The State of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat in China

During the last two years, the open counterrevolutionary alliance between the People's Republic of China (PRC), under the Deng-Hua leadership, and the United States of North America has shocked revolutionaries around the world. Its development puts a number of questions before the world communist movement. How can a socialist country develop such intense nationalism? Conversely, is a country with such a counterrevolutionary foreign policy really a socialist country? How can a country in which the working class has state power permit a governmental policy that is so profoundly against the interests of the international proletariat? Or again, does such collaboration with imperialism mean that there really is no dictatorship of the proletariat in China?

The confusion is compounded by the intense and often bewildering class struggle in China, where each group that comes to power claims that it alone has always been the true exponent of Mao Zedong Thought and that all the others are agents of "Soviet social imperialism." The situation stands in striking contrast to that of 20 years ago, when it appeared that the Communist Party of China could become a center of Marxism-Leninism in polarity with Khrushchev's revisionism. Though it is clear that this hope has foundered in the seas of nationalism, it is not so clear why.

Adding to the confusion, the Soviets have skillfully exploited the obvious flaws in China's foreign policy to cover up their own abandonment of proletarian internationalism. Resorting to the time honored tactic of "we told you so," they rightly condemn China's treacherous

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invasion of Vietnam and its support of such butchers as the Shah or Mobuto. But time has not erased the memory of Khrushchev’s betrayal of the revolution in the Congo in 1960 nor of Brezhnev’s continued support for the “peaceful road to socialism” which was drowned in blood in Chile. The Soviet analysis of China’s development is as pragmatic and self-serving as its foreign policy.

The PRC’s turn towards the United States didn’t just fall from the sky with the death of Mao Zedong in 1976. Its origins go back to the late 1960’s and the latter phases of the Cultural Revolution. The intense factional struggle of the period weakened the government, and the Party in particular, to the point where a major section of the army, under Lin Biao, became the dominant force. Its growing control over every section of Chinese society severed the Party from its vanguard role and encroached upon the power of the government bureaucracy to administer the economy. The result was what has become a pattern in the politics of the Chinese revolution — those on the outs united against the dominant grouping. The victory against Lin Biao in 1971 signalled the rise of the bureaucracy and the Right, led by Deng Xiaoping and later supported by Hua Guofeng, to the dominant position in the government. This victory also meant a major change in foreign policy — the decision to seek vast amounts of capital and technology from imperialism, led by the financial bloc of Trilateralists.

Evidence of this change became quickly apparent. In 1972, U.S. President Richard Nixon visited China in the midst of the Vietnam War. Though it is well known that the PRC was one of the first states to recognize the fascist Chilean junta in 1973, it is less well known that the Chinese embassy closed its doors to revolutionaries seeking sanctuary in Santiago during the coup. Then in 1974, speaking at the United Nations, Deng first publicly articulated the so-called “Theory of Three Worlds.”

The question of China is providing fuel for those who would challenge the entire historical process of socialism. The foreign policy of a socialist country is the result of complicated internal economic and political problems. Such conditions are not explained by simplistic conclusions. We don’t take up the question as dilettantes; our efforts to clarify the extremely complicated situation in China are intended as a defense of socialism and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The Politics of the Chinese Revolution

Much confusion about China comes from the presumption that Mao’s policy was Party policy, that the Party was a monolithic whole, or that the proletariat has had in the past absolute hegemony in Party politics. In fact, none of these things was ever the case. The politics of the Chinese Revolution have always been characterized by the struggle between factions and cliques, often armed, with separate and distinct power bases. This highly contradictory situation results from the fact that the Chinese Revolution has been seething and developing ever since the first Opium War in 1841. The Communist Party of China (CPC), formed in 1921, was a relative latecomer on a scene where the struggle against imperialism had been going on for 80 years. Whereas the Bolsheviks (CPSU(B)) and the proletariat in Russia led the bourgeois democratic revolution in 1905, the CPC was only one of many groups exercising leadership in the Chinese democratic revolution, at least in its initial stages.

After the PRC was formed in 1949, many of these other forces still played a significant role within both the Party and the government. The cliques today broadly break down into those based in the Party, those in the army, and those in the bureaucracy. However, within each there are strong regional differences and a fairly well-defined Left and Right, with Marxism-Leninists scattered throughout. The back-and-forth struggles so much a part of Chinese politics are marked with temporary coalitions and shifting alliances among the groupings. At the same time, in the struggle for economic policy they tend to fall either into a fairly coherent Right position or a more fragmented Left, made up of forces ranging from Marxist-Leninist to the extreme ultra-Left. Regardless of where individuals stand in this changing galaxy of groupings, Marxism-Leninism recognizes that history is made by class forces, not individuals, and these forces can be fairly clearly discerned in the struggle in China.

The People’s Democratic Dictatorship

Once in power, the CPC at the head of a victorious revolution established the state of the People’s Republic of China. This state took the form of a people’s democratic dictatorship, similar in nature to the people’s democracies of Eastern Europe. China’s revolution was an
anti-imperialist, anti-feudal revolution, essentially a national democratic revolution. It was a bourgeois democratic revolution occurring after the October Revolution in 1917, and thus a part of the worldwide socialist revolutionary process in the era of imperialist wars and proletarian revolutions.

An historical feature of this era is that the bourgeoisie of the colonial countries is no longer capable of leading a revolution against imperialism; nor could the people of China defeat imperialism without defeating their own capitalist class as well. The Chinese Revolution in this democratic phase was the confluence of two great revolutionary streams, separate though interconnected: a great agrarian revolution against feudalism and a revolution against imperialism for national liberation. This confluence created a revolutionary situation which allowed the CPC to seize state power in the name of the proletariat, with the support of both the peasantry and the national bourgeoisie. But the revolution at this stage was not inherently socialist. Only the proletariat participated on the basis of a struggle to seize the means of production, to end exploitation, wage-labor, and private property. The peasantry, though anti-feudal, was interested in securing better conditions for the sale of their commodities and the right to own their own land. The national bourgeoisie, though anti-imperialist, was mainly concerned with preparing the economic and political conditions for the exploitation of “their own” working class.

