be sought out, but not ridiculous one-sided acceptance of current horror stories as the evidence against the Four.

Leibel Bergman, meanwhile, was promoting apostagism—and revisionism—in his own peculiar form. He didn't believe in articles in anything the Four wrote, or in articles under their leadership.

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Struggle... Continued from page 6

Chou-Chen Chiao used to be my pal. This fellow piped, "It's metaphysical." When asked to explain why he thought so, for the benefit of the discussion, he became agitated and all he could blurt out was "I can't explain it, but there's someone back in my area who can." He then suddenly revealed the fact that the leadership of the "world-wide communist movement" had come up with the idea and the fact that Chou and Mao were fighting in the last years. Especially when Mao launched the campaign to criticize the bourgeoisie and others in the social base of China. Soon enough, this campaign was dropped and Teng's counter-revolutionary revisionist line was suddenly changed to "Peking Review". Bergman repeated favorably a statement by a bourgeois "expert" on China: "When Chou En-lai was in power, under those circumstances, Bergman had an answer ready for me: "Give me my old friend Chou En-lai—and all that's left of the Chinese version of socialism as fundamentally opposed to Mao's line and his "triumph."" He was the man who "kept the party together". In the period from 1976 to 1978 which was after the death of Chou and the death of Mao, Bergman repeated favorably a statement by a bourgeois "expert" on China: "When Chou En-lai was in power, the Chinese people would feel great grief; when Mao died, they would feel great relief." He actually said this reactionary statement "had something to it!" This perfectly reflected the view of the unformed bourgeois intellectuals and others. He was the most powerful and prestigious leader in China. Bergman even knew, and occasionally admitted, that Chou and Mao were fighting in the last years. Especially when Mao launched the campaign to criticize the "three directives" theory and his "sliding scale revisionism". But if "three lines" could be invented, then any outrage could be excused, blamed on the "haves" caused by the Four, or dismissed as unimportant because "the right controls the Peking Review."" Leib Bergman, however, did not bother much with such trappings. His revisionism was as naked as it was pitiful. Behind the smokescreen of "haze faith in the Chinese people," Bergman had a line. He was busily summing up that Mao had bowed up and that the Cultural Revolution had left nothing but chaos and power-grabbing, Bergman was perfectly characterized by Mao in his poem "Two Birds, A Dialogue": "A sparrow in its burst is still bright, Is this a hell of a mess? O, I want to fly and fly away."

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Shanghai workers criticize the revisionist formulation of "taking the three directives as the key link" during the movement to criticize Teng and back the right deviationists wind (1976).

During this time it had also become clear that Teng Hsiao-ping was to be reviled to some extent for his leadership in China. Especially since this was so flagrantly a question of principle, and even since Teng was not yet in office, there was still an ability to force at least Jars to go along with main- taining the policy of criticism. This was a revisionist whose line would have led to capitalistic restoration. Even as this was reiterated, however, Bergman threw through ridiculous contrivances and say that this did not necessarily mean the correctness of the Chinese revisionists' contortions and say that this did not necessarily mean the correctness of the Chinese revisionists' policy. This compromise was necessary to get out anything at all on Teng. The revolutionaries at the Party Center insisted that if a Central Committee was to be formed from the cadre of the Party on these questions, and the Bergman clique). Through firm struggle, Jarvis, Bergman and the rest were forced to go along with this and allow a leadership meeting to discuss these ques- tions. In the wake of the 11th Party Congress in China, the meeting took up and discussed the line of the "General Program" which had been authored in 1973 by the Chinese revisionists and condemned by Mao, as well as the question of the bourgeoisie in the party under socialism. Because they had no Marxist leg to stand on in front of the cadre of the Party on these questions, and with running wild below, the leaders of the clique agreed to an internal document which went still more deeply and the history of Teng Hsiao-ping (who was reinstated to the highest levels of the Chinese Party at the 11th Con- gress), which omitted the "General Program" as a revisionist promotion of the theory of the productive forces, and which treated the Chinese party under socialism as fundamentally opposed to Mao's line and his "triumph." Bergman, however, did not bother much with such trappings. His revisionism was as naked as it was pitiful. Behind the smokescreen of "haze faith in the Chinese people," Bergman had a line. He was busily summing up that Mao had bowed up and that the Cultural Revolution had left nothing but chaos and power-grabbing, Bergman was perfectly characterized by Mao in his poem "Two Birds, A Dialogue": "A sparrow in its burst is still bright, Is this a hell of a mess? O, I want to fly and fly away."

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Struggle...

