Encyclopedia of Anti-Revisionism On-Line

The Marxist-Leninist Education Project Theory of Knowledge Group

Dialectical or Mechanical Materialism (A Response)


First Published: Line of March Vol. 1, No. 3, October-November 1980.
Transcription, Editing and Markup: Paul Saba
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The principal error in the theory of knowledge which could stem from the confusion of categories used in Mao’s On Practice is mechanical materialism. This deviation attempts to root scientific concepts (such as “atom” or “communism ”) directly to perception and to sensation. It makes two false assumptions; one is that a quantitative accumulation of practice will lead (automatically or spontaneously) to theoretical knowledge; and the other is that the process of proof is immediately verifiable and simple. Both end up belittling dialectical logic or theoretical reflection (i.e., the struggle for scientific knowledge). Key to this deviation is a vulgarization of the verification process. Dialectical (as opposed to mechanical) materialism, recognizes matter and practice as the ultimate verification, but holds that it is not always a simple and direct relation. . . . For example, communism is a scientific category that has not yet been perceived or verified in the material world. It is the result of logic and deduction based on theoretical reflections on capitalism. If you don’t separate scientific knowledge from perception, you can never account for such a scientific concept as communism. – Marxist-Leninist Education Project (MLEP) Clarification in Study Guide for Mao’s On Practice, January 1980

Clay Newlin, in his article Idealism and Rectification attempts to show that the MLEP clarification to the On Practice study guide exposes the idealism “’inherent” in the rectification line. His main argument is that MLEP downplays the role of perception in the theory of knowledge in order to philosophically justify “liquidating the criterion of practice in the party-building period,” and thus “reduces party-building to a thought process – one that needs neither immediate perception nor immediate practice.”

Despite the sectarian approach which Newlin brings to this polemic (with his unprincipled attacks on MLEP as an institution and his caricature of our work on clarifying the Marxist theory of knowledge), his article does raise important philosophical questions, the resolution of which can significantly advance the party building line struggle. At the heart of the controversy are two questions: 1) what is the relation between perception and theoretical knowledge; and 2) what is the process by which our knowledge is verified in the material world? It is easy to see how these two philosophical questions impact the current party building line struggle. While Newlin claims the rectifictionists fall into idealism in answering these questions, we believe that Newlin’s response betrays the basic philosophical deviation of mechanical materialism upon which his fusion line rests.

The MLEP Clarification and Why We Made It

First of all, what is our clarification to the On Practice guide and why did we find it necessary to make it? Mao oversimplifies the Marxist theory of knowledge by distinguishing only between two stages; a lower stage of perceptual knowledge in which there is no concept formation and we only see “the phenomenal side, the separate aspects, and the external relations of things”; and a higher stage of conceptual knowledge where man “uses concepts in the brain to form judgments and inferences” that enable him to “reach the totality, the essence, and the internal relations of things.” Whether this over-simplification is due to problems in popularization or translation, to talk of scientific knowledge at the time it was written, or to actual misunderstanding by Mao (MLEP continues to use On Practice as the most succinct statement of the relation between theory and practice available to us), we feel that the relation between higher and lower knowledge must be drawn out more fully than is done in Mao’s text to avoid misunderstanding.

By his over-simplification, Mao merges the process of cognition, or the passing from non-knowledge to knowledge through original concept formation, with the process of deepening knowledge through transforming lower-level concepts into higher-level concepts or “theoretical knowledge.” The following illustration will demonstrate that these are really two distinct processes. For example, determining that the sound we hear is coming from an explosion demonstrates the first process, wherein “explosion” is a low-level concept, derived from our perception of sound, and describing the phenomena or outward appearance of things. On the other hand, determining that this explosion was caused by atomic fission demonstrates the second process, wherein “atomic fission” is a scientific category derived from lower-level concepts and capturing the essence and internal relations of things. Both processes involve qualitative leaps, the first from perception (differentiating the sound decibels reaching our ears) to the lower stage of conceptual knowledge (with the concept “explosion”), and the second from the lower to the higher stage of conceptual knowledge (the concept “atomic fission,” i.e., theoretical knowledge). The first leap is accomplished by “conceptualization” from perceptions, while the second leap is accomplished through the use of “dialectical logic” which Lenin called “the science of the laws of development of the entire concrete content of the world and its cognition” (Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 92), and past scientific knowledge. Mao is most concerned with distinguishing only between lower and higher knowledge, i.e., in the realm of concepts, but in doing so he over-simplifies and combines distinct stages in the theory of knowledge.