The People’s Democratic Dictatorship was to be a joint dictatorship of all revolutionary classes—the “people.” This concept was defined in terms of China by Mao Zedong. “Who are the people? At the present stage in China, they are the working class, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. These classes, led by the working class and the Communist Party, unite to form their own state and elect their own government; they enforce their own dictatorship over the running dogs of imperialism—the landlord class and the bureaucrat bourgeoisie, as well as the representatives of those classes—the Kuomintang reactionaries and their accomplices....”

Two things should be noted here. First, the antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie does not disappear by lumping them together as the “people.” One must dominate the other within the state. A people’s democracy is formed not as a successful coalition of equals, but because the proletariat essentially has power and chooses to grant the bourgeoisie a certain franchise in the government. Second, for this reason, such states are an unstable unity of antagonistic forces and thus extremely transitory in character. A rapid transition is inevitable because the proletariat cannot retain its power if it does not quickly push on towards establishing socialist relations of production, towards a genuinely socialist revolution. This transition was to last seven years in China, during which time both the national bourgeoisie and the proletariat, as well as every other force, struggled to consolidate political bases in the country.

The first economic and political task of the People’s Democratic Dictatorship was the completion of the national democratic revolution, not the construction of socialism. Specifically, this meant the political suppression of the landlords, the distribution of their land to the peasantry, and the nationalization of the property of the compradors. The state was also faced with the tremendous task of economic reconstruction in a country battered horribly by 109 years of war.

This was the period characterized by Mao Zedong as “New Democracy.” As the state and the government took form, the political representatives of the national bourgeoisie, the peasantry, and the proletariat were all fighting for position and control. The CPC itself was far from united by a common vision of China’s future. While many elements were intent on establishing socialism, a right wing emerged behind Liu Shaoqi (Liu Shao-ch’i), who held that New Democracy should last indefinitely. As the national bourgeoisie worked to consolidate their positions in the state administration—positions of control in running the state textile industry, planning, banking, etc., opened to them because of their training and experience—the Right began to develop a coherent political position on every major question.

Two factors allowed the forces in the government to retain a common program. The first was that the tasks of the national democratic revolution were not inherently opposed to the interests of either the proletariat, the peasantry, or the national bourgeoisie. Every faction could implement the program to some degree while still building its own political base and establishing positions in the Party and the cen-
entral apparatus. Secondly, the Korean War began only eight months after the PRC was formed. With its outspoken menace of nuclear attack on China, the war provided a common external enemy in the face of which it was necessary to submerge many differences.

The contradictory system of the People’s Democratic Dictatorship is summed up by the 1954 Constitution of the PRC. A constitution is not a program of intentions which describes future goals and the means to achieve them; it is a document which describes the existing economic base and the legal structure erected upon it. A constitution is the fundamental law of a government and as such describes the relation of the state to the relations of production it must defend.

Article 4: The People’s Republic of China, by relying on the organs of the state and the socialist forces, and through socialist industrialization and socialist transformation, insures the gradual abolition of systems of exploitation and the building of a socialist society.

Article 5: At present, the main categories of ownership of means of production in the People’s Republic of China are the following: state ownership, that is, ownership by the whole people; cooperative ownership, that is, collective ownership by the masses of working people; ownership by individual working people; and capitalist ownership.

Article 10: The state protects, according to law, the right of capitalists to own means of production and other capital.

The policy of the state towards capitalist industry and commerce is to use, restrict, and transform them. Through control exercised by organs of state administration, leadership by the state sector of the economy, and supervision by the masses of workers, the state makes use of the positive aspects of capitalist industry and commerce which are beneficial to national welfare and people’s livelihood, restricts their negative aspects which are detrimental to national welfare and the people’s livelihood, and encourages and guides their transformation into various forms of state capitalist ownership by the whole people.

The state prohibits capitalists from engaging in any unlawful activities which injure the public interest, disturb the social economic order, or undermine the economic plan of the state.”

China’s economy in 1954 was much like that of the Soviet Union in the early 1920’s. An avowedly socialist state ruled a country with five distinct forms of economy—patriarchal, small peasant, capitalist, state-capitalist (the last two concentrated in light industry), and socialist. An important difference was that the capitalists in China had a fran-

chise—they could participate in the political process. However, scientific socialism has always recognized that their exclusion is a tactical question, not a matter of principle. The period of economic reconstruction was drawing to a close, and the convulsive struggle to collectivize the land lay ahead. This critical economic endeavor would be complicated and affected by the political struggle and the factional struggles for power. It would be 19 more years before the socialist relations of production in agriculture were consolidated sufficiently to be reflected in a new constitution.

The Struggle in Agriculture

Throughout the entire period of socialism, the central problem is that of agriculture. The task of effacing class differences is primarily one of eliminating the differences between the proletariat and the peasantry. The relationship between these two classes determines the basic economic task of socialism—the creation of a qualitatively higher organization of labor. In China, eliminating these differences is not easy, because while capitalism prepared the prerequisites for the socialization of industry, it did not do so for agriculture. Agriculture in China in 1954 was based on small-scale individual production with primitive technique.

The only successful way to eliminate these differences is the one championed by Lenin and Stalin—the mechanization of agriculture.

The transformation of the small farmer, the remoulding of his mentality and habits is the work of generations. Only a material base, technique, the employment of tractors and machinery in agriculture on a mass scale, electrification on a mass scale, can solve the problem of the small farmer, make his whole mentality sound, so to speak.

The mechanization of agriculture is achieved by organizing agricultural production on a large-scale basis, which allows it to become capable of expanded reproduction. Peasants cannot be taken off the land to work in factories unless there is enough agricultural production to feed them. Key to this process is not just an increase in agricultural production, but a steady increase in agricultural productivity. When one agricultural worker can produce enough for two, then the other is free to leave agriculture.
The experience of the Soviet Union proves that it is entirely possible for a socialist country to build a modern economy by accumulating, through its own efforts, enough capital to develop industry. This was accomplished by establishing economic relations through trade with the peasantry, which permitted the state to drain capital out of the countryside for investment in industry. By raising the prices charged to the peasantry for goods from the state industrial sector and lowering prices paid to them for agricultural produce, the state imposed "an additional tax levied on the peasantry...something in the nature of a tribute, of a super tax, which we are compelled to levy for the time being in order to preserve and accelerate our present rate of industrial growth."