Continued from page 7
played an important role in educating them as to the
basic questions of line.
As the Central Committee meeting was also set
for the end of the year, at which all agreed the basic
questions would be taken up and resolved. It was
announced at this time that Jarvis had been made
more desirable double-dealing. On the one hand,
persons in his camp were whipped up to oppose the line
of the last bulletin, with which he expressed agree-
ment. On the other, he went to float to others at the
Party Center that he might be having changes in the
question. After all, he said, there was a lot of
revisionism coming out of China.

Central Committee Meeting

Other comrades at the Center welcomed this attitude
on Jarvis' part, while understandably not fully trusting
it, especially after so many continued factionalism and
charged up attacks on the part of many in his social
base. Winning over Jarvis on this question would cer-
tainly provide the best possible conditions for uniting
and educating the whole Party around a correct line.
Jarvis was given more material to study. Finally, in
the weeks before the Central Committee meeting at
the end of 1977, Jarvis stated to other comrades at the
Center that he felt his position had been wrong and that,
although he still had some questions, he thought
the line was basically correct. He said he would sub-
mit a paper to the Central Committee that would make
self-criticism and put forward this view.

Comrade Avakian also couldn't help but be encouraged
and arranged for further discussions with Jarvis for
that purpose. But Jarvis, who was always notorious
for being absent from meetings, was even later than usual
for these meetings. In fact, he didn't show at all. He evaded
phoning in for an interview for the whole week of the
Central Committee meeting, in a phone conversa-
tion with another Comrade at the Center, Jarvis gave no indication that he
was rethinking his recent expressed views.

Then, in a surprise attack, without even having made such a paper, Jarvis showed up at the Central Committee meeting, held in a talk at the Central Committee meeting with a three-page-paper—as empty as it was insubstantial—written as the first day of the meeting. This Comrade at the Center, Jarvis gave no indication that he
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was rethinking his recent expressed views.
With changes based on the discussion, the Central Committee report was prepared for circulation to all concerned in the struggle over these differences in this context. There was every confidence that these comrades could be won over based on political line and Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought. This proved to be the case. On the basis of all this, the Congress was held earlier than expected, as reported in the April/May issue of Revolutions—a congress of unity and of unity against revisionism. It was a lively and serious conclave, attended by Teng Hsiao-ping’s group of the eight major questions of line involved in this struggle, including the question of China. It reaffirmed the Party’s revolutionary line, holding on to the revolutionary path to stand up to revisionism here and internationally and to win the overall anti revisionist struggle.

In contrast, since the split the Jarvis-Bergman “Revolutionary Workers’ Headquarters” has continued to reveal their bankruptcy and opportunism. Their “sliding scale” has continued its dizzying descent into the pit of revisionism but, we are confident, it has by no means reached the bottom. They have even changed their documents upon publication in order to disguise their descent. Their first papers, for example, characterized Teng and the Four as “oppositional poles of the same struggle.” But what they are after are gone. The latest version of their line criticizes their “earlier antagonism” to Teng Hsiao-ping, thus negating the fact that he is a leading figure within the collective leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people. Their revisionism is the purpose of the recent publication of a volume of articles to mislead the world to think that Teng Hsiao-ping is one of these.” (Call, May 17, 1976.) On the other hand, the CPML is publishing articles such as “The Chinese Party ‘Turned on Us’ but When That Party Has by No Means Reached the Bottom.”

Our Mensheviks. In this one case, though, they are no more in the way of self-exploration of their pragmatism and opportunism than Teng Hsiao-ping. They can only hope to redeem themselves. One of the points made early on in this struggle was that Jarvis-Bergman’s line is straight pragmatism: Hua and Teng Hsiao-ping, therefore, and Hua and Teng and Co. must be and we must support them. But Teng’s position is not really too bad. Principle be damned! Teng’s got the power! Let’s return to the haunting refrain of Jarvis hustling Hua, “Teng Hsiao-ping! He’s a real opportunist!” It’s true Jarvis has always been consistent—consistently pragmatic and opportunistic. When it was convenient for him to piddle his revisionism inside the RCP, Jarvis did so, though in an effort to give some semblance of unity to our revolutionary line. But when Teng peddled this revisionism elsewhere, he’s ready at the drop of a hat to China.

Programme and Constitution of the RCP, USA

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The Programme of the RCP summarizes the present situation facing the working class in its struggle and points to the road forward. It is a concentration of the Party’s revolutionary line. It sets forth to the working class the vision of a new socialist society, an arm and ultimately communism—and the means to achieve this historic goal. It is a guide to action.

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