Modern science has demonstrated at least three distinct stages in the process of cognition (passing from non-knowledge to knowledge), and two stages in the process of deepening knowledge within the conceptual realm. Cognition involves sensation, perception, and the leap to lower conceptual knowledge or empirical knowledge. The process of deepening knowledge begins with empirical knowledge and is transformed into higher-level or theoretical knowledge through the application of dialectical logic and past scientific knowledge. (Scientific knowledge is not a distinct stage but is that part of theoretical knowledge that has been relatively verified.) A simple example will illustrate how knowledge is developed through these stages. Let us take the theory of genetics as developed by the monk Mendel, a gardener who spent years planting peas. Through perception he was able to differentiate the sensations reaching his brain and distinguish a certain number of green peas and a certain number of yellow peas. (Sensation and perception are closely related but are not the same. Sensation is the product of matter impacting our sense organs – in this case light rays hitting our eyes – while perception is the product of the brain’s activity in differentiating these sensations – in this case determining different numbers of different colored peas.) From this perception, Mendel began a complex system of classification which gave him the ability to predict the ratio of green peas to yellow peas based on patterns of re-occurrence. This is the leap to empirical knowledge, which transforms our perceptions into concepts describing the outward appearance of things – in this case the ratio of green peas to yellow peas. But at this stage, we still cannot explain why this phenomenon occurs. To answer this question, Mendel had to utilize dialectical logic and past scientific knowledge in working with the ratios to arrive at the theoretical knowledge of units of inheritance passed from each parent plant. In this way he developed the theory of genetics, which was verified in practice over years of experimentation and conscious mating. As a result, it has come to be regarded as “scientific knowledge.” This scientific theory was further deepened and verified with the development of the microscope and the discovery of chromosomes. Thus, the theory comes back in turn to enrich our perceptions.

With his “perceptual stage of knowledge,” Mao is actually referring to the whole process of cognition, passing from sensation to perception, and to empirical knowledge through the leap of conceptualization. Mao is wrong to combine these stages into one, and to say that at this stage there is no concept formation, although he is right to say that at this stage we only understand the appearance and external relations of things.

All knowledge (as opposed to non-knowledge, i.e., sensation and perception) is a reflection in the mind of the material world through the use of concepts. There can be no knowledge without concepts. It follows that there can be no spontaneous, mechanical relation between the objective world and our knowledge of it, as knowledge calls for the conscious act of conceptualization. Mao leaves the door open for the incorrect assumption that at this “perceptual stage” knowledge is automatic and without bias. Using our example of genetics, we can see that Mendel’s classification system (an accurate description of the external relations of things) did not arise automatically, but only through the struggle to form concepts – in this case ratios – from his perceptions about different numbers of different colored peas.

By citing only a lower and a higher stage of knowledge. Mao merges the distinction between the process of cognition and the process of deepening knowledge within the conceptual realm. As a result. Mao does not clearly draw out the dialectical relationship between empirical knowledge (the classification system) and theoretical knowledge (the theory of genetics), as well as the relation between theoretical knowledge and the material world (where the theory must ultimately be verified). There is no simple, direct relation between matter, perception, empirical knowledge, theoretical knowledge, and verification-in-practice. The true picture, in other words, is more complex than Mao seems to indicate. The path to theoretical knowledge is not a quantitative accumulation or mere “summing up” of perceptions and empirical knowledge from our practice, but rather requires a qualitative leap through the process of dialectical logic and application of past scientific knowledge. Dialectical logic is the science of working with concepts in their movement and interrelationship in order to produce scientific abstractions that, as Lenin says, “reflect nature more deeply, truly, and completely.” (Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 171) By not drawing out these relations, Mao fails to highlight the struggle of the conscious element to master the science of dialectical logic to be able to produce theoretical knowledge that accurately reflects reality. Lenin, on the other hand, draws out these relations in a very comprehensive and penetrating way in his Philosophical Notebooks, where he examines the dialectics of the theory of knowledge, in contrast to his Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, where he is more concerned with developing the materialist aspect of the theory of knowledge. Lenin says, “The reflection of nature in man’s thought must be understood not’ lifelessly’, not ’abstractly’, not devoid of movement, not without contradiction, but in the eternal process of movement, the arising of contradictions and their solutions. . .. The totality of all sides of the phenomena, of reality, and their relations – that is what the truth is composed of. . . . the dialectics of things produces the dialectics of ideas, and not vice versa.” (Lenin, Collected Works Vol. 38, p. 195-196)