The economic tasks of socialist construction are profoundly political in nature. The construction of industry and the mechanization of agriculture involve a whole series of policies which represent the partisan interests of the proletariat, irrespective of the demands of any other section of society. The tendency of the peasantry is to maintain small individual parcels of land. This leads to their growing stratification, once land reform is carried out, as those peasants favored with better land or weather conditions become richer, while the majority achieve at best a narrow self-sufficiency. The collectivization of the land is a result of the political leadership of the proletariat, which uses every political and economic means at its disposal both to lead and politically compel the peasantry to collectivize. This is the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The term "dictatorship" has a precise scientific meaning: "The scientific concept of dictatorship means nothing more than completely unrestricted power, absolutely unimpeded by laws or regulations and residing directly in the use of force."

The term is used in two different ways. On the one hand it refers to the dictatorship of an entire class, exercised by millions of people and expressed through the state apparatus. This includes a coercive aspect of suppression of the bourgeoisie and enemies of that state, and a positive aspect, including the political and organizational steps for the construction of socialism. On the other hand the term refers to the organized structure of the government, the administrative apparatus which determines policy within the limits defined by the state. The link between the class and the state on one pole and the governmental apparatus on the other is consecrated in the form of political line, based on scientifically determined economic policies, which advances the interests of the proletariat and leads to its hegemony in the state apparatus.

The dictatorship of the proletariat throughout the entire historical period of socialism is the sharpest form of class struggle. The process of collectivization in the Soviet Union from 1929 to 1932 is a clear example. The land was collectivized, and agriculture was put on a large-scale basis, precisely through the most intense struggle against the kulak elements in the countryside, the rich peasants who were the last bastion of capitalism. Collectivization was achieved through the direct leadership of the industrial proletariat, millions of whom went to the countryside and participated directly in the struggle. At the same time, the proletariat exercised its dictatorship through the state to compel the peasants to take up collectivization. They accomplished this by providing millions of large agricultural machines to the countryside and then dictating the policy for their use. Either the peasants could enter the collective farms and use these machines at a nominal rate—the guarantee of superior harvests and a better life—or they could stay out, in which case those with any excess produce would be taxed at extremely high rates. For the poor and middle peasants, the advantages of collectivization were clear, while, at first, the kulaks were not allowed to join. Thus collectivization served to strengthen the alliance between the proletariat and the peasants and consolidated the dictatorship of the proletariat. This alliance was not achieved by presenting the peasantry with an alternative that they were free to accept or reject. The further development of socialism dictated that the land had to be collectivized, and the proletariat dictated a political policy which reflected its own interests, and by extension the interests of the working people as a whole.

New Economic Conditions, New Class Relations
Between 1955 and early 1957, China transformed her economic base, establishing socialist relations of production throughout both industry and agriculture. Within about two years, almost the entire peasantry collectivized their land into higher-level Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives (APCs), in which the land was owned collectively and
produce was distributed on the basis of labor-time. These approximated the agricultural artels that had been the basis of the collective farms in the Soviet Union. The process of organizing the APCs was carried out quite smoothly as compared with the experience of the Soviet Union, if only because the kulaks were nowhere nearly as significant an economic or political force in China’s agriculture.

In industry, the state increased its restriction and control of the national bourgeoisie until, in 1956, the joint state-private enterprises were put on a unified organizational basis by industry. Thus they became genuine socialist enterprises. The final step was taken when the state bought out the capitalists with a yearly payment of five per cent, based on a fraction of their previous holdings.*

The establishment of socialist relations of production in agriculture and industry changed the class relationships in China. The political reflection of this was that the old unity of the People’s Democratic Dictatorship was shattered. Though their economic base was abolished, the national bourgeoisie were far from politically defeated. Coalescing with elements of the petty bourgeoisie such as rich peasants, ex-bureaucrats and military officers, they formed a right wing within the Party and the government and began to counterattack. They found ready allies in the Soviet Union.

After his rise to power, Khrushchev made it clear that the vast program of industrial aid to China which began under Stalin would be tied to support of his—Khrushchev’s—policy of “peace at any price.” Dazzled by the prospect of economic self-sufficiency by 1965, the Chinese Right militantly opposed the policy of struggling against modern revisionism, whether in Yugoslavia or in the Kremlin. Emboldened by the wave of decollectivization in Eastern Europe and inspired by the counterrevolution in Hungary, it launched a series of political struggles which are still being fought today. These struggles took many forms, ranging from questions of educational policy to music, but the real issue was one of economic development, principally the question of agriculture.

* Under capitalism, the term “capital” implies a definite social relation—the appropriation of surplus value from the proletariat, which owns no means of production. Under socialism, “capital” refers to the surplus product which accrues to the state as a result of production and trade. The form is the same while the content is different. Hence, socialist planners use terms like “capital,” “profit,” “interest,” etc. for their conceptual value, not because labor is exploited.
struggle during the "100 Flowers Movement" and the Great Leap Forward of the late 1950's. The state itself had to change in order to develop further relations of production. It required a new set of economic policies to enable it to lead this development, and this, in turn, required a further development and consolidation of the functions of the dictatorship of the proletariat. For example, will the state organs which regulate trade with the peasantry cooperate in a program which not only trades with the peasantry but also restricts the activities of the kulaks? The struggle to transform the government and the superstructure to lead the socialist base has been the objective task which underlies the complex struggles of the last 25 years. These political struggles, and the factional struggles within them, turn on the relation between the proletariat and the peasantry. The faction that historically has become dominant has been the one swinging over the support of decisive sections of the peasantry. The conditions under which this may be done is determined by the relationship between the peasantry and the proletariat.

The cornerstone of the dictatorship of the proletariat is the special form of alliance between these two classes against capital. The dictatorship of the proletariat can mean nothing else in a country in which the proletariat is the minority and the petty bourgeoisie—the peasantry—the majority. This relation is not frozen or immobile; it means specific agreements under specific conditions which change as economic and political conditions change. And not just any kind of agreement:

Naturally, in view of the fact that the peasantry preponderates enormously among the population, the principal task of our policy is to establish definite relations between the working class and the peasantry. Agreement between the working class and the peasantry may be taken to mean anything. We assume that, from the working class standpoint, an agreement is possible in principle, permissible and correct, only if it supports the dictatorship of the working class....