Newlin’s Argument

We have gone to some length to explain our clarification of the On Practice guide in order to address the charges of Clay Newlin that we have abandoned materialism for idealism. Let us now examine Newlin’s arguments in more detail. First of all, Newlin argues that we “deny the existence of a perceptual stage of knowledge.” Here, Newlin uses “perceptual stage of knowledge” in a way similar to Mao’s to mean a combination of the stages of sensation, perception, and empirical knowledge. (Mostly, Newlin uses “perceptual knowledge” to mean empirical knowledge. But, he also substitutes it for Lenin’s word sensation in quoting from Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, and he uses it to mean perception when he talks about the “transition from non-knowledge to knowledge.”) By this combination, Newlin falls into the very error which Mao’s over-simplification opens the door to – obscuring the qualitative leap (conceptualization) between perception and empirical knowledge. By including all this within one stage, Newlin implies a direct, simple, automatic connection – rather than a dialectical relation – between the two distinct stages. While we can give Mao the benefit of the doubt as to whether he really understands the dialectical relation but is just doing a poor job of popularizing it, Newlin leaves no doubt that he does not understand the dialectics of the theory of knowledge. His error is highlighted by the fact that there has been significant scientific advancement since Mao’s day that has shed much new light on the stages in the theory of knowledge and their interrelations.

Newlin’s fetish to defend the “role of perception in the theory of knowledge” leads him to falsely claim that the rectificationists have merged animal and human perceptions. Coming valiantly to the defense of the human race, Newlin points out that “whereas animals for the most part accept, and at best rearrange their environment, human beings actively mold and change their surroundings – and this on the basis of socially coordinated and historically developed actions.” We are in general unity with Comrade Newlin on this point. In fact, we would draw it out much further to point out that the key distinction is the uniquely human capacity to reflect back on the world through concepts in the mind, which are capable of accurately analyzing its make-up and laws of motion. It is this conceptual ability, this theoretical capacity to arrive at scientific knowledge of the world, that enables humans alone to consciously change the world. The increased perceptual ability of humans develops in dialectical relationship to human conceptual ability (e.g., the scientific breakthrough of the microscope enriching our perceptions) and thus should not be mechanically compared to animal perception.

Newlin ends up over-emphasizing the differences in perceptual capacities in distinguishing humans from animals and pays too little attention to the principal distinction, namely the uniquely human capacity for thought. The real point is not, as Newlin says, that “human perception is both qualitatively richer and more varied than that of animals,” (although this is certainly true enough), but rather that the reason why humans are able to “actively mold and change their surroundings” stems principally from their conceptual abilities. Any hedging on this point is actually a negative concession to the behavioralists (who, by the way, are mechanical materialists, not idealists), who blur the distinction between humans and animals by downplaying human capacities for thought, consciousness, and judgment. In fact, the MLEP clarification includes a three-page critique of the behavioralists on this very point, which Newlin obviously has not benefited from.

In terms of the technical point Newlin makes that “perception is not simply the passive reception in the mind of data given by the senses,” but “like all forms of consciousness it is conditioned by active engagement with the material world and is both socially and historically determined,” we would agree, but only in part.

Perception is certainly not “passive reception” – it is the activity of the mind in differentiating sensations, which can even involve very simple concept formations (colors, shapes, etc.). Yet, there is a qualitative difference between this type of brain activity and conceptual knowledge itself, a difference which Newlin obscures by combining perception and empirical knowledge into one. Only in the realm of conceptual knowledge can concepts be self-consciously used by man in the practice of changing the world. For example, it was only when Mendel had raised his perceptions of different numbers of different colored peas to a classification system and then a theory of genetics that he was able to undertake conscious mating, the development of hybrids, etc. Similarly, it is only when Marx was able to raise the perceptual experience of working-class oppression to the level of identifying the capitalist system as the root cause of this oppression, and then to reveal the laws of motion of this system through his theory of capital that the working class acquired the scientific knowledge to overthrow this system. Contrary to Newlin’s prejudice, perception alone does not give us the power to self-consciously change the world.