In other words, the agreement is the best that can be forged if it minimizes political contradictions with the peasantry, contradictions which otherwise would impede or restrict the leadership and power of the proletariat.

In China, the task of consolidating the socialist relations of production in agriculture, and the parallel struggle to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat, meant an intensification of the struggle to win over the peasantry from the policies of the Right. The party and the state became the battleground in a complicated struggle both to set policy and then implement it once established. The new economic conditions required new forms of the bond between the proletariat and the peasantry. This bond could only be stable if it guaranteed the leading role of the proletariat, was directed against the policies of the Right, and facilitated the abolition of classes. After ten years of struggle which lasted well into the Cultural Revolution, the bond between the proletariat and the peasantry became stabilized, although not entirely in favor of the proletariat.

Collectivization and Compromises

In the Soviet Union, during the collectivization period, the tractor symbolized the new form of the bond between the proletariat and the peasantry. It represented industrial aid to agriculture, the means for evening the differences between the two classes, and the guarantee of a rapidly expanding economy based on trade between the two sectors. In China, however, the proletariat had no such means to win over the peasantry. The intense political struggle required the strategic step of collectivizing the land before the country was industrialized. The relatively greater industrial base in the Soviet Union before collectivization resulted in a steady stream of tractors to support the class struggle in the countryside once collectivization was underway. In China the proletariat lacked the material means to guarantee a closer alliance with the peasantry; this served to magnify the importance of the political struggle. Furthermore, in the Soviet Union an essential condition for the success of collectivization was the political defeat of both the phony Left behind Trotsky and the Right behind Bukharin before the process was really begun. A purge of these forces was necessary because a state and a party confounded by such sharp political antagonisms cannot achieve the unity necessary to lead the socialist revolution. In China...
however the undefeated Right, united behind Liu Shaoqi, maintained what was essentially Bukharin’s line toward the peasantry during the process of collectivization, and has fought to implement it ever since. Summed up as the “theory of productive forces,” this position held that the land could not be collectivized until the productive forces existed to take advantage of it, i.e., essentially until the country was industrialized. This dovetailed quite nicely with the Right’s position of unlimited New Democracy. There being no prospects for rapid industrialization under any conditions, this would have meant postponing collectivization indefinitely. Instead the Right proposed, as Bukharin had in the 1920’s, that the state normalize agricultural markets and encourage individual family production in order to allow the peasants to enrich themselves.

There were two main reasons why elements of the CPC chose to collectivize the land before industry could really mechanize agriculture. First, relative to the poorly educated proletariat, the highly trained national bourgeoisie played a greater role in administering China’s economy than would seem to be justified by their economic importance alone. Their political representatives within the CPC spent the early period of reconstruction establishing nationwide factional machines and digging into the state apparatus. Therefore, although it was not economically feasible to mechanize agriculture, the forces led by Mao Zedong forced through collectivization of the land to outflank the growing dominance of the Right in the central apparatus by establishing socialist relations throughout the economy. Secondly, it was obvious even by 1955 that scattered individual production in agriculture was already beginning to impede industrial expansion. It was hoped that collectivization would lead to an increase in productivity through the pooling of labor.

In short, the situation in China in 1957 was extremely difficult. Socialist relations—though established—had to be consolidated in agriculture. This required that the state take a leading role, yet the Right was a significant force in the government and was beginning to counterattack. At the same time, the proletariat could not build the farm machines to compel economically the peasantry to carry out the organizational and administrative tasks necessary to advance collectivization. The resulting factional struggle definitely restricted and impeded the broad exercise by the proletariat of its dictatorship. In a period where the greatest unity was required, it was more often the case that each grouping implemented its own policies simultaneously, or quickly countermanded those of the other. The result was a number of compromises with the peasantry around questions of ownership which affected the process of collectivization. The low level of productive relations in the countryside in turn hindered the dominance of the proletariat in the state apparatus, where things were not at all resolved.

The process of collectivization, though it may involve compulsion, is not and cannot be the expropriation of the peasants by the state. The participation of the poor and middle peasants must be voluntary if it is to succeed. Lacking tractors, the CPC took a number of steps to attract the peasants to the APCs, the implementation of which, oscillating from liberalism to conservatism, reflected the see-saw battle for power which was going on. In the Soviet Union, the state applied great pressure to force the peasantry to give up their principal means of production without compensation to the collective farm as they entered. In China, on the other hand, the state struggled to establish terms for compensation, mainly benefiting, significantly enough, the more well-to-do peasants, when they turned in their draft animals, fruit trees, and fish ponds. In many APCs it was not even compulsory for the peasants to divest themselves of these resources until the Great Leap Forward in 1958. One result of such policies was that in many cases the richer cooperatives which were to be amalgamated fought to retain their resources after the APCs were formally established. In order further to sweeten the pie, the state manipulated agricultural prices and taxes to allow the peasants to retain and market themselves a significant share of their produce, including production from their private plots, which they were permitted to sell to the collective at prevailing market rates. In essence, the state centralized relatively fewer resources from the APCs than had the Soviets in order to guarantee the success of collectivization. This meant a trade off yielding fewer resources for industry and less food for the cities.

For a number of reasons, during the revolution the PRC did not nationalize the land in the name of the proletariat and the state and then allow the peasantry to use it in perpetuity, as was done in the Soviet
Union. This was to have an important effect on the process of collectivization, leading to property relations which allowed the peasantry a certain amount of independence from the proletariat. The APCs were and are collective property, a form of socialist property. However, each APC owns its own means of production in common, including the land.

The momentum of collectivization of the 1955-57 period carried through into the Great Leap Forward, which was designed to achieve leaps in both agricultural and industrial production simultaneously. The land was collectivized into communes on a vastly greater scale than previously through the combining of many APCs. However, a strong Left influence led to broad elimination of the peasants' private plots, the appropriation of their animals, and distribution on a completely egalitarian basis. These extreme measures provoked a reaction from the peasantry which the Right seized and attempted to turn into a movement for decollectivization. The Left errors, coupled with natural disasters and the treacherous withdrawal of all Soviet engineers and technicians by Khrushchev, gave the Right the opportunity they needed to brand the whole motion of collectivization as excessive. (This position has just been rearticulated by the Deng faction in their own summation of the history of China since 1949.) By criticizing the Great Leap, the Right rode to a position of dominance lasting until the Cultural Revolution, which openly broke out in 1966. The Right implemented a series of policies which led to decollectivization. As a result, in some areas more than half of agricultural production was carried out on an individual family basis in the early 1960's.