“To belittle the role of perception in either the lower (perceptual) or the higher (theoretical) stage of knowledge is to open the door to idealism.” So says Comrade Newlin. And, as Lenin would have said, “what a pearl” he has given us here! For here, Newlin explicitly states that there is a direct connection between perception and theoretical knowledge. Using our example of genetics, Newlin is saying that our perceptions of different number of different colored peas plays a direct role in formulating the theory of genetics. Or using our example of capitalism, Newlin is saying that perception of working class oppression played a direct role in formulating the theory of capital!

Like all mechanical materialists, Newlin here obscures the qualitative leaps between different stages of this process and substitutes quantitative and mechanical change for dialectical development. In fact, perception has no direct role in producing theoretical knowledge. The role of perception is to furnish the primary material for lower-level concept formation. Theoretical knowledge develops in dialectical relation with empirical knowledge (not perception) i.e., by the use of dialectical logic within the realm of concepts. The previous example of the theory of communism demonstrates our point. As stated in the introduction, communism is a scientific category which is yet to be perceived. The theory of communism is the product of Marx’s theoretical reflections on capitalism, i.e., using dialectical logic and past scientific knowledge in working with concepts to produce a systematic theory. Tying theoretical knowledge directly to perception would negate the reality of any theory not immediately perceived.

The negative ideological implications of this are very serious for our movement. Besides negating the reality of many scientific theories, this error serves to downplay or liquidate altogether the struggle to master the art of working with concepts. It does so by suggesting that a mere accumulation or summation of our direct experiences will in itself produce whatever “theory” we might need. This mechanical materialist orientation sacrifices the struggle for scientific knowledge in favor of theory that corresponds to the “immediately perceived” and the “immediately verifiable.” The logical consequence of this prejudice against theory and the struggle for scientific knowledge is to render such scientific works as Marx’s Capital irrelevant, as it does not arise directly from the immediate perceptions of the working class, it is not immediately verifiable, and it is of litle immediate use in winning influence in the class.

It is not surprising then to find Newlin betraying his basic anti-theoretical, anti-scientific prejudice with his charge that the rectificationists “belittle the role of perception.” What is Newlin really saying here? The MLEP clarification which he criticizes clearly states that “all knowledge is a reflection on matter,” that matter impacts our sense organs giving rise to sensations, and that the brain interacts with and differentiates these sensations to produce perceptions which form the basis for concept formation. It should be quite obvious to any Marxist-Leninist (except perhaps a very subjective one) that MLEP is not here repeating the idealist error of the empirio-criticists who recognized only their sensations as “real” and denied the existence of the entire material world1. Yet, Newlin, supposedly one of the leading Marxist-Leninists in our movement, uses Lenin’s polemic against the empirio-criticists to attack our clarification in a thoroughly unprincipled and obscurantist manner.

In doing so, Newlin betrays his basic anti-theoretical prejudice, namely that perception is more reliable than thought in knowing the world because it is “more concrete.” Theoretical knowledge is held to be less reliable because it is “fundamentally a mental process . . . that can occur totally in the minds of communists without any real connection to living reality ... (in fact) in the mind of one single Marxist-Leninist” (Marx? Lenin?). How does Lenin answer this question as to whether thought or perception is “closer to reality”? In his Conspectus on Hegel’s Science of Logic (which Newlin quotes against us to use the catchy phrase “the ass ears of idealism” but refuses to continue the quotation with the following passage), Lenin says: “Incidentally, in a certain sense, sensuous representation [sensation and perception] is, of course, lower [than thought). The crux lies in the fact that thought must apprehend the whole ’representation’ [of reality] in its movement, but for that thought must be dialectical. Is sensuous representation closer to reality than thought? Both yes and no. Sensuous representation cannot apprehend movement as a whole, it cannot, for example, apprehend movement with a speed of 300,000 km per second [speed of light], but thought does and must apprehend it. Thought, taken from sensuous representation, also reflects reality.” (Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 228) And further, “Thought, proceeding from concrete to abstract, does not get away from truth, but comes closer to it.” (Ibid., p. 171)