The basic level of ownership was reduced from the commune, organized on a countrywide basis, to the production brigade, analogous to the APC and organized on a township basis, and then to the production team, organized on a village basis. The struggle for collectivization surged back and forth until finally, during the Cultural Revolution, the basic level of ownership was firmly established at the team level. The three-level system of collective ownership as finally institutionalized is defined in the 1975 Constitution as:

*Article 7:* The rural people's commune sector of the economy is a socialist sector collectively owned by the masses of working people. At present, it generally takes the form of the three-level ownership, that is, ownership by the commune, the production brigade and the production team, with the team as the basic accounting unit. A production brigade may become the basic accounting unit when its conditions are ripe.

**The Great Leap Forward**

Corresponding to the socialist relations of production in agriculture, the communes represented a move toward shifting the power of government out of the central apparatus. In 1957, a program of decentralization was implemented which transferred much of the power to administer economic planning (although with only limited authority to determine it) from the center to the regional and local governments. Since 1949, the only governmental centers in the countryside had been the county governments, which functioned as simple administrative outposts of the central government with authority to do little more than collect taxes. The decentralizing measures invested the local county governments with a good deal of responsibility to coordinate planning and to guarantee that economic goals were fulfilled.

Concurrently, the vast irrigation projects and other agricultural programs undertaken by the communes during the Great Leap required the coordination of the agricultural resources of each commune from its center at the county seat. Instead of being appointed from above, the commune governments were elected by the members. As local governments began to function as organs of the state, a further step was taken to set up the people's militias; this had the effect of shifting political power in the army from the professional officer staff. The result of these moves is that the commune governments began to play a role similar to that of the soviets of the Soviet Union, local bodies without which the dictatorship of the proletariat could not function in either its

*Although such moves were certainly affected by Khrushchev's decentralization, or "de-Stalinization," during the same period, there were two major differences. Khrushchev attempted to break the political power of the Molotov grouping which was based in the central apparatus; thus he fought to transfer the authority to make plans into the regional apparatuses of the republics. In China, decentralization represented a shift of responsibility for implementing decisions to the regions, while leaving the authority for planning in the center where the imperatives of a national economy dictated it should be.
political or economic aspects. The communes have retained this function to this day, despite the fact that the basic level of ownership has been shifted to the team.14

China’s agriculture, which due to the mountainous terrain of the country is forced to feed a population three or four times as large as that of the United States on only 70 per cent of the land, absolutely demands intensive development.15 In many areas, farming is almost like gardening, relying on the intense use of labor with a very low technical level. It was central to the strategy of the Great Leap to use the abundance of labor in the countryside to create rural industries on the same labor-intensive, low technical basis. This was the idea behind the big push of the period to produce steel from backyard furnaces. Historically, the solution in China to the problem of supplying agriculture with industrial products has been “to walk on two legs.” Technical and capital inputs from the state sector are combined with measures that allow small rural industries to develop in the countryside. These small factories are oriented towards supplying local agricultural enterprises with tools like shovels, hoes, lanterns, and wheel barrows, and the production of simple agricultural equipment, like fertilizer, cement, small motors, and pumps. Today a significant number of industrial enterprises are owned collectively by the communes, brigades and teams, which exercise a number of privileges of ownership.

To allow rural industries to develop, the state built upon the compromise reached with the peasantry during the process of collectivization. Since the peasantry was allowed to keep a fair amount of their produce, the state attempted to convert this into investment for rural industries. Capital was allowed to pool in the countryside so that the communes, brigades and teams could reinvest and expand their production of industrial goods. Although such measures had certain positive economic effects (they minimized state investment in roads, for example, since a highly developed distributive system was not necessary), they also allowed the peasantry a measure of independence from the urban-based proletariat and strengthened its proprietary tendencies. This has had a big effect on the political struggle against the Right raging since the Great Leap. The proletariat could neither compel nor persuade the peasantry to enter into the relation which would decisively strengthen the former’s hand. Lacking this strength, the proletarian forces have not succeeded in purging the Right from the state apparatus and eliminating its influence. This has hindered the ability of the state in consolidating socialist relations of production. A corollary result has been that the resources left in the countryside—a significant amount of investment—represent resources that were not centralized for the development of state industry, an important factor hindering its development.

The economic and political conditions described so far have determined the objective circumstances which allowed for the rise of the Deng-Hua grouping. As we shall see, the same circumstances also condemn their program of the “Four Modernizations” to be a labor of Sisyphus rather than of Hercules. But first a couple of basic questions must be answered.

Is China a Socialist Country?

While China’s economy is relatively undeveloped as socialist countries go, it is still one of the world’s healthier economies, with an industry that has grown at a steady rate of about 11 per cent per year since 1952. This growth has persisted despite the intense political struggles, the flip-flops of policy and the implementation and countermanding of contradictory political lines. These struggles have had their economic effects. For one thing, China has never really had a five-year plan; planning is organized primarily on a yearly basis. In fact, it has not had a five year period of internal political stability since 1957. China’s industrial growth, however, has been relatively consistent, and this reveals something about the nature of the political struggles. Despite fireworks, the debates on economic questions, though important, are more debates of shades of difference, rather than of whether or not to establish capitalism. Whether the problems of the Cultural Revolution were due to the wrecking activities of the Gang of Four or the policies of Liu Shaoqi’s capitalist road (assuming one of these analyses is correct), industrial growth, though somewhat affected, quickly recovered.

In fact, China’s economy is strikingly similar to that of the Soviet Union, although there are important differences which reflect quantity more than quality.16 Industry is the predominant force in the economy in both countries. In 1974, industry’s share of the gross national product in China was estimated to be 328.3 billion Yuan, while that of agriculture was estimated at 81.1 billion Yuan.17 Most prices and
resources in China are strictly allocated and controlled. No one can use the market to accumulate capital. Although the market affects certain prices, as it does in all socialist countries, it is tightly restricted and not the regulator of the economy.