The point is there is a dialectical relation that Lenin is pointing out between thought and sensuous representation in the process of knowing the world. Sensuous representation, in order to produce knowledge of the material world all-sidedly and in its movement must be transformed into thought (theoretical knowledge). And thought, in order to reflect reality accurately, must ultimately be based in sensuous representation and verified in the material world. To absolutize either thought or sensuous representation destroys the dialectic and leads to deviations in the theory of knowledge. Absolutizing sensual representation as “more real” than thought leads to mechanical materialism and pragmatism. Absolutizing thought away from sensuous representation leads to idealism. Which aspect is being “absolutized” in the polemic between Newlin and the rectificationists?

Newlin charges that MLEP has “erected a wall between knowledge and the material world” by belittling the role of perception. We have already demonstrated that MLEP has not negated perception, but instead insisted that there is not direct connection between perception and theoretical knowledge. Indeed, it is Newlin himself who has erected just such a wall by absolutizing perception as more real, more “concrete” than thought. Whereas Mao’s over-simplification only leaves the door open to mechanical materialism, Newlin “drives a truck through this door” with his glorification of perception and what amounts to casting suspicion on thought’s ability to accurately reflect reality. This has the effect of undermining the struggle of our whole movement for scientific knowledge, especially when put forward by someone as leading as Comrade Newlin. The effect is especially damaging given the present low level of our trend and the prevailing mechanical materialist and anti-theoretical prejudices, which are deeply rooted in the history of the U.S. communist movement.

Implications for the Rectification vs. Fusion Struggle

Now we come to the basic political differences that flow from the different philosophical outlooks. Newlin charges, “Having reduced party-building to a thought process – and one which needs neither immediate perception nor immediate practice (verification) – the rectificationists soon stumbled upon the contradiction between their party-building line and dialectical materialism. Thus, they had no choice but to ’clarify’ the Marxist theory of knowledge.” Newlin then culminates by sounding a dire “warning to Marxist-Leninists – the leftist road of abandoning fusion terminates in idealism.”

We should really thank Comrade Newlin for providing us with such an excellent opportunity to address the key philosophical differences behind the elusive party building line struggle. Newlin has staked out his philosophical position around defending the role of perception in the theory of knowledge, and has linked this to this political position of defending “the fusion of communists with the advanced elements in the working class as very definitely a process that must go on in the real world,” (i.e., not the “unreal world” of “mental processes” which the rectificationists persist in putting forward as the “decisive arena” for struggle among communists during this period!)

Let us begin by asking how this party building line struggle might be resolved. Ultimately, that line which demonstrates its capacity to realign the communist movement and to organize the vanguard party will be verified as having been relatively correct. But for this type of verification we must wait a few years. In the meantime, it is best to proceed by asking the question of what does it take for communists to change the world? Is the key ingredient the amount of perceptions and experience we have gained by our practice, or perhaps our influence in the working class? Clearly, neither of these is the key ingredient, as easily demonstrated by way of the negative example of the revisionist communist parties in Western Europe. These parties have lots of experience, years of practice, and impressive influence in their working classes, yet the proletarian dictatorship is further away than it has ever been in these countries. (In fact, most of these parties have completely surrendered the theory!) No, if the communists are to change the world they must first of all be armed with scientific knowledge (synthesized into a line) to guide their practice. Lenin draws out the struggle for scientific knowledge thusly: “If what our practice confirms is the sole ultimate and objective truth, then from this must follow the recognition that the only path to this truth is the path of science” (Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 14, p. 143)