While a fairly large portion of industrial production stems from the small rural industries under collective ownership, the great bulk comes from the state sector (see below). Furthermore, unlike the “economic miracles” of South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, industrial production in China is weighted towards the production of the means of production rather than consumer goods. Thus China is guaranteed an independent and autonomous economic base (as distinct from the neocolonialist economies of the above three countries, which function as dependent, component parts of the world imperialist system) which objectively places the country within the socialist camp. In 1974 222.7 billion Yuan of production were generated as means of production and only 141.5 billion Yuan as consumer goods. The growth rate of heavy industry has always been greater than that of light industry.

As in any socialist country, the state in China centralizes and controls the important levers of the economy with a monopoly of foreign trade and transportation, the banks, money, and credit. Although planning certainly is not as taut as in the Soviet Union, it functions as the regulator of the economy. Most industrial transactions involve no money; rather, products are exchanged and enterprise accounts are either credited or debited. There is no exploitation of labor by means of a wages system. Workers are paid on the basis of work points that accurately reflect the amount of labor time they put in. Farm production is based on collective property. Land can be neither bought nor sold. The accumulation and distribution of agricultural commodities is controlled by the ingenious four-level pricing system developed by the Soviets. There can be no accumulation of surplus value through the sale of agricultural goods.

Socialism is an entire historical period—the lower stage of communism—and thus has a number of transitional forms, which, though transitional, are nevertheless socialist in nature. Socialist property includes forms of collective property, which is not qualitatively different from public property. Under communism all property will be either public or personal—individual means of consumption, gardens, etc.

Under socialism, there is still some inequality of distribution which is regulated by the principle “from each according to his ability, to each according to his work.” Lastly, there is still commodity exchange under socialism on the basis of the law of value. In fact, the peasantry refuse to alienate their products in any other form. These are all transitional characteristics which operate in different ways in different socialist countries, but they do not negate socialism as an economic system which functions on the basis of objective economic laws.

Is There a Dictatorship of the Proletariat?

A socialist economy can no more exist without a system of the dictatorship of the proletariat to protect it than a capitalist economy can exist without a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Excepting the forms of natural economy, an economy which does not have a market as its regulator must take up the tasks of planning and coordination, and these demand the active participation of millions and millions of people. Aside from the necessity of suppressing the bourgeoisie, the essential tasks of planning and counterplanning, running individual enterprises and entire branches of industries, supplying agriculture, accumulating funds, and restricting the exchange of commodities, all require the direct exercise of political power by the workers and peasants. Who will run the factories if not the working class? A technical elite or bureaucracy may very well develop from the administration of the economy of a country, but they cannot avoid the contradiction that they must grant the working class organized in a state power the authority to run the factories if they are to guarantee the source of their own power. The sheer size of the economic tasks requires such a division of labor. For this reason, although trade unions were abolished during the Cultural Revolution, one of the first acts of the Right in the early 1970’s was to reestablish them. As Stalin points out, the daily work of the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be accomplished without the mechanism of a system of levers and transmission belts comprised of functioning mass organizations.

The dictatorship of the proletariat in China certainly functions as a state form—the organization of a repressive apparatus which protects and defends the relations of production and which represents the guarantee that the governmental administration will carry out policy
that does not negate those relations. This is most definitely a dictatorship of the proletarian class. However, as we have seen, the political struggle has definitely impeded and restricted the exercise of the power of the proletariat. The flip-flops of the factional struggle alone have served to confound the systematic implementation and development of a policy which is to the maximum political advantage of the proletariat. The role of the government is to make such policy and to organize the dictatorship of the proletariat so as to serve as an instrument for building socialism. However, the state and the government are not the same thing.

When the capitalist class has state power, its dictatorship is absolute, although the governmental form it chooses is relative. Further, though the governmental form may remain the same, individual governments come and go. Bourgeois democracy and fascism are both state forms of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, even though they represent two different forms of organization of the repressive apparatus of the state. Similarly, the Carter administration is a different government than that of Lincoln or Roosevelt, though the three are bourgeois democracies. They operate under different political conditions, at different times, and face different economic and political contradictions. While the repressive apparatus protects the relations of production, the task of government is to determine the correct policy which will allow the economy to develop. The ability of the proletariat to exercise unrestricted power depends on whether the political line and policies of the government conform to objective reality. If they do not, then contradictions are bound to develop which undermine the functioning of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

These distinctions between state and government explain the contradiction between the steady growth of the economy in China and the steady succession of dominant governmental groupings, each with its own cataclysmic denunciations of the others. Is the struggle between the Deng-Hua group and the Gang of Four that much more acrimonious than the row surrounding Watergate? This reveals the limitations of the “tail wags the dog” school of superficial Marxism: “The Gang of Four said Deng was a capitalist. Deng took power. Therefore the capitalists are in power (which, by the way, says nothing about the economy). Therefore China is a capitalist country.”

So the proletariat hasn’t yet found the political lever to consolidate the peasantry, who are diverting resources from industry and hindering rational economic development; the government is more interested in pandering to imperialism than in the victory of proletarian rule in all countries; its economic policy is based on a number of subjective projections—does this mean there is no dictatorship of the proletariat in China?

Does it mean that there has automatically sprung up a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie? This question is in the same category as those concerning the economy of socialism, e.g., what if the economy is not developed and organized correctly? Does it become a capitalist country? In the case of the economy, the objective relations of production exist despite any subjective failings of the Party or the government’s leadership. Where objective laws are ignored, the economy is disrupted, thrown out of balance, disproportions develop, and dislocations occur, but the economy does not revert back to capitalism. Likewise, the dictatorship of the proletariat may become flabby and distorted or infirm. The government may lack the ability to compel the political solution which works in the best interests of the proletariat, and thus not be a dictatorship in the definitive sense. But this does not mean that the workers and peasants will not exercise their dictatorship to defend the socialist relations of production. In short, the dictatorship of the proletariat develops like anything else in life, through leaps forward and backsliding, one step forward and two steps back, through polarization and by zigzags.

Therefore the dictatorship of the proletariat, the transition from capitalism to communism, must not be regarded as a fleeting period of “super-revolutionary” acts and decrees, but as an entire historical era, replete with civil wars and external conflicts, with persistent organizational work and economic construction, with advances and retreats, victories and defeats.

**The Present Situation**

Two important factors have conditioned the present politics of the Chinese revolution. The political struggle to enable the government subjectively to reflect the objective relations of production, in particular the factional form of this struggle, which developed and continues within the state and the Party out of the initial unity of the People’s Democratic Dictatorship, impeded the functioning of the state
as an instrument to consolidate the rule of the proletariat. This affected the process of collectivization. In turn, limitations in the collectivization process hindered the ability of the proletariat to consolidate its hegemony in the state by means of a political defeat of the Right. These factors, combined with China's fundamental economic requirements for increased agricultural productivity and its tremendous shortage of capital, established the objective conditions within which the Deng-Hua government operates.

As a result of the struggle against the Gang of Four, Deng and Hua have made more contradictory promises than Jimmy Carter. Political support for their grouping hinges on their ability to pay off. However, their program of the Four Modernizations (of agriculture, industry, science, and the military) is based on the untenable projection that agriculture will grow at a rate of four per cent for at least seven years. No country in the world has ever experienced such a period of extended growth, least of all one with the absolute demand for intensive agricultural growth that China has. In fact, there are hints of a serious decline in agricultural production during the first three years of Deng and Hua's rule. It is hard to see how the leap in agriculture that China objectively requires can come from the present forms of agricultural organization. The low level of socialist relations of production—the three-level system of ownership—is becoming a block to the development of the means of production. The present leadership has already committed itself to supporting agriculture on its present basis with even lower taxes and higher agricultural prices. To attempt to change the three-level system of ownership would unleash forces which would destroy the coalition that put Deng and Hua into power.

Unwilling to take the steps necessary to generate sufficient capital from agriculture, Deng and Hua have turned to the only other alternative, seeking investment capital from imperialism. This is what principally lies behind their counterrevolutionary foreign policy. Deng and Hua are quite willing to sabotage revolutions in exchange for new plants and equipment. However, there are two factors which undercut this route as a viable alternative.

The first is that the United States will increasingly up the ante, demanding more and more acts of treachery in return for technology. This already threatens to upset the delicate political balance. After China's 1979 invasion of Vietnam, the Chinese government had to cut back substantially on the amount of capital it had intended to invest in the economy. The military demanded that the material lost be replaced. Even more foreboding, the rapid growth projected by Deng and Hua is predicated on a very slow growth of the military in order to maximize the capital available for other sectors.

The second factor is that imperialism cannot really penetrate China's economy. The talk in the capitalist press in 1978 of the glorious one billion person market has not been borne out. The Carter administration has had to caution the capitalists who were dreaming of selling a billion more toothbrushes and two billion more shoes that these projections were long-term at best. Coca-Cola is only served to foreign guests in the major cities, despite all the publicity. Capitalist companies have found that the Chinese economy is no more responsive to their dealings than is the Soviet, simply because neither is organized to allow for maximum profit through production and distribution of commodities. The PRC is just as serious as the Soviets about avoiding indebtedness. It has already cancelled out on one of its first big loans from Japan.

Imperialism also finds itself confronted with problems similar to those it has found in Saudi Arabia and other major undeveloped countries. The lack of an infrastructure (railroads, highways, electrical and communications facilities), and of a profit-oriented marketing apparatus, makes all kinds of investment unfeasible. For example, a company may be willing to sell a copper smelting plant, and the PRC may want to buy it, but it cannot be put into production if there is no electrical production near the plant site and if there is no way to get the workers to and from the factory.

Though there has been talk of the capitalist countries financing entire factories, the PRC wants to pay off this investment by giving them a share of the finished products of the plants after they are built. (This has been standard practice in Eastern Europe for years). There has been very little progress on this front, even though talk has reached the level of discussing the feasibility of foreign capitalists actually owning such plants. The flexibility of a socialist system cannot be underestimated (or voluntaristically overestimated) in this respect. But concessions do not in principle transform a socialist economy into a capitalist one.
We must not stint hundreds of millions or even billions of our boundless wealth, our raw materials, in order to obtain the assistance of big, advanced capitalism. We shall make up for it many times over later on; without the assistance of capital it will be impossible for us to retain proletarian power in an incredibly ruined country in which the peasantry, also ruined, constitutes the overwhelming majority—and of course this assistance capital will squeeze hundreds of per cent out of us.23

Is this an insidious plan for capitalist restoration? Lenin didn’t think so when he proposed it to the CPSU(B) in 1921. All the excitement over Chinese concessions is reminiscent of the same initial bourgeois hullabaloo over Soviet concessions in the 1920’s, concessions which hardly materialized at all because the foreign capitalists could not extract maximum profits from them.

Deng and Hua are having difficulties obtaining their capital from imperialism, yet for them this is an easier path than attempting to accumulate from agriculture the capital China’s economy requires. For one thing, the rural small industry strategy has reached the crossroads. The low quality output and high energy and labor costs of the majority of such factories do not make them suitable to shoulder the advanced tasks of modernization. However, centralized large-scale production would have a hard time replacing their production without a much more developed infrastructure, a major investment in itself. Although there is a lot of room for rationalization, the rural industry program represents at present an inefficient long-term use of investment. This dilemma is aggravated by the property relations in the countryside. The decision to allow the communes, brigades, and teams to accumulate capital was fundamental to the rural small industry strategy. However, it set up a resistance to the fundamental dynamic of socialist economy—the demand for increased efficiency and planning on a broad scale. The struggle was resolved in favor of the production units and has become institutionalized in the three-level system of ownership. Thus the state has been forced to permit a number of legal guarantees of rural autonomy and property rights.

It is not allowed to appropriate without compensation the manpower, material resources and funds of the collectives. The right of a production team to handle its own means of production and products must be respected . . . . The three-level system of ownership, with the production teams as the basic accounting units, applies in most rural people’s communes. This is determined by the level of development of the rural productive forces and is in conformity with the level of peasants’ consciousness. Production teams not only have the right of ownership of their labor power, land, domestic animals, machines, funds, products and materials, but they also have the right to grow what they think fit according to the different seasons of the year and local conditions. They also have the right to decide on measures to be taken for improving production and how to run their farms, distribute their own products and ready cash and ignore arbitrary orders from leading organs or leaders.24

This does not mean that there is absolute autonomy—a recalcitrant team may find itself shorted in fertilizer, for example, by the commune—but it hinders the ability of the state to plan or to compel the peasants to support economic plans which are not in their direct immediate interest. The relations between government and production teams are determined by the three principles of voluntarism, mutual benefit, and exchange at equal value.25 This has led to a system of loose planning where higher bodies can only require fulfillment of economic quotas, leaving the decision of how the surplus product should be invested to the production team. One result is the development of wide disparities in income in the countryside.