Here we have the crucial philosophical difference between the rectification and fusion lines. The fusion line glorifies the immediate gaining of experience and influence within the class and downplays the long-range struggle within the communist movement for scientific knowledge. The rectification line upholds the struggle for scientific knowledge, understanding that this is the most powerful weapon by which the vanguard arms itself in order to change the world. Of course, the two aspects of knowing the world and changing the world are dialectically related and can only be separated abstractly. As you come to know the world you change it, and as you change it you come to know it more deeply.The real question is what emphasis is to be given to each aspect in a given condition, time, and place, i.e., what is principal and what is secondary. The rectificationists answer that the aspect of gaining scientific knowledge (by rectifying the general line of the communist movement) is principal during this pre-party period, as this is what will build the vanguard party. They stress that this is mainly a theoretical struggle that must take place principally within the Marxist-Leninist movement on the part of those equipped with the science of Marxism-Leninism. Once the party is built, the rectificationists say, the other side of the dialectic – that of changing the world – will become principal. On the other hand, the fusionists argue that fusion of communists with advanced workers is always the principal task, including in the pre-party period. In doing so, they warn that we will fall into idealism if theoretical work is carried out by Marxist-Leninists in the absence of advanced workers (i.e., non-Marxist-Leninists). Marxist-Leninist theory, they say, to be real and useful, must be linked to the “immediate perceptions” of the advanced workers and must be “immediately verifiable.” Thus, while the fusionists have come around to agreeing that “theory is principal” during this period, the real disagreement has now become what do we regard as “theory.” Whereas the fusionists’ view of theory is the summation of our immediate experiences in organizing the class which can be immediately verified in our practice, the rectificationists view theory as the synthesis of the entire historical practice of the world proletariat, which while not “immediately verifiable,” is absolutely indispensable in guiding the U.S. proletariat in seizing the state. It is easy to see how such pragmatic prejudices by the fusionists serve to undermine the difficult struggle for real scientific knowledge within the communist movement.

But is this really an accurate charge against the fusionists? One need look no further than Clay Newlin’s article itself to confirm this pragmatist, anti-scientific bent. His “simple practical example” of comparing learning how to make revolution with “making chicken soup” is simply a classic! From Newlin’s own example, it follows that his method of making revolution can be reduced (in his own words) to “choosing the most sensible recipe [line] available and testing it out by actually attempting to make the soup [revolution].” What a wonderful lesson in blind pragmatism!

To prove that we are not unfairly putting words in Comrade Newlin’s mouth and distorting the “logic” of his fusion line, we turn to the very next page (19) of the same issue of The Organizer. Here we find a glowing report of PWOC-member Bruce Bodner’s Boston speech hailing PWOC’s trade union line. “Ideological struggle among communists without fusion is not an adequate basis for developing a revolutionary line,” says Bodner. He argues that “even now the PWOC has a line sufficiently developed to start fusing with the mass movement. The key is to take a conscious approach to propaganda in the economic and political struggles of the working class.” Please note that no one begrudges the PWOC the right to “start fusing” their line with the working class. What we object to is this empirical process then being passed off as “the essence of party-building.” Evidently, if the PWOC line is already “sufficiently developed” to fuse, then the basis for party formation is at hand – it only remains to formalize the vanguard (around the PWOC-led pre-party?). It seems that PWOC’s practice is indeed being guided by its pragmatist philosophy of “taking the most sensible recipe available” and attempting to build the party with it. As to whether this “most sensible line available” actually meets the test of scientific knowledge and will really be able to equip the vanguard to change the world, this remains to be verified. (Ironically, for all of Newlin’s fulminations against idealism, pragmatism itself is essentially an idealist philosophy, as it denies objective reality and objective laws of development – which can only be known through the application of science – in favor of the pat formula “whatever works is real.” This is not to suggest that we think of Comrade Newlin as principally an idealist, but only to demonstrate importance of “revolutionary, practical-critical activity” in transforming the world. Marx took this active side from the idealists (Hegel) in order to save materialism from the passivity of the mechanical materialists, who taught that men are products of circumstances but forgot that “circumstances are changed precisely by men and that the educator must himself be educated” (Marx, Theses on Feuerbach).

To the extent that Clay Newlin fetters the struggle for scientific knowledge with his own combination of mechanical materialist and pragmatist philosophy, he thereby restricts the process of “educating the educators” (i.e., the communists) and arming them with science so they can accomplish their task of changing the world. If we are to change the world, we must grasp the science of Marxism-Leninism and be able to apply this theory to the complex reality of U.S. society. Contrary to pragmatic prejudices, this ability will not develop spontaneously but only as the result of rigorous training and application. It is for the purpose of helping to conduct this training that MLEP is organized. To quote Engels, “[Science] will make this process easier for itself if it does not lose sight of the fact that the results of its experiences are summarized in concepts; but that the art of working with concepts is not inborn and also is not given with ordinary, everyday consciousness, but requires real thought.” (Anti-Duhring, p. 19).