These forms of ownership have led to a waste of capital and resources. The inherent inefficiency of small industries, combining high labor intensity with low technology, has produced poor quality products which do not last. Agricultural machines are often not standardized. Replacement parts vary in specifications from region to region, hampering their efficient use. These problems tend to constrain large scale cooperation, mobilization, and coordination, all of which are absolutely necessary to develop the economy at the fastest rate in a country short of capital.

China’s electrical system is another example of how the levels of ownership restrict the socialization of the means of production. There is only one scientific way to generate hydroelectric power, and that is on the largest possible scale. Massive dams produce qualitatively more electricity more efficiently than scores of minidams; gigantic electrical grids distribute more electricity more efficiently than do smaller units to underpin a broad industrial base. However, legal protection of the existing relations of production make it difficult to compel the concentration of capital for large scale rural projects. If a commune already has built an electrical plant adequate for itself, or if it has chosen to in-
vest in a cement plant, the laws allow them to resist incorporation into larger entities. The result is that China’s electrical system experiences a high level of load fluctuation and power outages. This is a result of small design and an absence of interconnected systems and power pools, which in turn result from restraints on broad planning and centralization of resources.29

Such economic problems stemming from these relatively unconsolidated socialist relations of production present the Deng-Hua government with insurmountable political problems. It is axiomatic for socialist construction to recognize that every economic problem has a political implication. Incapable of rallying the workers and peasants with anything but the crassest nationalism, Deng and Hua are trying to assemble a united front for economic construction. Thus they have forsaken the one political factor which can pull the country together—the political hegemony of the proletariat—by allowing every group to have a franchise and a veto. Just as Khrushchev and Brezhnev maintain their political hegemony by forewarning the political purge, so Deng and Hua have maintained their coalition by guaranteeing every section of society the sanctity of their economic and political bases and have promised to strengthen them. However, the proletariat serves to unite all the forces of society on a partisan basis, by compelling them to support a program which strengthens the proletariat itself. Without this leadership by the only force capable of playing the vanguard role, the government becomes a united front of various centers. The present government, which is taking on the appearance of a second People’s Democratic Dictatorship, is in form rapidly approximating “a state of the whole people”—the reflection of the dominance of the bureaucracy.

Deng and Hua have promised the peasants higher agricultural prices and fewer taxes, and the workers higher wages. In order to attract capital from overseas Chinese, they have restored the payment of fixed interest (abolished in 1966) to those capitalist remnants who had been bought out. Remaining true to their political antecedents, they have released and rehabilitated most of the political prisoners jailed as Rightists since 1957. Even Liu Shaoqi is receiving some form of rehabilitation, as the government embraces Khrushchev’s criticisms of China’s economic development when Mao was alive. In their efforts to form a national front, they have rehabilitated the eight political parties that were a part of the government in the 1930’s, have invited the ex-tyrant of Tibet, the Dalai Lama, to return, and have promised the Guomintang in Taiwan seats in the government if they come back. Such political moves—so confusing in appearance—make sense only in terms of the economic options the government perceives as open to it, and of the factional struggle seething below the surface. The fragile rule of the present government is shown by its decision to try publicly the Gang of Four, a step that reflects weakness rather than strength.

Economically, Deng and Hua are taking a number of steps which strengthen socialism. These measures include re-establishing bonuses for production (necessary expressions of the socialist law of distribution according to actual work which have been incorrectly attacked as steps on the “capitalist road”), strengthening centralized planning and economic rationalization. The contradiction between their politics and their more sensible moves is a result of the fact that the basic economic law of socialism is asserting itself with a vengeance. The government’s rule depends very much on satisfying the rising material and cultural requirements of society. The newspapers are daily full of new information showing that Chinese politics are again polarizing at a rapid rate. China’s socialist economic base prevents the economy from sliding back into capitalism. Twice, in fact, its economy has experienced serious dislocations, and each time its socialist economic laws have forced it to readjust. The first was the Right trend in agriculture in the early 1960’s, the second was the disruption of the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat by Lin Biao during the Cultural Revolution. Polarization can only strengthen the hand of the proletariat of China and the Marxist-Leninists within its communist party.

The demands of the economy and the pace of world events are forcing the Chinese revolution to move forward. The inescapable fact of politics in a socialist country is that the economic system’s objective laws tightly link foreign policy to economic construction. Socialist countries face a constantly greater demand for resources than can immediately be met, and thus require the tightest economic planning. But the hostile nature of imperialism forces the diversion of investment to achieve international political goals. This puts the Deng-Hua government squarely in the trap. In order to predominate in the intense fac-
tional struggle, they have tightly linked their program of the Four Modernizations to the "theory of Three Worlds." Committed as they are to developing the economy, they will not easily be able to make a turnaround in foreign policy without destabilizing their coalition and raising once again the struggle against the Right.

Lenin proved that every step in the national revolution is a result of a correct analysis of the international situation. Stalin built the world's second largest economy, and then rebuilt it, in just 25 years by relying on, not in spite of, proletarian internationalism. No proletariat will long support, or long sacrifice for, a government which does not defend its international interests. For 130 years, scientific socialism has recognized that the proletariat is motivated by internationalism. This fact makes foreign policy as necessary an element in socialist construction as industry and agricultural machinery. As Marx pointed out, revolutions are the locomotives of history. Deng and Hua will discover, as Khrushchev did, that you cannot stop a locomotive by standing on the tracks in front of it and waving a little red flag.

Footnotes

6 V. I. Lenin, CW, vol. 25, p. 441.
7 Ibid., vol. 32, p. 404.
9 Ibid., p. 430.
14 Schurmann, op. cit., pp. 484-497.
20 J. V. Stalin, Problems of Leninism, op. cit., p. 179.
21 Ibid., p. 41.
22 V. I. Lenin, "The Tax in Kind," op. cit., p. 117.
23 Beijing Review, no. 11, 16 March 1979, p. 10.